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NAVIGATING DEGROWTH SENTIMENTS IN EUROPE'S SEMIPERIPHERY: POLARISATION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ECOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION

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Abstract

This study examines the potential for a democratic endorsement of degrowth-oriented policies within the European semiperiphery, with a focus on Croatia. Degrowth, as an ideological complex, combines environmental crisis awareness, social justice concerns, and a commitment to collective throughput reduction and sufficiency; offering a foundation for a paradigm shift towards social organisation that respects planetary boundaries and global environmental justice. Socio-ecological research increasingly invokes substantive societal transformations consistent with degrowth in the Global North as a reaction of sober realism about the impending environmental collapse. Eastern Europe and European semiperiphery are usually seen as laggards in green policies and staunch adherents of catch-up growth ideology, despite a historic Global North integration. We explore the potential for Europe's semiperiphery to democratically support the tenets of a radically transformative policy for sustainability. Despite recent visibility of degrowth in the political sphere and Zagreb's hosting of the international degrowth movement assembly, the diversity of semiperipheral contexts beyond the North-South dichotomy often end up overlooked.

This research contributes to the literature on degrowth-compatible attitudes and sentiments within various populations, the prevalence of support for degrowth-compatible attitudes in the European semiperiphery (within a decade-long social research stream), and an analysis of degrowth ideological complex's potential for a shift in policy paradigm. The analyses are based on the Croatian data from International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) module Environment (2021). Contrary to historical trends of dominant indolence on radical socio-ecological action, by 2021 we find a stark polarisation between supporters and opponents of degrowth-transformation. We proffer tentative steps for environmentally minded degrowthers to win over some of their avowed opponents, thereby helping to shift the policy paradigm towards conservation and sufficiency in the face of environmental collapse.

Keywords: *degrowth, environmentalism, ISSP, semiperiphery, social attitudes*

1. INTRODUCTION

Societal-nature relations lie at the heart of collective and individual practices of reproduction and development. Addressing these relations through a transformative lens requires confronting environmental degradation and social domination simultaneously (Brand & Wissen, 2017). This study examines environmentally motivated degrowth orientations within the population of one of the poorest and most recent member states of the European Union. Its case is particularly instructive for debates on politically led sustainability transformations: even peripheral members of the wealthiest group of nations can exhibit the foundations of a radically transformative environmental politics. From the perspective of world-systems theory (Wallerstein, 1979), semiperipheral societies—precisely because of their intermediary position between the relatively immutable core and the subordinated periphery—possess the potential to advance governance approaches conducive to far-reaching transformation (Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1997; Wallerstein, 1998). In this context, attitudes and socio-political potentials within such societies may function as a sociological bellwether for confronting environmental destruction and social domination. Croatia and its regional neighbourhood have been characterised in the literature as examples of semiperipheral societies, a designation grounded not only in economic indicators but also broader cultural and value surveys (Blagojević & Yair, 2010; Domazet & Marinović Jerolimov, 2014).

Even institutions as ostensibly unlikely as the World Economic Forum in Davos now acknowledge that the world stands on the brink of environmental collapse (Dearing, 2020), with far-reaching social consequences (Brozović, 2023). This impending collapse threatens not only sparsely populated wilderness areas or legally protected ecosystems, but human societies themselves and the long-term sustainability prospects of a globalised humanity. Furthermore, meeting the basic needs of the most deprived 33% of the global population would generate an additional environmental burden equivalent to that currently imposed by the wealthiest 1% (Rammelt et al., 2023). This situation necessitates a reorganisation of economies, institutions, and value systems—extending beyond technological solutions towards ensuring just access to, and fair allocation of, resources and sinks (Lloveras & Quinn, 2017; Schlesier, Schäfer, & Desing, 2024).

Across the natural sciences, engineering, ecological economics and the social sciences, scholars increasingly investigate strategies for degrowth in affluent economies of the Global North (Hickel et al., 2022; Lehmann, Delbard, & Lange, 2022; Durand, Hofferberth, & Schmelzer, 2024). Degrowth is no longer a marginal or novel position but is recognised as one among several responses to global unsustainability and injustice. Yet its manifestations within the ‘eastern semiperiphery’ remain comparatively understudied (Pungas et al., 2024). Political conflict is required to replace the existing hegemonic ideology¹ with one better suited to prevailing planetary conditions, coun-

¹ In references drawing on the work of Antonino Gramsci, ideology refers to the ensemble of beliefs, values, cultural practices, and interpretive frameworks through which a social group understands and organises the world. It is not merely a set of abstract ideas, but a lived, practical

tering the obscurantism of dominant classes whose interests are tied to the status quo, despite its collective harm (Mannheim, 1949; Motesharrei, Rivas, & Kalnay, 2014). Hegemonic ideology is continuously reproduced within civil society, a component of the socio-political sphere that constitutes the integral state (D'Alisa & Kallis, 2016). For the state to adopt a transformative degrowth strategy that reshapes existing modes of social reproduction, it must publicly acknowledge the real conditions of currently unsustainable societal-nature relations (Hausknost, 2020).

The political pursuit of a 'good society' on a flourishing planet—framed in Gramscian terms of 'societal-nature relations'—requires identifying an ideology around which social consent can be mobilised. Empirical investigations into the values and attitudes that structure such consent in relation to environmentally motivated degrowth, as well as its opposition, remain limited, though they have been undertaken both cross-nationally and within specific European countries (Brajdić Vuković, 2014; Domazet & Ančić, 2017; Ivanova et al., 2018; Moser & Kleinhüchelkotten, 2018; Eversberg, 2020; Brajdić Vuković, Ančić & Domazet, 2020). This article contributes to these debates by presenting new empirical data for a south-east European polity, examining the nature of its forthcoming political conflict, and tracing the evolution of values and attitudes that constitute ideology and shape the potential for social consent.

Such consent may centre on environmental policies for restoration and withdrawal—key elements of a degrowth-oriented ideological complex—alongside redistribution and sharing (Brajdić Vuković, Ančić, & Domazet, 2020). Although Eastern Europe is not typically viewed as a stronghold of 'green' politics, Croatia has recently witnessed the rise of a green-left political actor (Možemo!) since 2017, and its capital, Zagreb, hosted the first in-person international degrowth conference following the global pandemic (September 2023), generating significant public debate.

