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XXIV Varna International Philosophical School

PHILOSOPHY BRIDGING CIVILIZATIONS AND CULTURES

Universal, Regional, National Values in United Europe

June, 1st –3rd
2006

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President of the Republic of Bulgaria

to the participants in the XXIV session
of the International Varna School in Philosophy

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is my pleasure to welcome you to this authoritative meeting of philosophers from various countries at the XXIV session of the International Varna Summer School in Philosophy.

The topic you have chosen is of paramount importance to the current processes of integration in Europe. Since Bulgaria is due to become a member of the Union in the beginning of 2007, debates concerning processes of integration have been intensified in our society during the recent years.

So far, it seems that the predominant discussions in the public space concern exclusively the technology of integration of our country together with the economical, political and administrative issues that accompany it. As a matter of fact, the processes of cultural exchange, interaction between languages, philosophies, identities, historical memory, and values are of equal importance to the cause of integration.

During the recent years it has become evident that the latter group of processes plays a crucial role in modeling the economical and political domains where the main efforts of statesmen and politicians are focused. Also, the association of new countries to the Union brings about growing diversity of cultures, ethnic groups, religions, and languages, and thereby causes salient problems and discrepancies within the framework of integration. For that matter, intellectuals, philosophers, and the men of spirit have to take the burden of searching for answers to questions like: how to combine unity with diversity, how to form a common European identity and culture, while preserving and developing our national identities and cultures?

Two thousand and five hundred years ago, here on the Balkans the bases of European civilization, value system and identity grew up. I am sure that your discussion will contribute to linking the past, present, and

future of the Continent, and will help forming the contemporary basis of United Europe through a constant dialog among European people for a better future for everyone.

I would like to wish you serious achievements in this dialog. Not only as a President of the Republic of Bulgaria dedicated to the cause of integrating our country to the European community, but also as a historian, I know that such a dialog is more valuable and long-lasting than the circumstantial political and economical interactions.

I am looking forward to the outcome of this year's discussions at the traditional International Varna Summer School.

Once again, good luck to the School in its twenty forth edition!

Sofia June the 1st 2006.

Georgi Purvanov

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA

Stefan Danailov

To the participants and the guests
of the twenty-fourth International Varna
School of Philosophy

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a pleasure and an honour for me to address you during the opening of the Twenty-fourth International Varna School of Philosophy. The reason thereof is not just the extremely dignified specialists participating, but mostly, the topic you have chosen as a subject of your research efforts and creative discussions – ***Philosophy as a bridge between cultures and civilizations: universal, regional and national values in united Europe.***

I perceive it as extremely topical and quite important not only from a scientific point of view, but also from the point of view of its practical application and management significance. It is close to me – as a person, whose life- and creative path has been entirely connected with the problems of the Bulgarian national culture, also as a politician, as a Member of Parliament and as a Chairman of the Committee on Culture of the 39th National assembly, and not the least now also – as a Minister of Culture, directly engaged with finding the good legislative and management approaches to the problems' solution.

It is my deep conviction that the cultural traditions' preservation and development is a point of departure when building the value system of both the separate individual and the society as a whole. The national culture is a creator of values, far exceeding the market's dimensions. It is an active accelerator of the country's socio-economic development. The investments for the development of the culture potential are also investments for the society's stabilization and national unification. The nationally shared aims in the field of culture, the instruments and actions for their achievement are the factors, promoting the society's consolidation and the active involvement of all its members in the processes of own change and development, as well as of integration in the community of European peo-

ples and states. Therefore the government and the ruling majority defined the sustainable development in the field of culture as their foremost task, and the increase in funds for development, promotion and integration of the Bulgarian culture – as one of the most important factors for strengthening our national security.

In the contemporary world of intensifying contradictions culture has a powerful potential to stabilize communities, to stimulate the processes of dialogue and extension of cooperation, and to give a touch of irreversibility to the integration processes. In the field of culture the differences mean first of all enrichment and mutual complementarity, whilst the search for European identity is connected with peoples' return to their common civilization roots and a rethinking of their shared heritage. In that connection Jean Monnet's words sound quite topical today, said a quarter of a century after the beginning of the European integration, and namely that if this process had to start again from the beginning, then he would have started it with culture.

Europe identifies itself mostly and sooner through its culture than through its institutions. The separate cultures coexist tolerantly; they compete sometimes in between, but often act in a condition of full accord. This harmony in the diversity needs preserving and developing. The interaction between the cultural differences opens opportunities for a creative exchange and mutual enrichment. Each nation gives its own contribution to the European cultural identity formation. Therefore, the European cultural policy has to create such integration conditions that can support multiformity, and not impose unification. The preservation and the protection of culture are ethic imperatives, tightly interwoven with keeping the dignity of human individuals and with people's and groups' desire to live together. There are considerable risks and practices of manipulating through culture. Today we all have to work against such dangers, and for eradicating the threat of cultural exclusion or capsulation.

In Bulgaria we have a rich experience in carrying out initiatives, projects and programmes, establishing the role of culture as a factor for equal dialogue and tolerance. In the last years we have been witnesses and real participants in the processes of intensive development in the field of culture. Defining their meaning and outlining the tendencies and those characteristics of the phenomena and of the processes in culture that

should be supported, or rejected and overcome, is thus a task of primary significance. The role of philosophers, esthetes, culturologists and many other specialists, involved in the processes of creating, as well as disseminating and acquiring the values of culture, is undoubtedly enormous and responsible. It is in this light that we should view the work of and assess the results of the commencing school of philosophy. These are also the grounds behind the Ministry of Culture's support for holding the school, as well as behind its readiness to continue its collaboration with the Institute of Philosophical Research at the Bulgarian Academy of Science, and not the least, with all the other institutions and specialists working on the culture's problems, development and preservation.

I wish the twenty-fourth international Varna School of Philosophy fruitful work.

Prof. Stefan Danailov

MINISTER OF CULTURE

I. Constructing the European Identity

Vassil Prodanov

THE MULTICULTURAL DILEMMAS OF EUROPE

The notion of "multiculturalism" and the respective policy of identity were first developed at the turn of the 70s of the XX century in Canada and became popular in the context of the big shift in the North America bringing about the so-called "third generation" of rights concerning the group rights of the communities in contrast to the first two "generations" which are individual. "In the new multicultural environment as opposed to the conventional multiethnic situation, the state glorifies differences from the way of life associated with the population that once represented a majority. It rewards those who personify the desired differences, while taking away cultural recognition and even political rights away from those who do not. The differences being honored involve not only a wide range of cultural exotica, but, perhaps even more importantly, the showcasing of alternative lifestyles".[1]

In some sense the idea of multiculturalism in contrast to the term "multiculturalism" is old and deals with the support of various ethnic groups and cultures within the same polity. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were multicultural but they disintegrated. Multicultural was also the Austria-Hungarian Empire where Hungarians and Austrians had even their own parliaments but it also broke up. The USSR and Yugoslavia wanted to create common Soviet and Yugoslav identities, retaining at the same time the identities and cultures of the different ethnic and national groups. During the last decades however the notion of multiculturalism has been connected primarily with the expansion of immigrant commu-

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[1] **Gottfried, Paul Edward.** Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt: Toward a Secular Theocracy, **University of Missouri Press, 2002, P. 14.**

nities in the developed countries and not just with the traditional local communities on the territory of a state. Respectively *two types of multiculturalism* – territorial and non-territorial – could be discerned. These two types of multiculturalism however are charged with conflicts.

On the European continent with its strong tradition of cultural homogeneous nations the multiculturalism brings dilemmas that are quite risky. I will point out three types of risks.

The first group of risks is connected with the growth of immigrants. As a result of the processes of globalization Europe is becoming increasingly multicultural, multiethnic, multireligious phenomenon. To help support an ageing population and counteract plummeting birth rates, Europe needs more immigration. Otherwise over the next 20 years, there will be 20 million fewer workers in Europe, even including migrants.[2] Maintaining the current birth-rate levels until 2050 Europe would need to receive an influx of 169 millions of immigrants in order to preserve the current ratio between the age groups of 15 and 60 years.[3] That could lead to radical changes of European identity, new ethno-cultural balances, and fast islamization of Europe threatening to turn it into an enlarged Kosovo. The increase of the number of culturally and religiously different immigrants, especially in conditions of economic difficulties harshly magnifies the conflict potential of the continent.

The second group of risks is related to the strong national identities in Europe and their clash with any common identity. Let's go over only several conflict points:

– A key element of any common identity till now has been the common official language as an instrument of communication and shared views, but the EU is a region without a common language. That is why its institutions are becoming a "Tower of Babel", the expenditure for translation from one language into another are on the increase, and the administrative procedures are getting more and more "language polluted".

– The distribution of authority between the institutions of the EU and the separate states is connected with persistent tensions.

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[2] Вж. **Rennie, David**. Europe needs a lot more immigrants, says EU chief, *Telegraph,* February 10, 2005.

[3] Вж. **Бьюкенен, Патрик Дж.** Смерть Запада, М., Изд. АСТ, 2003, с. 40.

– The strong tradition of national state and political particularism in Western Europe keep the individual states as separate entities and national communities have strong identities. For instance, despite half a century of continuous integration process the number of international marriages is the same as at the beginning of the XX century.[4]

– The war in Iraq in 2003 and the division among the states on that issue demonstrated that as an united political community EU is not mature enough to take common political decisions. The increase in the number of member countries creates even more opportunities for divergence in views, conflicts and the ultimately leads to incapacity to act as an unified entity with common political will.

The third group of risks is connected with the trend of disruption of the states and the revival of local and ethnic identities inside the member states of the EU. There are conflict issues such as:

– The trend towards regionalization within separate states brings about the rise of regional political structures, local cultures and identities. John Newhouse notes that most of the Germans today feel as if they are living once again as Thuringians or Bavarians or Westphalians first, and Germans second. It's easier to say, "I am a Swabian" or "I am a Saxon" than "I am a German," although some might add, "I am also a European."[5]

– The small – ethno-national communities aspiring to prevent the domination of their larger neighbors find out in the opening of the borders as a result of the processes of globalization and European integration opportunities for secession from their states and become separate political units.

– With the growth of global emigration streams representatives of different ethnic communities and nations take up their residence on many places over the world, but through the use Internet and mobile communications they retain contact with their native communities and often they don't just maintain their identity in a foreign environment but even strengthen it further. So they start to support actively the secession battle

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[4] Вж. **Желев, А**. Истерията на "правилните" демократи, в. *Зора,* 1999, бр. 6, 8 февруари 2000 г.

[5] Вж. **Newhouse, John.** Europe's Rising Regionalism, *Foreign Affairs,* January/February 1997, Vol. 76, N 1, pp. 67-84.

of their ethnic brothers in the native country if they are a specific group inside a larger political unit.

With the prevalence of all kinds of 'ethnic dilemmas' in Europe and North America – the problems of immigration, minorities or ethnic and racial conflict – the philosophical question of reconciling cultural or value pluralism with political unity has grown in importance and circulation.

In the early 1990s the previous liberal-communitarian controversy transformed into a more particular debate about how to accommodate cultural and ethnic claims onto a broadly liberal philosophy. The discussion was oriented toward the relationship between liberal Western values and non-Western traditions, minorities and immigrants. Although at first the two sides of the debate drew lines of opposition between individualist, rights-based liberals, and communitarian or identity-based liberals, the opposition has increasingly given way to a search for theoretical solutions, often versions of civic republicanism. That is, between a liberal position that puts the choices and autonomy of the individual as uppermost in any theory, and those who argued that a broader communal socialization in a historically rooted culture was necessary to enable the preconditions of such individualism identified in the pure theory. At a pure philosophical level, the debate was simply between two kinds of liberals, arguing about the source of reason and autonomy in a modern liberal democratic society: a Kantian vs. a Hegelian stance. However, under the influence of imported examples from current politics, the division began to take the form of tension between liberal Western values and the defence of non-Western traditions, minorities and immigrants.

Special attention was paid to the impact of the various kinds of demands made by minority cultures on the state. These demands have been categorized into three broad types.[6]

First, there are rights to do with government, including special representation rights, devolution and national self-determination.

Second, there are rights that seek to accommodate a variety of distinct cultural practices within larger states. These include both exemption

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[6] **Kymlicka, W**. Multicultural Citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995

rights and cultural rights, which give special assistance to a disadvantaged minority, such as affirmative action programs.

Third, there is a category of demands that are not rights claims, but pertain to the issue of collective esteem. This becomes a matter for public policy when the symbolism of flags, currencies, names, public holidays, national anthems, public funds for cultural activities and the content of school curricula bear on a minority's fragile presence in the public political culture".

There are different views concerning the negatives and positives of multiculturalism. Several philosophical positions collide:
– anti-essentialist (postmodernist) liberal individualism;
– essentialist monoculturalism;
– essentialist multiculturalism;
– constructivist multiculturalism;
– constructivist monoculturalism

All these positions are based on two opposite visions of multiculturalism – essentialist and anti-essentialist. Which are the characteristics and the weak points of these visions?

Cultural essentialism

The notion of cultural essentialism presumes that "each culture has its unique, fixed essence that exists independently of the context or the intercultural relations and forces the ethnic group to act in the way in which it acts".[7] This essence reveals itself more or less in the behavior of each representative of the respective culture. That means that cultural affiliation is not right of choice but predetermined essence of all members of a community and some positive but also and negative traits could be considered as given ant typical for each one of them.

Multicultural essentialism means that the individual per se possesses some characteristics of his culture as inseparable from his identity. So the culture confines the individuals within some boundaries, cutting them off from the others, limits their opportunities for change and choice, and in many cases impairs their individual rights. Policy based on cultural essen-

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[7] **Modood, Tariq.** Introduction, In: Tariq Modood and Pnina Werbner (Eds), *The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe,* London: Zed Press, 1997, p. 10.

tialism builds borders, and divisions, puts the people in their own cultural ghetto separated from the others. The person is "born" in a specific culture and is unable to come out of it. This divide is a way towards disintegration of states and a factor for conflict relationships between different communities.

If the cultural identities are fixed entities the matter at hand is whether a democratic society should respect cultures whose views on ethnic, religious and racial superiority are inimical to other cultures. Are we to tolerate, respect or celebrate all cultures, all ways of life? What should be done if some of them are authoritarian, intolerant and disrespectful regard to other views? This is the case with the different kinds of fundamentalism, nationalism, racism. And if not, then are we not simply embracing our own views of what should and should not be accepted and thus adopting a non-multicultural stance? This is the key dilemma of cultural essentialism.

Cultural anti-essentialism

Anti-essentialism or constructivism is based on methodological individualism supporting the idea that the main social reality are the individuals with their rights and opportunities for choice while collective entities such as cultures are something secondary and explicable through the individuals who create, choose and change these cultures.

A principal feature of anti-essentialism is the dominance of constructivist accounts of ethnic and national identities, with a particular emphasis on the plural. Anti-essentialists argue that groups do not have a unitary character and that culture needs to be analyzed as an interactive process rather than a fixed set of properties. Deriving from that are also the views that ethnic or cultural identities are not pure or static but change in new circumstances or by sharing social space with other heritages and influences. If there are no pure identities then the groups are not homogeneous.

Anti-essentialism emphasizing on the absolute right of the individual to choose his cultural products and identity suffers from an extreme market perception of the phenomenon culture. In the long run it entitles the individual to choose its identity and culture as any other product on the market. The problem however is what are the criteria applied to this choice. These criteria could not be explained by methodological individu-

alism. They are determined by the preliminary cultural attitudes and social development of the individual.

Anti-essentialist multiculturalism neglects the common traits which could unite the separate cultures in a national state. If there is no common national identity but many equal in rights and no one of them with priority over the others, then there is no ground for integration of people in a political community.

Multicultural anti-essentialism does not explain convincingly enough the coherence and lifespan of some cultures, mentality, values and the way they manage to maintain their continuity for a long period of time.

For a mitigated or a weak multiculturalism
vs. radical or strong multiculturalism

I will plea for a weak form of multiculturalism going beyond the extremes of the multicultural essentialism and multicultural constructivism (ant-essentialism, postmodernism). The main things to point out here are as follows:

1. A possible outcome of the dilemma value essentialism vs. value anti-essentialism (constructivism) is **value progressism**. What does that mean? The values are neither equal nor unchangeable. They undergo development, some of them are more general and universal, result of the human progress but nevertheless even they are historically and contextually anchored. For instance the absolute value of human life and the abolishment of the death penalty emerge as notions at a high level of human progress but are impossible at the earlier stages of historic development. Beyond their context in other historical circumstances they could be harmful and bring about devastating effect on the communities. The attempt to impose these values by force means a de facto value imperialism. The example with Iraq where the value of democracy was imposed by force is a salient example. The result was devastating, bearing in mind that more than 100 000 people – most of them innocent – have been killed over the course of the last three years.

2. Each individual has the right to choose his cultural identity. The level of individualization of the person in the postmodern societies and the high dynamics of the social processes they are a part of bring up the issue about the right of choice of the individual including also the choice of cultural affiliation and identity.

3. The outcome of the dilemma liberal multiculturalist anti-essentialism vs. cultural essentialism is the cultural historicism. The cultures are historically and contextually changing phenomenon and not unchangeable substances. Accordingly, the identity is not some incoherent melting pot of unchanging cultural traits that can simply be examined and enumerated in order to determine differences between groups. Rather, ethnic, religious, cultural groups are situationally defined in relation to their social interactions with other groups, and the boundaries established and maintained between them as a result of these interactions. The origin, content, and form of cultural identity are all open to negotiation, reflecting the creative choices of individuals and groups in the process of self-determination. Mobilizing particular identities will also depend, to a large extent, on the audience being addressed. The various individual identities may overlap with, or cross-cut other social identities. For example, one may be a man, an Orthodox Christian, a Bulgarian, a philosopher, teacher, a representative of middle class, all at the same time. We also need to keep in mind that ethnic, linguistic, class, religious and gender groups are themselves not solidary groups but have their own broad-based internal divisions.

4. The maintenance of stability and integrity of a state, the prevention of situations of disintegration and "clash of civilizations" becomes much more probable if there are no coincidences of different points of division or inequalities – religious, racial, cultural, economic, political, etc.

5. The steady existence of political communities and above all the state is impossible without a common identity and culture, a set of values, norms, rituals accepted by its citizens as their own. Just because there are no static and constant identities and cultures but a wide variety of different levels of cultural affiliation, it should be taken into consideration that the integrated political communities are possible if they have common value fundamentals, connected with common identity despite their cultural diversity.

Magdalini Rumanea

THE CONTRIBUTION OF „THE CITIZEN OF EUROPE" AS A CENTRAL ASSISTING FACTOR IN THE PROCESS OF UNIFICATION

It is an extremely interesting, and altogether curious fact, that the attempts for building theoretical standards and bringing closer the viewpoints for interpretation of the phenomenon of regional integration have completely ignored the main "hypotheses" – for the dynamics of formation of "the political individuality", of the political unity, or of the political system. More specifically, in the case of the European Community and the European Union, the manner of ignoring these issues has been particularly striking, since the Union aims to undertake – by means of a new political system – new possibilities for government and for exercise of autonomous powers and strength. The process of building of a new political system – such as the European Union – from political systems, which existed before, and which shall be turned into sub-systems or elements of the new political system, poses a direct reference to "the political hypotheses" for the formation of "the City", as formulated by Aristotle in his "Politics".[1]

Aristotle undertook analysis and interpretation of the phenomenon of the "City" by means of a comparative empirical approach based on the study of 158 different methods of government of his own time; this fact, mentioned by R. Macridis, turns Aristotle into "the first researcher of comparative politics, and also of the system approach". In order to understand the Aristotelian approach, it is extremely important to determine the exact content of "the City". The notion "City" with Aristotle should not be

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[1] Sir Ernest Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1968, and Aristotle, Politics, translated with an introduction by T. A. Sinclair, London, Penguin Books, 1969.

mixed with the modern use of the term "city" as a place of residence; in the Aristotelian times this meaning was conveyed with the term "αστυ". The term "City", as used by Aristotle, relates to a "politically formed society" in general, or to a political unity, and is very close to the modern terms of "political system", "political organization" or "political unity".

The starting point in Aristotle's approach, which presents a basic element of the integration theory, is Aristotle's view of the City as an integrated political unity, as a result (product) of a process of evolution. Such process begins with the simplest forms of unity (organizations) and connections, and later develops into more complex forms, to end up with the creation of the City. Such unities are created to satisfy the natural desires and needs of the people; this is because the separate individuals cannot satisfy such desires alone. In this sense, the choice of the City presents a natural state – the political phenomenon emerges in order to satisfy higher and more complex needs and desires.

The appreciation of the City as the product of a process of evolution justifies the thesis for the possibility to interpret the Aristotelian approach as a general integration theory. Furthermore, some common elements between the Aristotelian evolutional approach and the modern neo-functional approach cannot be else but evident. The modern attitude for the European Community – as a new form of political unity – is that it presents exactly the product of a process of evolution – it is formed of separate communities, its member-states.

In its essentials, the European Community may be seen as the Aristotelian City. Both the European Community and the City present the final products of an evolutionary development. It is not possible for anyone to miss the fact that, in the same way as the City for Aristotle is the final and perfect form of political unity, the European Community in the process of European integration is also described as the final form of political unity[2].

The European Community is a product of the phenomenon of "integration"; integration is defined as "to combine parts into a whole"[3]. Thus

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[2] European Union, Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans to the European Council, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 476.

[3] A.S.Hornby, Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, London, Oxford University Press, 1974, p.451.

the European Community presents a "compound reality". The City also presents a compound reality – both with respect to its origin, and to its creation – since it consists of many parts. According to an important formulation contained in "Politics", the City is "a compound"; it belongs to the compound states, which need to be analyzed in their separate compounding elements. The preservation of its compound character presents an absolutely necessary element for the existence and preservation of the City. In other words, differentiation and clash are the prerequisites for the existence of the City as a political unity. In case the community passes beyond a given border, the City ceases to be a City. In one of his outstanding excerpts, where Aristotle is critical of the political theories of Plato, he wrote: "it is obvious that the community is to some extent necessary for both the family and for the City. However, not an absolute community. There is a point where, if the community continues to grow, the City will cease to be a City. There is still another point, where the City may continue its existence; however, it would have lost all of its essential features, consequently, it will be a very bad City. It will be as if someone is trying to turn harmony into a monotonous sound..."

In still another formulation of his, Aristotle once more confirms that the City, being the final form of political community, cannot but have pluralistic character. In case the ever deeper integration of the community eliminates the pluralistic character of the City, this will mean destroying of the City itself. A real community – like the one of the City – should be formed by elements, which are diverse in their type. According to Aristotle, the chase of ever deeper integration of the community (the thesis of Plato) may bring to destroying the City – i.e. to the elimination of its political element. As noted by E. Barker, according to Aristotle, "a city is not one in the identity of exactly similar members; it is one in the co-operation of dissimilar units".

The above positions, which have been presented more analytically in Chapter Two of the Second Book of "Politics", present a hypotheses of a theory for political unity, containing a particularly important element – the stress on the dangers, to which the deepening of the unity may lead, if surpassing a given border. It is obvious that in the abovementioned Aristotelian analysis exist both the main principle of modern federalism, which is concentrated in the formulation "unity in diversity",

and the content of the principle of subsidiarity, which strives to divert the hyper-concentration in the institutional expression of the European Community[4]. Further, according to the interpretation of the Aristotelian thinking undertaken by E. barker, the City does not present a simple "compound" or "a whole", where the existence of its separate different parts vanishes. It is just the opposite, "the City presents a unity of elements, which continue their existence as parts of the new whole they have formed". Such description conveys, with a surprising precision, the essentials of our contemporary process of integration of the European Community.

We have stressed on the primary importance, which the Aristotelian analysis gives to the pluralistic character of the City (of the political community). As noted by B. Krieck, according to Aristotle, the essentials of politics presuppose differentiation, a dialectical counter-standing. The unity of the City should not surpass a given border, since the very meaning of the City will be rejected beyond such border.

The pluralistic formation of the political community and the achievement of equilibrium between "communion" and "differentiating", present one of the main problems in the building of the European Community. As we have already seen, the achievement of such equilibrium (through securing unity and differentiation at the same time) is of interest for Aristotle, who approaches this topic from different points of view – such as, for example, the manner of formation of the constitutional order (of a form of government), the formation of an ideal political system, or even of the factors and dynamics leading to the destroying, change, or revolution in the different forms of government.

Conclusively, we have to accept that the Aristotelian analysis has significantly contributed to the theory of integration – with the central importance he yields, and the research he makes on "the integrative capabilities and role" of the Citizen.

According to Aristotle, the City belongs to the category of "compounds", since it consists of different parts. More specifically, the City is formed by the Citizens, and the concept of the City also requires under-

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[4] K. Neanheither, "Euphoria about Subsidiarity?", Newsletter of the IPSA Research Committee on European Unification.

standing of the quality and role of the Citizen.[5] Aristotle inevitably sought the definition of the Citizen -on the basis of what could have been judged from his own time – and reached to a functional definition of particular importance, namely that "the Citizen is the one to take part in the process of rendering justice and government". Such definition, which can only be considered justified for a democratic system, however, relates closely to the meaning of "the political phenomenon". The City cannot be grasped without its citizens being identified with the City. The City, Aristotle underlines, is formed by a sufficient number of citizens, so that they could achieve "securing their lives".

Of course, in modern representative democracy the meaning of the Citizen has significantly changed.

However, the stress on the functions with participating content – as conditions, which predetermine the quality of the "Citizen" – has great importance for the understanding of the dynamics of formation of modern political systems on regulation bases – such as the European Community. As we have already designated, the central stress on the role of the Citizen for the existence of a political system has consequences on the size of the system (the City). Only in case the size allows the participation of the Citizens and their identification with the political process, shall it be possible for the City (for the political system/for the community/for the organization) to exist. Of course, it is self-understood that normally "the size" shall be viewed as a function from the resources and the capabilities of the communication systems of each epoch".

Aristotle found the unification role of the Citizen in the fact that the character of the Citizen presents a factor pre-determining the type and form of government, or of the Constitution (according to the analysis of Sir D. Ross[6], with Aristotle "each form of social order is formed and preserved through the specific character of the Citizens, and presents the mission of the City as pushing forward the character of the Citizen – by means of education". In other words, all forms of government correspond to the different character of the Citizens.

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[5] Aristotle, The Political, 1274b, 1275a, p.234, 236-239.

[6] D. Ross, Aristotle, London, Methuen and Co., 1964.

The Extraordinary European Council, which took place in Birmingham on October 16, 1992, tried to outline the meaning of „the Citizen of Europe" in the process of unification, and the more efficient „binding" of the Community with the role of the Citizen; this attempt followed the French Referendum, which ratified the Maastricht Treaty with an ultimate majority. The above-mentioned Council approved a special Declaration named "A Community Close To Its Citizens". Said declaration presents the most accomplished attempt made by the member-states with the purpose of forming a package of principles for determination of the dialectical relationship between the European Community and the European Citizen, and for enhancement of the role of the European citizen in the process of unification. This attempt has been correctly interpreted as a step towards the „de-bureaucratization" and „de-elitezation" of the process of unification. After stating in its Forward that, „as a community of democratic states, we can only progress with the subsidiarity of our citizens...", the Birmingham Declaration notes that the Community must "consider" the concerns of the citizens of Europe – as expressed during the respective discussions on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, as well as that „decisions should be taken as closely as possible to the Citizen of Europe". As principle means for achieving of the above goals, the Birmingham Declaration designates the following: the use and development of the subsidiarity principle – for democratization of the process of unification in decision-taking and for the formation of a policy of increased transparency. Consequently, „the search" for the European citizen – as an assisting factor, as the final beneficiary, and the legalizing factor of unification – has started with procedural regulations, and basically through the use of the subsidiarity principle.

The meaning of subsidiarity, which, as we have already noted, is contained in Aristotle's theory of the City, appeared – in its contemporary formulation – in the decade of the thirties of the previous century, that is, in a period of strong social and political instability, with the main purpose of enhancing the role of the individual, as „a capable and responsible assisting factor" in the organization of society[7]. In other words, the meaning

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[7] Subsidiarity: The Challenge of Change, Maastricht, European Institute of Public Administration, 1991.

of subsidiarity came to underline the meaning of the individual and its functions as a main unit within the frame of the social organization – a unit, which the state (the Government) has to respect.

More particularly, the content of subsidiarity was formulated by Pope Pius XI. He described the main leading principles in the organization of society, while almost exclusively stressing on the role, the meaning, and the mission of the individual. The central idea of his formulation was that „it is unfair, a big evil, and an anomaly in the harmonious order of things, if larger and more significant unities assume functions, which could otherwise be efficiently performed by smaller unities".

The underlying dimension of subsidiarity as a principle of the Roman-Catholic philosophy for social organization was the fixing of a border in the relation between the individual and the state, while stressing on the limitations of the activity of the state, and on the meaningful moral purity of the individual – for the performance of a number of functions. As M. Wilke and H. Wallace have marked: „the subsidiarity principle expresses the bi-lateral relationship between the society and the individual. Society is absolutely necessary for the development of the individual and his/her values and talents. Society needs the individual but the individual also needs society..."[8]

It is obvious from this point of view, that the analysis of Aristotle on the formation of the state and on the role of the Citizen contains – as a main philosophic notion – the subsidiarity principle (with the content added therein by the Roman-Catholic Church. This same content corresponds with the meaning of subsidiarity in the works of Th. Acquinas, Roudhon and Al. Tocqueville, as the main citizens' virtue with respect to the social and state organization, which aims to secure the role of the individual (and, to a lesser extent, the constitutional order); it has, as its supplement, the solidarity principle.

The meaning of subsidiarity at the citizen-institutional level has been largely related to the Federal Government System, and the role of the federal states and regions. The main law (the Constitution)[9] of the Federal Republic of Germany contains the subsidiarity principle – though the

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[8] M.Wilke – H.Wallace, Subsidiarity…… p.12.
[9] S.E.Finer. Fire Constitutions. London Penguin Books, 1979, p. 197-266.

exact term is not expressly used. Furthermore, Neo-liberalism, as well as the Roman-Catholic social dogmas, which contribute to the formation of the social structures and morals in Germany, have been influenced by the meaning of subsidiarity. It is important that the essence of these dogmas contains the principles of solidarity, social justice, and mercy.

The Federal Constitution of the USA also contains a hint about the subsidiarity principle, especially in its Tenth Amendment, which provides that „... the authorities, which have not been assigned by the Constitution of the United States, neither have been expressly taken away from the States, shall belong to the States or to the People".

In addition, the meaning of the subsidiarity principle has been underlined by a significant number of studies of the forms of federal and de-centralized government.

Within the European Community, the notion of „subsidiarity" first appeared in 1975, in a text, which the Commission processed as recommendation for the elaboration of the "Tindemans' Report"[10] for the European Community. This is a bit different from what President Delhors claims, namely that article 3 and article 4 of the Treaty for the EC, as well as „the Directive" as a legal act, which only binds its aimed result, also contain the notion of "subsidiarity".

The demand of the Citizens for support and overall diffusion of the subsidiarity principle was manifested particularly clearly in 1990, when the process started for enhancement of civil community. According to M.Wilke and H. Wallace, the interest for the subsidiarity principle is due to a number of reasons, amongst which:

A) the fears of the German länder concerning the possible reduction of their powers and constitutional role, because of the transfer of most prevailing authorities to the European Community.

B) the largely shared opinion that the Community is too much overloaded with powers, and, consequently, that a border and a barrier would have to be put to the expansion of the authorities of the Community, and to „the intervention" of the legislation of the European Community in daily social functions. Such opinion is equal with the more general civil philosophy for restricting the general role of the state, as already expressed – before all, by the British Prime-minister M. Thatcher (1979-1990).

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[10] European Union, Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans to the European Council.

C) the wish to secure the rights and the role of the national state related to the collective exercise of rights on part of the European institutions.

The demand for the subsidiarity principle to be included in the new Treaty for the European Community – the negotiations for which started in 1990 by summoning of a special inter-governmental conference – was basically supported by Germany, France, Great Britain, the European Parliament, and the European Commission. The President of the Commission Jacque Delhors „sees" subsidiarity also as a principle in the federal formation of the Community, with the purpose of securing the role of the authorities and rights of both the national states and the European citizens, i.e. in the logics of the Roman-Catholic philosophy[11]. The European Parliament supports the decreed declaration of the principle, as part of the Federal organization of the European Union, „which helps the restriction of the procedure of exercising authorities in the central bodies, the bodies of the European community, on the one hand, and on the other hand – in the Central government or regional units". The meaning of the subsidiarity principle (with the purpose of securing the regulation role of the länder) has been most acutely stressed by Germany. The institutions and the above-mentioned countries support "decreed subsidiarity" as a regulation of the federal organization of the European Union, as well as means for the protection of the role, rights, and authorities of smaller citizens' units, and of the rights of European citizen.

Vice versa, Great Britain and (to a lesser extent) Portugal support the decreed establishment of the subsidiarity principle, however, within their estimate that this principle could possibly act also as „means for deviation" from the federal development of the Community.

After overcoming significant problems during the negotiations (problems arisen because of these two different points of view), the member-states of the Community agreed on the inclusion of the subsidiarity principle in the Treaty for the European Union (Article 3B). This text was finally approved by the European Council in Edinburgh, and after undergoing some changes, in the Month of October, 1993, turned into a basis for reaching of understanding between the institutions (the Parliament, the Commission, and the Council) for applying the subsidiarity principle.

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[11] J. Delhors, "Le Principe de Subsidiarite".

In its Forward, the above-mentioned text underlines that the subsidiarity principle provides for „the taking of decisions as close to the European citizens, as possible". It is yet immediately acknowledged, that the formulation of article 3B of the Maastricht Treaty contains „rules" and „principles", which „go beyond the frame" of the meaning and content of subsidiarity.

As can be felt from the above analysis, „the answer" of the European community and of the member-states concerning the estimate of the legalization of the process of unification was actually focused in work of procedural nature, and in the content of regulations – application of the subsidiarity principle and enhanced transparency in the functioning of the institutions and in the procedures for formation of the policies.

It is obvious that such an approach can neither bring to legalization of the process of unification nor to the purpose of the European Community. From the view point of one of Aristotle's opinions, an approach is found answering the dispute and the „challenge to legalization", which approach shall lead to the establishment of the notion for the European citizenship – by means of acknowledgement and strives of teleological nature.

The European Community has failed to form the notion of European citizenship as main legalizing factor in the process of unification. As noted by Soledad Garcia „ ...the notion of citizenship in the modern world is formed by legal, economic, political, and social practices, which determine social participation, and which cover social contrasts. In this sense the quality of a „citizen" also presents a method for social integration, which gives equal rights to individuals of different genders, age, convictions, or colour. From this point of view, the notion of „citizen" contributes for the legalization of the modern state. It has also turned into an element of the legalization of the New Europe...".

The notion of European citizenship, as a legalizing base for the building of the European Community, and as an element of the legalization of the unification process (in a broader sense), makes a reference to two basic integrities in the formation of the Community:

A) the notion of „European identity"

B) the content of the „political outputs" in the system of the Community.

A. The European Identity

The notion of European cultural identity as a formation assisting factor of the notion of European citizenship (with its psychological, symbolic, and political dimensions) has not – as a system – been dealt with by the theory and practice of European unification. It was only recently, and following many disputes, tensions, and difficulties manifested within the ratification of the Treaty for the European Community, as well as following the nationalistic clashes in Eastern Europe, that attempts have started for reaching an analytical approach to the notion of European identity, as a formation assisting factor of the notion of European Citizenship. Certainly, the theoretical approach of K. Deutsch with respect to communication has its contribution for the understanding of this phenomenon (however, only within a limited scope).

Cultural identity, together with the historical collective memory, experience, and symbols, determine collective consciousness and common destiny – the common ends. From this point of view, cultural identity determines the psychological basis for fixing the notion of „citizenship". The notion of „citizenship" occurs in the political and social aspect (and not simply in the legal or constitutional aspect), only if it is rooted in the cultural identity.

The Maastricht Treaty for the European Community was the first to decree, as a legal provision, the notion of European Citizenship, Nationality). Article 8 of the Treaty provides that „Nationality of the Community is decreed. Citizen of the Community shall be each person, who is a National of a member-state". Alongside with this, and as a consequence of the legalization of the Nationality of the Community, the Treaty provides for a number of legal rights. Thus, the Treaty acknowledges the opportunity for each European citizen to avail of double citizenship. This is a situation, which is in harmony with the concept for participation of each individual in multiple cultural systems, and with the acceptance by each individual of multiple cultural identities.

The question, however, is whether the notion for the European Citizenship (European Nationality) is rooted, and legalized in the European collective cultural identity?

Any confirmative answer to this question naturally presupposes the existence of European cultural identity – as a sum of values, common

myths, memory, historical traditions, and symbols. As it is generally acknowledged, the legal effect and validity in time of the national state and of the notion of "nationality" are the elements, which (to a very significant extent) predetermine the cultural identity and morphology, but also the rivalries in the European space. National identity comes to offer concrete advantages related to „the idea of common European identity". From this point of view „Europe appears insufficient both as an idea and process".

Consequently, the determination of the European identity shall have to be made within a framework limited by the trends of globalization, on the one hand, and on the other hand – by the trends of national revival and exaltation. Between the above two (clearly contradicting) trends, shall have to be determined the elements, which form, or which could form and outline the European cultural identity, as a collective memory[12].

B. "Policy Outputs"

In case according to the analysis of Aristotle the justification base for the existence of a given political unit (political system) is based on „the ends" it seeks, and in case such „ends" essentially present „good life", i.e. „welfare" in the broader scope of the term, which also contains the idea of security, then it becomes easier to understand why the process of unification is legally challenged. As we have already designated, the process of unification failed to identify its content for the purposes of „welfare", and to depict such purposes as finally achieved (also on the basis of acceptance of such legalization by the European Citizens). Just the opposite, in some particular cases, and for specific periods of time, the process of unification and the institutions of the European Community have been considered as a hindrance for the progress of „the welfare politics" or even as factors, which have become the reason for unemployment and social tensions. Thus, for example, according to the Commissioner competent for Social Policy, P. Flynn, „there are too many people, to whom the Community is a factor assisting for the problem with unemployment, rather than a factor assisting for its solution..."

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[12] A.D. Smith, "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity", International Affaires, Art.68, 1992.

Borislav Gradinarov

NATIONAL POPULISM BETWEEN THE GLOBALISATION AND ISOLATION

Subject of this report is the nature and role of the national populism as a social and political phenomenon in the CEE countries.

In many states that changed their social, economic and political model of development in the end of the 1990s, movements that represent a peculiar symbiosis between nationalistic ideas and populist speaking are gradually gathering might and powers – which, apparently, is the only alternative to the political status quo.

Is this symbiosis harmless or is it an explosive agent that may entail unpredictable and fatal consequences both in the countries and regions where it is advancing?

The **populism** is a philosophical theory and political behavior, whose general idea is that the interests of the "ordinary people" and, in general, the "common folk" have been neglected, oppressed and unrealized by the existing political elite who is looking only after their own interests. According to those people "new faces" should take the ruling, to serve the nation, the downtrodden, common people's interests or the interests of the state as a whole, and not their own.

During the last few years populist natured social movements and leaders tend to be in the ascendant.

In many European countries as well as in the rest of the world, populist political parties win votes and more and more populist leaders gather popularity, enter parliaments and some of them even get into the governments. In this respect, typical movements and parties are those of Jean-Mari Le Pen in France, Carl Hagen in Norway, Jerry Brown, George Wallas, Pat Bukanon, Howard Dean, Jesse Jackson, Ross Perot, Ralph Nader in USA, Silvio Berluskoni, Umberto Bossi and Alexandra Mussolini in

Italy, Jörg Heider in Austria, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands, Preston Manning, Mike Harris and Ralf Kline in Canada, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, Leh Kachinski and Andrzej Lepper in Poland.

Obviously the outlined trend manifests all over Europe and in many other countries in the world, but it is especially peculiar to Central and Eastern Europe.

To take Poland for example – the conservative and populist party " Right and Justice " that won the elections in the autumn of 2005, signed a coalition agreement with another populist party – the Euroskeptic "Self-defense" in the end of April. The two of them as well as their allied parties from other countries, draw ideas and lexis from the confrontation and the hatred of the elites, the ideas of economic and cultural egalitarism, anticapitalism and xenophobia. And the highlights are the moralistic confrontation to the "corrupted elite", the noisy anticorruption rhetoric against the "old, exhausted" politicians and also the attempts for promotion of "new, pure" people.

And this leads to a total disintegration of the existing political systems and appearance of charismatic semi-authoritarian leaders at a number of places.

Such a process developed in Bulgaria in 2001 when Simeon Saxe – Coburg-Gotha created a party just for 3 months and provoked a political tsunami, which helped him win the elections and attract electorate from all social, educational, income and age groups. The trend revived also on the following 2005 elections when a similar formation, called "Attack", appeared and its supporters are still constantly increasing.

In a similar way the charismatic former policeman and security guard – Mr Boyko Borisov, won the elections in Sofia without having relations with any political party. This is a global phenomenon therefore we cannot expect that Bulgaria's EU accession will make it disappear.

The second element of this phenomenon is the nationalism in its two shapes.

The first of them is the excluding nationalism. It is understood as an ideology that emphasizes the idea that all those people, who ethnically belong to a given community, have common history, traditions, culture and language, should be united in one state on a united territory. When such a state is missing, it promotes the expansion as an instrument for

unity achievement. And when the given ethnical community exists in the frames of a bigger state, shared with other communities then this promotes separatist trends.

There is one softer version of the nationalism and we can call it civic nationalism. It presupposes loyalty and readiness to do the undertaken duties to a given geopolitical community, in front of which all people are equally treated as citizens despite the ethnical and cultural differences. However, this presupposes also the creation of a mutual spiritual space, language, culture and rules that are applicable to all members of the nation as well as their equal treatment.

Unlike the excluding nationalism, the civic one includes all citizens of a state, but due to that it is also quite more assimilating because, usually, it requires acceptance of the relevant language, culture, history as one's own. In countries like USA, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Germany and France the obtaining of citizenship requires not only handling the relevant language but also knowledge of the culture, history, customs etc.

In the environment of globalization the world is divided into two – between the civic and ethnical nationalism. On the one side, the ethnical self-determination and ethnical nationalism make headway in a lot of countries in the world. This leads to the disintegration of united civil nations and differentiation of ethnical territories in separate nations. The same happened to the former Soviet Union, when it was trying to build up a united civil Soviet nation composed of ethnically heterogeneous population. The same happened to Yugoslavia.

Most probably this tendency will also extend to the solving of Kosovo problem in the frame of Serbia after the separation of Montenegro. One and the same processes was repeating again and again during the time of dissolution of all the Federations of the Eastern block – the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, as well as ethnical conflicts and wars that deployed over some of their territories. However, this trend affects to a different extend the old EU member – states where there is an upsurge of ethnical autonomy movements coming, for example, from the Basque and Catalonian provinces of Spain as well as northern Italy and northern Ireland.

Which are the reasons for this symbiosis between nationalism and populism and what will lead this to?

Of course, as in all similar phenomena the reasons are quite complex.

As Ralf Darendorf (Darendorf, 1993) notes, the first group of reasons is in the fact that declassed elements have existed and still exist in all of the societies and under stress of circumstances or by their own choice appear to be outside of the political, economic and social life. Very often they struggle for existence, live without any significant goals and sense of affiliation to a group or nation. Sometimes these elements create ghettoes and live in awful conditions, other times they are constantly moving. These are the roamers, bums, permanent unemployed people and petty criminals who have been spurned by the society and have neither intellectual nor physical chances to become an integral part of it.

In cases of abrupt collapse of the social systems, for example in post war periods, economic crises, total change of the well known way of life etc., as it happened in the former Eastern block countries, the number of these declassed elements drastically increases. And trying to make public their negative attitude towards the circumstances, which have made them touch the bottom, they easily fall a prey to populist movements and leaders.

The second group of reasons is related to the weak points and malformations of the political democracy.

In regime of democracy it is possible also that big groups of people do not manage to become representatives of the governing state bodies and institutions fall into disrepute, especially when a society does not dispose of a strong civic corrective. For example, at the moment the symptoms of such a situation exist in Bulgaria. This leads to strengthening the process of rejection of the political status quo and to incessant punitive votes that actuate the political pendulum.

One more group of reasons exists, too. It is related to the process of globalization and the state's impossibility to perform its social functions as in the past. The globalization erodes the national state's key institutions like those of the social state and pension insurance systems, the social support and public services' policy, the trade unions organized power, states expenditures etc.

As U. Beck notes, when leaving the national states the transnational companies withdraw their loyalty to the national main play-

ers, too. And even the most developed social states are not protected from the danger to fall into a precarious vacuum: they have to spread their legally regulated acquisitions over more and more people but in time when they increasingly loose control over the taxes (U. Beck, 2002,21).

Of course, there are other circumstances like political elites' falling in disrepute, geopolitical embroilments as a result of the intersection of strong international interests, global financial and petrol crises. But the common denominator is the forming of a conjuncture, in which the national populism turns out to be in a favorable social and political environment.

What will result this in?

According to J. Lukach (Lukach, 2005; 184) the nationalism "replaces the old forms of patriotism and appears to be even a more sound and sustainable relation of the masses than the class struggle conscious". Its extreme manifestations and variations are more than hostility to foreigners. It means that such nationalists are full of contempt and hatred of people in their own countries for having insufficient nationalistic mood and even for being traitors.

This is no longer an aristocratic or conservative phenomenon – it is a populist one.

That is why the national populism is a phenomenon, which should not be ignored, as its manifestations may play a significant role in the further European integration. Despite the clear and strong trend towards drawing closer together the social, economic, military and cultural areas of the countries of the Continent, a great number of the problems and contradictions from the past periods have not been overcome yet.

The fear of depersonalization of the national priorities and their subordination to foreign interest are the most frequently used arguments for inculcation of doubts, opposition and rejection of the European integration.

At the same time we should pay attention to the fact that behind the national populism certain economic and authoritative interests stay whose political envelope could be different but they are amazingly similar at their core. And they could be found not only in the

so called young democracies but also in many of the states that have been recognized a long time ago as an example of highly developed economies with enough effective mechanisms of democratic political life.

All this creates a real problematic situation that should be analyzed in details. But the most important is that the considerable and practically feasible conclusions should be made vacillating neither from uncritical acceptance of the globalization as a positive synonymous phenomenon, nor to the isolationism as a last shelter taken from the expansion of the uncontrollable external forces.

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Dragolub Jivković

EUROANTHROPUS'S TEMPTATIONS

After the Greek mythology Europe was a beautiful girl Zeus fell in love with. Three boys were born out this love... Mythical Minos, brave Sarpedones righteous Radamentus. Asterious, the king of Crete, having been married to Europe, gave the continent Greece was on the name of Europe (Greek mythology, p. 26, Toubis).

If following the mythology, we could say that Europe has born its myth, its courage and its righteousness. Have its successors been cherishing those three virtues as their own in there own lives it is hard hard to say. It seems they have been existing only in the myth sphere. The real Europe, passing through many ages of its existance has revealed its own dramatic nature to us, from the most primitive human life forms up to the great civilization creations which make Europe the world history centre. It would be too much to mention what is that all born in Europe, and became the humanity base at all. Europe did not jelously conserve its inventions, ideas. Promethius and Ullysses themselves could symbolize the Europian path into the world history.

The Europeans have plenty of partial thruths about Europe, numerous of 'their own' Europes, not caring much Hegel's thought that 'only the whole is thruth'. We still have not reached that thruth whole, though many of those partial thruths are trying to force themselves like being absolute. If we, even today, are offered partial thruths as only ones, how is it possible to avoid a particular Europian's trap (from some part of Europe) of intruding himself to be a typical Europian man's model? If being so for ages, how could, for example, a western Europian accept an eastern Europian as a Europian at all? And that is not all. What is it in that partial Europian being that makes him not recgonize the other Europian, or to intrude his own Europian gorments as being Europian? A particular and solemn thruth from some part of Europe is being tried to force as a ruling thruth, and in

many ways, even including the millitary forces, is trying to subject Europe to its own demands and interests. Well, the Europe variousness and partial thruth have always been the frequent war cause in which the Europian people suffered a lot, more than in any other continent. So the opponent pictures of Europe have been mixed, and so representing that what could be called the human civilization reneissance and progress symbol, even including unbeliveable victories of evil against good. No other continent has this kind and quantity of diametrically opponent values as the Europian man has. No man could imagine so many contrasts in such a relatively small space.

To exceed the differences bearing tragical confrontations in Europe, the Europian civilization and man flows should be built on the base connecting the people of Europe by its positive energy, and make Europe a common house of the Europians. Well, except the geographical unity, is there anything in culture, tradition, economy, educatrion, feeling, politics, science, religion, etc. common with majority of Europians, and can it be their granted future base? How to reconcile such numerious differences in the future of Europe, and not to adopt violation over that particular and individual that is not in the position to rule, that is on the future Europe decision making, plans and projects edge? What is that expected to be the Europe progress carrier, its basic value, a thread linking, not separating or confronting the peoples of Europe. If known that even up to today has been playing a big role in the big world's play, then the modern Europe constructors' responsibillity is much more greater regarding all the future generations. Many dictators in Europe, trying to adopt it to their features and interests, have done so much evil that it could be said Europe is the largest camp of freedom, right to live, and the human dignity. Can generations today bear such a project of Europe that would have safe mechanisms to ensure yhe victory of good counter evil. Well, numerous are temtations that Europian man is confronted to, both today and tomorrow. The Europian reality philosophy has to give answers to those questions and temptations.

The basic Euroanthropus's Temptations' theme problem requires a great anlytic-synthetic effort, in comprehending that contents, and defining that notion. Antrophology bore a lot of notion and phenomenon definitions called 'man', and all the definitions beeing already absolved, there

is no need either to quote theme or to oppose them. What has to be said is that man is rather 'a task giving' then 'giving'; and that we deal with a united being for whom his nature is not an in advance given value system (as Leibnitz would say for the world's monanthous nature). Man is not man in advance, at least not by his birth. Without education, creative work, thinking, spiritual and physical effort, problem solving ability, knowledge and self-knowledge it is impossible to become man in advance by mere following nature laws. Even accepting his genetic predispositions, which no doubt have a great importance for man to become man, even than these dispositions or possibilities would not be realized without his special creating. Other living beings do not have to think about what will come next, to plan or make visions. Their future is defined by their birth. From his birth on man is totally opened for future, and his life is in whole a resultant of that he does and imports for himself while creating. His genetic ability creation frame is unbelievable, from the imitation of life just as with all other beings and even more beneath it, and all up to the divine results of his creative power. So it is true that being a man is most difficult for a man. Complex is, very difficult, and unpredicable the path from a weak being to a being who holds both his own and the world's destiny in his hands. There are a lot of proofs that the rule easiness of that animalistic instinctive and brutal in a human life multi-surpasses the effort for advancing towards the highest level of the human dignity. That kind of dignity was once defined as the power of ruling other people, and nature itself. And even today such a space and time orientation is regarded to be the highest and most desirable human dignity level. It is not his only mislead.

If we do not accept (as an esential onthological attitude) that a task giving and not a giving is the a human life essence the most perfect life organization is unvaluable for checking the development value. An oranization means the arranged mutual human relations, as well as human and nature relations. It also means certain rights and duties; it offers chances for the human creative effort demonstrations. Is it the Europe that is being born? The previous one was not such. It would be just a mere utopia to believe that that human, just by itself or under the institutional pressure, will come out and act spontaniously as all the Europians life dimensions. The Europian man creation is a very long and complex process. However, if that essentialy human in the Europian comming civilization gets lost

somewhere in the woods of institutions, rules, economy pressure, tehnologycal power, then there will be nothing of Europe as organization.

I am not sure about the so-called conditions set up to peoples and goverments which are 'not in Europe' yet without regarding there geographical position. Those conditions are written by the ones regarding themselves the world's masters, true Europians, selected ones who surely simbolize the right Europian future. Captivated by economic, technologycal, military and political power fethish they seem to see it is for more easier to fulfil the conditions than to become a Europian citizen in the real sense. And it is up to the moder Europian philosophy to call their attention, themselves getting included into the Europian man rising very actively, with all the differences, but one thought of the holy task towards constant improvement and completition as a being living in a creative dialogue with a world.

The second crucial question the Europian philosophy is exspected to answer is what life experience represents the best new Europe base besides the common geographical position. Is it the question of modern economy experience and commands, political constitution, law system, culture, science, education, sport, information system, computing culture, etc.? A thorough experience could be a driving power of forming a functional and surving Europian peoples organization. Therefore Europe should gather the new 'Europe' project strategists in various spheres whose ideas would have the highest political appreciation level. Voluntarism, or political scientism would not possibly become the political decision closest ally, being deaf for the scientific and philosophical ideas which have not become politics servants but its most important correctors. Political voluntarism and totaliterity having ruled Europe for centuries (even today with a significant adherent number) would not possibly be the leading Europian political idea. Europe should not be the exclusive office experts project that honestly serves the interests of those powerful, of profit, or partial elites. It is neither utopistic nor naive to worry about the recognizable demagoguery of political calculators with an abyss between that spoken i public and that really acted out.

In wise people's counciousness the new Europe appears to be a great chance of positive solving of big conflicts which made it the grounds of cold or open wars with apocaliptic consequences. It was not a mere chance

that in Europe only we have the greatest world wars, propaganda hates and revenges, proclaiming evil for good and vice versa, factories of death. The Europe of alienated people, civilization schism, violence, and the terror and the terrorism rule cannot be our future. A great job is being expected of Europian man, and to do it successfully the notion 'Europe' must be clear and close to him. The Europe of dynamic changes, democratic solving methods can be the home for every Europian possessing a positive energy. Such a Europe could become worthy philosophy subject. Well, we do need the modern philosophy life, economy, technics, culture, communication, politics, law, sports, education and science. That life philosophy can be a plentious spiritual food, and an intellectual support to the modern Europian man.

How much of the evil rule with the Europian man experience as to see that he has to make a common political body that will serve the interests of peace, tollerancy, altruism, the social differences reduction, all leading to violence and destruction of people. Perhaps that is why the United Nations appeared. The idea the Europian people should make something similar was announced long ago. But not long ago didi it become every Europian's real task in the name of the Europian democracy. However the each democracy gretest weakness is when the low ability people become political subjects. And here Plato could help us even today if we rember what the matter is. In the harmony with the best philosophy are cautiousness anallitical critisism of the philosophically educated people, and an openness for all the problems existing on the Europian future creation path. Such a critisism is not a utopism,. not an ideological mistake, or personal interest but the Europian historic movement knowledge consequence – of what it is today and can be tomorrow. Well, in order not to fall into the known problem of easily seen technological knowledge progress (in the technological culture era), and the from-savageness-to-civilization progress unseen, we have to remind of the following problems:

A – The contemporary Europian philosophy should not stay in the indifference sphere against the real life, in some thinking world of its own understood only by a small number of people. The philosophy not differing true and false, productive and destructive, efficient and sensual cannot take part in the new society dinamics. The ruling thinking methodology for which profability is not only an economical aspect but a universal so-

cial measure, is the the philosophy gravedigger. If the above methodology imposes to be a general ruling measure, a new mastering religion despising people from up the riches abundance and power, then the door is opened the philosophy indifference in all men's life questions.

B – Politics, as 'the seducing and dazzling art and cultural cynicism of the ruling ones' can easily change people'sconsiousness and behavior by the means of a powerful information system up to the unfor seen proportions of the imbecils' breeding.Such politics thinks it can thoroughly influence the general people's behaviour, quickly converting them from murderers and liars into men of trust and honour. In the situation like that there is not place for the crucial life truth care. The arguings with the world and the one's self, with the nature and cosmos are being cherishing into forgetness, or into 'the being – antibeing archeology'.

C – Justice is more and more becoming a justice for the powerful and their world control. Various assembly plays (passing so many laws, constitutions, rules, etc.) are mor and more alike a skillfully thought out trap for the naive. In the best case, it could be 'a democratic control of the weaker ones'. The power of the ruling ones is directly connected with the weakness of the ruled ones. Although it is a mere truth that all the beings' nature settled the fact that the physicaly powerful rule the physicaly weaker ones, when dealing with men there is something not admitting that law. Namely, there is no room here for the physicaly stronger subject rule. If so, man would be the earth's inferior being. That stronger in him consists of his mind, of his produced artificial beings, of his smartness, of his mutuel life forms. Even then can the stronger ones' law be proclaimed the human life postulate. Namely, the human kind deprived of the weaker ones' protection measures and rights, would need no laws at all. Those are ages long and past laws, always improving for the democracy development benefit.

What a fortune to bear the Europe Constitution, and what barriers to start its acting. It is still the problem of hope. It is enough if some of the powerful ones does not agree to that common law act without which there is no law basis of Europian man, no responsibility and right for all to follow; or if the priviledged authority carriers in some contries 'defend democracy' from the others; and then rights and justice still stay at the beginning. Being constantly at the social developement beginning means defending own priviledges in the name of everybody's benefit and hap-

piness. We are more and more beiing convinced that great priviledges and small responsibilities of the ruling ones are fully constitutional, and really good for all. The legitimacy problem has been made absurd with the sanctions undertaken by those 'most responsible' ones, most powerful ones, and all that against dictarships, terrorism, elementary human rights violation, being performed upon the whole nation, innocent people who endure both their own authorities evil and the powerful ones' justice at the same time. It seems justice is very selective, not adapted to everybody and always, that enormously proportioned unjustice can also be the powerful ones' justice. So either justice or unjustice are often helped and mixed up to the level which a common sense cannot stand.

D – Some institutions should exist as Europian uniting mechanisms. However, acording to its logic and notion an institution transfers easily its planned and defined position into a ruling one – for disciplinising people. The whole institution loses its contact with people. It really takes people for a statistics mass, impersonal beings with data, placed in some drawers, very easy to control. The institution becomes <u>everything</u> and a single being <u>nothing</u>. The larges and most beautiful buildings in Europe are those of governments, administrations, institutions, offices and controls, police, army, informatics, the human consciousness and behavior control. What about those of science, culture, art, creation, communication, spiritual and spontanious performances enviroment?

E – The myth and fetish rule, evil and seducing people rule can naither be the modern Europe basis nor Europian man's desiring characteristic feature. It means that the tehnics, profit. war, natural or religious belonging fetish, together with that of plays and informatics, which attack the human spiritual health agressively, cannot be the Europian man's values either. And the point is not to support any idealizing or tradition rule but of great danger of attacking the Europe base and that is no doubt the Europian man with all his natural and spiritualy developed needs. A virtual man and a virtual Europe is not our ideal. They are the democratic totalitarity prodacts, not knowing or recognizing the man's human dignity. If the value system perversion appears to be a democratic phenomenon then we are much more closer to the social pathology then the people's unity.

Well, enormous are the temptations Europian man is confronted with. Cautiousness is mother of wisdom. Philosophy that does not see it,

cannot become the spiritual strenght of the Europe that many people are striving to, and see a great possibility for their creative potencials for their own and world benefit.

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Alexander Stoychev

EUROPEAN RATIONALITY AS
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A VALUE CONSENSUS

The unprecedented process of European unification suppose not only an emerging socio-economic and political entity but also a commonwealth of nations based on shared values. While the content and interpretation of the values comprising such a consensus is subject to debates, the core and spirit of those values are founded on a specific form of rationality. The vagueness of the notion of European nationality should not stop us from identifying an intellectual and spiritual tradition that is not limited to modernity, but can be traced down to Greco-Roman antiquity. Jaspers summarizes the features of the Western man as an unlimited rationality rooted in Greek science and Roman law, subjectivity of Being revealed in the personality based on rationality, as well as the perception of the world as factual reality in time (Jaspers 1957). Most often Greece from VII-VI c. B.C. is pointed out as the birth place of a new theoretical and rational attitude in contrast with the pragmatic, mythico-religious attitude of antiquity and the Orient. While the practical aspirations of the ancient Greeks were limited by the narrow horizon of the polis, their theoretical aspirations included no less than the cosmos and the logos. The notion of infinity, otherwise alien to the Greeks, was readily attributed to the power of rational inquiry. True knowledge as episteme was contrasted to doxa (opinion) on the ground of theoretical inference and justification. Husserl describes their philosophical theoria as an end in itself, impractical and based on "artful epoche (suspension of judgment towards) on all natural practice (Husserl, E. 1962, p.394). He stresses however the transformation from "the original theoria, from the completely "disinterested" (resulting in the epoche from all practical interest) gazing at the world (wonder, thaumazein as a source), to the theoria of genuine intellectual science…"

(Husserl 1962: 397). Here comes the understanding of truth and reason as telos. A philosopher's life is devoted "to the task of theoria, to the building of theoretical knowledge on theoretical knowledge ad infinitum" (Husserl 1962: 398). The link of theoria with practice was mainly in the domain of ethics with the assumption that true moral values exist as ideal objects of rational inquiry and validation (Socrates and Plato). Otherwise the theoretical attitude tended to show a remarkable detachment from practical life and negligence of empirical observation of facts. When Russell stresses that the scientific outlook that "statements of fact should be based on observation" is an entirely modern conception, which hardly existed before the seventeenth century, he points out that even Aristotle who is often praised for his fidelity to observation was very far from such standards. "Aristotle maintained that women have fewer teeth than men; although he was twice married, it never occurred to him to verify this statement by examining his wives' mouths" (Russell 1953: 7).

When we compare the theoretical aspirations of the Greeks with the culture of Rome which manifestly lacks such a theoretical spirit and interests, it seems that the idea of "reason as telos " has been abandoned. Actually it has taken a new form in the pragmatic social institutions of Rome. For a first time a vast European space had been unified by the political power and the legions of Rome, but its civilizing impact was exerted through the thin threads of the viaducts, the Roman law and its public institutions. Roman law deserves special attention, as in its developed form it has exerted a remarkable influence throughout European history. In Thorndike's words "through law schools, through the decisions of imperial jurists, and through the legal literature, which reached its height about A.D. 200 in the writings of Ulpian and Papinian, and which is marked by acuteness of reasoning, clearness in statement, and fairness and judgment, Roman law became both technically and practically the greatest legal system that the world had known" (Thorndike 1956: 20). Furthermore "the Roman jurist was not content with logical reasoning if it led to an unfair decision. In such a case he went back and reexamined his premises. He was not satisfied to apply an old law or judicial decision in its original meaning, if the social and economic conditions to which it would have to be applied had altered since its formulation. (Thorndike 1956: 20).

Parallel with this remarkable development a contrasting picture of ruthless pragmatism and egoistic drive for power and material domination, political corruption and violence show ample evidence in the Roman society as early as I c. B.C. If we borrow a metaphor from K.G. Jung, the dark side of European rationality, its "shadow" driven by irrational impulses clearly manifests itself here and throughout the subsequent European history. It is difficult to present European rationality as a continuing body of reason from antiquity to present days. However the flashes of this spirit can be recognized in some of its strange metamorphosis in the Middle Ages. Among them we have to mention the universities with their privileges, autonomy and academic freedom, the special statute and liberties of towns people (e.g. Magna Carta and Habeas Corpus in England, the special individual liberty and security of private property in Italy, France and other European sites.) and even the appeal to reason and the attempts for rational justification of catholic theology. For example Augustine attempts to deduce standards of human behavior from theoretical principles. "His moral order is expressly routed in a natural order established by speculative reason. Justice in the highest sense prescribes the right ordering of all things according to reason" (Fortin 1987: 250). More than that, Fortin asserts that unlike Islam and Judaism that both "present themselves first and foremost as divinely revealed laws or as all-inclusive social orders, regulating every segment of men's private and public lives and precluding from the outset any sphere of activity in which reason could operate independently of divine law – Christianity on the other hand first comes to sight as a faith or as a sacred doctrine, demanding adherence to a set of fundamental beliefs but otherwise leaving its followers at liberty to organize their social and political lives in accordance with norms and principles that are not specifically religious" (Fortin 1987: 251).

Although the new spirit of the Renaissance and of the Reformation has been largely recognized and discussed, in many fields the humanists and reformers lacked originality. Except for the renewed interest in antiquity and the denial of medieval church traditions, the changes seriously affected mostly the fine arts. In many other fields "the course of development already initiated in the medieval centuries went on uninterrupted" (Thorndike 1956: 679).This continuity and the division between the secular and the ecclesiastical mentioned above, facilitated the socio-economic and cul-

tural development of Europe of the epoch of Enlightenment, guided by a marked respect for reason. The specific form that European rationality had taken with modernity was marked by the rise of mathematical knowledge connected with natural sciences and their further progress under the spell of empirical validation. Further manifestations of this spirit can be traced in the subsequent rise of new political ideas concerning human rights, freedom, democracy, equality and justice and in the accelerated technological changes and the rising industries . The last 3-4 centuries marked such an unprecedented explosive development of Europe, change has accelerated with such a speed, that today we began to wonder whether we are still guided by the same rational principles and values that were at the core of this progress. Reason as telos and the Socratic readiness to follow the argument wherever it may lead that had shaped European rationality, fell under the spell of Francis Bacon's "science is power", the idea of "conquering Nature" and the utilitarian-technical approach to the surrounding world. The optimistic visions of progress guided by science so typical of the XIX century had been replaced by bitter disappointments. The beginning of XX century saw the end of la Belle époque and the bitter disillusionment of European intellectuals after the slaughterhouse of World War I. Once again the dark side of European spirit had spread the "shadow" of irrational impulses over the continent bringing much pain and suffering accompanying the nationalistic and social clashes dominated by ruthless egoism, aspirations for power and totalitarian nightmares. The philosophical perceptions of the "shadow" can be traced in a variety of thinkers from that period. Spengler's "Decline of the West", Max Scheller's concept of the knowledge of achievement (instrumental knowledge) whose one sidedness threatens the West to degenerate into a state of "sophisticated barbarism" (Scheller, M. 1962); Husserl's concept of the externalization of reason leaving its proper domain (Husserl, E. 1962); M.Heideger's fears of objectification that result in the attempt to secure human freedom in the natural world through technology (Gillespie 1987: 897).

The rationalization of the "shadow" doesn't mean that once we have discovered and explained our irrational impulses and motivations and their corresponding societal forms, we would be able to remove them by adhering to an enlightened rational project. This is equal to the claim that there exist an ideal form of societal organization and leads directly to the

chimeras of utopian social engineering. What we claim is that in the light of a specific European intellectual tradition values can be justified by rational inquiry. This makes it possible to escape from relativistic post-modern conclusions that all sets of values stand equal and if "anything goes", then the best we can do is equally respect or at least tolerate all of them. The justified value choice is not separated from the question in what kind of a world we would prefer to live tomorrow. The model of liberal democracy may raise questions of different sort, but certain values have passed the test of rational inquiry. Summarizing the liberal tradition I. Berlin states it as follows: …"no society is free unless it is governed by at any rate two interrelated principles: first, that no power, but only rights, can be regarded as absolute, so that all men, whatever power governs them, have an absolute right to refuse to behave inhumanly; and second, that there are frontiers, not artificially drawn, within which men should be inviolable, these frontiers being defined in terms of rules so long and widely accepted that their observance had entered into the very conception of what it is to be a normal human being, and, therefore, also of what it is to act inhumanly or insanely…" (Berlin 1969: 165).

In the beginning of XIX century George Byron wrote prophetically:

"This is the patent age of new inventions
For killing bodies, and for saving souls,
All propagated with the best intentions."

That age lasted too long and costs too much to European people. Now for the first time in its history European society has the unique opportunity for peaceful and cooperative existence in a common socio-economic and cultural space. There might be disputes and different interpretations of the recognized common values that underlie this emerging unity and of course no ideal and final solutions. Repeating old errors, would be a lack of wisdom, only confirming J. Swift's statement that we never learn from our mistakes, because stupidity always takes a new image. The consensus about the possibility of finding reasonable practical solutions by means of rational debate and dialog, give us hope however, that our specific form of European rationality is increasingly establishing more control on the irrational obsessions of its "shadow".

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Maria Trofimova

PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNT OF MODERNITY: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PARADOXES.

In his Vienna lecture dated 1934 Edmund Husserl stated: "Clearly the title Europe designates the unity of a spiritual life and a creative activity – with all its aims, interests, cares and troubles, with its plans, its establishments, its institutions". From this he proceeds to the statement that the original phenomenon of spiritual Europe, not of the geographical concept of Europe, consists in the emergency of philosophy in the sense of universal science, science of the world as a whole, of the universal unity of all being. This phenomenon of philosophy as the first and universal science emerged in the Ancient Greece and since then, according to Husserl, remains the main pivot of European humanity.

In this paper I am not going to contest this idea of the origin of the European spirit, but rather try to elaborate on the consequences that necessarily follow from it. It can be stated that it is exactly philosophy that binds Europe as a unity and preserves its specific features through the centuries. The exact way of how it has happened and (if at all) continues to happen is by no means clear. Philosophy as a universal science and other particular sciences existed in the European society in a special mode, which was shaped through the centuries. This mode can be called the academy or, more general, school. The notion of school, though, appears to be obscure and problematic if it is considered in its historicity. The first group of problems is related to the notion of heritage and the unity of philosophical thought through centuries and can be pushed to its extreme with the question of whether the phenomenon called (post)modern philosophy has anything at all to do with, for example, Plato or Aristotle. Another problematic field comes from the attempts to search for the basis of the

classical distinction of philosophy into Ancient, Medieval and Modern. It can be argued that this distinction is nothing but an artificial scheme, which has nothing to do with the real historical thought-process, but there is, unfortunately, no serious alternative to it.

If we understand the school as an institution where philosophy is *shared* as *knowledge* and where it can be taught and learned, then philosophy understood along these lines has always existed within the framework of school: not only Proclus, Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas belonged to a school, but Plato and Aristotle as well, and the same can be said about Schelling and Hegel, and even – to mention the 20th century – about Husserl and Heidegger. The school understood in such a narrow way does not allow for the questions either about the origin of the school itself (to be more precise it allows such questions only in the form of the positivistic historical/archival investigation about the origin of the particular institution), or about the role of the wise teacher (ancient times) or the natural metaphysician (Kant) in the school. Moreover, this notion of school even blocks any possible articulation of the relation of the school itself to every kind of knowledge which it does not include and support. Philosophy so understood does not have any substantial opposition to itself and lacks an articulated and elaborated history other than the school's own legends. Needless to say, this kind of school can easily disappear, and such occasions we can be easily pointed out in the commonly accepted history of philosophy.

On the other hand, if by philosophy we understand the very *idea* of philosophical thinking (the philosophical *nous*), then we have to admit that it is not an achievement of any particular philosopher, and does not even have its origin in anything specifically human at all. Thus it cannot have a particular place among human activities, neither in a school, nor outside of it. This kind of thinking is so 'independent' in its origin that it cannot be opposed to school understood in any sense (neither in the aforementioned narrow sense, nor in the ancient or Neokantian sense, about which I will speak later). Neither can it be related historically (as an event) to any specific 'philosophy', be it the philosophy of Plato or of Descartes in opposition to Platonism or Cartesianism. Insofar as the so understood philosophical thinking does not have anything in common with the human striving nature, by the same token it cannot possess its own specific historicity. Its origin is very obscure and cannot be articulated in terms of an epochal event,

unless the very historicity of thinking acquires a totally different meaning – a meaning that does not guarantee the possibility of experience of any particular philosophizing human being. The truth of the so understood ideal philosophical thinking cannot reside in temporality or in the facticity of the human understanding aiming for this truth, as it was prescribed in the modern maxim of Enlightenment. Therefore, this idea of philosophy does not necessarily require the traditional historical existence of any philosophical school, and at the same time it is not 'responsible' for the disappearance of philosophy from the school when the latter transforms into the social institution, which is subject not to philosophy anymore, but to the scientific and the world-view crises, and represents a number of techniques for their rethinking, critique and overcoming.

The school can be also understood as the co-existence and common efforts of people aiming at truth accessible to human beings. This notion of school dates from ancient times and keeps its value even in the Modernity. The problem with such a definition of the school consists in the fact that it is difficult to position it within the horizon of what is outside of it, with the environing world. There is always a danger within the school perspective to label the outsiders as those, using Aristotle's expression, who all the time feel as good as we extremely rarely do. In this case, what is opposed to school will turn out to be no less than the psychological everyday life of the individuals and social structures of the humankind. In order to keep this opposition at work the school inevitably should claim the status of the 'elite' upon itself, which obviously means nothing but the participation in the two of the aforementioned pivots, i.e. the inscription into the existing acceptable human psychological behavior and social institutions. Another danger is that the school's own self-sufficiency and peculiarity can be easily reduced to the content of the philosophical myth about the 'wise Philosopher' whose works are more or less held as the point of departure for the members of the school own philosophical efforts.

We see now that any understanding of school, however problematic, calls into question the very notion of the historical division of philosophical epochs and especially the understanding of 'Modern philosophy'. If we turn now to the specific position that philosophy occupies in modernity, the obvious question we are faced with is about the modernity of philosophy itself; in other words, about the grounds on which the discipline

or science rooted in the tradition can develop and change and about the conditions of possibility of such a change. In the 20th century philosophy we have two exemplary ways of understanding and describing the philosophical changes in the transition from the 'old' (be it the Medieval philosophy or the renaissance of ancient thought) to the modern paradigm of thinking. To present them in the most simple and reduced way, Heidegger believes *metaphysics* to be the ground for all the changes: the shift in the fundamental metaphysical thinking defines the shifts in the essences of other sciences and the status of knowledge in general. Alternatively, Foucault claims that it is the *episteme* that changes, i.e. change occurs in the order and the essence of thought in general, and philosophy, as just one mode of thinking, changes accordingly. It has to be taken into account, though, that Heidegger has almost never dealt with the history of sciences other than philosophy (be it understood as logics or metaphysics), and Foucault also only mentions different *philosophical* theories in his descriptions of the shifts in the positivistic scientific knowledge. What is characteristic for both ways of argumentation is the absence of an account of the peculiar historical fact that the novelties in thought did not emerge and the old way of philosophizing did not disappear in one stroke or within, say, half a century. On the contrary, until the end of the 18th century traditional pre-modern philosophy co-existed with the modern and, moreover, were actively involved into theoretical discussions with it held in the framework of the academic disputes. This circumstance, i.e. the absence of attention to this fact in the works of both aforementioned philosophers, should not be accepted as purely contingent. It seems that the two exemplary ways of constructing the history of philosophy fail to deal with this fact for important philosophical reasons, insofar as both of them describe the history itself in no other way but as the *order* of justification. Heidegger, motivated by his idea of the end of metaphysics, plausibly sees the foundation of any epoch in its metaphysics accordingly. Foucault sees it in the positivistic order of knowledge or discourse, and this choice of foundation perfectly fits the framework of his archeological method. Both philosophers presuppose that the very philosophical basis of the historicity of any of occurring changes, which lead to the pulling down of one epoch and the emergence of the new one, is some *event* that is hidden behind the traditional history of philosophy or knowledge, but manifests itself in

the very possibility of such a history. Both modes of presenting the way of dealing with the problem of the emergence of modernity beg a question, whether there is simply too much of rationality and justification in these attempts to write a fundamental history of interconnected and intertwined field of philosophical knowledge. Are they not caught in the circle of the rationally understood history and the history of rational thought defined by Kant? Nevertheless, it can be presupposed that the history of modernity is not that well-grounded in itself, that the history of metaphysics and the history of knowledge have a connection, but are still two different histories which cannot serve as a basis for the justification of each other.

The established history of knowledge and the notion of the modern paradigm of knowledge have a problematic relation to each other, so that in many cases they even share clarity and justification or 'borrow' it from each other. It can be argued that the questions of the meaning and essence of philosophical modernity should be considered primarily within the accepted history of knowledge and history of philosophy. On the other hand, it can also be argued that the history of knowledge we have now is the by-product of Modern thinking. This paradox can be restated in the following way: the history of knowledge deals with 'modernity' as with one of its own peculiar concepts, although 'the history of knowledge' is itself a concept within Modern paradigm of thinking.

Arguably, the history of knowledge has as its aim the clarification of the meaning of historical reality and the answer to the question, why human knowledge has taken the form it did, what are the reasons for it to take the shape it has. On the other hand, the history of philosophy, for example, traditionally has very little in common with other historical disciplines. It is not a methodology of the historical inquiry unrelated to philosophy, and it is not connected with the elaboration of the concepts and schemes of the historical science in general. The history of knowledge is aimed at development of different kind of concepts, concepts defining the horizon of what can be known in principle given the particular understanding, occurring within the particular epoch, of what knowledge is. Some of these concepts can appear extremely problematic due to the fact that they describe the conditions of possibility for the philosophical knowledge in its totality. The notion of Modernity in its relation to philosophy is one of them.

It is quite telling that in the historical science proper there is no articulated notion of the contemporary situation. It is commonly accepted that the historical inquiry should promote itself into the future through the present, although the actual inquiries stop at the point where the last occurring events can be found. 'Afterwards' there is simply no object for the analyses of facticity, which are replaced accordingly with the moral, political or any other evaluation of the matters of fact. It is justified by the presupposition that in every historical inquiry a certain gap between the object of the investigation and the means of its description should be preserved.

This disposition looks very different in philosophy. If philosophy should be considered historically at all, then the present situation is first and foremost the object of radical rethinking: it is in modernity that philosophy finds the meaning of historicity (and exactly in the attempts to find this meaning such concepts as post-modernity and the like emerge), and to a large extent finds itself, in the sense of its striving to be something more rather than history of philosophy, rather than the denial or critical reproduction of the already existing thoughts.

Despite all the value of the notion of modernity for philosophy it can hardly be stated that philosophy nowadays has already acquired such a developed notion that imply only the elaboration of the details within systematic discussions and detailed research. The notion of modernity arguably calls for more problems than it is aimed to solve. It is essentially obscure not only because there can be found many co-existing formulations of it nowadays. But it is through elaboration of this notion the determination of philosophy not just as history of philosophy, but as modern philosophy, which exists here and now, takes shape.

The highest level of schematization in history seems almost inevitable. History in itself is the collection of facts first and foremost, so that any philosophical history should present us with the evaluation of the content of these facts, and this evaluation can hardly avoid being schematic, in terms of distribution of facts among the centuries, periods, countries and nations. History of knowledge is, nevertheless, not only the schematization of the ready-made material. When it tells us about centuries, nations and other constitutive elements of historical schematization it presents us with the account not only of the content of some historical moment, but with the essence of this historical moment in itself. In this sense the

philosophical peculiarity of the history of knowledge consists in the avoidance of what is taken for granted, what is understandable without any further deliberations. The temporality of the philosophical description of the knowledge history consists not in the schematizing, and not in the replacing of the physical time with the social, but in the underlining of what is non-temporal, ideal within the described period of time.

Thus, we are faced with the described above problematic field of the philosophy's account of its own historicity, which only becomes even more problematic if we recall the multi-layered notion of (modern) philosophical school. How, then, a modern philosopher should position itself within a contemporary society, given the fact that one understanding of the philosophical school requires a solely theoretical insight, which hardly coincide with human practical purposes and another way of understanding requires from a philosopher to be practically involved in the contemporary social life, even if it is reduced to its academic matters? Husserl, with whose quote this paper starts, suggests an arguably plausible solution to this problem, namely the synthesis of the opposing interests that occurs in the transition from the theoretical to the practical attitude. In order to achieve a theoretical insight an *epoche* (reduction) from all practical considerations is needed indeed. But this insight into the sphere of the ideal laws and meanings can be then transformed into a practical outlook, which can take shape of the political critique of the contemporary social structure or the practical outcomes of the particular sciences. It is exactly in this sense that he introduced the notion of philosophy as a rigorous science governing and giving justification to all other sciences, be it sciences proper, or humanities, or social sciences, up to the rigorous critique of the modern humankind itself with its explicit and implicit values. It is the theoretical insight which transforms into a practical norm guided by the scientific reason, and this reason only, according to Husserl, is able to elevate the humankind to the point when it will be in accord with norms of truth in every form, so that it will hold an absolute responsibility to itself. This is the possible way by means of which the practical and the theoretical attitudes can be joined together, and it can lead to 'the rebirth of Europe from the spirit of philosophy, through a heroism of reason that will definitively overcome naturalism.'

Ina Dimitrova

BRUNO LATOUR AND MERAB MAMARDASHVILLI – SITES OF ENCOUNTERS

The aim of this paper is a humble one – to present the common theoretical 'places' in the vocabularies and in the theoretical 'box with instruments' of two comparatively distant, at first sight, traditions: the eastern Marxist tradition, presented by Merab Mamardashvilli and one western, empirical, to great extent, research programme, namely Actor-Network Theory. In the focus I put two central notions – the so-called converted form (Verwandelte Form), broadly discussed and employed by Mamardashvilli and the 'black box' of ANT. I argue that they have considerably similar structure, origin and role in the conceptual scheme of Mamardashvilli and Actor-Network Theory, respectively.

The first part of the paper presents schematically some of the common initial assumptions, on which these two theories are based. The second one explores these two notions and the third one argues that some of the initial assumptions that are present in ANT and not in Mamardashvilli are crucial for the better 'utilization' of such concepts and respectively – for the investigation of such phenomena. Accordingly, this opens a wider horizon for research, especially in social sciences. Particularly, I focus on the fundamental distinction between that which is 'real', 'genuine' and that, which is 'mere appearance', epiphenomenon. This distinction is preserved in Mamardashvilli's thinking, while blurred in ANT. Precisely this feature of Mamardashvilli's theory makes him still speaking of 'the deep fetishist presuppositions' of the converted form, which distinguishes it from the 'actual scientific object'.

The step that Latour undertakes, that is blurring this distinction, is necessary one – the demystification-option disappears and what remains is treating the black box and exploring its possibilities as an entity or mac-

roobject, which has completely rational and sensible relations with the rest of the 'representatives' of given regional ontology. This perspective is crucial for the social sciences because proposes one way to consider a wide set of social phenomena or artefacts.

1. Initial assumptions – a sketchy account

Both programmes aim at eliminating some classical oppositions – subject – object scheme of knowledge and scientific practice, the clear-cut demarcation line between ontology and epistemology, the 'hard' distinction between the (material) world out there, which waits to be represented and the mental reality in here, in mind.

The logical outcome is the common thesis of the historical and praxeological genealogy of scientific objectivity, which could be connected with some Husserl's assertions in the Crisis According to him the law-like statements correspond to objective qualities of the world, due to the practical and conceptual production of the observable phenomena themselves (Husserl 2002: 133). This could be thought as one perfect summary of the essence of the conceptual efforts of ethnomethodology and social studies of science. The difference is that Husserl's focus on the transcendental subject is shifted towards communicative practices and technology, which cannot be enclosed in the structure of individual mind.

On this basis the consideration of ontology itself is also similar – Mamardashvilli speaks of the being-incompleteness principle and the continuum 'being-consciousness', and Latour of the mutual constitution of object, environment, scientist. As Callon says reality is a process – it passes through successive states as chemical compound (Callon 1986: 8). Latour holds that there are special states or phases of the scientific 'matter' that he calls – 'warm'. Just after that phase we have 'facts' or statements with no trace of authorship.

2. Black boxes and converted forms

This proximity of the initial assumptions is the reason for the comparison of the mentioned above notions – black box and converted form. A closer look at them proves that there is enough ground for this question – it appears that they have quite similar functions and origin.

Introduced quite schematically the black box is any setting that, no matter how complex it is or how contested its history has been, is now so stable and certain that it can be treated as a fact. "A black box contains that which no longer needs to be considered, those things whose contents have become a matter of indifference." (Callon, Latour, 1981). The law, for example, is a collection of black boxes. In its formation stage a law is a contested set of competing sentences around which occasionally large alliances are built to influence their specific shape. During the legislative process they are fluid and open. Once the legislation has been passed, contested sentences turn into a black box, sealing all the elements, however arbitrary they might be, in a fixed and stable relationship that cannot be questioned easily.

If we use the Callon's concept 'translation' which implies the passing through different, successive states in the mentioned above 'warm' phase of mutual constitution, the notion of black box should grasp the moment when the whole process begins to run automatically and there is no need to renegotiate the process case by case.

Through this concept Callon explains the durability of given configurations of actor-networks. The successful translation process leads to agreement and coordination and as a result the network converges and becomes irreversible (Callon 1991). In this moment it becomes stable and starts to behave and to be treated as one entity rather than as a heterogeneous network. In other words it becomes black box and wraps up all previous passage points in the process. A macro-actor (an actor-network that behaves like an actor) grows by adding or associating actors to herself and simplifying them into one black box. In the process of becoming black box the key moment that makes it possible is the so called displacement. In one of the most famous studies of ANT, the scallops are transformed into larvae, the larvae into numbers, the numbers into tables and curves which represent easily transportable, reproducible, and diffusable sheets of paper. The scallops have been displaced by graphic representations and mathematical analyses. They are transported into the conference room through a series of transformations. The same happens to the soil samples in Latour's study Circulating Reference (1999) or with the yeast in Pasteur's laboratory.

One of the most important features of black boxes is that they are the objects, which we designate as referent, as the cause rather than as the

outcome. In reality it is the outcome, which becomes possible and comes to existence only after a long series of transformations. In such a sense it is consequence and not a cause. (Callon 1986: 15).

It is time to explore the main features of the converted form. I will begin with one description, which is literally a repetition of the metaphor 'black box': Mamardashvilli characterizes the converted form as 'dead, lifeless space', as a shadow on different parts of the system, which induces a space of principal non-understanding.

It appears that these phenomena – black boxes and converted forms play similar role and are build up in similar way. The interaction in complex systems creates qualitatively new phenomena, additional 'forms of life', namely the converted forms. They regulate the system through filling the missing links and replace them with new relations. Instead of the complex web of relations we have quasi-object (Mamardashvilli 2004: 228). Now this quasi-object replaces those relations which have become unobservable and 'dropped out'. In these phenomena the intermediate phases have converged in the same way as in the case of black boxes. And again exactly like them, the converted forms are conceived as initial causes and premises, as indecomposable, independent entities (Mamardashvilli 2004: 224). It stands to reason the similarity with the irreversibility of the black box.

More than that – the converted form is crucially characterized by the notion – displacement: it 'saves up', economizes the passing through all the states and phases, which are irrelevant to the operation of the system as a whole.

3. Why ANT is better?

Simplifying, I would say that ANT is better because the key concept 'black box' is embedded in different set of initial methodological assumptions, besides those, mentioned in the beginning, which are quite similar. Mamardashvilli preserves in clearer way the ontological hierarchization of real and 'seeming', which is typical motive in social sciences and in critical theory in its modernist mould. Radically distancing from such position, ANT blurs this distinction and attempts to make 'one-level' analysis without the support of made in advance distinctions. Mamardashvilli's main tenet is to look 'behind', to reveal the deep fetishist preconditions of converted forms, to debunk. According to him in the real scientific

analysis we cannot do with converted forms – we should explore into the 'real relations' behind the converted form. Instead of this demystifying, liberating gesture ANT prefers doing good descriptions: If we display a socio-technical network – defining trajectories by actants' association and substitution, defining actants by all the trajectories in which they enter, by following translations and, finally, by varying the observer's point of view – we have no need to look for any additional causes. The explanation emerges once the description is saturated. There is no need to go searching for mysterious or global causes outside networks. If something is missing, it is because something is missing. (Latour 2004b). This position has its far reaching consequences: if we abandon the ontological hierarchization, we will be able to discern the importance of Things – those beautiful, searching for forums matters of concern, those mobile states, which resemble so much the Dewey's image of the 'public'. The politics today is forced to balance on the matters of concern, which should be handled with care and caution and shared responsibility. The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The critic is not the one who lifts the rugs from under the feet of the naïve believers, but the one who offers the participants arenas in which to gather. (Latour 2004a).

In such a sense today, in our globalizing or 'second modernity' society we should deal with highly complex, entangled social 'textures' and it is no more relevant to try to arrange our social lives and order by exercising the well known 'revolutionary gesture', directed towards all illusive idols. 'Reactionary' is dangerous and unstable word, but it might be understood as simply the wish to bring back into the fabrication in facts and to make the salutary 'Beware!' audiable again…(Latour 1999: 291).

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Liliya Sazonova

THE ISSUE OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY IN THE CONTEXT OF MULTICULTURALISM

The question about the European identity does not require reflection on a silent, past and completed phenomenon. As such, the elaboration of the contemporary phenomena challenges the relevance of the Hegel's notion that 'The owl of Minerva, takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering'[1]. It is rather an actual, unpredictable, on-going process that is being constructing and transforming at the time of the philosophical consideration.

That is why the main purpose of the essay is not to exhaust the issue neither is to propose receipts or definite answers how to shape New Europe or to construct effective European cultural identity. The paper, instead, aims at providing a framework for an open discussion or for further reflection on the subject. It tries to highlight certain problems connected with the creation of the European identity and its linkage with the concept of multiculturalism. Therefore, the main questions that will structure the paper address the discussion about the extent to what European identity is being multiculturally constructed as well as the consequences and specificities of constructing the European identity following a multicultural sample.

Speaking about the construction of the European identity, there is a clear link between the liberal theories and its creation. Both the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment figures and streams within liberalism be they 'classical' authors or more contemporary ones, influenced the foun-

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[1] Hegel, G. (1821), in: "Preface'" to *The Philosophy of Right,* translated by S. W. Dyde, 1896

dations of the European idea and principles. The modern culture and liberal values can be undisputedly seen as a basis of the European culture. For instance, the New Age attitudes towards creation of a new tradition, the age of ideology, rationalism, individualism, the notions of freedom, the social contract and order, and importantly – the concepts of universalism and democracy, have an impact on the construction of the European socio-cultural system.

Another issue that demonstrates the way liberalism inspired European culture and identity is the importance of the articulation and defense of the 'rights' – civil and human rights alike. As William Sweet[2] points out, not only the founders of modern liberalism, such as Hobbes, Locke and Kant, for whom the concept of natural right obviously has a central position but also authors like Rousseau, Bentham, Mill, and Green for whom such rights do not have such a fundamental role address the question of their nature, source, and limits. The European Union[3] continues the liberal rights' paradigm at the level of the civil and human rights. In this regard, the EU officially recognizes the universal applicability of human rights. Although the protection of human rights is not among the initial goals of the Union it is part of its engagements and political identity. For example, in 1999 a Committee on Democracy and Human Rights to the European Commission started to work providing technical and financial assistance, supporting programs and plans for action aimed at protecting human rights and the European Chart on the Fundamental Human Rights is underlined in the draft of the European Constitution.

From the above-mentioned, it can be concluded that, on the one hand, the historical roots of the idea of united Europe as well as some of the central characteristics of the European identity are reflected in its relation to liberalism.

On the other hand, given the challenges of post-modernism, the process of globalization and life in a world that is increasingly pluralistic, the criticism of the possibility of universal values and liberal notions has taken place. An evident example of such revision of the common European val-

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[2] Sweet, W. "Liberal Political Philosophy and Rights from the 18th to the 20th Century", http://www.uib.no/issei2000/workshop/sec4/sweet.htm, August 7, 2000.

[3] Hereafter EU

ues is the debate and eventually the refusal of the EU and consequently – European identity's identification with Christianity in the Preamble of the European constitution. The multicultural construction of identity adds new aspects to the human rights concepts insisting on their cultural specificity thus undermining or at least challenging the liberal EU values like universality, democracy, etc. Therefore, the second influence on the construction of the European identity one can observe derives from the concept of multiculturalism.

There is an on-going debate on the pros and contras of multiculturalism as well as on its applicability in the European context. For example, Mozejko in his article "Multiculturalism – an ideal and reality"[4] argues that unlike the Canadian multiculturalism that is implemented or intended to be implemented in practice, its interpretation in the majority of the EU countries remains mainly a theoretical issue taking place in the academic discussions but without a consistent legal basis and regulation. Countries like France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK similarly to the USA associate multiculturalism only with community-based claims arising from immigrant population with no results at the official political level. At the level of the separate nation-state members of the EU the responses to the "multicultural riddle"[5] differ. A notorious example illustrating the rejection of one of the basic multicultural policies – the acceptance of traditional and religious dress in schools, the military and society in general was offered by the French ban on religious symbols in public institutions. Such a political initiative that resulted in legal restrictions is in the spirit of liberalism according to which cultural identities (including religious ones) that differentiate individuals from each other remain for the private sphere only, while in the public one citizens communicate on the basis of their common universal characteristics – reason, human nature, shared values, etc.

Nonetheless, there are examples illustrating the opposite view: Italy and Spain have institutionalized multicultural practice by establishing re-

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[4] Mozejko, E. "Multiculturalism – an ideal and reality", http://www.slovo.bg/old/litforum/136/edwardm.htm

[5] Baumann, G. (1999). *The multicultural riddle: Rethinking National, Ethnic, and Religious Identities,* London: Routledge, pp. 122-133.

gions with their own powers, while Switzerland officialized linguistic diversity. Additionally, other authors criticize Canadian multicultural model claiming that although multicultural policies as a rule oppose cultural assimilation, the policy of Canada do support structural assimilation because the immigrant groups are encouraged to participate in the larger society, learn the majority languages, and enter the labour force.

Thus one can assume that the EU member-states do not respond equally to the multicultural challenge. But when it comes to the official EU policy some resemblance with the multicultural notion can be found. The implementation of the governmental multicultural policies around the world can include dual citizenship, programs to encourage minority representation in politics, education and the work force, support for arts from cultures around the world, etc[6]. Similarly, the EU's approach of managing cultural diversity within the Union duplicates this multicultural public policy. An example is the multicultural fragmentation of society into self-contained communities that corresponds to the EU official intent to promote the policy of regionalism having the ambition to decentralize political decisions (especially in the cultural and educational sphere) and place them closer to the citizens.

But what is even more important is the question if multicultural praxis can adequately correspond to the EU needs and reality when constructing a common identity for its people. On the one hand, multiculturalism presents a way to guarantee respect for cultural identities and equality of rights, while consolidating the foundations of democracy. In this regard, some Canadian political scientists argue that such a defuse of the nationalistic temptation can prevent the existing social problems in Germany, France, England and the Netherlands and can reconcile the conflicts in the South Eastern Europe that is to be eventually accepted in the EU.

However, the question that puts reservations about the possibility multiculturalism to be the "solution" for the European conflicts and for the construction of a common identity in Europe is the different historical background Europe has compared with the other continents where multicultural project takes place. For example, in Canada, the USA or Australia

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[6] See Wikipedia, Multiculturalism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiculturalism

the multicultural practice is reality to some extent and in some of them (Canada) it is even officially codified.[7] Symbolically, although the word "multiculturalism" was first used in 1957 to describe Switzerland –a European country, it came into common currency in Canada in the late 1960s. It was created as a response to the bilingual and bicultural French-English society. As such, it was a phenomenon designed and working in a, to some extent, artificial environment – demographically and culturally contemporary Canada was set up relatively recently and by immigrants. But on the old continent it is not the immigrants but the indigenous people living for centuries in the region who are addressed by the multicultural suggestion. Unlike the other above-mentioned continents whose history and common existence date back only few centuries ago, in Europe mutual stereotypes have been deeply-seated for centuries and the reciprocal hostilities motivated by the history, ethnic differences, religions and cultures have been part of the national myths. Therefore, a question that remains to be answered is whether the multicultural model can be transferred to the EU who is not a nation-state type construction but a structure constituted by centuries-long co-existing identities with deep national traditions and roots?

Moreover, multiculturalism tends to let the public space be invaded by expressions of subgroup identities. This, together with the fragmentation of society in several linguistic factions might ultimately lead to loss of public debate and democratic unity making many doubt the viability of a democratic European Union. However, the latter is not a critique related to the European identity only but to the multiculturalism as a whole implying that the world-wide ethnic revival of the late 1960s would lead to an ethnic Balkanization destructive to modern industrial societies.

From anthropological view it is significant to mention the influence multicultural construction of a common European identity might have on the individual identities of the EU citizens. Ayn Rand considered multiculturalism and monoculturalism to be *culturally determinist collectivism*

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[7] The multicultural policy was added to Canada's 1982 constitution, in section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Also the Canadian Multiculturalism Act received Royal Assent in July 1988 affirming that Canada is a multicultural nation.

(i.e., that individual human beings have no free choice in how they act and are conditioned irreversibly by society). Philosophically, Rand rejected this form of collectivism on the grounds that: 1) it undermines the concept of free will, and 2) the human mind (according to her philosophy) is a tabula rasa at birth.

In the same line of reasoning, Anthony Apia warns that the collective identification (of individuals as members of specific sex, race, ethnic group, nationality, etc) that multiculturalism presupposes imposes certain images how a person belonging to a specific group should behave and perceive him/herself. From the point of view of the philosophical anthropology, these collective scenarios have tremendous impact on human's self identification – they ignore and destruct the possibility of validating the personal existential value of moral choice and self determination as unique human being. On the contrary, acting in accordance with the multicultural principles, people tend to perceive themselves attributively – identifying themselves as representatives of a certain group, not subjectively – as distinctive, morally responsible human beings. The latter substitution reminds of the liberal reduction of the person – from a separate and distinctive human being to a citizen with equal rights among other citizens. The difference is that while liberalism puts the accent on the individual's belonging to the humanity or to human beings as such, multiculturalism recognizes even more specifically the individual on the base of his/her belonging to a particular group. But none of them discusses the person out of its belonging to the "sameness" – be it a nature, a characteristic, a group or a collective identity. However, these both critiques of multicultural and liberal vision of the human being do not undermine the great intellectual, political and social value and achievements they have and are evident when investigated from other standpoints.

At the same time, multicultural approach is a kind of an "under-questioning" of the traditional, prescribed, mainstream culture. Similarly to the postmodern ideas, multiculturalism states there are no obligatory samples but only dissimilar models, cultures and values with which the individual decides to identify him/herself. And if it was not so much orientated toward collective identities, it could be like a learning to be subject of one's own life, decisions and identity. Moreover, the term multiculturalism became a substantive category for all those who in the postmodern society

are striving to express their subjectivity and equal status. The creation of the phenomenon itself was inspired and motivated by the people's aspiration of fully recognized and embodied identity and respect of their status as unique and specific subjects sometimes to the extent of narcissism. Compared to the other possible approaches towards cultural diversity and the Others, like assimilation, integration or indifference, multicultural acceptance and respect offer a higher degree of expressing ones collective identity and peaceful co-existence with the Others. Thus unlike other polices of managing peaceful co-existence with the Others, like monoculturalism, leading culture and melting pot, multiculturalism better suit the European situation of having double – national and European identities.

Thus in terms of the philosophical anthropology, multiculturalism satisfies the need of the human being of self _expression and raises the important question about the Others in constructing *self* identification or as in the case of the EU – of a *common* field of identification. Importantly, the definition of the term "multiculturalism" in the EU situation has new aspects and requires redefining its traditional meaning as a governmental policy dealing with immigrant subcultures. In the European case we cannot speak about a *governmental policy* towards *immigrant* groups and their cultures only but about the EU policy that would concern both immigrants *and European citizens* ideally reconciling their possible cultural clashes and introducing a culture of mutual respect and recognition of each other's ethnic, religious, sexual, etc. identity.

The latter specificity of the *European* construction of identity shows the Others not only as a "prerequisite" for creating my identity but they are practically part of my identity – I construct a *shared* identity together with them. The emblematic Taylor's statement about the dialogical identity says that:

We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us (…) The making and sustaining of our identity (…) remains dialogical throughout our lives. Thus my discovering my own identity does not mean that I work it out in isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others[8]

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[8] Taylor, Ch. (1994) *"Politics of recognition",* in: Gutmann, A., *Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 33-34.

However, in the European situation the Others are not only my mirror, my "significant other" as George Mead[9] puts it, but they are *co-authors* of *our* identity. Or in other words, if multiculturalism emphasizes the unique characteristics of different cultures, as they relate to one another in receiving nations the European paradox is that there is no receiving nation in the EU when constructing the common identity. So together with the dialogue within the EU that following Taylor is to shape the national identities EU needs another significant "other" to become the Other of the representatives of the European identity? America? The Muslim other? Turkey – the inner other as a test for the EU. Or the Others this time are maybe the national identities that confront, complement and accept the new European identity thus forming it and being formed, reconstructed and respected by it on their turn.

It seems, however, that exactly the dialogue between the existing national and the envisioned European identities is missing. Although it is not socially-derived or monological, the multiculturally constructed European identity is in a way social oppression over the personal sphere or in the Amy Gutmann's[10] words multiculturalism deconstructs the intellectual subordinating it to the political discourse. This raises the debate to what extent political interests and considerations can interfere in the intellectual, cultural, personal, existential realities? Even more given that the normative, political approach is emblematic for the EU hierarchically constructed European identity and reminds of the Soviet or Yugoslavian cultural identities that proved to be unsuccessful.

The result of the two French and Dutch referenda have clearly revealed the distance that lies between the construction of the European institutional project and the existence of a common European identity that could eventually lead citizens to share the political and institutional aims. And here the main question is not anymore – how multicultural is the construction of the European identity. Because multiculturalism as a policy and as an ideology exists on the EU agenda and is systematically

[9] Mead, G. (1934). *Mind, Self, and Society*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[10] Gutmann, Amy (1994). *Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 36.

promoted from Brussels. It is rather the issue how to reconcile the tension "power – existential" in the EU and parallel to the politically imposed by the center to the periphery instructions, an authentic intercultural communication among Europeans to take place as a natural basis for a future common field of *our*-identification. Only then Europe will be able to reach its declared definition 'a state of mind' and replace the current one "a state of norm". And only then the pre-reflectively inherited national identities can be harmonically combined with the new identity constructed as a reflected choice one made on the base of the certain European values, models and standard of life.

Milena Licheva

PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE EAST AND THE WEST
(the process of constituting United Europe)

On the basis of philosophical reflection on experience in European projects Socrates (in the sphere of education) I will endeavour to describe my encounter of 'otherness' in representatives of European Union member states, as well as to ponder on conversations on the future of Europe – unclear and problematic – as Marcel Gochet refers to it (in Situation politique, Paris, 2005), conversations in which we articulate our differences but never for their own sake, but in the context of the thought of reality Europe.

My argument is that I differentiate between "intellectual difference" as such, seen by European masterminds, their reflections on the future of Europe, on the division East-West, and the "existentially experienced difference" which is precipitated experience, a basis for potential philosophical reflection.

I infer that the second difference is rich in reflexive and practical runways. And that it has potential for a practical unification of Europe in the sense of creation of bridges, links and interrelationships in everyday life. I will describe their potential in the context of change in the personality and change in society. I have in mind the contacts which serve as the beginning of change – spiritual, everyday life change, social and institutional change.

My first analytical viewpoint is that European intellectuals have dwelt upon the problem of the difference between East-West and expressed their belief that potentially there lies an opportunity for United Europe.

The West can be described implicitly through the notion of hypermodernism, which Jill Lipovetzki defends in "Hypermodern Times", S., 2005.

The hypermodern society is a function of the developed market economy, which gives rise to the dynamic, consumer type of man, orientated to everything connected with the market-focused thinking – "if something is sold, then it is good." The materially satisfied society, in which the diversification of goods and services creates and stimulates individualism of tastes, gives rise to a new type of man, according to Lipovetzki, the one after postmodernism, a man with new identity features. The hypermodern type of man takes over the flexibility of thinking and behaviour, based on his individualism, from the post-modern type. There are cases when this type of man might like certain lay or religious ideas from different traditions, but he will accept them only as far as they guarantee him spiritual comfort and practical value. That is why Lipovetzki is right in drawing the conclusion that "traditions have been re-tailored to suit the individual" (p. 105). However, this amalgam of ideas, beliefs, styles and tastes assumes utilitarian aspects, i.e. if something serves the purpose, assists, stimulates, then it is accepted, used, adapted to the situation. Taking steps towards "everything which …" can be interpreted as amorphousness of this type of man, his identity is undetermined, since the latter is a succession of eventual metamorphoses, led by the imperative of the moment. The individual becomes a sort of a centre, subordinating and engulfing everything which could be of use to him. Then the maxim "there re no eternal friendships, there are eternal interests" becomes valid. And on the background of such logic, the long-lasting social relationship becomes an anachronism.

On the other hand, the individualism means a need for toposes, which could allow him to realise his potential; those will be the sites where he will meet other representatives of his kind, brought to those sites by the same tastes and preferences/needs. Then the associative need for unification, security, togetherness, community identity is not only the other face of individualism, but also a sort of an individualisation of the social. Society becomes the particular groups of people, who meet a shared need and carry out a mission in the general social context, i.e. to raise a particular question or to do something for society. Identity is constituted, it is a problem, therefore, it is not given nor found, it is a product which people create as much as they can.

This process of individualism turning into socially utilitarian (it is not always the case) activities, can be defined as a natural process of separate

constituting of identities being realised and finalised in a socially acceptable end product.

These features-explanations make sense in the argumentation of the thesis that the West European also has his reasons to desire United Europe, and they are not only economical.

The identity in the process of being constituted, is always looking for opportunities to be realised, i.e. to create product (economic, spiritual), that is why the West European can be defined as a person whose spirituality always needs challenges. This word from the popular political practice can be understood as philosophical – the European spirit is being developed in the clash of opposites, in its meeting with the new and different and unpredicted: the European spirit itself is looking for challenges so that it can overcome them, understand them, and conquer them for reasonable aims. This gnoceological "hunger" for the new developments may be has its roots in the travels of the ancient philosophers to unknown lands to test their thinking, and perhaps to feel curiosity as a spiritual state, when the mind confronts new horizons.

The meeting of the unknown in the form of the "other Europe", which years ago was in opposition to the West, is a challenge, but it is a pre-set task – the unknown has to be understood and its integration achieved, i.e. this is a condition of mutual effort and activity.

Eril Veil, very much similar to Jill Lipovetzki, in "Political philosophy", Sofia, 2005, p.105 – he actually wrote it in 1955 – claims that the modern society of XX century consists of essentially unsatisfied individuals. The individualism is understood as breaking away from a certain tradition, engaging into conflict, and therefore, starting along a hazardous road – that of opposing something… Therefore, the membership in the traditional community brings about an internal unbalance, and it has to be realised in new conditions, those of a world with values listed as efficiency, success, calculation, struggling. Living becomes problematic every day, and this becomes the norm. The feeling of being isolated, outcast becomes widespread, but it is not due to the changing society, it is due to the changing individual, who wishes to achieve his own aims (p.111), but could never anticipate being unhappy after achieving them. Veil stands next to Lipovetzki when he establishes that the fate of the modern man is very similar to the one of the ancient man – they both have to survive

in day-to-day combat. The modern man, however, is in combat with the others, who also are individuals, and therefore the living communication becomes more difficult. The shift back to internal happiness can be seen both as a desire for balance, and desire for "standing firmly on one's legs", different from the living with a lot of insecurity, instability, changeability, which gives a sense of fatigue.

From the above mentioned statements and argumentation about the essence of the modern way of life of the man from the West, one can make the conclusion that the man from the West is in a new situation in the spiritual aspect – he understands he will have to work with an unknown partner and will have to build something difficult, forming in the process of mutual efforts in building it (getting to know each other, dialogue).

I do not want to claim that the fragile and confused man from the developed society will see in the unification of Europe processes his spiritual panacea, which will give him back the long lost stability. He will have the opportunity to look back into himself and to re-evaluate himself in the ensuing comparison, and there lies the historical chance for the "European type" of man to be created, in the aspects which Marcel Gochet mentions.

Gochet is a politologist, sociologist, but also a philosopher of the social aspects of life. In his book "The Political Situation", Paris, 2005, he makes a clear distinction between the notions "nation" and "civilisation". If the nation is a territorial and cultural formation, the civilisation has to be thought of always in the singular, according to him. It is a product of the existence of nations, the best they create in the economic and spiritual spheres. Civilisation is the sum total of all economic and spiritual achievements, products of the human genius, which are channelled along their social applicability towards entering the everyday life of the people to make it easier and more comfortable. The European man holds and nurtures this spirit of constant search, investigation, discovery, application and then again search – deductive and inductive. That is the basis of the European science which has always aimed at practical applicability.

The United Europe has turned out to be a historical chance for nations to cooperate and in this cooperation to enhance new dimensions of the European genius at different levels.

The modern man, however much he maybe under the control of his own individualism, is confronted by the tradition, in the broadest

sense – he will have to "defy" it, to process it and subordinate it to his aims.

Gochet formulates some of the traditional European values – everyone develops their own identity by reflection upon the universal values, seen through his own Self, which is based on precipitated experience, i.e. relatively permanent attitudes in thinking. The European spirit is the spirit of compatibility as a product of the individual insights into the realities. The compatibility then develops the European dynamics – the nations, according to Gochet, have always compared among themselves, they have always scrutinised each other, followed each other, copied each other. This mutual getting to know each other has happened many times in European history and it has affected it – movements, groups and societies, thinkers, have never been only national heritage (p. 473-5).

The European spirit holds in itself the strife to interpret "the universality of civilisation". If the universal is the best people aim at, today it is achieved in the process of mutual activity. And this is a challenge in itself. To strive after the best, that Platonic optimum, which is the idea itself, means the spirit to pursue his perfection. This leads to two aspects according to Plato:

- search within yourself, i.e. in your thought system for the better of the good, so that you do not impose limitations on yourself to stay within the completeness of either the idea or the thing;
- wish to constantly change the thing-as-a-product of your activity, and to adapt it to your needs.

Pierre Statius in a lecture to university professors (University of Besanson, France, December 2005) outlines the beliefs of Toquil about democracy on the background of the different French interpretations of Toquil. The anthropological dimension of democracy is in the understanding of equality – the other one is similar to me, and hitherto the so called "societies of the other" are those of co-belonging, solidarity. Closeness is the result, it is the product of the activity of equality. Man has deeply engrained in himself the strife to look for others of his kind, although he knows that even two individuals will be very different.

Modern democracy, according to Toquil, does not allow for much time to the modern individual for thought – he works and he has entertainment and these two activities are then repeated. Democracy needs

agreed consent of everyone, but it is prone to potential crises, because it bases itself on thinking creatures, that have many means of communication and information, diversified in their activities. The individual as an individualist is fragile, as far as he lives between a certain successive requirement for unity and his own autonomy of identity.

This orientation towards oneself as interior (the Self) and exterior (my things, my products) is impossible without turning to the others. The otherness is the experience of the others, another vision about things. The European spirit is also one of dialogue.

The constituting of United Europe is good in itself in the sense of unification is a challenge to the ways of thinking in the West and in the East. There is an array of questions we have to ask ourselves as Easterners. The European family which would like to include us, should it be achieved at the expense of old friendships, or should old friendships be renewed and interpreted in the new situation, in which the mutual interest is the determining factor? Is cooperation based on feelings of sympathy, or on closeness, for example? When does the feeling of having an obstacle in the cooperation arise? Is the modern consensus possible as a status quo, agreed upon among many partners? How could we look for the universal on a European scale when some of the Eastern European nations, we have not achieved that real "optimum" which some countries have; could we think about the better of that "best" when we are at the level of the worse that real "best"?

In the second part of my paper I state that I will be thinking about the problematic issues of Europe in a practical sense. I am aware that here I follow the style and the experiences of Montain and the confessions of Roussea.

The modern individual searches for his identity through his partnership in collective identities. He chooses those communities which allow him to feel at his best, and which allow him to realise his potential as a personality, to test himself, to learn to cooperate, to change.

There lies the realisation of the modern identity of the European man, who embarks upon a journey towards the otherness when he decides to take part in cooperative project work. This is an opportunity for a new group identity – entering a group with European membership, people who are different in languages, social experience, or systems of values.

Upon entering that European mini-community the personality has the opportunity to go beyond its realisations to new aspects.

I accept the argument of Jean-Claude Kaufman ("Inventing Oneself. A Theory of Identity", Paris, 2004) that in a community we tend to first establish the differentiation and then the unity takes place (p.169).

The European Union is constituted on the principles of voluntary activity, which means investment of time and efforts into working together. At the same time this type of work needs weekly electronic contacts, as well as developing knowledge of the language of communication.

Projects work involves not only group meetings in real physical space. It is also a manifestation of identities. The first reaction of the project participants is confidence, based on their own social context, after that it changes in the appreciation of the difference of the others. Every participant initially does a presentation – who they are, where they come from, how they work, what kind of product they have created (general information, form, parameters, innovation, process of manufacture). One can spot the difference in two aspects of identities – similar to one's own and different from one's own.

If the Bulgarian presentation is rationalised emotion, which is never totally "subdued", then in a Swedish project team there is a tone of quiet bonding, restraint of outer _expression in poor non-verbal communication techniques. The Swedish spirit is one of inner peace, balance, strong emotions, and an impressive vigilance for disproportion (in relationships, work rhythm, and work/entertainment routine). The Swedish spirit reacts spontaneously to unfairness with the express wish to restore it to a status of fairness (Aristotle would have termed it "justified fairness"). Besides, this spirit is strong with its mediator's mission, which the Swedish people accomplish with a feeling of pride and gratification. To act as a mediator means to help traditionally different standpoints come together. The Swedish spirit reflects an ecologically approached nature, nature which is worshiped as a cult, communication with nature is a natural need (and this could explain the purity of the internal urge to communicate with different cultural traditions). The North European is spontaneous in his own way – he has natural movements, without reasonable limitation, with subdued emotions, which even in their maximum seem low pitched on the background of the East European emotional volcanic eruption of feelings, movements, physical stylistics.

Into the European team the Swedish representative brings calmness, a feeling of immeasurable spiritual space, a genuine desire for cooperation and indefatigable patience in listening to the arguments of the different from him. He is not capable of repudiating the partner because he is positive and open for contacts. He is reserved and this may be understood as a certain passivity but not coldness. There is an aspect of taking his time in waiting, there is an openness to be in contact with everyone, his mission is to be like a bridge in different directions, and to enhance mutual activity.

The Spanish spirit is strikingly stunning – the Spanish participant is with emotions which are shown on his face, and it always shows the business mood, the joking mood, the caring mood. The Spanish representative comes into working mode with certain reservations – he does not feel very well when he is being organised. He feels that he has very special rationalism, indented by emotions, the emotions underlie him as an argument on all sides. When he tells a story, he not only acts it but also he co-experiences it. He does not distance himself from the fact but he remains in it, as if to represent himself as inner felt emotion. He impresses with his strong attachment to traditions – strict, crude, lacking in subtlety and etiquette, but eloquent in its imaging. The Spanish spirit is full of emotional nuances, he balances them well and subordinates them to practical aims. He brings traditions together, he worships the distant different friend, who has come to him and brought a different aspect to enrich his world.

The Spanish representative makes the European spirit and spirituality richer in the desire to cherish the very core of the soul. He endeavours to show that it can be lively, therefore, emotional or reacting in every moment. This vitality is contagious, and coupled with the desire for contact, it revitalises the team, it makes it one lively whole, a group of people who openly show their emotions.

The Romanian spirituality is rational-sentimental. It is also very much attached to its traditions, it also cherishes its nature with its variations as a cult, it is in its own way a type of workaholic, with a marked element of openness towards the others and desire for cooperation.

There is also a small element of worry in the desire to be liked and appreciated at any rate. Therefore, it makes greater effort to be accepted, overdoing the self-presentation in the subconscious fear not to be shunned. When it recognises the signs of appreciation and acceptance, it becomes

natural and free, and it unveils itself – it shows itself as uncontrollable at times, introvert as far as its fears, and very cooperative and imposing of its understanding of the universal, as it sees it. It is also very hospitable, it craves to keep the different ones for itself. It would enrich the European cooperation with its natural energy, depth of spirit and attachment to the universal values. There is an aspect of the feeling of the universe in it, if I may use the phrase of Berdyaev.

I believe that these descriptions-reflections and insights into the merit of the "pieces" of the European identity prove that not only man is "manifold and changeable" in the phrasing of Montain, but also

by being different, everyone enriches the European identity. Not only can we understand our difference on the background of the interpersonal relationships, but also we can use its positive side to enrich the potential of the European identity. The latter is not plain coming together and preserving some European values, but it is mutual enrichment and mutual curiosity to find oneself through the eyes of the others.

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Milan Tasić D.

ON SURPASSING (IN REASON) FORMS OF SOCIAL VIOLENCE; TOWARD (POLITICAL) ACTION OF WORLD'S PHILOSOPHERS, SCIENTISTS, ETC.

> *Philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways, but the matter is to change it.*
>
> Marx: *Theses on Feuerbach*, 11.

If we take a look "from above" at social history, what "persistently" stands out– this time said without nuances – would be:

1) a power of tyrants which has been conceived and perpetuated "beyond" humaneness;

2) a suppressed or diffused resistance of a multitude of individuals which only periodically took on an organized form and followed through to a rebellion;

3) a layer of people which truly thought over forms of living well in a community, but created it (somehow) "for itself" without a visible effort to do so.

We have therefore a man who – if not in a bare (slave) form – did not cease to tempt himself with a heavy burden of non-freedom, of frauds and lies, nor to think of a (more or less) unbearable existence, at least the schematic and general forms of its abolition. But, although the quantity of knowledge about what is around him (nature), about a community of people (society), as well as about himself, always increased, we don't see how he attentively thinks out effective forms of revolt and rebellion against a blind power over him, what could help him, at the beginning of millennium, to not be – as from the beginning – to such an extent dependent, or roughly said – a slave.

Let us choose, before an idea of a possible (general) teaching on resistance, or of a study (science) itself on it, to examine if it gives oneself and to what extent to (several) basic methods of social sciences and let us take from them that which we find to be most appropriate. This is also true in how we view the subject of learning as social learning.

In the later case, the answer is near trivial, if one takes the subjective reality of a human individual which "behaves" toward other individuals and (doesn't cease) to think about standards of worthy relations in a human community, or values to be respected, so that a harmony of particular and different motives and wishes appears, to be twice "in act": both in the "holders" of a repressive power and in those over which this power is demonstrated.

From there, in the sense of a method, every rearranging of relations in a society can find a point of departure (and be interpreted) in the sense-experience facts and this is the standpoint of (all) positivisms (E. Durkheim and others) in sociology. Just as an axiological approach also naturally should find a place (M. Weber, H. Rickert) in this area which, it is said, by disregarding facts, is searching (only) for understanding and for the meaning of spiritual values that an individual promotes in a community. Two in fact contrary positions, for their "strong points" are disparate ones and mutually non-reducible: from one side *subject* (positivism), and from the other *value* (axiologism), in the first case we are looking for *reason*, and in the other one for *motive*, or once for *explanation*, and another time for *understanding,* etc.

We find here that some unforeseeable gap doesn't separate the enumerated sequences, for if the matter is of an *object-value* "antagonism", where the "object" should bring something constant, unchangeable and the "value" – always different and changeable or, in gnoseological terms, the knowledge on the former should be "objective" and on the latter "subjective" – at least from the viewpoint of non-realizibility (to the end) of the "thing-in-itself" – we don't possess (even) the same notions about things of real world. We do not know which definition to follow, for by going from philosopher to philosopher, it is different. At least in its formulation. Therefore, we do not succeed in reaching a sufficient definition of a "table", because of an extremely great number of forms that it can obtain or a multitude of purposes it can serve. Therefore in such a thing resides necessary

vagueness so that the knowledge about it would be only approximate, just as in the case of moral categories which, throughout civilization, emphasize no less diversity than things of the real world. And we should similarly express ourselves when the matter is of every parallel: *cause-motive*, *fact-standard*, *explanation-understanding* etc. from the two spheres.

It is known also that "dialectic" methods convincingly justified the unity of object and method of knowledge, by following the same ontological picture which has seen objects and phenomena – in the visible and non-visible world –as contradictory ones and development generally as a struggle of contradictions (along the line "thesis-antithesis-synthesis") etc. In our opinion, the last position gains an advantage over the two others, in that it "envelopes" them, though we find that – for the whole destiny of science – every partial approach is more fruitful, and (at least) the "endless" atomization of the domains of knowledge in the framework of the existing sciences points to it. Inasmuch as the (limited) human power can't be brought in reasonable relation, even from afar, to any "theory of all" (a term of Stephen Hawking). Extremely simplified computer science where, we know, derivations are founded (only) on the two states of matter: "there is a circuit – there is not a circuit" in it (on the two numbers 0 and 1), confirms this standpoint, so that in this way can be realized both colour and sound, form and movement and gets itself the power that it has. Let's call such teachings "merologic" – from the greek words μερος (= part) and λογος – and let us try to make sketches of two[1] of them.

1) when the domain of interest is the "possessed" privatization of social property in the period of "transition" and numerous social groups would like to articulate their (different) – more humane – interests and bring them to a realization;

2) if the matter of fact is an urgent need of "men who know" to win the right to a (social) power throughout the planet, and visible signs of different cataclysms we anticipate are replaced by a realizable vision of harmonious life in the community.

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[1] We do it for we see that any of "atomic", singular, particular studies of this type of teaching is more possible than a general study of it, as historical materialism did not confirm itself in the practice, and on the side of opponents of holistic teachings, who are inclined to the science of society rather than to temporal schemas, than to scientific laws that are known, say, to physics.

By doing so we have taken (unintentionally) an inverse path: pointing out first a theoretical framework in which a possible social action can be interpreted, followed by a "spectrum" of particular operations which, taken together, would result in the same action.

A general and the furthest basis to dissolve the repressive power that "permeates" mutual relations of members of an institution, who acquire the possibility for a (human) creation in liberty, would be (nevertheless) the vulnerable human nature, or (nevertheless) the vulnerable human mind, which don't free themselves easily of the facts otherwise proclaimed as morally dangerous, undesirable, etc., but continue to last or to drop in the consciousness, so that it possibly could bear the (desired) changes.

On the other hand, since there are schools and education exists in them, one proceeds with those more or less standard forms of moral comportment of an individual in society which are anew transmitted to generations of men, serving them in a (already) created and conceived social frame. But a highest truth in human reality would belong to such an educative impulse which would suggest to an individual patterns of possible (and always new) changes of reality – in the sense of the thesis of Feuerbach.[2] So that we hold that a persistent transmission of a "permanent" ideal for changes, still from the *lowest age*, would effectively reflect in the quality of a particular life, as well as in the community itself. If an objection here would take place, otherwise reasonable, that human nature is inclined to a conformity and that our mind is rather addicted to laziness than to the uncertainities that bring an action in freedom, the answer would be that it is actually so, but that the whole history of human thought convincingly shows what a ruinous influence any "inert" inclination to the prejudices, illusions, errors had.[3] And from the other side the epithet "royal" really belongs to freedom, its borders being moved without end and releasing space at least to an "immeasurable" artistic creation. Therefore to first encourage a human individual to adopt "positive" and irrefutable knowledge about the world etc., and then always and anew to instruct this individual its "vocation" to invent ways of creativity without end. We

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[2] *These* 11. (See *motto* of the paper).

[3] Francis Bacon calls them "idols". Racall also that, during Middle Age, the learned persons cited Aristotles by words: *Magister dixit* ("Teacher said").

find in that framework the theoretical justification that a practical action toward changes in circumstances of a social nature is really possible.

Having explained for this instance a theoretical possibility of such merologic teaching, let's clearly define (as much as it is possible) the subject of knowledge itself. It would be: such rules, standards of behavior of an individual in a firm which would replace the existing (authoritative) form of direction with a more democratic model, which should satisfy the interests of the greatest number of people. Then: such a corpus of rules would (already) free a hierarchy between them, so that by the force of it, their effectiveness in practice would be highest one.

Let us take for a zero (or an initial state) of a work organization such as one in a position where the social property over it would be canceled and it takes up a position of privatization. By an unwritten rule, suggested from an economic-social theory, from an (evidently) strange space this time, it will not be asked for the origin of money which will be used for its purchase, furthermore the same social power will make all (what is paradoxical) such an organization, at least materially, to be made worthless, so that in a given moment its price would be sufficiently low. Then, roughly speaking, outside every ethical codex, the manager gives into temptation and – brings workers to the brink of physical and spiritual existence, who from reasons we don't quote, choose silence as their "categorical imperative". We have it in mind that further – according to a model –realized incomes will become his property, so that he alone would realize half of estimated value and "easily" induce workers, say, to take a loan from the bank, to see so far "their" company as really theirs. If they aren't fit for a loan – they will obtain fictive confirmations that they are, and soon they will deliver money, in "exchange" for some receipt, assigned stocks and so on. Speaking further, for this occasion simply, now salaries are reduced for amount of credit installment, and consciously supported a bad dealing, and lowered the market value of stocks to a negligible amount. Since the manager continues to choose his income as he likes, he comes to buy up all, or nearly all, stocks of the workers, which now "voluntary" agree to it, etc.

Thus, up to this moment, he is not especially motivated to advance dealing and increase earnings to workers, in addition he has the possibility, before the challenges of different investments, to easily join another business, where he could continue "to flow" the labor of employed people.

Time for which the competition would (possibly) strengthen and "move" our institution to a more unenviable place.

We find here that the furthest theoretical end point in the philosophico-psychologico-social sense belongs to the (confirmed) category of "confidence," and we put it at the center of all activities directed to a favorable exchange of relations we discuss. As we know, the most exact of all sciences, mathematics, is based (only) on the belief in the exactness of axioms, as in principles in physics, and every educational effort on the confidence of pupils in a teacher. So that these two words "confidence" and "activity" will meet, without doubt, between basic notions of a teaching on breaking of social force, founded in reason. Namely, *confidence* to be at the head of an organization deserving of only those who in earlier business realised visible results, or a constant growth of business success up to that time. And in waiting it becomes, it remains an *activity* to be developed which the *existing* repressive form will replace by a collective one of work organization. Then the income would be more righteously distributed and so on.

But how to attain it?

Taking into consideration postulated secrecy, a prevalent part of forms that know (public) nonviolent actions today in the world (mainly) aiming to overturn political dictatures, would be – inimaginable. We have here in mind: public speeches, signed declarations, slogans and symbols, boycotts and strikes,[4] ... and others that can be easily supposed, so that the activities which are based on the two other basic notions in this area will take place: "anonymity" and "secrecy". And then those acts which would be thought out by a group of people rather than an individual, and by "people who know" rather than those interested in it would be more effective. Naturally, we are attracted by those constant principles, well formed and brought in an ordered relation, which would make up part of a most distributed educative effort in schools. If they are classified in groups, such methods – we have indicated it – could be classified in a triple schema:[5]

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[4] From publication: Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, Boston, 1973.

[5] Every one of them could be supported by arguments of both philosophical, and psychological, and sociological nature, as well as the methods themselves – what we do not this time. This would not be also a complete form of it, but rather only a confirmed possibility that this type of principles could be thought through.

1. convictions that categories of fate, of believing, of confidence, ...are the basis of conceptions of "all" human and social relations, and what – we know it in sciencies – extends to the science of nature (Hume);

2. convictions that the secrecy of spreading ideas about efficient actions perhaps are more powerful than public confrontation with forces of oppression;

3. messages to the bearer of repressive power that it can be undermined, if the resistance would sufficiently grow and manifest to a destructive power, so that it would sway him in its regime of management.

And a particular prolegomenon to such an activity would represent some constant caution "the ideas of change" do not come in the hands of informers and spies. They would be "easily" recognized by insincerity, inconsistency, contradictions in their "support" for such changes, etc.

ad 1. Say:

1. The matter is about a "renowned" firm which has visible indexes of progress over decades.

2. The person at the head of a corporation impresses others with the "unity" of his moral character and an "image" as a businessman.

3. The website of the organization is *www*.... Copies from this site are ...

4. In a declaration by the manager of the company, a clear interest is expressed in their investment in our company.

5. In figures, it would mean they give at once such and such, in a year such and such, and for three years ...

6. The employees would be insured in their retirement with a foreign company which has a hundred year long tradition long.

7. New modern (productive) capacities and new business offices would be built and equipped, and working conditions essentially facilitated. In addition, the entire complex would be architecturally attractive.

8. The political option in which we trust is in favor of it and local factors can "easily" help us etc.

Here: passing from one member to another we find that (already) they are "many-sided" founded, being expressed in coordinates of past, present and future, of an individual and of a community of peoples, of material and spiritual values, of ethical and aesthetic categories and so on.

ad 2. Say:

1. The matter of changes being (already) of essential meaning for a man, why expose the idea of it to (arbitrary) factors which could be destructive for its realization.

2. During history, what is realized as socially new and under a hard burden of oppressive power, might pass a secret path – at least in the beginning. We see it from different micro-levels, through "fraternities" and religious communities, up to macro-forms themselves, such as revolutions.

3. To think out a model of action of which the governing structure would not possess consciousness and which is attainable only if we recognize the power of conspiracy.

4. Somewhere outside there would have to be a "center" of action, where events would be diligently monitored and ways discovered for the actions to be "advanced" in the spirit of a constant growth in the potential of resistance.

5. This time really there is no shortage of ways – technically – for messages to be registered and transmitted. (Public) telephone books make "access" to every person possible, and a certain secrecy is provided by telephone booths also.

6. Especially mobile telephones allow an immediate connection "without a trail" of an individual with many persons, by means of words or through letters.

7. In the indicated model, the place of every individual would be recognized and clearly determined, and he would respect undertaken duties etc.

Here again: the increased power of technical means, several of which almost everyone possesses, with equally jagged organized forms of connections and actions, favour the feasibility of this conspiracy project.

ad 3. Say:

1. Certainly, the messages would free here the idea of contents from the model of action 3. *ad* 2, but in the beginning one, both particular and "universal" hypocrisy would certainly take place: an enthusiasm for the existing forms of organization before the face of its holders and a readiness to oppose them on the other side.

2. A hypocrisy which would obtain diversity of manifestations: say, clearly not recognizible but hidden in the form of a boycott of leading persons, of orders that come from them, of their own work obligations.

3. Anonymous letters of individuals to redactions of reviews, to the Ministry.

4. Graphics: caricatures, slogans.

5. An agreed dress, identical or unusual, silence during work and in meetings.

6. (Anonymous) letters to the director.

7. (Natural) transition of qualified manpower to other work organizations, which offer more favorable work conditions, as well as higher salaries.

8. The dramatic events, next to each other, different in nature, resulted from quasi-legal situations to which the organization would be brought by quasi-legal behavior of individuals, etc. And finally

9. An open manifestation of demands of employed people for the abolition of privatization at the highest level by the highest institutions of the state.

Although poor in indications, the offered proposition of changes of social reality on a macro-level should offer the elements upon which a basis for sufficient general teaching can be founded.

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Let us support this time a "macro–project" of advancing ideals for a "harmonious" existence of human community before threatening signs of a nuclear, ecological, or demographic disaster, after a "collectively" thought out means to avoid them, just from philosophers, scientists and "(all) who know".

Namely, the quantity of knowledge left from the population of philosophers, scientists, ... on that which surrounds us (nature), about the community of peoples (society), as well as about man itself is truly impressive – for we know more than anyone in time – so that it seems near paradoxical that a "visible" transformation of the world still has not occured, after rules coming from the essence of it already seen as (anyway) a "social being", a "being of truth", "justice" and "beauty." He didn't cease to care for these patterns throughout the whole of history, though we recognize throughout it also "oases" of hate, injustice and evil, but we are witnesses to a "considerably" lost hope of organized social forces to see the light of day and to impose them as a model of living in a community. And already early history records utopian projects, but in the form of ideal organizations coming from reason, which didn't succeed, for coming from "above," from the head, they have been only constructions. *Republic* (Plato), *City of God* (Augustine), *City of the Sun* (Campanella), *Utopia* (Morus), ... have brought such projects whose destiny would be favorable if they were partly

supported by "positive" knowledge about man, society, nature. The case of "communist utopia" confirms the thesis, for it has been confirmed for a certain time in its initial phase – in socialism, and what has been justified by science, by knowledge of political economy and social history, ...

Therefore we plead for such forms of social engagement of "people who know," different in numbers of their members, as well as in the scope of goals that they have in mind.

How could, say, the word of a philosopher, of a physicist, a chemist, a biologist, on a global level, effectively "prolong" until the creation of forms of living in community which would be in harmony rather than conflict? In the cases of:

a) problems such as the threat of nuclear or ecological disaster of the planet, or

b) (im)possibility of a European culture which would arise through the process of globalization over the "ruins" of national cultures or communities?

ad a). We find here numerous and detailed inspections, diagnostics, warnings as well as solutions themselves, but which do not cease to reside in "ivory towers", being only pronounced, contained in books and proceedings. We do not register cases where philosophers, scientists forward their ideas up to realization in practice, and after they have been convincingly diffused among the people, or "conceived" possible events in society, etc. Historically, an instructive example of this kind brings the founder of "scientific socialism" Karl Marx, who in this place didn't stop at "the half-way point," but his possible contribution to philosophical science was pawned for work in the worker's movement. And the project of the classless society – at least up to a certain measure and in a period of time – nevertheless has seen the light of the day, though it had as a starting point a vague (social) concept of the "proletarian." Or (even) being a particular amalgam of a philosophico-socio-economic theory, of ideology and of arms of class struggle ... – a way that followed equally projects of enlightenment, of liberalism etc., having inspired an effective potential of some social group for it to "carry on"in practice.

Sporadically we find here movements, associations, unions which plead for (atomic) disarmament, peace, a healthy environment, but they are all rather on a mission to contest some imposed political project, to

point out "passively" a danger which is boding, to oppose the intentions of countries and governments. They come *post festum* and are based – if the matter is of radiation and ecological problems – on sporadic, partial, nearly complete knowledge from papers about harmful aspects of some economy, politics, ... Only as anonymous and "incidental" – if at all – some scientist as a "adviser" appears in a political office, though the effects of the knowledge he possesses are not visible in the decisions being made.

As in solving (every) micro-problem, we would start from a (foreseen) clear picture of disastrous effects which come from two spheres. Who should make it? The scientists alone and they by writting their papers rather "collectively" than individually. And then through scientific meetings, symposia, and congresses would an optmal programme of confrontation with the dangers be made and offer a vision for survival for which we have to fight. But in which way?

Taking into consideration that all around the world are prevailing democratic forms of reign, and that political parties, after gaining power, can realize their decisions in practice, **we propose philosophers, scientists of all fields to form political parties, legalize movement under an "approximate" name "gnoseocrats", or subtitle "party (movement) of people who know."** In their sum they would make an (ordered) system of organizations, of international character, in such a way that – in other conditions – worked the *International*, but our intention here is to make a proposition and to justify somewhat the possibility of realization, rather than to expose whichever projection of the organization itself.[6]

Who could say, for example, a reasonable word about " the coming era of nanotechnology"[7], about all favorable aspects of a (dramatic) change of reality which it could make possible, as well as about the dangers which are waiting on this road? Naturally, the nanotechnologists themselves (chemists, biologists, ...) who would direct convincingly into the world of new things and beings, so far non existant, or rather to all "corrections" of living nature, as well as to consequences of such a state. If the role of a politician could seem further unavoidable in social events, it would be

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[6] Even different "non-classic" forms of their organization would have place.

[7] After title of book: Erick Drexler, *Engines of Creation*; *The Coming Era of Nanotechnology*, 1986.

extremely disagreeable to a whole picture of the world to have nanotechnologists (only) for advisors –somewhere "in the shade" – of a politician. The two spheres therefore necessarily have to be brought close, and the other one to take an organized form, to free by itself the supreme potential, which would be effectively thought over afterwards.

Let us be reminded of what the subject is!

If it is sure that all nature consists of (chemical) elements, which enter into the composition of compounds, a power to separate the elements themselves – even just enriched uranium – have laboratories to make atomic bombs. And if it has been already confirmed that (far) presentiment of Democritus from Abdera that properties of objects – say, that a diamond is hard, sugar sweet, and milk white – is owed only to form, order and position of atoms, if we have opportunity to compose and separate elements and to "manipulate" them, we acquire a power to drastically transform the world around us and us ourselves.

Namely, on the level of nano-structures (a "nano" is a billionth of a meter) machines called "assemblers" have been conceived for manipulating atoms and molecules, following a programme, to be recognized and brought into a desired order. Then, by acquiring a power (not necessary in natural conditions) for creation, first it would put an end to something that has always been a constant threat to the survival of humanity: food, water, energy, for food could be "reared" in the home itself etc. Or when tissue gets sick (after an injury, say) and the atoms of its cells are lead in another order, or where"foreign" atoms (bacteria etc.) are present, to reestablish their former order would mean to substitute health for illness, and generally, force – for weakness of an organism, and an arbitrary choice of time – for an average life expectancy. The blind will regain their sight, the deaf their hearing, and the lame an ability to walk, so the remedy for "incurable" illnesses (cancer, aids) is invented and on this side are certainly methods of biotechnology, genetic engineering and so on.

But an overturning role in all of that would certainly belong to mechanical creations which do not have any equal, and which imitate human intellect – to robots. (Machines a thousand times more powerful, which will think better than man itself). For to supply – no matter in which form – machines with intellect is a step which could be compared with those when in ancient times primates acquired such power.

But the reverse of the vision offered, what will not cease to be a challenge for "endless" discussions, would be (equally) unforeseeable and negative aspects of the production of nano-particles for the "model" of the healthy environment we knew from the beginning. The automatization of production would disturb to a high degree the market of manpower, but problems of a moral nature would get the highest significance. We would meet such "creatures" which aren't the human beings we know ...

*ad b).*Here again let us ask ourselves in the same way: Who could say such a (reasonable) word, having in mind the (im)possibility of a "european" culture, which would replace the existing national cultures? As well as to convincingly support its realization in practice? For what comes up is part of a (near) unison of dissapproval of the idea of permeating different spiritual inheritances, but if the matter is of what a characteristic of every national culture is – say, rite, ritual, magic, myth, religion – such facts are studied to the highest degree from the ethnological, philosophical, and sociological standpoints so that we should not doubt the exactness of a justified "diagnosis". (As much as in the human sphere such end results are feasible, and are expressed in some schemas, as "general traits" etc., rather than being similar to the conclusions in natural sciences.)

And from where does the (unified) pessimistic tone come?

It seems that this is the _expression of the hypocrisy of (caste) layers and structures which, in these circumstances are losing social power, and to opposing "global" processes we join instead by inertia, by force of prejudice, by power of authority ... Or because the promoters themselves of these politics do not explain (more profoundly) the foundation of this idea, dealing with it as with something accepted as self-evident.

Let us put forward at least several (simple) questions: 1) Did anyone require anywhere to put an end to national cultures, justifying that it is necessary no matter what the reason? 2) Is it in accordance with (whoever's) definition of man as a social being, a being of freedom that "fits" to him rather than patterns of an isolated, local, limited living? 3) Is it possible to imagine the (contemporary) development of a country other than as technological-industrial and is a closure more favorable, or the (widest) openness – of market, borders of countries, ...?

In spite of possible threats being an inkling of the identity, or originality of what is national – we can argue – it is maintainable in a "united

Europe", as well as in the world as a "global community" with only an organized form to realize it needing to be found. Do thousands upon thousands of reports from scientific meetings of philosophers, sociologists, politicologists dedicated to this subject not offer – in no matter what extent – a realizable project to which we should come? The work of the latest World Congress of Philosophers was themed: "Philosophy Facing World Problems", and the supreme meeting of Russian philosophers was also occupied with: "Philosophy and the Future of Civilization" and so on. But we see here only proceedings after meetings, without even one step stretched out further toward a realization of ideas, toward practice … This is why we pledge here for a "classical" or possibly some "non classical" forms of organization and (political etc.) actions of world philosophers, scientists and all those "who know".

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Борис Аксюмов

«СТОЛКНОВЕНИЕ ЦИВИЛИЗАЦИЙ» КАК КОНФЛИКТ МЕЖДУ ТРАДИЦИОННОСТЬЮ И СОВРЕМЕННОСТЬЮ

Прошло уже тринадцать лет с тех пор, как в нашей печати появилась ставшая уже знаменитой статья американского мыслителя С. Хантингтона «Столкновение цивилизаций?». Наличие вопросительного знака показывает, что для самого автора реальность подобного столкновения, скорее всего, не представлялась столь уж очевидной, а выдвигалась в качестве некой гипотезы, предположения. По крайней мере, С.Хантингтон вряд ли мог думать о том, что прогнозируемое им столкновение (или его генеральная репетиция, преамбула) начнется так скоро. Следует также отметить, что американский автор, как нам представляется, слишком был поглощен разного рода теоретическими моментами, классическими схемами противопоставления (Восток-Запад, ислам-христианство и т.д.), чтобы в полной мере уже тогда, в момент написания работы, ощутить всю эмпирическую реальность надвигающихся событий, призванных сформировать новый мировой порядок. Однако все это выглядит не столь существенным обстоятельством в сравнении с гораздо более значимым вопросом: насколько теоретическая схема, сооруженная С.Хантингтоном, адекватно отражает (или выражает) те реальные события, которые происходят сегодня в Ираке, а завтра могут произойти в Иране? Тот факт, что определенное столкновение между различными государствами, различными группами людей имеет место в структуре отношений внутри современного мира не может вызывать абсолютно никаких сомнений; это нечто самоочевидное, аксиоматическое. Сложности начинают возникать тогда, когда мы пытаемся категориально охарактеризовать данную конфликтную ситуацию, сделать ее частью философского и научного дискурса,

преодолевая тем самым достаточно упрощенную, но в то же время гораздо более операциональную на данный момент политологическую парадигму.

Серьезное затруднение возникает уже при использовании в интересующем нас контексте слова «цивилизация».

Практически во всех подходах под цивилизацией понимается определенное состояние общественного развития, характеризующееся известным набором политических, хозяйственных, социальных отношений, высоким уровнем организации во всех сферах и техническим могуществом. В данном случае не столь важно, в каком – хронологическом или территориальном – смысле берется понятие цивилизации. Главное заключается в том, что почти всегда цивилизация выступает своеобразной оболочкой, заключающей в себе конкретное содержание жизни, той формой, внутри которой осуществляется развитие социальной системы. В то же время на эмпирическом уровне цивилизация воплощается в материальных артефактах, становясь, таким образом, материальным субстратом общественной жизни.

Таким образом, можно сделать вывод о том, что цивилизация уже сама по себе, сущностью своего понятия предполагает определенный уровень развитости наличного состояния социальной системы, по отношению к которой оно применено. Цивилизация не может быть примитивной или слаборазвитой, существует некая планка, ниже которой она по определению опуститься не может. Термином "цивилизация" фиксируется некое итоговое состояние социальной системы, прошедшей долгий путь развития. Цивилизация – это результат прогресса, усовершенствования изначально примитивных форм социальной организации; это определенная форма социальной системы, характеризующаяся высоким уровнем организации во всех сферах жизнедеятельности. Очень большой вопрос, подпадает ли в этом смысле во многом все еще традиционное восточное (в широком смысле) общество под понятие «цивилизация» и можно ли, следовательно, вести речь именно о «столкновении цивилизаций»?

Что же понимает под цивилизацией сам С.Хантингтон? Он определяет цивилизацию как культурную общность наивысшего ранга, как самый широкий уровень культурной идентичности людей. По его

мнению [1], цивилизация – это широчайшие культурные общности, в которых язык, антропологические особенности, религия, образ жизни, социальные институты являются теми объективными моментами, которые определяют цивилизацию. Фактически С. Хантингтон отождествляет цивилизацию и культуру, определяя одно через другое. По крайней мере, весьма трудно понять, в чем же заключается отличие цивилизации от культуры, и существует ли оно вообще. В сущности, американский исследователь вполне мог обозначить описываемую им конфликтную ситуацию и как «столкновение культур», и в смысловом отношении ничего бы не изменилось. Однако главное заключается в том, что и тот, и другой варианты обозначения проблемы чрезмерно абстрактны и сами по себе ничего не объясняют, а только указывают на наличие в данной области широчайшего проблемного поля, которое нуждается в более детальном внутреннем определении. Необходимо выделить тот ключевой элемент, который можно было бы определить как проблемообразующий. Таким элементом, на наш взгляд, является антитеза «традиционность-современность».

В последние годы в духовной жизни общества возрастает внимание к традиции и традиционалистской проблематике вообще. Привычно связанное с достаточно ограниченной сферой культуры и быта, этническими стереотипами, обрядами, обычаями и ритуалами, это понятие ныне обретает статус всеобщности и по частоте употребления начинает конкурировать с понятием прогресса. Сдвиг к резкому расширению смысла традиционности связан с именами У. Ростоу и К. Поппера. Как известно, У. Ростоу к традиционным отнес все доиндустриальные общества. Что касается К. Поппера, то он провел деление на закрытые и открытые общества. Закрытое общество, по Попперу, это "органическое", тоталитарное общество, оно сковывает самодеятельность индивидов и, прежде всего, поэтому традиционно. Открытое же общество, как нетрудно догадаться, это общество, где есть рынок, демократия и правовое государство.

Данную расширенную трактовку традиционности можно считать либерально-центристской, модернистской. Из всех трактовок, отождествляющих современность с буржуазностью, а остальные отноше-

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[1] Хангтингтон С. Столкновение цивилизаций // Полис. – 1994. – № 1. – С. 33–49.

ния, которые не вписываются в те или иные модели индустриального и демократического общества, объявляющих традиционными, т.е. устаревшими, вытекает одно: традиционное общество – это то, что надо преодолеть, либо так или иначе оно преодолевается само.

Изменение содержания традиции ведет к переструктурированию категорий социологии и культурологии, социального знания в целом, ибо на сегодняшний момент традиционалистская проблематика глубоко и противоречиво влияет на все наше мировоззрение. Данный тезис в полной мере можно отнести и к рассматриваемой нами проблеме «столкновения цивилизаций».

Социокультурное пространство современного мира вновь становится разделенным на два противоборствующих лагеря, которые можно обозначить как современную западную цивилизацию, с одной стороны, и традиционный афро-азиатский мир – с другой. Выделение ведущих противоречий и чёткое определение их субъектов-носителей становится важным этапом теоретического осмысления действительности. Исходное противоречие возникает между традиционализмом и современностью, между реальным технико-технологическим состоянием традиционного общества и необходимостью его модернизации в условиях глобализирующегося по западной модели мира. При такой интерпретации соотношения современности и традиционности современность ассоциируется с техническим и организационным могуществом, с истинными ценностями, которые считаются исключительно принадлежностью западного мира, идентифицируется с единственно правильно выбранной стратегией развития. Современность в данном случае являет собою идеал, своеобразное средоточие добра и красоты, истины и совершенства. Весь остальной мир, в том числе Россия, должен в своем развитии ориентироваться на этот, уже достигнутый, идеал.

На сегняшнем этапе развития мира проблема модернизации тесно смыкается с тенденциями к унификации и глобализации мирового целого. Несмотря на то, что научное исследование процесса глобализации начинается по существу только с середины 90-х годов XX века, глобализация и как практическое воплощение интегративных процессов (прежде всего в экономической сфере), и как теоретический проект (а также рефлексия этого проекта средствами

философско-научного абстрагирования и конкретных эмпирических исследований) прочно вошла в русло современной социокультурной действительности. С одной стороны, процессы глобализации способствуют стабилизации экономической ситуации, катализируют интегративные тенденции в политической сфере, отвечают духу таких стародавних и идеализированных принципов, как интернационализм и космополитизм (последнее, правда, практически не влияет на улучшение этнических отношений). Однако с другой стороны, логическим итогом глобализации будет снятие не только экономических и политических шлагбаумов, не только воплощение в реальность старой абстрактной идеи – Человечество, но также культурная и этническая унификация, элиминирование всего специфически национального.

Однако практика мирового развития показывает, что данные процессы проходят болезненно: феномен этнического возрождения, усиление традиционализма как теории и практики, усиленное подчеркивание многими странами своей самобытности и специфичности – только некоторые знаковые препятствия и контртенденции на пути глобализации. Именно в этой точке, где сталкиваются противоположные интересы и тенденции, в пункте пересечения противоречий между современной западной цивилизацией и остальным миром, зарождается современный конфликт ценностей, лежащий в основе «столкновения цивилизаций».

Если современности соответствует возвышенный идеал, то традиционность предстает как несовершенное, примитивное. Самими же носителями традиционности и идеологами незападного общества ситуация воспринимается наоборот: традиционность отождествляется с самобытностью и специфичностью восточной цивилизации, а понятие современности в их мировоззрении полностью утрачивает тот пафосный и позитивно-этический оттенок, который оно имеет в западноцентристской трактовке проблемы. Достижения западной цивилизации признаются неприемлемыми для восточной цивилизации, вредными для нее и опасными, т.к. предполагается, что перенимание западного опыта может привести к потере самобытности, к утрате той специфики, которая составляет основу восточной цивилизации и из которой она черпает энергию для дальнейшего раз-

вития. Типичной является точка зрения о том, что победа западной цивилизации будет означать крах восточных цивилизаций. Идеологи восточного мира склонны воспринимать данную ситуацию как конфликт между различными, во многом противоположными социокультурными системами, когда одна сторона стремится ассимилировать другую, а та, в свою очередь, всеми средствами этому противостоит. Очевидно, что столкновение цивилизаций, ставшее эмпирической реальностью современного мира, имеет под собой глубокие культурные предпосылки, основано на определенной асинхронности в развитии, вследствие чего корректнее говорить о конкретно-исторической манифестации социокультурных противоречий между современной цивилизацией и традиционной культурой.

Таким образом, проблема противостояния западной и восточной цивилизаций, взятая в контексте соотношения современности и традиционности, получает весьма неоднозначную трактовку, что объясняется тенденциозным толкованием данного вопроса двумя противостоящими сторонами. С точки зрения теории западоцентризма, ситуация выглядит так, что современность (подчеркнем это еще раз) – это все хорошее и положительное, это идеал и образец. Напротив, традиционность – это всё устаревшее и как бы обветшалое, все то, что безнадежно отстало в своем развитии и потому нуждающееся в модернизации и вестернизации. Между Западом и Востоком лежит пропасть, и процесс модернизации – тот единственный мост, по которому традиционные страны восточного мира могут перейти на другую сторону и в какой-то степени присоединиться к компании передовых современных стран Запада.

С точки зрения Востока, традиционность является достоинством, а не недостатком. Она символизирует самобытность и специфику восточного мира, является гарантией сохранения вековечных устоев жизнедеятельности и обеспечения непрерывной трансляции ценностей. Современная западная цивилизация во главе с США воспринимается как сила, стремящаяся разрушить самоидентификацию восточного мира, лишить его тех оригинальных черт, которые составляют его самое дорогое достояние. В этом фундаментальном противоречии между современностью и традиционностью и заключается главное основание «столкновения цивилизаций».

Виктор Авксентьев

ПОСТКОММУНИСТИЧЕСКИЕ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ И «КОНФЛИКТ ЦИВИЛИЗАЦИЙ»

Тема «конфликта цивилизаций», занимавшая умы многих мыслителей после публикации знаменитой статьи С. Хантингтона в начале 1990-х гг., заметно утратила популярность уже во второй половине десятилетия, уступив место более прагматичному анализу мировых и региональных процессов. Однако начало XXI века обнаружило как новые черты глобального развития, так и вывело на поверхность глубинные социокультурные напряжения, находившиеся в латентном состоянии в течение 1990-х гг., аналитики заговорили о войне цивилизаций, а не просто о конфликте.

В середине первого десятилетия XXI века в мировом обществоведении прослеживаются два подхода к анализу новейших тенденций в социокультурных процессах. Первый – политологический, согласно которому ключевые процессы объясняются через интересы политических акторов. И хотя во многих исследованиях влияние культурных разломов в различных регионах планеты также рассматривалось как конфликтогенный фактор, ему отводилась второстепенная роль. «Сосуществование различных групп, действительно, проблематично и хрупко, – отмечает Р. Тоскано, – но в основании насильственного межгруппового конфликта (не просто напряжённости, не просто различий и не просто противоречий) мы практически неизбежно видим сознательные, систематические и интеллектуально нечестные действия политических лидеров, направленные на убеждение группы: а) в ее исключительности и совершенстве; б) в негативной, достойной презрения природе соперничающей группы, при этом убеждение должно стереотипизироваться в абстракт-

ных терминах, чтобы не допустить индивидуальных различий или исключений; в) в объективном характере определённых групповых интересов, определяемых как «неизбежные цели»;.. г) в абсолютности соперничества по типу «игры с нулевой суммой». Согласно такой террористической установке все проблемы (употребление названия или флага, нескольких квадратных миль территории, берега реки или вершины горы) могут быть представлены как «жизненно важные» для самого существования группы» [1].

Такой подход в конфликтологии можно обозначить как «реалистический», сильной стороной которого, по мнению самих ее представителей, является то, что это направление убедительно объясняет всплеск этнической конфликтности в 1990-е гг. такими факторами, как распространение идеологии либерализма и особенно экономического либерализма, ослабление роли государственности, создание идеальных условий для этнического антрепренёрства. Подобные объяснения были вполне валидными до тех пор, пока эти конфликты имели локальный или региональный характер.

Второй подход к проблеме социальных расколов можно обозначить как социокультурный, согласно которому культурные факторы и идентичности рассматриваются как не менее важные, чем политические. Этот подход, представленный в 1970-е – 1980-е гг. многообразием школ и направлений, оказался на периферии обществоведческой методологии в 1990-е годы. Однако **события начала и середины первого десятилетия XXI века актуализировали те объяснительные модели социальной конфликтности, в которых культуре отводится значимая роль**. Сторонники социокультурной концепции в конфликтологии не отрицают, что в основе многих конфликтов лежат интересы, но исходят из того, что интересы являются не единственным мотивом конфликтного поведения людей. В научный оборот конфликтологии прочно вошёл концепт конфликта ценностей, нередко оспариваемый сторонниками «реалистического» видения конфликтов. Сформировалась теоретическая дихотомия «конфликт интересов – конфликт ценностей».

Вопрос о мотивах и стимулах участия людей в конфликтах остаётся одним из наиболее дискуссионных вопросов современной конфликтологии. Иногда в диаду «конфликт интересов – конфликт

ценностей» вводятся новые элементы: потребности (концепция Дж. Бёртона), идентичности. В концепции Бёртона эти два основания конфликта – потребности и идентичности – объединены в одно: Бёртон рассматривает идентичность в качестве базовой потребности человека [2].

Конфликт идентичностей не всегда укладывается в простые объяснительные модели. Как отмечает Дж.Ротман, «одним из атрибутов конфликта идентичностей является его «неуловимость». Другими словами, такой конфликт глубоко субъективен; соперники, оказавшиеся в конфликте идентичностей, иногда сами с большим трудом могут объяснить природу своего соперничества... Субъективный опыт соперников формируется специфической культурной реальностью и историческим контекстом. Более того, восприятие соперниками друг друга совершенно различно. То, что одной стороне представляется как борьба за свободу, другой – как терроризм» [3].

Концепт **конфликта идентичностей является ключевым для объяснения феномена «конфликта цивилизаций»**. По нашему мнению, конфликт цивилизаций – это не строгая научная категория, а научная метафора, но имеющая право на существование в современном обществоведческом лексиконе. Кризисное состояние идентичностей во многих регионах интенсивного этнокультурного контакта (Балканы, Кавказ, Ближний Восток) побуждает участников этих контактов рассматривать межцивилизационное взаимодействие через призму «конфликта цивилизаций».

Конфликт идентичностей, являясь сложносоставным по своей природе, отражает транзитивное состояние не только Кавказа и Балкан, России и «новой Европы», **но и всего человечества**. Неоднократно отмеченная в XX и XXI вв. европейскими философами исчерпанность потенциала развития западной цивилизации имеет множественные формы проявления: отрицательные величины демографических процессов, обширная миграция на территорию стран Запада инокультурного населения, меняющего цивилизационный облик западного мира, расползающийся терроризм, модернизационные проекты в исламском мире на незападной основе. Всё это вселяет тревогу в общественное сознание Запада, уверенного в единственности собственного пути развития.

Наиболее эвристически ценным объяснением «конфликта цивилизаций» является **дилемма безопасности**. В силу динамики современного социума и нарастающего числа контактов между представителями различных культур усиление статусных позиций одной из сторон потенциально конфликтного взаимодействия воспринимается другой стороной как угроза её статусу, даже если снижения последнего не происходит.

Распространённое определение современного межцивилизационного раскола по конфессиональному признаку не лишено оснований, хотя требует дополнительного объяснения. О религиозных различиях как важном компоненте мотивации действий людей в социальных конфликтах упоминают большинство конфликтологов, но вплоть до недавнего времени они, как правило, не заостряли внимания на этом факторе, трактуя его как одно из многочисленных культурных различий, формирующих среду протекания конфликта. Однако ситуация постепенно меняется, и связано это с тем, что религия выдвигается на роль ведущего социокультурного маркера современного человека, вытесняя на вторые роли этничность. «Религия станет играть всё более важную роль в том, как люди определяют свою идентичность, – отмечают авторы доклада «Контуры мирового будущего». – Во многих обществах границы между религиозными группами и внутри них могут стать не менее важными, чем национальные границы» [4].