The data on values and attitudes analysed here were gathered in 2021. Contemporary degrowth debates and Croatian translations of relevant literature have circulated in intellectual circles since at least the 2014 Leipzig international degrowth conference, while the reception of limits-to-growth debates, dating back to the 1970s, is well documented within academia and long-term development strategies (Hirvilammi et al., 2024). Croatian society, despite its semiperipheral and Eastern European setting, is therefore not unfamiliar with degrowth debates, even if they remain outside mainstream political discourse.

consciousness embedded in everyday habits, institutions, and common sense (it. *senso comune*). Gramsci argues that ideology plays a central role in the formation of hegemony, the process through which a dominant social group secures consent by shaping what appears natural, normal, and universally beneficial. Despite popular negative connotations of the term, given the sources we draw on here, ideology is understood as the cultural-intellectual field in which social consent is built and contested. It is both a product of existing social relations and a means through which those relations are reproduced or transformed, which is important for interpretation of the results presented here, and different from the more popular term 'worldview'.

Strategies for degrowth involve abandoning the ideological imperative of GDP growth and scaling down or redirecting destructive and luxury-driven forms of production. In the European context, this is likely to involve not only aggregate reductions in energy and material throughput but also a democratically supported transition towards “lesser and cleaner production of a smaller number of goods” (Heikkinen, 2020, p. 119562). Degrowth today constitutes an expanding ideological complex (Eysenck, 1954) grounded in the premise that growth is an intrinsically unsustainable development strategy (Jackson, Hickel, & Kallis, 2024). This is particularly noteworthy for semiperipheral societies whose populations are often portrayed as expecting catch-up economic enrichment as a pathway to wellbeing—an expectation aligned with hegemonic ideology. Yet degrowth, in its ideological structure, calls for a transformation of the entire hegemonic worldview in practice (Brajdić Vuković, Ančić, & Domazet, 2020), aiming to avoid a material lock-in of high-throughput practices accompanied by social exclusion, despite rhetorical commitments to planetary stabilisation (Blühdorn, 2017).

The scope of the crisis is not merely ‘environmental’—a matter for specialist disciplines or sectoral policies—but constitutes a fundamental crisis of societal-nature relations (Görg, 1999). Degrowth offers a holistic response to the imperative of reducing environmental impacts, distinct from technocratic approaches. Crucially, degrowth politics does not seek ‘another growth’ but requires an ideological reorientation away from economism and the associated worldview through which material reality and imperialist discourses have been conceptualised.

This paper presents a modelling of degrowth and pro-growth ideological complexes within the Croatian voting-age population, based on data from the internationally comparable ISSP Environment survey. It contributes to identifying potential support and resistance to socio-ecological transformation, tracing a shift from previously normally distributed orientations to a more polarised configuration within a semiperipheral society of the global North. The article is structured into five sections. Following this introduction (1. Introduction), we review literature on values and attitudes compatible with or antithetical to degrowth as a democratic foundation for radically transformative policy (2. Literature Review). We then outline the research design and methods drawing on ISSP Environment data (3. Methodology). The fourth section presents the findings of the statistical analysis (4. Results). The final sections (5. Discussion and 6. Conclusions) consider the significance of the modelling results for politically led socio-metabolic transformations and outline implications for future research.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This section presents the preceding research into local degrowth-compatible attitudes and an overview of a theory of socio-political transformation that could build on those attitudes. Our analysis contributes new findings to the research operationalising the application of ideology (Brajdić Vuković, Ančić, & Domazet, 2020), also based on survey research in Croatia, and international comparisons of some degrowth-compatible attitudes (Krüger, Domazet, & Dolenc, 2016; Domazet & Ančić, 2017). The preceding

research reached back to the much-used Eysenck's theory of the four levels of attitudes (Eysenck, 1954). To explore the concept of ideology effectively, a methodologically sound approach was implemented. Given the use of quantitative social research methods and surveys, Eysenck's theory of the four levels of attitudes offers a practical and reliable framework. It identifies four levels: specific opinions, which are isolated and not characteristic of an individual; habitual opinions, which are reproducible and tied to individual traits; attitudes, which consist of related habitual opinions; and ideologies, which are formed by interconnected attitudes. For example, attitudes like ethnocentrism and patriotism combine to form conservative ideology. As previous research has argued, Eysenck's approach is particularly useful for analysing the degrowth ideology.

Ideologies, as conceptual complexes, combine related attitudes, even when at first sight they do not conceptually sit close together. The transformation of a socially mandated material and energy throughput has a political dimension, expected to be reflected in political debates and programmes devised to implement and institutionalise it. However, a rapid and fundamental transformation that is required finds it hard to break out of the academic circles due to its challengingly radical nature. A rapid and fundamental transformation becomes daunting for political actors to offer a transformative programme if there is no indication of a mass support for it. It is, therefore, important to assess the potential forces of support and resistance to it within the constituency of this Global North but semiperipheral polity.

A policy paradigm that shifts suddenly and broadly enough to impact a wide populace might be a useful political projection of the appropriate ideological complex. The concept covers a range from ideas to widely popular practices, and is often presented through Hall's (1993) definition of policy paradigms as a framework of ideas that influences the way policies are formulated. Specifically, in our case of contribution to the global metabolic transformation in the interest of environmental stabilisation (which is more than a protection of the endangered species), we cannot focus on a single policy area. Nonetheless, awareness of environmental limits to growth and environment-economy trade-offs plays a key role in the construction of a relevant framework of ideas. The attitudes surveyed in this research deliberately target the policy range that the degrowth paradigm is expected to cover, and illustrate the extent and the type of popular support (and opposition) for a radical social-ecological change.

The said framework of ideas provides a narrower set of interpretative and agential perspectives on the problems facing the political community or institution. It sets different priorities on various decisions about appropriate policy goals (for example: economic growth vs. environmental protection) and on the instruments that are most desirable in achieving those goals (Hall, 1993, p. 271). In a democracy, the ideas at the foundation of a paradigm must be shared with broad enough, or even majority of the population in form of values and attitudes that this paper proposes to measure. Our research includes the internationally applied instruments that cover both the environmental protection and economic growth priorities, as well as some possible values aligned with political instruments that would instantiate such priorities.