Сравнительный анализ межцивилизационного взаимодействия в полиэтничных и поликультурных макрорегионах, каковыми являются Кавказ и Балканы, свидетельствует, что **сами по себе конфессиональные различия не являются конфликтогенным фактором**, и на протяжении столетий совместного проживания произошла «притирка» христианского и исламского миров. В то же время в условиях нарастающей социокультурной динамики религиозные представления и установки влияют на мировосприятие и поведение индивида. Осознанная религиозная принадлежность, вне зависимости от уровня религиозности, побуждает человека к оценке и сравнению нравственных, догматических, жизненных устоев, присущих его и другим конфессиям. В наибольшей степени это сравнение по принципу «мы-они» актуализируется при получении новой

информации о других конфессиях, при взаимодействии с представителям других вероучений. Коллективное сознание с большим трудом принимает модели поведения, отклоняющиеся от принятых внутри общности образцов и установок. Тем более это относится к религиозным и этнорелигиозным общностям, сформировавшим мощную культурно-конфессиональную традицию, ставшую их цементирующей основой.

Исследование потенциальной конфликтности религиозной сферы в этнополитическом центре Северного Кавказа – Ставропольском крае – показало [5], что значительная часть христиан не готова воспринимать Россию поликонфессиональной страной и полагает, что православное христианство должно доминировать в религиозном пространстве страны. Мусульмане, наоборот, считают, что ислам – одна из основных религий в стране, хотя и не претендуют на главенство. Большинство опрошенных в ходе исследования мусульман выступает за равное отношение государства ко всем конфессиональным объединениям, причём такое отношение должно выражаться в государственной поддержке различных религий. Среди христиан большинство выступает за поддержку прежде всего православия, причём, необходимо отметить, что среди мусульман оказалось 17,3% тех, кто выделил в качестве конфессии, которой необходимо оказывать государственную поддержку, православное христианство; среди христиан лишь 1% опрошенных назвал в этом случае ислам. За равенство конфессий при получении преференций и поддержки со стороны государства выступает заметно меньшее количество христиан – 28,6%. Эти результаты до определённой степени подтверждает предположение о том, что определённая часть христиан, в первую очередь, православных, на сегодня не считают возможным приравнивать к своей религии иные конфессии и деноминации.

Банкротство основных политических идей в постсоветской России – и левых, и праволиберальных, оставило религию фактически единственным духовным источником, обеспечивающим возможность сохранения гомогенного коллективного сознания и ощущения себя не только политической, гражданской, но и цивилизационной общностью, что весьма важно для социума, увязшего в перманентном «состоянии транзита» и не восстановившего за весь постсо-

ветский период своей позитивной идентичности. Утрата наднациональной, имперской идентичности и отсутствие заметных успехов в формировании новой общегражданской идентичности стимулируют укрепление этнической и конфессиональной идентичности граждан, что, в свою очередь, переводит процесс выстраивания отношений с иными этническими и конфессиональными общностями в плоскость упоминавшейся выше дилеммы безопасности. Подобная «социальная призма» не способствует интеграционным процессам внутри социума и может привести к ещё большему отчуждению отдельных групп общества друг от друга и давлению на государственную власть с целью признания особого статуса своей этнической или конфессиональной общности и принятия мер по их защите.

В ситуации конфликта идентичностей современным государствам, как европейским, так и России, придётся либо принимать отдельную концепцию государственной конфессиональной политики, либо настаивать на жёстком соблюдении уже имеющихся правил и установлений, основанных на светском характере государственности. При этом, однако, не стоит полагать, что исключительными проводниками идей останутся т.н. традиционные конфессии – православие, ислам, буддизм, иудаизм. Поиск духовной опоры немалой частью общества будет продолжен, значимость религиозной идентичности будет возрастать и в этом плане европейским государствам в ближайшее время придётся определяться с новой моделью государственно-конфессиональных отношений.

Примечания

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ДУХОВНОЕ НАСЛЕДИЕ ВЕЛИКОГО КНЯЖЕСТВА ЛИТОВСКОГО: РАЗНЫЕ КУЛЬТУРЫ – ОБЩАЯ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТЬ

Вопрос "Возможна ли европейская идентичность и как она возможна?" приобрел в последнее время особую остроту как в связи с известными проблемами в продвижении экономической и политической интеграции европейских стран, так и в связи с острейшими конфликтами, обусловленными расовыми, этническими, религиозными, в конечном счете – культурными различиями разных групп населения современной Европы. Пылающий Париж, всегда считавшийся культурной столицей Европы, стал зримым символом кризиса европейской идентичности, которая априорно включалась в идеологию европейской интеграции.

Евроскептики полагают, что проблемы неразрешимы, так как укоренены в самом менталитете европейских народов, а сама история Европы – это история перманентных конфликтов. Самые страшные из них, приобретшие характер мировых войн, пришлись на XX столетие и были развязаны европейскими нациями. Но разве становление этнической карты Европы не было результатом катаклизма мирового масштаба – Великого переселения народов, вызванного экспансией с Востока? Разве европейским народам уже не приходилось объединяться, например, в противостоянии арабской экспансии, грозившей завоеванием всей тогдашней ойкумены? И разве, несмотря на постоянные конфликты, Европа не была в разные периоды своей истории объединена разнообразными династическими, дипломатическими, экономическими, культурными связями? Так, в пору критического военного противостояния белорусских княжеств с орденами крестоносцев в XIII веке совершались регулярные

взаимные торговые экспедиции между Ригой ("Готским берегом") и Полоцком, Витебском и Смоленском, обеспечиваемые дипломатически многочисленными договорами, а также политической волей правителей. Характерно, что в Смоленске в первой половине XIII века существовала даже немецкая кирха ("Немецкая божница"). А это можно рассматривать как одно из многих проявлений и веротерпимости, и взаимного доверия, не всегда просматриваемых на фоне эксцессов политической и военной истории.

Но исторический процесс всегда многоаспектен, и делом гуманитариев (не только историков) должно быть раскрытие этой многоплановости, ее осмысление и превращение в элементы метаполитического дискурса, предполагающего, кроме прочего, превращение общих ценностей европейской цивилизации в организующее средоточие и политики, и экономики, слишком часто подверженных сиюминутной конъюнктуре.

Исторический опыт (как положительный, так и отрицательный) – из категории такого рода ценностей. И, возможно, как раз исторический опыт народов Центральной и Восточной Европы, находящихся сейчас по существу на периферии европейских интеграционных процессов, станет тем необходимым компонентом, которого так не хватает для становления европейской идентичности, не разрушающей, но поддерживающей различия. Конечно, где имеются различия, там возможны и конфликты. Но только мертвое внутренне бесконфликтно. Для жизненности необходимо многообразие целого.

Белорусский народ, как и другие народы Европы, имеет свой неповторимый опыт, ему знакомы высокие взлеты и жесткие падения. В этом опыте на протяжении многих столетий формировалось и самосознание нашего народа, его, как иногда говорят, менталитет. Современное общественное сознание белоруской нации имеет под собой реальную историю, берущую свое начало в более ранних социокультурных образованиях, имевших особую организационную – феодальную – структуру: в так называемой Киевской Руси, Великом княжестве Литовском (ВКЛ), Первой Речи Посполитой. Почти тысячелетняя история существования этих образований сформировала во многом уникальное восточно-европейское социокультурное пространство. Его уникальность была обусловлена тем, что,

во-первых, оно было открыто для различного рода мировоззренческих влияний; во-вторых, содержало в себе полиэтнические и мультирелигиозные компоненты; в-третьих, наша донациональная история дает уникальный пример реальной коллективной идентичности, в которой практически отсутствовали репрессивные практики, носящие не социально-классовый, а этнический и религиозный характер.

Лучшая в Европе правовая система, развитое книгопечатание на языках всех народов, бывших подданными Великого Князя, уникальные памятники архитектуры, ментальность, сложившаяся в ВКЛ с его принципами веротерпимости, уважения к закону, любви к своей общей полиэтнической Родине – вот лишь наиболее яркие элементы нашего наследия. Многие проявления этого менталитета практически забыты, другие известны только горстке узких специалистов, а третьи неоднократно трансформировались и приспосабливались для построения новых национальных идеологий. Поэтому *сегодня существует, на наш взгляд, настоятельная необходимость в проведении комплексного исследования духовно-философского наследия Великого княжества Литовского с такими его важнейшими компонентами, как мультикультурность, поликонфессионализм, национальная и религиозная толерантность.*

Наконец, крайне важен вопрос о судьбах этой великой культуры, которая стала исходным материалом для формирования сразу нескольких восточноевропейских наций. Ибо разделенное духовное наследие, которое имеют сейчас белорусский, литовский, польский и украинский народы, не есть результат неких коллизий, которые вызревали внутри истинной истории Великого княжества Литовского, а тесно связаны с последствиями позднейших интерпретаций, вызванных стремлениями создать идеологические основы для нового национального строительства.

Поэтому у исследователей и возникают серьезные расхождения на уровне интерпретации культуры региона ВКЛ в контексте той или иной версии национальной истории. До сих пор не утихают споры о том, кто является правопреемником наследия Великого Княжества. Каким образом и в какой части его история коррелируется с национальными историями современных восточноевропейских наций?

Обосновывая преемственность своей национальной культуры по отношению к духовности региона ВКЛ, историки, принадлежащие к различным национальным школам, нередко допускают произвольные интерпретации некоторых сторон единой культуры в соответствии с более поздними национальными представлениями белорусской, литовской, польской, российской или украинской историографии.

Даже при самой профессионально выверенной авторской позиции реконструкция ментальности Великого княжества Литовского часто производится с исходных позиций конфликта. Произвольно, субъективистски многих персонажей этого духовного ареала, который во время его существования был образцом религиозной веротерпимости и этнической толерантности, делят на положительных и отрицательных, прогрессивных и регрессивных, толерантных и экспансионистских. Критерии такого деления часто совершенно необъяснимы, иррациональны и не имеют отношения к самому предмету исследования. И самое негативное здесь в том, что во многих случаях, будто по воле злого рока, отдельные исследователи охотнее занимаются поиском и анализом тех моментов в истории региона, которые затем используются политиками и государственными деятелями для разъединения, конфронтации, противопоставления наших народов и культур, а не для их объединения и консолидации.

Сегодняшний момент в развитии европейской цивилизации трактуют как переход к постнациональной стадии. В условиях объединяющейся Европы наиболее приемлемым концептом предполагается модель некой общеевропейской идентичности, носители которой имеют не только одинаковые духовные корни, но и нераздельную историю. Однако для нас очевидно, что в таком случае общеевропейская идентичность скорее может стать только очередной синтетической конструкцией с тем же искусственным духовным компонентом, который сейчас имеют все современные европейские нации. Конечно, сегодняшних европейцев многое объединяет, начиная от исповедуемых религиозных принципов и кончая манерой одеваться. Однако выдвинуть очередной тезис, что на протяжении двух последних тысячелетий все они жили единой дружной семьей, изредка раздираемой мелкими коллизиями, было бы уже очевидной натяжкой.

Гораздо более продуктивно поиски моделей общей идентичности могут решаться на более узком, региональном уровне. И в этом отношении Великое княжество Литовское дает уникальный пример реальной коллективной идентичности с весьма либеральными отношениями к каждой этнической и религиозной группе, ибо на первое место здесь выдвигалась преданность Великому Князю и тем законам, которые издавались от его имени. В определенной мере это относится и ко всем государственным образованиям, которые возникали и существовали на восточноевропейском пространстве на протяжении с IX по XVIII вв. – Древняя Русь, Великое княжество Литовское и Первая Речь Посполитая. Исходя из этих соображений о ментальной и социокультурной специфике восточноевропейского пространства эпох Средневековья и Ренессанса, вполне правомерно, по нашему мнению, выдвинуть тезис о том, что *регион ВКЛ является не синтетической, а подлинной конструкцией, которая имеет реальную, а не сконструированную историю, причем, как политическую, так и социокультурную.*

Представляется, что первичной посылкой при построении интеллектуальной истории региона ВКЛ должно быть его понимание как единого социокультурного пространства, некоего веера интерпретаций единой ментальной конфигурации Великого княжества Литовского, духовные и философские артефакты которого относятся к корпусу неосязаемого культурного наследия всех ее наций-преемников.

С этой точки зрения и исходя из требований ЮНЕСКО и Совета Европы по сохранению культурного наследия, можно полагать, что *идеальным, по нашему мнению, был бы вариант написания интеллектуальной истории региона Великого княжества Литовского в рамках единой исследовательской программы, объединяющей ученых из Беларуси, Литвы, Польши, России, Украины, а также из других стран, заинтересованных в данной проблематике.* При этом необходимо акцентировать не образы этого региона в повседневной жизни сегодняшних народов, населяющих эту территорию, а на восстановление первоначальных смыслов духовности, на создание таких интерпретационных моделей, которые могут донести эти смыслы до наших современников, являющихся преемниками этого великого наследия.

На основе этого можно предложить следующую методологию исследования. Категориальная основа культуры региона ВКЛ как сохраняемого культурного наследия может быть построена как многослойная структура. Любой элемент культурного наследия имеет материальную или интерсубъективную субстрату. Некая первичная символизация, являющаяся продуктом творческой активности автора или авторов артефакта, налагается на материальную или интерсубъективную субстрату. Иными словами, мы видим здесь феномен овеществления субъективности. Любое культурное явление имеет также вторичные (третичные, четвертичные и так далее) символические стратификации, которые следуют из восприятия первичной символизации и исторически следуют одна за другой. Естественно, первый и второй компонент всегда остаются постоянными, третий отличается чрезвычайной подвижностью. Эта подвижность определяется мировоззренческими ориентациями людей, наследующих определенную культуру, их практическими задачами по отношению к духовному наследию.

Стабильная культура с устоявшимися мыслительными традициями через некий разлом порождает существование нового, которое в свое время может настичь катаклизм. История восточно-европейского региона – наглядный пример эволюционно-революционного пути, который отчетливо делится на ряд заметных эпох: Древняя Русь, Великое княжество Литовское, Люблинская Уния, Первая Речь Посполитая, ее разделы, борьба наследующих ее народов за свое национальное возрождение.

Однако концепция эволюционно-революционного стержня – только первое приближение к проблеме обоснования периодизации истории региона ВКЛ. Это мультикультурное, полиэтническое и мультирелигиозное образование, очевидно, строилось, по крайней мере, на нескольких темпоральных стержнях. Это многообразие временных ритмов может быть интерпретировано при помощи классической концепции долгой временной протяженности Фернана Броделя. Долгая временная протяженность, или время большой длительности, совсем не обязательно означает продолжительный отрезок времени. Речь в данном случае идет о том пласте истории или пласте структур, который эволюционирует и изменяется мед-

леннее всего. Долгая временная протяженность – это неторопливый ритм. Ее можно обнаружить и наблюдать и на относительно коротких отрезках времени, однако она неизменно скрывается под историей событийной, под среднесрочным стечением обстоятельств [1].

В нашем конкретном случае интеллектуальной истории региона ВКЛ долгая временная протяженность может означать символизацию такого времени, когда ничего особенного не происходит, и одновременно время накопления взрыва. Причем, если политический взрыв обычно взламывает всю структуру социума, то можно говорить о взрывах духовных (эпоха Возрождения с коренным переосмыслением принципов мироздания, Статут Великого Княжества Литовского с нормами права, совершивший настоящую революцию и, конечно, христианизация Руси и христианизация Литвы, которые для региона ВКЛ были двумя весьма отличными друг от друга способами культурной революции). Процесс инкультурации означал внедрение не только принципов христианства в языческие культуры, но и новых правовых, этических, эстетических норм жизни. Эти два направления культурных революций означали еще и привнесение в культуру региона ВКЛ всех коллизий, возникших в ходе возникновения двух культурных парадигм, связанных с разделением Римской империи на восточную и западную. И, как следствие, возникновение в культуре данного региона двух самостоятельных духовных потоков (православного и католического), которые отличались не только содержательно, но и структурно, в том числе и динамикой развития. По сути дела, мы можем говорить о двух самостоятельных конструкциях долгой временной протяженности, которые, впрочем, никогда не существовали автономно, а постоянно взаимодействовали, коррелировали друг с другом, переплетались и пересекались, вызывая возникновение вторичных структур долгих временных протяженностей.

Таким образом, периодизация интеллектуальной истории региона ВКЛ, видимо, должна быть, на наш взгляд, не хронологической, а структурной. Необходим тщательный анализ всех возможных строений долгой временной протяженности, ее описание, изучение процессов внутренней корреляции, взаимовлияния и даже в какой-то мере слияния.

С нашей точки зрения, социокультурное пространство региона ВКЛ может быть представлено как многослойная пространственно-временная структура, объединяющая ряд переходящих друг в друга или пересекающихся между собой социокультурных и государственных образований: Древней Руси, Великого княжества Литовского, Первой Речи Посполитой и Российской империи, в составе которой завершилось формирование белоруской, литовской и украинской наций.

Вплоть до начала XX в. эти перечисленные геополитические образования, с одной стороны, составляли единое социокультурное пространство, с другой, обладали почти полной культурной преемственностью, сходной идентичностью и поэтому объективно в полном своем составе составляли актуальное прошлое нынешних восточноевропейских наций. И, наконец, попытки найти в феодальной истории региона что-нибудь чисто белорусское, литовское или украинское являются проявлением неуважения как к исследуемым культурам Древней Руси и Великого княжества Литовского, так и к своим нынешним нациям-соседям, ибо, повторим это еще раз, социокультурные структуры Древней Руси и Великого княжества Литовского являются первичными и самодостаточными по отношению к нынешним национальным государствам.

Манипуляции с духовными культурами Древней Руси и Великого княжества Литовского строились по различным схемам. К примеру, одним из таких путей являются игры на конфессиональной принадлежности тех или иных представителей элиты Великого Княжества Литовского. В частности, стало традиционным рассмотрение православных и католических компонентов в культуре Великого княжества как элементов, находящихся в постоянном антагонизме. Причем, в зависимости от сегодняшних конфессиональных ориентаций того или иного сообщества ученых, те составляющие культуры региона ВКЛ, которые не совсем соответствуют канонам православной или католической конфессии, либо отбрасывались совсем, либо объявлялись враждебными, либо рассматривались как второстепенный, вспомогательный компонент.

Очевидно, духовная жизнь ВКЛ была гораздо сложнее, и, кроме религиозных споров, в ней было и многое другое. Однако то, о чем говорили, спорили и даже конфликтовали элиты Древней Руси

и ВКЛ, было их внутренним делом, не имеющим никакого отношения к процессам национального строительства эпохи модерна. Выраженную выше посылку можно переформулировать следующим образом: дискурсы, которые существовали в то время и имели свои уникальные идентификаторы, были совершенно забыты и стали неактуальными в эпоху национального строительства. Новые национальные элиты, заботясь о построении своих государств, произвольно выдергивали факты из общей старой истории восточноевропейских наций, подстраивая их уже под свои, новые идеологические потребности. Именно поэтому мы утверждаем, что история донациональной Восточной Европы должна пониматься как единая, неделимая, общая для белорусов, литовцев, украинцев и поляков.

Исследование культуры региона ВКЛ следовало бы проводить, по нашему мнению, через реконструкцию подлинной логики социокультурных и ментальных процессов, проходивших в Древней Руси, Великом княжестве Литовском и Первой Речи Посполитой. Вышесказанное означает, что при исследовании как преднациональной, так и собственно национальной стадии ВКЛ, более продуктивно делать упор на восстановление первоначальных смыслов духовности и на создание таких интерпретационных моделей, которые могут донести эти смыслы до наших современников.

Каждый человек всегда имеет выбор из того набора символизаций, который ему предлагается. Производя этот выбор, он добавляет к смысловой структуре духовного наследия новую символизацию, то есть рассматривает прошлое через своеобразные "концептуальные очки". Структура таких очков динамически коррелятивна мировоззрению личности, ее ценностным ориентациям, способу веры, стилю мышления и поведения. Во всех этих случаях мы говорим о модернизации символической основы культурного наследия, которая производится согласно классической герменевтической процедуре, комбинирующей в себе восприятие, понимание и интерпретацию. Через этот философский образец (как правило, в неосознанной и неформализованной форме) духовное наследие входит в настоящее как один из способов объяснения смыслов существования.

Создание национального культурного наследия может рассматриваться как специальный случай интерпретации некоторых

культурных явлений для политических целей некой нации или государства. В ходе творения национального духовного наследия артефакты отбираются и интерпретируются под влиянием некоторой политической парадигмы. Операциональная модель национального культурного наследия может быть рассмотрена как трехуровневая структура. С одной стороны, государство как форма человеческой ассоциации должно строго выполнять обязательства по охране каждого компонента культурного наследия. С другой стороны, как член мирового сообщества государство должно признавать универсальное наследие, то есть культурные активы, которые рассматриваются всем человечеством как неопровержимые ценности. И, наконец, культурное наследие используется государством для его специальных целей: установления определенного политического порядка, легитимизации своих институтов, оправдания права управлять своей исторической территорией, поддержания патриотических чувств и т.д. С этой точки зрения мы можем говорить о национальном культурном наследии как об одном из столпов национального самосознания.

Изменение смысла наследуемого – неизбежный процесс. Однако с точки зрения поставленной нами задачи сохранения первой (подлинной) символизации духовной культуры региона ВКЛ, мы должны отличать правильное использование его культурных артефактов от злоупотреблений.

В качестве методологической гипотезы можно предложить следующие критерии для дифференциации правильного использования духовного наследия от злоупотребления им. Наш подход к теоретическому обоснованию данного различения следует из общего понимания культурного наследия как многослойной структуры. С этой точки зрения: (A) Невозможно использовать культурное наследие для целей исключения. (B) Следующий добавленный смысл не должен приводить к фатальным искажением исконной символической структуры. (C) Любое использование объекта духовного наследия не должно разрушать его первичный субстрат. (D) Наконец, это использование не должно закрывать пути для любой новой ресимволизации. История не может быть материалом для построения любого рода идеологической пропаганды.

Для построения концептуальной модели интеллектуальной истории региона ВКЛ прежде всего предстоит осуществить детальную периодизацию духовной и философской культуры региона с учетом всех культурных потоков и временных ритмов, которые существовали здесь, выработать единые подходы и методологию исследования этого феномена. Необходима большая источниковедческая работа, ставящая целью включение в контекст изложения максимально большого числа источников различного характера. Необходимо по сути заново перечитать и переосмыслить все те исследовательские труды, которые были созданы в ходе изучения культуры региона ВКЛ на протяжении двух последних столетий.

Честная и профессиональная интерпретация прошлого принесет большую пользу как настоящему, так и будущему восточноевропейских народов. Она будет способствовать пониманию и признанию исторического выбора, совершаемого народами в том числе и сегодня, росту сотрудничества и взаимопонимания между ними, преодолению тех разногласий, которые были вызваны прошлыми предрассудками. Диалог на основе общих корней – это самый продуктивный диалог.

И определенные шаги в этом направлении в Институте философии НАН Беларуси уже делаются. Так, в прошлом году под эгидой ЮНЕСКО у нас прошла международная конференция «Духовное наследие народов Центральной и Восточной Европы в контексте современного межцивилизационного диалога», в работе которой самое активное участие принял и Чрезвычайный и Полномочный посол Республики Болгария в Республике Беларусь, член-корреспондент Болгарской академии наук, доктор философских наук Петко Ганчев. В работе конференции также приняли участие философы из Литвы, Украины, Польши и России. Эта работа, безусловно, будет продолжена.

Такая исследовательская программа имеет, очевидно, далеко не узкорегиональное значение. Ведь проблема раздела общего наследия остро стоит и в других регионах Европы. Такова ситуация, например, в регионе былой Австро-Венгрии, культура которой достигла в свое время невероятных высот, а общую идентичность которой пытаются символизировать концептом *Mitteleuropa* – Срединная Европа. Несравнимо сложней ситуация на Балканах, где элементы общей

идентичности просматриваются на уровне фольклорно-этнографическом, но маскируются слишком продолжительной историей конфликтного существования.

Реальная европейская идентичность никогда не сформируется политической риторикой и выдачей желаемого за действительное. Она сможет родиться в результате воссоздания – идеального в теории и реального в жизни – исторического опыта добрососедства и сотрудничества как в границах крупных социокультурных и геополитических образований, так и на межрегиональном уровне. Тогда, возможно, и проблема мигрантов станет видеться в новом свете. Ведь смогли же в свое время интегрироваться в этноконфессиональную и политическую структуру ВКЛ татары-мусульмане, сохраняющие свою религиозную и культурную идентичность в составе белорусской нации.

Пока же пылающий Париж – символ слабости. Не экономической – духовной.

Nikolina Sretenova

IS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN RESEARCH AREA POSSIBLE IN SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES?

(Summary)

As it is well-known the basic concept of the EU FP6 is 'European Research Area' (ERA). The expectation of the EU policy makers is that ERA might strengthen the capacity of the European research potential in a given field in the context of Lisbon strategy. This paper discusses the impact of EU FP6 on the shaping of the national programmes in Social Sciences and Humanities of the 'old' EU member states and current perspectives of the 'new' member states and accession countries, in particular Bulgaria.

The Challenge

The creation of ERA for Humanities and Social sciences (SHS) can serve as a powerful leverage for their reorganization and for restructuring the research in the respective areas at the national levels in order to produce a kind of synergy of their functioning at the European level.

The major challenge here is that Humanities and Social Sciences are strongly dependent upon different national settings, national research traditions and cultural contexts which results in their *fragmentation* at the European level. Then how an ERA could be build for them?

Generally speaking the research agenda of the national scholar communities derives from and to some extent is determined by the national funding arrangements for Social and Human Sciences in the respective country.

J. Smith identifies five types of national funding arrangements for Social and Human Sciences research in the 'old' EU member states. They are as follows:

A. Strong research council system with both initiative and responsive mode funding schemes – Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom; Norway and Switzerland;
B. Strong research institution funding from several national sources – France and Italy;
C. Strong research council and institution funding with dominant responsive mode – Germany;
D. Mixed (but more limited) research council and institution funding with both initiative and responsive mode funding – Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain;
E. EU Framework Programmes playing major role in the funding of research community activities and projects – Greece and Ireland.

Here 'responsive mode' funding schemes means open grant schemes where topics are not pre-determined or specified. Research communities determine the research topic proposals to be submitted. 'Curiosity-driven' research or 'science-driven mode' are another common terms used to describe the responsive mode research funding. The 'initiative mode' funding means calls for proposals for grants/contracts where the research topics are pre-determined and specified. These topic choices are made therefore on the 'initiative' of funding bodies. 'Targeted research' or 'policy-driven mode' are another common terms used to describe 'initiative mode' research funding.

Following J. Smith the specificity of each type of national funding arrangements for HSH might be described in following terms.

Type A: Strong research council system with both initiative and responsive mode funding schemes – Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom; Norway and Switzerland.

This type of national funding arrangements for Social and Human Sciences requires a strong presence of *scientific administrative culture.*

Governing bodies of research councils which decide upon thematic priorities contain a broad representation of academics, government ministry advisers, the representatives from industry, non-government bodies and 'user' organizations. The research councils define strategic themes for national programmes with duration of 3-5 years and after then the experts develop the programmes' content, work plan and budget. This exercise takes a year work. Within this type of national funding arrangements approximately *one-third* of budget resources are distributed through the 'responsive mode', while the distribution of the other budget resources uses 'initiative mode'.

Type B: Strong research institution funding from several national sources – France and Italy – CNRS (France) and CNR (Italy)

This type of national funding arrangements for Social and Human Sciences operates in countries with strong institutional framework of specialized institutes (permanent infrastructure of institutes) with research careers.

The case of CNRS: The CNRS operates a mechanism of *interdisciplinary research programmes* (PIR) in topic areas such as environment, health, urban life and information and communication technology. The emphasis is on *interdisciplinary research* across all fields of science, including SHS. In this way CNRS provides initiative for its disciplinary –oriented institutes' teams **to adjust their research priorities** and work together on a common agenda. Institutional mechanisms allow for, and encourage, therefore, new research agenda-settings within the permanent institute structures. Also new institutes are created (or institutes merged) to tackle new fields.

The CNR in Italy also created several new institutes in 2001 tackling new interdisciplinary approaches in SHS priority fields (e.g. on science policy and innovation, social welfare and democratic change).

The Ministry of research plays direct role in promoting 'targeted thematic research programmes', e.g. the French Ministry of research launches 'call for proposals' for 'targeted research programs'. The administrative culture within this mode of funding is based on expert input – extensive groups of national committees exist within the national funding agency.

Type C: Strong research council and institution funding with *dominant responsive mode* – Germany. Some of the specificities of the German case are listed below:

- 'Science-driven' nature of setting research priorities through grant and programme themes;
- The important role and mission of DFG (German Research Society); emphasis on *scientific excellence and innovation*, peer review system of elected review committees; Board and Senate members of DFG are elected from the German scientific institutional landscape;
- DFG Priority Programs preparation by steps: research teams submit proposals for programmes to DFG, 'call for proposals', Independent steering committee and the program coordinator for the approved programmes;
- Institutional funding, 'policy-driven research' promoted through government departments at the federal and regional level.
- The Ministry (BMBF) is also a federal funding partner in key social science research institutes; BMBF performs a coordinating role in encouraging German research Community to apply to the EU FP
- Strong administrative culture as in 'Type A'

Type D & Type E

A common feature of the national funding arrangements for Social and Human Sciences of type D&E is crossing a threshold in terms of the size of SHS research communities and scale of resources devoted to SHS research. Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Greece and Ireland have smaller and disperse scholar communities and limited funding for Social and Human Sciences research.

Type E: EU Framework Programmes playing major role in the funding of research community activities and projects – Greece and Ireland.

Greece and Ireland lack National programs in SHS.

J. Smith identify eight clusters of national thematic priority programmes in SHS research across the 'old' EU member states and studies the impact of the FP6 on their shaping.

Cluster 1: Economic Performance/Competitiveness
Cluster 2: Democracy/Governance
Cluster 3: Environment/Human Behavior
Cluster 4: Health/Living Conditions
Cluster 5: Knowledge and Learning
Cluster 6: Multi-Ethnic Societies/Cultural Diversity/Identity
Cluster 7: Welfare State/Social Cohesion
Cluster 8: Science/Technology/Innovation

For example the Cluster 5 'Knowledge and Learning' involves programmes like:

- Learning and the Acquisition of Knowledge (Swedish Research Council)
- Information processing in Social Context (DFG, Germany)
- E-Society (Economic and Social Research Council, UK)
- Knowledge in Society, Power and Knowledge in Modern Societies (Danish Social Sciences Research Council, Danish Humanities Research Council) and so on

These programmes correspond to the 6FP themes: knowledge production, knowledge society, life-long learning, role of media, etc.

On its turn the Cluster 8 'Science/Technology/Innovation' involves the following programmes:

- Ethics, Research and Policy (Netherlands Research Council, NOW)
- Science in Society (Economic and Social Research Council, UK)
- Public Understanding of Science (Ministry of Science and Culture, BMBWK, Austria)
- Ethical, Legal and Social Aspects of Biotechnology (Norwegian Research Council)
- Studies on Science and Science Policy
- (Academy of Finland)

with the 6FP connecting themes: Science and Society, ethical values; communication of uncertainty and risk; scientific expertise, science and government.

The EU policy-makers designed within the 6FP a new and innovative instrument for building ERA in all fields of research including Social Sciences and Humanities research area. The name of this instrument is 'ERA-NET' scheme which aims at supporting of transnational networking and coordination of national research programmes, i.e. the scheme's participants are programme managers working in national Ministries and funding agencies. The objective of the 'ERA-NET' scheme is to set up cooperation and coordination of research activities (i.e. programmes) carried out at national or regional level in the EU member states and associated states through the networking of research activities including their 'mutual opening' and the development and implementation of joint activities.

In short the new ERA-NET's ultimate ambition is to establish an instrument for common research programmes on topics with shared priority among all members, with joint calls and shared evaluation systems.

It deserve noting that during the first Call for SSA under this scheme 32 ERA-NET projects received initial funding (preparatory grant) from the EU 6FP in order to prepare proposals for ERA-NETs in different research areas. Among these 32 successful ERA-NET projects there is one ERA-NET in the field of Humanities and one ERA-NET in the field of Social Sciences research.

ERA- NET in Humanities "The Humanities Speaking with One Voice" (ERCH project launched by an association of European Research Councils)

The key terms of this ERA-NET are: *Ethics, values, culture and gender.*
According to the applicants of this ERA-NET project the scope of the humanities ranges wider still. Such issues as *ethical standards, values, culture and gender* are widely debated at all levels, and academic research in these important areas requires support to ensure closer contact between researchers and society. Parts of the humanities are still weak in cross-border co-operation. Europe has always had an outstanding tradition of research in the humanities but, unlike science and technology, these efforts have been largely confined within national borders. This is no great surprise since studies of language, culture and history have strong asso-

ciations with individual nation states and are traditionally bound up with concepts of national heritage and identity. Change is in the air, however.

The annotation of this project states:

The humanities are closely associated with national heritage and identity, but can also contribute insights into broad issues of ethics, values, culture and gender – key issues for Europe's progress towards a competitive and sustainable economy. ERCH will collect information about national practices and programmes, and will suggest possible joint research themes and infrastructure projects to be implemented through a future ERA-NET in the research field of humanities.

The ERA-NET project in Social Sciences is titled "The Next Step for Social Sciences" (New opportunities for research funding co-operation in Europe – a strategy for social sciences).

Bulgaria currently participates in one ERA-NET project: 'SEE-ERA. NET' ('Integrating and Structuring the European Research Area in Southeast Europe') This is a networking project aimed at integrating EU-member states and Southeast European countries in the ERA. The project is co-ordinated by Austria and involves 17 institutions from 14 European countries, including all countries from the Balkan region.

The objectives of SEE-ERA.NET are stated to be:
– to enhance research cooperation in Europe by fostering integration of Southeast Europe into the growing European Research Area;
– to add value to existing bilateral S&T agreements through multilateral coordination;
– to improve interregional research cooperation following the principles of the stabilization and association process in Southeast Europe;
– to contribute to the 'EU-Balkan countries Action Plan in Science & Technology' adopted at the Thessaloniki Ministerial Conference in 2003.

The SEE-ERA.NET objectives will be met through:
– systematic exchange and dissemination of information and best practice models on bilateral RTD activities. This will contribute to a sound understanding of research systems and policy approaches in the SEE-ERA.NET partner countries;

- needs analyses from the viewpoint of researchers, RTD organizations as well as policy makers in the target countries, concentrating on international RTD cooperation;
- support of the policy dialogue on ERA-integration of countries referred to as West Balkan countries and related awareness raising activities in the European Union;
- identification of complementary approaches followed by the implementation of joint instruments and initiatives, including a joint evaluators database and joint calls for research proposals in 2007 and in 2008.

Social Sciences and Humanities in the Reality Shows of Transformation: The Bulgarian case
(The Impact of EU FP for re-shaping of research agenda of EU candidate countries)

1. Funding of Social Sciences and Humanities in the 'new' EU Member States and Accession Countries. The Bulgarian case

None of the above described five types of national funding arrangements operates in the 'new' EU member states and accession countries. To obtain a complete picture of the funding arrangements for Social Sciences and Humanities in Bulgaria we have to trace the distribution of researchers *across R&D sectors* and *across fields of science* and to connect these data with the respective R&D expenditure by sectors and fields of science.

Table 1: Distribution of Bulgarian researchers *across R&D sectors*, head count and percentage, 2000

Bulgaria	Business Enterprise (BES)	Higher Education (HES)	Government (GOV)	Private Non-profit PNP	All Sectors
Total	1225 11,6%	2 488 23,6%	6 763 **64,2%**	51 0,5%	10 527 100,0%

Source: European Commission, ENWISE Report, 2003

Table 2: Numbers of researchers (and % of women among them) by main field of science of GOV +HES in Bulgaria in 2000

Field	Natural Sciences	Engineering & Technology	Medical Sciences	Agricultural Sciences	Social Sciences	Humanities
Bulgaria	2 720 (51%)	2 122 (28%)	1 063 (50%)	965 (50%)	504 (47%)	934 (57%)

Source: European Commission, ENWISE Report, 2003

From Table 1 is evident that **64.2%** of the Bulgarian researchers are employed in the GOV R&D sector and 23.6% – in sector 'Higher education'. Social and humanities scientists are more likely to be found in the GOV research and HES institutions than in enterprise (BES sector). Table 2 shows that Bulgarian researchers are concentrated mainly in 'Natural Sciences' and 'Engineering & Technology'. Only 504 social scientists and 934 humanity scientists are employed in Bulgarian GOV and HES sectors, i.e. the research community is relatively small. Let us now connect these data with R&D expenditure by sectors and fields of science *per capita researcher* and *in Euros.* (Romania, Czech Republic and Slovenia and taken for comparison)

Table 3: R&D expenditure, in Euros per annum, *per capita* researcher and by R&D sector in 2001

Sector Country	BES	HES	GOV	Total
Bulgaria	12 470	2 830	7 254	6 791
Romania	8 854	2 832	4 853	6 301
Slovenia (for comparison)	105 651	16 718	40 137	45 313

Source: European Commission, ENWISE Report, 2003

The data presented in Table 3 show that the financial resources available *per capita researcher per annum* in Bulgaria and Romania are compa-

rable – 6 791 Euro and 6 301 Euro respectively, but they are very low in comparison with Slovenia – 45 313 Euro and indeed incomparable with the EU -15 average of 178 868 Euro *per capita researcher per annum*.

Table 4: R&D expenditure, in Euros per annum, *per capita* researcher (women + men combined) and by fields of science in HES and GOV sectors in 2000

Field Country	Natural Sciences	Engineering & Technology	Medical Sciences	Agricultural Sciences	Social Sciences	Humanities	Total
Bulgaria	5 584	5 700	2 661	20 247	4 264	4 606	**6 753**
Romania	3 975	6 857	7 892	10 194	7 662	3 173	**5 841**
Czech Republic	35 333	43 057	42 079	35 052	26 781	22 287	**35 909**
Slovenia	55 192	51 191	34 791	40 528	37 142	28 390	**44 589**

Source: European Commission, ENWISE Report, 2003

From Table 3&4 is evident that the access of a Bulgarian researcher in the GOV R&D sector to research funding is approximately 6 times less in comparison with his/her Slovenian colleague, while the respective figures for a Bulgarian social and humanity scientist in GOV and HES sectors are respectively – 8.7 and 6 times less respectively. Table 4 also shows that the gap in resource allocation between *hard* and *soft* sciences is very narrow in Bulgaria and Romania, which is not the case with Slovenia, Czech Republic and the other 'new' EU member states.

The presented data are indicative that all Bulgarian researchers (both in *hard* and *soft* sciences) employed in the GOV sector face one and the same trouble related with their access to financial resources. The research carried out in the GOV sector is funded from the state budget via Bulgarian Ministry of education and science. As a matter of fact the allocated re-

sources to the GOV R&D sector cover only researchers' salaries and partly the function of the research infrastructure (the cost for phone, electricity, heating, etc.). The so-called 'research money' in practice do not exist in Bulgarian GOV R&D sector. It means that the attraction of finances from the EU Framework Program and other EU funding bodies are *a matter of survival* for the researchers employed in this sector be they engaged *in hard* or *in soft* sciences research. Therefore in medium-term perspective the scenario 'E' of the above national funding arrangements of the EU-15 seems more close to the Bulgarian case.

2. After the political change of 1989 in all post-communist countries, including Bulgaria was established within the respective Ministries of science new grant-giving bodies, i.e. new funding mechanisms for R&D on the basis of a grant system were introduced. However the support offered by these granting bodies should be considered as additional income towards the resources allocation to the GOV R&D sector, which is financed mainly from the state budget.

For example in the Slovak Republic, 0.59% of GDP in 2002 was allocated to the R&D sector, from which 0.30% of GDP was financed from the state budget. The special state bodies – *Agency for Science and Technology* and *VEGA* (Scientific Grant Agency) deliver research grants on the basis of competitions.

In Hungary governmental R&D financing constitutes about 65-70% of the total funding of the Academy and the universities. The grants awarded by different governmental granting bodies such as *OTKA (Scientific Research Fund), MÜFA (Technological Development Fund)* and *NKFP (National Research and Development Programme)* contribute to this funding.

In Bulgaria the subsidy from the state budget comprises about 80% of the income of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and the grants from the *National Research Fund* (a state body, which deliver grants on the basis of competition) is about 3% annually.

3. Immediately after the political change in Central and Eastern European countries emerged new research institutions (the so-called 'think tanks') funded by private resources mainly from USA which shaped the

Private non-profit (PNP) R&D sector and provided stimuli to develop SHS fields. Some innovative Private non-profit R&D[1] emerged outside the GOV R&D in all post-communist countries.

For example in Poland, following the introduction of a market economy, private R&D institutions came into being, and independent branch institutes were established. New, autonomous research centers, such as the A. Smith Institute in Warsaw or the Case Foundation, were also set up. The institutions mentioned here are set up as foundations, thus they are financed by private funds. They describe themselves as independent, private, non-commercial, non-profit institutions.

In Hungary the Bay Zoltán Foundation is the largest research foundation in the country. It was founded in 1993 by the National Committee for Technological Development and it has three research institutes: the Institute of Biotechnology, the Institute of Material Science and Technology and the Institute of Logistics and Production Engineering. It is financed by grants, R&D contracts and interests (non-governmental funding).

The Private non-profit R&D sector is still negligible in Bulgaria but currently it competes with the GOV R&D in attracting EU funding.

4. Turbulent state-of-the-arts in SHS – introduction of new theoretical and methodological approaches, but also a great *fragmentation* of research communities. This is an outcome of the completed EU FP5 funded project "The State of Three Social Science Disciplines in Central and Eastern Europe (Economics, Political Science and Sociology)". The project was carried out by the Collegium Budapest, a Hungarian PNP research organization. Within this project was organized a workshop in Budapest during which social scientists from all CEE countries debated on the *new research agenda – building* related with the 'EU-entry' priority themes and issues and its potential impact upon the national funding arrangements in their fields. A key speaker at the opening of this workshop summarized the state of Social Sciences in the CEE countries with the statement: 'We are increasingly getting the grants but we do not have enough influence on

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[1] According to the Frascati Manual, the R&D activities are heading under the four sectors of economy: Higher Education sector (HES), Government sector (GOV), Business and Enterprise sector (BES) and Private non-profit sector (PNP).

the setting and content of the research agenda'

Conclusion: In order to survive the social sciences and humanities in Bulgaria have to adapt their research agenda to the EU Framework priority themes and issues.

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Cafer Sadık Yaran

A NON-RADICAL RELIGIOUS PLURALISM FOR A PEACEFUL DIVERSITY IN UNITY

Introduction: The principle of "unity in diversity" or "diversity in unity" is a perennial formula for multi-religious, multi-racial, and multi-cultural societies. It may easily be found in many ancient philosophical and mystical traditions of various religions, civilisations and cultures from the East to the West particularly as "*unity in diversity*" in a *pantheistic* and *onto-theological* fashion. Today, however, it is still valid and even much needed in the post-modern world of new religious movements and many new minority groups and sub-cultures in almost all countries of the world, especially as a principle of "*diversity in unity*" rather than unity in diversity in a *pluralistic and socio-cultural* fashion.

In this paper, I will advocate *diversity in unity* and a *non-radical religious pluralism* to arrive at a *peaceful and practical* achievement of cultural and religious diversity in unity in Europe and in the entire world from the perspective of the philosophy of religion and of the Islamic faith. First I will mention cultural diversity in unity in a few sentences, and then I will explore religious diversity in unity, and finally I will point out the basic principles of Islamic diversity in unity.

Cultural Diversity in Unity: We note with growing concern that very large segments of the people of contemporary societies including Europeans sense that they are threatened by massive immigration and by the growing minorities within their borders that hail from different cultures, follow different practices, and have separate institutions and loyalties. People of both parts, majorities and minorities, are troubled by street violence, verbal outbursts of hate, and growing support for various extremist parties. These are unwholesome reactions to threats people feel to their

sense of identity, self-determination, and culture, which come on top of concerns evoked by globalization, new communication technologies, and a gradual loss of national sovereignty. The challenge before us is to find legitimate and empirically sound ways to constructively address these concerns. At the same time, we should ensure that these sentiments do not find antisocial, hateful, let alone violent expressions.[1] In other words, the deadly dilemma of our day is that the assertion of one's own distinctiveness seems too easily to imply attacking others simply because they differ, ignoring and destroying all bonds of unity; whereas the effort to achieve unity is interpreted as requiring the suppression of the access of peoples to the cultural and religious wellsprings of their identity and thereby the very roots of their sense of unity with others.[2]

Two approaches should be avoided: promoting assimilation on the one hand, and unbounded multiculturalism on the other. Assimilation-which entails requiring minorities to abandon all of their distinct institutions, cultures, values, habits, and connections to other societies in order to fully mesh into the prevailing culture-is sociologically difficult to achieve and unnecessary for dealing with the issues at hand. It is also morally unjustified because of our respect for some normative differences. Unbounded multiculturalism-which entails giving up the concept of shared values, loyalties, and identity in order to privilege ethnic and religious differences, presuming that nations can be replaced by a large number of diverse minorities-is also unnecessary. And it is also normatively unjustified because it fails to recognize the values and institutions undergirded by the society at large.[3]

The basic approach we should favour is diversity within unity. It presumes that all members of a given society will fully respect and adhere to those basic values and institutions that are considered part of the basic shared framework of the society. At the same time, every group in society is free to maintain its distinct subculture-those policies, habits, and institutions that do not conflict with the shared core. Such diversity within unity allows one to fully respect basic rights, the democratic way of life, and core values, as

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[1] www.gwu.edu/ccps/dwu_positionpaper.html, 20.05.2006.

[2] www.crvp.org/seminar/seminar_94.htm, 22.05.2006.

[3] www.gwu.edu/ccps/dwu_positionpaper.html, 20.05.2006.

well as those minority values that do not conflict with it. We observe that such diversity within unity enriches rather than threatens the society at large and its culture.[4] In our present condition this is not a formula but a destiny, not an ideology but a task, not a utopia but a direction. But how can this be achieved?[5] In addition, diversity in unity in the sense of living in one geographical or political boundary is not only a contemporary but also a historical fact for many people in the world. However, what is important and urgently needed is to succeed in living in a *peaceful* and *practical* diversity in unity, not only in theory and discourse. In order to achive peaceful and real diversity in unity in multi-cultural and multi-religious societies, it is almost necessary first to arrive at a consciousness and consensus about the religious framework of diversity in unity. And for this purpose, now I will deal with specifically diversity in unity from the religious point of view. What are the ultimate religious principles for diversity in unity which can promote living together in peace, happiness and cooperation? What sort of theory should we have to understand religious diversity, all asserting to be true and the best?

Religious Diversity in Unity (or a Non-Radical Religious Pluralism): In order to attain to the ideal condition of peaceful diversity, most religious people need a paradigm shift in looking at the other religions, which constitute of the primary basis of civilisations and cultures. As we have already said about cultural diversity in unity that two approaches should be avoided, namely promoting assimilation and unbounded multiculturalism, likewise we should defend in relation to religious diversity in unity that parallel two religious approaches should also be avoided, namely, religious exclusivism and radical religious pluralism. Rather than a radical religious exclusivism of the mediaeval and modern times and also rather than a radical religious pluralism of the post-modern process, what is needed is either a religious inclusivism or a non-radical religious pluralism for bridging the religious people who adhere to various religions and denominations. For while religious exclusivism extravagantly emphasizes *diversity without unity* and radical religious pluralism similarly emphasizes *unity without diversity*, religious inclusivism lay emphasis upon

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[4] www.gwu.edu/ccps/dwu_positionpaper.html, 20.05.2006.

[5] www.crvp.org/seminar/seminar_94.htm, 25.05.2006.

unity in diversity and a non-radical or moderate pluralism lay emphasis upon *diversity in unity*.

The absolutist rhetoric of Medieval theology and the dualistic rhetoric of modernity were naturally reflected into the modern conception of religion and into the theories concerning the plurality of the world religions: a true, good and salvific religion on the one hand and the whole other religions on the other, briefly and technically stated, religious exclusivism. If the truth is only one as some sciences of that time showed, and my religion is the truth, then any religion outside my religion is automatically false religions. Although exclusivism has always been popular among religious people of any religion in any time, it possibly arrived at a higher point in modern times, as the increase of the function of missionary at that time has showed. Thus, there seem to be a considerable relationship between the general dualistic values of modernity and the religious exclusivism.

Together with certain positive affects of the modern developments in information and communication technologies, and in the movements of immigration and increasing tourism,[6] religiously exclusivist paradigm has started to be criticized like the other one-sided and exclusivist perspectives of modernity.

Although exclusivism may be natural and normal for devout people who were brought up in an exclusivist environment and education, or for some people who were in a position of self-defense in relation to religion, it may be argued that it is one of the excessiveness and implausibility of the middle age and modernity. For it is an obvious fact that basic religious, spiritual, and ethical truths and values do not belong to only one religion; and the other religions are not devoid of them completely. In addition, since God has the attributes such as mercy, justice, and wisdom, God will pay to everybody what he or she deserves exactly and justly in the hereafter, to whatever religion he or she belongs. Moreover, it is known that families usually play an important role in belonging to a religion; and it is not easy to change a religion and to convert to another one psychologically and sociologically. Although it usually stems from a strong belief and a sincere religiosity, when it is thought empathetically, one can understand

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[6] John Hick, "Whatever Path Men Choose is Mine", in John Hick and Brian Hebblethwaite (eds.), *Christianity and Other Religions*, (Glasgow: Fount, 1980), pp. 171-74.

that an absolute religious exclusivism cannot easily be defended even in religious terms. In this case, almost any kind of exclusivism including religious one should possibly be left any more.

Inclusivism may be said to be between exclusivism and pluralism, and also between modernity and posmodernity, both historically and theologically. It is usually accepted to start from the years of 1960s with the studies of Karl Rahner and with the declarations of the Second Vatican Council. For inclusivists, their own religion is still at the centre or zenith of the religions in truth and salvation, but the other religions can also have some amount of similar truth, and their members can have some possibility of a more limited amount of salvation in some special cases. This is the enterprise of widening the circle of the salvation to a certain extent in a religiously responsible and self-possessed manner so that this widening neither contradicts with basic religious doctrines and scriptural expressions nor endangers the religiously importance and even superiority of that religion in the eyes of its members.

Inclusivism is a positive development in a right direction. Looked at from the religious point of view, it does not require religious people to make too much radical changes in their theological conceptions of their own religion and the other religions. Although it rejects to see the one religion as the unique source of religious truth and salvation, it does not diminish the believer's belief, trust and love to his or her own religion. However, it seems to us that inclusivism is a narrower concept than exclusivism and pluralism. Moreover, Christian inclusivists' ideas about seeing the members of the other religions as anonymous Christians and the other religions as preparation to Christianity are too particularistic and anachronic views. The historical period in which one religion may be seen as preparation for the other must be over for a long time.

Some Muslim approaches to other religions, which may perhaps be called as Islamic inclusivism, also seems to us as good but insufficient development. For they seem to widen the circle of religiously considerable truth and salvation so as to cover the three Abrahamic religions, in other words, the People of the Book, and apparently not more.[7] It is good, but

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[7] Süleyman Ateş, "The Attitude of the Koran Towards Divine Religions", *Kuran Mesajı: Ilmi Arastırmalar Dergisi*, 1999-2000, Vol. 22, 23, 24.

there are also millions of sincerely religious people worshipping and praying God [in the most general sense of the word] and doing good deed for the purpose of salvation [again in general sense] outside these three Abrahamic faiths. Is it fair and plausible to overlook them? The Qur'an does not condemn the adherents of any religion to the Hell totally, and says that there are good people and bad people among every religious community. For example, the Qur'an says about Jews in a verse (5: 66) that "there is from among them a party of the right course: But many of them follow a course that is evil." There is another verse which seems to show the divine principle on this issue more obviously:

"Not all of them are alike: Of the People of the Book are a portion that stand (for the right); they rehearse the Signs of Allah all night long, and they prostrate themselves in adoration. They believe in Allah, and the Last Day; they enjoin what is right, and forbid what is wrong; and they hasten (in emulation) in (all) good works: They are in the ranks of the righteous. Of the good that they do, nothing will be rejected of them; for Allah knoweth well those that do right." (3: 113-115)

Therefore, it seems better to go beyond inclusivism, too, and to try to solve the problem of religious plurality and religious peace under the terms of religious pluralism.

John Hick is the main representative of the religious pluralism after modernity. His pluralism has both theological and philosophical dimensions. In his earlier and more theological writings, he suggested a Copernican revolution in the theology of religions. The "needed Copernican revolution in theology", according to him, "involves a shift from the dogma that Christianity is at the centre to the realization that it is *God* who is at the centre, and that all the religions of mankind, including our own, serve and revolve around him."[8] In his later and more philosophical writings, he presents religious pluralism as a particular theory, which is philosophically dependent mainly on some Kantian ideas. Based on Kantian distinction between noumenon and phenomenon, or between the Real *an sich* and the Real as variously thought and experienced by human beings, Hick

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[8] John Hick, *God and the Universe of Faiths: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion*, (London: Macmillan, 1988 [1973]), s. 131.

argues that, in the particular cases of religious awareness, there appear to be two basic concepts through which the Real is humanly thought and experienced, the Real as personal and the Real as nonpersonal.

For Hick, "we never experience the Real *an sich* but always as it is finitely, inadequately, and no doubt often distortedly thought of and perceived by different human communities of faith…. Like the ancient parable of the elephant and the blind men … so it is with the different religions: each identifies the Real in terms of its own partial experience of it.[9] So the religions are equal in the fact that none of them knows the real properly; and so there cannot be any superiority among them. They are also equal to be "a range of human responses to a transcendent divine reality."[10] There cannot be ethical criteria to compare and contrast the religions, either. Therefore, all the great world religions are equal among themselves; for none of them knows the Real properly, all of them are human responses, and all of them transform human existence from self-centeredness to reality-centeredness

Even if religious pluralism is getting widespread in intellectual environments in recent decades, as even Hick himself points out sometimes, it has not been in a central position among the religious people yet. Why is it so? Is it a structural problem or not? It seems to us that the popular Hickian religious pluralism has some philosophical, particularly Kantian dimensions, which may seem too radical to some people, and may cause it to remain marginal. However, such a dimension is neither necessary nor useful for a properly or sufficiently religious version of religious pluralism. Then, it may be useful to make some criticisms and suggestions to turn towards a non-radical and more moderate and religious version of religious pluralism. There should be such concept of religious pluralism that, while it submits the right of the other religions in truth and salvation, it should not shake or weaken the believers' faith and trust in his or her own religion, either. We can enumerate some of our tentative proposals towards a non-radical pluralism.

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[9] John Hick, "Religious Pluralism," in *The Encyclopedia of Religion,* ed. Mircea Eliade, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, London: Collier Macmillan Publisher, 1987), p. 333.

[10] Hick, "Religious Pluralism," p. 333.

(1) First, it seems to us that, while Hick's Copernican God-centered revolution in theology is perfectly all right, his Kantian distinction between the Real *an sich* and the Real as variously thought and experienced by human beings, and his assertion based on this distinction that this type of dualistic concept of God as personal and non-personal can be found in every religion are neither necessary and useful for a theory of religious pluralism nor easily acceptable for the believers of the monotheistic religions. The main theological emphasis of Islam, for example, is the oneness and uniqueness of God; and even an implicit dualism is quite alien to Islam and does not sound well to the ear of any ordinary Muslim. Then, a non-radical pluralism should be far from any suspicion or flavor of *dualism*.

(2) Secondly, Hick's Kantian emphasis that all religions' experience and knowledge of the Real are always finitely, inadequately, and often distortedly, like the ancient parable of the elephant and the blind men shows, is again neither necessary and useful for a theory of religious pluralism nor a desirable fact to emphasis from the religious point of view. Although it is true that nobody can experience and know God, or the Real, in God's absoluteness and uniqueness, the emphasis must be on the positive side of what the religions know or tell about God similarly to each other rather than on the negative side of the fact that none of them properly knows God, the Real. For this approach associates agnosticism, whereas religion and especially common-sense religiosity do not live on too much agnosticism. Religiosity usually depends on believing in and trusting to the truth and goodness of what scriptures or prophets said on their exceptional authority. Then, a non-radical pluralism should also be far from any suspicion or flavour of excessive *agnosticism*.

(3) Thirdly, Hick's general description of religions as "human responses to the transcendent" also seems to be radical, in other words, to be more excessive than necessary for a religiously acceptable theory of religious pluralism. There is a belief in the transcendent here; so it is not naturalism, which sees religion as just a human projection. However, the emphasis of "human response" in explaining the religions seems to imply that human beings were the only actors in the formation of the religions and that God or the Transcendent was completely passive probably as a non-personal reality. It associates the exclusion of divine or transcendental factor in the religions through revelation, inspiration, providence, or

some other ways. God's personal dimension and personal relation to human beings, namely, theistic conception of God, seems to be undermined or at least underestimated from the perspective of monotheistic religions. In a famous metaphor, which Hick often quotes, the Muslim Sufi poet Rumi wrote about the different religious traditions: 'The lamps are different but the light is the same: it comes from beyond.'" (cited in Hick 1987, 332) The last phrase of this sentence, "it comes from beyond" should not be neglected in any non-radical pluralism. In the simple formulation of "human responses to the transcendent", God seems to be too deistic, and religion seems to be too humanistic. Then, a non-radical religious pluralism should not be too open to the criticism of *humanism* (in its restricted sense) and of *deism*.

(4) Fourthly, the religions have both various worldviews (belief systems, theological doctrines and teachings) and various forms of life (rituals and norms for ethical behavior). Some of them are the same or similar among some religions and some of them are completely or relatively different and incompatible among them. It is good to emphasize the more common and compatible points rather than different and incompatible ones; but this desire does not take somebody to claim that the most common point among the religions, for example, the transformation of human existence from self-centeredness to the Real-centeredness, is really important but the other theological, ritual, ethical and historical dimensions are not so important. Pluralism should damage neither to the total structure of any religion nor to its total value in the eyes of its believers. It should be far from subjective and selective *reductionism*.

(5) Fifthly, non-radical pluralism should not emphasize the equality and identity of religions too much, as radical exclusivism emphasized the inequality and differences among them. For both attitudes would end up abolishing people's freedom of choice among religions. If the whole other religions are false, as in the case of exclusivist attitude, you do not have a real freedom of choice, you must necessarily remain in your own religion as a reasonable person. And similarly, if the whole religions are completely equal, as may be in the case of radical pluralism, again you do not have a proper freedom of choice, and again you must naturally remain in your own religion as a reasonable person. People should be forced neither to change nor not to change his or her religion. Freedom of choice and

change should always be open. A non-religious pluralism should also be far from a kind of soft or implicit *totalitarianism*.

(6) Sixthly, a more coherent and a more peaceful pluralist attitude seem to require being pluralist and tolerant against alternative theories concerning religious plurality and diversity, namely, exclusivism and inclusivism. Whereas, for example, Hick can accuse exclusivism as "attitude of religious imperialism"[11] and Paul Knitter can accuse inclusivism as "open to colonialist or imperialist distortions."[12] Some of exclusivists and inclusivists can really be as they accused; but most of them cannot have had such negative ideas and ideals. In addition, almost the same reasons for defending religious pluralism seem to be valid for believing in a pluralism of the theories of religions. All of them are equal in being an explanatory theory for religious diversity. And most defenders of any of these theories were born in a family or society already believing according to that theory. So a non-radical pluralism should be careful not to fall into a different kind of *exclusivism*.

(7) Sevently, from the perspective of Socratic philosophy, for example, one can believe in God and talk about God although he or she is aware of the fact that the knowledge arrived at is very limited. Philo-sophia means the love and search of wisdom in spite of the fact that one will never arrive at the real wisdom. In addition to this, as everybody knows, Socrates talks about God's inspiration to him in his decisions. For him, his thoughts and beliefs are not only his human responses to transcendent; the transcendent inspires him, too. Philosophically, Karl Popper's critical rationalism can also supply inspiration or insight to a non-radical religious pluralism. Like critical rationalism, he also defends a critical pluralism against a relativistic one, which, according to him, takes the society to the hegemony of violence. In his critical pluralism, the thought of truth, or better to say, the search for truth has a very considerable place. These philosophical ideas seem illuminating for a non-radical religious pluralism, too. So a non-radical religious pluralism should be based on a critical or spohialogical epistemology rather than an unbounded *relativism*.

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[11] Hick, "Whatever Path Men Choose is Mine", p. 172.

[12] Cited in Harold Coward, 2000, *Pluralism in the World Religions: A Short Introduction*, (Oxford: Oneworld, 2000), p. 41.

Briefly speaking, non-radical religious pluralism should be far from any suspicion or flavor of *dualism, agnosticism, deism, reductionism, totalitarianism, exclusivism, and unbounded relativism*. On the contrary, it should emphasize upon understanding and respecting religious differences and diversities while celebrating a moderate and critical common ground or unity of diverse religions like moral and spiritual evolution of souls and societies in this world and in life after death.

Islamic Diversity in Unity: If we look at the issue first from the unity perspective, we see that God is one and has created and sustained the entire universe, animate or inanimate. God sent messengers or prophets to every nation. The Qur'an obviously points out that "… there never was a people, without a warner having lived among them (in the past)" (35: 24). It also points out that the essence or common core of their message was one and the same: "For We assuredly sent amongst every People a Messenger, (with the command), 'Serve Allah, and eschew Evil'…" (16: 36). These *two* commands, "serve Allah and eschew evil", constitute of the united essence of the diverse prophets' messages. Since all the great religions have these two basic essences even if in general sense and different degrees, that means they have a common core and a shared value system. Similarly, the Qur'an also mentions *three* basic and united essences shared particularly among the Abrahamic religions; and it adds that they will have what they deserve justly in the hereafter: "Those who believe (in the Qur'an), and those who follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the Christians and the Sabians, any who believe in Allah and the Last Day, and work righteousness, shall have their reward with their Lord on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve" (2: 62; see also 3: 64). The three basic features, namely, to believe in Allah and the Last Day, and to work righteousness, are the basic religious characteristics which unite the diverse religions.

Unity is the need of human beings. But emphasizing unity is not the total negation of diversity. Islam teaches that diversity is, first of all, a fact of natural world. God has created the whole universe with diversity (see the Qur'an, 35: 27-28). Then, there is diversity among human beings. They have variety of genders, colours and languages and multiplicity of races and tribes. These diversities are considered natural and are called "God's signs" in the Qur'an (30: 20-22). Islam rejects ethnocentrism when it is focused on a particular race, be it white, black or yellow, or any other one.

The difference of races is part of the one humanity and their equality within this one humanity is a divine rule and a sign of the Creator to all these colours and races. The diversities of races, tribes, and cultures also have a healthy and constructive purpose, viz. that "you may know each other". It is pointed out in the Qur'an (49: 13) as follows:

"O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you…."

In addition to these natural and cultural diversities, there are also religious diversities, which Islam recognizes and respects. Religious centralism that wants the universe to profess one creed is refuted by Islam, for the Islam considers diversity of faiths as a divine rule that can neither be changed nor altered. Indeed, the Qur'an mentions both the divine factor in the diversity of religions and the ideal attitude of religious people in the face of the reality of religious plurality:

To each among you have We prescribed a Law and an Open Way. If Allah had so willed, He would have made you a single People, but (His Plan is) to test you in what He hath given you: so strive as in a race in all virtues. The goal of you all is to Allah; it is He that will show you the truth of the matters in which ye dispute" (5/48).

This verse may be considered to summarize the theoretical essence and practical principles of a non-radical version of religious pluralism, or of a peaceful diversity in unity: Diversity among us is completely natural and acceptable because of its divine origin; and the unity point among us is just "to strive in a race in all virtues". This is the most essential and perhaps universally acceptable principle of unity in diversity. For the three common Qur'anic features mentioned above, repeatedly, to believe in Allah and the Last Day, and to work righteousness, were more specifically valid among the adherent of Abrahamic religions; the two common Qur'anic features mentioned above, repeatedly, serve Allah and eschew evil, were seemed to include believers in God or the Ultimate Reality in general; but the last feature mentioned in the last verse, viz., to strive in a race in all virtues, is such a universally acceptable feature that can include and unite even the atheists who have ethical consciousness and moral values.

As a result, one can say that cultural, religious or Islamic diversity in unity based on a non-radical religious pluralism shall neither be too excessive to break the bound of national or religious unity and loyalty, emphasizing exclusively or extravagantly similarities and equalities among cultures and religions, nor lead to national racism or religious fanaticism and fundamentalism, stressing excessively the elements of differences and diversities. Diversity in unity will allow us, whether we should be a member of majority or minority group in any country, both to protect our cultural and religious identities, and to respect to the others' rights and values, and also to be able to remain loyal to our greater responsibilities as citizens of a country, or just virtuous and wise human beings of this beautiful world.

Bogdana Todorova

THE ROLE OF RELIGION TODAY AND THE EUROPEAN FEARS

Today Europe feels metaphysical horror by the shaking insight that it has to accept new members, which are not only poorer but also show cultural differences. If the first ten accepted countries in 2004 are poor and former communist countries from East Europe, and also basicly Catholic and Protestant, and these countries threaten with potential invasion of cheap labour force and deep delay of economic speed, today's candidates to join are basicly Orthodox (Bulgaria and Romania) or that is worse – Islamic (Bosnia and Turkey). We are interested in ontological sense of this European fear. The fear which leads Europe risking to take the decision for consolidation of relations with the USA which is opposite of the European statement about the American invasion in Iraq. It is not clear how the European self-fixation, which proceeds from existential fear, will combine personal rights (by more deeper limits of greedy, individual Ego) with the collective rights of the Muslim word where spirituality and publicity are basic values. Human rights are important only for the West where individual is the fundamental of society. But today the world changes dynamically and European values cannot stay the same. It is impossible to forbid people to look for a better life in the Promised Land of democracy. That is why, it is very important Europe to make a real civilization choice. It is a fact that Islamists represent between officers in the Turkish army, in municipalities, police, or between intellectuals. What happens with Europe in case of disintegration of the State in Turkey since Europe cannot save itself not involving in problem? That is the reason that Bulgaria is strategically important for the European Union in the sense of a real barrier against fundamentalism and chaos, which is described by European specilaists even by the Arabian term "*fitna*".

What is Europe afraid of today? In my paper, I stress on three basic problems:

1. Religious renovation as return.

2. Radicalism of young Muslims and non-Muslims, and the new phenomenon – *"salafitian jihadizm"*.

3. Balkanization (or fragmentation) of the Continent.

Across Europe the conflicting currents of secularism, Christianity and Islam are compelling Europeans to wrestle with their values as never before. Religion's role in public life, and its influence on politics, have been center-stage questions worldwide since Sept.11, 2001. But the debate in Europe has been complicated by the continent's difficulty in integrating its fast-growing Muslim immigrant minority. It has been sharpened by tragedies such as the bombing of a Madrid train station last March, and the brutal murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gohg by an Islamic extremist lasdt fall.

Two events last year neatly frame the challenge: in the United States, a California man tried to remove "One nation, under God" from the Pledge of Allegiance. 90% of Americans wanted to keep the phrase-and on June 15, the Supreme Court halted the bid on procedural grounds. Three days later, in Brussels, officials agreed on the final text of the European Union's new Constitution. The charter made no mention of God, despite calls that is recognize Europe's Christian roots.

"The clash between those who believe and those who don't believe will be a dominant aspect of relations between the US and Europe in the coming years, says Jacques Delors, a former president of the European Commission./1/ Those incidents "will reinforce secularism" in Europe, predicts Patrick Weil, a sociologist of religion at the Sorbonne in Paris. "The tendency now in Europe is to say we have to be clear on the limits to religious intervention in public life. We are not going to sacrifice women's equality, democracy, and individual freedoms on the altar of a new religion."/2/

Today, only 21 percent of Europeans say religion is "very important" to them, according to the most recent European Values Study, which tracks attitudes in 32 European countries.A survey by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life found that nearly three times as many Americans, 59 %, called their faith "very important".

Although a Gallup poll found last year that 44 percent of Americans say they attend a place of worship once a week, the average figure in Europe is only 15 percent, although the picture varies widely across the Continent.

Luis Lopez Guerra, wonders why in a country where less than half the population ever goes to church, he should have found a Bible and a crucifix on his desk, along with the Constitution, when he was sworn in as undersecretary at the Ministry of Justice a year ago.

Spain is currently the front line in the Vatican's rear-guard battle to retain church influence over public policy in Europe. But with public opinion ranged firmly on the government's side, there seems little it can do but make its displeasure known.

The Spanish government's plans to legalize gay marriage this spring, to liberalize divorce and abortion laws, and to permit stem-cell research, do not represent an attempt to impose an atheist state religion, he insists. Rather, he says, they "extend civil rights and make the law independent of Catholic dogma". He adds, "The government has a responsibility to represent the majority of the people. Our policy has to depend on the people's will, not on the preferences of the Catholic church."/3/

There is an important statement of the new Iraqi President Dzauad al-Maliki, who has the support of the Shiits, Sunits and Kurds: "Democracy means to accept the opinion of majority. I am going to create a family that is not based on religious or ethnic grounds".

The changes in Spain, Chatolic church leaders worry, are part of a broader trend. Cardinal Renato Martino, head of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, recently attacked "a new holy inquisition… motivated predominantly by prejudice toward all that is Christian." The president of the French Protestant Federation, Jean-Arnold de Clermont, warned of a climate of secularist zeal that was undermining all faiths.

The renovation and reformation in Islam have their features that are different from that ones of the Europeans and the North-American world. The renovation in Islam is not an introduction of new religious and social principles, but it is considered restoration, return to the prime sources of Islam – Koran and the Suna. Loui Massignon determines two patterns of the historical Islamic society./4/ The first is this one of integral society which is consolidated in all the aspects – social, political and mental, and

it exists in the Age of Muhammad and the right Khalifs. The second is that one of the empire Islamic society, which is based on the structures of former Near-East societies. For example, the dynasty of the Abassides, which is influenced by the Sassanids administrative traditions, rules over Bagdad (661-1258) and by its government appears the most popular term for State – *daula*. Inspite of the existence of this second pattern, one cannot speak about distinction between State and religion in Islam. Islam always will be *"din ua daula"* (Religion and State). This is most popular point of view of many Western researchers and Muslim authors such as Ahmad, Asad, Fadlallah, Ghannouchi, al-Mawdudi, al-Turabi. According to modernist Fazlur Rahman, the last is pure demagogy. The slogan that in Islam Religion and politics are inseparable is used to mislead common people that politics and State serve the long-term ends of Islam while Islam begins to serve the short-sighted purposes of party politics ./5/

Political theory in the Muslim world finds more concrete expression accentuating historical tradition. The tradition in this case serves for legitimacy of criticism of status quo and for support of evolutionary and revolutionary changes. Quoting the Golden Age of Islam is used by both reformators-modernists and religious activists to confirm the need of reforms in Muslim societies showing compatibility of Islam with the common values of the Modern Ages: democracy, social justice and human rights. Even representing defenders of the tradition, religious scientists use it for a mean of power and control. According to Syrian philosopher Sadik al-Azm, fundamentalism in the forms of both Christian or Islamic is based on principle routine, and he shows the possibility of "Islamic secularism". Although fundamentalists could adapt themselves to the needs of modern world, this can become triumph of secular reason. In a long-term plan actual secular reality surely is outlined against the misitc cover of Islam./6/

Paradoxically, Islam defends itself and, at the same time, produces conditions to be overcome. We do not claim following modern Christianity that "through religion asking to leave the religion", but we should notice that the concrete forms of political socialization which were born by Islam grow weak the ideological prescriptions which are defended by itself. In the late 19 century starts the intellectual school known as *Salafia* (by *Salaf*, Islam ancestors), which looks for inspiration in the early Muslim society. The grand-son of Sudanese Mahdi, who leads the revolt against

the British in 19 century, Sadik al-Mahdi, considers the Age of "the right Khalifs" perfect because of the purity of faith in the early Muslim community./7/ Radical Islamists (the term Islamist, although it turns to popular in the end of the 20 century, first appears in the Middle Ages in the work of Abu al-Hasan al-Aw'ari "The theses of Islamists", which exerts influence on ibn-Taimia) relate the respect to prime-sources with the supreme place which they give to the concept *"jihad"*.

This non-harmonic symbiosis between *Salafism* and *jihad* which is inspired by Saudi Arabia leads to forward position the created *Muslim transnationalism* in today's events. Many members of *"salafits jihadizm"* seek a refuge in European countries and start to build their structures there. In Great Britain live three key persons: Syrian Abu Musab, Palestinian Abu Katada and Egyptian Abu Hamza. Up to 1992 radical Muslims concentrate in the area between Kabul and Peshavar, but today their dispersion over Europe is shocking. *Three main factors* prevent natural consolidation of the Muslims in Europe. First, Western political, cultural, social and economic influences keep the Muslims in a position of lower class. The second comes from the framework of the same Muslim societies – it is the confrontation between the Muslims from different countries, cultures and traditions. Third, it is the intensive differentiation because of the activity of European media.

The Muslims in the European cities come from different cultural strata and groups which concerns their religious practice, and this turns into a reason for their reluctance to consolidate in the new countries that are their second home. For radical leaders this is a good reason to collect these people under the slogan of *Uahabits* Islam (the term *"uahabizm"* is an exact abbreviation, but the Saudis refuge it being afraid that it misrepresents their ideas like seprete sect in Islam, and they use the term *Muuahhidun*, or unitarians, who express the absolute Good's unity), but such a strategy impedes Muslims going into higher social position and power in the framework of the new extended European Union. The same concerns also the children of emigrants-Muslims, who live between open West society and the culture of the homeland of their parents. They are permanently in contradiction and fight with their own attachment to ideas and reality. Radical Muslim groups stake on this and try to involve them helping to find job, school and education.

The fear from Islamization of Europe is a fact. But more alarming is the fact that the point here is for radicalisation not only of the Muslim, but also non-Muslim youth. Even contemporary specialists on the problems of the Near East strongly discuss the possibility next suicidal terrorists to be European. How much are the radical Europeans who are followers of Belgian Muriel De Kuk? "Teheran recruits white British shahides for Israel" is the shocking head-line of "The Guardian" of April this year./8/ "Islamizm or democracy?", or who wins, asks rhetorically philosopher Mezri Hadat in "Liberasion". In fact, European specialists do not turn their attention to the real problem – about existing crisis of leading positions in the European Muslim communities where radical Imams wage serious war for practising a policy keeping with the prescription of Islam. Ahmad Abu Laban is Imam of Palestinian origine, and with radical uahabits views. Living in Denmark a quarter of century, he speaks Danish with difficulty, but in return for it he translates his own sermons in Arabian, and he also distributes tapes of his records (he practises the so-called resounded Islam, or *al-Islam al-sauti*, which becomes a serious competition of "the written Islam").

Islamizm proposes young unemployed population a hope of escaping its problems and a feeling of safety about its position in the society. It is attractive for proletarian students who build the stratum of the so-called lumpish intellectuals, according to Roy, on the analogy of the attachment of the West-Europeans to communism in the 30-s of the 20 century./9/ It is it considering that Islamists provide education through mosques, sport facilities and health services while public schools become worse. Today the population of Teheran is nearly 8 million people as the poor South districts of the capital are densely populated by poor new-comers from villages and immigrants. Nevertheless, the capital proposes educational privileges compared to villages, and better perspective for the future. The same situation is in Pakistan and Turkey, and right the big cities are centre of Islamists groups. They immediately ask for support the new-comers, who are afraid about their own social status in the big city. That is why, it is not surprising young age of the participants in Islamists movement.

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, twenty years after the revolution most part of the population do not know the Regime of the Shakh. It is the population which is not educated by the routine social order and repressive morality of religious hierarchy of Homeini. The election for Parliament

(18. 02. 2000) is earned by the reformators which is a sign that the society supports politics of Hatami against the social and moral order which is the legacy of Homeini. The discussion about the transition from the Islamist Age to post-Islamizm reminds of the discussion about post-communist period of the former Soviet societies. What is paradoxal is that Marxist speech is interpreted by Homeini in Islamic one which helps him to collect the poor and downtrodden for revolution. Even the model of cell structures of Islamists movements is influenced either by secular Nazi and Marx-Lenin structures or the structures of *Sufi* organs.

European reality creates difficulty and contradictions for the activity of radical Muslim leaders. On the one hand, their wish is to live practically under the Muslim law, but, on the other hand, they would not reject local liberal law since it gives them freedom of speech and consequently a room to sermonize on European society. Although a good deal of the European media keep anti-Muslim rhetoric, there are many Europeans who try to find a solution of social problems which are reasons for tension regarding the European Muslims.

The Danish cartoons and the other of the Bulgarian "News-caster" are a sign for urgent necessity of dialogue and co-operation. We do not have to speak about Muslims but keep dialogue with them. But the Europeans, including the Bulgarians, have to think how much and what kind of freedom are they able to afford, which is the freedom which does not hurt someone's feelings. It has to be discussed real essense of freedom, which may prevent us from racism and discrimination, but, at the same time, keeping the fundamental of our society. It is obvious that European development contains constructive initiatives but the last could be shaken if moderate Muslims do not want to take the responsibility which has to be taken they to show resistance against radical elements and destructive leadership.

European democratic society is founded on the principles of secularism and liberalism, but we should have in mind that in Islam community of believers is a religious-political community where everything is performed "in the name of Allah" but not people. The global issue today is whether we may expect pluralism that is natural for Christianity to be kept by the rest world religions, including Islam.

There is a lack of discussion about the various traditions in Islam (this religion is not really clear for Europeans as well as for the same protesting

Muslims), and also the Balkanies are not precisely explored which leads to appearance of the new European fear – the fear from Balkanization (or separation in groups). When 80-million Turkey enters in the European Union all the European population will contain 20 percentage Muslim, but in this sense we have to consider also the population of Bosnia, Kosovo and Bulgaria.

All the above happens parallelly with the contemporary process of consolidation of the Muslim Shiits and Christians which is a part of the new war inside Islam itself. The religious middle class of Islamic society look for new allies, once, between the partners non-believers, and then, between the Christians in a country with religious variety. As an argument to intimacy of Christians ans Muslim Shiits in Lebanon it is showed the coincidence of the cult to the Virgin Mary and the Shiits adoration of Fatima, daughter of the Prophet and wife of Ali, who is "mother of the believers".

Trying to approach to the European left-wing, charismatic orator Tariq Ramadan (grand-son of Hasan al-Bana) proposes an alternative of the politics to oppose to the West. He tries to inscribe the Islamic mobilization into the mobilization against imperialism showing that most of the victims of imperialism are Muslim. We have to remember that first ali-Shariati uses Marx opposition of the depressed and the arrogant (as he calls the arrogant leaders who do not respect God). Tarik Ramadan considers European democracy a mean for defense against despotism, which reigns over most Muslim countries, and he requests his fellow-citizens to use the rights given by civil society.

Ramadan suggests that Muslims in Europe should overcome the Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb dichotomy, in which they are either in a state of peace because Islam prevails or a state of war because they are in the minority. He also rejects the concepts of Dar al-Amn (space of security) and Dar al-Ahd (space of treaty) for Europe, proposing instead that the position of Muslim scholars and activists in secular Europe is similar to the Meccan period. This concept, known as Dar al-Da-wa (space of testimony) is indeed very similar to that spelled out in the new pope's 1991 publication, "Turning Point for Europe".

In conclusion

Both Christianity and Islam in Europe can benefit from 1) the establishment and expansion of a secular public sphere, in which debate and ac-

tivities are carried out free of the direct influence of religious institutions; 2) the introduction of equal rights for both religious and non-religious players, so that they can all participate in the marketplace of ideas on a level playing field.

However, neither Christianity nor Islam can accept the following:

1) radical secularism, which strives to remove religion completely from the public sphere and make it a purely private matter

2) discrimination against faith-based players by proponents of the three modernist master narratives (Liberalism, Conservatism, Socialism) which seek to portray Europe's past and future in purely secular terms.

Finally, in order to better understand the future of the religion/politics interface in Europe I encourage you to do the following:

1) use the currently predominant Hegelian idealist-dialectical approach, in order to grasp the clash or interaction of ideas and civilisations

2) make better use of the Marxian materialist-dialectical approach, thus introducing political economy to the study of Islam in Europe.

Endnotes:

/1/ Ford, P. (2005) *What place for God in Europe?* In: The Christian Science Monitor, 2

/2/ http:// www.csmonitor.com/2005/

/3/ Ibid.

/4/ В: *"Обновлението като завръщане"*, в-к "Култура", ноември 15,2002

/5/ Rahman, Fazlur (1982) *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual tradition,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 140

/6/ Sadiq al-Azm (1993) *Islamic fundamentalism reconsidered. A critical outline of problems. Ideas and approaches,* part II Sout Asian Bulletin 13, no.2, 97

/7/ Mahdi, Sadiq al (1990) *The Challenges of the 1990s*, Cairo, 197

/8/ Във: в-к "Сега", Април 2006

/9/ Roy, Olivier (1992) *Islam and Resistance in Afganistan*, 2d, ed.New York, Cambridge University Press, 70, 73

Stanka Hristova

THE ECONOMIC ETHOS OF ORTHODOXY AND OUR EUROPEAN FUTURE

In the last two decades, especially following the break-up of state socialism and the ensuing necessity of the former socialist countries to join Europe, a new concept, though not always manifest, sprung up – the concept of an European model of economic ethics based on the values of Catholicism.

Several fundamental arguments support this idea.

The first argument is related to the emerging process of **de-secularization.**

The binding of economic mentality to any one system of religious values in an intrinsically secular society such as the European would look like an anachronism if the processes of de-secularization and resurgence of faith did not recently emerge. After the secularity of modern age, those processes represent "God's revenge" in Samuel Huntington's words. Characteristic of the years until the mid-20ieth century, the beliefs of religious decline and the beginning of a post-Christian era have been seriously shattered since the mid-1870s by the emerging initial phase of religious resurgence as a reaction to the processes of economic, cultural and social modernization.

According to research, the church as an institution, as well as the big religious denominations, still remains secularized, but de-secularization and resurgence of faith at an individual level can be observed. In this sense, it is not so much the institutional Orthodox Church but the mentality based on Orthodoxy that can be perceived as reacting against the processes of Euro-integration of the Orthodox countries.

The second argument is related to **the sources of European identity**.

It is beyond doubt that one of those sources is the Judeo-Christian tradition. The question is whether or not this tradition as a whole has formed

the European identity or in different historical periods different Christian denominations have given meaning to it. In his famous book "The Clash of Civilizations and the Re-making of World Order" published in 1993, Samuel Huntington uses the fact that during the last decades a number of Catholic nations have chosen the road to democracy, as well as his own conviction that Orthodoxy is an "anomaly" in Europe which is predominantly Catholic and Protestant to argue that the "third democratic wave" is in itself Catholic because of the processes of democratization in the 1870's and 1880's in Portugal, Spain and Latin America.

The question of the role of the different Christian denominations in relation to economic ethics is quite topical. Its importance is reinforced by the fact that the process of Euro-integration requires a minimum set of societal and mutually-shared values in the spheres of economics and economic behavior. It's important to note that unlike the beginning of the Modern Age when modernization and the accelerated development of capitalism were related to the Protestant economic ethics, contemporary capitalism has nothing to do with the protestant virtues; it is rather related to the new post-material values associated with the Catholic economic doctrine and practice.

The concept of the existence of modern economic ethos based on the Catholic doctrine has been set forth by Michael Novak in 1981 in his book "*The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism*" and further developed in his book "*The Catholic ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism*" in 1993. Criticizing M. Weber for neglecting the Eastern, Judaic and Catholic traditions and their role in the formation of the "spirit of capitalism", he contends that the Catholic ethics is much more relevant not only to the reality of today's world but also represents an inspiring handbook for the future. That is why we need a new framework for re-interpretation of Catholicism so that new values which make it compatible and consistent with modern capitalism can be deduced. This framework is based on human creativity put inside man by Creation and Incarnation though which man acquires the power to become co-Creator, free to evince initiative and take responsibility.

The separation of interpretation from man's creative abilities corresponds directly with the commonly accepted in the last decades idea of the significance of the so-called human capital for the development of economy. It synthesizes the individual, cultural and religious determi-

nants of the labor and consumer ethics and combines the idea of rationality with the idea of innovation. M. Novak creates six doctrines of the theological doctrines within Christianity, which in his mind, are common to all Christian denominations. He contends that those six doctrines – the Original Sin, the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Competition, the Separation of Church and State and Caritas – are the real powers in the history of mankind. All of them are intrinsically connected to democratic capitalism.

The third argument is based on the fact that **some of the former Socialist countries on the road to Europe are Catholic nations** and, therefore, any economic ethics based on Catholicism would be readily accepted despite all the years of indoctrinated socialist ethics.

The forth argument is based on the M. Weber's idea of **"the doctrinal incompatibility between Orthodoxy and the "spirit of capitalism"**. Because a number of the annexing former Socialist countries are Orthodox and because Orthodoxy is ineffective in creating strong economic ethics, those countries should be offered a set of economic ethics different from the one based on Orthodoxy. The Protestant ethics is economically unproductive, while the Catholic ethics is much more applicable to the new realities, therefore, it is the latter that those countries should adopt. Whenever he writes about Catholicism and the Spirit of capitalism in both his books M. Novak means the Judeo-Christian tradition which incorporates all Christian denominations. That is why he argues that the political system of democratic capitalism is applicable to all developing countries, including the Orthodox countries of the former Communist bloc.

This idea has been supported by the Roman-Catholic Church, as well. In 1991, in the encyclique "Centesimus Annus", when he asks what should be done after the collapse of communism, Pope John-Paul II actually means what kind of system could be offered to the former Socialist countries and to the Third World countries. Since the collapse of Socialism is due to a large extent to the inadequate use of human spirit, personal initiative and creativity, he believes that the capitalist model supported by the modern Catholic ethics could be offered to those countries, including the Orthodox ones, because Orthodoxy is much closer to Catholicism than it is to Protestantism.

At first glance, one could say that this pro-Catholic contention is at a dissonance with the popular opinions[1] that Europe must accept Christianity because it enjoys the same rights as all other European religions.

The main argument is **the size of the Orthodox representation in Europe**. So far there has been only one Orthodox country in Europe – Greece. However, soon there will be three more Orthodox countries – Rumania, Bulgaria and Cyprus, and five more where the influence of Orthodoxy is huge: Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia. As was noted by the Orthodox Bishop of Vienna Illarion, 94 percent of the Orthodox Christians in the world reside on the Old Continent.

The second argument results from **the danger that the fundamental principles of Orthodox religion could be neglected** to the extent that the western liberal ideology could assume the status of being the only model for social development in Europe. According to Bishop Illarion[2] the modern western ideology is formed on the basis of secular humanism and the idea that there exist universal values common to mankind. "Common to mankind" does not mean common to all people and religions, but only to liberal humanist ones relying upon the right and freedom of man to choose his own way of life so long as it does not infringe upon the right and freedom of other people.

In religious traditions, however, not all that does not infringe upon the interests of others is morally acceptable. That is why the obtrusion of this ideology to people raised in a different moral tradition and set of values represents a danger to their religious identity which could possibly result in religious fundamentalism, the adaptation of religion to the liberal standard (on the analogy of Protestantism)[3], or the dialogue between re-

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[1] See: Гобъл, П. "Православният Евросъюз" В: «Вашинтон Таймс» 1 май 2006 http://www.vsekiden.com/news.

[2] See: Епископ Иларион(Алфеев) *Благословение или проклятие? Традиционные и либеральные ценности в споре межзу християнством и западной цивилизацией*. Доклад на Мировом общественном форуме "иалог цивилизаций", Гавана(Куба) 27-30 март 2005 http://bishop.hilarion.orthodoxia.org.

[3] The pathos of bishop Illarion is oriented toward the harmful moral consequences of secularism and Protestantism. Instead of defence of Christian values the protestants betray them giving its consent for legalization of the homosexual marriage, euthanasiaq etc. That is why he insist that the future of Europe could be built on the Christian – Catholic and Orthodox, but not protestant values.

ligion and the principles of liberal humanism, so that a balance between the liberal democratic model of western society and the religious beliefs and mode of life of citizens can be achieved. Catholicism and Christianity pursue common aims in this process, therefore they can and they must act together on the basis of their common values. The unity is necessary because according to Ilarion the EU represents a secular super-state built on humanistic principles inherited from the Enlightenment, which is why the dialogue between the Enlightenment and the two denominations – Orthodoxy and Catholicism – is very difficult and so far practically impossible. We hope that when the new European constitution is adopted this dialogue could become possible because the new Constitution is expected to endorse universal values which are the foundation of a new Europe and which are, in turn, founded on the cultural, religious and humanist heritage of Europe.

Moreover, both the Roman-Catholic and the Orthodox Churches have endorsed documentation that accentuates the priority of religious values over the interests of man's earthly life; the freedom and dignity of man interpreted in the spirit of Christian tradition, as well as justice and solidarity amongst people which could be the basis of the new social, economic and political order. [4] In other words, Europe's future is possible on the basis of the Christian-Catholic and Orthodox values rather than those of Protestantism which are now a past stage in the development of European identity.

The third argument is identical in its premises to some of the arguments offered by the followers of the idea that we need an economic ethics based on Catholicism but it interprets them in favor of Orthodoxy. What is meant here is that **there exists proximity between the Orthodox**

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[4] Such kind of document of the Catholic Church is a «compendium of the social teaching of the Church», eleborated by the Papal comission «Justitia et Pax» and published in 2004, also and the published in 2000 document «Foundations of a social conception of the Russian Orthodox Church». See:. Епископ Иларион(Алфеев) *Благословение или проклятие? Традиционные и либеральные ценности в споре между христианством и западной цивилизацией.* Доклад на Мировом общественном форуме "иалог цивилизаций", Гавана(Куба) 27-30 март 2005 http://bishop.hilarion.orthodoxia.org.

economic doctrine and the postmodern and post material values conditioning economic behavior. It is thought that it's the postmodern society that Orthodoxy is doomed to play a major role in since it corresponds better to the peculiarities of modern capitalism.

In his book "*Modernization and Post-modernization. Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 societies*"[5] the prominent American sociologist Ronald Ingleheart does a thorough research on the alterations in the values and positions of people in 43 countries in the world in the period 1981-1990, on the basis of a research titled "*World Survey of Values*". His research shows that the industrially developed societies change their social-political trajectories in two cardinal aspects: system of values and institutional structure.

The accent that Protestants place on the industrial economic values is one of the reasons that made modernization possible, whereas a change to material priorities has diminished the significance of the obligations to the municipality and has brought about the acceptance of social mobility. Any movement to post-modernism makes the supreme priority of economic achievements step aside giving way to an accent on the quality of life. By the same token, disciplining norms get superseded by the individual freedom and choice of life-styles.

As industrial society develops, the changes in the institutional structure in the process of modernization – the hierarchical bureaucratic organizations, the line production, the hierarchical corporation and so on, get closer and closer to the boundaries of their functional efficiency which makes people refuse to accept human expenditure related to bureaucracy and the observance of strict moral norms. It is the high state of welfare and sense of safety created in the process of and as a result of modernization that diminish the necessity for strict moral norms and absolute rules such as religious sanctions. That is why, post-modern society is a witness to a decline of hierarchical institutions and strict social norms at the expense of widening the sphere of individual choice and a decline of the priority of economic efficiency at the expense of self-expression.[6]

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[5] Inglehart R. *Modernrzation and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies.* Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1997.

[6] See Инглхарт Р. *Постмодерн: изменяющиеся ценности и изменяющиеся общества.* В: Политические исследования, 4 1997, с. 9 – 11.

It is thought that the peculiarities of the Orthodox economic doctrine which determine the proximity of the Orthodox economic ethos to post-material values relate to the organization of labor, labor and consumer moral, the attitude to property and the richness in modern economy. Orthodoxy does not consider labor as a means to achieve material success since earthly possessions are transient and perishable but rather as a means to achieve spiritual elevation and self-recognition. It stresses spiritual incentives not outside usefulness; inside essence not material achievements and status; creativity not routine. That is why "Orthodoxy pays special attention to **who** does what rather than what is done."[7]

Orthodoxy defends the idea that man should be a jack of all trades rather than a narrow specialist. In other words, ideally one should have a variety of skills rather than a single skill developed to perfection. Orthodoxy is the only religion amongst all Christian religions which does not oppose against each other the different forms of property which corresponds to the diversity of forms of property in post-industrial society. Orthodoxy does not follow the individualistic ascetic model of Protestantism; it is rather closer to the hedonistic type of man of post-materialism. Wealth is not an individualistic and egotistic purpose, but rather a social and collective one. It is justified only as being a good to all and the size of wealth is justified through a just distribution. Congregation finds its modern analogue in cooperation and productivity of common efforts, etc.

However, deducing economic ethics directly from the Orthodox doctrine cannot be a reference point as far as our propensity to adapt ourselves adequately to the European economy is concerned. We should take into consideration not only the doctrine, but the functioning labor and consumer morale of the Bulgarian people which is a function of different influences which have formed our specific Orthodox-Slavic-Balkan mentality.

The barriers to the economic Euro-integration of the Orthodox countries are related not only to the doctrinally-determined and functioning economic ethos but also to some general conditions. The first one has to do with the level to which the specific religious traditions of Orthodoxy

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[7] See Коваль, Т. *Этика труда православия* В: Общественные науки и современность, Изд. Наука, Российская Академия наук, 1994 кн. 6, с. 62

are compatible with the institutions and values of liberal democracy and market economy which are the dominating forces in today's Europe and could hardly be changed despite what the Catholic and the Protestant Churches want. The important question here is whether or not Orthodoxy will succeed in adapting to or winning over them. As was noted by Peter Burger in his report "Orthodoxy and Global Pluralism" delivered in Vienna on 7-9 March 2005 at the "The Spirit of Orthodoxy and the Ethics of Capitalism" conference held by the Institute of Human Sciences, in order for any religious institution to survive in the current situation it must have the ability to act as a voluntary association. However, there are no indications at all in the history of Orthodoxy that it has been prepared for such an alternative.

As long as Orthodoxy continues on following the historically placed principle of synphony – the harmonious relations between society, state and church – it will be difficult for it to get accustomed to the values of liberal democracy; moreover, the idea of the congregation will remain an obstacle to accepting market economy because it is regarded as an expression of ruthlessness and greediness.[8]

The second condition is related to the fact that the resurgence of religion in Europe does not follow the framework established in the rest of the world. Europe is much more seized by the spirit of secularism unlike the other countries of the world. That is why it is not without reason that P. Burger classifies "euro-secularization" as a special type of culture of secularity acting as a foundation to the European identity and ardently defended by Brussels when adopting the European Constitution.

One could hardly expect from the EU to ignore the principles of secularism in the sense of Bishop Illarion, i.e. to realize the principles of a real institutional de-secularization. In the spirit of secularism, in all European countries, citizenship and religion are separated; the validity of the state law, rather than canonic law, is established, and the citizens of Europe follow the logic of economic changes without altering their national and religious identity. The resurgence of faith even at an individual level, let alone at an institutional, has not been met with enthusiasm in Europe which

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[8] See. Burger, P. *"Orthodoxy and the global pluralism"* In: Demoiratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization. Summer 2005 http://www.findarticles.com.

can be seen by the changes in legislation related to the demonstration of external manifestations of religious affiliation.

Secular Europe recognizes the right to personal faith, religious convictions and values; it is, however, against decisions taken on the basis of religion instead of on law. P. Burger's expectation is that "the more a given society gets closer to Europe, the more it will suffer from the influence of European secularity."[9]

The third condition is related to religious pluralism, as well as the so-called "market of religions" based on it. None of the contemporary religions can count on its traditional presence in an individual's life passed on hereditarily. De-secularization, to the extent that can be currently observed, does not represent an automatic reversion to the traditional religion of our forefathers and is not based on the unity between religion and society but rather, in the words of Peter Burger, represents an individual choice of religious values.

The fourth condition has to do with whether Europe, in the spirit of its religious tolerance, will choose the unity of Christian tradition as is proclaimed in the blueprint of the European constitution, or it will rather continue to tolerate Protestant values.

It will be the answer to those questions that will determine whether or not there will be a clash of denominations in addition to the clash of civilizations.

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[9] See Burger, P. *"Orthodoxy and the global pluralism"* In: Demoiratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization. Summer 2005 http://www.findarticles.com.

Nina Dimitrova

BULGARIAN NEO-PAGANISM
AND THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL/
EUROPEAN IDENTITY

"From a religious point of view, the fact of it being entirely Christianized makes Europe a unique phenomenon among the continents."(1) These are René Raimond's words, defining Christianity as a "trademark" of the continent. At the same time, a deep crisis occurs inside Christianity all over the continent, starting in the middle of the past century. This leads authors such as Rorty, Habermas and others, known for their skepticism towards religion, to the conclusion of an emerging process of de-secularization. Nevertheless, the revival of religiosity in contemporary Europe doesn't initiate a second rise of Christianity but causes different attempts for "invention" of religious traditions. Religious revival, that is to say – return of societies to their pre-atheistic state, is characteristic also for the countries from the "eastern bloc". A major tendency in this process is the rebirth of pagan religious complexes.

Today's "New Age" type of spirituality develops as an alternative of Christianity and scholars often identify it with the ongoing eruption of paganism. Undoubtedly, very strong similarities exist between these two spiritual phenomena, which justify their identification. Such analogical element is the deep reverence of nature (it is not an accident that a lot of people from among the "greens" and the followers of the different ecological movements declare themselves as "New age"-ers or pagans.)

The female image of a triumphant deity, returning to the world, is another major likeness, which is the cause of the feministic accent in both movements. In fact, the difference between them is like the one between genus and species – the spirituality of "New Age" is adequate to the globalized post-modernity (or whatever name we should give it, using the

prefixes – *post-, hyper-*, etc.), being global, comprehensive and "omnivo-rous". (This spiritual movement is characteristic mainly for the West, but it also has its followers in Bulgaria, without being an overly peculiar phenomenon.)

"New Age" consists of pagan complexes that belong to the different ethnos around the world, but being a totalistic religious syncretism, its core is a universalism similar to the theosophical one. Paganism does not deplete the spiritual content of the movement. In fact it carries an opposite energy charge – the revival of this phenomenon is characteristic with its specific attitude towards Nature, it is also motivated by the desire for establishment or restoration of local and native traditions. If "New Age" is a kind of postmodern religion, then the different types of modern paganism – *Wicca*, the *Druid cult*, the apology of *Shamanism*, etc., are in direct opposition to the process of cultural universalization and the neglecting of national traditions and peculiarities.

Being a typical dimension of the de-secularization process, today's pagan "emancipation" isn't a restoration of the native antiquity, regardless of the constant declarations. Obviously, it's not a naturally developed and gradually established religious phenomenon either. What is happening can be defined as attempt to "construct" a religion. Russian author Ilya Aga-fonov points out that: "Neo-paganism is in no way a "traditional" creed; it is a purely contemporary phenomenon that has been caused and provoked by the general crisis of today's views of life and spirituality." (2) As Victor Schnierelmann aptly indicates: "The term "neo-paganism" should be read as – a distinct, "national" religion, artificially created by city intellectuals, using fragments from real ancient beliefs and rituals with the aim of "revival of the national spirituality". In fact what we're speaking of is not really an attempt for revival, but one for construction of the ideological basis of a new social and political community, corresponding to the new conditions of the modern era." (3)

Among the diverse pagan phenomena in modern times, the worship of nature is an irrevocable constant. An article, published on a Bulgarian pagan website reads: "Paganism is an open informational system, presuming its constant renewal out of the inexhaustible wisdom of Nature. This is the main superiority of the pagan movement over the egalitarian and

dogmatical systems of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, which are based on given and unchangeable precepts, recorded in sacred scriptures. Our ancestors have never confined themselves only to the authority of such scriptures and legends. They have always induced their beliefs from the eternal archetype – Nature, and have counted on the wisdom of Heaven and Earth, of stones, trees and animals." (4)

But homage to the elements of nature in their quality of an immanent, impersonal god is not the chief characteristic of the revived pre-Christian teachings of our time. The main accents now are: On one hand – clear and unconditional differentiation from Christianity and the declaration of these beliefs as a unique, genuinely native and even national religion – a kind of "national creed", which, in fact, is the name of another Bulgarian website on paganism. (*Rodnoverie* is the name of an analogical spiritual movement from Russia. (5)) Special attention is given to specifics of the *topos*, or "the place" where the old/new gods re-emerge. An article on *wotanism* by David Lane has been translated in Bulgarian and published on the website of "Dulo Society". In this article he points that "Only a religion that is proper for given people, is capable of preserving and protecting its identity." (6) So, *if "New Age" is the religion of a world undergoing globalization, the re-emerging pagan movements express the religious principles of anti-globalism*. Local religions often have strong relation with ultra-nationalist organizations, and although being, in Bulgaria for instance, a phenomenon of marginal importance, its connection with radical nationalism grows more and more evident. (The ideologist of Russian national-socialism Dobroslav claims that in ancient times religious and nationalist sentiments simply coincided, that is to say paganism represented a combination of the tribal cult with the tribal social system. (7)) The anti-Christian pathos of neo-paganism is woven into political extremism, especially when speaking of the restoration of the *Aryan cult*. "We, Bulgarians, are Aryans, and our ancient religion – the Tangrism, isn't any different from the other Aryan religions" – writes Ivan Mitev/Shegor Rasate in the beginning of his article – "The gods of Bulgaria" (published on the site of "Dulo society"). In this article he defends the principles of racial theories. The general message is this: religious cults are conditioned by biological facts. "God and race are one unified nature" is the paradigmatic assertion of Mitev/Rasate. Accordingly Tangra – *the Bulgarian god*, couldn't be a

universal god, that is to say – God-Absolute, but more so – "the god of our higher racial essence".

It is important to mention that *Bulgarian movement for native origins* differs from similar organizations in countries, belonging to the Slavic world – Russia, Belarus and Ukraine – by the fact that among pagans in our country the Slavic element isn't highly respected. The revival of the "creed of the ancestors" is related mainly to the cult of Tangra – *the Thunderer god*, closely connected to the Teutonic deity – Wotan. (Nevertheless, a website dedicated to Slavic neo-paganism and "The eternal Slavic fire" exists – http://slavpagan.hit.bg. Other, "proto-Bulgarian" websites, such as "Warriors of Tangra", "Dulo society", etc., are far more influential). The difference becomes even more evident when we compare the pseudonyms used – Rasate, Eltimir, Malamir, Sevar, Hunor, etc. with the ones of their Russian "colleagues" – Dobroslav, Veleslav, Velimir, Svetoyar, Velena, Ladomir, etc. Despite the absence of specifically ethnical – in this case Russian – deities and the orientation towards the more general ancient Slavic pantheon, a tendency towards nationalistic views ("Aryan nationalism" to be more specific) can be sensed in the ideologies laid on a great number of such Russian websites. In his effort to substantiate Bulgarian paganism Mitev/Rasate claims: "We respect the tradition of Orthodox Christianity as a traditional creed of the Bulgarians but our critique is aimed at the Judaic-Christian doctrine that is the foundation of all the Christian churches and hasn't really been altered from the very birth of Christian faith. The doctrine is alien to our racial virtues and does not offer an idea of salvation, applicable in real life." (8) This sounds quite familiar and isn't really restoration of ancient beliefs but, in fact, an echo from far more contemporary views. Urged by today's unprecedented revival of pagan energy, Mitev/Rasate draws the conclusion that paganism is a fundamental concept for understanding Bulgarian national identity. His meditations about the ethnic (Aryan) descent of Bulgarians, about the importance of pagan clergy, being a kind of elite of the nation, etc., are used as arguments and are published on the website, mentioned above.

Obviously the problem of the European identity of contemporary Bulgarians is a complex one and has specific interpretations among the new followers of *Tangra*. These kinds of new "local" religions tend to put an accent on the native and original aspects of a nation's life, and com-

bined with their strong anti-Christian charge they end up being a centrifugal force, shaking the unity of "the oldest of Christian continents".

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Nonka Bogomilova

CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE: CORPORATE IDENTITY OR DIVERSITY?

It is generally considered that, in the developed Western democracies, there are three basic models of Church-state relationships, characteristic of the epoch of secularisation: 1) the model of a state Church expressing a predominant religion (Finland, Greece, Great Britain); 2) the model of divided existence and co-operation, where the Church is separated from the state but is part of society (Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain); 3) the strict separation of church from state (France – the only European country with a categorical separation between Church and state)[1] .

Another proof of the secular nature of European statehood is the absence of any reference to confession-based religious theses and ideas in the preambles to the constitutions of the European countries. Such references exist in the preambles to the Greek and Irish constitutions. Whereas the French principle of *laicité* accepts that the state must be completely neutral with regard to all religious matters, the German tradition allows the so-called Invocatio Dei; this difference is reflected in the contrary positions of these two countries on this issue in connection with the European Constitution. [2]

The secular principle of separation between Church and state is evident in the new constitutions of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe: in some of their preambles there is reference to God (Poland, the Ukraine); others refer to their religious traditions (Czech Republic, Slova-

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[1] **Horvat,V**.Church in Democratic Transition between the State and the Civil Society, in: Religion in Eastern Europe, XXIV, April 2004

[2] **Shmid, K**. In the Name of God? The Problem of Religious and non-Religious Preambles to State Constitutions in Post-atheistic Contexts, in: Religion in Eastern Europe, vol. XXIV, N1, February 2004

kia); still others make no such reference or simply have no preambles to the constitution (Romania, Latvia, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan). In the most frequent case there is no reference to God (Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Russia, Slovenia, Serbia and Montenegro).[3]

The basic legal acts and documents that establish the principles of state-Church relations in developed democracies are the following: 1) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), art.18; 2) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the United Nations (1976), art.18; 3) European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953), art.9: "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance."

In assuming the freedom of religion to be a core principle of European identity with regard to state-Church relationships, the international documents in this sphere affirm the rights of separate countries to take into account in their legislature their national and cultural specificity (Art. 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU; Amsterdam treaty Declaration N11 on the status of Churches and non-confessional organisations).[4]

Examining the various emphases and even the philosophy of this legislature in Germany, France, Great Britain, Spain, L.Bloß writes that it: "appears to draw a highly differentiated picture of the European Union as a whole being divided into several major legal approaches in this arena."[5] But these European models of state-Church relations are not static. There is a trend towards reduction of the relative weight of state Churches and towards granting greater rights to other confessions; in recent years this tendency has become evident in Sweden and Finland, in Italy, Spain, and Portugal.

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[3] Ibid.

[4] **Bloß, L.** European Law of Religion – organizational and institutional analysis of national systems and their implications for the future European Integration Process, Jean Monnet Working Paper 13/03, in: www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/03031301.rtf

[5] Ibid.

The same author points out several basic stresses in European legislature with regard to the freedom of religion: freedom of worship, individually and collectively; a certain degree of church autonomy; financial relief in the form of direct support and/or tax relieves; participation and/or representation in mass media and school systems; support on an equal basis in the cultural and social realm. [6]

The comparative picture of the current state of the legal framework of state-Church relationships in some Balkan countries (Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro) shows:

– In all three (now – four) countries modern democratic constitutions have been adopted, which guarantee equal civil rights and liberties with regard to thought, conscience, religion, association; also guaranteed is the equality of national minorities and of religious communities. However, the legislature regulating relationships between state and Church, which is meant to give a concrete and effective legal framework of the general constitutional assertions, is at a different stages for each of the countries:

– Since 1993, when the Law on the Legal Situation of Religious Communities in the Republic of Serbia was annulled; there is a dangerous legal vacuum with regard to the relationships between state and religious communities: since 2002, three draft laws have been worked out and presented for discussion; they met with criticism on the part of small religious communities, national and international human rights organizations, and even some of the traditional churches; currently an improved version is being prepared of the draft "Law on Freedom of Belief, Churches, Religious Communities and Religious Associations" of July 2004.

– Since 1997, a Law on Religious Communities and Religious Groups was passed in the Republic of Macedonia, the basic articles of which were rejected by the Constitutional Court as unconstitutional and not in harmony with international legal tools in this sphere. This fact makes the law inadequate as a regulatory tool; currently a new draft law is being worked out.

– Since 2002 there is an operative Religious Denominations Act in the Republic of Bulgaria, which takes into account the basic Eu-

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[6] Ibid., p.16

ropean standards and international legal tools, but which has periodically been criticized on separate points by some parties and human rights organizations and by the structures of the European Commission, which implies that this law will evolve and be perfected in the future.

This slow and painful evolution is a result of the complex situation of the legislator in the studied countries. He has to move between the Scylla of European imperatives and standards, presented in the criticisms by NGOs and by small religious communities, and the Charybdis of internal political circumstances, mass attitudes, the real social authority and social status of some of the religious communities, and xenophobic attitudes.

This is where the deeper meaning and philosophy of our analysis of national legal texts lies; they are not only components of a universal, global, and standardized legal universe, but are embedded in a specific social context and the people involved, the balance between people generate the texts. Moreover, even if the texts of the laws were to be literally adopted and copied from the developed democratic countries, still the question of the application of these texts would remain with so much the greater weight, the question of their acceptance as an organic part of the respective culture.

The religious education in public schools is an important aspect of the Church-state relations. Many European countries' education systems prefer the non-confessional (not connected to any particular faith) teaching of religion – Sweden, Norway, Denmark, England, Scotland, Holland, Slovenia etc. It offers knowledge and understanding of religion and human experience and does not form confessionally oriented devotees[7]. This alternative has been actively discussed in Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. While in Serbia there exists confessional education for 7 traditional (historic) religious communities, there is no solution to the problem in Montenegro and Kosovo yet.

Prof. S. Tomovich, Minister of Confessions of Montenegro believes, that before one sets on learning and changing the world, one needs a spiritual support to overcome the dramas in life, like the loss of loved ones, to have hope, to become a better person; he believes one needs not history of religion

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[7] **Kodelja, Z.,T.Bassler**. Religion and Schooling in Open Society, Ljubljana, 2004, Open Society Institute

as a cold registration of facts, but religious spirituality and inner harmony[8].

A 2004 sociological survey in secondary school students in Kosovo titled: "Should the subject of Religion be taught in schools in Kosovo?" found that: the majority of students would like to know more about religion, but the ways in which this should happen, are different. Those who accept the necessity of studying religion at school expect that it would help them solve their emotional problems and overcome such negative issues as alcohol and drugs; the predominant opinion is that school studies must provide knowledge of all religions with focus on their moral values, ie. with that which unites them, not the dogmas and the rituals that divide them[9]. In response to such expectations, it would be useful to include in the textbooks ideas and views of some of the significant religious philosophers like M. Buber, N. Berdyaev, F. Schleiermacher, who focus on this side of religion.

The sociological survey on the social opinion concerning above issue in Bulgaria gives some light on the reasons for that: 46.7% of the interviewed accept that the religious education should be realized by the family; 38.1% – by the school; 10.6% – by the religious institutions. 80.5% give preference to the optional subject on religion and to the teachers and not to the theologians.[10]

The subject "Religion" in school should: give knowledge on religion as culture – 46.5%; form spiritual values – 17.4%; form moral values – 15.5% (Sociological Agency ACCA "M", March, 1996).[11]

I think that some specific features and even paradoxes of the religious education in some countries could be understood within the framework of the inner and more differentiated approach to the local religious profile.

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[8] Образованье и васпитанье (Education and Instruction) N4, 1997, Podgoritza, in Serbian

[9] **Rogova,V**. Kosova, in: **Z. Kodelja, T.Bassler**. Religion and Schooling in Open Society, Ljubljana, 2004, Open Society Institute, p. 46-47; **Basdevant-Gaudemet, B**. Education et religion dans les pays candidates a l'Union Europeenne, in: Le statut des confessions religieuses des etats candidates a l'Union Europeenne, ed. F.Messner, Milano, 2002

[10] **Bogomilova, N.** Religion, Law and Politics in the Balkans in the End of the 20th and the Beginning of the 21st Century, Sofia, 2005, Ed.Iztok-Zapad (bilingual, Bulgarian and English), p.228

[11] Ibid., p.229

Rumen Mudrov

CONFESSIONAL CULTURE
AND LATITUDINARIANISM

Existence of democratic civil society has been always one of the most important conditions for exercising almost all of the human rights and obligations. But this cannot be one society of peace where violence is maintained in silence forcibly or voluntarily. This has to be one society of freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, and fair laws valid for everybody. Exactly because of this not even one institution or personality cannot represent itself as authorized one or to assume right only it to define which to be categorized as moral and which not, what is the meaning of the human life, of the private happiness, what philosophy to prefer, which religion to follow, and which to deny. It is known that human rights cannot be neither given, nor held for life. They just have to be achieved and should be deserved again and again. If necessary a person has to deserve it day by day. Even now, in the beginning of the 21st century, the Convention of the human Rights shouldn't be taken as something turned into reality only desire, or only as abstract good wish. It has to be assumed as a real practical manual for action to every contemporary person.

Civil society, progress, and democracy should be connected to one another, for not letting some dissimilarity to lead to mutual intolerance, conflict, and even aggression between different groups, strata, and religious communities. The system, fallen in 1989, maybe had turned bigger attention to the equality, turning a back to freedom. The present system, really concentrated on freedom also is coming to the same grief if it forgets the equality.

Actually, globalization hides the real danger of unification, depersolization of the national cultures. On a high level this strengthens in many people the desire to turn to them and to withdrawn to themselves to rid off

all influences. Otherwise, their inner and individual opposition can turn into object of various influences, in this matter religious, ideological, cultural, or nationalistic. That's why the contemporary educational system insists not only on learning but also on critical thinking training. This manner of thinking will give the opportunity for realizing and understanding the changes in the public, economic, and private life, to added new values and to forge their destiny without any quaestors, in this matter religious and theological. We cannot speak about confessional culture after part of the Bulgarian Orthodoxy clergy and some theologians are trying most of the time to confess us that only the Orthodox Church is good, impeccable, and can be the only keeper of the authentic Christian faith and rituals. I cannot and I don't accept suggestions for principal immorality of people who don't believe in God. I cannot unreservedly or complete to accept or agree with the statement that Bulgarians had survived as nation only because of the Orthodox Church. I don't agree in Constitution to be written that the traditional Bulgarian religion is Orthodoxy, even less the Islam far ago is also traditional religion. We are not even talking that in this case to orthodoxy is given meaning of ethnography or explanation. So, even it is like that, why we don't write in the Constitution that the wooden pipe is traditional musical instrument from Rhodopa Mountains, or that on Christmas time in Bulgaria is accepted to slighter a pig, etc. But no! There is specified only the orthodoxy. No matter of the constitutional character in some religious and political writing figures, in Bulgaria and in West Europe in it some discrimination elements towards other confessions in Bulgaria, and even to the non believers, who are deeply confessed that the EU is more non attentive are we or not believers or atheists. In the Constitution is written also this our right, except of the right for religion selection and it is not compulsory this to be Orthodoxy. The EU is most interested in none depriving corrupt, and of the non ability of our juridical system to act more operative.

In this manner of thoughts Brussels continue to act in tolerant way to the "poor" Bulgarians and Romanians, not because that by tradition we are Orthodox or that in some way we are connected to the Christian faith and history, but because the secular tolerance is much above the confessional. Europe is not fanatic religious, but relying on the good in the Orthodox tradition without forgetting the idea of the Enlightening and the

price of Democracy continues to be defender of latitude, generosity, and solidarity. So the people's minds to be orientated more to the future and less to the pass.

Obviously the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and its clerk already 17 years couldn't understand that the continuous staring at our historical past and apologizing the religion usual sound not only archaic but also conservative. Neither in Europe, nor in Bulgaria will anyone be excited of the epic fights of the Orthodoxy against socialistic totalitarian state. Obviously, the Bulgarian Orthodox church management is incapable to understand that the tiredness of such a long economic and political stage during the government of different parties a reason for that hole in the relationships between politicians and voters. And with the schism and its "frays" to the State part of the priesthood reproduce disgusting archetypes of groveling, and lack of primary moral, and greed, and the lack of ever what kind of far-sightedness alienate not a few believers. more than absurd was the " bless" made by official church servants of the Bulgarian rangers going to Iraqi. And because it was not enough, on TV we saw detailed reporting of Bulgarian bishop, giving them Bibles and joining of some of them to the Christian faith in public. Such thoughtlessness destroys the authority not only of the Bulgarian orthodoxy but of the whole our nation, because according to the Church we are Orthodox. I don't want to be Orthodox because I am adversary of crusades and Bulgarian Orthodox priests made their best to present it in this way. I hardly listen to the endless sermons about Christian morality's greatness on our national media because I heard the "silence" broadcasted by the Holy Synod during the bombing of other Orthodox nation in former Yugoslavia.

I see nothing constructive in Bulgarian Orthodox church's activities, because a lot of its figures couldn't "realize" that the party model of governing in Bulgaria gradually is changing to oligarchy. In this reason their flirtation with party leaders is more than short-sighted and repulsive. Bulgarian clergy also didn't realize that democratic adjustment of Bulgarians are stronger than patriarchal and many young people are more interested about their personal professional and social realization, than the fact are they ethnical Bulgarians caring Orthodox faith in their souls.

Is Bulgarian orthodoxy ready for the European integration after receiving official definite answer by our state? Is superior clergy conformed

to the voice of reason and pragmatism that the biggest and most important checking about the maturity of each of the Bulgarian institutions, including the church one is providing now. The church has to respond immediately to pro-European signal no single institution to start vain debates and unusual tribunals. Otherwise it stimulates euro-skepticism of many Bulgarians on the age of despair. Poor is church that relies on such laity only, or anathematizes block busters as PR action, screening itself behind sacral aura. It reminds me of "Silabus"/reasons/, the application named "Reasons for the Biggest Delusions of our Times" in Pii IX encyclical from 8th December, 1864 year.

Finally Bulgarian Orthodox church has to realize that its philosophy can't be based on the presumption that people are mindless creatures which needs religion and nothing else. Of course the socialism restricted its activities, but the totalitarian authority restricted not only religious freedom of people, but their rights to be informed and to have own opinion too. It's even more thoughtless that in period of anathemas like that our Church shifts the responsibility upon the state again and in the same time stops it to take the whole care about decreasing of poverty, helping people to find occupations, problems with drug addictions, prostitution. As it seems our clergy pays attention only about reproducing of religiosity and doesn't interested of the models of Christian charity, sympathy, missionary work. You cannot speak about tolerance and ask the state institutions to ban film broadcasting in the same time. Having disagreements with the author is not the same as anathematizing. It may be interpreted as frustration.

Is Bulgarian Orthodox church prepared for open discussion not only with its followers but with the whole society? Has our modern Church moral power not to distance from so called "revival process, according the fact that metropolitan Kiril, who was ready to stop trains, deported Jews with his own body, is the author of "Measures for the complete make Bulgarians of people from Rhodopes and Bulgarian Mohammedans" special plan.

When we speak about the democracy in Bulgaria we have to say that neither Bulgarian "democrats," nor Bulgarian Orthodox church's activists, believers or atheists make the totalitarian regime to fall down. Even more, our Democracy as every kind of ideology and political practices carried out almost without our participation. The Western civilization and

economical power mainly of USA destroyed so called "socialistic system." We received our political freedom almost as a gift so in near future it is unlikely for us to receive our spiritual, cultural, religious, or economical freedom. Bulgarian Orthodoxy have never had "theoretical theological" competitors, except physical cruel pressure during the centuries of slavery and political pressure during totalitarianism.

In the fact totalitarian authorities persecuted Bulgarian Orthodoxy to a smaller degree than other Christian denominations, connected with the Western countries. The competition becomes stronger in Bulgaria and it should be not only economical, but spiritual and religiously-theological too. The both of Western denominations comes with a lot of funds, with great traditions of missionary activities and charity, with perfect prepared activists and very often more educated than our clarity. In Western Europe and USA beside equality if rights of the religions people can criticize each religion (except Islamic as we saw), without seeing the ghost of communism in these actions. Obviously Bulgarian clarity still can't realize that there is laic, scientific, and philosophical criticism except "communistic" one to religion and to the Church too and it doesn't frighten anybody and nobody finds bad thoughts as it happens with critics of Islam.

Stoycho Yotov

POSITION OF RELIGION
IN CONTEMPORARY GLOBALIZING WORLD

Religion is one of the elements in human society which firmly presents in its history. In considerable periods of the development of society religion plays a main part in all the spheres of social life – such as ideological, political and even economic one. Of course, this role always has its concrete dimensions – for one or another historical period, for one or another world area, for different political events. Changes in social-historical development of humanity set – directly or indirectly – their mark also on the position and role of religion in people's life.

The last decades of the 20-th century and the beginning of the new century contain a series of important events and processes, which lead to big changes in world economic, political and ideological order. Three of them should be outlined: **globalization, the fall of East-European socialism, the war against terrorism**.

Globalization is indisputably a process which runs to various directions. Of course, it is not a new phenomenon, and it does not start right in our lifetime. In all human history we find efforts for world domination, cases of peoples migration, export and mixture of cultures: the wars of Alexander the Great, the Catholic crusades, invasions of the Mongolians, the Tatars and the Turks, colonization of the American and African continent by European countries and people, the two world wars. Of course, transforming and disseminating local or national cultural and scientific advances happens not only by war. A special importance for this have trade relations between seprete countries and nations, and the last grow quickly through the development of shipping and the Great geographic discoveries.

Indisputably, contemporary globalization processes are mainly influenced by some factors: the revolution in information systems, estab-

lishment of trans-national industrial and economic alliances as well as international or world financial authorities.

Globalization could have either positive or negative consequences concerning concrete country and people. On the one hand, modern information systems (which actually continue to develop) ruin all the barriers and national borderlines giving the possibility everyone to communicate and to take any kind of information from any place of the world. At the same time, this surely sets mark on national cultures and national identity of different races and people, on their view of life and value system.

History eloquently shows that the countries which have economic and military domination in some historical period as a rule start to develop empire ambitions to impose dependancy or slavery on other countries and people, to impose their culture, language, religion, value system, etc.

The fall of communist system in East Europe and transition to capitalistic social relations in former communist countries lead to radical changes in international economic, political, military, cultural, and religious relations, etc.

First we should mention that one of the most important results of the fall of communism is the recognition of the USA as an ultimate world leader, which tries to judge of any world question, of course, regarding the same American interests.

Another important consequence of the fall of communist system is determination of **terrorism as the enemy number one** for democratic changes and democracy in general.

As it is known, during the Cold War the main enemy of Western society and the USA is the communist camp and the Soviet Union above all. Ideological opposition between the two social systems (beside economic and military one) is performed in all the spheres of people's mind including religious field. It is known that in this ideological struggle religion is one of the basic ideological tools against atheistic communism. Nowadays there are clearly shown the special deserts of the Catholic Church and the pope Joan Paul II for the struggle against communism. Of course, the side of the capitalists against communist atheistic ideas is taken on principle not only by the Catholic Church but also all the rest religions and churches.

Here we call atheistic ideas communist entirely consciously. We do not need to demonstrate that atheism as a phenomenon and a view of life was born yet in antiquity, and it is ridiculous any atheist to be called communist. But statements like this have big influence when they are used for ideological purposes, and they are still used, upon believers' psychology.

One of the paradoxes of American public consciousness, which means the popular one, is the wide-spread intolerance to atheism. It is a paradox considering that the USA is a leading country in scientific progress in all the world, besides, the USA history and development go just in the frame of the past two centuries. It is important to notice also that in the USA religion and State are divided, and the relation to any religion is more liberal than it is in the rest of the world. American popular faith shows tolerance to any religious features even to the most exotic and strangest kinds of religion, moreover, it is showed more loyalty to the ideology of the Satan Church than the persons with atheist view of life.

In fact, we can explain this initial paradox through American bourgeois ideological system. In the process of establishing American society, religion becomes an inseparable part of the American value system. Not only the first ones but any American president till now needs to follow some religion. The second American President D. Adams claims: "A patriot without faith is the same paradox as an honest man without fear of God". And almoust two hundred years later D. Eisenhower is explicit that, "Our government makes any sense without deep religious faith – I do not ask which exactly faith is this", (Quoted by D. E. Furman "Religion and social conflicts in the USA", Moscow, 1981, p. 89).

The last part of Eisenhower's statement clearly shows two details. First, American society is not subordinated to a concrete religion, or precisely, any religion has leading role. According to American ideological system, all religions are allowed on the condition that they confirm American value system, which inseparable part is religion. The term pure American, which term is strange for European mind, does not mean person of American origine, but any individual irrespective of one's origine who shares American value system and the American way of life. American ideological system is related with a system of rituals, which includes complicate interlaced ideological symbols: State ones, national and religious. The religious symbols support the State ones giving them a reli-

gious sense. Each new president takes an oath upon the Holy Bible, and a Protestant pastor, a Catholic priest, a Judaic rabbi, and an Orthodox priest until 1957, pray for God's blessing on the President. By prayers start sittings of the Congress, congresses of the two parties, priests serve in the American Army, prayers are hold in the schools and there are read texts from the Bible.

We turn our special attention (although sketchy) to the position and role of religion in American ideological system because of two reasons. First, examining this question is easy to explain the relation of American politics to religion outside the USA. Second, this way we not only explain but also we can surely prognosticate the future of religion in our own country.

As it is already noticed, any religion is allowed in the USA but only on the condition that it defends and confirms, or idolizes the American way of life, American politics, the right of the Americans to judge in all of the world. That is why, the American Government, frankly or under cover, makes efforts to extend worldwide the sphere of influence of all religions, but mostly of these which were born in the USA or which are accepted there. The former are above all some Protestant, or close to the Protestants creeds and Churches, which arise in the 19-th and the 20-th century in America, the latter are also Protestant forms coming from the Reformation in West Europe, but today they are set and develop in the USA keeping missionary activity abroad. As an example we could show our own country. In the end of the Turkish Slavery starts the propaganda for Methodism and Congregationalism, after the Liberation come Baptism, Adventism, and the Pentecostals. After 1989 the so-called democratization of society gives the possibility (of course, under political pressure outside) in our country fluently to come and to be legalized a big deal of creeds and religious organisations (not only Protestant), which number till now is nearly eighty. In general, the relation of the USA to the Orthodoxy, the Catholicism and Islam, is much more distant and sometimes negative. First, it is since in many countries ethnic origine and religious affiliation are considered identical – Russian or Bulgarian means Orthodox, Polish – Catholic, Arabian or Turkish – Muslim, etc. The second that is, of course, more important is that the same religions often turn against the politics of the USA for world domination, and they defend their do-

mestic interests. Although one of the American presidents, J. Kennedy, is a Catholic, the Vatican does not want to support entirely American politics since it understands well and feels anti-American statements amongst many Catholics in the world, especially in Latin America.

More complicated and contradictory is the relation of Islam to the USA after the declared anti-terrorist war and the conflicts (including military ones) in many Muslim countries. While the USA and their allies consider the war in Iraq and the war against terrorism at all a struggle for democracy, many Islamic countries consider it a war of the Christian West against the Muslim East, and that is why for most Muslims the conflicts are not economic and political but religious ones.

All the above shows that the worldwide advance of religion after the fall of the communist camp comes not only because of pure religious reasons, but religion turns to as much important factor for international ideological, political and economic life as in the past.

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РОЛЬ РЕГИОНАЛЬНЫХ ЭЛИТ В ОБЕСПЕЧЕНИИ ВЗАИМОДЕЙСТВИЯ ВЛАСТИ И ГРАЖДАНСКОГО ОБЩЕСТВА В РОССИИ

Вопрос о роли региональных элит и социальной эффективности или деструктивности их деятельности – один из важнейших для интенсивно развивающейся ныне в России региональной конфликтологии, концентрирующей свое основное внимание на *выявлении, осмыслении и концептуальном интегрировании конфликтогенных факторов (политических, экономических, социально-психологических, этнических, культурных, религиозных и т.п.), вызывающих и обостряющих типичные конфликтные ситуации в общественных взаимоотношениях, складывающихся в различных регионах страны, в особенности – на тех из факторов, которые ведут к разного рода принуждению и насилию, на раскрытии дестабилизирующих и деструктивных последствий действия этих факторов, а также на поиске и обосновании с помощью всего этого возможных мер по их нейтрализации и по приданию социальным конфликтам характера и форм, содействующих общему улучшению социальной ситуации и движению всего общества к развитой демократической стадии.*

В этой связи все более обостряется и становится настоятельно необходимым научно обоснованное решение проблемы моделирования и реализации *политики адекватного воздействия на возникающие в регионах социальные напряжения и конфликтные ситуации,* что становится возможным на основе соответствующей оценки и корректировки действий и мотивирующих эти действия политических, экономических, культурных предпочтений их основных инициаторов и активных участников – *субъектов политического процесса,*

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а также на основе выявления факторов, содействующих их заинтересованности в урегулировании и разрешении, а не интенсификации и эскалации напряжений и конфликтов. *Среди такого рода субъектов ведущую роль играют, разумеется, региональные элиты и их представители*, поскольку само их руководящее положение в основных региональных структурах, – по общепринятому в настоящее время определению как раз и позволяющее зафиксировать их принадлежность к элитной группе, – побуждает их в первую очередь к тому, чтобы контролировать и в нужном, с их точки зрения, направлении изменять ситуацию как в этих структурах, так и в регионе в целом.

Для актуального и действенного конфликтологического анализа сложившейся ныне в стране ситуации, как представляется, *необходимо сосредоточить внимание на проблемах моделирования и реализации не региональной политики в целом, а прежде и больше всего – на положении со всем этим в отношении **социальной политики в регионах**,* поскольку именно с ней связаны основные и наиболее острые социальные напряжения и конфликтные ситуации во взаимодействии региональных элит как с населением регионов, так и между собой и с общероссийскими элитами.

Следует напомнить, что в Конституции РФ, принятой в 1993 г., в ст. 7 п.1 записано: «Российская Федерация – социальное государство, политика которого направлена на создание условий, обеспечивающих достойную жизнь и свободное развитие человека». Однако, приходится с сожалением констатировать, что осуществление радикальных социально-экономических реформ, направленных, по уверениям их инициаторов и проводников, как будто бы на решение именно этой задачи, в действительности сопровождалось снижением общего уровня жизни населения, безработицей, разрушением привычных жизненных стереотипов мышления, ломкой имевшихся социальных гарантий. Все эти и многие другие социально-экономические факторы, пережитые всей страной, всеми ее регионами в последнее десятилетие, вызвали такие негативные социальные последствия, как неуверенность основной массы населения страны и регионов в завтрашнем дне, превышение смертности над рождаемостью, появление безнадзорных и беспризорных детей, так называемых социальных сирот, рост психических стрессов, неврозов, суицидов и

целый ряд других опасных «болезней» общества, подрывающих его безопасность и угрожающих самому его существованию.

Поскольку из сказанного само собой понятно, что возникновению и усилению всех этих своих болезненных состояний российское общество вообще и его регионы, в частности, обязаны «в первую голову» поведению элит всех уровней и направлений, своими «руководящими» действиями не только не обеспечивших движение к социальному государству и соответствующей социальной политике, но и прямо, намеренно препятствующих тому и другому, то единственно действенным лекарством от них может служить, как все настойчивее подчеркивают многие российские обществоведы, *только обращение всей совокупности российских элит к действительно сильной и эффективной социальной политике,* способной обеспечить экономическую и политическую стабилизацию положения российского населения как в целом по стране, так и по отдельным ее регионам, привлечь инвестиции для перевооружения и устойчивого развития их экономики и создать на основе всего этого достаточно мощный потенциал для повышения – достаточно быстрого и эффективного – народного благосостояния[1]. Они прежде всего должны отчетливо понять и внутренне принять ту достаточно простую и вряд ли опровергаемую истину, что проведение социальной политики не является благотворительной деятельностью государства и соответствующих органов и институтов власти, деятельностью которых они руководят. Это – насущная необходимость как для общества, так и для самого государства. Социальная политика – один из способов производства и воспроизводства бытия общества и социального бытия человека. Последовательное и организованное проведение социальной политики с соответствующей данному уровню развития общества материальной базой должно являться непременной составляющей государственного управления. Это обусловлено следующими факторами: социальная политика способствует сохранению и приумножению физических и духовных сил личности и нации в целом, сохранению и накоплению производственного и професси-

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[1] См.: Вопросы современной социальной политики: региональный аспект. Ярославль, 2002, с. 56-57

онального потенциала работника, укреплению психического здоровья человека. Тем самым *социальная политика благоприятствует сохранению человеческого капитала, укреплению благосостояния общества и отдельного человека, становлению устойчивого и стабильного общества*[2].

Возникает, однако, достаточно важный и неотложный вопрос: в какой мере наши российские элиты вообще, региональные в особенности готовы к соответствующей переходу к сильной социальной политике «перестройке» своего поведения и своих ориентаций, насколько они ощущают и осознают их необходимость? Если исходить из имеющихся данных конфликтологической экспертизы и становящегося в настоящее время «на ноги» во многих регионах конфликтологического мониторинга, ответ пока что выглядит малоутешительным. Эти данные показывают, что элиты всех уровней и направлений по-прежнему озабочены в основном обеспечением своей собственной выгоды: *политические*, – как центральные, так и региональные, – обеспечением и укреплением контроля за властными рычагами, усилением его превосходства над всеми другими механизмами и факторами влияния на общественные процессы, позволяющим бесконтрольно и безоглядно распоряжаться общественными богатством и достижениями; *бизнес-элиты* всех уровней – обеспечением, расширением и усилением эксплуатации собственности, сосредоточением в своих руках и для распоряжения в своих собственных интересах всеми сырьевыми, трудовыми и техническими ресурсами общества, его территорий и населения; интеллектуальные элиты – обеспечением бесконтрольного манипулирования общественным сознанием через средства массовой информации в интересах «укрепления терпимости» (отождествляемой с терпеливостью) всего «рядового» населения, его отказа от борьбы за прежние идейные и культурные ценности[3].

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[2] См.: Акопова Т.С., Титова Л.Г. Социальная ответственность политической власти в формировании социальной политики.// Вопросы современной социальной политики: региональный аспект. Ярославль, 2002, с. 74

[3] См.: Самарин А.Н. Становление элит в современной России: проблемы и перспективы // Современная конфликтология в контексте культуры мира. М., 2001

Не случайно поэтому многочисленные и разнообразные исследования, отслеживающие процесс десоциализации российской власти в центре и на местах, демонстрируют не исчезающее крайне негативное отношение всех слоев российского населения к государству, бизнесу и СМИ, которые сегодня не в состоянии обеспечить гарантированное существование, благополучие и удовлетворенность жизнью, ее нынешними условиями не только социально ущемленных слоев населения (молодежи, инвалидов, пенсионеров и т.д.), но и достаточно обеспеченных групп[4].

Конфликтологические исследования фиксируют также острые претензии, к тому же нарастающие и обостряющиеся по выражению степени неприязни, предъявляемые населением и собственно к региональным элитам, прежде всего политическим и экономическим. Так, в проведенном Центром конфликтологии Института социологии РАН совместно с нижегородским

региональным Центром конфликтологии экспертном мониторинговом исследовании выяснялось, в какой степени гармонично или конфликтно выстраиваются взаимоотношения между властями региона и населением, в том числе – насколько однозначно воспринимают острые и значимые проблемы региона и власти, и население. Оценивалось также, насколько власти «отзывчивы» к требованиям и сигналам, идущим снизу, от населения (проблема канализации интересов и запросов общества), каковы степень доверия к администрации, характеристики стиля ее деятельности, возможности влияния простых граждан на власть, включая общественное мнение, и, наконец, какова идентификация граждан в качестве сторонников или противников администрации. Его основные результаты представлены в материалах специального выпуска серии «Социальные конфликты: экспертиза, прогнозирование, технологии разрешения» на тему «Региональные конфликты: моделирование, мониторинг, менеджмент».

Общее представление об отношении нижегородцев к своим региональным элитам можно составить хотя бы из их ответов на вопросы «Может ли простой человек отстоять свои законные права пе-

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[4] См.напр.: ж. «Конфликтология – теория и практика», 2003, № 1, 2004, № 1

ред региональными и местными властями?» и «Прислушивается ли администрация к общественному мнению при решении значимых проблем»? На первый вопрос только около 10% респондентов дали утвердительный ответ, тогда как свыше 75% высказались отрицательно. В ответе же на второй вопрос более 60% опрошенных указали на то, что региональная власть не прислушивается к мнению местного сообщества. Таким образом, степень отчуждения властных органов от населения оказывается очень высокой. Это свидетельствует также о том, что авторитарные тенденции в действиях политической элиты на региональном уровне не только не слабеют, но в чем-то даже и крепнут. Тем самым наблюдается тенденция к концентрации и консолидации региональной власти во главе с ее исполнительной ветвью, которая, по сути, *стремится стать самодостаточной и самовоспроизводимой, практически независимой от общества*[5].

Не менее деструктивно население оценивает действия региональной бизнес-элиты, соотнося теперешнее неблагополучие своего собственного материального положения в первую очередь с ростом экономических преступлений среди предпринимателей, связанных с незаконным присвоением собственности, доходов, с финансовыми спекуляциями, рэкетом и т.п.[6]

Вместе с тем, исследования фиксируют наличие конфликтных ситуаций и противоборств и между самими элитами – как центральными, так и региональными. Так, по свидетельству известного отечественного специалиста по политической конфликтологии, А.В.Глуховой, *одной из главных примет политической жизни России последнего времени стали структурно-институциональные конфликты в регионах.* Под ними автор имеет в виду противоборство различных институтов и уровней власти в регионах, главным

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[5] См.: Никовская Л.И. Экспертиза и мониторинг социально-политической конфликтности в Нижегородском регионе// Социальные конфликты: экспертиза, прогнозирование, технологии разрешения. Вып.20: Региональные конфликты: моделирование, мониторинг, менеджмент. М., 2003

[6] См.: Валиулина Г.Р. Опыт регионального конфликтологического мониторинга //Социальные конфликты: экспертиза, прогнозирование, технологии разрешения. Вып.20: Региональные конфликты: моделирование, мониторинг, менеджмент. М., 2003

образом между законодательными и исполнительными ветвями власти, региональными структурами и институтами федеральной власти в регионах, между областными властями и местным самоуправлением. По ее оценке, в последнее время число таких конфликтов нарастает в Красноярском, Приморском краях, Омской, Екатеринбургской, Смоленской, Ульяновской, Воронежской и других областях. Их причинами, как правило, становятся:

– борьба за разделение предметов ведения и круга полномочий между органами государственной власти Центра и регионов, за распределение бюджетных средств между ними;

– необоснованные переделки уставов, положений, структур управления, перенос сроков выборов глав исполнительной власти регионов и местного самоуправления;

– низкая политическая и правовая культура конкурирующих группировок региональной и местной элиты и т.д.

Весьма важную роль играет и субъективная заинтересованность федеральных властных структур в поддержке или ослаблении определенных группировок в структуре региональных и местных властей, поддержка мэров крупных городов в их борьбе против областных администраций и т.п.[7]

Последнее замечание, думается, не только нельзя оставить без внимания, но и необходимо тщательно рассмотреть и оценить. Ибо оно, как представляется, с одной стороны, фиксирует не только конфликтную, но и достаточно рисковую, опасную для региональных элит ситуацию потери ими если не всей вообще, то, во всяком случае, весьма существенной доли своих собственных руководящих и контролирующих возможностей по отношению как к власти, так и к бизнесу и пользования информацией. Однако, с другой стороны, *именно эта угроза может и даже должна сыграть конструктивную роль в плане корректировки отношения региональных элит к социальной политике и своему участию в ее эффективной реа-*

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[7] См.: Глухова А.В. Роль региональных элит в российском политическом процессе // Социальные конфликты: экспертиза, прогнозирование, технологии разрешения. Вып.20: Региональные конфликты: моделирование, мониторинг, менеджмент. М., 2003

лизации. Дело в том, что в плане выбора одной из альтернатив по известной формуле «либо молотом взвивайся – либо наковальней стой» региональные элиты в складывающейся ситуации оказываются в промежуточном положении между «молотом» и «наковальней»: «наковальней», – которую они до сих пор старались сделать из населения регионов, стремясь подчинить его своему диктату, реализации своих собственных интересов и выгод, – они сами стать не хотят, а быть по-прежнему «молотом», из-за неравенства сил и возможностей со своими конкурентами из центральных, общероссийских элит, действующих как достаточно сплоченные и организованные «кланы», – не могут, не в состоянии. И потому у них остается, по существу, единственная возможность сохранить хотя бы в какой-то мере свою свободу, руководящую роль и контроль над региональной ситуацией, т.е. собственно «элитарность»: ***обратиться за поддержкой к самому подвластному им пока еще населению своих регионов, мобилизовать, поощрить их к этому***. Но это уже невозможно осуществить «пустыми обещаниями», к которым все региональные элиты уже не раз так или иначе обращались, особенно в периоды предвыборных кампаний, и которыми население повсюду на местах уже вдоволь «наелось», по существу, перестав им верить и проявляя все большую готовность противостоять им решительными протестными действиями. В этом отношении весьма показательным примером служит, скажем, протестное голосование жителей Нижнего Новгорода при выборах мэра, когда процент проголосовавших «против всех», по существу, почти сравнялся с позитивным голосованием «за» нового мэра (а по некоторым оценкам – и «переплюнув» его, составив более 30% от всех принявших участие в голосовании)[8]. Этот своеобразный сигнал одной из весьма влиятельных региональных элит, – к тому же пользовавшейся в данном случае весьма основательной поддержкой со стороны центральной власти в лице Полномочного представителя Президента РФ в При-

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[8] См.: Соколов С.В., Акулов К.М. Выборы мэра Нижнего Новгорода как показатель социальной конфликтности в регионе и выражение политической зрелости его населения // Социальные конфликты: экспертиза, прогнозирование, технологии разрешения. Вып.20: Региональные конфликты: моделирование, мониторинг, менеджмент. М., 2003

волжском федеральном округе, – отчетливо показывает, что теперь она, да во все возрастающей мере и элиты других регионов могут получить поддержку местного населения, только демонстрируя действительную помощь и реальное участие в удовлетворении его насущных потребностей и интересов, в проведении соответствующей этому региональной социальной политики.

В этой связи им предстоит, видимо, внимательно учесть опыт построения социальной политики в развитых западных демократиях, в которых, по существующим оценкам, власть народа реализуется в механизме представительства, которое, по определению, предполагает известное соглашение между властью и обществом по поводу того, кто будет выражать в определенных институтах социальные интересы определенных социальных групп. Разумеется, основной проблемой здесь является степень реализации властью своих сущностных социальных целей – регулирования социальных отношений, артикуляции и агрегации интересов.

Как показывает практика современных развитых стран, эта проблема не сразу решалась демократическими обществами, проходившими долгий путь от формальной к реальной демократии, от исключительно политических до социально-экономических и культурных прав и их экономического обеспечения. Лишь появление развитого, эффективного и социально, в том числе и патриотически ориентированного среднего класса, занимающего главное место в социальной структуре развитых стран, и обеспечение его деятельности поддержкой со стороны региональных и национальных элит всех уровней и видов показало, что эти общества обладают реальными возможностями обеспечивать и удовлетворять насущные потребности основной массы населения, притом – при активном участии самого населения, активно и охотно объединяющегося в разного рода корпорации, общественные и профессиональные объединения как структуры гражданского общества, обеспечивающие самодеятельное участие различных его групп и органов в реализации разнообразных социальных проектов и программ.

Думается, и нам, нашим региональным элитам в том числе и даже, быть может, прежде всего предстоит пройти примерно тот же путь в процессе формирования и воплощения эффективной соци-

альной политики. Можно констатировать, что кое-где в регионах, в которых уже осмыслена и воспринята эта необходимость, такое движение уже началось. Это хорошо поняли, скажем, организаторы социальной работы в мэрии Ярославля, заявившие устами заместителя мэра города по вопросам социальной политики и культуры А.А.Ипатова: «существенной частью этого процесса (разработки и реализации социальной политики – Авт.) является координация деятельности общественных институтов и социальных групп населения по поводу активизации самозащитных действий людей, а также оказание помощи тем, кто действительно не может себя защитить»[9]. Ибо все это и «является инструментом общественного согласия, интеллектуальной основой гражданской консолидации, способом понижения избыточного социально-политического напряжения.»[10]. Как представляется, такая постановка проблемы правильно ориентирует как региональные элиты, так и население региона и может служить «примером для подражания» на всей территории России.

Одну из наиболее значимых и эффективных мер по осуществлению этой задачи составляет ***всемерная поддержка становления и укрепления органов местного самоуправления как основных координаторов и реализаторов объективно необходимых гражданских инициатив.*** Ибо местное самоуправление – один из способов производства и воспроизводства бытия общества и социального бытия человека. ***Последовательное и организованное обеспечение эффективной деятельности осуществляющих его органов с соответствующей данному уровню развития общества материальной базой должно поэтому являться непременной составляющей современного государственного управления.***

Это обусловлено следующими факторами: местное самоуправление способствует сохранению и приумножению физических и духовных сил личности и нации в целом, сохранению и накоплению производственного и профессионального потенциала работников, укреплению психического здоровья всех российских граждан. Тем

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[9] Ипатов А.А. Новые подходы к формированию социальной политики в г. Ярославле// Вестник социальной работы. Ярославль, 2001, № 1-2, с.11-12

[10] Там же, с.13

самым эффективное местное самоуправление благоприятствует сохранению человеческого капитала, укреплению благосостояния общества и отдельного человека, становлению устойчивого и стабильного гражданского общества и соответствующего успешному осуществлению этой задачи государства[11].

По своей сути, *местное самоуправление представляет собой широкое, заинтересованное, активное и инициативное участие самих граждан в решении проблем, их непосредственно касающихся*. Отсюда ясно, что оно представляет собой институт гражданского общества как такой совокупности социальных отношений и структур, которые функционируют хотя и под контролем государственной власти, однако, вместе с тем, относительно независимо, автономно от нее, выстраивая свои с ней отношения "снизу вверх", "от периферии к центру", на основе развития прямой, непосредственной демократии, расширения гласности, повышения действенности общественного мнения и т.д. Это предполагает активность всех рядовых членов организационной системы местного самоуправления при решении общих для них вопросов, развитие различных форм их собственной инициативы, в том числе – в выработке и принятии управленческих решений[12].

Осуществляться местное самоуправление может как через сложившиеся управленческие структуры, так и через вновь возникшие, созданные по инициативе самих граждан; как с использованием местных государственных органов власти, так и с участием самодеятельных общественных организаций[13]. Причем, *чтобы самоуправление было как действительным, так и эффективным, эти структуры, органы и организации, как показывает историческая*

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[11] См.: Цейтлин Р.С., Сергеев С.А. История государственного управления и местного самоуправления в России. Москва, 2004

[12] См.: Дилигенский Г. Что мы знаем о демократии и гражданском обществе? Pro et Contra. Т2, №4. Гражданское общество. М., 1997; Гильманов А.З. Перспективы становления местного самоуправления //Социологические исследования. 1998. №11

[13] См.: Щербакова Н.В., Егорова Е.С. Местное самоуправление в России: теория и практика. Ярославль, 1996.Ершов А.Н. Возможна ли собственная модель самоуправления? // Социологические исследования. 1998. № 11, с. 39.

практика и самой России, и развитых демократических стран Запада, должны действовать не вместо одна другой, а вместе одна с другой, координируя и согласуя свои решения и действия и обеспечивая тем самым свое социальное партнерство. Иначе существует реальная угроза того, что самоуправление либо вообще не состоится, либо бюрократизируется, став иллюзорным, существующим только формально, «на словах»[14].

Одной из основных проблем здесь является степень реализации властью своих сущностных социальных целей – регулирования социальных отношений, артикуляции и агрегации интересов и гражданских инициатив, выдвигаемых и выражаемых системой органов местного самоуправления. В этой связи российским властям всех уровней предстоит, видимо, внимательно учесть опыт построения социальной политики, соответствующей интересам местного самоуправления, в развитых западных демократиях (Германии, Франции, Англии, США и др.), в которых, по существующим оценкам, власть народа реализуется в механизме представительства, которое, по определению, предполагает известное соглашение между властью и обществом по поводу того, кто и как будет выражать в определенных институтах социальные интересы определенных социальных групп[15].

Как представляется, в определенной мере этот опыт учтен в двух тесно взаимосвязанных законах – №79-ФЗ «О государственной гражданской службе Российской Федерации» и № 131-ФЗ «Об общих принципах организации местного самоуправления в Российской Федерации», первый из которых принят в конце июля 2004 г., а второй, хотя и принят в начале октября 2003 г., однако вступил в действие позже (что представляется не случайным) – лишь с 1 января 2006 г. Впрочем, в ряде регионов – например, в Ставропольском крае – закон о местном самоуправлении уже прошел активную практическую проверку и получил определенную оценку с точки зрения

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[14] См.: Абрамов В.Ф. Теория местного самоуправления на отечественной почве // Политические исследования. 1998, № 4

[15] См.: Игнатов В.Г., Бутов В.И. Местное самоуправление: российская практика и зарубежный опыт. М., 2005

как своих позитивных положений, так и тех, которые нуждаются в определенной корректировке, в том числе – и в плане его взаимного согласования, сбалансированности с определенными положениями закона о государственной службе, призванного реформировать структуру и функционирование административных органов власти в интересах их дальнейшей демократизации.

Определенная сбалансированность обоих законов обеспечивается прежде всего тем, что в их основу заложена ставшая ныне уже вполне очевидной общая идея о том, что в современных условиях не может быть создано эффективное государство без развитого гражданского общества – и наоборот, а потому реформирование государственного управления должно проводиться с оглядкой на организацию и работу структур гражданского общества, а организация и работа последних, в свою очередь – на состояние и достижения органов государственной власти.

При этом закон о государственной службе акцентирует основное внимание на четком выполнении государственными органами и их сотрудниками социальных обязательств государства по созданию организационных и правовых основ жизни и деятельности граждан в различных сферах общественных отношений – политике, экономике, культуре, науке, образовании, семье, а также по обеспечению безопасности как каждого из них, так и всего общества в целом. В нем учитывается также, что, в соответствии с Конституцией РФ, существуют три системы органов власти – федеральная, региональная (субъектов Федерации) и местное самоуправление, а потому требуется четкая разработка их полномочий и механизма их реализации в интересах обеспечения согласованного ведения дел. Ибо недоработка предшествующего законодательства в данной области, как показал повсеместный опыт российских регионов и его осмысление во множестве научных исследований и публицистических констатаций, выступает одной из основных причин сложившейся политической и социальной напряженности, а также подрыва доверия граждан ко всем уровням государственной власти. Вместе с тем, эта недоработка оказалась чревата такими негативными последствиями, как нечеткость полномочий и ответственности федеральных органов исполнительной власти, неопределенность их вза-

имоотношений с исполнительными органами субъектов РФ, а также слабость поддержки ими процесса развития системы местного самоуправления, инициатив граждан и их объединений, нарушение их неотъемлемых прав и свобод. Например, в федеральных положениях о министерствах отсутствовала четкая регламентация связей с соответствующими органами субъектов РФ, ясное распределение их полномочий и ответственности. Ни федеральными, ни региональными нормативными актами не решался также вопрос о том, как и в какой мере должны рекомендации и иные положения, разрабатываемые федеральными органами исполнительной власти, соблюдаться соответствующими органами власти субъектов федерации. Скажем, если в Положении об МВД РФ устанавливалось жесткое подчинение деятельности его структур федеральным и региональным органам власти, то в Положениях о деятельности федеральных и региональных органов Министерств труда, культуры, здравоохранения – такого подчинения не предусматривалось.

Как представляется, принятый закон о государственной службе, более гармонично соотнесенный с задачей содействия развитию гражданского общества и учета нужд и интересов граждан, позволяет более конструктивно подойти к реформированию государственного управления, основываясь на принципах целесообразности и дополнительности взаимодействия государственных и общественных структур, разработать и осуществить более эффективную систему распределения ответственности и полномочий между федеральными органами исполнительной власти, субъектами федерации и органами местного самоуправления, а также обеспечить правовой контроль за ее надлежащим функционированием и совершенствованием.

Это, разумеется, не означает, что в будущем, по мере осмысления и оценки опыта реализации основных требований данного закона, не может возникнуть необходимости его дальнейшего совершенствования и дополнения. Уже сейчас можно предположить, что такого совершенствования и дополнения потребуют те положения закона, которые призваны обеспечить заинтересованность государственных служащих всех уровней – особенно регионального – в максимальной реализации интересов общества, обеспечении прав и

свобод его граждан, в нейтрализации их подмены своими личными и групповыми (корпоративными) интересами, а также повышение персональной ответственности чиновников за принимаемые и реализуемые ими решения.

Примерно так же можно оценить и содержание нового закона о местном самоуправлении, который, содействуя реализации гражданами своего права на участие в определении и реализации задач государственного управления и развития, вместе с тем, явно нуждается уже сейчас в усилении тех положений, которые определяют условия и средства обеспечения финансовой и ресурсной базы для поддержки местных инициатив и реализующих их общественных структур, а также определяют и регулируют вмешательство органов государственной власти в их деятельность.

В целом, можно заключить, что, содействуя дальнейшей практической реализации административной и муниципальной реформ, а также их большей сбалансированности и демократической ориентации, оба закона создают необходимые юридические и политические основания для того, чтобы, следуя их требованиям, властные структуры – центральные и особенно региональные – повернулись лицом к людям и их основным потребностям и интересам и начали *плодотворное сотрудничество с широкой общественностью во всех российских регионах в искоренении таких крайне опасных для состояния самого российского государства недостатков, как равнодушие и невнимание к судьбе, правам и жизненному положению подавляющего большинства населения страны.*

Анатолий Самарин

НАУЧНОЕ СООБЩЕСТВО РОССИИ В УСЛОВИЯ ЛИБЕРАЛЬНЫХ РЕФОРМ

На судьбе российской науки самым драматичным образом сказались те неблагоприятные макросоциальные процессы, которые в течение последних двух десятилетий развертывались в мире и в нашей стране, доведя её до крайнего упадка. Эти процессы могут быть поняты лишь в непосредственной связи с натиском глобализации извне, которая слишком напоминает империалистическую экспансию. Ни западные глобалисты, ни отечественная квазиэита никак не заинтересованы в сохранении и развитии страны. С определенностью можно выявить обратное.

Из США поступают ясные ориентировки вдохновителей реформ о том, что свой порядок они собираются строить за счёт России и на обломках России, как чётко выразился Збигнев Бжезинский. В документах Международного Валютного Фонда с середины 90-х годов содержались рекомендации о троекратном снижении потенциала российской науки и образования. Во многих отношениях реформаторами это указание уже перевыполнено.

По данным доктора физико-математических наук Л. К. Фионовой, за последние пятнадцать лет:

– количество научных и проектных организаций сократилось в 7.8 раза; – конструкторских бюро – в 3.6 раза;

– научно-технических подразделений на промышленных предприятиях – в 1.8 раза;

– финансирование науки уменьшилось в 10 раз и в настоящее время в 200 раз ниже, чем в США;

– число научных сотрудников снизилось втрое, ныне оно не более 600 тысяч человек (включая и вузовскую науку- А.С.);

– средний возраст работающих в науке перевалил 60 лет.

По справедливой оценке этого же автора, «осуществляемый «реформаторами» разгром науки приведёт к тому, что в стране некому будет учить и лечить, а уровень образования населения будет падать, что сделает невозможным подъём экономики, снизит культурный уровень, качество жизни и оборонный потенциал»[1].

Совместными усилиями внешних заказчиков и внутренних лоббистов упразднения наук воспроизводство знаний было сознательно посажено на голодный паек с самого начала «демократических реформ». Так, если в 1994 г. на развитие науки предполагалось выделить 2,6% бюджетных средств, а в 2000 г – 2%, то на 2007 г. планируется лишь 0,9%. Особо впечатляет последняя, уже символическая цифра, которая появилась при самом благополучном финансовом положении страны. Но ведь, как неоднократно отмечалось экспертами, *ни разу за постсоветскую эру даже такие показатели реально не выдерживались,* фактическое финансирование оказывалось много ниже планового. Тем самым и наука, и образование в отсутствие средств были обречены властью на деградацию уже в течение десятилетий.

Происходящие сегодня в науке и образовании процессы угрожают уже не одним этим сферам, но и самому будущему России. Бывшие в недавнем прошлом гордостью страны, ее великая наука и выдающаяся система образования реально приходят в упадок, что является очевидным следствием неолиберального разрушения российской экономики, ее деиндустриализации вплоть до развала высокотехнологичных производств.

Ставка на узкую сырьевую модель развития приводит к невостребованности научных результатов, высококвалифицированных специалистов, да и всего культурного воспроизводства. Последнее привело к многочисленной эмиграции ученых и к внутренней «утечке мозгов», перетекающих в другие сферы деятельности даже в самой России. Не менее значима утрата важной технологической, геофизической, геологической и др. информации, которая ускорен-

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[1] Зачем России наука? - Круглый стол в редакции газеты «Время», № 11-12, 6 апреля 2006 г.