In invoking what is effectively a paradigm shift in terms of Hall and new institutionalists (Rayner, 2015), ideas present in the civil society subsequently require institutions to 'embed in and become fortified by established institutional arrangements' (Menahem, 2008). In Croatia this might actually be taking place in the political society through the green-left party-political actor and its municipal governance in the capital. But even without such tentative connections, previous research among leaders of climate protection and environmental justice movement in Croatia shows them to be open to and supportive of degrowth (Domazet & Ančić, 2019). This is degrowth primarily understood as a political response to the so-called 'impossibility theorem' (infinite material growth is impossible on a finite planet), i.e., global environmental limits to growth. Therefore, organisation working on advocacy of environmental issues, together with wider (Gramscian) civil society holding particular values and attitudes and indicative interest from some political actors could constitute a nascent and novel policy paradigm (Kern, Kuzemko, & Mitchell, 2015). Previous research into attitudes, organisational structure and theoretical frameworks of politically driven social change indicates that Croatia contains prerequisites for a progressive degrowth policy paradigm. How much support such a paradigm might garner, and what might its alternatives be like is the topic of this research.

Awareness of environmental limits, an imperative to "bring the economy back into balance with the living world" (Hickel, 2021), and the need to dethrone the economic rationality from contemporary comprehensive political governance (Latouche, 2012), are among central tenets of degrowth in literature and popular imagination. The understanding of degrowth most often begins with the awareness of environmental destruction wrought by the processes that contribute to economic growth, and a negative attitude to the possibility of decoupling them (Hickel & Kallis, 2020; cf. also Section 3). Previous studies that claimed to have directly assessed the support for degrowth, either among the general public or within a specific target group (like industry leaders or researchers connected to economic disciplines) have reported equally on reluctance to support degrowth values (Drews & van den Bergh, 2016) as well as general preponderance for them (Drews, Savin, & van den Bergh, 2019; Domazet & Ančić, 2019; Komatsu, Rappleye, & Uchida, 2022; Lehmann, Delbard, & Lange, 2022). Degrowth has been shown to have a polarising tendency in the past, where ambivalence was rarely an option while the scope of change in theoretical presentations is comprehensive. Nonetheless, in European and North American contexts degrowth sentiments are not rare among different professional groups or the general public.

However, when general attitudes—rather than specific strategies measured against currently dominant societal goals—are assessed among different publics, literature increasingly finds them more and more broadly acceptable. This is especially pronounced among the more concerned scientist and activist (environmental justice) communities. Degrowth narratives are positively perceived in relation to the social justice and the environmental restoration aspects presented as general societal goals, in both national (cf. ADEME, 2023) and comparative studies (cf. above, this section) of social attitudes. The

popular support for general attitudes aligned with degrowth is significant, growing and more and more clearly defined in Europe. Degrowth sentiments are on the rise.

Most importantly, previous comparative studies across Europe have found Eastern and Southeastern nations' populations dominated by a particular attitude to environmentally motivated degrowth thinking (Brajdić Vuković, 2014; Ančić, Puđak, & Domazet, 2016; Balžekiene & Telešiene, 2017; Domazet & Ančić, 2017). According to these studies, the said populations assent to a strong concern for environmental sustainability, but report a low activation in addressing the related issues through Western liberal and market-based means like civil society organising and protest politics or higher payment for environmental services. In Croatia, survey-based research has found majoritarian support for degrowth-compatible attitudes (Domazet & Ančić, 2017; Brajdić Vuković, Ančić, & Domazet, 2020), and prevalence of specifically Eastern European counter-hegemonic practices like the food self-provisioning for reasons of autonomy and joy (Jehlička, Ančić, Daněk, & Domazet, 2021). Eastern Europeans have in previous research shown support for degrowth-motivating concerns, but reluctance to collectively act upon them.

We acknowledge that there is some way to go from assent to values and expression of particular attitudes in surveys to radical metabolic transformation through purposeful policy design. Sentiments on their own do not bring about policy paradigm shifts. There has been criticism in literature of the ability of various surveyed attitudes and behaviour reports (pro-environmental and environment-economy trade-off, for example) to hit the right extent of the radical nature of change. A support for environmental limits does not necessarily distinguish between degrowth, post-growth or steady state (cf. criticisms in Dunlap & York (2008) and Drews & van den Bergh (2016)). However, as presented above, policy paradigms need theory, political institutions and broad ideological complexes to align for a realistic change. All of those are present in Croatian society, alongside its semiperipheral position and the prominence of the recent Zagreb international degrowth conference.

No less importantly, especially when considering the international position of semi-peripheral societies compared to core ones, the social psychology studies assessing elements of pro-degrowth behaviour and attitudes in everyday life but devoid of the overall ideological complex combining environmentalism with a broader crisis recognition, have found that individuals can hold merely partially progressive views and practices (Whitmarsh, 2011; Carrington, Zwick, & Neville, 2016; Dreijerink, Handgraaf, & Antonides, 2022). Furthermore, some studies suggest that more than expressed attitudes or self-reported practices, it is people's social position, either nationally (Eversberg, 2020) or internationally (Krüger, Domazet, & Dolenc, 2016), that most influences their readiness to challenge the existing unsustainable and unjust hegemony and ecological impact. Policy paradigms framework can go some way towards accounting for this criticism by pointing to the inter-related levels from prevalent ideas to nature of governance institutions (Kern, Kuzemko, & Mitchell, 2015), i.e., by combining the attitudinal foundation with the ideological and political superstructure. Policy paradigm shifts requ-

ire both the wholesome theory of change (i.e., degrowth) and the ideological complex suffusing the society (i.e. the sentiments) to counter the real existing opposition coming from those who deny limits or want to see them transcended in some (not necessarily ideologically just) way. Politics and sentiments are connected, and this research explores the potential of the extant degrowth sentiments to align with (or to resist) degrowth politics down the road.

The importance of ideas, of their prevalence and their structuring into a narrative framework remains a necessary element of politics of transformation, even if it is not sufficient on its own. It is undoubtable that popular ideas can impact heavily upon institutional change, from development and modernisation to welfarism and neoliberalism. Kern et al. (2015) stress that institutional change putting in practice a socio-metabolic transformation often takes place in response to crises. It is precisely ideas and their aggregate expression in forms of narratives that convince the population, or its decision-making sub-groups, that there is a crisis, and that existing policy is failing to solve the crisis (cf. the impossibility of decoupling economic growth from environmental destruction (Hickel & Kallis, 2020)). Some of the attitudinal elements of the degrowth scale (cf. Section 3) invoke the crisis, whilst some measure readiness to act on it. Croatian population is particularly interesting here given its Eastern European environmentalist legacy, the nascent political movements that understand and integrate the European degrowth debate (especially the municipal government in the nation's capital) and the furious corporate media reaction to the 9th International Degrowth Conference in September 2023 (Prvan, 2023).

3. METHODOLOGY

Analyses presented in the paper are based on the data from the International Social Survey Programme Environment module which was conducted in Croatia in 2021. A sample of N=1000 respondents is representative of the Croatian population in terms of sex, age and education.² The instruments used are wholly comparable across countries participating in the ISSP, as no additional variables were added to the Croatian sample. The ISSP Environment module is based on a range of theoretical and methodological approaches that focus on environmental attitudes, beliefs and behaviour (Hadler & Schweigart, 2023).

² ISSP sampling does not include regional or county stratification. However, respondents are selected through a three-stage stratified random procedure in which place of residence constitutes the first stage, using probability-proportional-to-size sampling. Because Croatian municipalities of all sizes are represented across all regions, and all municipal size categories are included under this rule, the resulting sample can be assumed to represent the Croatian population by region in proportion to population density.

3.1 Instruments

Socio-demographics (independents): Sex was assessed in 1 – female, 2 – male. Age was measured in years of respondents at the time of conducting research. Education was measured as a total number of years in formal education. Personal income refers to self-reported monthly personal income average of a respondent. Urban-rural place of residence was assessed by the following categorical variable: 1 – a large city, 2 – a suburb or the outskirts of a large city, 3 – a town or a small city, 4 – a village.

3.2 Dependents

I. *Government responsibility* is measured on the Likert scale from 1 “Completely disagree” through 5 “Agree strongly”, using the following statements: “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce differences in income between people with high incomes and the low incomes”; “Croatia should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect the national economy”; “Croatia should limit immigration in order to protect our national way of life”.

II. *General trust* is measured on the scale from 1 “You can't be too careful” through 5 “Most people can be trusted” and assessed using the question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?”. *Trust in institutions* is assessed through trust in a) university research centres, b) the news media, c) business and industry, d) the national parliament, and on the scale from 1 “No trust at all” through 10 “Complete trust”.

III. *Environmental issues concern* is measured on a scale from 1 “Not concerned at all” through 5 “Very concerned” with a question: “Generally speaking, how concerned are you about environmental issues?”. *Human-caused climate change scepticism* is assessed using a question: “There has been a lot of discussion about the world's climate and the idea that it has been changing in recent decades. Which of the following statements comes close to your opinion?”. Answers were measured using the scale 1 “The world climate has not been changing”, 2 “The world climate has been changing mostly due to natural process”, 3 “The world climate has been changing about equally due to natural process and human activity”, 4 “The world climate has been changing mostly due to human activity”. *Perception of influence of climate change* was measured on a scale from 0 “Extremely bad” through 10 “Extremely good”, and with questions: “On a scale from 0 to 10, how good or bad do you think climate change will be for the world as a whole”; “On a scale from 0 to 10, how good or bad do you think climate change will be for Croatia”.

IV. *Environmental pollution concern* is measured with a set of questions related to how dangerous the following are for the environment: air pollution caused by cars, air pollution caused by industry, pesticides and chemicals used in farming, pollution of Croatian rivers, lakes and streams, a rise in the world's temperature caused by climate change, modifying the genes of certain crops, nuclear power stations. Items are measured on a scale from 1 “Extremely dangerous” through 5 “Not dangerous at all”.

V. *Pro-environmental sacrifice willingness* is measured with questions “How willing would you be to...in order to protect environment”, with inserts: “pay much higher pri-

ces”, “pay much higher taxes”, “accept cuts in your standard of living”, on a scale from 1 “Very unwilling” through 5 “Very willing”.

3.3 Degrowth and pro-growth scales

There are 21 items that are included in the ISSP Environment questionnaire and that are used in our analysis that represent degrowth and pro-growth attitudes. For all attitudes, answers are measured on the Likert scale ranging from 1 “Completely disagree” to 5 “Completely agree”.

Scale called “degrowth“ consists of 12 items: 1. “Almost everything we do in modern life harms the environment”; 2. “I do what is good for the environment even if it costs me more money or time”; 3. “Environmental problems have a direct impact on my everyday life”; 4. “Preserving nature should be a Croatian priority, even if it negatively affects economic growth”; 5. “There are natural limits to economic growth that our industrialised world has long reached or even exceeded”; 6. “To protect the natural foundations of our survival, we must be willing to change our own standard of living”; 7. “We can solve our environmental problems through a fundamental transformation of our mode of production and way of life”; 8. “Untouched nature is an invaluable element of a good life for me”; 9. “I worry about the environmental conditions in which our children and grandchildren will have to live”; 10. “We must quickly implement measures to mitigate climate change, or the consequences will be so significant that we won't be able to cope with them”; 11. “Human-induced environmental problems such as deforestation or plastic in oceans and seas anger me”; 12. “We should not consume more resources than can be naturally replenished”.

Out of those 12 items, a multidimensional additive scale is constructed, because those items are saturated on three factors in orthogonal rotation that has explained 53.4% of variance. Those dimensions are related to (i) perceived importance of the environment and concern for its future stability and conservation, (ii) the perception that we need to change our way of life, and (iii) the willingness to bear some personal sacrifices to move the society in the right direction. Cronbach's alpha for the constructed scale is .83.

The scale labelled “pro-growth” consists of 9 items. Those are: 1. “People worry too much about human progress harming the environment”; 2. “We worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about current costs and jobs”; 3. “There are more important things in life than environmental protection”; 4. “It is pointless for me to do what I can for the environment if others are not doing the same”; 5. “It's hard for a person like me to do something significant for environmental protection”; 6. “It is difficult for me to know whether my lifestyle is beneficial or harmful to the environment”; 7. “Many claims about environmental hazards are exaggerated”; 8. “Many environmental advocates exaggerate ecological problems”; 9. “It angers me when people tell me I should adjust my lifestyle to be more environmentally friendly”.

Out of those 9 items two-dimensional additive scale is construed, because items are saturated on 2 factors in orthogonal rotation that has explained 51.5% of variance.