но выводится за рубеж. Эти потери суммарно могут быть исчислены, по меньшей мере, десятками миллиардов долларов, если не более. Наконец, деиндустриализация, демодернизация и дезинтеллектуализация российского бытия привели к снижению объективного социального спроса на образование, что заметно отразилось на его уровне, а также на общекультурном состоянии народа.

Еще меньше в научной деятельности и высокой культуре нуждается та линия на расточение и расхищение национального богатства под флагом пресловутой приватизации, которая возобладала в постсоветский период и которая подчиняет себе всю социально-экономическую сферу.

Путь зависимого, периферийного полукапитализма, по которому идёт теперь Россия, сильно напоминает латиноамериканскую модель социального изменения с концентрацией основных ресурсов в руках ничтожно малого компрадорского слоя и латифундистов, с нищетой и вырождением масс, с консервацией социальной отсталости, из которой большинство стран этого континента не могут вырваться столетиями.

Исчезновение социального слоя, кровно заинтересованного в развитии страны, формирование олигархических империй, занятых перекачкой ресурсов на Запад и озабоченных лишь вывозом капитала, предопределили негативное отношение либеральных «элит» к системам науки и образования. Ученые стали «лишними людьми» на фоне господствующих потребительских установок и целенаправленного отказа псевдоэлит от созидания. Внимание реформаторов привлекают лишь материальные ресурсы науки и вузов, в первую очередь, – в виде недвижимости, содержание научного знания они просто не в состоянии оценить. Интеллектуальные ценности и сами специалисты интересуют их лишь в том случае, если их можно немедленно продать, «толкнуть на рынке», говоря языком этой среды. Регулярно принимаются даже меры для активизации «утечки мозгов» и распродажи отечественных «ноу-хау».

Погромщики науки и просвещения руководствуются одновременно многообразной, но всегда деструктивной мотивацией. С одной стороны, добивая науку, они непосредственно исполняют указания, поступающие от западных дирижеров реформизма, с другой,

они, подобно мародёрам, жаждут поживиться на приватизации учреждений науки, их ресурсов. Наконец, потенциальное устранение учёных с общественной сцены, с их точки зрения, уменьшило бы вал критики в отношении деструктивных реформ, то есть в реформаторском накате на науку и образование присутствуют и ясные идеологические мотивы.

Двадцать лет реформаторы урезают и громят то, что создавалось веками, разбивая всю ту культурную матрицу, на которой держится уже и без того хрупкое национально-государственное единство. Делают это они вполне целенаправленно, в условиях, когда противниками запущен проект «распада» Российской Федерации.

До настоящего времени, хотя и сильно обветшавший, бастион академической науки ещё уцелел, и, кроме того, сохраняется высшая школа с остатками её научного потенциала. Они то и обозначены как очередные и главные мишени для атаки.

Групповой корыстный интерес компрадорских группировок, как указывалось выше – не единственная мотивация к разрушению академического мира. Есть мощный социальный заказ извне со стороны внешнеполитических конкурентов на интеллектуальное ослабление России. Основные идейные вдохновители реформаторов в лице МВФ и Всемирного банка в своих рекомендациях на снижение научного потенциала нашей страны были более чем настойчивы и последовательны, начиная с середины 1990-х гг. В первую очередь отсюда возникали те радикальные проекты «реформирования» этих сфер, которые, как из рога изобилия, появлялись в течение последнего десятилетия. Их общий знаменатель сводился всегда к тому, чтобы приватизировать весь имущественный комплекс этих областей жизни и перевести на рыночное «самофинансирование» то, что, либо по своей природе не продаваемо (как, например, фундаментальная наука), либо то, что, при ограниченной платежеспособности населения России, не сможет выжить в рыночных условиях (образование).

Цели зарубежных инициаторов смертельной хирургии (а ясно, что летальные решения по нашей науке принимаются там) состоят в том, чтобы, во-первых, в итоге разгрома получить дополнительно кадровое приращение за счет эмиграции учёных и преподавателей,

во-вторых, добиться критического ослабления интеллектуального и оборонного потенциала страны. Там прекрасно понимают, что до тех пор, пока сохраняются его крупные секторы науки и образования точка «невозврата» в инволюции современной России не пройдена.

Да, «оборонка», развалена, но есть ещё люди, знающие как её восстановить. Да, кадры во многих стратегически важных сферах деквалифицировались, но ещё можно подготовить новые. Ликвидация же целого социального пласта, способного сделать это, и есть сверхзадача новейшей псевдореформы. Если связать развитие подобного процесса с развертыванием иностранных военных баз вблизи и по всей периферии нашей территории, то решения по науке всё больше напоминают спецоперацию по снижению нашей обороноспособности перед лицом возрастающих рисков агрессии.

Упразднение науки в России означает на практике сведение национально-государственной безопасности к нулю. Только смена стратегических целей государства: возвращение на путь отстаивания национальных интересов, развитие реального сектора экономики на базе высокотехнологичного производства позволит востребовать науку и образование, и даст шанс на сохранение российской цивилизации.

Любимая реформаторами М. Тэтчер однажды изрекла, имея в виду именно Россию: «Нация, которая пренебрегает своей наукой, обречена». Преобразователей это не смутило, как, впрочем, и г-жу Тэтчер, вполне удовлетворенную тем, по ее словам, что «Россия больна, она умирает». Уже одного систематического недофинансирования было вполне достаточно для исчезновения русской науки в течение ближайшего десятилетия, но кто-то из заказчиков счел необходимым поторопить реформаторов и приступить к более активному выметанию из России (как из обреченного «государства-неудачника») ее интеллектуального и культурного потенциала. Преобразовательные пароксизмы, «концепции», продвигавшиеся в течение последних двух лет, возымели необходимое действие: «утечка мозгов» только за текущий год выросла, по экспертным оценкам, примерно на 20 % по сравнению с предыдущим, что, вероятно, входит в планы изобретателей «концепций». Подобно загонщикам на охоте они гонят свою квалифицированную «добычу» в очень определенную сторону – в эмиграцию.

Все это означает, что все разговоры о внедрении инновационных технологий и грядущем в связи с этим подъеме производства беспочвенны: крах науки и просвещения поставит крест на любых планах модернизации, включая и остро необходимую модернизацию обороны. Не понимать этого даже неолибералы, читающие хотя бы М.Тэтчер, не могут, сохранение института науки и тем паче образования – есть сегодня условие национального существования. Следовательно, те, кто атакует область производства знаний, в сохранении страны и народа явно не заинтересованы. Некоторые из зарубежных и даже наших экспертов говорят о происходящем как о спецоперациях по интеллектуальному разоружению России перед лицом назревающих угроз. Похоже, что мы имеем дело с развертыванием самой серьезной из таких операций после разрушения СССР и разгрома отечественного ВПК.

Пока сохраняется культурная матрица, заложенная в том узком слое, который связан с производством и воспроизводством знаний, большинство чудовищных потерь последних двадцати лет (за исключением человеческих) может быть восполнено. С утратой этой матрицы будет необратимо потеряно едва ли не все. Вот почему дебаты вокруг судьбы науки и образования в современной России приобрели столь серьезный размах, и вот почему российские ученые, в том числе и виднейшие – представители самых разных направлений научного знания, от философии до физики и математики, а также работники сферы отечественного образования столь жестко, остро и нелицеприятно – обсуждают волнующие их социальные и организационные вопросы нынешнего состояния и перспектив развития российской научной и образовательной сфер жизнедеятельности современного российского общества. Ибо речь сегодня идет зачастую о невежественном, недальновидном уничтожении того дела, которому была посвящена жизнь многих поколений ученых, более того – о гибели величайшего культурного континента, сосредоточенного в научных и образовательных институтах. Развалом научно-образовательных институтов под сомнение ставится фактически наше коллективное существование как самостоятельной цивилизации.

Ivan Katzarski

BULGARIA IN ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA

Bridges between cultures in the first place presuppose mutual knowledge of each other.

During the post-communist period, the interest in Bulgaria on the part of western and world mass media has increased significantly. Their attention has been attracted mainly by the political changes and especially by the moments of severe social and political crises related to them. During/In* the last few* years the interest in our country has increased because of its accession to NATO and the real possibility for EU membership. Particularly during the current year, Bulgaria has gained quite a negative image among western mass media as a place where corruption and organized crime flourish and state authorities are either not willing or lack the capacity to cope with them.

Here I have made an attempt to reconstruct Bulgaria's image the way it is shaped in a milieu different from that of mass media, that is what makes the country popular and how it is presented in academic milieu. Formulated in this way, the topic has many aspects and it is impossible for one researcher to cover it, especially in a study of this type. I decided to make my task simpler and analyze Bulgaria's image as presented in Encyclopedia Britannica (Ultimate Reference Suite on DVD, 2005). The advantages of this source determining my choice are: (1) it contains a large amount of information concerning all significant phenomena; (2) there is ample evidence about Bulgaria and Bulgarians referring to various spheres of academic treatment; (3) the representativeness and authoritativeness of the source are unquestionable; (4) the last electronic edition of the encyclopedia is very convenient to use.

The present reconstruction is based on an analysis of the following types of information units: articles, parts of articles, images and multimedia.

Table 1

**Information units containing evidence about Bulgaria,
Bulgarians and everything concerning them.**

	Number
Basic author's (signed) articles on Bulgaria	4
Unsigned articles on Bulgarian realia and phenomena	96
Paragraphs presenting Bulgarian realia and phenomena within articles concerning non-Bulgarian issues	77
Paragraphs or short articles where the mentioning of Bulgaria is rather neutral in relation to whatever image	451
Images (including charts and diagrams)	9
Multimedia	5

There are four author's (signed) articles on Bulgaria in Encyclopaedia Britannica: the major article „Bulgaria" (by Francis W. Carter, University of London and John D. Bell, University of Maryland, Baltimore|); "Year in Review 2003: Bulgaria" (from Richard J. Crampton); "Boris I" (Wassil T. Gjuzelev, University of Sofia`); "Bulgarian literdture" (Liliana Brisby, free lance editor and writer on East European affairs). Most unsigned articles are short. The greatest number of them deals with Bulgarian towns (31) and persons (32). Besides the specially designed articles for Bulgaria and Bulgarians, they often appear in the following contexts: Balkans, Byzantine Empire, Ottoman Empire, Eastern Orthodoxy, Slavs, Slavonic language and culture, modern history of the Balkan countries and European history.

Further on I will attempt to present the main features characterizing the image of Bulgaria and the Bulgarians according to Encyclopedia Britannica.

Bulgarian nature. Plains, mountains, valleys, rivers, lakes, the Black Sea and its gulfs, climate, soil and mineral resources are revealed. Emphasis is laid on the variety of Bulgarian nature. Close association between nature and economy is typical. Industrial development of the country after World

War II (metallurgy, machinery construction, chemistry) has been recorded but the branches assigning Bulgaria a special place on the international scale are possible only in the unique nature and climate of the country. On the international scale Bulgaria is famous for its grape and wine production, rose plantations and rose oil production; it is also known as a tobacco, vegetable and fruit growing country. Marble extraction and processing have also been pointed out. Bulgaria is also mentioned as a tourist country which is linked, of course, also to its natural landmarks (nice beeches, beautiful mountains) and to its cultural and historical heritage.

Technical innovations. As truly Bulgarian such have not been mentioned. Bulgaria is indicated as a place where ancient peoples have developed metallurgy and gold and copper processing (V c. BC). According to the Encyclopaedia, John Atanasoff was the inventor of the first electronic computer. He is presented as an American physicist and mathematician from Iowa State College without mentioning his ethnic Bulgarian origin.

The Bulgarian Language. The history of language has been traced back, its special place in the Slavonic language family has been revealed as well as similarities and differences in comparison to the languages of the other Balkan peoples have been pointed out.

Folk culture. Single, although short articles, depict the Bulgarian dance horo and the national folk instrument gusla. Special attention has been paid to the Bulgarian rhythm, variety of musical metre, which according to the Encyclopedia has influenced some works of XX c. composers such as Bela Bartoc and Igor Stravinsky. Bulgaria is mentioned as a country where fire walking is practiced. Bulgaria is among the countries where late heroic poetry has been written – an epic about the heroic deeds of tsars and heroes presented orally accompanied by a stringed instrument. This kind of epic genre is almost died out in modern times but the ancient tradition „is still alive among certain illiterate and semiliterate peoples living in remote communities. In the late 19th and 20th centuries a wealth of new heroic literature was collected from native storytellers".

State and political history. This has been a key issue considered in a great number of articles. In its essence, it assigns a historical significance to Bulgaria on a regional (Balkan) and European level. One gets a firm impression of this significance being much more apparent during the pre-Ottoman period. Even a small number of titles in the historical section of

the article „Bulgaria" – "The First Bulgarian Empire", "The Second Bulgarian Empire" are indicative of that. Samuel's state has also been called an empire stretching from the Adriatic to the Black Sea. The nationalistic dream "Bulgaria touching three seas" has become reality only during the pre-Ottoman*** period. At that time Bulgarian elites have not only won remarkable military victories but have also demonstrated instances of great and skillful diplomacy and a capacity to carry out an important cultural mission among the Slavonic countries.

The time of the Third Bulgarian state definitely seems pale against this background. As a whole, the impressions one gets about that period are not that favorable: after the liberation "Bulgarian government did little to encourage industrialization, preferring to use the state budget for finance the growth of bureaucracy and to maintain as powerful army as possible in the hope of territorial expansion. Bulgarian military expenditures on a per capita basis were the highest in Europe and brought the country the reputation of being the Prussia on the Balkans". The firs accomplishments after the Liberations (the Unificaton between Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, the victory in the Serb-Bulgarian War) were followed by military catastrophes. The first of them (The Second Balkan War, 1913) which actually prepares the following (the unfortunate involvement in World War I) to a great extent was prearranged for reasons of diplomacy: by „the great mistake of Bulgarian diplomacy to organize a war against the Ottoman Empire without first clearly resolving" the competing claims of the allies. The country keeps lagging behind compared to the West. The parties have no clear identity and rather resemble "partnerships for the exploitations of power". Authoritarian and later totalitarian governments appeared, at some points having a repulsive bloody physiognomy.

The presentation of the communist period in Bulgaria is equivocal. On the one hand there are the severe repressions immediately after overthrowing of the former regime, the massive violation of democracy, repressions not only against political opponents but against ethnic minorities, religious groups and institutions, and forcing the country to become a most faithful satellite of the Soviet Union. An unique trait in Bulgarian political history is the attempt at staging a coup against Todor Zhivkov (1965) – "the first ever within a communist regime". On the other hand, the accelerated industrialization of the country leading to substantial increase of life standard and

culture of the greater part of the population is considered as a positive process. After World War II Bulgarian villages "have undergone a transformation from sleepy, backward, and poverty stricken settlements that typified much of the region for centuries. Almost all of the rural population lives in villages supplied with water and electricity; three quarters of the houses are recent constructions, replacing the older lath and plaster structures, most of the villages have paved and asphalted streets. Processing plants have been built in many villages, so that rural areas are increasingly industrialized". Besides this the state provides "free education at all levels", "a free medical assistance of all types", even cultural development of the regions. The negative aspect of industrialization, environmental pollution, has also been stated. At the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s most indicators (yearly nitric and sulphur oxide emissions) show that environmental pollution in Bulgaria is at the level characteristic of Eastern Europe and at a much higher level compared to Western Europe (the latter however has a higher level of carbon dioxide emissions per capita compared to Bulgaria).

In fact, systematic observation of Bulgaria (history, economics, administration, culture, etc.) in the Encyclopaedia end up about 1991-1992[1]. This generates a serious problem concerning the actuality of presentation. The reader gets the impression of Bulgaria as a country running quite a booming economy controlled by the state, providing free education and health care, etc. It looks like phenomena such as inflation and unemployment have emerged just now. This is definitely not true concerning nowadays. The profound transformation in Bulgarian society in the last 15 years has not been presented. Consequently, one can be quite astonished jumping from the impression of the beginning of the 90s to the picture of the country in 2003 (the last year of review in the Encyclopaedia. The peaceful and prospering society under state control proves to be stricken by corruption and organized crime and the administration is unable or does not want to handle the problem.

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[1] It cannot be said that this is a demonstration of a particular attitude towards the country. Systematic observation of Romania, Greece and Turkey also ends up somewhere at the beginning or the middle of the 90s. Countries that sprang up from the division of Yugoslavia seem to be "privileged" in this respect. This dissolution, the conflicts and the resulting wars obviously could not have been left without consideration.

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Literature and cultural heritage. In this sphere too, accomplishments of European and world impact are due to cultural elites of pre-Ottoman times. Centers of Slavonic literature and culture were established in the country which play an important role in the mission of incorporating the Slavonic world into Christianity and civilization. The onset of the Bogomil movement (quite a long article in the Encyclopaedia has been devoted to it) is also indicative of the intensity of the social and cultural processes going on in the country; it has spread far beyond the confines of Bulgaria including Western Europe as well. On this background the New-Bulgarian literature and cultural heritage have been revealed by processes and accomplishments important to the country but not on a universal scale. In literature, as well as in the other spheres, the country rather makes up for the lagging behind, acquires European models.

A big drawback of the article on Bulgarian literature is that its development has been presented in detail just to the beginning of the communist period (1944). А следващите десетилетия съвсем не са били безплодни.

Careers. The Encyclopaedia makes the impression that nowadays a Bulgarian could achieve great accomplishments exceeding the national boundaries in the sphere of sports allowing direct competition and standardized measurement of the score. Leading positions that Bulgaria has had in sports like weight lifting, running, volleyball, sambo have been mentioned. Special attention has been paid to Naim Suleimanoglu whose personality and success have been discussed in quite an unusually detailed article. One could hardly find a reasonable answer what has generated this special treatment.

In the field of science and culture it turns out that Bulgarians could achieve widespread popularity if they work out of the country and more precisely in the West. The inventor of the first computer (1939) John Vincent Atanasoff has been presented just as an American physicist and mathematician. In the sphere of arts and spiritual life, universal significance is attributed only to Christo Javacheff's environmental sculpture, Julia Kristeva's works and the performances of "Le mystere des voix bulgares". All of these cases relate to creative works and projects realized in the West, in a non-Bulgarian cultural environment. Only tame will show however how long their fame will last.

Странно защо в полезрението на Енциклопедията не са попаднали например имената на световно известни оперни певци като Boris Christoff, Nikolay Geuroff, Rayna Kabaivanska и др.

If we ignore the obvious drawbacks pointed out, the picture of Bulgaria presented in Encyclopaedia Britannica could be accepted as correct. The name of Bulgaria is associated with two categories of phenomena – the first has to do with the national history and culture, the second go beyond this context and carry a more universal implication, regional and European significance. We cannot miss the fact that the second category of phenomena on the one hand we owe to generosity of nature and on the other – to achievements of people and generations belonging to the remote past. The perspective of Bulgaria's integration into the EU, I would like to believe, is a chance to expand the horizons of Bulgarian society and culture and to overcome the provincialism typical of the period of New Bulgarian history (the way it actually is in the history of the other Balkan nations during that same period).

Latjo Latev

THE TRANSFIGURATION OF
THE BULGARIAN SPIRIT DURING
THE LAST TWO CENTURIES

There is a great deal of hesitation when the phrase "Bulgarian spirit" is used. It is not certain if there is any such thing at all and if there is – what it means. If there is, indeed, it is something quite ambivalent, filled with mutually exclusive features. In the beginning of the 19th century Sofronius complains as a martyr about the outrages of the Ottomans. Later on Botev supports him as well. But roughly around the same time period P. R. Slaveikov illustrates pictures of peaceful co-existence of Bulgarians and Ottomans in the villages of Stara Zagora. Also, there is a conspicuous contrast between the elevated revolutionary rhetoric of Rakovski, Karavelov, Botev and the impartiality of the common Bulgarian people. Furthermore, many of the participants in the April Revolt and the battalions of Botev were betrayed by Bulgarians. Thus, there is hardly such a thing as a uniform "Bulgarian spirit". But when such is mentioned, it is probably assumed of the spiritual manifestations of such rank that are important for the meaningful historic events. For example, the aspirations of the spiritually elevated representatives of the Bulgarian people to national and political emancipation virtually result in what we call Liberation with capital L.

Another point of the conceptual instability is the use of the predicate "National" for the "spirit". It is hard to tell what exactly is outstanding or special in the Bulgarian or any other national spirit. In the attempt to do that there is always the chance to either go into exaggerated generalization or excessive individualization. For example, we often hear claims that Bulgarians like something, but whatever this something is it obviously cannot be liked by every single Bulgarian. In the same way the claim that Bulgar-

ians are characterized by some trait (like hospitality and diligence) can be a claim of every nation.

It seems obvious that the most substantial element of a national spiritual culture is the national language. Along with it, prominent national forms can be found in folklore (music, dances). At the same time there are other spiritual manifestations which can hardly be added to the national forms but have a substantial meaning in the national life. They are related to the historic events and have a program value. They create a perspective of the historic activity. These are ideas and concepts which guide the national aspirations in a particular direction. They are declared by historians as an expression of the common collective will. It might be said that as emanation of the national aspirations and interests they are first line of the historic eventfulness, although they are on a second line in the collective memory and the traditional national customs.

In our history the road to national Renaissance is the beginning of such a program. At first this is the cry of Paisius and later on of Sofronius and other early writers of the Bulgarian national revival. With this cry a program for ethno-national self-determination rises; for the recognition of the Bulgarian national identity. It is accentuated on the awakening of the Bulgarian self-awareness, because it, exactly, was menaced by erasure because of the spreading of the Greek culture amongst the Bulgarians.

Later, for a few decades in the 19th century this program undergoes certain transformations. With the bringing in of elements of reform in the conservative Ottoman Empire the Bulgarian writers of national revival see the need and the opportunity the Bulgarian national self-determination to be secured institutionally. This happens under the form of an aspiration to acquire spiritually national independence. Remarkable in this case is that the religious affiliation becomes a represent of the national affiliation. Eventually with this trick the program turns out to be working and in the beginning of the 70s Bulgarians achieve independent Bulgarian church.

At the same time another program is activated – the program of the national independence on political basis. It is an initiative of the revolutionaries – Rakovski, Karavelov, Levski, Botev. The efforts result in the April revolt, which as a revolt is a failure to the program, but inductively leads to its ultimate success because of the attention it attracts from the outside world.

After the Liberation the national ideal again undergoes a transformation with correspondence to the current reality. Because parts of the Bulgarian people remain outside of the borders of the newly formed country the new ideal is unification of all the Bulgarians. With the price of many victims and a few national catastrophes this ideal is unsuccessfully fought for until the end of the Second World War.

After the War a new transformation of national ideals and goals occurs – for creating a society with social equality. In the context of the geopolitical and other realities of the time this seems to be a lost cause. A torturous transition follows which is undefined with regard to the national ideas or ideals. But eventually the image that stands out and becomes more and more actual is the image of Europe. This turns out to be a relatively unifying idea which was being widely discussed in different forums.

Regarding the last two centuries, the Bulgarian idea of Europe has different aspects. Mainly it is about a political stereotype. This is because of the assumption that the European status of the social process is the highest standard and as such is worth following. When Paisius appeals to Bulgarians to realize the importance of their national identity he intuitively makes his point on the basis of the European concept that it is the right of each person and nation to determine their own status in national, ethnical, and religious aspect.

Secondly, Europe is an economic model. It is the synonym of economic prosperity which has no better alternative as a perspective of the more slowly developing European communities.

Thirdly, the following of the European model has a moral importance as well. It is an overcoming of some historic social injustice, establishment of a more just condition or realization of some virtues.

It is notable that there is a particular historic dynamics in the development of the image of Europe in the Bulgarian culture. During the Bulgarian Renaissance and up to the 20s of the 20th century it was almost an exact pattern to follow. During the 30s there is some adjustment of the model to the Bulgarian reality. During that period the idea of the importance of the national culture prevails and thus an uncertainty that the European model should be followed in its every single aspect occurs. Regretfully, with the coming of the Second World War this tendency died away, and especially under the weight of the new all-embracing social

experiment. Also, in modern times, regretfully, this tendency is almost forgotten and the image of Europe is again most often a cliché which guides all national aspirations. This is probably the case because the current image of Europe to Bulgarians is marked with the same abstraction as it was two centuries ago. Often in speeches the perception of Unified Europe is the perception of the "normal countries", with disregard to the fact, that in the European Union there are such differences, that the separate countries cannot define each other as normal. The "normality" here is very abstract, a fact that often serves political manipulations. It is much more serious to study particular aspects at the edge of compatibility and the opportunities for a common European identity, as we strive to do in scientific forums as this one.

Hristina Ambareva

IMAGE-MAKING AND PERSONAL IDENTITY

The purpose of this presentation is to show what are the basic elements used in the construction of personal image and how they create the power of personal image.

The word "image" has come into Bulgarian language (with transcription [imidg]) as part of the international vocabulary and is used in the meaning "deliberately chosen vision of oneself and the related behavior/appearance consistent with this vision".

"Image-making" means that a man constructs and follows a desired image of himself and tries to behave in a way that harmonizes with this image. The presence of "image" is associated mainly with business and commercial arts. It is explained as self-positioning on the market or as aesthetic self-presentation. This concept however affects all spheres of human life, because always and everywhere there have been a strong dependence of identity on image.

It is often said that there are two major ways for a man to know who she/he is: by looking at his/her image in the mirror or by knowing what others think of him/her. The image in the mirror reflects our appearance. The image in the public's eyes reflects our reputation. In the first case, we speak about the image literary and in the second – metaphorically.

In both cases, we strive to achieve the ideal parameters of one desired image of oneself that includes a vision how we would like to look and be in other people's eyes. This is strife for identity, as well.

All you know that personal identity is a very complex structure. Huntington enumerated nearly 50 factors that influence the description of personal identity. Some of these factors are: age, gender, race, language, religion, nationality, ethnic factor, place of birth and life – region or continent, political orientation, profession, industry, social environment and

social status and many others. He separated six major types of identity: prescribed, cultural, territorial, political, economic and social identity.[1]

In my presentation here I want to concentrate on culture as a factor, which influences understanding of personal identity and more specially – description of personal identity. However I won't speak about spatial parameters of culture, about its geographical dimensions, but about its changes in time and the influence of these changes on the ways for description of human personality. This is a step to the understanding of how image-making combines deeply rooted in human history symbols and beliefs.

According to the anthropologists human cultural history has developed from the pre-literacy times of oral culture, throughout the literacy time of written culture to the post-literacy world of "image" culture today.

These periods of culture are really real, but they are also quite conventional too, because the time frame of oral culture for example is not strictly situated by the time of 1500-1700. There are societies, tribes, whose cultural tradition is still transmitted by oral communication. Only 60 years ago I know that in one town of Bulgaria, Koprivshtitsa, the news was announced by a public crier.

On the other side, first writings appeared 5000 years ago (cuneiform and Egyption hieroglyphs). Written culture was not developed then because first of all, the complexity of the scripts made the general literacy difficult. They were understood only by the limited circle of people – scribes, officials, doctors, priests. Even the first drawings date from thousands of years ago. So it obligatory to specify that oral, written and image elements of human culture always have existed together. However one of them dominates in certain time and society.

1.What are the main features of oral tradition and what follows from them for the description of identity?

1. Knowledge transmitted by this tradition is subjective. It is always told by someone who we know – grandmother, grandfather, parents, priest, doctors, officials and no difference between knowledge and the one who

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[1] Хънтингтън, С. (2004) Кои сме ние?

knows is made. So, the knowledge conveyed by oral tradition is a question of belief, trust, suggestion or influence, not of analytical proof.

2. The main carrier of oral tradition is language. This is a culture of sound and hearing. The relevant instrument for identification of a man depends on sound and hearing too – this is the name. In this respect, the ethimology of the Chinese hieroglyph for "name" is very indicative. The hieroglyph is composed of two symbols, the symbol of "darkness" and the symbol of "mouth". That is to say, the name is equal to the voice by which someone recognizes you in the darkness. Name is generally perceived as a carrier of a identification, which people recognize by its very hearing.

3. Knowledge transmitted by oral tradition is always situational – it is about experience and everyday living. This knowledge is always contextual – as the information is related directly either to some ritual, holiday, celebration of growth, or to some other social event, it has obvious relation to practice and fulfils clearly set purposes in the life of community. The power of word under these circumstances is enormous, because in the mind of man words equals things and this reflects directly the symbolic power of name: name equals existence.

The symbolic importance of a person's name is manifested clearly in the anthropologists' descriptions of taboos concerning naming traditions. In some cases, for example, personal names are kept in secret, because of the belief that knowing the real name of something/someone means controlling it. Fear exists that the knowledge of a personal name could be used in vicious magic. In some societies, there are strict rules of addressing one's own husband, wife and respective relatives-in-law without mentioning their given names.[2] In China it was forbidden for example to write and pronounce the names of Chinese emperor and his ancestors.[3] There were also taboos with regard to the deceased relatives, whose names for some periods had not to be uttered.

All these taboos, bright traces of which exist in our highly advanced rational civilization, give prominence to the strong power the name pos-

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[2] Frazer, Sir James George, The Golden Bough, § 2. Names of Relations tabooed, http://www.bartleby.com/196/56.html

[3] Naming taboo, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naming_taboo; http://www.answers.com/topic/naming-taboo

sesses over human mind. The following are some points that describe the belief in the symbolic power of name:

1. The thing that has a name is more important than a nameless thing. To deprive you of your name is a severe moral punishment. To have no name means to be cast out of society, beyond the borders of human culture and humanity as well. A nameless thing is dangerous.

2. The sound of a name calls for identity and lots of sounds were forbidden as sounds of the evil. The name, it is superstitiously believed, expresses an essence to such extent that it calls for the existence it signifies. Even now the commandment of not mentioning in vain the name of God is respected.

3. It is much easier to change a name, than to change the negative message the sound of this name is associated with. It is very popular practice for musicians or actors at the beginning of their career to choose brightly sounding names and make their professional identities associated with the message of these names.

4. How destination or man's inner nature is believed to be given in his name is obvious in the fact that man is still explained in terms of his/her name by some popular mantic practices. There are names that are considered unsuitable for someone or something, just because they do not correspond to the anticipated nature or purpose of the thing that should be named. A simple example, it is not appropriate to give to a boy a female name. This directly reflects the conviction that the name is of essential importance for the adequate description of personal identity and violating this rule can invoke disorientation and problems.

5. There is a strong suggestion in taboo traditions, that the name spoken by voice is generally approved, because according to the common belief only what is locked in silence could be dangerous.

How these beliefs affects the contemporary image-making? They result in several simple rules:

1. The name is a symbol of existence. So, in order to exist, you need a name.

2. The name should be "good" and adequate. The adequate name is of essential importance for the description of personal or brand identity. Name is a mark of character – of nobility or disgrace. The

power of a "good" name, allows the use of the name as an equivalent substitution for any written agreement. The good name is associated with truthfulness and commitment to any engagement created on the base of oral word. So, the efforts of image-making to explore the resources of the "good name" are justified by the moral code of oral communication.

3. The name that is not well-known looks suspicious. The book that is not reviewed in a popular edition does not seem so valuable. The aim of any advertising campaign is make the name popular and familiar. To create the deceptive impression of personal attitude to something it is necessary to repeat the name of this thing as many times, as it is necessary to make the name sound familiar. This is part of the suggestive mechanism of advertising campaigns. Popular name wins over the unknown one, because it is better situated in a familiar set of associations. This set fights successfully against fear and suspicion and helps the name to be associated with distinct values of life.

2. What is the contribution of written culture to the description of identity and how it supports the symbolism in image-making?

Although the first writings appeared 5000 years ago, the slow and difficult process of reproducing writings and books keeps them away from the illiterate multitude for centuries. At the beginning written tradition was only developed in particular institutions and only some classes had admission to it (religious institutions, monasteries, universities; the highest stratum of society)

The real upswing of written culture comes no sooner than the invention of printing press (in 1436 by Johann Gutenberg) and the increased percentage of educated people. Then the availability of books and newspapers grows quickly and gradually creates the world of "information".

Written culture is a culture of signs. Its major carrier is the written word. And written culture needs people, who are trained to understand and recreate it.

In contrast to the oral tradition, when man lives through a culture in the everyday experience, during the time of written culture, man informs

about culture(s). Acquaintance with cultural tradition pushes the "knowing person" to isolation in the library or cabinets. My point here is that written knowledge turns things into concepts, into signs as well. Things become subjects of analysis. Researchers and explorers get acquainted with things, not necessarily being involved in them.

How this affects the concept of identity?

Name is still a symbol of existence, but existence is already mediated by signs. So, to exist now means to have your name written in the social registers. Verification and consequently falsification of identity adopts specific dimensions; identity is not verified unless there is a sign to prove it.

The technique of writing transfers identity from the full-blooded life to the page and, nevertheless formal and conventional, it proves a useful instrument to confirm or represent identity beyond limited space and time.

Written culture creates person's graphological identity (in terms of handwriting and signature), which is easy – literary – to preserve and carry in space. Graphological expertise allows experts to identify for example, Charles Dickens' handwriting and signature and this way to testify for the authenticity of a document.

I would like you to pay attention to the abbreviated signatures, called "Manu propria", which from Latin means "signed with one's own hand". In the Middle Ages Manu propria was widely used to testify authenticity of hand written documents. This kind of abbreviation is still used in Bulgaria as a confirmation of personal identity along with hand written signatures. I think that this clearly testifies about the presence of strong written tradition in our society even on the threshold of the new digital age.

Signature as a sign of identity opens new sources of symbolism. Meeting a famous person, many people are eager to ask for autograph. The one who has obtained a signature (autograph) of a famous book-writer, tennis-player after his bright victory, music star feels special. Giving and taking autographs becomes a ritual of communication and then benevolent attention to a person takes her/him out of anonymity and directs to her/him a small beam of somebody else's glory. Receiving autographs is met with great deal of emotion – autograph is a kind of ownership of a piece of one's identity. It is a symbolic appropriation of some features of this identity, too.

The personal signature suggests personal attitude in the time of written communication, when distance between people is growing and becomes a source of alienation and social anonymity. In the time of written culture benevolent attitude of a famous person paying attention to a man is an important event. Autograph presents a symbolic connection between people. The book, signed by its author, does not change in content, but the owner of the book believes that the attitude of the very book to him has changed.

How image-making uses the symbolism of signature?

1. When the signs create signature not only for a person, but also for a company or brand, it becomes a symbol of style, quality, quantity, mark of status and social environment. People who use products that bear the signature (for example, the logo of "Adidas" on clothes or the sign of expensive designers on the suit) often do this in order to show their personal commitment to the demonstrated by the brand style of life, status and so on. In this case, the appropriation of the symbolic power of the signature of already established and strengthened brands helps in building a personal image. It is not only true that in the contemporary epoch people eat images, sleep on images, dress in images[4], but also that by means of these images people create their own image. They identify with the brand of shoes and suits they wear, with the symbols of identity of their consumable environment.

2. The success in making personal image can be measured by the extent in which one's signature (or logo) appears as meaningful symbol of identity, which somebody else will wish to sleep on, dress with, wear or demonstrate in public and make a part of its own personal (feeling of) identity.

3. Symbolism of signature provides a reliable and common technology for transmission of information that overcomes here-and-now of situation and proves capable to create invisible connections among people by means of recognizable signatures. Logo of a brand becomes a source of a group identity.

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[4] Rosen, Christine 2005, "The Image Culture," in The New Atlantis, Number 10, Fall 2005, pp. 27-46.", http://www.thenewatlantis.com/archive/10/rosen.htm

3. What is the contribution of image-culture to the description of identity and in the symbolism of image-making?

Image culture:

1. Image-culture is an image-based culture.

Development of contemporary image-culture begins after the invention of camera in 19 century and with the devices for fast multiplication of images. Now images are major carriers of information and are the most important part of the "language' of visual media.

1. Image culture is also a media culture. The image culture, as well as the written culture, does not create direct cultural experience like oral tradition and cultural experience is predominantly situated in the world of images, imagination and simulations. So the demand of active cultural life is substituted by the demand of images associated with video-products. We still have some real cultural experience, but the range of virtual cultural experience is growing.

2. The value of knowledge in the conditions of image culture is quite ambiguous. In the time of oral culture people were believers – they believed what they were told by the priestman; written culture allowed people to be analytical thinkers that rationally, by means of arguments, decided about truth and lie. In the time of image culture images as a source of knowledge are neither objective, not subjective source of information. They are reality, which is a question of vision. And, of course, technological equipment. So people nowadays have to learn to be skeptic even about what they see by their own eyes.

Image:

When in the 19th century the camera was invented and the first photographs were made, there was no doubt that the image represents truly and untouched the real object. So, in the time of image culture image should be a carrier of the idea of reality.

However, the fame of photography increased when it became clear that this technology allows the manipulation of pictures[5]. It allows even to simulate realities. Sometimes images are true representations of real-

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[5] Sontag, S. 1978, On photography

ity; sometimes they represent "imagined realities". Anyway, now documents for personal identification are not considered valid without image attached to them.

What speaks the symbolism of images?

1. Photos are not just representations, but a powerful source of suggestions and values.

The modern techniques of retouching and beautification of photos for example, changed significantly the value system of societies with developed media-culture. The mass production of aesthetically retouched photos imports aesthetic values in the everyday life of society. And like the moral values, aesthetic values are aggressive. They are not meant for contemplation and relax, they actually influence and change behavior.

2. Once we said that books are our window to the world. Well, now this window are images. Images always have been used and now are used, too, as a kind of symbolic codes that become windows to entirely new worlds. Even one image is powerful enough to open a new horizon of thought.

3. Having a photo of a person is some kind of "possession" of this person[6].

How image-making uses the symbolic power of images?

1. Images as a source of values make image-making a profound value of image-culture. Image-culture turns the high-rated art of retouching photos into the art of retouching identity. Images are a source of imagined identity and the images of the "stars" (musicians, actors) are the brightest example of imagined identities. They perfectly demonstrate the illusion of having rich, richer, richest cultural experience and experience of activity, knowledge, moral, belief, life in a time when life of every ordinary person suffers the luck of cultural experience. We live in a reality full of images that symbolize quality of life and the strife to achieve quality of life now becomes a strife for personal image.

2. The symbolic power of image to open windows and horizons of thought is used in the image-making as a successful way to create connections between a brand and some famous stories, symbols or myths. The popularity and the influence of these symbols and myths becomes associated with the

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[6] Sontag, S. 1978, On photography

popularity and influence of the brand. A good example is how the brand of Coca-Cola builds its image by means of the great myth for Santa Claus.

3. Images incite a desire for consummation and possession. They make the one who possesses or consumes them to feel oneself as a part of imagined stories, experience, myths. So attractive images of youht, beauty, happiness, health are "attached" to goods, brands, and people in order to make them an object of desire.

ID cards

If we think for a moment about the content of our present ID cards, we can see that the identifying information in them consists of our name, our signature and some text-information, and our photographical image.

No matter how common and routine their presence may seem, name, signature and image are more than just formal means for confirmation of our identity. We have got used so much to the convention of having personal name or recognizing ourselves in signs or numbers, as well as pointing at a picture and to saying "that is me", that we have forgotten how name, written sign and image have a separate history of their own.

These means of identification have developed in the course of human cultural history. Initially they come from different cultural contexts and in this way they represent not only particular signs of our identity, but distinguished symbols in the periods of culture, when they are considered main carriers of identity, produced by the predominant character of communication.

Nowadays, we can be interested in the individual importance of each of these cultural phenomena. An identity can be described in terms of name, sign(ature) or image. On the other hand, we are witnessing the scope of their combined power. Image-making, as a major value in today's media world, includes these three main elements, each calling for identity. In the use of these identifying elements image-making strives to intensify and to benefit from their combined symbolic power, deeply rooted in the history of human values and beliefs.

Identity as a product of image-making now is a combination of a name (chosen for the sake of euphony), a sign, a retouched appearance and a retouched reputation. And the success in making an image is measured by the extent to which the name turns into a legend, the sign tells exiting stories and the image makes a good show. So identity becomes a promoter of values and people wish to wear, to eat, to use, to sleep on it.

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Ivan Bozukov

GLOBALIZATION – A NEW SHELTER OF TURNED OVER LEFT THINKING

In the basis of this text are containing two interlinked hypothesis:

1) Contemporary world is not post-ideological, and, at all not – non-ideological!

2) Today we are witnesses of unprecedented triumf of left thinking, wich "concealed" itself behind paternal phraseology of pseudo-right values!

Actually, what did exactly happen in 1989? May be the answer is as surprising as banal – nothing special. Presented just till now as

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"fatal",

"braking out",

even "revolutional"!...

</div>

for the countries from Central and East Europe 1989 became nothing more than "storm in the cup of water"!

It was happen so, that (just) nothing of the dreams of dissidents from the "Cold war" period did not realize. The reason of this crush of illusions, on its row, have its roots in the circumstance that their – belongs to the dissidents – idea for democratic western world have been (and remaining) deeply wrong, even turned over!

The problem of dissidents from the countries of Central and East Europe is that they have not realized (and some of them going on to not realize) that in longing by them western world still then, in the time of socialistic Eastern Europe – more in the countries in Western Europe than in United States, – social opinion has already been fatal "infected" with left values' "bacillus", included with growing skepticism in respecting to free market and its just mythological in our times hipper-productivity!

One of typical left value which integration in western tradition of thinking has began still in Marxian time, and that today still more in-

sistently (and even aggressively!) is imposing by so called "democratical political elits", is cosmopolitanism. Namely this value, which contemporary variant may be synthesized in the utopian maxima "Let's live in world without borders!",

<div align="center">

entusiastic,

skeptic

and/or ironic,

but (nearly) never neutral,

we call "globalization".

</div>

Why globalization is "left", and not, for example, "right" or – as preferring to believe many our contemporaries – ideological "neutral"?

The answer to this question is directly connected to the problem with ideologies in the yesterday's, today's, and probably as well as tomorrows world.

At the end of the last century – especially after the "crush" of Berlin wall – some political theoreticians, including the famous prof. S. Huntington, speeded to promulgate advancing of ideologies end. Huntington insist that today ideological conflicts gradually have pushed to the back, retreating place for the clash between civilizations and cultures.

In the second half of 90-s years of last century this hypothesis have got greate support among sociologists, political scientists, culturologists and – quite surprisingly – among philosophers! Yes, even philosophers, which would have to be in awake with relatively big average prolonging of one, let's use the Bjejinsky term, "metha-myth", such like undisputable is this of the ideological perspective – so even philosophers have looked like fascinated of the greatness and speed of described by Huntington macro-tranzition from the "cage" of political extremism to the "prison" of ethno-religious fundamentalism! Now (already) at least philosophers don't think so.

In any case ideologies, independently than connotations put in them later, were born not earlier than 18 century and today, when the first shock by 1989 has already past, many social and political thinkers still more brightly realize that it is early, too early for noisy promulgation of their "dead". More over: as difference than 90-s years of last century now, just few years after triumphal entering in 21 century, ideologies not only are not thought as "dead", but it looks like still stronger the mood that they (probably) are the most "live" than ever!

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What these new moods are due to?

At first place – to the restructuring of political space in European and worldwide plan.

It hapens so that something – in fact quite things – from already "dead" socialistic system, no suspiciously for us, East-Europeans, have been deeply inherent for other, western world, for the world behind "iron curtain" as well. More over: it seems as even part from so called "authoritarian stereotypes" found fruitful soil in West-European political systims and – in lesser degree – in that of the United States.

But the most surprisingly thing is that in many relations democratic societies in Western Europe has appeared as more "left" than these from the East part of the Continent!

To realize why it is so, we have to count "left" and "right" values, as their "centric" analogues. To do this, we have to inseard two important specifications:

1) Since time of its born til now "left" and "right", as kinds of thought, meaning just the same things.

2) "Center" is relatively new knotion that has formed just in 60-s and 70-s years of 20 century down the "pressure" of ecological movements and, to this reason, not always entries adequately enough in the "left-right" scheme.

And so:

"Right" is – and has alwayes been – ideology of statuesque, and "left" – of change.

"Right" is – and has always been – deeply connected to pragmatic mood of, let's call them, "sedate people", and "left" – to romantic impulses of the restless minds.

"Right" is – and has always been – presentation of militaristic beginning in human behavior, and "left" – of pacifism.

"Right" is – and has always been – indivisible from religiousness, and "left" – from secular thinking.

"Right" person has always keep very much to home and family, and "left" is often adventurer – person that can not keep him or her self at the same place very long time.

The representator of "right" thinking has always been "calculational" nature – person who calculate what and how much has gained, and the

representator of "left" thinking strives not toward material gaining, and – imagine! – toward intellectual satisfaction.

The last, but not least, "right" person definitely is patriot (or – what is the same thing – nationalist); he or she is sentimental connected to the country where was born and/or lives, and "left" person is cosmopolitan; his or her native land is the whole world...

What about "center", it seems to hav only one authentic value – an idea for so called "equilibria development".

Since, as it has already marked, political "center" is relatively later product in the process of ideological formation, it (naturally) inclines more toward the pole on the axis "left-right" that, in last result, have "managed" to imposes as dominated in ideological struggle – as we shall see it is the "left" thinking.

Besides they almost in whole "borrow" by the ecological movements "their" ideology, that may be synthesized in the appeals

<div align="center">"Back to the nature!"</div>

<div align="center">and/or</div>

<div align="center">"Forward to ecological clean world!",</div>

like whole the "centrists" are more inclined to accept "left" than "right" values.

They are more often flexible than traditional; more inclined to romanticism than to pragmatism; having greater affinity to pacifistic than to militaristic beginnings, as gentle to be the motives for respective war or forcing intervention; and, certainly, they are more cosmopolitans than nationalists.

This "rough" – and, for that, inevitable little inexact – scheme of values in the ideological specter on the axis "left-right" is useful because it may help us to explayn to ourselves the processes that are developing in the world through several last decades, and whose result is today's – sooner democratic than authoritarian, sooner globalistic than particular – statuesque in borders of that which we often call "western civilization" or "culture".

In spite of ideologies are as whole relatively later product of modern epoch, today, at the beginning of 21 century, we may say that in its development till now modernity is sooner "left" than "right". This assertion, although perhaps surprising for many people, has several important grounds:

1) Modernity is time of changes. It is definitely connected to rejection of (first of all religious) statuesque of Middle ages world and to affirmation of new (most of all secular) values.

2) Modern person is deeply and "incurable" romantic. Marxian maxima that we not only have to strive understanding the world, but as well as changing it, is so "capture" that soon it is "engrosses" even minds of typical "right" thinkers – so called "libertarians". More over: in this respect they get even more "left" than only "left", believing that the world not just have to be changed, but itself, without helping of containing subjects, it will "crystelising" in self-regulating chaos of free market – by this – imagine! – only because so called "free market economy" had been more effective than state planning!

3) In the years after Second world war the protests in Western Europe, especially these in France in 1968, have been inspired by pacifistic motives. The same may be saying about the protests in the United States – and at other places – against the war in Vietnam, as well as about powerful dissatisfaction against the last war in Persian Bay.

Pacifistic too – "Make love, not war!" – are many of hypparian movements in Western Europe and the United States since 60-s years of last century till now.

4) In his book "The silent revolution" Ronald Ingelheart writes about moving of material values by post-material in the bounders of western world in the second half of 20 century. The Ingelheart's thesis is supporting by still more growing recently readiness for charity of extremely rich represeters of great business and even of whole industrial giants.

If capitalism is that which Max Weber maintains that it "is" – namely strive to self-purpose gain – contemporary society is too hardly to be called "capitalistic". In the same time contemporary person has emphasized affinity to intellectual satisfaction.

We bet to football meetings not so for the idea that we have to win, and as satisfaction of the play.

Still deeper crisis of roman that we witness today in great degree is result of circumstance that we still more read not so for the subject of the book, as for the satisfaction of style of the author.

Although it is not difficult for us to meet each other, many times we prefer to communicate through SMSes and on Internet for the satisfaction of being in virtual reality.

5) Through last decades – especially in the years after Second world war – for still more people is still harder to lead sedate way of life. They turn back to the constancy for ephemeral beginnings with unsure results. Manifestation and sequence of this way of thinking is so called "projectile system" of financial support of the most variegated beginnings, many of wich appear to be with insufficient rentability or not so useful for these who they are designed to benefit. Often changing of job, home and intimacy partner is only one of the aspects of growing dynamism which is "enveloped" contemporary person.

6) Here we get to globalization. Although in the basis to be variant of manifested still in Antiquity cosmopolitanism, globalization is very special kind of cosmopolitanism. It just is not exhausted with natural strive of every person to feeling like at home everywhere. Contemporary cosmopolitanism – globalization – is much more technical and technological problem than existential one. It is indivisible from – because it would not be possible without – contemporary technical means for moving, contemporary technical means for communication, technological lighten of procedure for passing state borders, and – certainly – without technological (first of all juridical) lighten of procedure for "renting" of cheap working hand in economical prospective lands from the poor countries.

More important is that this technical-technological form of globalization has been inspired by one purely intellectual "left" appeal:

"Proletarians from all countries, get together!".

Capitalism, independently if it just has ever existed, has never been – and will not be – provoked and maintained by inclination to overcome borders – less state borders. For difference of socialism, in which, in last result, may be synthesized all variants of the "left", capitalism has never been, is not and will not be anything more than strive to maximal (because is self-purpous) win.

However the win in it self may not to be social ideal, since moral scruples of many people would not let it to be widely shared position in the framework of any society. In other words, capitalism hasn't its own social ideal, but in order to be imposed it must to be based on and to work for not inherent for it social ideals. It is paradoxical but it is appears that the win, the most wide spread now social practice – especialy after crush of socialistic regimes in Central and East Europe, – have to looking for and in

last result finds support in "left" values, which namely, but not capitalism, have forming ideological view of contemporary person.

As typical "left" value globalization affirms itself not because one relatively closed economical system may not to function effectively enough – EU is example for contrariwise – and because it perfectly conceals "flourishing" of powerful business interests!

It is public secret that powerful industrial giants and not users define what and how much/many to be produced. User uses that which producer one sided has "decided" to impose him or her because it is meant for prestige, because respective client do like average user who leads himself on other users behavior, because – at the end – he or she has not other choice.

So user decide to buy car instead to use not more unqualified – may be even cheaper – services of the public transport, although he ore she no travel often out of settlement where lives; he or she buys computer to see films which by the same success – may be even cheaper – could see on video; he or she buys legal software at high price, although has opportunity to use free "pirate" copies which would be no less useful for him or her...

Globalization in itself is deeply human social ideal, but its realizing – alas! – totaly doesn't justify this humanistic "charge". Contemporary person still more tend to be global not because is cosmopolitan, and because the most liking directly related to globalization process technical and technological products.

American movie is global not because is no longer American, and because is the most preferring product on worldly movie market.

The Alps, as a difference from Rodopies Mountains or Carpates, are worldly famous mountain not because are more beautiful than the latter, and because are more successfully advertising.

The products of "Mycrosoft" are without competition by the side of other producers in the branch not because are better than these of alternative enterprises – as just it has such ones – and simply because they are the most famous trade mark...

It is paradoxical but globalization is much more manifestation of mass test, fashion and prestige behavior, than authentic expression of cosmopolitan thinking, as on the words of its theoreticians would have to be. It, however, is something more than this as well. Besides all other remain,

besides, so to say, "crossing point" of successful politics of industrial giants, globalization is something extremely "left" in order to be steady, even lasting.

As can be judged to great protest actions of opponents of globalization in Western Europe countries and the United States, and to the silence on the side of labeled as its proponents nothing suspect citizens, containing majority of the population of these countries, it already – and perhaps for a long time? – has exhausted its consolidating resources.

At any case one is sure: today globalization is just "left" "cover" of as dominating of "right" values western societies.

The reasons of this "degenerating" of idea for globalization, certainly, are many. Here I want to finish with just one of them.

So called "transition" which society in half Europe began in 1989 in last result it seems just will not be appear as "right". More over: it even is not "neutral". By low popularity of autentical "right" ideas in the framework of West European countries in the years after Second world wa – indisputable result of disgust to Nazism and fascism – there has no how there to not "flourishing" "left" ideas, common noun for which is the notion "left intellectual". Since it had to be respectful enough in order to make balance between two disgusts – to excessively "right" management, "fruit" of the moods after Second world war, and to "ultra-left" regimes in their own countries – dissidents from Central and East Europe have appeared to be long lasting unready for grotesqueness ideological symbiosis which has established and is still more affirm in contemporary world – paradoxal "alloy" of loosed its pathos "left" thinking and "pseudo right" values, and all this "jumble" abundant "garnished" with huge, even almost "indigestible" portion business interests, which representatives, if not now, just in the future, easily would sacrifice all, including dreaming of many peoply democracy, in order to defend them.

Globalization is rather doubtful value, for which we may say that "today is here, tomorrow not".

Who knows, perhaps leading "players", "hidden" monopolists in as equal market competition in one moment can to decide that it is already not need to them – purely because its products are exhausted! What does will hapen then? – Very simply, it will be replaced by any other value – this which at the moment is the most advantageous for legitimizers (and,

therefore the basic winners) in still more banal, but (still) "captured" because "feeds" – and that which is may be more important, justifies – natural human egoism, play, pathetic called "free market". Today's society has just one advantage – it does not suffer by "deficit" of ideologems!...

Ivanka Stapova

PLURALITY OF THE SELF
IN THE EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY AND ART

From the very beginning of its philosophical self-rationalization the problem of identity of the Self preserves its inexhaustible ideological freshness, constantly live meaning, unfading aspiration for reaching the authentic truth from the highest instance on the slipping out essence of this divine-earthly creation. Who am I and am I really the one who self-reflectively treats this essentially eternal topic?

There is no doubt that philosophizing about the world as early as from the hoary antiquity has been practically reduced to philosophizing about the human nature. Moreover, not a human being as a biologically constructed and practically united material essence (the bodily unity is almost beyond doubt), but becoming aware of a man as an I, "self", "ego", personality.

It seems that in the program of a man the doubt as a constant determinant of his essence underlies even on the genetic level. When the thesis of a man's unity, wholeness and compositional steadiness is maintained in philosophic reflections on the man, he starts doubting the expedience and impossibility in principle of such unity. When the position on his plurality is imposed, he begins to doubt the stability and exhaustive argumentation of it.

Philosophic approaches to the problems of the two basic components of the gnoseological relation "object and subject" have been developed by all philosophic schools and from different positions. Ancient philosophers treat the nature of the psychic activity, and there is almost no doubt that this problem will always continue to excite philosophic minds owing to inexhaustibility of different aspects of its interpretation. That is why interpretations of the subject and object (in gnoseological aspect), of the Self and psyche (in psychological aspect), of the changes in interpretation of

the dominating component in the psychic activity of a subject (different psychoanalytical positions and opinions of the analytical psychology) in the present work have rather illustrative character and are not an object of special investigation.

Philosophers both give the problem on the essence of the Self a possibly interpretable air and create its mysteriousness as a "fundamental knot", "world enigma" or "Himalayan problem". Practically all attempts "to decode the nature of the human psyche" appear to be new codes – still more complicated and intricate.[1]

Points of view on the essence of a man are not missing; they can be met in various versions and all kinds of concepts – from religious-ritual through philosophic-theoretical ones, pass through clinical-pathological versions (schizophrenic manifestations of the many-faced ego) or unite positions and oppositions of literary-poetical revelations.

Presumably it is most easily (or most difficult) for poets and art creators to define man's essence, its non-unity and bifurcation, because they shouldn't by all means with exhaustive arguments prove the tossed in the process of poetical flight ideas. "The Motif for the Doubles" (Z. Freud), the bifurcation remains in philosophy and literature as "Faust's motif", "Faust's beginning", (Tzv. Stoyanov), "Faust's topic" (I. Passi), "the motif of bifurcation" (Ya. Yanev). The problem of the Self, of the core of a personality is put forward in the hoary antiquity – probably it starts from the myth about Narcissus who looks at himself in a strip of water and does not discern himself. Due to the lack of knowledge about himself as " a body that discerns itself", "a face that is reflected in the water" he fells in love with himself. The strip of water proved to be the identification code of the first meeting of the Self with himself. Narcissus's enlightenment that

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[1] За природата на психичното и историческите форми на неговото развитие. See: **Стъпов, Р.** Фундаменталният възел. Унив. Изд. "Св. Кл. Охридски". С., 2001. **Стъпов, Р.** Идеалното – от загадката до теорията. Изд. ГЪЛИКСО. С., 1998. In my work I don't stop at length on the historical development of the problem about the nature of the human psyche. It is comprehensively and with competence done in the above two monographs, and not only in them. The object of my work is plurality of the Self in the aspect of the idea about the double, mainly through literary characters.

the person looking at him from the water is he himself is a tragic cry of the self-conscious ego in the battle with his fate. But probably interpretation of identity is connected with ancient philosophers, with Plato's philosophic dialogues, in particular with the problem of dealing with the soul's essence. "The middle position of the soul – between the idea and the thing, between the identical and the different, between the indivisible and divisible – determines the duplicity of its function. On the one hand it is existentially and cognitively directed to the noetic cosmos, on the other hand – as a principle of movement and life in a sensuous world it constructs the whole somatic sphere. That is why the soul can never be fixed to a definite layer of the being; it is just the *intermediate* between the being and the becoming, the link between the immobile and the moving, the sense and the senselessness, the equal and the unequal, the good and the bad…"[2] Without going into the details of the Plato's doctrine of the soul (I mention this accent on interpretation of the soul and its middle position again in the aspect of the problem considered by me), I'll mention annotatively that from here starts the interpretation of a soul as a polyvariant component in the man's wholeness.

On the way to the Cartesian "cogito ergo sum" (let's remember that the authentic philosophizing on the Self starts from Descartes) there stands Augustine, who starts adopting the opposition of spirit to flesh by means of the Plato's ideas on the difference between the sensuous and intelligible world. "Along with this duality Augustine accepted the whole magnificence of the eternal in contrast to subordinated to the time, that of the unchangeable in contrast to the constantly changing."[3]

Cartesian dualism is used by many researchers of the relation between the soul and the body as an idea supporting their thesis. But it seems that considerable part of the authors interpreting the possible plurality of the

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[2] **Бояджиев, Ц.** "Неписаното учение" на Платон. С., 1984, с. 170-171. "According to Plato the essential oppositions are between soul and body, non-material and bodily, eternal and changeable. Just they get greatest weight in Plato's wordings." Тейлър, Ч. Изворите на Аза. Формирането на модерната идентичност. С., 2003, с. 215

[3] **Тейлър, Ч.** Ibid, с. 131; See also: Личев, В. "Аз"-ът като образ на културата. Автореферат на дисертация. С., 1993, с. 3-4.

Self look for proving material rather in literary sources than in philosophical treatises.

Ever since the man's self-realization as exclusiveness there come the first opinions behind which take their stand the firmest adherents of integrity of the Self, its monolithic-unshakable wholeness, but also doubts regarding possibility of such wholeness. The entity of the Self is a calming possibility for existence of something complete and steady; its plurality is a flattering prospect for polyvariant character of acts, deeds, and positions.

Initially postulated non-unity of a personality inevitably causes the appearance of asynchronies of points of view on it. A person owes the privilege of being whole and inviolable to the conventionally accepted initial self-agreement of the Creator his creation to be neither entirely divine nor completely material. The unity of a sparkle – emanation of the God, and ashes – structural component of the material, earthly – should remind of the eternally-transient nature and essence of the creation. The material world itself provokes dual actions of a man. Eastern philosophers understood quite well that that the essence of the Self is a fiction (Hermann Hesse). "Every man is a unity as a body, as a soul – nobody… In the poetry of ancient India this notion (self – Iv. St.) is quite unknown. Heroes of Indian epics are not individuals, but balls of personalities, incarnation rows." [4]

In one of the books investigating the philosophy of yoga it is said: "Material world is a world of duality. Today we endure summer heats, tomorrow – winter frosts. In one moment we are happy, in the next – unhappy. In the material world of duality it is impossible to understand something without understanding its opposite. I won't understand what honour is if I don't know what dishonour is. I won't understand what happiness is if I have never been unhappy. A man must rise above these dualities, but as long as he is in the body, he will be doomed to meet them." [5]

Duality marks with lasting traces the life of the Self, who must "learn to endure duality".

There is no doubt that the attempts to explain the Self are divided between two extremes – on the one hand, there is the striving to ground the unity, wholeness of a personality, treating the inner castling as "self-adjust-

[4] **Хесе, Х.** Степният вълк. Изд. "Христо Г. Данов", Пловдив, 1980, с. 61-62.
[5] Съвършенството на йога. С., 1992, с. 38.

ments of the whole". On the other hand, there are approaches to articulation of non-unity, plurality of the Self in a clear or metaphoric way. There isn't a single trace of the two beginnings – the divine, ideal and the material-sensual, that isn't present in every moment of the earthly life of the Self. Moreover, the collision between the two is considered to be the initial motive for man's tragedy. "The tragedy of the earthly life begins with the act of splitting between freedom and law – with irony and horror of a mind covered with chains of substance, it turns into a lightning of despair and protest, after that it ascends to the heaven in the light of eternal life and sinks into the abyss of chaos. It ends with the song of the God or a man. The earthly man bears his cross of great pain and great shame. Riding the furious horse of life, he gallops from one end of the world to the other, chased by himself. The devil, whose tail girds the world as a marriage ring, runs on his one side, and on the other side runs the death. The body is made of soil and flame. On his hands he bears the icon of his own crucifix, on his forehead – a wreath of roses and thorns, and on his breast – the sign of redemption and rebellion."[6]

The divine-earthly parameters of a man make him apparently unified and not less apparently plural. His onlyness gives him consoling safety of protection, non-impairability and legitimacy, while his plurality gives him a flattering idea of productive creative work, flirtation with the fate and challenge to the initial creative power of the Creator. Good and bad fight for the essence of the Self, man's soul is an inestimable trophy both for the God and for Satan's aspirations. "Just because of it a man is a tireless clash of doubt and faith, flesh and soul, and this clash ends with apocatastasis, return of things to their divine initial origin. Plato's dualism here assumes a pantragic character. …This motif of bifurcation and struggle underlies in the basis of the future philosophy…"[7]

The clash of the united and plural in the wholeness of the Self adds a really tragic accent to his existence. The unity always dashes at the inexpressible and in principle inaccessible divinity (Plato), while plurality reminds a man that he can master the tempting possibility of not being

[6] **Янев, Я.** Трагедията на човека. – Философски алтернативи, кн. 3/2004, с. 67.

[7] **Янев, Я.** Ibid, с. 72.

himself, of being someone else besides himself, of being different from himself, scraped in depth off the bosom of his nature doubts about himself and phenomenologically turned them into a pleiad of Selves (as Freud would tell), in a "sheaf of many "Selves" (let's remember H. Hesse).

The Self – it is a united cosmos and plural small universes.

Valeri Lichev

THE SPIRITUAL CITIZEN
OF WHOLE EUROPE IN R. MUSIL'S NOVEL
"THE MAN WITHOUT PROPERTIES"

R. Musil raises many complicated questions about value and social transformations in Europe in the beginning of 20th century in his novel "*The Man without Properties*". As one of his characters – preacher of new spiritual order – states, the West European culture had lost the ground under its feats because of its intellectualism. That imposes the need of finding a new tower of strength which could contribute to building of a future social order (Музил 1984; 2: 183).

The author succeeds to reveal the contradictions and paradoxes of his contemporary age with a great mastership in a philosophical and psychological way. He traces out dead-end streets, in which his characters fetch up, against the background of life in Austro-Hungarian Empire. The reasons for their bewilderments are the values which they accept as leading dicta of their behavior. One of these confused characters is the husband of the sister of the man without properties.

He is a professor of pedagogic who has overcome the "transient hypostasis of his provincial existing" through his scientific work. Thus he has attached himself to the most progressive and shining minds of his time. In this way he has become a citizen of Whole Europe, where he found his "*spiritual home*". Unexpectedly the image, he has built in the course of years, has been exposed to the danger of public compromising through a turn twist of a fate. His wife went away to commit the body of his father to the ground. After the funeral she decided never to come back to her family home.

R. Musil draws the attention of his readers to the time of family live. It is the most abstract form, in which family relationships could be struc-

tured or built up. This form remains empty. Because of that the family relationships have fallen apart.

We can guess the way in which the life of a professor's wife used to run through her relation to the calendar. It became a "***dreadful symbol of her life***" (Музил 1984; 2: 302). By this symbolic means she gives an account of her days, getting away in vain. The departure to the funeral of her father gives her matter for tearing off of the dreadful symbolism. The escape is the only way out of her exile in the prison of marriage.

M. Chaevalier and A. Geerbrant have pointed that every symbol reveals – depending on the point of view – *two* contrary *sides*: **bright** and **dark**. The same could be said about the symbol, which for professor's wife meant her senseless running days. She turns her back to the dark side of this symbol without any interest in the way in which it will appear to her husband after her leaving the family house. Musil shows the sequence of personal transformations of his character exactly in the line of perceptions of this symbol of time.

Agatha's husband never asks her how she had used to spend her time. After her departure he decides to stand in silence in memory of her being away from the family home. He refuses to update the date on the calendar in his home. He considers this way to pay the last homage to her, as if she had really died.

Thus a small "***speck of desolation***" is placed in the professor's home (Музил 1984; 2: 303). The sense of this spot is to maintain vivid the professor's recollection of his absent wife. The Frenchmen use to say that every painful parting is a kind of a small death. However, the professor understands this proverb word for word. He allowed the desolation in the dining room of his house not because he is grieving for his wife, who will be away from home for a definite time, but because without it he will maybe forget her existing.

The husband is not ferocious man. The death of his wife has to be temporary. He fancies it in a ***mythical way***. As long as it is lasting, he could return to his bachelor's way of life. Thus he will regain the power he needs for maintaining relationships with his wife. It is obvious that he does not like carrying of a family ox-bow. He bears it because of the duty he pays to public opinion. Exactly this opinion will force him to a very serious internal personal conflict.

As long as the happy returning to his bachelor's years is lasting, the professor does not make out the absence of his wife in any way. He is using this time for carrying out of his official duties. Apparently the speck of the wall in his dining room does not make him any impression. It is the only representation of his absent family partner. Other mark for maintaining recollections of his wife's – he could not find. Maybe without this speck he would forget that he is married.

However, the professor is very well orientated out of home in the public time, because his whole life is running in it. When his wife returns home she will remove the speck of desolation. Then the time will resume its flowing in the dining room. The fact that the professor does not eat together with his wife in this room is without meaning for him. By that he will enjoy the happy imaginary returning to his bachelor's years.

It turned out that public opinion – by contrast to professor's memory – does not forget the existing of his wife so easy and soon. The professor's friends and colleagues catch sight of the fact that his wife's absence is lasting more than usual sorrowing over the death of a close man. They begin to ask uncomfortable questions about her emotional condition and about the day of her return. The lonely husband feels very embarrassed to answer their questions because he does not know the real reasons for his wife's absence.

The manifestations of this useless concern forced him to cease his holiday return to bachelor's years. He has to invoke his wife, who had symbolically descended in the kingdom of dead persons. The time for her returning to the world of married people has arrived. When she comes back, the speck of desolation will be removed from the wall of the dining room and the others will stop with their boring questions.

The professor begins to write open postcards to recollect his wife that the time for her returning to home has arrived. Naturally, he does not receive answer. His wife does not have any intention to come back to the tomb of her family life of which she had escaped.

The form, chosen by the professor, is deliberately marked out by the author. It is an eloquent testimony to his distorted pictures of the way of constructing of personal relationships. First, the open postcard gives a small space, which could be filled with a written text. However, this space is enough for the husband, who is sparing of words, feelings and maybe of money.

Second, the message, sent on an open postcard, could be red by anyone. That means the professor does not acknowledge the parting between the *private* and the *public sphere*, which according to H. Arendt had been established in the antic police (Арент 1997: 59-62). Apparently the family life does not contain anything, which could not be revealed to the public gaze. Because that the professor chooses a laconic and concise form of communication with his life.

The reasons of this kind of indiscretion could be looked for in his personality. He has come – or he renders so – over his feelings and emotions in the spirit of Kant's philosophy. Thus he has erased anything from his personality which could divert him from the execution of his duties to the others and to the future generations. Every particular and occasional feature in his nature is removed. He has built himself as a universal person.

However, it turns out that the professor's dedication, without any reservations to the others, leads him to serious internal contradictions. He has overcome the "transient hypostasis" of being provincial teacher but the same could not be claimed for his notions about marriage. He has found his home in the common spiritual European space, but he has no idea that he should built home with his own wife.

When the others begin to ask him questions about his better half returning he discovers that he needs her presence, at least formally, because the divorce will throw shade upon his bright image. At that time his suppressed feelings begin to force their way towards his mind. He begins losing the control over his emotional condition simultaneously with losing the power over his wife.

He does not have any other arguments to invoke her expect his written commands. However, this form of communication does not work. His wife expresses her unwillingness to come back by her silence. Thus she does not give her husband any reasons for her reluctance to come back.

In this way she causes unwillingly an unexpected change in the house of her husband. In the state of agonizing suspense the time begins to run there in a new way. "The small speck of desolation", which could be removed without any difficulties, grows up and extends on the walls of the whole house. The questions of the others as if eat it up. The spot becomes a "running wound", which could not be healed by the lonely professor (Музил 1984; 2: 303). The only remedy is the returning of his wife, but he can not find the way to gain over her heart.

The ravage overcomes not only the house, but also the professor's soul. He begins to perceive the absence of his wife in the space and in the time. Although he does not feel any emotional necessity, he needs his wife because of public opinion, which is a source of his pride, but also of his fears. Unfortunately, the time when he has to build the bridges between himself and his better half has passed away. The professor has become a spiritual citizen of whole Europe through his written scientific work, but he does not know – as one of M. Tournier characters has said – the secret of love writing.

One day the husband received a letter from his brother-in-law instead of his wife. It was written in a style similar to the professor's one. Its content is short, laconic and polite, but decisive. The wife's brother expresses the desire of his sister to divorce with her husband. The professor understands from the letter of the brother-in-law that he does not care for his own feelings. Thus his image is seriously neglected. He perceives himself as an insect, which could be removed without any regrets from the leave, where it is perched.

The letter of the brother-in-law marks a new stage in the demolition of the idealized professor's self-notions. The husband begins to diminish in front of the stronger arguments of his enemy like F. Chavka characters. The image of small beetle does not pass to his elevated notions of spiritual citizen of whole Europe.

Musil draws deliberately attention to the catoptrical symbolism when he pictures the relationships between these two characters. The only mirror, in which the professor used to enjoy his bright image, is the public opinion. However, his brother-in-law gives him back an image, which is very humiliating. The beetle is an animal, which is possible to be removed from the leave without any efforts or regrets, because it does not posses any place in the world.

The metaphor, chosen by Musil, has many layers of meaning. The professor does not overcome at all his feelings. He has erased from his soul only these, which could be related to the heart of his better half. However, he has preserved his patriarchal feeling of ownership of the wife. Exactly this feeling has been humiliated by his brother-in-law. On this basis begins the dialectic between the Master and the Slave, which has been investigated in a psychoanalytical way by J. Lacan (Лакан 1998: 293).

The professor perceives his wife's desire of divorce as a violation of his sacred property. This notion corresponds to his proprietary feeling on emotional level. Similar relationship is allowed only to the slave, who has to give up his free will in the battle for acknowledgement. If we borrow one term from S. Buvoar, we can say that the brother-in-law had led the professor to an existing, which is lower than the human, to the "under-man" (Бовоар 2002: 38).

However, the abandoned husband is not disposed to surrender without fight. He has no intention to receive the conditions of capitulation, which are sent him from his brother-in-law. Hagauer is determined to regain his wife at any rate. The consequences for her emotional condition, which would follow fulfillment of his desire, are of no importance for him. He does not ask himself the question about the feelings of the other. The most important thing in the world is his propriety feeling and his bright image in the eyes of the others.

According to the husband's opinion the decision of his wife is a result of her immature will. If she overcomes it in the way of socialization, she will change her mind. This stand expresses the professor's treating of his wife as an immature child. In the spirit of Kant's pedagogic (Кант 1994: 152) he thinks that his duty is to prevent her from accomplishment of some unconsidered deeds, which could do harm to her, because she cannot demarcate the good for her personal development from the bad.

From this point of view the professor's propriety feeling is morally legitimized. He has all reasons to insist on the tutorship on his wife, because he is a professional in this field. If she overcomes her feelings as he had done the same, she will give up her desire of getting divorce. From the letter of her brother it is obvious that she can not express her desire of parting. That proves her immature will.

The answer, sent by the husband to his brother-in-law is definitely "No". However, the answer demolishes totally every professor's hope for easy and fast success. This time the insistence for a fast divorce is accompanied with the threat for sensational public scandal, which surely would stain the bright professor's self-image.

Now the husband is driven to the corner. He has to choose between the *lesser* of *two evils*. His wife refuses to come back from the kingdom of dead men to the bright world of married people. She becomes a ghost

which could extend its shade on the professor's public image. In this way the most important thing, built by Hagauer, could be demolished.

Thus the husband loses his Master position. For the first time his brother-in-law *humiliated* his *propriety feeling*, whose object is his *wedded wife*. This **battle** for **acknowledgement** happens in the **symbolic register**. Modern law is against patriarchal feelings and claims. The professor has received recognition in a public sphere, but he can not deserve it in the same way in the field of the private relationships. He has overcome his feelings through his mind, but he can not put his will over the law. The epoch of possessing people has passed away.

The professor had lost the battle with his enemy in the field of written communication, where is his strongest side. Because of that he is forced to reconsider his self-images. He is intimidated with public compromising and cannot do anything against this threat. The image of beetle is still hidden from the gaze of society. In spite of all he feels he is in two minds because of the splitting of the mirror, which reflects his self-images. He refuses to accept the divorce because of the idealized notions, which he has for his personality. However, the maintaining of these ideas is impossible because of the immature desire of his wife and of the symbolic support she receives from his brother.

Simultaneously with losing of his family power the professor begins to experience how the time runs in the position of the *Slave*. Before the departure of his wife he used to know only the time of the *Master*, who does not care about the feelings of others. In the new situation he receives the possibility to perceive in a new way the time's running. He takes the place of his wife and casts a glance at her "*terrible symbol of life*".

In this situation the calendar does not receive the meaning of a "*small speck of desolation*" or of a "*running wound*", but rather of an "**orphaned child**" 1984; 2: 305). Without the concern for his public image the childless professor would never arrive to this *metaphor*. A blood relationship exists between his wife and time. However, he thinks about the **public**, **common for everyone time**, not for the **time of existence**. The *calendar* is in his eyes a **middle term**, which used to be a mediator between him and his wife during the time of their *childless marriage*. This symbolic means for measurement of time becomes "**orphaned**" not after the *departure* of its "*mother*", but after the brother's-in-law **threat of public humiliation**.

The melancholic experience is the same. For example, the time ceases or reverses its flowing in the houses of T. Gautier's characters because of

their desires to return to the golden age of their happiness. However, the professor does not have anything in common with melancholic experience. The metaphor "*orphaned calendar*" expresses the evaluation of his *wife's absence*. The "*running wound*", radiating desolation in the whole house, became a **neglected child**, leaved to the **mercy of fate**.

The professor forgot that he is exactly a professional in the field of pedagogic, a science, whose subject are the methods and principles of cultivation and education of children, including these, who have lost their parents. If he makes use of his knowledge, he will apply it in a new field of experience. He will understand that human relationships are structured not only in the *public time*, but in the time of the *intimate, private live*.

Hagauer has imposed to his wife a living only in the public, common for everyone, time. He does not suppose at all that there is another form of time, which has to be filled with a matter meaningful only for the spouses. He has renounced the possibility to become the "*father*" of this time because of his insensitiveness to the feelings of the others. In this way he has caused the "*death*" of his wife for their family live.

The time of private life neither gives in to upbringing, nor to bringing under control. It can not be institutionalized, i.e. mastered by symbolic or other power. Actually the "*orphaned calendar*" reveals the professor's helplessness to cope with the **stopped time** of his **private life**. Although the gaze of society can not penetrate through the wall, it has caught the internal alteration in the professor's world through the absence of his wife.

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Ivelina Ivanova
Todor Hristov

IS MULTICULTURALISM MULTICULTURAL?

1.

The philosophical notion of multiculturalism was essentially shaped under the influence of a famous essay by Charles Taylor called "Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition" (1992). The debate initiated by Taylor stimulated the elaboration of a theoretical framework generally believed to be one of the most successful alternatives to liberalism.

Liberals required the authorities to treat any individual with equal respect and concern. Multiculturalists however claim such toleration to be essentially incomplete. A complete toleration would require, from a multicultural perspective, giving equal respect and concern not only to the individual persons, but also to their cultural identity. The national state however is generally geared at discriminating minority cultures in favor of the national cultural identity.

The national state authorities act on behalf of the nation. They are considered to act legitimately in so far as the population identifies itself with the nation, i.e. in so far as the population entertains an appropriate national identity. In order to secure its legitimacy, the national government tries to develop a national identity, a sense of belonging to the nation it acts on behalf of, and hence – as rough as it may seem – the national government has to deal with the minorities inhabiting its territory. The national state tends to do so by means of various forms of exclusion.

One could differentiate the following forms of exclusion: (1) exclusion by way of violence, as in the case of ethnic cleansing; (2) exclusion by means of isolation as in the case of denying citizenship to immigrants or underrepresenting their interests in public deliberation,

or in case of any closure insulating the majority from the minorities (e.g. due to negative stereotypes, prejudices, or stigmatization); (3) internal exclusion as when requiring the members of a cultural minority, in order to join the general public, to develop a common identity based on the national political culture or on some notion what does it mean to be a citizen of the national state. [Taylor 1999]

Any type of exclusion however leads either to minority's physical disappearance, to disappearance from the public sphere, or to isolation in heterotopic localizations (e.g. ghettoes or minority areas).

What is more important, authorities resort to exclusion from the public sphere or to heterotopic localization not in spite of but rather in favor of democracy, and without violating the standards of treating the individual minority members as equal. Respecting the human rights of the minority members however does not make the exclusion innocent since it infringes upon their cultural identity and causes suffering. The public exclusion still damages the very core of the minority members' identity because it denies any value to the cultural horizon they live their lives in.