One of the dimensions is a complex of values opposed to environmental conservation and expressed anger about social prioritisation of this issue. The other latent dimension complements these values with those held by people expressing apathy and inclination towards defeatism when it comes to environmental protection. Cronbach's alpha for the constructed scale is .81. There are 434 respondents (43.4% of the sample) that are above the mean (25.08) of the scale (ranging from 9 to 45).

4. RESULTS

4.1 *General sample and socio-demographic characteristics*

First, we are interested in the descriptors of the general sample and the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents concerning our computed scales. There are 454 respondents (45.4% of the sample) who score above the mean (44.23) of the scale *degrowth* (ranging from 18 through 60), the so-called *degrowthers*. There are 434 respondents (43.4% of the sample) who score above the mean (25.08) on the *pro-growth* scale (ranging from 9 to 45), i.e. the *pro-growthers*. The results indicate that that adherence to the degrowth-oriented values is stronger, than adherence to pro-growth-oriented values. The degrowth scale registers a more coherent approval, than the pro-growth scale does. That is, the sub-sample that scores high on the degrowth scale is more compact than the pro-growth sub-sample. The correlation between the two scales is strong and negative, as was expected ($r=-.413$, $p>0.000$).

We have built two linear regression models, with six blocks of variables for each scale as dependents. To understand the socio-demographic predictors in variation of each scale, the usual relevant variables sex, age, education and income were included in the first block. As it is evident from both Tables 1 and 2, the model with only socio-demographics is very weak although significant for both scales. It is somewhat stronger and explains more variation in the pro-growth scale. When controlling for other socio-demographics, degrowth is a little more supported by female than male respondents, and by older than younger ones. Unlike the effect of sex, the effect of age mostly continues to hold as other opinion-related variable blocks in the model are added. Education and income are consistently not significant.

For pro-growth, we observe different socio-demographic results. Sex and education are significant correlates, in a way that male respondents hold pro-growth attitudes more than females; and that those with lower educational attainment hold them more than those with higher attainment. Income and age are not significant throughout the blocks of the model, and education remains significant even when all of the blocks are added.

4.2 *Degrowthers*

In both linear regression models, after socio-demographic variables, we added *Government responsibility* in the second block, *Trust in people and institutions* in the third, *Environmental and climate concern* in the fourth, *Perception of environmental threat* in the fifth, *Willingness to sacrifice for the sake of the environment* in the sixth.

Table 1. *Correlates of attitudes toward degrowth*

	I.	II.	III.	IV.	V.	VI.
	β (*sig.)	β (*sig.)	β (*sig.)	β (*sig.)	β (*sig.)	β (*sig.)
I.						
Sex (<female)	.105*	.085*	.086*	.013	-.036	-.040
Age in years	.112**	.094*	.113*	.097*	.056	.063*
Education	-.001	.017	-.004	-.039	-.022	-.025
Income	-.013	.017	.014	.028	-.009	-.019
II.						
It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes (<completely agree)		.215***	.146***	.090**	.086**	.095**
Croatia should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy (<completely agree)		.117**	.118**	.071	.024	.002
Croatia should limit immigration in order to protect our national way of life (<completely agree)		.043	.050	.059	.069*	.086**
III.						
General trust in people (<most people can be trusted)			-.031	-.008	.012	-.015
Trust in university research centres (<complete trust)			.219***	.140***	.058*	.064**
Trust in the news media (<complete trust)			.090*	.075	.051	.051
Trust in business and industry (<complete trust)			.011	.013	-.002	.009
Trust in the Croatian national parliament (<complete trust)			-.157***	-.102**	-.052	-.106**

IV.						
Environmental concern (<very concerned)				.349***	.272***	.225***
Human-caused climate change (<due to human activity)				.026	.002	-.022
Climate change impact world (<extremely good)				-.299***	-.168***	-.170***
Climate change impact Croatia (<extremely good)				.047	.040	.027
V.						
Environmental danger: Air pollution caused by cars (<not dangerous at all)					-.072*	-.059
Environmental danger: Air pollution caused by industry (<not dangerous at all)					-.170***	-.171***
Environmental danger: Pesticides and chemicals used in farming (<not dangerous at all)					-.062	-.062
Environmental danger: Pollution of Croatian rivers, lakes and streams (<not dangerous at all)					-.115**	-.111**
Environmental danger: The world's temperature caused by climate change (<not dangerous at all)					-.061	-.050
Environmental danger: Modifying genes of certain crops (<not dangerous at all)					-.003	.002
Environmental danger: Nuclear power stations (<not dangerous at all)					-.150***	-.117***
VI.						
Environment protection: Willing to pay much higher prices (<very willing)						.106*

Environment protection: Willing to pay much higher taxes (<very willing)						.087**
Environment protection: Accept cuts in your standard of living (<very willing)						.083**
<i>F-ratio</i>	3.587	10.226	10.832	24.186	32.818	34.788
<i>F-sig.</i>	.007	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
<i>R²</i>	0.022	0.100	0.169	0.379	0.547	0.592
<i>Adjusted R²</i>	0.016	0.091	0.154	0.354	0.530	0.575

****p*<0.000, ***p*<0.010, **p*<0.050

As shown in Table 1, all the blocks in linear regression analysis for degrowth scale as a dependent variable make significant models. R square even rises to 0.575 in the largest model explaining a lot of variation in the degrowth scale. The data suggest that degrowth attitudes are supported by those who think that it is the government's responsibility to reduce income inequality, and are concerned for the environment and climate. They tend to exhibit trust in the research institutions, but not the official representative political institution—the Croatian Parliament. Their concern for the environmental threats posed by the air and water pollution is heightened, and they remain unconvinced that nuclear power is safe for the environment. Those who hold degrowth attitudes more are also more willing to pay for the protection of the environment through all of prices, taxes and possible cuts to standard of living.

4.3 Pro-growthers

Table 2. Correlates of attitudes toward pro-growth

	I.	II.	III.	IV.	V.	VI.
	β(*sig.)	β(*sig.)	β(*sig.)	β(*sig.)	β(*sig.)	β(*sig.)
I.						
Sex (<female)	-.167***	-.159***	-.154***	-.080*	-.060	-.061
Age in years	.023	.011	-.013	-.007	.025	.016
Education	-.159***	-.152***	-.128***	-.099**	-.123**	-.121**
Income	-.027	-.024	-.025	-.027	.006	.018

Environmental danger: Air pollution caused by industry (<not dangerous at all)					.040	.047
Environmental danger: Pesticides and chemicals used in farming (<not dangerous at all)					.023	.011
Environmental danger: Pollution of Croatian rivers, lakes and streams (<not dangerous at all)					.079	.088
Environmental danger: The world's temperature caused by climate change (<not dangerous at all)					.163***	.161***
Environmental danger: Modifying genes of certain crops (<not dangerous at all)					-.018	-.019
Environmental danger: Nuclear power stations (<not dangerous at all)					.064	.042
VI.						
Environment protection: Willing to pay much higher prices (<very willing)						-.166**
Environment protection: Willing to pay much higher taxes (<very willing)						-.031
Environment protection: Accept cuts in your standard of living (<very willing)						.032
<i>F-ratio</i>	10.668	8.232	7.797	16.541	15.439	15.062
<i>F-sig.</i>	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
<i>R²</i>	0.059	0.078	0.122	0.283	0.345	0.372
<i>Adjusted R²</i>	0.053	0.069	0.106	0.265	0.326	0.372

*** $p < 0.000$, ** $p < 0.010$, * $p < 0.050$

As presented in Table 2, all the blocks in linear regression analysis for pro-growth scale as a dependent variable make significant models. However, R square rises even to 0.372 in the largest model explaining a lot less variation in the pro-growth scale. This need not be surprising or disappointing, as the chosen building blocks of variables-attitudes were based

on the degrowth-compatible concepts and expectations. They thus described pro-growth attitudes in the negative, i.e., in opposition to the coherent set that was selected for degrowth attitudes and ideology. The analysis shows that pro-growth attitudes are supported by those who think that it is the government's responsibility to reduce income inequality, but also to limit immigration to protect the national way of life.

As a group, they tend to be more distrustful of others, and have less or no trust in the institution of science. Furthermore, respondents who are predominantly pro-growth-oriented are less concerned about environmental protection, and are climate sceptics in every sense. They are not significantly concerned about any form of environmental pollution, and even believe that climate change will ultimately be beneficial for the world.

Those more adherent to pro-growth attitudes than degrowth attitudes, are also significantly unwilling to pay for the protection of the environment through higher prices of consumables.

5. DISCUSSION

5.1 No middle ground

Majority of the academic literature and politically mandated meta-analyses invoke a crisis-motivated transformation in global and national environmental governance (Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change (IPCC), 2023; IPBES, 2019), and a sober approach to sustainability of contemporary societies. This is even without going into aspects of just access to need-satisfaction and wellbeing that are obtained from the current social metabolism. Crises have in the past been shown to be moments of political agency that can engender a wholesome paradigmatic shift in policy and political organisation (Hay, 1996), or at least enhance the conditions for a viable challenge to the hegemonic policy (Wilson, 2000). But these crises need narratives that explain the status quo as constituting a problem, which requires attention and can be addressed by appropriate attitudes and supported by universally applicable values (even when primarily economic, as in Blyth (2002)).

A narrative, such as the degrowth critique of the hegemonic ideology and the socio-economic arrangements based on it, plays an important role in laying the foundation for a shared perception among a range of actors within a population that a crisis exists. Moreover, it offers important and credible explanations as to why the status quo constitutes a crisis and what the directly related solutions might be. An alternative paradigm, like the much-maligned gestalt shift popularised in early invocation of paradigms in philosophy of science, gives a new interpretative framework and ideas of policy directions that will replace the hegemonic ideology of growth and externalisation of environmental destruction. Our degrowth scale combines the awareness of the impacts of development and economic growth on the environment in Croatia and globally, as well as invocations of crisis of unsustainability, transformation of social practices and affective response to environmental destruction. The pro-growth scale does not so directly assess a systematic attachment to the hegemonic development position (growth with trickle down

redistribution), but rather a negation of impacts of development, denial of crisis of sustainability, opposition to general pro-environmental transformation, and affective responses to its invocation. It is therefore based more on an opposition to degrowth as a possible alternative paradigm, than a measure of support for a coherent expression of the hegemonic status quo. The two opposing narratives examined in this research either (i) invoke the wholesome environmental crisis and the invitation to social transformation needed to respond to it, or (ii) deny the crisis status of the environmental conditions and the willingness or ability of the local civil society to actively contribute to the crisis resolution. The testing of their respective aggregate preferences for the role of social trust, various specific environmental concerns and behaviours, as well as the role of national government in economic stewardship goes some way in assessing the political society's readiness to consider changes in institutional actors and their behaviours – changes in hegemony, perhaps.

It can be considered worrying that the Croatian population divides into two neat halves over the issue of support for degrowth narratives, indicating an already polarising nature of the emerging issue in Croatian society. Yet given the severity of the crisis (cf. Introduction) this is an issue that, in the twenty-first century, ought to assume priority, as it determines whether societies will be able to avert the risks of systemic collapse or face severe setbacks to all other social aspirations, including poverty reduction, material development, and ecosystem protection.

The firm entrenchment of positions on either side of the divide seems to leave little room for improvement by winning over 'hearts and minds' of an undecided but attentive group in the middle. Moreover, it comes as a steady progression from an approximately normal distribution with a sizeable proportion of the population reporting indifference and ignorance about growth-environment trade-offs (cf. early and tentative results in (Domazet, Ančić & Brajdić Vuković, 2014) and more nuanced in (Brajdić Vuković, Ančić & Domazet, 2020)) to the present coagulation in the two camps. Given the lower homogeneity and attitudinal cohesion of the pro-growth camp, there is some hope of winning over some of its adherents to move towards a majority supportive of the narrative behind the degrowth-transformation paradigm.

5.2 How can another historical change be trusted?

Based on the socio-demographic characteristics of the pro-growth camp, enhancing educational attainment might be one way to increase the number of degrowth supporters, but it is also a pathway that cannot be easily applied to the present generation (respondents in the sample are all over 18 years old already). On the other hand, statistical significance of opposition to higher prices in aid of environmental protection, might suggest that a palpable material concern is driving the narrative of the pro-growth camp. Presenting degrowth as a strategy that will not bar access to the commodities that enhance quality of life or social position—through massive expansion of access to public services and a curb on luxuries—might attract initial converts who experienced climate's ravaging effects and support the redistributive role of the government. Likewise, similar

could be expected with the greater understanding of sustainable welfare and labour market policy for a just transition (Ding & Hirvilammi, 2024).