In order to alleviate that damage, multiculturalists propose a hole range of recognition policies: (1) educating the young minority members in the cultural traditions of their own ethnic group; (2) giving recognition to the customs and practices of the minority groups guaranteed by the legislative and state authorities; (3) fighting poverty and illiteracy among the minorities; (4) developing autonomous cultural institutions (minority theatres, libraries, museums, literature etc.) Canada is commonly believed to be most successful in initiating that kind of recognition policies.

The recognition policies consist in protecting, fostering or perhaps even reviving certain cultural identities by means of state interference, so as to prevent their marginalization or annihilation under the influence of the dominant culture. Multiculturalists claim that this sort of state interference does not violate the principles of liberalism. In fact, they claim, liberal policies would otherwise be defective and incomplete as the paramount goal of liberalism is to protect individuals from suffering and humiliation, and bringing down one's identity does exactly that. Therefore multiculturalism has a certain advantage

before the conventional liberalist doctrines since it protects individuals from suffering and humiliation, which conventional liberalism is unable to prevent (in truth, which liberalism is often guilty of, in view of the fact that public exclusion and heterotopical localization are usually justified by citing liberal tenets).

Multiculturalists tend to admit however that recognition policies should respect the following rights: (1) ethnic groups do not have the right to oppress their members; (2) ethnic groups do not have the right to be intolerant to members of other groups; (3) any member should have the right to leave the ethnic group; (4) any ethnic group should treat its members with equal respect and concern. Furthermore, recognition policies should respect the following practical consideration: (5) they could be legitimately applied only to living and viable cultures. One should also take into account an axiological stipulation: (6) recognizing the value of all cultures does not mean recognizing their equal value.[1] [Raz 1998}

The principal task of multicultural philosophy is justifying the politics of recognition. Hence multiculturalism is embedded in the context of that type of politics, as well as in the specific nature of the United States and Canadian society. Nevertheless philosophers striving to develop a general theory of toleration have drawn consistently on the conceptual framework of multiculturalism. The most prominent philosophical project of that type is Michael Walzer's *On Toleration* (1997):

It is generally held that toleration implies eradicating particular attitudes like racism or xenophobia for example. In fact, toleration implies satisfying only one condition: developing tolerant social practices.

One can distinguish five historical regimes of toleration: (1) the multinational empire: the center of the empire is rather disconnected from the ethnic communities and the imperial authorities interfere in their affairs as far as this is required in order to maintain peace allowing the communities to develop whatever culture they choose to; (2)

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[1] Taylor was perhaps the first to propose that stipulation. In our view however it makes the so-called recognition of value to any culture an ambiguous recognition harboring possibilities for discrimination (albeit more sophisticated one).

international society: any state participating in the community tolerates whatever the other members do as long as they do it in their own territory; (3) consociation: a democratic state relying on the cooperation of the elites of two or more ethnic communities each enjoying an extensive autonomy; (4) national state: a state built upon a national majority culture and geared at protecting it; (5) immigrant society: a democratic state trying not to support any ethnic culture, to tolerate the individual choice, and to develop a community membership based on will and consent rather than on ethnic origin.

Any toleration regime has advantages as well as disadvantages: the national state for example, although being theoretically capable of toleration, in practice often does not tolerate minorities; the immigrant societies are most tolerant to individual choice, yet they complicate and often even jeopardize the survival of the ethnic cultures. In fact, the most important ambition of multiculturalism is to put right this shortcoming by advocating policies able to secure the survival of the minority cultures.

We are not going to offer any extensive critique of multiculturalism here, yet we would like to point out that multiculturalists have not developed any practical criteria allowing one to identify the cultures viable enough to deserve a recognition, or the ones that prevent their members from leaving the community (e.g. do we stay Bulgarian because we do not want any other identity, or we do want other identity, but the Bulgarian society somehow prevents us from casting off the Bulgarian one).

I would also like to note that multiculturalism has an important strategic advantage: it allows one to get rid of some rather inflated or perhaps eroded notions as majority and minority, and instead to portray the present-day societies as fields of interaction between differing cultures.

2.

The principal liberal theories of the 1970-ties tried to account for the struggle against racial discrimination in the United States, and to support the affirmative action policy. In order to cope with the challenge of multiculturalism however, they need to be adapted to the changing context of the 1990-ties. The most influential multicultural adaptation of liberal-

ism is generally held to be the one offered by Will Kymlicka in *Liberalism, Community, and Culture* (1989):

Many liberals believe that different cultures should be treated with equal indifference. That is unfortunately impossible for the state inescapable discriminates between cultures as long as it makes one culture official, or uses its language or its holidays as state language or state holidays.

The most profound liberal philosophers of the 1970-ties, Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls, overlooked that problem assuming that the American society, notwithstanding the diverse cultural backgrounds of its members, could speak only one language.[2] Yet they did not rule out the possibility of cultural minorities having group rights against the state.

On the contrary, the founding liberal principle of equal treatment implies that minority groups should enjoy special rights recognized by the state, if their culture is indeed in a disadvantaged position (e.g. because the members do not have the opportunity to educate themselves on their own language, or the authority to take autonomous decisions for themselves).

Recognizing minority group rights is important, because individuals choose their lives in a framework developed by their own culture and if their cultural framework is unfairly damaged, so is their freedom. Therefore, in order to protect the freedom, one should protect the cultural framework by preventing the majority from making political or economic decisions about its future.

One can produce also two supplementary reasons for granting group rights to a cultural minority: the intrinsic value of cultural diversity and the fact that such rights have been already stipulated by settlements made in the past (e.g. the settlements between the Native American communities and the United States government).

Such group rights however should respect one condition: they are appropriate only in mending a morally unjustifiable inequality,[3]

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[2] Kymlicka claimed that the most important cultural inequalities emerged from the unequal status given to the language of one group via affording it the privilege to be the official language of politics and education.

[3] Kymlicka proposed that a minority cultural group being in a disadvantage situation is morally as unjustifiable as racial segregation.

and after that unjustifiable inequality being set right, the group rights themselves should be abolished, because from that moment on they would do nothing more than a redistribution of resources. [Kymlicka 1998]

One should also say that group rights depend on the cultural context, and therefore Kymlicka's argument does not necessarily apply to the Bulgarian situation (one could apply it only after having decided which cultural minorities are disadvantaged, what policies would fix their disadvantage, and after making sure that those policies would achieve more than a mere redistribution of resources). As it seems, the answer to those questions is still far from self-evident.

3.

Let me point in conclusion three problems multiculturalism could be undermined by, usually neglected by liberal philosophy:

- Notwithstanding the wide-spread idea, multiculturalists do not claim that all cultures are equal. Charles Taylor for example found it necessary to distinguish the recognition of equal potential from the recognition of equal factual value, and said that one owes the first to any culture, but claiming the last would be unjustifiable and unconvincing. That however harbors the risk that the equal treatment of minority cultures and the relevant group rights could in effect turn out to be potential, but never factual ones.

- Taylor proposed that the claim that all cultures have equal value was convincing only if understood in the weak sense that all cultures which had animated entire societies for a long period of time had something important to say to all human beings. That much weakened however, the claim for equal cultural value would exclude all the cultural phenomena that had not animated entire societies, or did it only in a short period of time (e.g. many minority and immigrant cultures of the United States would not satisfy that standard and therefore would be unable to claim equal treatment). If o culture meets the standard however, it would ultimately remain unclear how important is the thing it tries to say to all human beings, and in effect invites a more sophisticated cultural inequality.

A multiculturalist could plausibly claim for example that all the longstanding societal cultures have something to say yet some say far more important things than others. And what if the thing a culture has to say to humanity has only historical value, i.e. if it has value only to historians, or if the culture cannot speak the language of humanity? One could say that, ultimately, the weak multicultural principle of equal treatment is multiplying instead of reducing inequalities, since it invites the exclusion of non-longstanding non-societal culture, and since it does not guarantee that some cultures are as important to humanity as others.

- Taylor believed that Foucault or Derrida would attack him by saying that values are in the end shaped by power (in our view, what Taylor had in mind was rather Rorty's theory of solidarity, [Rorty 1989]). Taylor believed that he would deal with that argument without any difficulty because if recognition was shaped by will to power, it would be more of benevolence than of recognition, and so it would fail to satisfy the claims of the minority groups and ultimately fail as a policy. But if we make difference between Foucault and Derrida, which we should, since they had rather bitter argument and often advocated diverging research policies, we would not fail to see that the principal concern of the regimes of power and knowledge invented by the West European societies were not the values but rather the authenticity, identity, subjectivity. So what could be claimed to have been shaped by will to power are not the values but rather the identities, which multiculturalism takes for granted, as well as the very need for recognition and respect.

If multiculturalism fails to account for those dangers, the goal of its projects could easily turn out to be not the enhancement but the containment of cultural diversity, not cultural equality but rather potential equality masking factual inequality.

I will illustrate the danger by summarizing a postcolonial critique of multiculturalism developed by Rey Chow in her book *Protestant Ethnic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (2002): the benevolent tolerance advocated by multiculturalists has emerged as one of the pillars of the late capitalist biopower; it offers legitimation to a new inequality – between the tolerant cultures and the intolerant ones, and that is an extremely dangerous

inequality since it is able to justify any discrimination or violence against the intolerant cultures as far as it is done in the name of tolerance. What is more, multicultural tolerance succeeds as well at ruling out the possibility to speak of the factual inequality for now the discriminated groups are discriminated in the name of tolerance and therefore any critique of their discrimination would be an attack on toleration (hence the critique could be easily silenced or discriminated by force, again in the name of toleration). In a word, multiculturalist posed a question neglected by liberal philosophers indeed, but not the one of cultural group rights. They rather posed the question how to resist a tolerant violence, or – if we rephrase Foucault – how not to be governed by means of tolerance. [Foucault 1984]

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СОЦИАЛЬНОЕ ПАРТНЕРСТВО КАК СОВРЕМЕННЫЙ ИНСТИТУТ ЭФФЕКТИВНОГО РЕГУЛИРОВАНИЯ ПРОТИВОРЕЧИЙ И КОНФЛИКТА ИНТЕРЕСОВ РАБОТОДАТЕЛЕЙ И НАЕМНЫХ РАБОТНИКОВ В СОВРЕМЕННОЙ РОССИИ

Социальное партнерство в широком смысле слова означает гармонизацию основных интересов различных классов, социальных групп и слоев, в узком смысле – демократические взаимоотношения между работодателями и наемными работниками . С позиции современного обществознания социальное партнерство представляет собой систему цивилизованных отношений, действующую на основе согласования и защиты интересов наемных работников, работодателей, органов власти, местного самоуправления путем договоров и соглашений по актуальным проблемам экономического и социального развития общества (1).

В основе теории социального партнерства лежит идея функционального *представительства* как одного из важнейших каналов взаимодействия различных «групп интересов» и соответствующих экономических объединений не только друг с другом, но прежде всего с государством (2). Сторонники идеологии социального партнерства исповедовали идеи «социального мира», принципиально отличавшиеся от теории «классовой борьбы» К. Маркса. Им были значительно ближе суждения О.Конта о том, что «любое общество держится на согласии умов». Они опирались на этику Л.Фейербаха, на концепцию «гармонизации отношений» Л.Блана и П.Прудона, на идеи Ф. Лассаля и других теоретиков социал-демократического дви-

жения, солидарных со взглядами Э. Бернштейна и таких представителей либерального реформизма, как М. Вирт, О. Михаэлис и др.

В настоящее время развитие социального партнерства связывают с научно-технической революцией, так как произошла определенная интеграция наемных работников в систему капиталистических социально-трудовых отношений, изменилась их классовая психология. И собственники предприятий и компаний в целом отказались от систематического злоупотребления экономической силой и властью, усиливают коммуникации с персоналом. В то же время профсоюзы исходят из необходимости существования юридически оформленных коллективных договоров, расширения своего участия в управлении производством.

Объективным условием реализации концепции социального партнерства служат достаточно высокий уровень благосостояния большинства населения экономически развитых стран и здоровая экономика. Речь идет о наличии *среднего класса*, составляющего большинство жителей процветающих стран, как необходимого условия эффективных партнерских отношений в сфере труда и производства. Ибо лишь в этом случае подавляющее число «групп интересов» адекватно отражает интересы и ценности именно этого базового слоя общества, а не маргинальных или экстремистских групп социума. Помимо отмеченных объективных условий социальное партнерство предполагает не только намерение, но и реальные возможности его основных субъектов – государства, работодателей и наемных работников под руководством профсоюзов – эффективно сотрудничать друг с другом.

Фундаментом концепции социального партнерства является идеология *трипартизма* или трехстороннего сотрудничества основных «игроков» на поле социально-экономического взаимодействия. Помимо равноправия и паритетности всех заинтересованных сторон переговорного процесса в основе социального партнерства лежит ряд других принципов. К ним относятся: принцип *многоуровневого сотрудничества* (на предприятиях, в отраслях и регионах, на федеральном уровне); принцип *добровольного и равноправного партнерства*; принцип *примирительно-третейского и арбитражного разбирательства* трудовых конфликтов; принцип *социальной справедливости*, опирающийся на права и свободы человека.

В соответствии с действующим российским законодательством социальное партнерство – это система взаимоотношений между наемными работниками, работодателями (или их представителями), органами местного самоуправления, направленная на обеспечение согласования их интересов по вопросам регулирования трудовых отношений.

Укрепление системы социального партнерства тормозится целым рядом факторов, к главным из которых относятся: слабо развитые традиции культуры делового партнерства; недостаточная институциональная оформленность его субъектов; неразвитость социальной ответственности всех сторон партнерских отношений вследствие слабости законодательной базы, регламентирующей отношения «собственник – менеджмент – персонал» при заключении коллективных договоров; низкая правовая культура наемных работников и их профсоюзов. Относительно последнего фактора полезным в российских условиях представляется опыт США и Канады, накопленный национальными профсоюзами этих стран в сфере проведения переговоров с менеджментом предприятий с помощью неофициальных посредников. Подобные альтернативные технологии позволяют разрешать трудовые споры в течение нескольких недель, тогда как судебное рассмотрение отнимает годы. Большая роль профессионального посредника в повышении эффективности переговоров при заключении коллективных договоров, при разрешении трудовых конфликтов признается Федерацией независимых профсоюзов России, которая в качестве одного из направлений развития социального партнерства утвердила комплексный план ежегодной подготовки профсоюзных переговорщиков, проведения их обучения и повышения квалификации (3).

Однако при всей важности решения данной задачи оно не ликвидирует всех актуальных практических проблем становления системы социально-трудового партнерства в России. Необходим целостный комплекс взаимосвязанных социально-управленческих мероприятий, которые смогут поднять на качественно более высокий уровень функционирование этого социального института сбалансирования и примирения противоположных экономических интересов сторон социально-трудовых отношений.

В современных условиях в России с функционированием партнерства на различных уровнях существует также так называемые

межсекторное социальное партнерство между «государством – бизнесом» и «институтами гражданского общества – негосударственными некоммерческими организациями». Основными формами социального партнерства являются: коллективные переговоры, договора, соглашения, консультации по вопросам регулирования социально-трудовых отношений; участие работников в управлении организацией; досудебное регулирование социальных конфликтов и трудовых споров. В современной России реализуются несколько моделей социально-трудовых отношений: партнерская, патерналистская, неправовая, которую представляют так называемая теневая «скрытая» и принудительная системы труда.

15 лет развития социального партнерства в России выявили ряд проблемных тенденций, среди которых важнейшими являются следующие (4).

1. Уровень и содержание современного социального партнерства во многом определяется характером взаимодействия частного и государственного секторов в экономике. Частный сектор в известной мере паразитирует на ресурсах госсектора. В нормальной конкуренции отношения секторов должны действовать не по принципу «хищник-жертва» или «хищник-хищник», а образовать систему партнерства. В развитых странах экономическое взаимодействие между секторами служит одним из аргументов, оправдывающих существование госсектора, который выступает в качестве стимула эффективной деятельности бизнеса. В России госсектор явно недостаточно развит, при этом частный сектор стремится эксплуатировать ресурсы и финансы государства в гораздо большей мере, чем свои собственные. Такое положение никак не может быть признано нормальным.

2. Негативно сказывается на состоянии и результативности социального партнерства неразвитость организационно-правовой инфраструктуры трудовых отношений, которые в этом смысле имеют релятивный, условный характер. Новый Трудовой кодекс РФ, введенный сравнительно недавно, не может пока действовать в полной мере, так как для этого необходимо принять ещё 46 законов и реализовать около тысячи поправок. К тому же для нашей страны очень важно вписаться в систему европейского законодательства и соответственно ориентировать свое нормотворчество.

3. Отрицательное влияние на состояние и результативность социального партнерства оказывает несформированность и неопределенность функций института работодателей. Кроме того, не все работодатели готовы к цивилизованным действиям в сфере трудовых отношений, многие из них допускают грубые нарушения трудовых прав работников в виде несвоевременных выплат зарплаты, необоснованных сокращений и увольнений неугодных сотрудников, использование принудительных форм труда и др. В известной мере подтверждением этого является крайне низкий уровень средних затрат на рабочую силу в России по сравнению с развитыми странами мира. Так, в расчете на один отработанный час в 2000году в промышленности Германии они составили – 23 доллара, в Японии – 22 доллара, в США – 19,9 доллара. По расчетам Госкомстата России в 2000 году, этот уровень составлял 1,2 доллара, в 2002 году он вырос до 1,8 доллара. [1]

Удельный вес заработной платы в затратах на рабочую силу растет медленно и составляет в 2002 году 71,8% (в 1995 г. – 60,5%) ; расходы на профессиональное обучение составили 0,3% и не увеличились за два истекших года; на культурно-бытовое обслуживание – 1%; по оплате питания и проживания работника –0,5% или 34,5 рубля в месяц в среднем на одного работника.

4. В современных условиях четко прослеживается тенденция принижения роли профсоюзов на предприятиях, в организациях и ослабление их позиций в сфере социально-трудовых отношений. Это объясняется рядом причин.

Во-первых, происходит вытеснение профсоюзов из сферы экономической, финансовой деятельности предприятий и организаций. Большинство отраслевых профсоюзов лишены необходимой им информации по экономике и финансам под предлогом коммерческой тайны собственников и акционеров компаний.

Во-вторых, профсоюзы в условиях плюрализма форм собственности не осознали объективной противоположности интересов наемных работников и работодателей, предпринимателей, и не научились строить рыночные отношения с новыми экономическими

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[1] Материалы Госкомстата России. О составе затрат на рабочую силу в 2002 году//Общество и экономика. 2004. №1. С.179-191. С.179-180.

партнерами. Если прежде руководители предприятий воспринимали профсоюз как неотъемлемую часть административной системы и как структурное подразделение своего предприятия, то в настоящий период работодатели, предприниматели и профсоюзные лидеры пока лишь созревают для конструктивного диалога друг с другом.

В-третьих, профсоюзные лидеры оказались не готовы к решению задач формирования фонда заработной платы, улучшения условий и охраны труда, реализации социальных гарантий. Профсоюзным работникам не хватает экономических, юридических, политических знаний. Многие из них признают, что не умеют обосновывать свои предложения по совершенствованию оплаты труда, использованию прибыли, что им тяжело оперировать финансово-экономическими показателями. Разумеется, профсоюзные комитеты могут в пределах своей компетенции пригласить независимых специалистов, экспертов, способных профессионально оценить экономическую и социальную ситуацию холдинга, компании, и оказать им соответствующую помощь, но чаще всего не предпринимают такого рода действий.

В-четвертых, ослабление позиций профсоюзных организаций происходит в результате преобладания коньюнктурных, соглашательских, а нередко и коррупционных отношений с работодателями. В результате с молчаливого согласия профсоюзных лидеров подчас применяются внеправовые, насильственные методы решения возникающих проблем, в том числе и во взаимоотношениях с органами государственной власти.

Поскольку подробно рассмотреть все упомянутые тенденции в рамках своего выступления невозможно, остановимся лишь на одном сюжете. Следует сказать, что в сфере социально-трудовых отношений действуют в основном две различные по своей модели концепции – патерналистская и партнерская. Однако некоторые аналитики считают, что они не могут сосуществовать, так как являются антагонистическими по своей природе. Тем не менее они официально реализуются и в нашей стране и в европейских государствах. Реально это означает, что время отказа от одной модели в пользу другой пока не пришло даже в экономически развитых странах. К тому же в системе социального партнерства в России участвуют всего лишь 5-7% хозяйствующих субъектов, то есть предприятий и организаций, имеющих коллективные договора.

Вопрос о национальной модели социального партнерства требует глубокой научной проработки. Поиск данной модели должен идти по принципу осмысления российского и мирового опыта. Причем конструирование новых моделей должно осуществляться не за счет отказа от всех социальных завоеваний, которые были достигнуты ранее, при социализме, а на основе анализа и обобщения работающих социальных технологий управления, которые были разработаны и реализованы на протяжении прошлых десятилетий.

Но реализовать успешно данную модель можно, если изменится менталитет и система ценностных ориентаций работников, работодателей, государственных чиновников, функционеров институтов гражданского общества, и они будут взаимодействовать как системные рыночные акторы. Если также в массовом общественном сознании сформируется позитивный образ партнерских отношений, что позволит действовать по новым «правилам игры».

По мнению ведущих экспертов нынешние партнерские отношения не устраивают ни органы власти, ни бизнес, ни профсоюзы, ни большинство производственных и экономических организаций так называемого «третьего сектора». В более долгосрочном плане социальное партнерство будет претерпевать трансформацию под влиянием новых сил глобализации.

Пока не ясно, какого рода отношения государство – бизнес придут на смену той порочной практике, которая существует сегодня. Тем не менее имеет смысл посмотреть на возможную эволюцию этих отношений в перспективе.

С учетом реализации органами власти разнонаправленных функций поддержки и ограничения возникает четыре возможных варианта развития взаимоотношений государства и бизнеса на основе политики меркантилизма, патернализма, невмешательства и легализма.

Степень поддержки со стороны государства	Высокая	Меркантилизм (налоговая политика)	Патернализм (опека государства)
	Низкая	Невмешательство государства	Легализм (на основе закона)
		Низкая	Высокая

Степень ограничений, налагаемых государством[2]

Согласно данной схеме Россия находится в ситуации, близкой к недостаточно развитой модели невмешательства, в то же время выбор экономической политики в пользу меркантилизма представляется маловероятным. Нет также твердой уверенности, что Россия на следующей стадии развития сдвинется и к патернализму, так как государство пока слабое.

Движение к легализму могут заблокировать чиновники государственного аппарата, но для страны такой вариант может быть вполне осуществимым. В данном процессе государство должно ориентироваться на создание более широких и прозрачных отношений «государство – бизнес», равно как и более эффективных институтов, обеспечивающих власть закона.

В этой связи одной из главных задач современной административной реформы, полагают российские ученые, становится рационализация и упорядочение тех государственных структур, которые прежде использовались в режиме неформальных связей и норм. В данном контексте особую значимость приобретают трех, двух и многосторонние комиссии по урегулированию социально-трудовых отношений. Убедительным примером в этом отношении может быть деятельность Российской трехсторонней комиссии по социально-трудовым отношениям, а также Общественных советов при Президенте РФ по ряду отраслей культуры, образования, науки.

Наряду с этим представляется важной выработка процедур ведения конструктивных переговоров, формирования системы контроля за выполнением достигнутых соглашений, принятия конкретных мер усиления социальной ответственности сторон в системе партнерских отношений.

Социальное партнёрство в современной России стало формироваться под эгидой государства, путем заимствования зарубежных моделей при отсутствии достаточно разработанной концепции социаль-

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[2] См. Ионсонг Ли.(Корея) Российский капитализм в эпоху глобализации: задачи и перспективы// Мировая экономика и международные отношения 2004. №2 С. 42-47.

ного партнёрства, учитывающей российскую специфику [3]. Такая Концепция была подготовлена Министерством труда и социального развития РФ с участием учёных, и после длительных согласований в 1996 г. была утверждена на заседании Российской трехсторонней комиссии по регулированию социально-трудовых отношений. В Концепции были закреплены следующие формы социального партнёрства:

– коллективные переговоры по заключению коллективных договоров и соглашений;

– трёхсторонние (двусторонние) консультации (согласительные комиссии, советы, комитеты, фонды, совещания и т.д.), письменное согласование по проектам нормативных документов;

– участие представителей наемных работников в органах управления организаций (наблюдательных, производственных советах, специализированных комиссиях, комитетах и т.д.);

– урегулирование коллективных трудовых споров;

– упорядочение регистрации коллективных договоров;

– совершенствование процедур присоединения к заключенному соглашению, порядка распространения действия отраслевых (межотраслевых) и профессиональных тарифных соглашений на работодателей, не участвующих в заключении данного соглашения;

– государственная статистическая отчетность в сфере коллективно-договорного регулирования социально-трудовых отношений.

Однако указанная концепция, по мнению некоторых ее разработчиков, не оказала сколько-нибудь заметного влияния на нормализацию социально-трудовых отношений в современной России, и прежде всего в связи с её низким правовым статусом. Если бы концепции придали форму Федерального закона, то её эффективность могла бы быть существенно выше.

Сегодня механизм социального партнёрства определяется Трудовым Кодексом РФ, другими федеральными законами, а также законами субъектов РФ «О социальном партнёрстве». В последних определены виды соглашений, правовой статус, принципы и порядок формирования региональной трёхсторонней комиссии и др.

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[3] См. Киселев В.Н. Российская модель социального партнёрства (Сущность, проблемы, факторы становления). К IV съезду ФНПР. // Труд и социальные отношения. Спецвыпуск научного журнала АТ и СО. - 2001. - С. 103-111.

Профсоюзную сторону в комиссии представляют, как правило, члены совета *территориального объединения* организаций профсоюзов, председатели отраслевых обкомов профсоюза или председатели профкомов наиболее крупных организаций. Решения комиссий принимаются по *соглашению всех сторон*. Проект соглашения обсуждается, как правило, на заседании президиума территориального профобъединения, а предварительно – в профкомах всех или наиболее крупных профорганизаций. Соглашение утверждается на заседании комиссии, при наличии разногласий составляется протокол.

Что касается *региональных отраслевых тарифных соглашений*, то они, как правило, являются двусторонними. В отраслях бюджетной сферы, например, в здравоохранении, оно заключается между департаментом здравоохранения администрации субъекта РФ и обкомом профсоюза работников здравоохранения. Имеется практика заключения в городах (районах) муниципальных соглашений по социально-трудовым отношениям.

В соответствии с Трудовым кодексом, *социальное партнёрство* определяется как система взаимоотношений между работниками (их представителями), работодателями (их представителями), органами государственной власти и местного самоуправления, направленная на обеспечение согласования интересов работников и работодателей по вопросам регулирования трудовых и иных, непосредственно связанных с ними, отношений. В России понятие «социальное партнёрство» впервые использовано в Указе Президента РФ «О социальном партнёрстве и разрешении трудовых споров (конфликтов)» в конце 1991 г. и в дальнейшем стало широко употребляться в практике социального партнёрства.

Система социального партнёрства имеет *структуру,* включающую стороны и субъекты, принципы, уровни и виды соглашений, формы и функции. *Стороны* – работники и работодатели в лице их полномочных представителей. *Субъекты* – стороны и другие участники социального партнёрства (органы государственной власти и местного самоуправления и др.).

Основными принципами системы социального партнерства являются: законность, равноправие сторон, полномочность их представителей, свобода выбора вопросов для обсуждения, добровольность принятия обязательств, их реальность, обязательность и контроль

выполнения коллективных договоров, соглашений, ответственность сторон за их невыполнение и др.

Система социального партнёрства включает следующие 9 уровней (каждому уровню соответствует конкретный вид соглашений по социально-трудовым отношениям [4]):

1. Федеральный (Генеральное соглашение);
2. Федеральный отраслевой (отраслевое тарифное соглашение);
3. Федерально-окружной (федерально-окружное соглашение);
4. Федерально-окружной отраслевой (федерально-окружное отраслевое соглашение);
5. Региональный (региональное соглашение);
6. Региональный отраслевой (региональное отраслевое);
7. Муниципальный (муниципальное соглашение);
8. Муниципальный отраслевой (муниципальное отраслевое соглашение);
9. Уровень организации (коллективный договор).

С мая 2000 г., в соответствии с Указом Президента в РФ функционирует новый уровень в системе государственной власти – федерально-окружной, в 7 федеральных округах назначены представители Президента. Уже в сентябре 2000 г. в федеральных округах были образованы представительства Федерации независимых профсоюзов России (ФНПР), которые стали субъектами федерально-окружной системы социального партнёрства. Сегодня практически во всех федеральных округах приняты двух- или трёхсторонние соглашения, основными задачами которых являются:

– формирование единого экономического пространства,
– обеспечение социальных интересов жителей округа и трудовых прав работников,
– развитие социального партнёрства и др. Указанные соглашения позитивно влияют на социально-экономические процессы в регионах [5].

Социальное партнёрство реализуется в форме: коллективных переговоров по разработке и заключению коллективных договоров и соглашений; взаимных консультаций (переговоров) сторон, обес-

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[4] Вид соглашения указывается в скобках вслед за названием уровня.

[5] Подробнее см.: Киселёв В.Н., Смольков В.Г. Социальное партнерство на уровне федеральных округов. // Труд и социальные отношения. – 2002. – №1. – С. 54-62. - № 2. - С. 85-91.

печения гарантий трудовых прав работников и совершенствования трудового законодательства; участия работников, их представителей в управлении организацией; участия представителей работников и работодателей в досудебном разрешении трудовых споров. [6]

Отечественные учёные еще не выработали общего подхода к пониманию сущности, содержания, структуры, функций и моделей социального партнёрства, в специальной литературе практически *отсутствуют работы, посвященные функциям социального партнёрства.* Для их выявления было проведено *сравнительное исследование* законов субъектов РФ «О социальном партнёрстве» (норм, определяющих задачи социального партнёрства), отличающихся большим многообразием.

Обобщение результатов проведённого анализа позволило выделить следующие функции социального партнёрства: **экономическую, политическую, нормотворческую, организационную и технологическую, контрольную, регулятивную, защитную, охранительную, общественной стабилизации и профилактическую (5)**.

Экономическая функция заключается в реализации социально-ориентированной рыночной экономики, выступающей основой устойчивого развития экономики организаций, отраслей, регионов и т.д., роста доходов и уровня жизни граждан на основе учета и оптимального сочетания интересов сторон социального партнерства. Она включает обеспечение развития экономики области, эффективного механизма регулирования социально-трудовых и связанных с ними экономических отношений;

– обеспечение роста доходов трудящихся по мере стабилизации экономики;

– обеспечение устойчивого развития производства и стабильного повышения уровня жизни на основе учёта и оптимального сочетания интересов сторон социального партнерства;

– создание благоприятных условий для дальнейшего развития производства, экономики и предпринимательства, обеспечения занятости работников на территории субъекта РФ, и т.п.

Политическая функция направлена на обеспечение выработки и реализации социально-трудовой политики в РФ и её субъектах. Она предусматривает:

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[6] Подробнее см.: Бородин И.И. Формы социального партнёрства. // Труд и социальные отношения. – 2004. – № 2. – С. 30-45.

– разработку, принятие и реализация согласованной социально-экономической и социально-трудовой политики;

– обеспечение сбалансированности интересов работников и работодателей;

– совершенствование законодательства, в первую очередь, – в сфере социально-трудовых отношений.

– проведение активной политики занятости и др..

Нормотворческая функция выражается в участии субъектов социального партнёрства в разработке законов и других нормативно-правовых актов РФ и её субъектов, федеральных и региональных программ в области социально-трудовых отношений. К ней относятся:

– участие в подготовке нормативно-правовых актов в сфере социально-трудовых отношений и связанных с ними экономических вопросов;

– расширение правовой основы для развития партнерских отношений в сфере труда, многоуровневого договорного регулирования социально-трудовых отношений, согласования и соблюдения социально-экономических прав и интересов участников трудовых отношений;

– выработка эффективных методов правового регулирования трудовых отношений;

– разработка предложений по совершенствованию законодательства в сфере социального партнёрства.

Организационно-технологическая функция направлена на совершенствование организации системы социального партнёрства, разработку и реализацию социальных технологий функционирования социального партнёрства. Это предполагает:

– подготовку и заключение соглашений, коллективных договоров в соответствии с законодательством РФ и Законом о социальном партнёрстве;

– согласование и учёт социально-экономических интересов работников и работодателей при выработке общих принципов регулирования социально-трудовых отношений;

–создание эффективного механизма договорного регулирования социально-трудовых и связанных с ними экономических отношений.

Контрольная и регулятивная функции призваны обеспечить контроль за реализацией коллективных договоров и соглашений на всех уровнях договорного регулирования социально-трудовых отношений, а также эффективный механизм регулирования социально-трудовых и связанных с ними экономических отношений. Они предполагают:

– достижение оптимального сочетания интересов сторон социального партнёрства, обеспечивающего устойчивое развитие производства и обеспечение мотивации производительного;

– развитие трудовой и предпринимательской активности населения области;

– обеспечение эффективного механизма регулирования социально-трудовых и связанных с ними экономических отношений, проведение коллективных переговоров, взаимных консультаций сторон соглашений с учетом географических, климатических, демографических и других особенностей области;

Защитная функция заключается в разработке и реализации механизмов защиты прав и интересов наёмных работников, других категорий населения**,** что предусматривает:

– предупреждение массовой и сокращение длительной (более одного года) безработицы;

– обеспечение занятости и социальной защиты населения;

– содействие занятости и развитию рынка труда;

– социальную защиту наиболее уязвимых групп населения области.

Охранительная функция направлена на обеспечение охраны жизни и здоровья работников на рабочих местах.

Наконец, **функции общественной стабилизации и профилактики социально-трудовых конфликтов** заключаются в обеспечении социального мира общества на основе объективного учёта интересов сторон и субъектов социального партнёрства, а также – в предотвращении и эффективном регулировании конфликтных ситуаций в сфере трудовых отношений. Сюда относятся:

– усиление роли органов исполнительной власти, объединений работодателей и профсоюзов как социальных партнёров в решении социально-экономических вопросов;

– повышение уровня социальной эффективности деятельности органов государственной исполнительной власти и местного самоуправления.

– предупреждение кризисных явлений и конфликтов в социально-трудовой сфере;

– содействие мирному урегулированию трудовых споров и социальных конфликтов;

Учет и реализация всех этих функций и составляют необходимое условие обеспечения эффективности процесса укрепления и развития социального партнерства в сфере трудовых отношений.

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Ivailo Kutov

BULGARIA'S LONG WAY TO OCCIDENTALISM

The conception of nation is related to unity of origin and cultural development. This same cultural commitment outweighs in the definition, the layer of culture going before the one of origin. Speaking about French, English or German nations, for example, this definition concerns unity of will, culture and legal order. Unity of origin, however, could be applied to these 3 mentions; each of them having endured major "incest": so, Rome and German "blood" joined the Celtic root and the French nation. Anglo-Saxon and Norman-French "blood" joined the British one and the English nation. And Celtic and Slav "blood" joined the German "blood" and German nation. Nevertheless each of these 3 nations has clearly outlined unity in its historical and spiritual life, each of them being united through the medium of language and customs, spiritual culture and historical memory.

Political unity is not *nolens volens* for National unity. One and the same nation can live in a number of states such as a number of nations can live in one and the same state. This comes to explain the difference between nation and people – its connection with state being inherent by origin and conception as its initial meaning is the one of detachment, of a special kind of military detachment (Weigand). This phenomenon exists in the conventional every day communication – for several centuries, for example, the population of Switzerland is named "people" including 3 nationalities.

Since 19th century when the state clearly acts to preserve the people's being and culture (notwithstanding the doctrine veil – conservative, liberal or social-democratic – on the political strategies). Since then the nationality has transformed in a factor or extreme importance for the political and social functioning. Since then the mutual confrontation of the nationalities has increased in the mixed states. The stronger nation strives for domination going to exclusiveness in the frames of the state. Her wish

is to assimilate the national minorities attaching great importance to various forms of language and religious strangulation. The oppressed nations manifest forms of "desperate" resistance and in case of favorable circumstances they search for contacts with their kindred nations outside the state and even with forces inimical to their state.

This way the oppression of the minorities becomes a duty to preservation of the state; the aggression and defense increasing to *circulus vituosus*. And so nations exchange accusations of infamous barbarity about what each of them commits against the national minorities within its frontiers. This logical absurdity is quite clear to understand in psychological aspect: each majority treats as bad and infamous everything that goes against its interests and vice versa – it approves and praises what is of its use or at least seems to be.

Only after the last World War this kind of contradictions become dull in Western countries in favor of truth, justice and cultural prosperity. To our mind this phenomenon has its roots and traditions which will be subject to our later discussion. Suffice it before to notice that instate combinations like Switzerland or the United States and some countries of the historical and cultural space of Western Europe far before the last World War, the equality of rights of peoples and nationalities has become an acknowledged and realized *complex of spiritual standards.*

A new adjustment of cultural traditions and political pragmatism has been achieved in the West European countries. The problem is put to discussion and settled in this way: which factor to be given a chance of superiority – to the freedom from fear and institutional democracy or to the endless struggle for national dominations, incl. to attempts to control of will?

Obviously the conditions of the 18th and 19th centuries permitted some forms of assimilation and cultural abrogation of minorities to be applied. In the course of time these forms of pressure meet an increasing and wiry resistance towards the minorities but the modern constitutional state has not adequate instruments at disposal to oppress the minor nationalities or religions. The dilemma is between the constitutional order and the vicious circle of hostility. Its settlement in the spirit of roots and traditions is in favor of the constitutional order.

And yet why do the centuries-old syndromes of confrontation and outrages in the name of the national and religious exclusiveness lead the

today's movements to confederativism (in the face of the European Community) and powerful push to globalization? The reply is not difficult, it is simple and scientifically valid.

The outstanding socio-cultural areas reflecting today the attenuation of hostility between nations in favor of more general industrial and cultural values have their exact historic and cultural genesis. On the base of this triple genesis (we anticipate to name it) Walter Lippman, Andre Sigfried and others have derived the notion of *atlantism* more than seven decades now on which they project this notion. Which are the supporting points of the *Atlantism*?

These supporting points the above-mentioned and some other research workers find in cultural completeness realized in times long before they unite in construction known in geographical and especially in philosophical plan under the name of *Altantism.*

This cultural completeness is presented by the following:

- ◻ Greec-antique sense of harmony ;
- ◻ Rome state and legal experience and heritage;
- ◻ Judish-Christian dominant of the value of life and the inviolability of person.

These 3 supporting points we accept as generalized and purified from the strata and deviations in their real development. They are worked out for the needs of the system analysis and to profile the difference of the civilization spread from historical and geographical point of vue on the Western Mediterranean and finishing along both costs of the Atlanic. One of the first documents to fix the values of those differentiated civilizations is the well known Atlantic Chart adopted in August 1941 by the Presidents of the United States and the United Kingdom Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill.

But when looking for the ancient roots the historic development and actual dimensions of the Bulgarian national identity some obvious difficulty arises about its localization. In other words, by its substance, content and real movements the notion for Bulgarian national culture could not find its strict definition and peculiarity to particular and wider community. Not only due to centuries-old "incest" on the lands within the confines of the present day Bulgarian state. Without treating any subjects concerning history, anthropology or ethnography we presume only slightly to

outline 2 major factors which even these days act in people's subconscious and influence the nature of the Bulgarian culture and our national self-confidence.

Both factors give one noticeable reply (although incomplete for making conclusion) about the opportunities to outline how far the Bulgarian cultures a distinct expression of the exigible unity in spiritual life and history, united by language and customs, spiritual products and historical memory.

Do the inhabitants of our lands have had ethnic self-consciousness of Bulgarians at the end of the 14th century? (Here I discount some monuments left by rulers who even in series of some modern foreign issues are hardly recognized as sovereigns of state with its inherent attributes.). Later on another question seeks for reply: Why only in Bulgaria do not exist inventories of towns and villages with names and number of families what is a regular practice in the 14th century for Easter Roman Empire (Byzantium), the Ottoman Empire or Serbia? These two facts justify the Ottoman institutions to not recognize officially the Bulgarian nationality up to 1870, as well as the latest start of the Bulgarian National Revival which takes shape not on the background of revolutionary cataclysms like elsewhere on the Balkans but as a cultural and historical fact of aspiration for national recognition. This process makes progress moved by Bulgarian elites (mostly religious and worldly, but also foreign – by American missionaries in Constantinople). The broad lower layers of the population have not been very active and stimulated the Revival much more lead by life motive and less because of conscious impulse to national identity.

All this (incl. the other nationalities on the Balkans) development of the Bulgarian history gives its logical reflect on the national self-confidence and culture through the decades to follow after the Liberation. Then many factors accumulate and motivate the strong impulse of this young state and this new and young society. Just in the 70-ies starts the American whw\eat invasion on the European and other markets, the geographic situation leaving Bulgaria in the "feet" of the "Great Bear" (Russia).

Although the unfavorable factors the era of Ferdinand I (up to 1912) marks an unprecedented progress for Bulgaria (as compared to her neighbours and more distant partners as well as to the entire new Bulgarian history) but in the field of culture this "progress" is not so rich in con-

tent. The poet and Nobel laureate of literature for 1948 Thomas Elliot in *Notas para la definicion de la cultura*, Madrid,1947 outlines that culture interwins with all transformations in society. His doctrine is based on the conception of the *grading society* in which *the elites are the highest form of expansion*.

To his mind the scheme is obvious and finally comes down to the conservative function of culture. Family is the most important element in the process of transmission of culture; no matter for the British poet the levels of culture and strata – if there is a will to avoid "decrease" of culture and preservation of the national identity, culture must be handed down as expression of one and the same interests, attractions and way of life.

If I remember Elliot it is to focus once more the attention on the Bulgarian cultural development after the Liberation. No doubt his doctrine is applicable to societies with crystallizes as a result of centuries-old layers of authentic, social, industrial and customs individualism. This kind of individualism in favor of society is mostly typical for the spirit and practice of Occidentalism. But it hardly could find positive consequences in the Bulgarian conditions – since old times to nowadays – mostly because of lack of pronounced Bulgarian identity to be compared to one more universal area of culture.

So if we agree with Thomas Elliot (and also with many other protagonists on the same thesis) about elites we can not apply this same thesis to Bulgaria as a pattern of cultural policy. At the beginning of 20th century yet Bulgaria has bright particular spiritual elite whose main body and engine is presented by the Missal ("Thought") circle. Its adherents dream for the "spreading" and adoption of Occidentalism in Bulgaria as ideal for cultural, logical, spiritual and social life. Their efforts are not successful even in the period of unique industrial, politic and cultural progress (acknowledged as substantial expansion of the opportunity for touch with cultural welfare of wide social layers) up to 1912. The principal lack of clearly pronounced politic will and strategy to occidental orientation of Bulgaria comes from the permanent maneuvers of Ferdinand I and Bulgarian executive authorities between Western Europe and Russia. Even more, Bulgarian authorities lack the purposeful policy of Russian rulers after Peter I and his successors, who converted Russia to authentic cultural inheritor of Europe with leading European personalities in the field of culture.

Just the opposite, Bulgarian policy as a whole (partly justified by our geographic situation) abandoned the country on the cultural periphery of Europe in quality of non-identified crystal between Occidentalism and Orientalism and under the overdosed Eurasian influence of Russia. There is no Bulgarian Nobel laureate among the basic Christian nations on the Balkans (in 2006 Turkey joined this laureate society with the prize for literature). How formal this criterion can be, several dozens of similar lacks of recognition could be mentioned.

To summarize, the conclusion outlines that without determined political will and inner political consensus, our national culture is doomed to be accepted as foreign to the spirit of *Atlantism*. One purposeful culture; policy is not allusion to one based on orders and commands. The most difficult problem in joining the Atlantic values comes from the everyday data that we are far from achieving sincere consensus to our full value cultural presence in the NATO and the European Community. As a result if we paraphrase one Rumanian analyzer from the latest weeks – the occidentalization of Bulgaria for the Atlantic world will be as difficult as the present-day mission of the United States to democratize the whole Islamic world.

II. Philosophy of Science, Ontology, Epistemology and Logic

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
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN EDUCATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF CONTEMPORARY SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

Abstract: According to the standard 20th century view of scientific culture ('naturalism'), that was to provide the principal world-view to be transmitted through educational practice value and meaning constitute no part of the real world, and are undesirable in development of uniform rational autonomy of individuals through education. In line with more recent educational trends of individualistic initiation into social practices through education, all in service of increasing potential for satisfaction of individual wants, 'naturalist' world-view is portrayed as short-changing the individual student in dealing with the totality of experience (which includes value judgements and sentiments of worth). Three discernible but connected issues are addressed in this context: (1) general legitimacy of scientific knowledge to be transmitted through education, (2) legitimacy of the primacy of scientific ('naturalist') world-view in educational practice, and (3) effectiveness of transmission of scientific knowledge through educational presentation. It is suggested that modified 'naturalism' that incorporates open acknowledgment of values inherent in and attributed to scientific knowledge, as well as limits the scope of its world-view in education, can provide a genuine interest in, as well as understanding of and respect for, science (and its technological achievements) amongst the students, without drawing the charges of inadequacy or dogmatic indoctrination.

Key words: scientific knowledge, values, naturalist world-view, education, relativist critique, circularity of justification, scientific explanation

What is, across Europe now, accepted as worthy of educational transmission is the procedural and propositional knowledge and values[1]. In some areas of education (e.g. civics, citizenship education, and compulsory political education) the latter are of primary importance, and it is on them that the uncertain knowledge of each individual can rest and be evaluated. Whether or not this programme can indeed be successful, at first glance it does not seem to be a route open for the natural sciences education, as it should follow aims of its practiced discipline in being value free.

According to the 20th century 'standard' view educational transmission of scientific knowledge is compelled to follow the canon of general scientific culture (Cooper calls this 'naturalism', and though a rough sketch it will serve for illustration here):

- " the world is the natural world as depictable, in principle, by the natural sciences;
- human beings are entirely natural elements within that world;
- as value and meaning are not entertained by natural scientific enquiry, they constitute no part of the world, but are, say, 'projections' onto it by those unusual creatures, us;
- the realm of knowledge is exhausted by knowing that certain things are the case and by knowing how to do things, as there is no room in the naturalistic account of the world and ourselves for an understanding of the way of things which *eo ipso* bears with it a 'skill in living';
- understanding should be understood as it paradigmatically is among the scientists, in terms of submission to canons and criteria endorsed in a community of enquirers in which public, open debate reigns;
- an important ideal – this time not 'projected', but implicit in an exemplary way in scientific practice – is that of rational autonomy of mind, achievable (unparadoxically) through participation in public, criteria-governed modes of enquiry." (Cooper, 1998:30-31).

Thus the theoretical task in education, most notably natural sciences education, was to train the uninitiated mind in developing its rational autonomy to be applied to certain spheres of experience (Cooper, 1998:32).

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[1] Or at least an inclination to attain 'valuables', those things that are imbued with value.

We can raise at least three discernible but connected issues here, with a proviso that a solution proposed for any of those will heave a bearing on the other two. The first is the issue of the overall legitimacy of scientific knowledge, especially when criticised by the relativist denials of the universality of scientific world-view. This, though, is an issue for general philosophy of science, not just its sub-class that ventures into education. The other is of the legitimacy of primacy of scientific knowledge, or at least the scientific knowledge ideal, in the educational practice (e.g as it is sketched in the 'naturalist' position above). Of course a firm resolution of the first issue, draws consequences for the second one, as it is not one of mere pragmatic choice conducted by the educational policy makers, but of the genuine conflict for supremacy between different world-views. Finally, there is a pragmatic issue of the most desirable (e.g. efficient, if efficiency is desirable) way of educational transmission of any given body of scientific knowledge. Based on the success in achieving the defined pragmatic goal, resolution of this issue bears heavily on the second one as well. Naturally the second issue, the one of world-view primacy and its presentation and elaboration in education, also bears consequences for the third one (c.f. Cooper, 1998 and Hodson, 1998).

With regards to the issue of primacy of scientific education Cooper maintains that the opinions of US Pragmatists (James, Dewey, Putnam) ought to be instructive: when deciding between whole philosophical standpoints, questions of value legitimately intervene. Thus, all such standpoints that can be shown to reinforce "a bad culture" should be abandoned "and only an artificial dichotomy between ethics and epistemology prevents people from recognizing this" (Cooper, 1998:36). Cooper uses this to conclude that since the 'naturalist' world-view offers no guide through "the experience of rightness and wrongness, […], the significance or insignificance of what there is in the world", and yet those are some of the essential components of our culture, of our everyday lives even, it deserves to be abandoned in the wake of a "reflection on a pre-theoretical experience of the 'lived world'" (Cooper, 1998:38).[2]

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[2] This is not to say that legitimacy of scientific knowledge is denied altogether, it is also not an argument against teaching science in schools, it merely advocates that such education be confined to an enclosed niche within the educational system.

Thus, the resolution of the third and pragmatic issue, in this case perhaps providing education that best adheres with the everyday experience, decides on the second issue as well by minimising the overall role of the 'naturalist' world-view in the educational process. For the sake of brevity, we can only warn of the practical problems facing such a solution, from the apparent lack of definition of what exactly "pre-theoretical experience of the 'lived world'" calls for to the conceptual and experiential difficulties of uninitiated approach to science (scientific world-view, though best justified for some spheres of experience is not straightforward and most obvious one to come by for a novice) (cf. Hodson, 1998).

More importantly, in advocating education according to the world view that acknowledges the role of values to achieve universal applicability, one must incorporate an assumption that there is a universally acceptable distillate of values that are appropriate for all humans and whose appropriation by students does not represent mere indoctrination. And this assumption is getting harder to justify in the contemporary western societies committed to value pluralism, as the condition they end up providing practically spells, through full-blown relativism, the end of any education based on values. This position turns out to be more damaging than liberating for an individual, as it is desirable to instil in students (for, among others, pragmatic reasons outlined above) a set of values and show them that morality in general is more than an arbitrary choice between conflicting alternatives. On the other hand, the value-pluralistic view is not an accidental by-product, but is a fact about contemporary society, as well as an outcome of application of reason to conduct of daily life. It is hard, if at all possible, to reasonably justify a choice of any given set of values over and above the said alternatives (Mendus, 1998).

Wider educational application of the above deliberations may be roughly illustrated by the turn in educational philosophy of Paul Hirst. In 1993 Hirst charts the transition in his educational philosophy from the dominance of analytical philosophy and rationalism in the 60s and 70s towards the 90s primary concern with social practices. This is partly due to realization that the former development of uniform rational individuals is detached from the real biological and psychological demands of human nature, as well as neglectful of individuality of every student. The latter utilitarian ideal of maximising the overall personal satisfaction in the society sees rationality as mere guide and not a means in itself. Education,

then, is more than an acquisition of knowledge; it is an initiation into rationally enhanced social practices to secure the most efficient satisfaction of wants. Propositional theoretical knowledge here is of great importance in securing the wide-reach and efficacy of beneficial practices, but is only a second order category built out of critical reflection on first order satisfaction of practical wants (Hirst, 1993).

In the light of the above we might want to argue that 'naturalist' worldview (though, of its own admission, aiming to be value free) incorporates the most universal and, in at least some domains of experience, beneficial social practice available today (cf. second issue above). Though initiation into social practices focused on the development of individuals is not founded solely upon transmission of theoretical scientific knowledge, such knowledge, as enshrined in the Western scientific practice, will prove to be of the most universal benefit. Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond argues in 2006, that if that may be so it is not because of some necessarily universal validity of Western science, but solely due to the contingent fact of its contemporary dominance in the global social practices. He bases such claim both on the overview of alternative, and in their own context successful, scientific practices through history, as well as the claim that some cultures have achieved dominance despite turning their back on scientific development (most notably Ancient Rome) (Lévy-Leblond, 2006:28; also Hodson, 1998:204). Accepting some such argument, we may still legitimise initiation into scientific social practice (sadly leaving that term in itself insufficiently explored, save for Cooper's summary above), but not for the reasons such practice ascribes to itself.

Such criticism can be further used to legitimise the abandonment of the 'naturalist' methodology as it cannot guarantee the provision of sufficiently broad understanding of experience, for it deliberately leaves out an important segment of it (the value-based aspect). This acknowledges the failure of scientific attempts to strip the knowledge-gathering of all inessential disturbance and thus 'speak the language of the world' (cf. first issue above). 'Relativist'[3] critique demands that such thoroughgoing aim be

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[3] This is just a sketch-name for purposes of illustration. It is hard to group so many different positions under one umbrella, and throughout this text the term is used to cover such schools/positions as postmodernists, hermeneutics, constructivists and the like.

abandoned (to a varying degree depending on how radical the authors are) based on two 'philosophical' theses: (1) that there is no mechanical recipe for obtaining knowledge (based on the problem of satisfactory analysis of knowledge in epistemology and philosophy of science), and (2) that no decision can be made between competing explanatory conceptual schemes (leading to a form of epistemological and ontological relativism) (Luntley, 1995). As humans we do not seem to have a universal access to truth over and above the reasons, proofs and justifications we explicitly assent to.

'Naturalism' can, on the other hand, accept that all processes of knowledge production and codification are social ('cultural') and as such bear the marks of their context of production. Once we accept that all knowledge is social in character, then this very fact stops being the demarcation criterion used in evaluation of knowledge. But the fact that all knowledge is socially produced does not mean that all knowledge is epistemologically (philosophically, theoretically) the same. For there is a crucial difference between production of knowledge and its *emergent properties*, we must see that even though socially produced, knowledge has the power to *transcend* the conditions under which it has been created (Moore, 2000). Thus different knowledge can have different not-socially-constructed value (along some widely-applicable scale) associated with it. Such legitimation of scientific knowledge can be used to bear on the questions of the role of the associated world-view in educational practice.[4]

An attempt to provide a foundation (to be used in legitimation of scientific knowledge) requires some conception of truth (and, perhaps, some conception of reality) without the presupposition of access to, or even the existence of, a 'cosmic register of truths'. The solution most commonly proposed (e.g. by Luntley, 1995) has a limited scope with respect to a great many contemporary scientific theories (thus, perhaps, failing to be a workable solution at all) as it requires an agreement on a very basic

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[4] Consider for example: "The emergent property of knowledge is itself intrinsically *social* – it is something that *people* do in a particular, socially organised, way. It depends upon a distinctive 'configuration' […] of values, principles and social procedure that became institutionalised and achieved sufficient autonomy from traditional sites of power (the state, religion) to constitute itself as a culture and model of social organisation in its own right (crucially, in the ancient universities of the West in the early modern period)." (Moore, 2000:32).

and limited conceptual scheme derived from a limited range of everyday observable phenomena: an ontology of limited size material bodies in space and time. An arduous task is then placed before scientific theories to rigorously prove that the complex (and often entirely novel) ontologies of contemporary scientific theories are in a satisfactory manner built on the aforementioned (common-sense) conceptual scheme. In that they seem to be expected to continuously follow a simple (mechanistic) metaphor of extended objects with physically defined properties and potentials that provide a causal construction for a series of specific events whose consequence may be open to experience, or may entice further events, and which consequence follows from *the nature* of the objects (Turney, 2004:218).

But Kitcher complained that 'causal relatedness' is dependent on 'explanatory success' and not vice-versa. "In learning to talk about causes […] we are absorbing earlier generations' views about the structure of nature" (Kitcher, 1989). He, thus, strongly advises comparative unification of explanation, a way to economise the expenditure of thought, as the foremost defence against radical relativism. According to such an account explanatory value ('explanatoriness' in Kukla & Walmsley, 2004), particularly as part of potentially all encompassing unified account, is the crucial emergent value-bearing property of scientific knowledge.

Bear in mind, though, that the 'relativists' have not proven (according to the above sketch, they have not even tried as much) that the true states of affairs do not exist. Their criticism of knowledge rests on a claim that such states of affairs are not directly and inherently accessible to human enquiry. Though history of philosophy and science warn us that the ways in which we conceptualise the world, what we ground our experiences in, can be susceptible to human fleeting interests, it is still reasonable[5] to

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[5] Of course, relativists may cry foul here, and claim that what we may find reasonable or unreasonable is not universal but a product of our social and historical context. In a possible parallel context then it may not at all be reasonable to assume that the correctness of our conceptualisations of the world depends on some ideally objective and real state of affairs, but on the whim of some omnipotent being, the workings of the reality generating deception machine or some such. Even this much may be conceded here, providing we keep in mind that none of our friends or foes, no member of our, or any other community we may come

assume that whether these conceptualisations are correct or not, whether they are true or false, depends primarily not on how we are inclined to construct them but on *the state of affairs in the real world* (cf. Carr, 2003:130).[6] These are unavoidable constrictions in every construction of knowledge, and a concept of 'value' that respects those could provide the grounding for cross-cultural applicability of the 'naturalist' world-view in at least some domains of experience. Alternatively, perhaps the said constrictions can provide the criteria of evaluation to adjudicate the worth of different segments of knowledge or pretenders to the title.

A more detailed examination of the 'naturalist' canon above may allow for its modification that combines the epistemological fallibilism with ontological realism, and gives some idea of specific concept of value that is rooted in 'naturalist culture'. There are limitations placed on knowledge by the independently existing reality though that knowledge itself is, at least in part, socially constructed (Smith and Hodkinson, 2002).[7] Just as we are not in everyday life the fully rational creatures idealised by the 'naturalist' picture, so the great technological advances based on contemporary science and used in everyday life of most cultures today cannot be attributed solely to chance or radical social constructivism, and the *novel predictions* of phenomena arising from contemporary science are unparalleled in their reliability by other cultural practices operating in the same domain of experience. Paraphrasing Goldman's more technical account, scientif-

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to interact with, is or can be such an omnipotent being or machine. The issue is not whether we are mistaken, or even deliberately deceived, about the detailed structure of some independent reality, but whether such a reality, as independent of our actions and will, does or does not exist.

[6] According to Carr the fallacious blurring of the distinction between truth and judgement is to blame for consequential epistemic relativism (*ibid.)*.

[7] Furthermore, and this is especially important for science education, we have to be aware of a difference between knowledge as fact and knowledge as explanation of the given fact (Carr, 2003:129). The two are seldom interchangeable for they may carry a vastly different deal of conviction (a fact may be objectively accepted and verified, though its explanation may not be). Within scientific world-view there is currently a varying degree of success of provision of explanation. Thus, the hard-to-defend examples need not carry conviction against the whole enterprise.

ic practices are more reliable predictors of interaction with the external world than any set of non-scientific practices available to human beings in answering the sorts of questions that science seeks to answer (Goldman, 1999:247). But in educational context a sociologically motivated fact that scientific research and utilization of its products are not value-free cannot be ignored (Hodson, 1998:203).

On the other hand it is frivolous to lump all relativist critique in the band of vulgar relativism ascribing all interpretations of sensory experience to a contingent set of social conventions. Serious relativist critique does not advocate an 'anything goes' scenario, but merely demands that we abandon the false hope of reading the cosmic register of truths (now and for ever in the future). We are still free to make judgements and prefer some things to other, and will continue to do so. But they warn of a circle in naturalist reasoning (a circle that may or may not be vicious): to know the true state of affairs we must have a procedure distinguishing true from false appearances, to know that the said procedure is reliable we must know that it is successful in distinguishing the true from false appearances, but to know the latter we must already know (via some other method) which appearances are true and which are false (i.e. know what the true state of affairs is) (Smith and Hodkinson, 2002:293, attributing the precise formulation to Chisholm, 1973). Similarly, Kukla and Walmsley, 2004, argue that explanatoriness provided by science cannot be used as value in any argument that seeks to establish the values behind belief in scientific claims. Thus, we cannot too easily smuggle in some sort of value foundationalism to replace the epistemic one, but could perhaps offer different evaluative criteria for different stages of the supposed circle.

Though it would be too ambitious to expect that any proposed approach to our third issue above can in and of itself provide a cogent solution to the first two, a tentative proposal may still be put forth. It seems that it is important to teach about science alongside of teaching science itself (cf. Hodson, 1998: 209-210).[8] This may allow us to escape from un-

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[8] Though, we must also bear in mind Hodson's methodological aspects of this general proposal: "[…] I recognise that telling students, too early, that scientific inquiry is context-dependent and idiosyncratic could be puzzling, frustrating and even off-putting." (Hodson, 1998:210).

desired epistemological relativism, into seemingly less problematic ethical relativism: science, like any other cultural practice, has its own set of values which are most appropriate to its limited aims (and for the purposes of contemporary education those can in fact be limited) and which allow every individual student to ground the knowledge appropriate upon the tentative adoption of those values (e.g. Goldman's veritistic aim, 1996: VIII). We must of course be careful to distinguish which sense of 'value' we wish to associate with scientific knowledge in education, whether instrumental value, value *per se*, intrinsic value etc. (Kirschenmann, 2001). Furthermore, any such programme must be wary of the general problem of universality of values, the problem of circularity in relying on explanatory unification to be enshrined as a value, and the weak sense of 'value' as pragmatic means to practical ends.

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Anguel S. Stefanov

PHILOSOPHY AND REASON: CONTINUING MARRIAGE, OR A COMING DIVORCE?

In so far as the title question presupposes *tendencies*, wished or not, achievable or not, a conclusive answer to this question could hardly be produced "here and now". What is possible, however, is the consideration of philosophical claims and modes of philosophizing that might *envisage* a definite answer, as well as the assessment of their efficiency, though in a curt and a sketchy way, with respect to their conceptual influence. I shall turn my attention to the contemporary philosophical receptions of three key themes to this effect: reason, thought, and rationality.

Reason

Even now, I presume, the contention that philosophy is drifting apart from reason would bring a discomfort to a lot of people tempted by philosophy. Yet whether this is so, or not, depends on one's definition of philosophy, on the way one understands the subject of philosophy. I shall hardly be wrong if I say that different realizations of philosophy depend on their supposed attitude to reason. If reason were accepted to be a superior cognitive faculty for human knowledge, and/or a legislator of human actions and deeds, then the marriage of philosophy and reason would continue to be flourishing. A reliable witness of this was Thomas Hobbes who taught in the 18-th century that philosophy was the activity of the natural human reason to investigate the order of all created things, their causes and effects. If, however, philosophy is construed to be a mere activity for concept creation, as G. Deleuze and F. Guattari have suggested, or is reduced to a kind of therapy, as R. Rorty has insisted, then the divorce of philosophy and reason is doubtlessly notified. There are philosophers who reject the cognitive role of reason even in the development of science

that is traditionally accepted to be a paradigmatic example of a rational enterprise. P. Feyerabend's "Farewell to Reason" was succeeded by a steady wave of relativism and social constructivism. This, in its turn, resulted in a reaction of realistically minded philosophers and scientists who produced instructive readings like the well known collection *The Flight from Science and Reason*.[1]

But what are the reasons in favour of the divorce, and are they reliable?

I shall divide them into two different types. The first type are articulated arguments concerning the contemporary intellectual situation, the situation at least since the end of the 60ies of the 20-th century, influenced by new economic, social, and cultural changes. As Jean-Marie Domenach puts it:

L'individualisme déchaîné pose en somme le même problème à la politique et à l'épistémologie. Comment, d'une "pluralité de mondes inter-reliés mais incommunicables", tirer une unité de vues et d'action?[2]

The postmodern claim was raised that grand philosophical systems should be abandoned, that we now share a new form of intellectual life where the conceptual structures of these systems are already void of sense. Grand philosophical systems from Plato, through Descartes and Kant, to Hegel and Marx are, however, based on metaphysical thinking incorporating reason; so, a rejection of those and similar systems would imply a rejection of reason playing a central role in philosophy. And this is not regretful at all, other authors contend, adding to the first, a second claim, to the effect that grand schemes of reason inevitably lead to some kind of totalitarianism.

The first claim is doubtful in many respects, but I'll touch on here a practical one. Contemporary philosophers, sharing the claim, could be viewed *not to follow their own instruction*. They can willingly reject Hegel's philosophy for instance, and at the same time, not less willingly, can embrace Heidegger's philosophy, in spite that the latter displays no difference in its pretension to be a fundamental ontology. An objection that reason is conceptually engulfed by the grand question about the sense of Being, is losing strength against the background of Heidegger's chief intention.

The intention to have a look back at the ancient Greek philosophy as a way of life. The authentic arrangement of the Cosmos that was believed to be both perfect and reasonable defined the ancient views about the world. The present situation, as some wise thinkers notice, is just the opposite. Different contemporary world views, "incommunicable worlds" – to use the locution of Jean-Marie Domenach – define different pictures of the Universe.

As *the second claim* is concerned, the thesis that schemes of reason always lead to some kind of totalitarianism, I adhere to the following reflection:

A possible *correction* to this thesis, as it seems to me, may turn it from an incontestable claim into a mere useful *warning*. In the latter form this thesis will assert that schemes of reason *might* lead, in certain social and/or cultural contexts, to some kind of totalitarianism. In other words, reason is in no way causally related to a dogmatic order of thought, or a totalitarian practice, that allegedly appear in the end of its systematic application… What makes me believe in the plausibility of the corrected thesis, is *the critical power of reason*.[3]

The second type of motivation in favour of the divorce comprises influential ways of philosophizing that are not characteristic of some new born intellectual trend, but that have been present throughout the whole history of philosophy. What I mean here is the observation of David Hume on *the different species of philosophy*. The one, called by him "easy and obvious philosophy", pays special heed to the evaluation of human actions in different situations of ordinary life, and considers man "as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment".[4] The other species of philosophy, called "accurate and abstruse", is of a speculative brand. Philosophers who subscribe to it consider man as a reasonable, rather than an active being.

It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and abstruse; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more useful than the other… The fame of Cicero flourishes at present; but that of Aristotle is utterly decayed. La Bruyere passes the seas, and still maintains his reputation: But the glory of Malebranche is confined to his own nation, and to his own age. And Addison, perhaps, will be read with pleasure, when Locke shall be entirely forgotten.[5]

If David Hume could have proved to be right in his prognosis about the future of philosophy of his times, the divorce between philosophy and reason might be a fact in our days. Fortunately, it is not. But let me remember that Hume's observation reflects two real and live tendencies in philosophy. We witness them today even in more sharp contours. And if the metaphysical tradition – to mention Hume's own examples of Aristotle, Malebranche, and Locke – has not been forgotten, this is maybe due to the fact that reason has persisted to be a good lover to philosophy, so that their marriage is still happily lasting.

Thinking

Reason would be an odd philosophical notion, if there were no possibility of ascribing either some ontological status to a thinking subject, or some *unity* to consciousness that could "possess" objects of thought. Descartes has made the classical philosophical step in this direction by his *cogito ergo sum*, setting up "the age of reason" in modern European philosophy. The task of thinking is to think objects, to give meaning to different objects and their interrelations. But the result of thinking is dubious without the self-assurance about the reality of a thinking essence, as a thinking mind. For this reason Cartesian philosophy gave priority not to the "first", but to the "second" cognitive intention, to the intention directed not to external objects, but to the thinking that thinks its own thinking. Through this second cognitive intention the notion of a thinking selfhood is created, whose existence is beyond any doubt, and whose substantive presence guarantees the existence of all knowable external objects. The philosophical notion of a thinking mind has been later developed into the Kantian concept of a transcendentally constituted knowing subject.

A similar philosophical operation is relinquished, however, by a postmodern phenomenological project, known also as hermeneutic ontology. It is rooted in Heidegger's fundamental ontology, and pretends to be aiming at revealing the sense of being, hidden by the reflective philosophy of modernity. The criticism of this project is directed towards the possibility of a self-reflective thinking, towards the transcendental way of substantiating the possibility of knowledge.

What makes the phenomenological project to seem quite promising is its main contention about the uncovering of an authentic world, in the

sense that every phenomenon is self-revealing, and not formally constituted by consciousness. The being of man is thus understood as a being that is revealing the being. Man has a direct cognitive access to things in the world, they are not concealed as "things in themselves" by the curtain of their appearance, and truth is grasped as openness.

If this is so, however, the role of reason in the phenomenological project is greatly diminished in the process of theoretical knowledge, even if not as a "practical" reason, presenting moral grounds for every human choice. Thus phenomenology would hardly fulfil the role of an epistemological project. If one is reluctant to explain the history of scientific knowledge solely as a change of human horizons of meaning, then one must pay heed to the capacity of the "good old" speculative reason. At the least, because the latter is the source of heuristic ideas. They suggest the constitution of contemporary scientific fields by the help of pure theoretical concepts, which rarely have observable referents. And this is valid both for the micro- and the mega-world, explained by theoretically constructed, and not by self-showing phenomena (quarks, multi-dimensional space-times, superstrings, etc.).

Rationality

Reason and rationality are so closely related, that the popular definition of an irrational behaviour states that the latter is not guided by reason. I shall stick here to the general assumption that rational behaviour *is* guided by reason, i.e. it complies with a set of consistent rules and some aim(s) to be followed. Problems appear, however, if either we accept that rationality displays more vices than virtues, or give a negative answer to the question "is there only one type of rationality?"

There was a time when a negative answer to the last question would seem to be impossible – a time, reigned by what is popular today as classical rationality. A negative answer during that time was unthinkable, because any other form of rationality would have destroyed reason, and thus would have appeared as a hidden form of irrationality. Now the situation has greatly changed, and we face a whole divergent field of possible philosophical views, pretending to supersede classical rationality.

▫ *Non-classical rationality*. In fact, if one concedes a non-classical rationality, then the possibility is tacitly opened for many non-classical

rationalities. Some philosophers contend that they are related with different non-classical logics, or that the latter are their explications. True, or not, this additional claim is not a direct solution to the key problem *how different types of rationality could be held together by one consistent reason*. Since the problem is shifted to the sphere of defining the status of logics themselves: are they a *canon* of reason, an *organon* of reason, mere descriptive formal languages, or something else?

- *Flight from rationality*. I concede that such a flight is also a flight from reason, and assume that anyone who undertakes this adventure must present and defend his arguments (if not willing to remain silent), so that we must not expect arguments on beside of the representatives of opposite views.
- *Relativism*. A possible, but methodologically week position.
- *Critical rationalism*. The closest philosophical stance to classical rationalism.

We can easily see the need of philosophical care and work here, if we are willing to defend the right of reason. Yet a final conclusion after what has been said up to now, could hardly be seen to support the claim that philosophy is going to say farewell to reason, if it still pretends to account for the possibility of human cognitive contact with the world.

Notes and references

1. Gross, P.R., N. Levitt, and M. W. Lewis (eds.), *The Flight from Science and Reason*. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 775, June 24, 1996. See also Noretta Koertge (ed.), *A House Built on Sand. Exposing Postmodernist Myth about Science*. Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, 1998.

2. "The unchained individualism poses in general the same problem to politics and to epistemology. How, from "a plurality of inter-related, but incommunicable worlds", to draw a unity of views and of action?" (my translation). Jean-Marie Domenach, *Enquête sur les idées contemporaines.* Éditions du Seuil, 1981, p.115.

3. Angelov, S., "Will Philosophy Become Estranged from Reason in the 21st Century?", *News and Views*, N 5 (April, 2005), Yerevan – Athens – Berkeley, pp.3-4.

4. Cf. Hume, David, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh*. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianopolis, 1977, p.1.

5. Ibid., pp.2-3.

Howard Robinson

PROBLEMS FOR THE POWERS CONCEPTION OF MATTER: AN ARGUMENT FOR IDEALISM REVISITED

The idea that the material world has to be conceived of as consisting ultimately only of powers – forces, energies, dispositions and the like – is probably the most common current conception of materiality. (See, for example, Blackburn (1990), Harre (1970; 1986), Harre and Madden (1975), Martin (1997), Molnar (2003).) Indeed, it can be argued that that is the only conception of matter available (Robinson (1982). As has been recognized from the eighteenth century, however, this conception faces serious problems (Hume (1978)). I argued against this account of matter in Robinson (1982), and I want now to review the argument, in the light of later responses.

In outline the case against the powers conception of matter is as follows.

A power is a power to produce some effect, but if everything is a power, it is the power to produce another power (presumably by modification of a power-entity already present, not by creation of a power from nothing). Why this leads to a regress can be seen as follows. Let us call the first power A̲. We only know what A̲ is if we know what kinds of thing the actualization of its potentiality give rise to. In other words, we only know what A̲ is if we know what it is a power to do, what states would constitute its manifestation. Let us call the power which A̲ is the power to produce, 'B̲'. So what A̲ is, is the power to produce B̲. But this is not informative unless we know the nature of B̲. B̲, being a power, is the power to produce some further power state, call it C̲. (We could close the circle and say that it is the power to produce a power of kind A̲, but then we would be in a circle of the kind to which Hume objected in his account of solidity.) It seems

that we are moving into a regress. You can understand what a power is only by reference to a further power, of which one has no specific conception unless you know the power state which would be its effect, and so on. And though I have stated this argument in terms of what we could know, the argument is not essentially epistemological. One could equally well say that what the nature of $\underline{A}$ $\underline{is}$ depends on what it is a potentiality for, for what a power is, is given by what it is a power to do. What it is a power to do is a function of what would constitute its manifestation, and if the nature of this latter can have no determinate expression, neither can the power which is defined in terms of it.

If the physical realist is committed to the powers conception of matter, and if that conception is radically defective, then the physical realist is in trouble. Furthermore, his opponent will point out that, if the pure powers conception is vicious, then the powers that are supposed to constitute matter must produce something which is not itself a power, but a monadic quality. And such qualities are to be found as sensible qualities in the sense-fields of perceivers. So the physical world is a structured capacity to give rise to experience, and this is an idealist conception.[1] We must look more closely at the regress argument to see whether it is really vicious.

Disputes about whether a particular regress or circle is vicious tend to be between those who say that, so long as one can always name the next element along the line, the regress is not vicious, and those who say that, unless the process can be completed, nothing contentful has been proposed. There are regresses of both kinds and the problem is to decide into which camp a particular regress falls.

The crucial issue seems to be whether the content of the early members of the series depends on the content of the later. Here is an example of a regress where the content of the earlier members do not depend on the later: if it is true that $\underline{p}$, then it is true that it is true that $\underline{p}$, and so on. No-one, so far as I know, thinks that this is a vicious regress. The reason is that neither the content of, nor our understanding of the content of, the assertion that $\underline{p}$ is true depends on the later elements in the list. No-one

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[1] This is slightly too swift. For a more detailed spelling out of this part of the argument, see Robinson (1982).

would suggest that you cannot understand what it is for p to be true unless you already understood what it is for it to be true that it is true that p.

Another kind of non-vicious regress is where an infinite series approaches asymptotically to a limit, for in that case the earlier elements do not depend on the later. Pi is 3.14159..., with no end. But, although the next number will make the figure more exact as an expression of pi, the number we have so far (that is, 3.14159 without the dots) is both a complete numerical expression in itself and accurate to a high degree of precision as a representation of pi. The significance or content of what has gone before – or that it should have any significance or content at all – does not depend on what comes next. The matter is otherwise in the case of powers.

What it is to be a particular power does depend on what it is a power to produce, for to say that something is a power, without saying what it is a power to do, does not distinguish it from all other powers: which, if powers are all that there are, fails to distinguish it from anything else. So, for any given power, there must be a contentful nature to what it is a power to do, otherwise it is not differentiated from anything else. If 'power to produce x' is to be differentiated from any other power, there must be a specific content substitutable for x. If that content is 'power to produce y', this will have no specific content, differentiating it from any other power, unless there is a significant substitution for y. And so on. It is because the notion of 'power to produce ...' is an incomplete expression that trying to complete it by putting an expression of the same form into the blank does not improve the situation.

It might be productive to compare the regress of powers with one which, unlike pi or the regress of 'is true', is genuinely controversial. This is the regress of causes and the kin issue of whether the world could be infinitely old. There are those who think that the regress constituted by causes stretching infinitely back into the past would be vicious and those who think that it would not. Notice that here there is no question of the nature of any event or entity – say a present one – depending conceptually on the nature of the events or entities that went before. So, suppose that Aristotle were right and the world were infinitely old and humans had always existed. The essence of what I am – namely, a human being or a rational animal – would not involve essential reference in a regressive way to the previous members of the series. The definition can be given

complete and well-formed for contemporary humans in their own right. The controversy about a regress of causes relates to the legitimacy of actual infinities, not to anything about the nature of the things that are supposed to participate in the infinite series. This case is, therefore, radically different from the regress of powers and defenders of the pure powers ontology consequently cannot seek any solace by appeal to a comparison with the dispute concerning an unending regress of causes.[2]

Contemporary discussion of the powers regress. Philosophers occasionally acknowledge that the concept of matter is problematic in the way I have tried to make clear in the previous section, but, considering the importance of the issue raised, it is not as widely discussed as one might expect. As it is absolutely fundamental to the issue of whether one can give empirical content to the notion of mind-independent matter, I want to consider three recent attempts to respond to it.

(i) The most enigmatic is Simon Blackburn's (1990). Blackburn's initial response to the powers ontology is positive. He says of this picture of the world: 'Is this the way it has to work? I believe so.'(63) But he then considers a version of the 'regress' objection to this theory, accepting that the regress can only be ended because '[c]ategoricity in fact comes with the subjective view...' (65). And he continues '[t]he trouble is that such events, conceived of as categorical, play no role in the scientific understanding of the world.' (65) This appears to be a complete surrender to the argument. Blackburn's only response is to lapse into a sceptical detachment. After remarking that 'I leave the issue in Hume's hands rather than Berkeley's' (64, n.7), (which, I presume, is a way of refusing to admit that it might have idealist implications), he concludes:

> It almost seems that carelessness and inattention alone can afford a remedy – the remedy of course of allowing ourselves to have any idea at all of what could fill in space. (65)

This sceptical *hauteur* does not seem to me to help the realist come to grips with the challenge that the argument presents.

(ii) Stephen Mumford thinks that the argument rests on a view of dispositions which is akin to Ryle's empiricist analysis where the ascription

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[2] For lucid discussion, from both sides, of whether actual infinities are coherent, see W. L. Craig and Q. Smith (1993)

of a disposition is nothing more than affirming the truth of a subjunctive conditional.' (33)

He is attacking the argument specifically as it is stated in Robinson (1982), but if the criticism is to have any general application, it must be an objection to any attempt to define powers or dispositions in terms of the states that constitute their actualizations, meaning by that the state brought about when they are activated. Mumford spells out his objection:

We need not look for the actualization of a disposition solely in its manifestation, however, for we understand dispositions to be actual whenever they are ascribed. This is the realist alternative that I will be defending. If we were to treat dispositions as actual properties that play a causal role in their manifestations, then we can understand why dispositions are actual even when not currently manifested. (33-4)

Mumford's objection only works if essentially characterizing a power in terms of its actualization is equivalent to adopting the reductive account of powers and dispositions. Surely, however, the nature or essence of anything which is a pure power must reside in *that which it is a power to do*, whether one conceives powers realistically or reductively. I think that Mumford is misled by a possible equivocation in the sense of 'actual' in this context. The fact that a realist believes that a power is *actual*, in the sense of *actually existing* when it is not activated, does not mean that its nature is not expressed by reference to its actualization, in the sense of the manifestation of the power. Even when dormant, it is essentially the power or disposition to give rise to that actualization.