The other measures in the models do not fare much better for the possibility of attracting pro-growthers to the opposing camp. Social trust, and especially the trust in science, is significantly lower among this group. Both are important pillars in the construction of the narrative invoking a global environmental crisis and need for limits, as well as instruments of desirable social transformation. As Savini (2021) summarises, degrowthers are critical of the ideology of competition and call for an “ethic of solidarity, cooperation and wellbeing”, an “economy built around notions of care and reciprocity” (Savini, 2021, p. 1077), all of which require higher social trust than competition of all against all. Moreover, pro-growthers express scepticism about anthropogenic climate change and the absence of concern for local environmental degradation. Such attitudes do not motivate holders to engage in political action based on the warnings of scientific fora such as IPCC and IPBES.

Most importantly, because the hegemonic paradigm continues to rest on the presumption of necessary economic growth driven by international competition—both to maintain welfare and to achieve a hoped-for technological transcendence of widely recognised environmental limits—the pro-growth camp encounters comparatively little intellectual pressure to formulate a new or coherent narrative. Its position remains viable so long as it can sustain denial of the crisis and demonstrate efforts to meet redistributive and nationally protective expectations of the state. The marked opposition to migration, articulated as a defence of existing ‘way-of-life’ social attainments, reinforces the internationally observed correlation between nationalism and climate-crisis denialism (Kulin, Johansson Sevä, & Dunlap, 2021).

5.3 *Something must be done*

It can be considered encouraging, though, that in 2021 the Croatian population already supported a degrowth-compatible narrative with a slight majority (45.4% of our sample). It is important to note that this is a semiperipheral European nation with the per capita national income at the bottom end of the EU, lower emissions and greater inequality than the EU average. Moreover, historical and cross-national comparisons point to the slowly rising support for a degrowth-compatible environmentalism ideology (Brajdić Vuković, Ančić, & Domazet, 2020; Cik, 2021), thus continuing a positive trend. But most importantly, the statistical model used here suggests that degrowthers not only support the crisis narrative and are ready to act upon their concerns, but that they in

³ As with all social research, it is worth accentuating the potential of the survey-recorded attitudes to translate into a political support. This is why we stress that ‘degrowthers’ in the sample *might* rather than *will* support the political society’s shift in the direction of the necessary transformation. Our results cannot support the claim that an adequate proportion of citizens is prepared to adopt and implement the actions and solutions that they declaratively support through the survey, let alone to embrace it as their ideological label. We are grateful to the reviewers for pointing out this nuance.

general might support the instruments and objectives that move the political society in the direction of the necessary transformation.³ In other words, they might be ready to lay the groundwork for an alternative policy paradigm. The paradigm in which representative democracy, as currently practised in Croatia, must be upgraded (Jurić, 2023), but social trust and trust in science (a source of alarming calls for radical transformation) is upheld.

The state is instrumentalised to reduce inequalities (much as the pro-growthers expect as well), but without attendant international protectionism and isolationism. Environmental concern is generally upheld, and awareness of industrial and fossil fuel transport pollution is explicit. Finally, despite not being characterised by predominantly richer social strata, the supporters of degrowth attitudes show even greater willingness to pay for environmental protection, which was usually not the case with Eastern European populations (Dolenec, Domazet & Ančić, 2014).

An encouraging interpretation of the statistical modelling sees a sizeable population that degrowth politics could work with. The strongest starting point, as presented in our model, is the redistributive role of the central government, the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes. Degrowthers are consistently significantly supportive of that expectation as model blocks are added, more so than pro-growthers. But in the end both groups share that simple commitment, despite a shared distrust in present-day parliamentary institutions.

Addressing environmental and climate concerns and scientific leadership in degrowth transformation could be an important element of a policy paradigm supported by a slight majority of the population (provided that the declarative survey support can be translated into political action). In line with IPCC's acknowledgment (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2023, Chapter 18) that transformative shifts are based on visions and agendas that induce societal tipping points, and can include coherent degrowth narratives, our research suggests that Croatian population has the initial (ideational) conditions for the tipping point towards environmental stabilisation, redistribution, and changes in lifestyle (including material sacrifice). Whether the remaining institutional and contextual elements of a policy paradigm shift exist remains to be explored, and is also highly dependent on the broader European context. Building on the widespread presence of the appropriate 'ideology' for degrowth within Croatian society (Brajdić Vuković, Ančić, & Domazet, 2020), and with the significant societal and socio-political events between 2017 and 2021 (pandemic, climate-related extreme weather, appearance of a national green-left political option) we find the increase in emphasis of sustainability concern within the population in line with similar longitudinal comparisons (Cik, 2021).

A closer examination of support for environmental engagement beyond green consumerism and virtue signalling reveals broader endorsement of environmental politics situated within a degrowth ideology. Although the indication of strong and continued support for wealth redistribution cannot be examined further with the instrument used

here, it does not suggest any weakening of the combined commitment to redistribution and radical environmental regeneration. This commitment—central to degrowth politics as a promise of inclusive and just sustainability—requires further exploration, particularly in relation to the concrete actors and institutions capable of advancing it. Degrowth, conceived as a collective and deliberative process aimed at the equitable downscaling of overall production and consumption throughput in wealthy societies and a shift away from market competition (Sekulova, Kallis, Rodríguez-Labajos, & Schneider, 2013), forms the basis of a policy paradigm conducive to sustainability-oriented governance. However, widespread disillusionment with representative democracy continues to pose a significant obstacle to building an environmentally restorative degrowth society within the existing party-political framework.

6. CONCLUSION

In Croatia, a semiperipheral European state, degrowth-compatible attitudes and values have long been present within the general population and have steadily gained support. Whereas a decade ago degrowth-related sentiments were relatively niche or largely absent, they have now become more visible, accompanied by a clear division between supporters and opponents. The present research—fielded in 2021 and designed to test adherence to the degrowth attitudinal model among the Croatian population, as well as its convergence with broader environmental concerns and socio-political dispositions—identifies a pronounced polarisation, with degrowthers and pro-growthers represented in roughly equal proportions. Because identical instruments were employed across all countries participating in the 2021 ISSP Environment module, these data invite closer examination of cross-European support for an environmentally motivated degrowth ideology, as well as the areas of overlap between opposing camps and their relation to ongoing political conflicts concerning Europe's and the global community's sustainable future.