(iii) George Molnar (2003: 173ff) titles the regress argument 'always packing, never travelling'. Although not a defender of the 'pure powers' ontology, he does not believe that it can be refuted a priori, as the regress argument purports to do. He has two main responses to it. His first objection has some similarity to Mumford's objection considered above, in that it concerns the connection between the real existence of powers and the truth of counterfactual conditionals. When Blackburn states his version of the powers ontology, he does so in a way that seems to imply that powers are either equivalent to, or at least imply, the truth of conditionals. (He says, for example: 'An electrical field can abide, certainly, *but that just means that there is a period of time over which various counterfactuals are true*' (63, my emphasis).) Molnar points out that there has been con-

siderable literature in recent years devoted to casting doubt on whether dispositions can be analysed conditionally, or even whether they entail conditionals (176-7). But the argument as I have stated it above does not make explicit appeal to conditional statements, only to the essentiality to a power of what would constitute its actualization or manifestation. No one would deny that the nature of powers and dispositions essentially involve what would constitute their manifestations, and any problem derived from difficulties in formulating the exact connection between powers and conditionals that goes beyond this is not relevant.

Molnar has a further objection directed against C. B. Martin's statement of the regress argument against pure dispositionalism.

> Martin has also suggested that leaving out physical qualia at the level of the fundamental entities results in a Pythagorean ontology in which all is numbers, quantities, ratios and proportions, but there is no *whatness*, no quiddity, nothing that the numbers are numbers *of* and quantities *of*. Except of course further numbers, which returns us to the regress generated by pan-dispositionalism. I think Martin's worry can be assuaged. If the property of exerting a certain force is a definite *something* that the numbers can measure, so is being the *source* of that force. That *about the object* that makes it a source of a force is a (quantitive) power property. It is open to the dispositionalist to say that this is where the quiddity lies, this is what the numbers are numbers of. (179)

The problem with this response is that it is hard to see what content one is supposed to attach to the italicised words in the claims that 'the property of exerting a force is a definite *something*' or that there is a '[t]hat *about the object* that makes it a source of the force', if all the properties are pure powers. Molnar is talking as if *that which lies behind* the force is something other than the force itself, considered as potential or dormant, which on a pure powers ontology it is not. Assigning a numerical value to this potentiality clearly adds nothing relevant. Of course, it would make a difference if one could consider powers as Janus faced, by giving them some other nature additional to the capacity to act. I now want to turn to considering various ways that the physical realist might do this.

II. 3. Grounding basic powers. The dispositions, capacities and powers of complex objects are grounded in and explained in terms of the properties of the more minute structures that make up such complex objects. The problem that concerns us is with the powers of the ultimate elements of physical reality. If a pure powers ontology is not coherent, how should a physical realist think of basic powers as being grounded?

Harre illustrates what is wanted, taking the example of solidity.

> Solidity is the alleged quality, the possession of which is responsible for the fact that two material things cannot occupy the same place at the same time and is logically connected with impenetrability, the power to resist penetration, in that the possession of the former is supposed to account for the manifestation of the latter. (1970:305)

Martin at one time held a similar theory, with any intrinsic quality treated as 'a two sided dispositional qualitative coin...The dispositional and the qualitative are equally basic and irreducible; there is no direction for one being basic in a property and the other "supervenient". (1997: 216, citing his previous view) He moved, however, from this 'Janus faced' theory, to one according to which the dispositional and the qualitiative are not different aspects of a property, but are identical.

> ...the qualitative and dispositional are identical with one another and with the unitary intrinsic property itself...

> What is qualitative and what is dispositional for any property is less like a two-sided coin or a Janus-faced figure than it is like an ambiguous drawing. A particular drawing, remaining unitary and unchanged, may be considered one way as a goblet-drawing and differently considered, it is a two-faces-staring-at-one-another-drawing. The goblet and the faces are not distinguishable parts or components or even aspects of the drawing, although we can easily consider the one without considering, or even knowing of, the other. The goblet-drawing is identical with the two-faces drawing. (216-7)

The analogy does not look helpful. What is *interpreted as* a goblet or as two faces, is neither of these things, it is a line or lines on a piece of paper. As there is clearly nothing accessible which is *seen as* a disposition and *seen as* a quality, what is really present must be some mysterious third unknown.

Such a mysterious unknown plays a part in Harre's attempt to cope with the regress. Rom Harre played a major role in popularizing the powers ontology in the philosophy of science, and in drawing attention to the importance of Boscovitch in the historical development of this conception of matter (Harre, 1970, Harre and Madden, 1975). It is interesting to see, therefore, how he copes with the problems that face it.

Harre's way of recognizing the problem is somewhat elusive. He refers to the dilemma that confronts anyone who tries to universalize the dispositionalist account of properties. It seems as if one must choose between the *inelegant* alternative of grounding science on ungrounded dispositions, and the *alarming* prospect of an indefinite regress of groundings. (1986: 296. My italics)

Given that one is dealing with the ultimate nature of reality, it is not surprizing if it should turn out to be unfamiliar in a disturbing way, so the force of 'inelegant' and 'alarming' is unclear. Furthermore, it is hard to see what is *inelegant* about ungrounded powers, if the notion makes sense. Nevertheless, Harre does acknowledge it as a problem that he wants to solve. The immediate solution that he gives is as follows.

Ideally the dispositions which theoretical micro-regresses require physicists to ascribe to unobservable beings, like quarks and gluons, would be grounded, at least in principle, in observable properties of the universe. These properties would be occurent rather than dispositional, embracing such matters as the quantity and distributon of energy fields. (296)

This solution, which he derives from Mach, looks rather like a form of phenomenalism, because the subatomic world is being grounded, ontologically and not just epistemically, on the observable. (I put aside the oddity of calling energy fields 'occurent *rather than dispositional*'.) But later he develops the theory in a Kantian direction. The basic powers of matter are the product of the interaction between 'the ur-stuff of the world' – which he prefers 'to nickname... 'glub', to avoid any of the metaphysical temptations that arise from the connotations of the word 'stuff'" – and our observation apparatus.

Whatever this theory is, it is not straighforward physical realism. Harre compares his 'glub' to Kant's noumenal world, having no character-

istics accessible to us. The theory, therefore, seems to have more in common with Kantian idealism than with normal physical realism.

A more empiricist option is to adopt the neutral monism that Russell (1927) once espoused. This is the line taken by Grover Maxwell (1978) and Michael Lockwood (1989, 1993). The bearers of the ultimate powers and the intrinsic qualities of matter are those qualities that show themselves in conscious experience. These are in fact the intrinsic nature of the matter of which our brains are made. This theory seems to imply that the intrinsic nature of, for example, an electron, will be something such as a blue quale or a slight itch. One might try arguing that it need not be a phenomenal entity of such a developed kind, but a *proto-phenomenal* quality. But what something is that is not phenomenal but which when combined with others of a similar sort becomes phenomenal, takes us back to mystery. Furthermore, given the difficulty in formulating a convincing version of the 'Janus faced' account of quality and power, the connection between the qualitative core and the causal powers would seem to be entirely contingent and, hence, not explanatory.

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Julia Vasseva

DUBIOUS SCIENTIFIC VALUE AND AD-HOC HYPOTHESES

This investigation has been provoked by the ideas of Popper and Lakatos relevant to the problem of demarcation between science and pseudoscience. The differences between them instigate this speculation on the problem. The focal analysis in this paper is focused upon the so-called ad-hocness. The differences between Popper and Lakatos ideas concerning the role for ad-hoc hypotheses into the process of knowledge, are good bases to discuss the problem of ad hocness into the problem of demarcation. For this reason I will divide this work in three steps. The first one will present Popper's criterion for demarcation. The second one, sets out Lakatos research programmes. Finally the third one, gives in advances my ideas relevant to the role of ad-hoc hypotheses and the problem of actual demarcation between science and pseudoscience.

One of the important issues for Popper in his book "Conjectures and Refutations", concerns the possibility to make sharp distinction between science and pseudoscience. The problem of demarcation arises from the question: "…"When should a theory be ranked as scientific?" or "Is there a criterion for the scientific character or status of a theory"." (Popper, K. Conjectures and Refutations. 1963 pp. 63). He seeks for an answer that would be capable to separate science from pseudoscience or a "genuinely empirical method" apart from "pseudo-empirical" one. This problem is getting complicated if we are having in mind that: "… science often errs, and that pseudo-science may happen to stumble on the truth." (Popper, Conjectures and Ref. 1963, pp. 64). Astrology is a typical example for pseudoscience, but Popper stresses that it was not astrology, which led him to the problem of demarcation. Popper describes two situations in order to show the importance of the idea of demarcation. The first (situ-

ation) concerns the general ideas of the three inflowing theories at that time: Marx theory of history, Freud psychoanalysis and Alfred Adler "individual psychology". The second situation concerns Einstein's theory of relativity. We have to mark that these four theories were very influential at that time. The two situations in Popper presentation of the problem of demarcation corresponds to two different ways of making knowledge. Popper analyzes these theories from three crucial, from his point of view, features: *explanatory power; verifications of theory; confirmations*. Guided by these principles, it would be possible to make a demarcation between science and pseudoscience. The explanatory power of a theory has a high level in pseudoscience not in science. In other words, if a theory can explain everything, it is not a scientific theory. The verifications of a theory can not prescribe scientific features. It is pseudoscience seeking for confirmation of its own theories, not science. Contrary to those theories Einstein's theory has an exact explanatory power, gives no verifications, but falsification, or seeking confirmation as a result of falsification. In conclusion, Popper formulates seven principles or criteria for demarcation.

"1) It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory-if we look for confirmations. 2) Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions;… 3) Every "good" scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is. 4) A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is nonscientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of theory (as people often think) but a vice. 5) Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. Testability is falsifiability; but there are degrees of testability; some theories are more testable, more exposed to refutation, than others; they take, as it were, greater risks. 6) Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of a genuine test of the theory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory. (I now speak in such cases of "corroborating evidence.") 7) Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers-for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by re-interpreting theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status. (I later described such a rescuing operation

as a "conventionalist twist" or a "conventionalist stratagem. ")" (Popper, K. Conjectures and Refutations. 1963 pp. 68-69).

In this paper I will discuss the role of ad-hoc hypotheses for the scientific status of theories. As it can be seen from the quotation above, for Popper, ad-hoc hypotheses are an indication for dubious scientific value. The possibility to draw up a sharp demarcation prohibits the introduction of hypotheses that aim to protect the theory from refutation. The "conjecture – refutation" model rejects the opportunity to pass over one of its criteria. The condition to be scientific based on the condition to be refutable. That is the reason to avoid ad-hoc hypotheses in science. Nevertheless, there are many examples that put into doubt precisely this model presented by Popper, because some of the most important hypotheses in science are the ad-hoc hypotheses. For example, Pauli introduced the hypothesis of the neutrino as an *ad hoc* hypothesis and Adams and Leverrier concluded, regardless of theoretical calculations, the position of a planet – Neptune. Lakatos criticism on this theory offered by Popper concerning the role and epistemological status of ad hoc hypotheses, present a different view. He distinguishes three stages into Popper's philosophy. The first, Lakatos named it "$Popper_0$" and defined him as a "dogmatic falsificationist". In this period Popper did not publish any work. More important for him are the next two periods in Popper's philosophy. According to Lakatos the twenties are the period of the so-called "$Popper_0$" and "$Popper_1$" stages and the fifties are the period of the so-called "$Popper_2$" stages. According to him it is important to distinguish between naive and sophisticated form of falsificationism. The second one is named also as a "methodological falsificationism" ("$Popper_2$"). Therefore, this Lakatos criticism on Popper's ideas will help me to present the second definition of ad hocness, which I will call a positive one. Distinguishing three stages into philosophy of falsification, Lacatos presents the idea of 'scientific research programmes". Contrary to Popper, he refuses to treat ad hocness as an obstacle to growth of scientific knowledge. According to him, "…ad hoc stratagems allows us to progress even on inconsistent foundations" (Lakatos, Musgrave Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge Univ. Press. 1970, pp.182).

Here I will try to present the positive –as I decide to call it – Lakatos idea concerning a different kind of ad hoc hypothesis. Let me introduce a working definition of ad hoc hypotheses of my own: when a theory finds a

difficulty in the data, we try to explain it and introduce a hypothesis. This practice is not unusual in science. According to Lakatos, research programmes arise, live and die into the ocean of anomalies. This is the reason which led him to an idea contrary to Popper's one. It is important to emphasize that there are different kinds of ad hocness. Lakatos mentioned three patterns of ad hoc hypotheses: ad hoc_1, ad hoc_2, ad hoc_3. The first one – ad hoc1 – did not predict any novel facts. The second one – ad hoc2 – predict novel facts, but they failed. The third one – ad hoc3 – is still unsatisfactory, or is an isolated formula apart from the research programme. The examples he gives are: for ad hoc_1 hypotheses stands Galileo's theory of circular natural motion of terrestrial objects; for ad hoc_2 hypotheses stands Bohr – Kramer – Slater theory of 1924; for ad hoc_3 hypotheses stands Planck's radiation formula of 1900. I just want to remind you that Lakatos's three types of ad hoc hypotheses were based on Popper's two types of ad hocness. If a theory makes a prediction and this prediction is confirmed (the example with the planet Neptune), then there is no problem with ad hoc hypotheses. This is the first type of ad hoc hypotheses, called natural addition to the theory. The content of the second type describes the ad hoc hypotheses as a speculation seeking to save the theory, in spite of the fact that the condition may happen to be falsifiable. This is the reason to point out the presence of ad hoc hypotheses as a criterion of demarcation. Thus means that Popper did not make a problem out of good ad hocness, but extrapolates the dangers coming from attempts of saving a theory from refutation.

In conclusion, I will try to promote my idea about the possibility to apply ad hocness as a working criterion into the process of demarcation. For this purpose I will use both the negative (Popper) and the positive (Lakatos) points of view. I will claim that Popper was right in saying that ad hoc hypotheses put a dubious scientific value of a theory. But my definition differs from Popper's one. I think that the introduction of ad hoc hypotheses can be used unproperly by theories apart from research programmes. In this way this type of hypothesis becomes a reason or a door for pseudoscientific attacks. It is easy to say from the inside of science what is science or to discuss the problem of ad hocness into scientific theories. Contrary to this, it is not easy to make a sharp distinction between scientific theories and other knowledge. I find it fruitful to use Popper ideas

about ad hocness, not to make doubts about scientific value of theories, but to show that in attacking this hypothesis, non-science is going to look like science into the eyes of society. In this connection, I think that Popper criterion of ad hocness into the process of demarcation is a good marker, not inside science but for society. It is useful to apply Lakatos ideas of three types of ad hoc hypotheses, if we want to analyze the growth of scientific knowledge. However, when we try to explain why it is not science, it will be useful to attach Popper's convert criterion of ad hocnes. Let me give one example. In the last two years there was a great deal of attention towards the so-called Intelligent Design. Many scientists defended its ideas and conception. Here, I will try to give an argument against those positions. The ideas of ID (Intelligent Design) try to refute Darwin theory of evolution. For this purpose they try to demonstrate the untenability of ad hoc hypothesis introduced into the "protected belt" of the evolution theory. If we follow Lakatos, we will be able to show the impossibility of this statement. In the first place – the Evolution Theory (ET) is a progressive research programme. Secondly – ET survives in the ocean of anomalies by making ad hoc hypotheses. Last, but not least – despite the weaknesses of ET there is no better theory to replace it. For non-experts or generally for society it is reasonable to see in ID a better candidate for scientific theory, than ET. Here it would be better to apply the convert ad hoc criterion: if the only reason to attack ad hoc hypotheses is to save our beliefs, then it is not the way to build scientific theory, but remains speculation, which can not be examined. The problem of controversy between ID and ET is not a case of compatible theories. The analysis of the role and epistemological status of ad hoc hypotheses will give, I think, a good mean into the process of demarcation.

Appendix

Popper's problem of demarcation

"Is there a criterion for the scientific character or status of a theory"?

- to separate science from pseudoscience or a "genuinely empirical method" from "pseudoempirical method"
- to have in mind that: "… science often errs, and that pseudo-science may happen to stumble on the truth

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The features of science
(Popper)
- *explanatory power*
- *verifications of theory*
- *confirmations*

Popper's definition of ad hoc hypotheses

I. ***Good ad hoc*** – there is an anomaly → we introduce ad hoc hypothesis only in order to predict new fact → then the prediction is <u>confirmed</u>. This is the so-called "natural addition" to the theory. In this way we protect the theory from negative evidence.

II. ***Dangerous ad hoc*** – introduced to protect theory from refutations. This is a not **a** falsifiable hypothesis.

Ad-hoc hypotheses in science

- Pauli *ad hoc* hypothesis of neutrino.
- Adams and Leverrier *ad hoc* hypothesis of the planet Neptune.
- Einstein *ad hoc* hypothesis – the addition to the cosmological constant to relativity in order to allow a steady – state universe (the idea of dark energy).

Two ideas of ad hocness	
Popper	*Lakatos*
▫ Negative. ▫ Model of Conjectures and Refutations. ▫ Ad hoc criterion as a pseudo-scientifical feature.	▫ Positive. ▫ Model of Scientific Research Programmes. ▫ Positive heuristic (protective belt) – save theories from anomalies. Negative heuristic (the hard core) – irrefutable.

What is to be scientific theory?

▫ *Justificationist* – confirming instances of a theory.
▫ *Naive Falsificationist* – refuting instances of a theory.
▫ *Methodological Falsificationist* – collaborating instances of a theory.

Three patterns of ad hoc hypotheses
(Lakatos)

▫ *ad hoc$_1$* – did not predict any novel facts.
▫ *ad hoc$_2$* – predict novel facts, but they failed
▫ *ad hoc$_3$* – is still unsatisfactory, or is an isolated formula apart from the research programme.

The examples:

▫ for *ad hoc$_1$* hypotheses stands Galileo's theory of circular natural motion of terrestrial objects.
▫ for *ad hoc$_2$* hypotheses stands Bohr – Kramer – Slater theory of 1924.
▫ for *ad hoc$_3$* hypotheses stands Planck's radiation formula of 1900.

Ad hoc hypotheses in science as a "door" for pseudoscience
▪ In attacking ad hoc hypothesis non-science looks as science in the eyes of society. ▪ Popper's ad hoc criterion is a good mean for demarcation – not inside of science, but for society. ▪ Lakatos three patterns of ad hocness are fruitful, if we want to analyse the growth of scientific knowledge.

Popper's convert criterion of ad hocness
❖ *If the only reason to attack ad hoc hypotheses is to save our beliefs, then it is not the way to build a scientific theory, but remains speculation, which can not be examined*

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Engelsina Tasseva

SOME ASPECTS OF "DETERMINATION – DOMINATION" CORRELATION IN SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

Let's consider a simple example. The first (iron) bicycle with a handle-bar and pedals was shown in 1801 and was forgotten afterwards. So that much more primitive wooden prototype shown later in 1808 (in another social context) became actual predecessor of contemporary bicycles despite all amazingly resembling the earlier 1801-prototype. That's similarity through convergence – a phenomenon which can be observed in evolutionary contexts of various fields (biology, history, sociology, ethnography, evolutionary epistemology etc.). It's due to interaction of two different determinations: functional and contextual. Interacting determinations are characteristic of forming and functioning of technical things, artifacts and various other objects having heterogeneous (bi- or polygenetic) nature. That refers directly to the much discussed question of determination-character of the world, and of determinism as a philosophical principle. Science developments during XX century have provided enough occasions for revising notions and views of causality and accident. Old philosophical questions, such as "how is it possible to exist accident?", or "how is it possible to account existing of accidental but not causeless things without contradiction?", or "how can it be understood that accident and indeterminism are not identical?" etc. have been actualized by the virtue of a series of situations appearing in science and giving concrete character and sharpness to the fact that Laplace's determinism and similar views are utterly insufficient as a means for treating the variety of objective determinations in the world and cognition. I'll mention some.

The main intrigue in mathematics and logic of XX c. lies in their foundational studies. Attempts to provide reliable and non-contradic-

tory justification for mathematics, have led to discovery of essential incompleteness, indefiniteness and insolvability in that kingdom of extreme exactness. Instead of reducing mathematics to logic, the logic itself has proved to be turned into mathematics in a very high degree (many mathematicians don't recognize another logic but mathematical). The very foundations of logic have turned out to be problematic because of Gödel's theorems and analogous results, logical and semantic antinomies, and because of pluralism of logical systems. Logical pluralism is a peculiar case. Variety of logical systems is so broad as amount and assortment that defining them as logic relies mainly on intuitional notions and operational "habits". The situation is deeply problematic not only because of annoying conceptual insufficiency of those two "foundations", but because of serious tensions coming into being along the line of opposition between intuitionally contentive notions of the logical and ultimately formalized instrumental standards of "making" (mathematical) logic as well as along the line of perpetual confusing of empiric and theoretical aspects in philosophy of logic reflections. Utmost generality of logical categories makes a very difficult task to seek after unity of logic systems variety (existing or future) by interpreting it within the framework of a more general category apparatus. Attempts to conceptualize the general in different "logics" – I. g. "logic is a study of entailment" turn out either to be incomplete (some logics have no strictly defined entailing operator) or to be circular (by "entailment" it's meant not any sort of entailment but a logical one). That can be avoided by defining logical entailment on the base of the more general category "determination" what makes clear why the logic of questions is recognized as logic for all that – it has no typical logical entailment but contains a defined structure of specific determinations intuitionally guessed and instrumentally treated as logical.

In physics, on the place of simple and clear atomistic ideas of determination character of the world settle indeterminacy (Heisenberg), relativity (Einstein) and chaos as an actively worked up theme at present concerning: 1. accident as manifestation of outward, nonessential, unstable, unique relations; 2. accident as a way of turning the possible into the actual involving existence of more than one independent possibility (bifurcations, polyfurcations); 3. certain explicit properties oriented beyond the intuitive idea of chaos as disorder – such as ho-

mogeneity, equiprobability, stochastic equilibrium, fluctuating motion of elements etc.

Interdisciplinary system investigations have posed important and difficult questions like that of "elementarism – holism" correlation in determination and interpretation of system behavior: the topic of system objects nonaditivity (how does a system acquire specific properties, irreducible to properties of its elements, by the virtue of its structural continuity), or the problem of system objects self identity (how can a system function, change, exchange elements with environment, remaining the same object and how can be made distinction between system normal function and its destruction). As well as oversimplified versions of fatalism like Laplace's determinism obviously are not to the point in interpreting of humanities and social sciences, because of their polygenetic, polycentric, and hence – polyparadigmatic nature.

In philosophy those developments give rise to a broad spectrum of problem fields relevant to various deterministic aspects of concordance of the whole and a part, the local and the global, the discrete and the continuous, the empiric and the rational, the fundamental, the causal and the phenomenal, and of correlation between the correspondent, the coherent and the competitive in concepts of truth. Within practically all main science areas have been accumulated large massifs of facts and interpretations, requiring revision of a series of basic views on determination character of the world and determinism as principle. Accented indications that it has been noticed can be found in postpositivism, critical rationalism etc. mainly (but not only) as response to some Vienna circle views on determinism.

In short, the situation is: in logical foundations of scientific knowledge we come up against metaeffects like indefiniteness, indeterminacy, incompleteness, incompatibility, insolvability, paradoxes, paraconsistent and other nonstandard models etc. requiring corresponding interpretation; at the same time there is no adequate enough conceptual apparatus, being, at first, suitable for treating such metaeffects in the aspect of determinism, and having, at second, paradigmatic status, I. e. having complete enough patterns of formulating and solving corresponding scientific problems and being popular enough within corresponding science society. It is natural to see ultimate views, appearing under those circumstances – predictions

of the end of determinism or, to the opposite, so named "butterfly effect". It is relevant to note here at least four points: 1. Affinity to suchlike views is quite natural in areas of studying "clouds" (in Popper's sense) – large aggregates of homogeneous and difficult of observational access objects – where statistic lows markedly prevail over dynamic ones. 2. When the end of determinism gets announced, by "determinism" usually is meant a kind of fatalism like Laplace's, rather popular than actual and already much criticized. 3. Reports of determinism end and chaos total establishing has proved strongly exaggerated – the notion of omnipresent simple chaos soon "turns" towards ideas of "deterministic chaos" which renounce reducing determination directly to causal interaction but don't renounce deterministic principles at all: at present deterministic chaos theory develops fast, furthermore, it's actively applied. 4. Thus the very chaos refuses end-of-determinism prognoses acquiring an image of a strictly instrumentalized deterministic subject corresponding with the fatalistic concept of "butterfly effect".

"Butterfly effect" is the view that insignificant influences lead up to significant consequences of large dimension by a chain of causal determinations. This view has its reason – the model of avalanche-like development of non stable balanced situations. Contemporary technologies – electronics, nanotechnologies etc. also correspond with "butterfly effect" model. But understanding determinism as direct linear causal connection makes impossible to explain neither appearance of "butterfly effect" in mentioned special cases, nor the observational fact that its influence is restricted, as well as the possibility to control it in cognition and technology. That involves necessity to extend the content of category "determination" conceptually. Attempts are made in this direction to introduce the notion "contextual determinacy" in connection with account of scientific theories resistibility to counterfactuals or to promote the idea that determination is relative by Popper's "clouds" and "clocks" metaphor. Those attempts, however, are lacking in generality, system, and adequate concordance of definitiveness and flexibility. As for dialectical treatments of the topic, in spite of being more general, flexible, and systematic they are lacking in paradigmal status as adaptation and popularity. According to dialectic views causal determination is foundation of other determinations but the latter are not reducible to the first. It allows considering and classifying different sorts

of determination: basic determinations (existential determination of essences and substrata) and accidental ones: conditional, causal, correlative, structural, functional etc. This conceptual apparatus is ultimately general and remains in a certain sense indifferent to the concrete problem situations without due adaptation. An obvious point of contact of mentioned views is closeness of the notions "contextual determinacy" and "conditional determination". It is as well the most appropriate point to search answers relevant to the questions of how is possible to exist accident, when and how determination chains interrupt, how is possible to control determinations in general – I. e. questions referring to contexts of determination.

In the world and cognition things become realized under conditions of interaction, crossing, competition and counteraction of a variety of different determination factors. Taken in broad enough borders the complexity of this system involves incompleteness, indeterminacy, incompatibility etc. Cognitional orientation and finding definiteness in such a complex system of determinations is possible because it is not homogeneous. Certain substances, relations, states, conditions, aspects, characteristics prevail over others and can be outlined in reflection as essential against the rest that can be ignored as insignificant. Conceptual support point in interpretation of this picture can be found in the notion "domination". The relation of predominating is closely connected with determinism. It is everywhere where realizing or not realizing determinations under conditions of competition of determination factors can be observed. Next two examples illustrate shortly the idea of domination: 1. As a result of interaction between two different opposite forces (able to "cause" corresponding acceleration to a body with given mass) the body begins to move in direction of the larger force – determination of the dominating factor realizes. If the forces were equal, the body wouldn't get moving – for lack of domination equilibrium state gets established. 2. The terms "domination" and "dominant" are adopted in different fields by analogy with inheritance of dominant and recessive characteristics in genetics. As it is well known recessive characteristics presenting in the genotype of a certain individual appear in its phenotype only if they are not in "competition" with dominant alleles. Else, as a determination of a given characteristic gets realized the genetic dominant.

Domination may be considered separate of the types of determination mentioned above or can be assigned to some of them – I. g. to con-

ditional or contextual determination. On the other hand it is opposite to logical determination in cognitive contexts because of being factual. It's rather a type of quasi determination, being a characteristic of joint action of different determinations. In any case, however, it has interesting peculiarities which outline it against enumerated sorts of determinations: 1. Domination characterizes competitive aspects of determinism and can't be considered separately and independently from situations of competitive interaction of determinations; as well as it doesn't involve elementaristic interpretations being a pointedly structural entity. 2. Domination characterizes non obvious quantitative aspects of determinism – it involves comparison (more active determining factor – dominant), degrees (more categorical determination), accumulation (strengthening or getting weak), and change (getting balance or changing direction of domination). 3. As far as it is binary or quasi binary relation in determinations field presumably it is the simplest kind of determination interaction. So that it deserves attention, even taking no account of the fact that all XX c. philosophy of science looks into study dominations (of paradigms, hypotheses, theories, standards etc.).

László Ropolyi

SHAPING THE PHILOSOPHY
OF THE INTERNET

About thirty-forty years ago a few engineers and computer scientists started to build up interconnected systems of individual computers. (Zakon 2006; Living Internet 2006) By now this technological initiative has entailed many infinitely complicated and extremely extended implications. People started to use the interconnected computers in many unexpected and unforeseeable ways in every fields of human life from the everyday praxis to the most abstract scientific or cultural activities. (Bakardjieva 2005; Barabási 2002) In this way the systems of interconnected computers has been involved into many essentially different contexts of practices and meanings. In these new contexts the "original" characteristics of the computer systems receded and some new characteristics were constructed. As an illustration let's think on chating: the essential dimensions of it do certainly not relate to the computers, but about special interests of human beings involved into chating. Inventing and discovering more and more basically different contexts for the interconnected computers a special kind of superorganism (or supersystem)[1] has been built up. This superorganism, the Internet, consists of many fundamentally different organisms (or systems) and its characteristics are determined by the component-organisms and by their interactions. The most known component-organisms are the physical network of computers, the World Wide Web formed by the linked

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[1] Because of some undisclosed ontological reasons instead of the concept of "system" we prefer the concept of "organism" in our description. Organisms are structured beings. "Beings as beings", material and spiritual entities, i.e. living organisms and worldviews, furthermore systems, networks, worlds, etc. can be considered as typical organisms.

web pages, real and virtual social networks, communities, activities associated with the physical network or the web, and so on.

In the last few years the presence of the Internet in every fields of human existence has became clearer and clearer, even the researchers of the Internet have started to speak about the ubiquity of the Internet.[2]

Scientific and philosophical understanding of the Internet

Although we are able to realize the presence of the Internet everywhere, but we are not able to understand it, moreover its true identification and acceptable description seems also to be an extremely difficult task. Is it a technological organism or rather a social or cultural one? Probably all of them, but in this case a new question arises: Is it an autonomous being or just a collection of coexisting components? In this paper we try to sketch some methodological ideas to contribute to a successful answering of these questions.

Perhaps we could follow the accepted scientific methodologies, i.e. the methodologies of information, communication or cultural theories. In this way we would confront with different hard difficulties: the extremely high number of such a theories even within one discipline, the uncertainty of conditions of their applications, the weakness of their predictions, the relatively narrow validity of a single discipline, etc. Notwithstanding of these difficulties, in the praxis of the Internet research huge number of studies are performed in this traditional scientific style. Researches based on these studies can show one or another aspect of the Internet, however in an unconscious way, because they do not reflect on their presuppositions on the Internet itself. For example we can read a lot about the "new media" of the Internet, about the formation of information society, about the free accessibility of information and so on, without any reflections to the presuppositions on the real nature of the Internet.

It is a rather natural observation, that because of the complexity or ubiquity of the Internet it is not easy to shape the discipline of the Inter-

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[2] The annual conference of the Association of Internet Researchers (http://aoir.org/) was devoted to this topic in 2004.

net research, a discipline which would be sensible to all the aspects or dimensions of the Internet. The territories of regular researches cover many various disciplines (from engineering to philosophy) and follow essentially different methodologies. In this situation it seems to be evident that without a philosophical analysis there are no chance to create from these different disciplines with various methodologies a more or less coherent methodology for or discipline of the Internet studies. In the European culture only the philosophy can suggest a theoretical framework to ensure a conceptual understanding of a being as a complete entity, a whole, which consists of different components, as an organism with identity, integrity and reproduction. This means that, first of all, accepting a philosophical methodology we have to understand the nature of the Internet as a whole, i.e. to elaborate a philosophy of the Internet. Scientific methodologies and disciplines can contribute to the process of elaboration, and necessarily sustain its consequences.

Realizing the success of the Aristotelian philosophy in the analysis of the nature of the beings and following some intuitions we decided with the elaboration of an "Aristotelian philosophy of the Internet".

In the classical Aristotelian methodology we have to find out four causes of the beings for a proper understanding of the nature of the beings: the material, the formal, the efficient, and the final causes. For the Aristotelian describing of the nature of the Internet we want to follow this method and try to identify four aspects, dimensions, or kinds of understanding for the Internet. The Aristotelian philosophy of the Internet will apply the following contexts for the complete understanding: the technological context, the communication context, the cultural context, and the organism context. We have no room to describe our motivations for these decisions, but it seems to be necessary to call the attention that we use the concept of context instead of the traditional Aristotelian cause.

Four contexts for the Internet studies

Based on the above considerations the four interrelated contexts will be suggested for Internet studies. (Ropolyi 2006) Each context is equally fundamental, significant, and co-exists with the other three ones.

1. Technological context. The Internet can be considered as a network of computers. The technological context is fundamental if we want to de-

scribe the role of the Internet in the satisfaction of human needs, as it can be seen in banking, shopping, e-commerce, etc. Comparing to the traditional technologies it is easy to find many common characteristics and to identify the specificity of the Internet: it is a kind of information technology. Characterization of information technology is based on an understanding of the concept of 'information' and leads to emphasizing of the role of 'virtuality' and 'openness' in every situations. For a deeper understanding of the consequences of information technology a hermeneutic approach to the concept of information is very fruitful: every interpreted being can be considered as information. From this position the information technology is a "hermeneutical industry", where the production is performed by interpretation in the individual human minds. Engineers, computer scientists, lawyers, sociologists, philosophers of science and technology can contribute and use to the technological context of the Internet.

2. Communication context. The Internet can be considered as an active agent of communication situations. The communication context is fundamental in the description of the role of the Internet in building up specific human communities, as can be seen in the cases of different online communities including mail, chat, news, etc. All sorts of communication is a technology of community building, because in the process of communication we want to share our mental states, views, experiences with each other, and in this way to create a community between us. The communication via Internet is a technology of virtual (open) communities. A deeper understanding of the communication via Internet is based on a communication situation analysis, including considerations on the active role of the media, and the specificity of computer as communication machine. Information and communication theories, their philosophical analysis, sociology, psychology, media studies, political studies, etc. are useful tools of the communication context of the Internet.

3. Cultural context. The Internet can be considered as a medium of culture. The cultural context is fundamental if we want to describe the role of the Internet in building up a new (not natural and not social) realm for human beings, as it can be foreseen from the perspectives of the creation and use of homepages, and from the very specific personal, social, political and cultural praxis in the Internet. Traditional culture creates a social world from natural beings by reevaluation of natural conditions, but

the 'cybercultural' praxis of the Internet creates a world of network-being from the social system by reevaluation of social values. Netizen is a citizen of three worlds: natural, societal, and the net. In this way we have a new organism consist of three (of course not Popperian) worlds.

4. Organism context. The Internet can be considered as a specific organism. The organism context is fundamental if we want to characterize the specific (postmodern) organization principles of the Internet. The most significant principles are the followings: plurality, virtuality, fragmentality, individuality, against outer power, and included modernity. Certain aspects of these principles can be seen in the specificity of the identity and the evolution of networks. The organism of the Internet is an artificial being created by (direct and indirect) interpretations. In this respect one of the most important tasks to study the Internet-related implications of the mind/body problem, the Internet/brain analogy. Cognitive science, theory and philosophy of (natural, artificial and general) systems can be associated to the organism context of the Internet.

Philosophy of the Internet

The four Aristotelian causes are not really independent of each other. They tell us together that what is the being, what does it made of, how does it made of, and why? In the case of understanding of complex nature of the Internet we have a similar position in our Aristotelian philosophy of the Internet, in which all the four contexts can be applied. In this way we can conclude that the Internet is an organism created by human interpretations and practices, an organism which exists as a network of computers, and as an active agent of communication situations, and as a medium of culture, and as a specific organism. The functioning and the meaning of the Internet can only be described by a huge number of disciplines, i.e. engineering, computer technology, law, sociology, philosophy of science and technology, information and communication theory and philosophy, sociology, psychology, media studies, political studies, psychological, social, ethical, anthropological ideas and principles, cultural studies, philosophy of culture, theory and philosophy of society and personality, cognitive science, theory and philosophy of (natural, artificial and general) systems. However, the Aristotelian philosophy of the Internet can disclose the most comprehensive common aim of all of these fragmented aspects: to build

up a more complex, more free, more individual – but virtual – realm for the netizens.

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Rosen Lutskanov

GÖDEL, WITTGENSTEIN AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE: SECOND LOOK AT BENACERRAF'S DILEMMA

It may be contended, that one of the main problems which every present-day philosophy of mathematics tries to solve is bound up with the so-called "Benacerraf's dilemma". It was formulated in the seminal paper "Mathematical Truth" (1973) and may be rendered as an argument which substantiates the point that it is impossible to construct account of mathematical knowledge which provides simultaneously explanation of its truth and argumentation for its knowability (Benacerraf 1983: 414). Obviously, the immediate import of this dilemma is that all traditional philosophies of mathematics fail to provide an adequate account of mathematical knowledge which appreciates at the same time its ontological commitments and its epistemological characteristics. In view of the fact that Benacerraf's dilemma proved its viability by resisting all attempts to be settled or explained away, new philosophies of mathematics have emerged. They tried to evade the horns of the dilemma by the introduction of a new point of departure for the philosophy of mathematics, like the concept of "mathematical practice", for example. As Thomas Tymoczko has put it, "the new directions in philosophy of mathematics is largely an attempt to understand that concept – in contrast to such traditional goals as understanding mathematical objects (ontology) or mathematical knowledge (epistemology)" (Tymoczko 1998: 385). Evidently, such modification of the foothold of traditional philosophy of mathematics is inspired by the Wittgensteinian concept of "language game", comprehended as "part of activity or form of life". As I'll try to show, this concept's introduction was inspired by the formerly propounded theories which will be presently schematized: the Vienna Circle's conventionalism and Gödel's mathematical Platonism.

I'll start with the Circle's stand on the question of the nature of mathematical knowledge because it is clearly situated on the "epistemological" side of the alternative set out by Benacerraf's dilemma. As it was flatly put by Hans Hahn, he attaches himself to the position that logic is deprived of ontological posits (Hahn 1968: 45-6). In the same vein, Rudolf Carnap winds up his presentation of logicism at Königsberg with the following words: "Logicism proposes to construct the logical-mathematical system in such a way that, although the axioms and rules of inference are chosen with an interpretation of the primitive symbols in mind, nevertheless, inside the system the chains of deductions and of definitions are carried through formally as in pure calculus, i.e., without reference to the meaning of the primitive symbols" (Carnap 1983: 52). This is to say that, sacrificing the semantical perspective, the Circle's members concentrated themselves on the epistemological task to "understand the present century's scientific picture of the world … in a unified perspective" (Haller 1991: 96). The main obstacle on the way to the accomplishment of this objective was the account of the epistemic status of logical and mathematical propositions – the received "Kantian" view treated them as synthetic a priori and in the same time the fundamental claim of the modern empiricism was the resolute "denial of the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge" (Carnap 1959: 143). The adoption of Russell's logicism and the Tractarian conception of logical truths as devoid of content tautologies provided the wanting solution: it made possible to view logical empiricism as compatible with the existence of the incontestable truths of logic and mathematics on account of their conventional statute (Detlefsen 2001: 55). But this theoretical account of mathematical knowledge, as far as it was founded on the "new logic" of Principia Mathematica, openly presupposed that we are capable to deduce in its deductive framework all consequences of the conventional postulates governing the use of mathematical concepts (Carnap 1959: 145). Unfortunately, Gödel demonstrated that this presupposition is unjustified, proving the existence of undecidable propositions, framed in the language of Principia (Gödel 1986: 145-7): the Circle's undertaking failed and it turned out that new suggestions are needed.

This is the reason why Gödel placed himself emphatically on the "ontological" side of the dilemma by interpreting his result as indication that the mathematical concepts are not by-products of linguistic conven-

tions – the basic principle of his philosophy of mathematics is that "we are not creating mathematical objects by introducing conventions. In order to introduce conventions, we have to know the concepts" (Wang 1996: 224). If we turn back to his incompleteness theorem, we see that he asserts that "the heuristic principle of my construction of undecidable number-theoretical propositions in the formal systems of mathematics is the highly transfinite concept of objective mathematical truth, as opposed to that of demonstrability" (Wang 1996: 242). The truth of undecidable mathematical propositions is established by informal metamathematical consideration which in its turn presupposes the presence of the faculty of mathematical intuition which mediates our proof-independent grasp of the objective properties of mathematical concepts " (Gödel 1983: 484). This is to say that the limitations imposed on every formal system susceptible to Gödel's proof may be systematically discarded by supplementation of its mathematical formalism with intuitively motivated axioms. As Charles Parsons suggests, this picture establishes the a priori knowledge of mathematical concepts on the same footing as the empirical knowledge of perceptible things (Parsons 1995: 63-4). But the fact that the allegedly quasi-empirical character of mathematical knowledge is substantiated with the help of some mysterious source of knowledge bridging the gap between our world and the transcendent reality of pure mathematical being is the proper occasion for the greatest anti-metaphysician of the XXth century to enter the stage.

As I have stated in the outset, the relation between Vienna Circle's and Gödel's position on the nature of mathematical knowledge conforms to the relation between the two extreme positions confronted by Benacerraf's dilemma. On the one side, Circle's members neglect the question of the truth conditions of mathematical propositions and view justification conditions as constitutive for their meaning; on the other side, Gödel considers the truth conditions of mathematical propositions as the sole foundation of their intuitive justification. Apparently, these two extreme positions are vulnerable to the horns of Benacerraf's dilemma which, as was stated in the outset, has to be sidestepped in one way or another. One palpable way out of this situation is suggested by Wittgenstein's theory of meaning as use which reduces to the claim that the meaning of both words and propositions is determined by the rules for their use. This theory stems

from Frege's critical remarks about formalism, codified in the fragments of his Blue book " (Livingston 2004: 34) and was originally expounded around 1932 in Wittgenstein's lectures on the foundations of mathematics (Ambrose 1979: §2). The introduction of the "use" theory which supersedes the old Tractarian "picture" conception was definitely motivated by the emergence of Gödel's limitative result (Shanker 1988: 235). As I'll try to show, one of its primary concerns was to adapt logical theory to the newly emerged incompleteness phenomenon by casting serious doubts on the standard interpretation of Gödel's theorem (Floyd 2000: 232). Wittgenstein's use theory evades this problem by focusing on the concept of proof thought as a function of "logical machinery" but as part of some particular language game (Diamond 1976: 194). The so thematized concept provides us with the requisite common construal of truth conditions and justification conditions: on the one side, the proof fixes the context that the proven proposition occupies and thereby fixes its truth conditions by use of suitable modification of Frege's context principle from words to propositions (Diamond 1976: 137); on the other side, the proof provides the justification conditions of the proposition, it not just establishes its content but displays the process by which its semantic assignment turns out (Wittgenstein 1956: 52). That is why "the end result of a proof is not isolated from the proof but is like the end surface of a solid. It is organically connected with the proof which is its body" (Ambrose 1979: § 9). This implies straight away that the mere idea of true but undecidable propositions in logic is self-contradictory when viewed from this standpoint (Wittgenstein 1990: 377).

If we now turn back to the starting point of this exposition, we may infer that the cogency of Benacerraf's dilemma is partly derived from the incompleteness phenomenon: separating the truth from proof it entitles the separation of truth conditions from justification conditions in the province of mathematical knowledge. Wiping out the borderline dividing truth from proof, Wittgenstein removes the indispensability of Gödel's platonistic remedy: the mystical intuition of mathematical concepts (Wittgenstein 1956: 51). In this way his unjustifiably neglected language-game approach opens up completely new perspective for the philosophy of mathematics. If we view the truthfulness of mathematical propositions not as transcendentally grounded artefact but as spontaneous emergence descending from

the functioning of the various language-games played in mathematics, we may at last cast aside the restrictive foundational spirit from his ultimate stronghold. We may finally abandon the search for the right metamathematics, realizing that there is no metamathematics, that our theories are self-validating pictures of reality (Kjaergaard 2002: 134-5). The distinctive trait of such conception was voiced in Wittgenstein's last work: "I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility" (Wittgenstein 1993: 22). Benacerraf's dilemma shows that it is hard to fix once and for all the relation between our predefined ontological and epistemological theories. But if we let "play and make up the rules as we go along", we will be able to view our ontological posits and our claims for knowledge as mutually adjustable, as jointly constituted in our multiform theoretical correlation with the world.

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Nenad Miščević

ARMCHAIR KNOWLEDGE: A NEO-RUSSELLIAN APPROACH

Abstract

A neo-russellian account of candidate a priori beliefs is presented and briefly defended. Russell's externalist proposals, like most externalist theories, seems to focus upon the ground-floor of our cognition, or, to be more precise, upon the primitive ground-floor of elementary logical abilities. His internalist chapters, foundationalist-coherentist, either of intuition-based or linguistic or expressivist stripe, seem to address the kind of knowledge available at a higher level of sophistication. This points to a two tiered (or two-level) theory of justification as the proper format for reconciliation of contrasting considerations that fuel contemporary debates on the a priori.

Introduction

Are some items of our knowledge justified a priori, without recourse to experience? [1] If no, why have practitioners (mathematicians, logicians, moralists) as well as philosophers for centuries been persuaded of the contrary? If yes, which ones are those? How is such knowledge possible? Do we have an a priori capacity of intuition? These questions concerning a priori knowledge and intuitions is at the very center of contemporary epistemological debate. I shall assume that some of our mathematical, logical, metaphysical and moral beliefs at least appear to be somewhat independent from immediate empirical justification. They are candidate a priori beliefs. In order not to prejudge whether they are deeply and strongly

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[1] Thanks go to Marina Bakalova for inviting me to contribute, and to my audience at the Varna philosophy conference.

a priori, I shall call them armchair beliefs. In this paper I would like to present a very rough sketch of a general strategy of justification for armchair beliefs. I shall take as my lead Russell's idea from his later period that epistemology should integrate two different perspectives, an externalist, and an internalist one. The externalist perspective is built on sophisticated science, but geared to simple, more elementary kinds of knowledge. The internalist perspective is more of an armchair matter (although not exclusively), and it starts from demands of doubt and relief from doubt.

Learning from Russell

In his later works, starting from *The Analysis of Mind* (1921), through. *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* from 1940, up to *Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits* (1948) Russell presents a two-component view of epistemology, encompassing both internalist and externalist elements. [2] Here is how Russell presents the duality of externalist and internalist approaches to theory of knowledge.

There are two different inquiries, both important, and each having a right to the name "theory of knowledge". In any given discussion, it is easy to fall into confusions through failure to determine to which of the two inquiries the discussion is intended to belong…

In the first form of theory of knowledge, we accept the scientific account of the world, not as certainly true, but as the best at present available. The world, as presented by science, contains a phenomenon called "knowing", and theory of knowledge, in its first form, has to consider what sort of phenomenon this is. Viewed from the outside, it is, to begin with, a characteristic of living organisms, which is (broadly speaking) increasingly displayed as the organism (*An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth,* p.12-13).

The second, internalist project, is introduced through a problem in the externalist, naturalistic account. It appeals to science, and science seem to be at odds with commonsense, naïve realism.

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[2] Note that Russell's externalism finds its place within a view of epistemology which is both descriptive and normative

The problem for epistemology is not "why *do* I believe this or that?" but "why *should* I believe this or that?" In fact, the whole subject is a product of Cartesian doubt. I observe that men err, and I ask myself what I must do to avoid error. (InqMT: 16)

… naive realism, if true, is false; therefore it is false. And therefore the behaviourist, when he thinks he is recording observations about the outer world, is really recording observations about what is happening in him.

These considerations induce doubt, and therefore lead us to *A critical scrutiny of what passes as knowledge. This critical scrutiny is "theory of knowledge" in the second of the two senses mentioned above, or "episte-mology", as it is also called. (p. 15)

The internalist project, described in the text as the second form of theory of knowledge "is a product of Cartesian doubt. I observe that men err, and J ask myself what I must do to avoid error." [3]

The combination of causal reliabilism and a generous internalism (es-sentially foundationalist but open to coherentist considerations) is sur-prisingly up to date. It is in line with two-level views of Sosa and Alston, and seems nicely to bridge the gaps that have separated externalists from internalists and coherentists from foundationalists.

The general picture: the two tiers of justification

Here is the beginning of a neo-russellian proposal: start with a thinker asking question about her belief that two plus two equals four She is per-sonally reflectively justified in her belief, if she has valid reasons to trust its source. If the source is also de facto reliable, she is meta-cognitively justi-fied tout court. The picture then features two tiers: the natural reliability of thinker 's capacities, and the internalist tier of reasons she has to trust

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[3] The internalist/externalist duality has been foreshadowed even before late period. Tom Baldwin in his important recent paper ("From Knowledge by Ac-quaintance to Knowledge by Causation", in Nicholas Griffin (Ed.): *Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell,*CUP, 2003) notes that even in the early *Problems of Philosophy* there are traces of reliabilist sympathies. Russell notices that a lot of eve-ryday knowledge is acquired without explicit reasoning from the data. What makes the relevant beliefs into knowledge is that it is suitably connected to its sources.

So although he maintains a formal commitment to the gold standard of logical justifications for beliefs, he appears in practice content to accept the paper money provided by the causal connections inherent in his conception of psycho-logical inference, It is, then, not going to be a big step to allow that where these causal connections are reliable enough, there is no need for a hypothetic discover-able logical connection as well. (Baldwin, in CCR: 428)

them. The second encompasses all the deliverances from the first one. All capacities might come into play: we thus test the memory by appeal to deliverances of perception and testimony by appeal to deliverances of both.

Let us apply this to intuition-states and capacities. When discussing intuitions we are all in the position of a cognizer wondering whether her intuitive abilities are trustworthy. What is the relation between the internalist and the externalist accounts?

So, what should we do with the externalist grounding? A simple proposal: take it as a first tier (maybe as a basic level, in the spirit of Sosa and Alston). The reliability of a thinker's abilities is of course not necessarily accessible to the thinker herself. Take So foundationalist-coherentist considerations stay on an upper level, and the externalist justification is the ground level

Now, the cognizer is able to reflect about her abilities and their reliability, to raise the issue of how reasonable it is to trust them. Take this level of reflection as the second level. Here, the reasons are accessible, or "internal" to the thinker herself. Such reason bestows an "internal" justification, as opposed to the external one, bestowed by reliability. If a cognitive capacity is reliable (i.e. has external justification) and the cognizer has good reason available to herself to trust it (i.e. has internal justification) than the cognizer is justified in an absolute sense. This general picture captures rather well the historical and actual character of the debates about intuitive cognition. It fits in its general two-stage format Descartes' quest for reflective certainty about the reliability of his natural belief-producing abilities that has shaped the debate for centuries. It captures nicely Hume's contrast between spontaneous working of our cognitive nature and the philosophical doubts that arise a level about that spontaneous working. Most contemporary debate (Sosa's virtue epistemology and Alston's doxastic practice approach) is following the lead of these classics, with some interesting variation.

The externalist account: hyper-safety

What is the right externalist requirement for reliability of armchair belief? The possibility of luck in a priori domain shows that definitions offered in literature of what it is to believe by luck that p are inadequate, since they mostly rely on the possibility of it being the case that not-p. When p

is necessary, such a definition should be supplemented by one pointing to variation in belief, not in the fact believed. Here is what we aim to avoid:

Veritic armchair luck
It is a matter of luck that the agent's belief is true.

The agent's belief is true in the actual world, but in a wide class of nearby possible worlds in which the relevant initial conditions are almost the same as in the actual world–and this will mean, in the basic case, *that the agent at the very least forms her belief in the sufficiently similar way as in the actual world–the agent has a false belief.*

A more remote possibility is *the agent's cognitive structure might have differed in a minimal way from the actual one, and beliefs.* The parallel consideration is even more important for derived armchair beliefs. We, the cognizers, should want to avoid the following (bad) luck:

Procedural veritic luck
It is a matter of luck that the agent's true belief is a result of correct, i.e. valid inferential procedure, for short, that it is correct.

The agent's belief is true and correctly arrived at in the actual world, but in a wide class of nearby possible worlds in which the relevant initial conditions are almost the same as in the actual world–and this will mean, in the basic case, *that the agent at the very least forms her belief in the sufficiently similar way as in the actual world–the agent arrives at the belief in an incorrect way.*

What should belief-generating procedures be like, if they are to avoid such pitfalls. Here is the closest equivalent to safety, a kind of truth-tracking that can be proposed for containing armchair luck. In contrast to safety, it does not trade on counterfactual stability of environment, but on counterfactual stability of the cognizer: even if cognizer's ways of thinking and even capacities were to vary slightly, she would manage to arrive at the same true belief as in the actual world and thus continue to track truth. Call it

Hyper-safety (or Agent Stability):
For all agents, A, if an agent knows an armchair proposition p, then, in most nearby possible worlds in which she forms her belief about p in a

slightly different way or with slightly changed cognitive apparatus as in the actual world, that agent will also come to believe that p.

The next issue is the explanation of external reliability. Russell wondered about our reliability in our reactions to logical form. The universality of logi offers a nice explanation of having and of reliability of logical intuitions. Logic is universal, i.e. minimal rationality very probably involves practical understanding of logical constants. Being minimally rational very probably involves being minimally logical. This is common ground of naturalists and anti-naturalists). Therefore, any process that results in there being minimally rational creatures, also very probably results in there being minimally logical creatures. *If* evolution produces rational creatures, *then* it very probably produces minimally logical creatures. (The most relevant probability is the probability of this conditional). *Given evolutionary naturalism, minimal logical capacities are to be expected.* Note that nobody would seriously question causal explanation on the ground that the emergence of life itself is relatively improbable, or that evolution of nervous system is antecedently quite improbable. The challenge is more geared to the alleged possibilities of evolution of intelligent creatures similar to ourselves, but devoid of logical rules. However, even the antecedent is less problematic than one would have us think. Minimal practical rationality brings practical advantages, so the antecedent itself is not so wildly improbable as anti-naturalist critics (from Plantinga to Nagel) would have it. So, although the evolution of rational creatures is in itself "radically contingent" (extremely improbable), the fact that once rational creatures are on their way, minimally logical creatures are on their way is *not* radically contingent. We have no reason to doubt our own rational capacities and basic logical intuitions on the grounds of evolutionary theory. Evolutionary theory does not undermine itself. We now pass to the second tier, comprising internalist account.

The internalist justification

Human cognizers are able to reflect about their abilities and their reliability, to raise the issue of how reasonable it is to trust them. Take this level of reflection as the second level. Here, the reasons are accessible, or "internal" to the thinker herself. Such reason bestows an "internal" justification, as opposed to the external one, bestowed by reliability. If a cogni-

tive capacity is reliable (i.e. has external justification) and the cognizer has good reason available to herself to trust it (i.e. has internal justification) than the cognizer is justified in an absolute sense.

Interestingly, Russell's texts on knowledge of logic go beyond the "false dichotomy" of foundationalism and coherentism (Sosa). He starts from the traditional foundationalist set, centered on the notion of acquaintance. According to it, cognizers are acquainted with logical form of complexes. This acquaintance has to be ascribed on theoretical grounds, and it explains the ability of cognizers to infer in accordance with the logical structure of propositions they understand. However, the set is not inimical to some coherentist elements. In his "Regressive method" he is at great pains to stress that it is simple theorems that are known by acquaintance, whereas axioms are epistemically derived, and justified by their ability to entail self-evident theorems.

One might take a slightly different route, and distinguish foundationalist and coherentist elements according to the degree of reflection involved: foundationalist ones are spontaneous, coherentist might find their place at the higher, more reflective level.

However, one important element has to be added, namely the explanatory one. What explains thinker's entitlement in this area, e.g. her acceptance of $2+2 = 4$ on the bases of $1+1+1+1 = 4$? We need the explanation of having such beliefs, and of their reliability. First, we need it against mystery-mongering. Second, against luck. But it is also a plausible way to specify the notion of coherence, namely in terms of explanatory coherence. Through this three grounds, *explanation becomes a part of reflective justification*. Note that some two-level theoreticians, e.g.Sosa, reject explanationism.[4]

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[4] Here is Sosa's version of Benacerraff's dilema:
E Sosa.
a. Platonism is committed to the acausality of mind-independence of mathematical objects.
b. Any causal explanation of our mathematical reliability is incompatible with the acausality of mathematical objects.
c. Any non-causal explanation of our mathematical reliability is incompatible with the mind-independence of mathematical objects.
d. Therefore, There is no explanation of our mathematical reliability that is compatible with Platonism. (Sosa, "Reliability and the A priori" p. 370)
In answer to it, he rejects explanationism.

And this combination of coherence and foundations seems acceptable.

Finally, a word about sources of apriority and aposteriority. At the level of externally oriented account we might encounter a possible empirical origin of some target concepts. How far this is relevant for justification is a question for further discussion. In considering the grounds of hypersafety one might appeal to independence

from particular features of the world as a source of apriority. But there is a consideration in the opposite direction. For instance, a causal explanation might point to our innate categories derived from evolutionary trial-and-error.

At the level of internalist considerations the main sources of apriority are the self-evident character of basic, quasi-foundational intuitions, and the narrow reflective equilibrium at the reflective level. However, there might be the opposite considerations of wide reflective equilibrium including explanation. In this case both positive and negative support are holistic, i.e. partly empirical. And explanation is part of reflective justification, but causal explanation is a posteriori, therefore, justification might be partly a posteriori. Here is the summary:

	DEMANDS	**SOURCES OF APRIORIY**	**SOURCES OF APOSTERIORIY**
EXTERNA-LIST RELIABI-LIST	*HYPER-SAFETY AND AGENT STABIL-ITY* *of individual's beliefs*		possible empirical origin of some relevant concepts
	of trans-individual, e.g. evolutionary procedures	independence from particular features of the world	innate categories: evolutionary trial-and-error derivation no reason for assuming correctness

INTERNA-LIST	IMMEDIATE CERTAINTY	self-evidence	
	GENERAL REFLECTIVE COHERENCE including EXPLANATION OF HAVING AND RELIABILITY	narrow reflective equilibrium	wide reflective equilibrium including explanation: a) explanation is part of reflective justification b) causal explanation is a posteriori c) justification is partly a posteriori

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Lilia Gurova

NATIONAL PHILOSOPHIES OF SCIENCE? HOW SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION SCREENS OFF GENUINE CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS

The main aim of this paper is to point to the evidence for the claim that some national/cultural explanations of how science works are based on fallacies in causal reasoning. It will be shown that taken seriously, the fallacious causal explanations may have far-reaching negative effects.

My interest in fallacious causal claims was provoked by the observation that unfortunate causal conjectures are not made only by laymen, they could be found even in masterpieces of 20th century philosophy of science.

One could read, for example, the following in Pierre Duhem's famous book *The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory* (1906): "The English mind is clearly characterized by the ample use it imaginatively makes of concrete collections and by the meagre way in which it makes abstractions and generalizations. *This peculiar type of mind produces a peculiar type of physical theory*" [Duhem 1906: 86].

Duhem, obviously, has some recent followers. In his 2002 discussion paper, which is published on the web-site of the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Sciences of London School of Economics, Rom Harré put ahead the conclusion that "…there are some influences from the national/cultural location of the researchers *on the content and also on the methods of research*" [Harré 2002][1].

What kind of thinking leads to such causal claims that "*peculiar type of mind produces a peculiar type of physical theory*" (Duhem) and that "there are some influences from the national/cultural location of the re-

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[1] The *italic* mark in both citations is mine – L.G.

searchers *on the content and on the methods of research*" (Harré)? How are these claims justified and are they justified at all? And is being unjustified the main defect of such claims?

In what follows I'll try to elaborate on these questions.

Observationally indistinguishable causal relations

Let's start with a simple example. Two bulbs are given to us. As shown on Fig.1 a) and b), either both of them are on, or both of them are dark.

Fig. 1

We conclude (rightly) that the two bulbs are somehow connected and that anyone of the causal schemas shown on Fig.2 can produce the observed behavior of the bulbs.


Fig. 2

Can we decide whether (1) or (2) represent the real causal connection between the bulbs A and B, if we just observe their behavior? The right answer is: no, there is no way to do that because (1) and (2) are observationally indistinguishable. One may suggest then that (1) and (2) are

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explanatory equivalent as far as they account for the same observations. They are not, and it is easy to demonstrate that. If both bulbs are on, and we unscrew the bulb A, in the case of (1) the bulb B will go off immediately, but if (2) is the case, B will stay on.

In other words, the only way to discriminate between (1) and (2) is to intervene, to make an experiment. Mere observation does not provide enough information to solve this problem. So, any suggestion to accept either (1) or (2) as an explanation of the observations a) and b) should be claimed unjustified, if it is based only on the given observational data.

In their real life people very often make such unjustified, and in this sense fallacious, causal explanations. They might be occasionally right, but in one half of the cases they go wrong. And sometimes staying attached to wrong causal explanations may have long-lasting negative effects. In what follows I am going to draw attention to one of these effects, which appears when the assumed unjustified causal explanation is a common cause explanation, i.e. an explanation assuming the existence of a hidden common cause, controlling the observed correlating events. It will be shown that once assumed, such a common cause screens off the relations between the observed events.

Reichenbach's common cause principle

The effect of screening off was first revealed by Hans Reichenbach in his book *The Direction of Time* (1956). He pointed there to the fact that two events that have a hidden common cause appear dependent but are independent conditional on their common cause. In this sense the common cause "screens off" the spurious relation between its two effects. Later on this claim has begun known as "Reichenbach's common cause principle".

In Reichenbach's example a real (but hidden) common cause screens off the spurious relation between its two effects, which one may assume (wrongly) causally connected because they appear dependent. But the screening off effect is also present in the reverse situation: when one assumes wrongly the existence of a hidden common cause of two events, which appear dependent. In this case a non-existent common cause screens off the real connections between its alleged effects. The immediate result of this screening off is that those who have accepted the common cause explanation, stop looking anymore for any direct connections between the alleged common cause effects.

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Let's see how this happens when the suggested common causes are unobservable social, in particular national/cultural factors.

Duhem's fallacious natural/cultural common cause explanation

Several important changes took place in the methodology of physics in the last quarter of 19th century: the beginning of use of models as a tool for bridging the gap between the abstract theoretical assumptions and the empirical data, which are supposed to support these assumptions was just one of them.

As it often happened in science, not all of the physicists were happy with these changes, some of them openly resisted to the new methodological inventions. Pierre Duhem was among those who did not admire the rise of what he called "the new English physics". It is difficult to estimate whether his reluctance to accept the basics of the works of Maxwell and Thomson (Lord Kelvin) has led him to the claim that all these works are nothing but a product of the "ample but weak English mind". Or on the contrary, his attachment to the common cause explanation that all that happens in contemporary British physics is simply a product of the ample English mind, has led him to the conclusion that it does not make sense to look for a deeper understanding of the introduced methodological innovations. It is clear however, that there is a strong connection between his blindness in regards to the values of the scientific standards enforced by the British physicists and his adherence to the national/cultural common cause explanation of these standards: his common cause explanation has completely screened off for him all proper scientific reasons that might be involved in the acceptance of these standards. A good illustration of this screening off effect is that when faces the fact that "the English manner of dealing with physics has spread everywhere with extreme rapidity" [Duhem, 1906; 87], Duhem points to "the fashion" as the only possible explanance: "Among these reasons (for the spread of English manner of doing physics – LG) we must, in the first place, mention the taste for the exotic, the desire to imitate the foreign, the need to dress the mind as well as the body in the fashion of London." [Duhem 1906: 91].

Duhem's national/cultural account of what happened in physics in the late 19th century is, of course, unjustified. There is not any convincing evi-

dence for the alleged difference between "the deep theoretical French mind" on the one hand and "the ample weak English mind" on the other. On the contrary, there are many counterexamples, which could not be simply put aside. (Duhem himself points to some famous exclusions of his national/cultural categorization – "the deep theoretical mind of Newton" and "the ample and weak mind of Gassendi"). However, the main flaw of Duhem's common cause natural/cultural explanation is not that it is unjustified. The main problem of Duhem's national/cultural account is its explanatory weakness. I just pointed to its inability to provide for a plausible explanation of the rapid spread of British style of doing physics but this is just a follow-up. The main defect of the common cause national/cultural account is that it prevents those who take it seriously from seeing and understanding the proper scientific value of the new methodology (in particular, from seeing the methodological merit of the idea to use mechanical models as mediators between abstract theories and raw empirical data). The national/cultural account thus leads to misunderstanding not only of this particular episode from the history of physics but of the driving forces of science in general as well.

One of the blames which Duhem (wrongly) ascribes to the "ample English mind" is its alleged "hostility to metaphysical principles". Such a hostility should be present if Duhem were right that "the ample English mind" is reluctant to any kind of abstract notions and/or principles. It is not: in fact, the late 19th century English physics is not less metaphysically grounded than the French or German physics of the same period, the difference is that it adheres to different metaphysics. That means that the social (national/cultural) categorization, which implies the mentioned blame is misleading in this respect, too.

* * *

Let me summarize the chief points made in this paper:
- The national/cultural explanations of scientific enterprise are usually common cause explanations.
- It has been shown that the common cause explanations which assume a non-observable (hidden) common cause are typically unjustified, if they have been drawn from mere observations.
- However, the main defect of the national/cultural common cause explanations is not that they are unjustified; their main defect is the

explanatory weakness: insofar the common causes screen off the possible relations between their alleged effects, national/cultural explanations prevent seeing the variety of causal factors, which might be responsible for the dependencies among the observed phenomena.

◻ In particular, Duhem's national/cultural account of the late 19th century changes in the standards of doing physics has screened off the proper scientific reasons for these changes and thus has led to general misunderstanding of this particular episode of history of physics as well as of the proper scientific value of the main inventions, which have appeared during that period: the algebraic and mechanical models, and their accompanying metaphysical assumptions.

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Marina Bakalova

A DISJUNCTIVIST ANSWER TO THE PROBLEM OF SUBJECTIVE INDISTINGUISHABILITY

Both in epistemology and in philosophy of perception a lot has been written about the common nature of the states in which one perceives something, and states where one only seem to do so, but which are in fact epistemically corrupted either by an evil demon, or by a mad scientist, or simply by hallucinations and illusions. On the basis of this reasoning some seriously pessimistic conclusions about the nature of perceptual knowledge have been laid down, i.e. that perception like hallucinations and illusions provides no access to the external world, and therefore that we gain very little by perceiving. In the recent decades, proponents of disjunctivism about perception have attempted to throw an optimistic light over the issue by arguing that there is much less in common between the veridical and the non-veridical states than previously thought.

1. Traditional HCF Accounts of Perceptual Experience.

The traditional treatment of perceptual experience poses a common element to veridical perception and hallucination, which is constitutive of the experience as such. The main idea is that perception and hallucination belong to the same mental kind. McDowell calls the constitutive common element "highest common factor"[1], and I will use the abbreviation "the HCF accounts" for the traditional accounts of perceptual experience. According to HCF accounts, perception is analyzable into two components:

    i) the common element (or HCF), constitutive of perceptual experience, and

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[1] McDowell 1996, p. 113

ii) the satisfaction of some further condition: "the extra-bit that perception has over and above the appearance".[2] This "extra-bit" includes the real presence of the object of perception, and its proper causal relation to the appearance of the object.

2. Disjunctivist account of perceptual experience.

Disjunctivism about perception is a single theory which denies the HCF accounts. Disjunctivists claim that veridical and non-veridical states are of fundamentally different mental kind, or that there is an excluding disjunction between them. The veridical state encompasses its external object; it has a factive and relational nature, which the non-veridical state does not have. Allan Millar nicely summarizes the view by outlining three main principles associated with it. The first principle claims a disjunction between veridical and non-veridical cases. Here is the formulation by Millar[3]:

"(a) A case in which it appears to the subject (in some modality) just as if an F is there can be a case in which she has an essentially relational experience implicating an F or it can be a case in which this is not so."

The second principle straightens the disjunction by stating that veridical case has an essentially relational nature, whereas the non-veridical one does not have such a nature:

"(b) Cases relating to (a) in which the subject is not having an essentially relational experience implicating an F include cases in which the subject is hallucinating an F and cases in which the subject perceives something which, though it appears to be an F, is not."

Finally, relational experience omits the analysis of perception characteristic to the HCF account, namely that to perceptive is to have a veridical appearance. In other words, disjunctivists reject the view that perception is a hallucinatory-like state, complemented by the presence of the object and the causal link between that object and the perceiver. Hence, the third principle of disjunctivism:

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[2] Dancy 1995, p.421

[3] Millar (*forthcoming*), p. 4

"(c) The case in which the subject has an essentially relational experience does not admit of decomposition into (i) the having of a non-relational experience (what <u>Snowdon</u> calls an "inner experience"), and (ii) the satisfaction of further conditions."

I would like to defend a moderate version of disjunctivism about perceptual experience, although I could not fulfill this task within the present paper. Here, I am going to address one particular problem concerning my defense, the problem of subjective indistinguishability for disjunctivism.

Before focusing on the problem, let me explain why I do not like the HCF accounts and what I understand by "moderate disjunctivism". First, it is mainly epistemological reasons that draw me against the HCF accounts of perception. By postulating a common nature of the veridical and the non-veridical states, those accounts isolate the perceiver from the external world. Thus, they secure only a very narrow basis for knowledge. In particular, HCF accounts deflate our putative knowledge to just knowledge about appearances, possibly pure fictions. Needless to say, such theories invite skepticism about the external world.

By "moderate disjunctivism" I mean the view that rejects the letter of disjunctivism but preserves its spirit.[4] In particular, I want to keep the disjunction between the good and the bad state, but at the same time to allow for a common element between them. There is no obvious obstacle to such a position, since one can argue that this common element is *not* essentially constitutive for the good case.

My moderate version of disjunctivism is based upon three main principles, which I will outline very briefly. The first principle is called the *Primacy Thesis*, and this is the claim that epistemically good situation is epistemologically primary (over the bad one). In particular, perceptual situation is epistemologically primary (over the mere being appeared to situation. The second principle is the *Principle of Factivity*. According to this principle, reasons and justification available in epistemically good situations are factive (to use Descartes' example: the very fact that I am sitting by the fire). Hence, reasons and justification available in the perceptual situation involves perceived states of affairs ("facts") themselves.

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[4] See Williamson 2002, p. 47

And finally, the *Principle of Reflective Inheriting* is the principle that in the good case the reflective, second-order justification inherits the good factive qualities of the first-order knowledge. [5]

3. The Problem of Subjective Indistinguishability for Disjunctivism

Finally, we arrive at the problem of this paper. A pressing objection against the disjunctivist theories of perception is that once abandoning the HCF, disjunctivists are left with no resources to explain why hallucination is subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perception. I want to argue here that the problem is not compelling. The disjunctivist can claim that there is a common element to both states sufficient to explain their indistinguishability, but not constitutive of the perceptual state.

What is this element? I bet on the phenomenological character of our experiential states. I will argue that both states are indistinguishable because they have the same phenomenological character, but that the character is *not* essential to the states. I have two reasons in support of my claim. First, character is usually not essential to the entity (e.g. if I change my character I will remain the same person). Second, cases of inverted qualia are possible.

The second point requires further clarification. Under "qualia" I mean the components of the phenomenological character of experience, interpreted as introspectively accessible phenomenal features of our mental states. Qualia describe what it is like to be in a certain mental state, e.g. what it is like to see red. Now, what it is like to see red is probably a substantial property, but not very informative about red things. This statement is supported by the Inverted Qualia Thought Experiment. The experiment invites the possibility that there are people to whom red objects appear green since birth, but they have learned to call them "red"; yellow objects appear blue, but they have learned to call them "yellow"; and so on along the whole color spectrum.

The possibility of inverted qualia shows that states with the same description "it seems to me that I see red", and more importantly with the same referent (which makes them both states of *perceiving* red) can have

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[5] The principles are inspired by Duncan Pritchard's paper in Pritchard (*forthcoming* 2006)

different phenomenological characters. So, once again: character is not constitutive of the veridical perceptual state.

Let me say some more words about my understanding of qualia. I would like to combine anti-representationalism about qualia with externalism about mental content.

Anti-representationalism about qualia is the view that qualia are qualities of experiences as opposed to qualities represented by experiences.[6] The view is motivated by the Inverted spectrum thought experiment[7], which shows that qualia can vary without variation in the semantic content of our experience. On the other hand, externalism about mental content applied to qualia is the view that qualia do *not* determine the content of the mental states, at least the states of perceptual experience.[8] Rather, our perceptual states have wide content, i.e. they are individuated by their relations to the environment.

4. Objections to my proposal

One may object that qualia are too thin to explain why the good and the bad cases are subjectively indistinguishable. Indeed, qualia are only the non-intentional properties of experience, and being such they cannot explain why we seem to represent objects in our experiences. But in hallucination we seem to perceive objects, and this very fact begs for explanation. So, I need a story of why qualia are so salient that they by themselves can create an accomplished imitation of veridical experience (like in hallucinations).

I don't have a clear answer to that objection, but I can offer a direction for reply. We can try to detach the informative (epistemic) elements of the state from the elements that contribute to the impact of the state, such as their aesthetic strikingness. Then, we could argue that only the core informative elements are constitutive of the state.

This answer is slippery, however, since it is undermined by a second and more cogent objection. I cannot say that the Invert's state is a proper perceptual state only because it is informative enough. In other words, it is absurd to claim that the Invert perceives red properly, since what she sees

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[6] Representationalism about qualia is supported by Siewert 1998. Motivation for anti-representationalism can be drawn from Block 1990 and Davidson 1986.

[7] Even more by the Inverted Earth thought experiment offered by Block 1990.

[8] For classical defense of externalism about mental content see McGinn 1977.

is actually green. I agree with that objection, and I think that just information-conduciveness will not do the whole job. In order to classify as information of a given faculty-type, i.e. perceptual information, it has to be obtained by a standing faculty. Invert's information about red is not obtained by her perceptual faculty, but in a roundabout way: through training in a particular linguistic community. However, I do not claim that the Invert perceives red properly, neither that she seems to perceive red properly. What I claim is that she can compensate the informational deficiency of her perceptual state in a non-perceptual way. This does not mean that the informative element is not constitutive of the perceptual state.

In conclusion, I believe that the disjunctivists can afford admitting a common element to veridical and non-veridical states without sacrificing their main standpoint, namely that what is constitutive of veridical perception is its relational nature.

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Zoltan Wagner

FREE WILL, SELF-FORMING ACTIONS AND SCIENCE

1.

Martin Luther's famous sentence: "Here I stand, I can do no other" has been used in both sides of debate about free will and determinism. To mention only two significant theorists: Daniel C. Dennett and Robert Kane used him as a paradigmatic example to demonstrate their views. Dennett is confident in his belief that Luther's example shows that free will is compatible with determinism for Luther's act was free, responsible and rational. Robert Kane, as an incompatibilist libertarian thinks that Luther's act can only be free if it was preceded by an indeterministic choice at some point that led to his unshakable decision. Whereas these two thinkers take Luther's diction as both true and expressing his belief, Galen Strawson finds it less than obvious that we have to take it literally.[1] In this paper I wish to look at Dennett's and Kane's opposing interpretations of Luther's case. The latter one, Kane, relies on modern science; this is how science comes into picture. My conclusion will be that science does not make a crucial difference in our practices of judging people free and responsible. To do that we can rely on the phenomenology of the agents.

Let us read first Dennett's view:

"Here I stand," Luther said. "I can do no other". Luther claimed that he could do no other, that his conscience made it *impossible* for him to recant. He might, of course, have been wrong, or have been deliberately overstating the truth, but even if he was – perhaps especially if he was – his declaration is testimony to the fact that we simply do not exempt someone from blame or praise for an act because we think he could do

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[1] Strawson, G (1986) *Freedom and Belief*. Oxford: Claredon Press, p. 139.

no other. Whatever Luther was doing, he was not trying to duck responsibility."[2]

Dennett refuses the shared assumption of several philosophers writing on free will. According to this, "A necessary condition for holding an agent responsible for an act is believing that the agent *could have* refrained from performing the act".[3] This widely held assumption lies behind the consequence argument and other arguments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. Dennett thinks that we should forget about this assumption. Though perhaps Luther did not have free will in the libertarian sense, his act was free and dictated by reason.

Kane disagrees with Dennett, and thinks that Luther's example does not prove that his incompatibilistic libertarianism is false. He argues the following way:

An act like Luther's can be ultimately responsible […] though determined by his will, *because* the will from which it issued was a will *of his own making*, and in that sense it was his "own" free will. […] Ultimately responsible acts, or acts done of one's own free will, make up a wider class of actions than those self-forming actions (SFAs) which must be undetermined and such that the agent could have done otherwise. But if no actions were "self-forming" in this way, we would not be ultimately responsible for anything we did."[4]

It is crucial here that SFAs entail indeterminism, so in Kane's view free will is only possible in an (at least parrtly) indeterministic world.

Now, let us look at the following two examples:

(1) We have two possible worlds, a deterministic one (Wd) and an indeterministic one (Wi). Martin Luther can be found in both of them. Let us call the one who lives in Wd Luther(d), and Luther(i) will be the name for the inhabitant of Wi. Now, suppose that both of them have exactly the same life histories. They have gone through exactly the same experiences

[2] Dennett, D. (1984) *Elbow Room*. Cambridge, Massachussets: The MIT Press, p. 133.

[3] van Inwagen, P. (1984) 'The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism'. In: Watson, Gary *Free Will*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 46-58, p. 50.

[4] Kane, R. (1996) *The Significance of Free Will*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 78.

and they have made exactly the same acts. And most importantly, they are exactly the same in all phenomenological respects. Not only that we cannot tell them from each other by looking at their life stories but also there is no *phenomenological* difference between them. The only difference between them is that Luther(i) has made at least one kaneian SFA, whereas the other one has not.