In policy paradigm terms, the issue of governance, legislation and policy for sustainability becomes one of diffusing the nationalist agenda dismissive of global climate concerns and scientific warnings, through the redistribution-driven and environmentally-minded science-led internationalism (degrowth). Future research should look more closely into the ability of political institutions to win trust in the fairness of burden sharing whilst conducting pro-environmental throughput reductions. Croatia's case is instructive for debates on politically led sustainability transformations by showing how even peripheral members of the wealthiest global group of nations can engage with a radically transformative environmental politics.

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ODRAST NA EUROPSKOJ POLUPERIFERIJU: POLARIZACIJA I IZGLEDI ZA EKOLOŠKU TRANSFORMACIJU

Mladen Domazet, Marija Brajdić Vuković

Sažetak

Ovaj rad ispituje potencijal demokratske podrške politikama usmjerenima na odrast u europskoj poluperiferiji, s posebnim naglaskom na Hrvatsku. Odrast, kao ideološki kompleks, objedinjuje svijest o ekološkoj krizi, zahtjeve za društvenom pravednošću, kao i opredijeljenost za načelo dostatnosti te smanjenje ukupnog društvenog metabolizma, čime pruža osnovu za paradigmatički zaokret prema društvenom uređenju koje uvažava planetarne granice i globalnu ekološku pravednost. Socioekološka istraživanja sve češće upućuju na potrebu dubinskih društvenih transformacija u skladu s načelima odrasta u zemljama Globalnog sjevera, kao izraz trezvenog suočavanja s nadolazećim ekološkim kolapsom. Istočna Europa i europska poluperiferija pritom se često prikazuju kao zaostale u zelenim politikama i kao čvrsto vezane uz ideologiju sustizanja gospodarskog rasta, unatoč povijesnoj integraciji u Globalni sjever. U radu se istražuje u kojoj mjeri europska poluperiferija može demokratski podržati načela radikalno transformativnih politika održivosti. Unatoč sve većoj vidljivosti odrasta u političkom prostoru te činjenici da je Zagreb bio domaćin međunarodne skupštine pokreta odrasta, raznolikost poluperiferijskih konteksta izvan dihotomije Sjever–Jug često ostaje zanemarena. Istraživanje doprinosi literaturi o stavovima i orijentacijama usklađenima s odrastom u različitim populacijama, o raširenosti podrške takvim stavovima u europskoj poluperiferiji (u okviru desetogodišnjeg istraživačkog kontinuiteta), kao i analizi potencijala ideološkog kompleksa odrasta za promjenu političke paradigme. Analize se temelje na podacima za Hrvatsku iz modula Okoliš (2021) Međunarodnog programa društvenih istraživanja (ISSP). Suprotno ranijim obrascima prevladavajuće pasivnosti prema radikalnom socioekološkom djelovanju, rezultati za 2021. godinu ukazuju na izraženu polarizaciju između pristaša i protivnika odrasta. Rad predlaže okvirne korake kojima bi akteri usmjereni na okoliš mogli pridobiti dio protivnika odrasta te time pridonijeti pomaku političke paradigme prema očuvanju i dostatnosti u uvjetima ekološkog kolapsa.

Ključne riječi: društveni stavovi, ekološki pokret, ISSP, odrast, poluperiferija

DEGROWTH-STIMMUNGEN IN EUROPAS SEMIPERIPHERIE NAVIGIEREN: POLARISIERUNG UND DIE AUSSICHTEN AUF ÖKOLOGISCHE TRANSFORMATION

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Zusammenfassung

Diese Studie untersucht das Potenzial einer demokratischen Unterstützung Degrowth-orientierter politischer Maßnahmen innerhalb der europäischen Semiperipherie, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf Kroatien liegt. Degrowth als ideologischer Komplex verbindet das Bewusstsein für die Umweltkrise, Anliegen der sozialen Gerechtigkeit und das Bekenntnis zu einer kollektiven Reduzierung des Ressourcendurchsatzes und zur Suffizienz. Damit bietet es eine Grundlage für einen Paradigmenwechsel hin zu einer sozialen Organisation, die planetare Grenzen und die globale Umweltgerechtigkeit respektiert. Sozioökologische Forschung verweist zunehmend auf substanzielle gesellschaftliche Transformationen im Einklang mit Degrowth im Globalen Norden als Reaktion auf den drohenden Umweltkollaps. Osteuropa und die europäische Semiperipherie werden trotz einer historischen Integration in den Globalen Norden meist als Nachzügler in der grünen Politik und als überzeugte Anhänger der Ideologie des Aufholwachstums angesehen. Wir untersuchen das Potenzial der europäischen Semiperipherie, die Grundsätze einer radikal transformativen Nach-

haltigkeitspolitik demokratisch zu unterstützen. Trotz der jüngst gestiegenen Sichtbarkeit von Degrowth im politischen Raum und der Ausrichtung der internationalen Degrowth-Bewegungsversammlung in Zagreb wird die Vielfalt der semiperipheren Kontexte jenseits der Nord-Süd-Dichotomie häufig übersehen. Diese Studie leistet einen Beitrag zur Literatur über Degrowth-kompatible Einstellungen und Stimmungen in verschiedenen Bevölkerungsgruppen, zur Verbreitung der Unterstützung für Degrowth-kompatible Einstellungen in der europäischen Semiperipherie (im Rahmen eines jahrzehntelangen sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschungsstroms) sowie zu einer Analyse des Potenzials des ideologischen Degrowth-Komplexes für einen Paradigmenwechsel in der Politik. Die Analysen basieren auf den kroatischen Daten des International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), Modul Umwelt (2021). Entgegen historischen Trends einer vorherrschenden Untätigkeit gegenüber radikalen sozioökologischen Maßnahmen stellen wir bis 2021 eine starke Polarisierung zwischen Befürwortern und Gegnern einer Degrowth-Transformation fest. Wir schlagen vorläufige Schritte vor, mit denen umweltbewusste Degrowth-Befürworter einige ihrer erklärten Gegner für sich gewinnen können, um so dazu beizutragen, das politische Paradigma angesichts des ökologischen Kollapses in Richtung Naturschutz und Suffizienz zu verschieben.

Schlüsselwörter: gesellschaftliche Einstellungen, ISSP, Semiperipherie, Degrowth, Umweltschutz