If we apply Kane's theory on free will and responsibility to these two Luthers, we have to regard Luther(i) as a being who has free will and we have to judge him ultimately responsible for his "Here I stand, I can do no other". But when we judge Luther(d), we have to say that he has no free will, and he is not responsible for his act in the sense relevant for moral responsibility. I believe that there is something wrong with this judgement. The reason for this is that the two Luthers are exactly the same from the *phenomenological* point of view. That is, both of them believe that they have gone through the same life history, that they both made enormous efforts to become what they are, that they both had the same intention, the same ideals and the same goals. Both of them experience themselves as executors of the same life project and as creators of the same life. But if Kane is right, Luther(d) is mistaken in his belief. In a sense he is right because Luther(i) could have become a different person who acts differently, whereas Luther(d) could not have. But given that they are the same in all observable respects, it seems to be *unjust* to claim that Luther(d) was only lucky. And what is more, Luther(i) is equally lucky. For it is mere luck that he is an inhabitant of an indeterministic world. And hence, it is mere luck that he made an SFA.

Imagine a different example. (2) Jane and Joan live in the same world, are identical twins, and both of them are brilliant pianists. All music critics agree that they have exactly the same artistic credits, none can be said to be better than the other is. Now, suppose that Jane has made one kaneian SFA and Joan has not. Is it right to say to her: "after all, you have only been determined to all this, you are not a free agent and you are not ultimately responsible for your achievements"? What is wrong with this judgement is that both of them have practiced for ten hours per day for twenty years and both of them have made the same sacrifices to become pianists. Meanwhile they gone through the same experiences and they think that they have made the same choices and the same efforts. Hat is, they are simi-

lar from the *phenomenological* point of view. The point here is that given the phenomenological similarity, it is not *just* to judge Jane and Joan differently. Of course, after getting to know the difference between them as regards SFAs, music critics will not cease to judge them differently from their point of view. They will not devalue Joan's musical achievements and even though she had a completely deterministic life history, they will not regard her something like a mere machine. Why would this be different from an ethical point of view? Why would we say that she has no free will and that after all, she is not responsible for what she has become and what she has achieved? The difference between them is not like the difference between two rich people, one of whom has made his fortune by twenty years of work and the other of whom has won the lottery. Jane and Joan have made the same efforts, and are similar from the *phenomenological* point of view.

2.

In the second part of this paper I will focus on science, and how science changes the interpretation of the two examples. Kane thinks that whether free agency works in the way he suggests is not a question to be answered by mere armchair speculation. Rather, it is an empirical problem that can be examined with the help of modern science. In Kane's view the functioning of the human brain involves chaotic indeterminacies that make it possible for agents to do or to refrain from, doing something. There are quantum indeterminacies in the brain, and they are amplified to the level that is relevant in decision-making.[5] In the Luther example, Kane admitted that Luther's dictum could have been true in a way that does not question his free will and his responsibility. That is, it is not a problem for libertarianism that Luther could not have acted otherwise, so long as his decision was based on motives that go back to an indeterministic SFA. If one reads a Luther biography, one like Erikson's famous one[6], one will see that Luther went through a serious identity crisis in his youth. Kane thinks that we can locate the indeterminacy somewhere here. The chaos of his

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[5] For details of the theory see especially chapters 8 and 9 of his book cited above.

[6] Erikson, E. (1958) *Young Man Luther*. New York, London: Norton.

youthful crisis was an indeterministic one, in which Luther made SFAs, forming his character. In the resolution of his identity crisis he formed a character, and it was so firm that it made it impossible for him to do otherwise when he broke with the Church.

If the process of the formation of his character had been deterministic, he would not have been a free, responsible agent. At this point, science comes into picture. For it seems that if Kane's scientific explanation of choice is right, Luther's character formation *could not have been deterministic*. It seems to me, that Kane's view implies that the *phenomenology of agency* which includes a feeling of inner uncertainty before the choice, and after the it has been made, a strong feeling of determination, is parallel with metaphysics (or rather, physics). That is, the inner feeling of indecision corresponds to a chaotic state that is actually indeterministic and the inner feeling of being decided about what to do corresponds to determinism. Therefore, we are living in a world in which some of the events are determined, and some of them are undetermined. If this scientific picture is right, the phenomenology of free will cannot exist without indeterminism. Phenomenology of agency includes such concepts as choice. And this concept includes the inner feeling of uncertainty together with the feeling that one can both do and refrain from, doing something, and if science is right, we can be sure that this feeling is due to an actually existing chaotic, indeterminisctic state in our brains.

Now, let me go back to the two examples. If Kane is right, science could show that, since the phenomenology of agency corresponds to the indeterministic nature of reality, and since Luther(d) and Luther(i) are similar from a phenomenological point of view, the example cannot work. If Luther(d) really has the same phenomenology as Luther(i), he lives in a world that *is not actually possible*, or at least, in a world which is a strange, not normal, far-off possible world. If there is really a close connection between the phenomenology and indeterminism, then in all normal worlds, where there is conscious, intentional agency, choices are preceded by indeterminism and consequently Luther(d) is too strange a creature to count as a counterexample against Kaneian libertarianism.

If we turn to the second example, we see something similar. If Kane's scientific theory of agency is true, it is also true that all of us are such creatures that make SFAs. Therefore it is not possible that while Jane has made at least one SFA, Joan has not.

To sum up this point: if science could show that there is a close connection between the phenomenology of free agency and chaotic indeterminism, the two counterexamples would not work because they talk about something that is *not possible*. That is, the two worlds in the two examples (Wd in the first example and the world of the second example) are not really possible worlds. Such scientific theory could show that it could not be the case that two agents, having the same "superficial qualities" or being the same from the phenomenological point of view can be different as regards indeterminism.

But if that is true, what effect does it have on our moral practices of holding people responsible? If our phenomenology is based on indeterminism and the existence of free will, we need not worry about the metaphysical aspects of an act; we can simply rely on the phenomenology of the agent. But if it turned out that there could not be such a scientific theory that ties together indeterminism and the phenomenology of agency, our counterexamples start to work. In these examples I showed that given the phenomenological similarity, it is not just to judge Luther(d) and Luther(i) differently, and in the other example, that it is not just to judge Jane and Joan differently. So, in this case again, we can rely on the phenomenology of the agent. That is, whether science proves that free agency is tied to indeterminism or not, in our practical judgements we can rely on the phenomenology of agency.[7] Science cannot make a big difference for ethics of free will; rather, it can just show "how it works". How come that we have such a phenomenology that we believe that we are free agents? And all this leads to the following compatibilist conclusion: it is correct to judge certain agents (similar to the ones in the examples) free on the basis of their phenomenology even if determinism was true. But in case it is not, we would still rely on the same information in judging them free or not free.[8]

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[7] Of course, it cannot be so simple since the phenomenology of the agent is accessible directly only for the agent. The point here is that when we have a piece of information of the phenomenology of the agent, it does not make any difference whether the phenomenological content was created by deterministic or indeterministic means.

[8] It might be an important detail that we evaluate the lives of the agents discussed in this paper positively. Perhaps we would tend more to *forgive* someone whom we evaluate negatively if it turned out that he was determined but we should not devalue positive aspects of human life by saying they are determined and hence, they are not free.

Nina Atanasova

IF SSK WERE A SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY

This essay deals with the scientific status of SSK in a twofold way. First, it will examine the SSK's pretension to be a scientific study of science. Next, it will be concerned with the confusion made by most of the science studies' critics when taking SSK, along with other programmes that are even more radical, to be the contemporary philosophy of science. In addition, while the criticism, received by most of the science students from the scientists, taking part in the so-called science wars, is equitable, it is unfair regarding the contemporary philosophy of science, which is far from being a relativistic epistemology. Relativism being the main feature of the science studies is a solvable problem in philosophy.

The topic of this essay is inspired by Lilia Gurova's presentation at the last session of the school[1]. In her paper, she defends the philosophy of science against the Sokal and Bricmont's criticism by pointing out that it is unfair to blame the philosophers of science[2] alone for the widespread misuse of their work. If we are to blame someone for the improper public image of science, these are both the philosophers of science and the scientists[3].

The main thesis in what follows is that scientists blaming philosophy of science are in fact fairly attacking other disciplines. Studies such as Latour's and SSK students' presuppose philosophy but are not a philosophy themselves.

It is worth taking exactly SSK under study because of their pro-scientific attitude and even their science popularization ambition. The criticism they received from the scientific warriors in the science wars has to be

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[1] Gurova, L. (2004).

[2] Which they do in their (1998, p. 52) and (2001, p. 29) for example.

[3] Gurova, L. (2004, p. 53).

carefully examined in order to SSK-ers be able to revise their programme and be useful science popularizers.

The Strong progamme

In his (Bloor, 1976) David Bloor states the new sociological programme for studying science. It is a study, which strives to be a science of science. It is also an attempt to expand the implications of the classical sociology of knowledge, which deals with cultural forms such as religion and aesthetics, to aeries like natural sciences, which are examined as cultural forms not much different from others.

In opposition to the old study of science, SSK deals with the genesis of scientific knowledge regardless of its truth-value. If the old programmes both philosophical and sociological allowed for the sociology of science to only deal with the wrong judgments (to be a sociology of error), made by the scientists, the new way of studying scientific practice will not be concerned with the right or wrong status of a decision. Causes of both right and wrong beliefs will be examined and this will guarantee the morally neutral conclusion of the study. Thus, this new theory of science will be more as a science itself.

Its principles are:
1. It would be causal, that is, concerned with the conditions which bring about belief or states of knowledge. Naturally, there will be other types of causes apart from social ones which will cooperate in bringing about belief.
2. It would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity, rationality or irrationality, success or failure. Both sides of this dichotomies will require explanation.
3. It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same types of causes would explain, say, true and false beliefs.

It would be reflexive. In principle its patterns of explanation would have to be applicable to sociology itself. Like the requirement of symmetry this is a response to the need to seek for general explanations. It is an obvious requirement of principle because otherwise sociology would be a standing refutation of its own theories.[4]

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[4] Bloor, D. (1976; p.7).

Bloor states the requirement for the causal explanation instead of the teleological and claims that it is a feature of sciences' that helps establishing the scientific status of SSK. However, it is a closely related to the empiricist methodology claim. Thus, SSK has to be a kind of an empirical study of science. Hence, it has to obey the rules stated by the empiricism, which they actually criticize following Feyerabnd and Kuhn.

If this discipline were to take the model of science, that is the empiricist methodology, in order just to call itself a science, it would be better to look for a better fitting to history of science model than the model proposed by the empiricism. Such a model can be found in the methodologically realistic, though remaining empirically informed models of science. In this model, the seemingly arbitrary way of choosing a theory, which is obviously not driven by empirical considerations, is justified by at least methodological if not metaphysical claims to reality.

Is SSK a Science?

If it is a science, than it is a false science. That is bacause it contradicts the empirical data, it studies. If it is the social reality, created by the scientists, which is under study, than the scientists' arguments for a theory-choice will matter for the social study of science. SSK-ers in contrast, do not care for any philosophical argumentation used by scientists. All that matters for them is the sociologically detectable mechanisms driving the negotiation process.

This is a clear case of a theory contradicting the empirical data it studies.Hence it has to be either given up, or at least revised.

Is SSK a Methodology of Science?

One way of approaching this problem is when observing that it is mistakenly taken to be the only possible alternative to the old positivist philosophy of science, which was widely criticized and shone to be inadequate for explaining science. It is easy to observe that there are approaches such as the scientific realism that solve the problems put before the positivism without being relativistic.

Moreover if it were an empirically adequate study of science, than it would be justified to inductively state generalized claims about the causes, making scientists to maintain a theory. It is not, hence any general claim of its is not justified.

If SSK is a science, which strives to fit the empiricist model of scientific theory, than it is a false science, because it is not empiricaltty adequate. The reality studied by SSK is the social reality where the scientists make their theory choices. Hence, the motives for preferring a given theory rather than another, proclaimed by the scientists themselves are the empirical data, which should be studied by the SSK-ers. But these protocols contradict the SSK' s conclusions for the scientists' motivation. Therefore, SSK is falsified.

If we are to be naïve falsificationists, then we should give up the SSK's programme. But if we adopt a methodological falsificationism, then we should revise the programme and see whether it is worth reformulating some of its most unlikely claims.

Is it worth studying SSK at all?

As far as it has a science popularization programme[5], which, if accompanied by a philosophical discussion of the cases studied, would give a good account of the scientific practice in respect to generating knowledge it is.

Finally, it is the time to state the conclusion: If SSK Were a Scientific Methodology, than the criticism exposed by the scientific warriors against the philosophy of science would be fair, because they often take the SSK, along with all the science studies, as the contemporary philosophy of science. As far as SSK is not a philosophy of science, the criticism it received is not applicable to the philosophy of science.

The criticism SSK received could lead it to a revision of some of its most radical claims. If it restricts its cognitive pretensions to only external history of science, then it would be quite an acceptable programme. Actually there already are such attempts to make it acceptable to the scientists themselves. Peter Daers[6] proposal for reading the science studies as merely epistemography leaving room for the classical epistemology of science is a step towards a sober solution of the too warlike mood of the science and anti-science warriors in the science wars.

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[5] See for example Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 1. Issue 1. 1992.

[6] Dear, P. (2001)

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1. Gurova, L. (2004). „Philosophy of Science in the Struggle for the Soul of Science". In: *Challenges Facing Philosophy in United Europe*. Proceedings of XXIII Varna Philosophical School, Sofia: IPhR – BAS, pp. 50–56.

2. Bricmont, J. and Sokal, A. (2001). "Beyond War and Peace". In: Labinger, J. and Collins, H. (2001). *The One Culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 27–47.

3. Sokal, A. and Bricmont, J. (1998). *Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science*. New York: Picador USA.

4. Bloor, D. (1976/1991). *Knowledge and Social Imagery*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

5. Dear, P. (2001). "Science Studies as Epistemography". In: Labinger, J. and Collins, H. (2001). *The One Culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 128–141.

Jana Yaneva

LOGIC AND TOLERANCE

> *It is easy to preach **tolerance** from a position of weakness;*
> *It is hard to abstain from using **violence** from a position of power.*

The topic of Communication and Tolerance is one of the five topics in the Logic curriculum for secondary education in Bulgaria[1]. Until recently, this topic was not typically associated with logic. What do logic and tolerance have in common?

Logical culture is at the basis of European culture and civilization. The term *European Rationalism* has become a common name (just like *American Pragmatism*; or *the Mystical East…*).

In the broader sense of the word, logical culture is associated with effective argumentation. But before we can ***use*** logic as an instrument of argumentation, we need to have a sufficient array of ***logical knowledge and skills.***

Tolerance is benevolent acceptance of individual, ethical, ethnic, religious, racial, political and other differences.

Logical knowledge and argumentation facilitate the dialogue between different cultural communities and help to unite them. Logical culture does not depend on any ethnic, religious, racial, political or other differences and exhibits natural tolerance toward them. But there are two aspects which need to be taken into consideration:

First, logical argumentation is only one of various possible kinds of argumentation. As any other kind of argumentation, its aim is to

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[1] Programme No 5, 2000, of the Ministry of Education: "AzBuki" v. 38, 2000. *Logic and Tolerance* is one of five topics, along with *Rationality and Thought, Logic and Forms of Thinking, Questions and Answers, Truth and Argumentation*. All these have to be fitted within 27 teaching hours or less (in reality).

convince. But this is not always related to logic and rationality. Often rhetoric can be much more effective for this purpose. Suggestion is also a powerful means of argumentation. So are drugs. If a nation is susceptible to belief (either religious or ideological), it would be inclined to be convinced through methods which are rather different from rational ones. There are various sources of knowledge and criteria for truthfulness, such as:

    1. Practice (facts, usefulness);
    2. Logic (rationality);
    3. Belief (ideology, religion, suggestion);
    4. Power (coercion, violence).

These same ones, under certain conditions, could be regarded as kinds of arguments: factual arguments; logical arguments; arguments of belief; arguments of power; and so on.

Logic (rationality) makes no claims to having a dominating influence over the process of knowledge and argumentation. But in this process it has the unique chance to build bridges and to unite people: logic, as a kind of disciplined thinking, exhibits no ethnic, religious, racial, political or other differences. And if efforts are made to develop logical culture (according to European standards), this would undoubtedly limit the ideological and religious inclinations to knowledge and argumentation (which easily transform into "mentality").

Among the many kinds of struggles in the world, we could outline two main kinds: the struggle for truthfulness and the struggle for power. In the first one, logic has some priority. But even in this area there are no high expectations from logic. The criteria for truthfulness are not exclusively logical: factual criteria may be said to have priority (no matter how flexibly the facts are interpreted). On this plane, European Rationalism competes with American Pragmatism.

Second, logical argumentation has some specificity which determines its relation to tolerance:

a. Because of its very nature (order and disciplined thinking according to some rules and regulations), logic cannot be tolerant toward chaotic thinking. Its tolerance has certain limitations.

In a logical aspect, tolerance means acceptance of different logical methods – their simultaneous application for argumentation and dia-

logue. But the way to do this is through knowing them and being able to apply them[2].

b. In a more general, humanitarian and educational aspect, the existence of logical culture (knowledge and disciplined thinking) could affect positively the manifestation of tolerance to other kinds of differences: ethnic, religious, racial, political and so on. This tolerance, however, goes beyond the scope of logic. Logic cannot pronounce itself on tolerance in general, as the latter is rather an ethical or cultural category. Logic is not interested in the problems of tolerance toward organized crime, corruption, people trafficking, drug dealers and so on.

And even though logic has nothing to say about tolerance in such cases, it takes little logic to understand that tolerance also has its limitations. It turns out that even though we need tolerance, we have much more need of "zero tolerance" to some things and phenomena around us. The term "zero tolerance" is often used as a mantra, a magical formula for things to get right. However, things don't get right by talking about them only. And even if this "zero tolerance" is materialized, it will be nothing more than a step in a long list of measures: tolerance; zero tolerance; intolerance; passive and active intolerance; sanctions; a civil society; an ordered and civilized state…

Some aspects of life in our current society require more than *zero tolerance*. The other steps need to be taken as well:

1. Showing *intolerance* to some negative phenomena – passive and active intolerance[3].

Passive intolerance toward the object of intolerance consists in "a refusal to communicate, leaving the room, going away, relocation, etc. Active intolerance is always directed toward the other, it is the striving of

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[2] For example, the different logical methods for solving syllogisms have their advantages and disadvantages, and different people may have different preferences. But even if we use different methods, this doesn't mean that we could obtain different (contradictory) answers to the same syllogism.

[3] Tulchinskii, G. L.: Г. Л. Тульчинский, "Логика и ненасилие". – In: *Современная логика: Проблемы теории, истории и применения в науке*. St Petersburg, 2002, pp. 188 – 191.

one power to domination over another power…"[4]. It could use force as a method of coercion. And then all logical arguments which could prevent the illegitimate use of violence are powerless.

2. It is necessary to go even further and to apply *sanctions* (regulated within a good and well functioning judicial system);

3. There needs to be a civil society which would facilitate the development and governance of the country. That would reduce the possibility for deviant governance (dictatorship or tyranny).

If no intolerance and sanctions against negative phenomena are exhibited, the negative phenomena can easily be established as a style of living ("mentality").

Intolerance and sanctions could also be exhibited in some kind of grotesque fashion toward normal individuals and phenomena. An illustration of that can be seen in *One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest*. However, there is no proof to date that the whole world is so confused.

If we don't show the required intolerance and sanctions against the negative phenomena in our country, the better ordered and more civilized countries will do so. Obviously we shall have to tolerate it and *live* with it, even if it sometimes feels as humiliation, and even if we expect tolerance from them. We can only hope for them to exhibit "normal" criteria in applying just the necessary sanctions in just the right moments, rather than sanction us when they wish in some whimsical fashion.

Bulgaria is on the Balkan Peninsula and there may be a greater degree of Rationalism in it; but at the same time there is a considerable degree of Eastern disorderliness and Balkan unrest.

Is there a way for the constant Balkan unrest and Eastern disorderliness to be curbed, so that they pose no threat to the cultural and civilizational values of Europe?

Will Europe manage to take control over those processes, or will it allow certain regions to become Balkanized and ideologized[5] and to blow up its cultural and civilizational model, based on European rationalism with a human measure?

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[4] *Ibid*., p. 190.

[5] A general term for processes referring to an overdose of religion, ideology, mentality of an ethnic community.

In the European countries' efforts to find a successful outcome to this problem, there can be found two simultaneous strategies:

1. Control (supervision) over the Governing structures of the countries exhibiting "Balkan mentality" in the process of their preparation for accession to the European Union, with the purpose of reducing disorderliness (a currency board, safeguard clauses, a number of limitations and requirements, reforms and harmonization with European standards and regulations, an energy-dependent economy, etc);

2. Cultural levelling in these regions:

2.1. In the form of tolerance toward different cultural, racial, and ethnic groups (multiculturalism);

2.2. Subsidies for education and educational programmes with view of common European cultural and civilizational values at the basis of global European equilibrium.

Subsidies and Control, so that there are ***Reforms***: these are still civilized measures for influence, supervision and help in the development of countries like ours. Hopefully these civilized measures will be sufficient to make us part of the European standards.

In a more general humanitarian and educational aspect, the problem of "logic and tolerance" is in the context of the relation between European rationalism and multiculturalism. Logic is in a position to exert positive influence over the manifestations of tolerance to different (ethical, ethnic, racial or political) communities. In this sense, it facilitates their unification.

As an application of the topic of "logic and tolerance" in a narrowly professional logical aspect we could see how logic treats different results in its own filed; how it decides which of its results are tolerable and which are not.

A private case of "logical tolerance" are the textbooks in logic for the secondary schools published between 2001 and 2002 in Bulgaria – a total of eight textbooks. In the different textbooks, the number of valid modes of the syllogism vary (there are either no modes given, or 24, or 15 in some of the textbooks). According to the different textbooks, one and the same syllogism will have different conclusions. How can one show tolerance to-

ward such an "educational result", since such tolerance has been shown to all these textbooks? How can a student's competence be tested according to the "right – wrong" evaluation system, or even according to the existing grading system where 2 is "fail" and 6 is "excellent"?

The year 2005 was the year of education in Bulgaria. But the need to take care of education is not over with the end of the year. On the contrary, it has become clear that the reform in education is yet to come. A reform in the Logic curriculum is necessary too. But there will be no reform in Logic if we just rename and re-order the topics and include some fashionable ones such as "tolerance" in the textbook tables of contents, while at the same time reducing the number of teaching hours in Logic.

Reform requires subsidies and control, so that disorderliness and chaotic innovations in education are curbed.

Tolerance is an important humanistic value, and even though it is only marginally related to Logic, logical knowledge and argumentation can contribute to the development of tolerance to differences.

However, tolerance has its limitations. Intolerance and sanctions are required in order to control certain negative social phenomena, as well as instances when the lack of professionalism leads to poor educational results.

Miljenko Stanić

LOGIC, CREATIVITY AND NARRATIONS

We present here one software for teaching symbolic logic. We address the system of teaching to children 10 years old but also will be applicable in lectures on university to students who are not skilfully in mathematics.

Our main goal is improve student's capability to make symbolic expression of reasonable utterance in natural language.

1. We focus our attentions up on a given configurations on chessboard, and then we write down the sentences-formula.

The computer checks the well-formedness and the truth-value of formula according the configurations found on table. (Formalizations world around us)

2. We start with several sentences-formulas and then the students have to construct the appropriate configurations on board. (Make model over formal languages)

The idea of teaching the symbolic logic with aid of computer came from software "Tarski's world».

This software was published with the book of J.Barwise and J.Etchemendy: *Language, Proof and Logic* (1989)

Tarski's world is the chessboard with geometrical figures.

Here, introduce a little different table-world, more collored, with some drawing figures which designed some tale or story which is possibly created in cooperations of students and teacher.

Drawing 1. represent the original Tarski's World and drawing 2. represent our modifications.

Drawing 1.

Drawing 2.

J.Barwise and J.Etchemendy, did not only give to us the good tools in teaching logic, but they opened new field of research in logic itself.

With them started new approaching to logic, the heterogeneous reasoning that meanings to apply pictures or diagrams into logical inferences.

I like to quote Sun-Joo Shin, today the most eminent scientist and the student of J.Barwise, from article

Heterogeneous reasoning and its logic edited in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic vol.10 no.1 2004.

"**Birth of heterogeneous logic**. The innovations that….*Tarski's World* …provided did not end in the teaching of logic. Barwise and Etchemendy drew a valuable lesson from the way these programs have been received by students and teachers, and opened a new area of research in logic. They gained important insight when they asked the following questions: Why are these programmes more effective than traditional teaching methods? Does it mainly have something to do the use of computer?"

In languague of classical logic they entered new rules as like as: **Given, Apply, Observe, Assume, Subassume, Merge…etc** for discraibing visual

inferences which we use in common life, by examples, when we read the map of unknown city.

Now, turn back to ours pictures.

I like to show the properties which is possible to investigate from tableworld.

For instance, the student's may try to find or to dicovere:

I. Universal laws.

It is evident by the picture that:

(1) Property of predicate: «All items is on the red or the yellow square on table».
In formal form: $\forall X \ (\mathbf{red(X)} \lor \mathbf{yel(X)})$

(2) Binary relation: «For each two items X and Y on table we can judge that X is to the left (right) of Y or X is a front (back) of Y»
In formal form: $\forall X \forall Y \ (\ \mathbf{(X)left(Y)} \lor \mathbf{(Y)left(X)} \lor \mathbf{(X)front(Y)} \lor \mathbf{(X)back(Y)} \ )$

(3) Property of predicat: «Every one which has propetry to be **wom**en, **man,**
animmals or **pla**nts is **li**ving **b**eings.»
In formal form: $\forall X(\mathbf{wom(X)} \lor \mathbf{man(X)} \lor \mathbf{ani(X)} \lor \mathbf{pla(X)} \Rightarrow \mathbf{lib(X)})$

The sentence (1) is self-evident just from the picture (or diagram) but other sentence need some more explainations.

About the construction of relations **left**, **right**, **front** and **back**, we will easy to see that relations are relations of partial orders. However, that meaninig that we need some intrisic knowdlidge or have to discavered inner propety of relations.

The type (3) law is forced in the table-world from outside, from our private classifications.

Resumed with:

II. Game and logic: performed by picture and tale story

One example for explaining the definition of a new relation.

We can suppouse that the chief of village (BAR) proclaimed the rules:

(1) "**Every men and women must be in same row or same column with at least one person of opposite sex**".

(2) « **Each vechicle must be at any time watched by his owner.**»

How that orders is fulfilled in our world? Look on the chessboard.

The rule (1) is not fullfiled, even the chief not follow its owen proclamation.

The rule (2) is respected, if we assume that: the vehicle is watched by owner if not existed any items **beetwen** them.

Formal achievement of the rules.

Rule1.

The rule brought to us new relations **to be in the same row** (**or column**).

But our world recognize only binary relation: **XleftY, XrightY, XbackY, Xback Y** and ternary relation **X between Y,Z**.

Is it possible to interpret new relation with aid of old relations and predicates ?

Answer is afirmative:

X is in the same row as Y: if X is left (right) of Y then is not that X is back or a front of Y.

Or more formally:

XleftY ∨ XrightY ⇒ ¬(XfrontY∨ XbackY).

In similar way the following is easly definied **the X is in the same column as Y.**

Rule 2.

We iterpreted this order in table-world like this:

If on table is posted some vechicle then we must place some women or man but no items between them. Show the pictures.

TET is owner of AUT.

ANA is owner of ZAP.

Question: Does it is possible to send one women to perfom her job and reminde only one wumen to keep all two vehicles ?

This is question of minimal cardinality of the domain.

Answer: Yes, remouve the ANA and TET keep the watch over both vehicles.

Let's formalize the order. $\forall X \exists Y(vec(X) \Rightarrow ((wom(Y) \vee man(Y) \wedge \neg \exists Z(ZbetXY)))$ or this formula would be tansformed in prenex form like as:

$\forall X \forall Z \exists Y(vec(X) \Rightarrow ((wom(Y) \vee man(Y) \wedge \neg (ZbetXY)))$.

Question: Is it possible to form the **adjoins** relations ? The adjoins relation is binary relation which colected pairs of item posted in neighbour cells. See pairs (ANA,KRU),

(TRE,JUR), (JUR,JAB), (JUR,MAK)....ect.

This relations is not possible represent by the basic relations.

The border problem.

Look over the formulas:

$\forall X((X)left(BAR) \Rightarrow red(X))$

This formula is true becouse the atecedent is not satisfied. The individua BAR is placed on utmost left column in world.

Question: Is it possible reconaizing the individua on border of world by basic relations?

If the answer is negativ then we open the problem to find the relations which be jointed to basic relations to give the positiv answer.

If the last formula be thru in all configurations with fixed position of BAR, then we be shure that the BAR is on the border. But then we open the door for stady the possibilia with table-world.

Martin Tabakov

HOW A "PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC" IS POSSIBLE AND RELEVANT

In this paper I will discuss questions: Why, for what reasons the term "philosophical logic" appeared and become popular?; "How a "philosophical logic" is possible and relevant."; "What they call and what must be named a "philosophical logic"". I will analyze the common usage of term "philosophical logic"; common objection against usage of term "philosophical logic"; problems posed by use term "philosophical logic". And finally i will explain my conception what must be a "philosophical logic"

1.For what reasons the term "philosophical logic" was approbated and become popular.

There are 2 main reasons – Scientific and Theoretical and social and practical.

1.1.Scientific and Theoretical reasons

The main question is "Are there a significant field of study for what there is no suitable TERM" It is followed by next main questions – where is this field of study named "philosophical logic" in the philosophical map, **what are relations between "philosophical logic", logic and philosophy. Is "philosophical logic"(PhL) a logic?!**

There are two main possibilities

"(PhL)" is (kind of) logic	and	"(PhL)" is philosophy but logic!
. Then philosophical map look like this:		Then philosophical map look like this
PHILOSOPHY		PHILOSOPHY
ontology		ontology
epistemology		epistemology
---		---
logic		logic
modal logic		modal logic
philosophical logic		philosophical logic
--- logic		----
-----		----

1.2. SOCIAL AND PRACTICAL, everyday life reasons. That for my opinion is the main reason for use the term "philosophical logic! **(many of the causes are also of socially-psychological nature)**

1.2.1. **Reason of job Approving a such term is convenient and usefully for a large group of scientist, especially for their work and career! – for instance:**

– People with traditional, classical training without any knowledge in modern logic(those who do not know well enough current logical research), but with anxiety for working and making career in the field of logic. - Philosopher with good knowledge in some other fields – ontology, epistemology, philosophy of science, history of philosophy which for different reasons find job as logic lecturers. - Scientists with good skills in formal (mathematical) method, frequently with firmly mathematical education (having mostly a mathematical logical orientation) which for different reasons find job as logic lecturers in philosophical departments.

It is interesting to analyze the development of the term "philosophical logic". In (1) Thomason notice **"...**the distinction between the two subfields has been magnified by differences in the sorts of professional training that are available to logicians, and by the views of individuals on what is important for the field. The statement of policy presented in Volume 1, no. 1 of the Journal of Symbolic Logic (1936) lists bringing together the mathematicians and philosophers working in logic among the goals of the new journal. Probably at this time both the mathematicians and the philosophers shared a sense that their subject was considered to be somewhat*

marginal by their colleagues, and may have felt a primary loyalty to logic as a subject rather than to any academic discipline. Articles in the first volume of the JSL were divided about equally between professional mathematicians and philosophers, and the early volumes of the JSL do not show any strong differences between the two groups as to topic. This situation changed in the 1960s. The 1969 volume of the JSL contained 39 articles by mathematicians, and only 9 by philosophers. By the early 1970s, many philosophers felt that philosophical papers on logic were unlikely to be accepted by the JSL, and that if they were accepted they were unlikely to be read by philosophers. At this point, the goals of the two groups had diverged considerably. Mathematicians were pursuing the development of an increasingly technical and complex body of methods and theorems. Many philosophers felt that this pursuit was increasingly irrelevant to the goal of illuminating philosophical issues. <u>These divisions let to the founding of the Journal of Philosophical Logic in 1972.</u>"

1.2.2. Publicity -"philosophical logic" sounds impressive and hardly provoke objection.

– It helps to earn money from. machinery of government, foundation, deans, rectors and other university managers... – term "philosophical logic" is attractive for students – (instead of logic1, logic2...)

2.Objection.

The main objections against usage of the term "philosophical logic" are:Which problems belong to logic but not to "philosophical logic", are papers of Aristotle's, (Frege. Hilbert... Kripke) "philosophical logic"? Let we say that "philosophical logic" is (kind of) logic. But "Logic" is a part of philosophy(it study the Truth) so why we must Restrict logic through the more general concept philosophy ("philosophical logic" looks like "mathematical geometry, algebra"); By the way, if "philosophical logic" is philosophy but not logic it will conflict with 1.2.1. – all this people **want to be logical lecturers!**

"philosophical logic" in unnecessary – "LOGIC" is well enough in all cases.". In my opinion it is reasonable. In **basic usage of** term "philosophical logic" without any problems we **can use "logic"!**

3. Let see **Most common uses of "philosophical logic"**

- philosophical logic" (PhL) is Traditional Logic
- "PhL" is that what "philosophical logicians" are doing – **a vicious circle!**

- **"PhL"** is Metaphysics
- "PhL" is philosophy of language
- "philosophical logics" are Nonclassical Logics (modal logic)
- "PhL" is general semantics for different logical systems
- "PhL" is the semantical foundations of logic
- "PhL" is metalogic
- "PhL" is philosophy of mathematics!
- "PhL" is philosophy of logic
- "PhL" is philosophical examination of systems of formal logic
- "PhL" as the philosophical elucidation of those notions that are indispensable for the proper characterization of rational thought and its contents.(2)

The list of sample topics in the first issue of the *Journal of Philosophical Logic* in 1972 included: "- 1. Contributions to branches of logical theory directly related to philosophical concerns, such as inductive logic, modal logic, deontic logic, quantum logic, tense logic, free logic, logic of questions, logic of commands, logic of preference, logic of conditionals, many-valued logic, relevance logics; 2. Contributions to philosophical discussions that utilize the machinery of formal logic...;3. Discussions of philosophical issues relating to logic and the logical structure of language, .4. Philosophical work relating to the special sciences. But as Thomason in (1) mark *"most of the articles over the subsequent 28 years of the JPL belong to the first of these four categories."*

Actually there are so many "philosophical logic's" as "philosophical logicians"

Here the are some more, composed by me "definitions". - "PhL" is the ontology of the logical forms and the objects of logic – their essence and nature. - An area where the logical concepts and problems are discussed and analyzed in a phenomenological, hermeneutical or hegelian style, rather than through the methods of analytical philosophy. Ore more general: philosophical studies in which are discussed questions and concepts of logic, but which do not comply with the established criteria for logical investigations. And in particular don't use formal (mathematical) methods. But actually Aristotle use formal methods, so its work are not philosophical logic. The development of contemporary logic seems to me natural and consistent: the initial breakthrough has been performed

in the area where logic is used most extensively, most systematically and most coherently, in the use of its means of expression (in the most extensive, systematic and coherent way). Being aware of the efficiency and productivity of contemporary methods, contemporary logic continues to develop but this time it does it by going deeper and wider: mathematical methods allow explicating essential logical moments of the extra-mathematical logical 'empirics'.

Besides in most contemporary studies in logic coexist both – the content-based reasoning and the formal (mathematical) methods! It is started with qualitative reasoning which justify the approach, then a logical system is define, it is analyzed through formal methods and finally the results are analyzed on an informal level. Are they "philosophical logic" ore are not?

So is there any sense to introduce a new term if the concept it signifies is from the outer so proliferate!!!

4. My conception what must be a "philosophical logic"

I accept the term "philosophical logic" when it is motivated by various social and practical goals – e.g. the increase in the number of lecture courses, or to impress sponsors, students or officials. But at a theoretical level the introduction of a special concept of "philosophical logic" is useless and it only leads to unnecessary augmentation of the essences (Ockam razor!)

But as long as the term "philosophical logic" is quite often used I shall expose my view on possible reasonable use.

−1. **In narrow sense as logic "Philosophical logic" is logic and studding logical systems with connection to philosophy.** So Logical systems serving as bases for a mathematical theory are not "philosophical logic" the same with Logical systems – (only!) mathematical models – and systems created without philosophical justification: they are interesting at least because they allow analogies with other systems interesting to philosophy. And also Applied logic – logical systems that do not claim to explicate logic in any general philosophical, epistemological or ontological sense, but aim only to express logical relations involved in a particular field of application far from philosophy.

But The creation of many-valued, modal, intuitionistic logic is related to philosophical postulations! Logical systems – attempts for the

explication of logical inference. (in philosophy) are "philosophical logic"; Logical systems expressing epistemological aspects belong to "philosophical logics". Logical systems related to ontological aspects too. **Especially Philosophical logic as logic investigate nonmathematical reasoning.**

2."Philosophical logic" is the "logic of philosophy" and to explore the rules of the logical inference, the modes of deduction from and in philosophy and epistemology.

In wide sense "Philosophical logic" is not a logic it is interdisciplinary field between logic and other philosophical areas ontology, epistemology, philosophy of science, history of philosophy. For instance: Finding of tangent points and common studies with established philosophical approaches, in which the word "logic" is used . The synthesis of the two types of rationality – the philosophical and the mathematical one- Analysis of the most important methodological logical results. The relationship between the results of Modern Logic and some basic philosophical categories and conceptions.

– The development of Logic in the light of the popular conceptions – of Kuhn – about the scientific revolutions and Lacatos – about the principles of proliferation.; Are there revolutions and crisis in logic ...

– Questions set to the philosophy by the development of modern logic, concerning the limits of the logical, the unity and the universality of logic, about the demarcation, etc.

– Questions, which philosophy sets to or should set to logic:

Finding of tangent points and common studies with established philosophical approaches, in which the word "logic" is used

– Logic of the Non-classical science – Classical logic is related to statements of classical science and it is not a priori evident that it can be extrapolated to the contemporary non-classical and post-non-classical science.

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2. J. Lowe Philosophical Logic. From internet

Nikolay Obreshkov

ABOUT APPLIED CHARACTER
OF THE GAME THEORY

1.Something about the fundamental concepts
of the theory of games.

1.1. Game theory is the theory of mathematical models for decision-making in conflict situations (e.g. in contests).

The implications of this very wide definition need detailed analysis.

The theory deals with models, i.e. not with actual optimal decisions but with idealized schemata of them. All the general statements that may be made about arbitrary models apply in game theory. These models are not just kind of model, but formal, symbolic, mathematical models. This means that all the game-theoretical statements must be sufficiently precise to lend themselves to complete formalization.

In particular, the very object of the game theory, the optimal decision-making under conflict must be formalized, and this in turn requires the formalization of the concepts of "decision-making", "optimality" and of the "conflict" in question.

The formalizations for each of the three concepts are problems of entirely different complexity.

1.2. Decision-making is understood in the simplest sense as the choice by the decision-maker of an arbitrary decision from within a set of possible decisions given in advance. Game theory is not necessarily concerned with the physical or social nature of the decision, the decision-maker`s reasons for or the means of selecting his decision, much less his manner of implementing it – these are partly matters for cybernetics (computer science) and operation research. Nevertheless, in dealing with specific cases, game theory may also have to bear these aspects in mind. An elementary

but very instructive exposition of game theory contains in the book of M.D.Davis (1970).

1.3. The formalization of the idea of a conflict is appreciably more complex.

A conflict is a phenomenon in which we know who is involved and how; what are the possible outcomes; and how. This description can be enlarged upon.

First, we must list all the acting factors. These can be collective and possess some internal structure. Therefore they may be called acting coalitions. The total of all such coalitions constitutes a set, which we can designate *Ca* .

Secondly, all permissible decisions for each operational coalition must be indicated. Usually, in the theory of games no distinction is made between the decision and its implementation (a kind of identification frequently used in mathematics). The actions, behaviors and decisions of each acting coalitions K can be designed *Sk*.

Thirdly, we have to indicate all the possible outcomes, which are basically the results of the choices of strategies by all the coalitions. These outcomes are called the situations. The set of all situations we designate *S*.

The coalitions having chosen and carried out their strategies (1.2. above), the outcome is assumed to be completely predetermined, i.e. the situation is univocal. This assumption is less restrictive then it might seem. Suppose the choice of strategy by the coalitions does not lead univocally to a particular physical outcome but leaves open the possibility of any of the outcomes of a subset of the set of all outcomes. The uncertainty here could be of tow kinds. 1) The outcome is random and the probabilities of its realizations depend on the strategies chosen by the acting coalitions. We can consider it as a single, complex outcome, i.e. a single situation; for example, the conflict is a chess mach in which the winner gets a lottery ticket as a prize. 2) The strategies chosen by the acting coalitions can have different outcomes to which no probabilities can be assigned. Here, at least one other factor not included in constructing the model is playing a role. Hence, the model does not describe the conflict adequately, and must be revised.

Fourthly, we must include all the parties interested in any way in particular outcomes of the conflict. Like the acting factors, they too may be

collective and structured and can be called interest coalitions. The set of all interest coalitions is Ni .

In real conflicts, the operational and interest coalitions usually coincide, but this is not a rigid rule. A football fan watching a match on TV has an interest in the outcome but cannot influence the result. On the other hand, the referee has no interest in the result, (or should have none…), but exercises considerable influence on the course of the match and its result.

Fifthly, we must indicate in what the interests of the interest coalitions consist. This is done by showing, for each comparable pair, which of the two is preferable. It is not essential, however, that any two situations for each interest coalition be comparable. Indeed, it may happen that a particular situation will be absolutely non-comparable (exactly as in ethics no comparison is allowable between the value of money and the value of human life). The fact that situation s for interest coalition K is preferable to situation t will be designated by s ›– k t .

Very often, the preferential relationship for interest coalitions is described as follows. For each coalition of interests K for all situations S is defined a numeric function Hk and s ›– k t is accepted where Hk (s) › Hk (t). The function Hk is called the payoff function of the coalition.

It follows that any conflict may be formally described as a quintuple

‹ Na, {Sk}k∈Na, S, Ni, {›– k }k∈Ni › (*)

In which the meaning of each letter is as explained above; the subscript near each of the braces indicates that the content of the braces is variable and depends on the index that accompanies it and that the index itself varies within the bounds of the set, as follows from the symbols adjacent to the braces.

The formal model of the conflict, represented by the system (*), is called the game. Basically, the mathematical theory of games deals with the study of conflicts treated as a games, in the sense of this definition.

This definition of games may appear too complicated and abstract. However, it reproduces in a formal language all the features which are inevitably inherent in any conflict, without at the same time containing any of the indices proper only to special isolated classes of conflicts.

1.4. The formalization of the concept of conflict led us to the game concept. The formalization of the notion of optimality, on the contrary, is not a preliminary step for working out game theory, but a fundamental problem of the theory itself. Moreover, it is in game theory that optimality, its nature and its variants, becomes a major scientific problem and, above all, a mathematical one.

2. Applications of Game Theory

2.1. When speak of applying the theory of games, a distinction must be made between: 1) the description, in game theory terms, of phenomena found nature or in society, and 2) real decisions arrived at by games theory methods in dealing with specific, practical questions.

The second are still sporadic and isolated. It is not proposed to go into detail, but simply to indicate the difficulties.

First, to store a practical problem by game theory methods, it is first necessary to formulate it with precision, i.e. give an exact description of the relevant game. All the players and their strategies must be determined, and the preferential relationships over the set of situation shown. This in turn requires accurate information about the phenomenon involved. If the preferential relations are determined by the payoff functions, the information must be quantitative. But this implies exact measurements, and the methods for obtaining them have not yet been satisfactorily worked out.

Secondly, the game theory solution does not always satisfy the executor who carries out the decision. For example, a mixed strategy recommendation raises the question of responsibility in the event of unfavorable consequences. Moreover, the multiplicity of the game`s solutions (already discussed) makes it impossible to obtain a specific recommendation on which to rely.

We therefore discuss only the possible rather than actual applications of game theory, in cases in which the phenomenon involved lends itself to description in game-theoretical language.

As its definition indicates, game theory is in principle usable in conflicts of any kind, and these can be found in nearly all disciplines. Accordingly, many phenomena in nature and society lend themselves to treatment in game theory terms.

2.2. Its originators saw game theory mainly as a mathematical tool to help in making optimal economic decisions. The title of the first basic

monograph by J. von Neumann and O.Morgenstern, "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" (1944), is fairly explicit. In a competitive economy, game theory could be used in studying competition for markets, advertising, price questions, stock market operations, and so on.

The theory has proved to have much broader possibilities. It can equally serve in the conditions of a

2.3. War is of course the most obvious of all cases of conflict. Military applications of game theory are dealt with in Drescher`s monograph (1961) "Games of Strategy. Theory and applications."

2.4. The low is another scene of evident conflicts – first who make up a society. But the making of the law is itself based on a conflict; for the legislator is at grips with the factors, not always very clear or specific but nevertheless very real, which give rise to crime or breaches of civil law. Legislation to anticipate mass developments that have juridical consequences and accordingly may need to be incorporated in law also falls within the purview of game theory. Court trials are competitive, involving optimal behavior and norms of procedure. Verdicts are ordinarily made in conditions of uncertainty; and law-makers and courts alike can be considered as players making decisions.

2.5. Ethical and legal norms having much in common, applications of game theory to moral questions are very similar to those in jurisprudence. The fact that, in contrast to low, ethics is not codified only increases the uncertainty in the choice of optimal ethical behavior.

2.6. Sociology has a variety of openings for game theory – conflicts between groups and in concrete group between coalitions or individuals, global conflicts end so on.

2.7. Application in biology are rather special. The animal and, even more, the vegetable kingdoms can hardly be said to take deliberate decisions with a precise and in view, or to be conscious of interests that conflict or do not conflict. Nevertheless, the interpretations in game theory terms of such phenomena is both possible and useful. For example, the struggle for existence between two species can be treated as a two-person game in which the admissible forms of behavior of either species figure as their strategies and the number of individuals in each as their objective functions. It is particularly worth while to treat questions of symbiosis and parasitism in game theory terms.

Another natural subject for game theory treatment is the study of evolutionary processes, which may be considered as conflicts between the species complicated by random external conditions, with the line of evolution of a species as its strategy and the principal evolutionary trends in species as their objective functions. Since optimal strategies are ordinary mixed, it is natural to assume that it is the mutations that represent the mixed strategies in this case. The description of these phenomena in terms of game theory may lead to new discoveries in heredity and in the shaping of the genetic inherence.

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Christian Enchev

HISTORICAL AND SOCIO-CULTURAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE INVESTIGATIONS ON INTENSIONAL LOGICS

When the role of epistemic processes becomes thematized and in relation to them different formal structures are considered as admissible or not, it allows philosophers to ask *how realizing something as known, wished, felt, imagined, etc. could be referred to a "mode of conviction" in order to be distinguished truthful and erroneous admissions* (see *Husserl* 1992: 114-115). Realizing something in *this* or *that* way is intentional; the logical aspect of the matter in hand falls back on grasping "cogitations" at the truth-functional level of logics and with regard to the attempts for adequate interpreting such contexts considered here as "intensional". Intensional contexts are not univocally determinable with a view to the conditions of their truthfulness because their structure could be explicated in many different ways. Intentionality expressed by those contexts is not a direct threat to logics – such one is rather their opacity and irreducibility to extensional contexts univocally determinable as truth-functional.

When we apply approaches treating the language bearers as "ideal" the language seems like semantically reflecting world structures in their static, while the attitudinal dynamic of those bearers may relate to pragmatic. The impossibility to be considered in isolation some pure and utterance independent referential acts demands to be made the difference between the linguistic competence of a bearer and the utterance situation (context). Every real language bearer, however, possesses some specific information available in a particular situation. That information is different from the linguistic information in itself tied to the bearer's linguistic competence. In that case, if we allow the too strong idealization of a linguistic competence related entirely with the character of the language itself, it will cost con-

frontation between semantic and pragmatic such that the propositional attitudes may receive a "cold welcome" within the semantic field. Reducing the intensional contexts to extensional on these approaches come true at the cost of neglecting to the peculiarity of different language bearers bound by the content species of different ontological regions as well as to the dynamic of socio-cultural contexts influencing language structures.

In his seminal work on modal logics *"Meaning and Necessity"* [1947] Rudolf Carnap admits that the problem of the logical analysis of sentences expressing *propositional attitudes* (Russell) or *epistemic attitudes* (Ducasse) "has been much discussed, but a satisfactory solution has not been found so far" (*Carnap* 1956: 62). In the introduction to his work *"Intension and Decision"* [1963] Richard Martin writes that "the study of intensions ... is in its infancy and although valuable progress has been made, no fully satisfactory semantical theory of intensions seems yet to have been formulated" (*Martin* 1963: vii-viii). A similar ascertainment appears also in the leading article of Elena Smirnova and Pëtr Tavanez *"Semantic in Logics"* [1967] (for a reference note to that article see *Smirnova* 1982: 139): "a satisfactory sense theory is missing until now in logics" (*Smirnova and Tavanez* 1967: 29). Considering those references we are not entirely unjustified in saying that the concept *sense* (Sinn) in its different modifications remains no less problematic in the logical investigations about the middle of the twentieth century than it has been for Frege on introducing the concept.

The treatment of the problem of sense in *"On Sense and Reference"* [1892] is as follows: it is not possible to reach to a fully "clarified" reference which could be expressed in the ability "to say immediately whether any given sense belongs to it", but according to Frege "to such knowledge we never attain" (*Frege* 1952: 25). In a footnote referring to this citation[1] Frege clears up that opinions on the sense of a proper name could differ (the sense for Frege is objective not as a possession of all people in general but only as a "common possession of many people"), and only "so long as the reference remains the same, such variations of sense may be tolerated, although they are to be avoided in the theoretical structure of a demonstrative science and ought not to occur in a perfect language". (ibid.: 23).

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[1] See the Kripke's analysis on this note in *"Naming and Necessity"* (*Kripke* 1972: 257-258).

This imperative for a logical perfect language could be seen as a base of the strong program started at the end of the nineteenth century. The essential matter in our case is that the sense problem posed by Frege still remains in the contemporary investigations on intensional logics.

Stephen Toulmin makes an analogy between the 30's of the seventeenth century and the 30's of the twentieth century about approving a unified program of Reason within which occurs, according to the Hegel's term, *Aufhebung*. It is important to be specified that the ideals of formal accuracy referring to the natural philosophy of the seventeenth century are not recurred in the same way – we would be speaking of far more ultimate form of rational control. The rout of the Central Powers in the First World War, as Toulmin draws attention to, posed a task to the European intellectual, situated in the period between the two World Wars, identical with that of Leibniz after 1670: "to create a rational method for comparison of ideas from different nations and to form international institutions which could avert renovating the World War" (*Toulmin* 1994: 183). Obviously a rational method having such effectiveness had not been created: "renovating the World War" is not avoided. While consequently belonging to the Vienna Circle scientists and some of their adherents emigrated to America and became pillars of analytic philosophy, their colleagues from continental Europe did not have exclusive alternatives after the end of the Second World War: it seemed natural they together with Theodor Adorno to bring in question the moral value of the *philosophy after Auschwitz*. Richard Bernstein's conviction is that namely here should be searched for the real reason for the opposition between, if it could be ironically said, the Anglo-American "serious" and "cleansed" of metaphysics philosophy and the "opaque" European philosophy.

At the beginning of the 50's of the twentieth century first post-war international philosophical congresses have been conducted – X[th] in Amsterdam [1948] and XIth in Brussels [1953] (see *Sadovskii and Smirnov* 1980: 9). Giving a new meaning of the European continental philosophical conceptions, as a result of the emerged after the Second World War mistrust towards the value neutrality of pure science, provoked interest in phenomenological and existential (in general) attitudes for philosophizing. However, the adherents of positivism who left Europe during the 30's and emigrated to the USA and Great Britain had the historical chance to get into conditions enabled them "to believe in productivity and construc-

tiveness of their program for reorganization of all traditional philosophy – reducing it to a logical analysis of scientific language" (ibid.: 10).

The opposition between extensionality and intensionality could be generalized as an opposition between the idea for absolute aquirableness of the world in a transparent way (in a "logically perfect language") and the idea for rejecting the possibility of knowledge referring to all things in themselves. Parting of logics with some approved laws and principles gives me a reason to make a philosophical-methodological consideration of logics as a *developing branch of knowledge* in the context of transition from set-theoretical to constructive modeling of possible worlds taking as patterns, respectively, the metaphysical approaches of Leibniz and Kant.

In the dogmatic metaphysic of Leibniz we can see that "the concept of possible precedes the concept of existent" (*Smirnov* 1987: 225). As Georgi Donev says, in that metaphysic "thinking is reduced to analytic activity in the frame of absolute objectivity" and because of absent reflection "on the foundations determining existence of the object itself" we could be speaking of "transcendent object" alone which is "extensional a priori synthesis of all possible ontological models, on account of what does not exist "intensional logical form of thinking which to describe the act of synthesis as independent of transcendent objectivity" (*Donev* 1996: 39).

The constructive approach borrows the Kantian idea about the possible as relativized towards the existent. In his work *"On the One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God"* Kant finds that the analytic decomposition of a concept stops on a limit beyond which is necessary, in order to preserve the concept's meaning, to be specified its real basis. The last as well as it is embedded in the question *"How something is given"* to Kant means a basis of each analytic proposition, because according to him the logically possible connection between concepts could be thought only when the latter are considered through some material content (see *Kant* 1998: 190). But the forms of possible knowledge, as well as the given is presented inside of them in some way, could be interpreted "constructivisticly" (in general) as not fixed by the things in itself but by the subject and his cognitive activity (manner). In that way "when we mentally reconstruct the existent we obtain the idea for the possible"; "It is not that the existent is one possibility among all others but the possible appears rearranging of the existent" (*Smirnov* 1987: 225-226).

Treating of propositions as sets of possible worlds in analyzing intensional contexts shows the limits of set-theoretical approach. Philosophical-methodological consideration of a constructive approach in relation with the idea for structured propositions gives significantly more hopeful results in analyzing such contexts. *One very important question in concretization of the constructive approach refers to the role of the language bearer and to the relation between semantic and pragmatic.* However, accordingly to that approach, as well as logics could not be considered independently of particular cognitive procedures, it is exposed to the danger of exchanging the question about "the objective bases of knowledge which in a conceptual form *a priori* give the conditions and possibilities for expanding of knowledge" with the question "in what stage the process of knowledge is anthropological, social, cultural or psychological" (*Kanawrow* 2003: 206). With a view to that it is not necessary "pursuing the last absolute basis" as it is in the set-theoretical approach of Leibniz, but raising a "logical-epistemological norm of clear and distinct knowledge" *not only with respect to the content but also with respect to the form of knowledge* (ibid.: 209). In this sense as an "articulation background" of analyzed texts should be searched a conceptualization "completely in the logical sense as a connection between palpabilities due to the truthfulness of their form" rather than building some "supreme faculty for human knowledge" grasped "in the psychological sense of subjectivized objectivity" and "presented in a consecution of acts" (*Denkov* 1994: 201).

It seems reasonable in accordance with what is said above to be searched such specification of the role of the language bearer which is undividedly connected with semantic but not dependent on a preliminarily given ontology. Under the terms of adopted here logical-epistemological norm that specification should be viewed on a philosophical-conceptual stage of analysis so that to be grounded the possibility of clearly and distinctly defined intensional-logical form of thinking.

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Doroteya Angelova

IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS AS LOGICAL AND SEMANTIC CONSTRUCT AND THEIR ROLE IN EPISTEMOLOGY

Nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible.
Hume

The aim of this article is to show the necessity of such logical and semantic construct as this for impossible world. There are different conceptions about this issue – some of them admit the importance of the impossible worlds, others – are skeptical about the productivity of their application. The opinions about the character of the impossible worlds are too much. We will try to present different views and will outline some methodological directions about their role in epistemology. We will demonstrate that logical resources, including impossible worlds, are helpful for the epistemological work.

The mentioned construct is known in literature under the following names: non-normal worlds, non-classical worlds, atypical worlds and impossible worlds.

In different conceptions *the ways can't be* are refereed with the following constructs: 1) worlds (Restall, Zalta, Varzi, Priest); 2) situations (Barwise, Perry, Zalta, Restall); 3) state of affairs (Vander Laan, Mares); 4) states (Barwise, Restall); 5) indices (Mares).

Usually under impossible worlds it is known some of these things: 1) world, where some contradictory sentences of the form a and ~a hold (Restall, Mares, Zalta, Vander Laan, Varzi, Barwise, Mortensen). The reason for calling such a world impossible is that such a pair of sentences can not be true in no classical interpretation. Therefore the epithet "impossible world" is a generalization of the last. 2) world, where might be things that fail to hold, but that hold in every classical interpretation such as the

form a∨~a (Restall, Varzi); 3) world in which the set of truths are different from those which somebody confess (Priest) [7: 481].

The nature of impossible world is some of the following: 1) ersatz constructions – just linguistic descriptions of the ways our world might not have been (Lewis); 2) elements of any set-theoretical model for which is stipulated to be under certain constraints (Mares, Restall, Priest, Varzi); 3) abstract objects – which existence is inferred or abstracted in rational way (Zalta, Vander Laan, Barwise).

There are different positions about the usage of impossible worlds: 1) to distinguish logically equivalent propositions (Vander Laan, Restall); 2) in connection with the propositional content and in particular with intensional contexts (Restall, Mortensen,Vander Laan); 3) for counterfactual statements with impossible antecedent (Mares, Zalta); 4) to interpret systems of relevant and paraconsistent logic (Restall, Priest, Zalta); 5) to analyse information (Barwise, Varzi, Restall, Mares); 6) the usage of impossible worlds is not needed (Lewis, Stalnaker).

We will try to present some of the most considerable cases, which use relevantly impossible worlds. That will permit us at the same time to express more explicit their particularities. A main direction in this presentation will be to show a lot of examples mostly from the field of logic and epistemology in maintenance of our opinion that the impossible worlds have applications thoroughly in these disciplines.

- **The impossible worlds in logic**

As is well known, the following formulas are available according to the postulates of classical logic:

$A \wedge \sim A \vdash B \rightarrow$ *The sun is shining* **and** *The sun is not shining* **consequently** *I like to sing*

$B \vdash A \vee \sim A \rightarrow$ *9 is even* **consequently** *I am sleeping* **or** *I am not sleeping*

According to the first formula if there is a contradiction in a system then can be trivially inferred each statement (true or false) from it. According to the second – when there is a logically true statement it can be inferred from any arbitrary (even false) statement of the system. It is typical of both formulas that they do not explicate any relation concerning the content between the premises and the conclusion.

To avoid such "paradoxes" of implication, the most successful mode in logic is the usage of paraconsistent (including relevant) notion of inference.

In general the systems of paraconsistent and relevant logic are looking for counterexamples of the presented formulas. It is known that if we want to deny some formula for entailment, we need a "case" where the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. According to the above formulas – we need a "case" or a "world" in which A∧~A is true (namely, an inconsistent world) and A∨~A is false (namely, an incomplete world). In the first of these worlds the law of non-contradiction is not available while in the second – the law of excluded middle is invalid.

There are developed different semantics of impossible worlds to achieve these conditions. So the most essential usage of these worlds is to avoid the triviality of entailment.

Broadly speaking the inconsistent model is a model with gluts about truth-values and the incomplete one – is a model with gaps concerning truth-values. These are two opposite ways for generalization of the classical model where every atomic sentence is exactly determined – it is true or false [13, p.8].

• The impossibilities and logical semantics
Usually the semantics that contain impossible worlds introduce a certain relation between them C called a relation of compatibility. If we have xCy it means that nothing given by x is rejected by y.

To admit inconsistencies the relation C has not be reflexive. Contrary, if a certain world is self-compatible, i.e. there is xCx, then if it contains A and ~A the last ones can not be simultaneously true [9, p.9].

But in semantics with impossibilities, the states can be inconsistent – in them A as well as ~A are **true**, i.e. x|= A и x|=~A. They can also be incomplete – where A as well as ~A are false. The latter is due to the presumption that the state x could be a state of some restricted part of the world so that it has nothing to say about A.

1) If the states x and y are *compatible*, i.e. xCy and in x ~A is not true (x|≠~A) then in y A is true (y|=A).

2) When there is x|=~A and y|=A, i.e. in the state x ~A is true and in the state y A is true, then x and y are *incompatible*.

We will consider some examples which demonstrate the relationships between some kind of worlds or states:

a) The worlds x and y can be compatible even though some of them are incomplete, for instance x.

x = the world of Sherlock Holmes

y= the world of Watson

The world of Sherlock Holmes could not be in contradiction (i.e. could be compatible) with the world of Watson, although the world of Sherlock Holmes is incomplete with regard to Watson's feeling about broccoli – maybe he likes broccoli, may be he does not – Holmes is not concerned [13,p.5].

b) There could be compatibility between the states x and y, i.e. xCy even though x is not compatible with itself. In such cases x is inconsistent [9, p.9], i.e. x⊨~A∧A. Nevertheless, x may still be compatible with y, because y may support neither A nor ~A. So x does not contradict y, because y says nothing about A (y is incomplete in regard to A). Here is an example for states that are themselves inconsistent and in the same time are compatible with other states:

I may not contradict somebody although I contradict myself on some topic, because this person may not make any assertions about the topic in which I contradict myself [9, p.10].

According to us, the relation of compatibility may play a useful role about the relationships between theories and the statements that they support.

● **The impossible worlds, databases and theories**
Very often the impossible worlds are met in different databases. According to Restall, we ordinary have databases with information from different sources not all of which are completely reliable. As a result it may

contain inconsistencies. If the database is inconsistent, it is not a trivial collection of all the sentences that the language uses. In other words, if the database claims A and ~A, then it also claims A∧~A, but it does not follow that it claims every B which we want [9,p.17].

In other cases the data bank may be consistent, but incomplete – i.e. both A and ~A are false. So, nothing can be told for A and ~A. This is the case when, as Varzi shows, the models are not completely determined about the semantic value of some atomic sentences, i.e. when the bank does not contain all the information about the objects in its domain. The intuition is that we will get the same result no matter how will fill in the gaps, therefore the gaps do not matter [13,p.5].

The situation in scientific theories is similar. A scientific theory may be inconsistent for many reasons, i.e. directly or indirectly includes an inconsistency.

The most formal theories which are based on empirical or experimental sciences are ordinary indirectly inconsistent. In this sense the theory admits the truth of some statement and its negation. Therefore the reasoning in such cases has to be paraconsistent in order to avoid the necessity to infer (to think) an arbitrary statement from any contradiction.

On the other hand a scientific theory may be incomplete in many ways, so for a contention A is possible A as well as its negation ~A to be false in the theory. Then the reasoning has to be incomplete in order to avoid the necessity to think about things which are out of the theory [2, p.3].

• **The impossible worlds and the counterfactuals with inconsistent antecedents**

For the analyses of counterfactual statements with inconsistent antecedent is used paraconsistent logic which is an extension of Lewis's semantic, including impossible worlds [3,p.516].

Let's look at the next examples, given by Edwin Mares:

1. If Sally were to square the circle, we would be surprised.
2. If sally were to square the circle, we would not be surprised.

The first of these counterfactual statements seems to us true whereas the second – false.

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1'. A□ →B □→ – a sign for counterfactual implication
2'. A □→~B A – an inconsistent antecedent

In order to think about such counterfactuals with metaphysically impossible antecedent and to deal systematically and non-trivially with them, we need means to distinguish these two kinds of statements. It can not happen without impossible worlds, because in the possible ones the contradiction is always false, which means that the consequent has no matter and two counterfactuals of this kind can not be distinguished. The usage of impossible worlds gives the possibility for pair counterpossibles to have different values.

To acquit the first contention and if we accept the consequent to be true it is enough the antecedent to be false. This is acquitted, because it is absolutely natural to admit the contradictory antecedent as false. However to deny the second contention, the antecedent have to be true and the consequent – false. It means that we need a world where the inconsistent antecedent is true, i.e. we need an impossible world.

The impossible worlds are treated as presence of contradictory truths in order to do operations with such kind of counterfactuals. The idea is that in their practical activity people often consider what would be the case in various impossible situations.

• **The impossible worlds and the problem of propositional content**

The impossible worlds have a useful role about the propositional content. The latter is in close relation with the intensional context which content may be inconsistent. Here are also the inconsistent beliefs.

We will show several examples about the meaning of impossible worlds in regard to the content of different propositions.

a) *I tie each of my shoes before the other.*

This proposition, as Barwise shows, is modeled by a set of possible worlds **P**. Since it is impossible to tie each of my shoes before the other, then the set **P** is an empty set of worlds [1,p.490].

That is also meant for the following examples:

b) *2+2=5*
c) *Fermat's Last Theorm is false*
d) *Socrates is taller than himself*
e) *the addition is noncommutative*

Therefore different contentions expresses equivalent propositions because all of them pertain to the same set – the empty set. In this way they can not be distinguished. But then believing (or doubting, or claiming) one of these propositions should be the same as believing (or doubting, or claiming) the others, which is false [1, p.490]. There is an intensional difference between them.

However in the light of impossible worlds the claim of the impossibility of **P** corresponds not to the claim that the set **P** is empty but rather to the claim that **P** contains only impossible worlds [1,p.491].

We will present two variants for dealing with the inconsistent beliefs in the view of impossible worlds. Here we will pay attention to other inconsistencies.

First, let's see this example expressing agent's beliefs:

A = Ivan Vazov Street is northwards-southwards.
B = Pencho Slaveikov Street is westwards-eastwards.
C = Pencho Slaveikov Street is parallel to Ivan Vazov Street.
A∧B – is true;
A∧C – is true, because the agent is "quarantined" from the information about the content of B;
B∧C – is true, because the agent is "quarantined" from the information about the content of A;
A∧B∧C – is inconsistency;

According to the first variant, which is proposed by Lewis, the agent's beliefs have to be considered as "chunked" into separate categories, quarantining inconsistencies [10,p.2]. The agent believes A∧C, B∧C, but not A∧B∧C. Namely, the set of beliefs is quarantined in consistent subsets that are considered separately. The methodological justification of such approach is that not all beliefs can be compared or conjoined with all other beliefs at all times [10,p.2-4]. According to us, it can be epistemo-

logically explained with the circumstance that the pairs of beliefs hold in different moments and are inconsistent when are conjoined only in one moment or in one stage of the cognitive activity.

The other variant, proposed by Restall, is to permit the overlap between these parts (in our case A∧B∧C) in order to be presented an inconsistent theory using paraconsistent notion of inference [10,p.8]. According to him the situation is similar when we impose two maps, which inconsistently describe the landscape or connect two stories, which inconsistently describe a situation [10,p.4].

We see that the impossible worlds are defined through the possible ones. Therefore in such models the possible worlds are, as Restall points, the basis and the impossible ones are `epiphenomenal' [10,p.11]. The impossible worlds, which present how things can't be, are combination of at least two worlds for which things can be. Since there are many ways things can' be, so there are many different impossible worlds.

They have, as we saw, an important role when we want to distinguish the propositional content, giving the possibility to different inconsistent beliefs (claims, doubts) to be included explicitly in different logical transformations. Otherwise, if are used only possible worlds, such kind of propositions will refer the empty set. They will be excluded from the logical transformations and of course, it will not be able to distinguish their propositional content.

Except the discussed kind of impossibilities by imposing different worlds, there is other kind of impossibilities – by imposing different objects. In the second case the impossibility arises when are taken two different objects which properties are inconsistent one another and with such objects is formed a new one [10,p.12]. Instances of such kind of objects are: circle square, square circle, being green and colorless and so on.

This kind of impossibilities can be justified epistemologically (according to Barwise), if we are not concerned by the metaphysical possibility, but by the epistemological one – if the agents have known about the circle and the square only how they can arise from the surface [1,p.499]. For example, in the following way:

1)   2)   3)

According to us, the only thing the agent knows in this case is that he/she may construct a square from (1) and that may construct a circle also from (1). Looking at the sketches (2) and (3) we see that it is really possible. So the only information which agent has about the circle and the square is that they can be constructed from two perpendicular lines as is showed on the sketch (1). She/he has no other knowledge about the properties of these figures. Because of that he/she supposes that it is possible to be constructed a figure having the properties of both the circle and the square (as they can be constructed from the same components), namely – a circle square. We constructed this example to show that a notion for such kind of impossible objects can be formed from agents who are beginners in a certain sphere or who are deprived from considerable information. The semantics of impossible worlds give them the possibility to do operations with such kind of objects.

The intensional contexts include also the perception. Illustrations about our ability to perceive impossibilities are the drawings of Escher.

Epistemologically that, which we want to describe, is a cognitive phenomenon – how is it that it seems, when it seems inconsistent. It concerns the presentation of the impossible data [4,p.532]. For the explanation of such "phenomena" are used (Penrose, Mortensen) the theory of cohomology groups and the theory of heap.

- **Information and impossibilities**

Now we will present the position of Barwise about the importance of the impossible worlds and their role in different inquiries. His position is a kind of pragmatic theory of possibilities. The latter he considers in regard to a system containing a certain information. On every stage of a given inquiry there are relevant issues. Every way for solving of these relevant issues is a state [1,p.494].

Those states of the system in the inquiry, which are excluded from (are incompatible with) the available information, are impossibilities. The states, which are not *such* excluded, are possibilities. So in regard to the available information certain states are possibilities and others, which are incompatible with the available information, are impossibilities. The state is unitary thing whereas the information comes in pieces. The Inverse Relation Principle is in use: when the available information is enlarged then there is a corresponding decrease of the possibilities and vice versa [1,p.492-495]. In other words, the elimination of possibilities leads to a strict increase in the information available at the next stage of investigation [1,p.488, 499].

The change in the relation between the available information and possibilities depends on the course of investigation and the context. Some states may be possible in any context and impossible in other one. The available information is affected: on one hand – by the viewpoint of the investigation; on other hand – by the context, which depends on the kind of possibility; on third hand – by the progress of investigation in regard to this viewpoint [1,p.493-498].

In other words it is necessary to have impossibilities in mind, because if we begin to believe for any reasons that our information is not reliable or is uncertain then it becomes invalid and that which has seemed impossible may begin to seem possible.

As a conclusion of this article we think that impossible worlds are relevant construct for logic and epistemology. It permits us to do operations with logically undetermined concepts in contrast to the semantics of possible worlds where all things and properties are clearly determined. The impossible worlds are appropriate instrument when we have a lack of information on some issue. It gives a possibility to include the inconsistencies in our reasoning and work with them until we precise and treat

the available information and differentiate exactly our contentions. On the other hand they give us resources to exclude from our logical transformations those contentions which are indifferent for our system. The presented construct releases us from the logical chaos of the classical interpretations and allows us to realize non-trivial inferences.

The formalisms of classical possible worlds have no place for inconsistencies, because they are just systematization of possible, i.e. they consider the total ways world could be. The semantics of impossible worlds include also partial ways, which describe limited parts of the world and model different phenomena sensitive to information [9, p.4]. And all of that have a place in the field of epistemology.

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Assen I. Dimitrov

ONTOLOGY OF COMMUNICATION

Abstract:
The paper deals with a simple model of communication, the problems it poses and the conclusions at which it arrives.

Keywords: communication, packages, signals, modalities, language and reality

1. Packages

Let us imagine that we are in a foreign country, whose language is almost unfamiliar to us. It may be a beautiful and orderly country, and yet, as if an invisible wall separates us from its inhabitants and the objects that surround us. They, are as if wrapped up in an invisible envelope. We are incapable of reaching them in any way, and feel helpless (to ask) and awkward (to reply). We are incapable of searching and uninitiated to possess. – Both the people and the objects seem completely close and intelligible, the order and the abundance – impressing, but inaccessible. Instead of people and objects, we have to do with *packages* – tightly wrapped up and sealed.

We ourselves are tightly packed, besides not only abroad. – If we are in a locked room, we are packed in relation to our neighbours. We have no direct contact with them at all. Yet, we could signalise them about our existence. We could achieve this through signals, understandable for both.

2. The packed iron atom

Not only the objects and the agents in the world of culture are packed. This completely refers to the building elements of the living cell, too. – It is by no means built up by the familiar from the inorganic chemistry atoms and molecules, but rather – from *packages*.

Let us consider a well-known chemical reaction, such as the oxidation of iron in the atmosphere. It could proceed like this:

$$4Fe + 3O_2 \rightarrow 2Fe_2O_3$$

This is a reaction between free chemical atoms and molecules, which directly react with each other.

The reaction between iron and oxygen in the environment of the living cell proceeds in a completely different manner. – It is a matter of the equally well-examined oxidation of hemoglobin. Here the iron atom is tightly packed, besides in a double envelope. Its outer layer is a globular protein. Inside it is positioned the hem – an organic substance, known also as porphyrin. And only inside the hem, in a specifically adjusted nest, is the iron atom, itself.

Schematically, it looks like this:

It is seen how the iron atom is tightly packed in the Russian matryoshka type of structure of hemoglobin. It is no longer an ordinary chemical element, to which the atmospheric oxygen has a direct admission, but a *package*. A direct chemical reaction between the iron atom of the hemoglobin and the atmospheric oxygen is impossible. Their interaction is mediated through a cellular *signal path*, which includes hormones, mediators and receptors.

3. Good alcohol

All biochemical processes in the live cell are reactions between packages, i.e. wrapped up chemical agents. These agents cannot bind up di-

rectly, but only through chemical signals that are intercepted by specific receptors. No chemical agent can penetrate into the living cell, provided it is not intercepted by a – capable of recognizing it – receptor. Even water doesn't penetrate through the cell membrane through osmosis, but is interpreted by the cell as a chemical signal, which is again intercepted by a receptor, specific for this case.

Biochemical reactions inside the cell are between packages, communicating through chemical signals, intercepted by receptors.

This has led a team of British researchers to the idea of depriving alcohol of all its side effects as: hardened coordination of the motive, verbal and mental activity, headache, etc., and leaving just the pleasant euphoria of drunkenness. They have succeeded in blocking the receptors intercepting the harmful and undesirable ingredients of alcohol and in leaving active only these that capture the desirable and harmless chemical signals, it conveys.

One could well drink unlimited quantities of sulphuric acid, if only the cell receptors for this aggressive chemical have been blocked in advance. This certainly might seem exaggerated, however it is a plausible explanation of the nestinar dances on fire. It seems that somehow *nestinars* – here and elsewhere – succeed in blocking psychically their thermo-receptors, so that the glowing coals are incapable of causing them any skin injuries.

What is important is that the considered cases point at a simple

4. Ontological model of communication:

– What interacts during communication are wrapped up objects, *packages*
– Packages can communicate only through *signals*

Package 1   signal   Package 2

Even this pretty simple model poses quite complex

5. Problems of communication:

i) Who/what is inside the partner package?

Since the inhabitant of Package 1 has no direct access to that of Package 2, he can only rely on the self-description the latter provides through various signals. – A situation well familiar to the inhabitants of the cyberspace.

ii) What is the ontological nature of the packages?

The inhabitants of the separate packages are dynamic agents, yet they never act immediately, as physical objects do. Through the signals they send out, they only demonstrate their real presence and aim at a rich expression of their qualitative potential. Packages, therefore, should be regarded as paradoxical, *modal*, ontological agents.

Let us compare the crossing trajectories of two billiard balls and the exquisite movements of dancing partners. Billiard balls are objects, which collide directly, governed by blind physical forces; while dance is a language, through which partners communicate as modalities. Although they precisely express themselves in the dance language, these modalities are present solely in the meaning this language conveys.

iii) But then, is communication just a dialogue, a conversation between the partners, or is it a real interaction, after all?

It is definitely the second case.

And indeed, at a certain moment *packages can and have to be unwrapped.* **The whole meaning of the communication is precisely in specifying when and how it can take place.**

We deposit a package of clothes to dry cleaning; we wrap it up additionally with a proper verbal message and monetary signs; after a certain time, we receive another package. In both cases, these are clothes, which are packed before the submission, and unpacked after the receipt.

Packing and unwrapping, modality and reality, are not divided by a precipice; they are constantly converted into one another and it is precisely what endows our behaviour with meaning.

The problem is that we could deposit into the above-mentioned firm a coat and receive trousers – in other words, errors are quite possible in a communication. Since errors are excluded for the physical interactions, the problem evidently is

iv) What is the adequate language of communication?

The reply is simple, but its accomplishment – very hard. A meaningful and productive communication starts with the spotting of universal processes and regularities. They could be the only basis for the producing of signals – precise and meaningful for the inhabitants of both packages. Indeed, in some cases, the objective may be just the opposite – communication may also be cheating. But even then, it again refers to the real and the universal[1].

v) What is the difference between signals and physical forces?

Physical forces cause effects, while signals induce meanings.

We cannot apply mechanical force upon an object, isolated from us through a thick wall. The signals we can send behind this wall are again physical processes, e.g. sound or electromagnetic waves. Signals however have unique peculiarities, which principally distinguish them from meaningless physical forces.

– *Signals are physical forces, which can freely cross the envelope of the packages.*

The biochemical content of a delicious fruit, growing on a high tree is inaccessible for us, but it is generously signalled through the light waves it reflects.

– *Signals act upon their addressee in an inductive, rather than a causal manner.*

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[1] The same refers to the assertion that language is conventional. It can grow to be such only on the basis of *natural signals*, immediately related with the behaviour of the packed objects. It is only above them that conventions could be built.

We write out 'There is no smoke without fire' through symbols, conventional for each language, but each of them is a fruit of the thousands year old evolution of written signalisation. At the basis of the above string of signs, in its turn lays the universal for all communicating packages, chemistry of combustion.

Their causal impact as direct physical forces is real, but negligible. They are however capable of inducing in the receiver the immediate presence of their sender (despite the lack of a direct encounter between them). – We instinctively bend ourselves at the sight of a frame of a swooping train or a gun, which the actor 'by chance' points at the spectator, rather than at the victim. "_ _ _ . . . _ _ _", taken as a physical sound or light sequence has zero causal effect upon us, while its inductive effect as a signal of lethal danger, could be incomparably more suggestive.

Finally, how does reality look like through the ocular of communication?

6. Some implications of the model

i) Through communication, reality is inserted into semiotic (language) settings;

ii) Thus reality turns into a proposition (sentence), rather than being a physical-chemical structure;

iii) Thus Wittgenstein's thesis is turned upside down: it is not language structure that mirrors the structure of reality; on the contrary – reality turns into a linguistic construction;

iv) *'States of affairs'* turn into *statements*; situations are stated, communicated, problematised and resolved;

v) Reality, likewise the proposition, acquires meaning;

vi) Thus we arrive at a rational alternative of creationism; at the ontological grounds of an intelligent evolution, which resulted in the origin of life, mind, human culture and civilization;

vii) At the intimate mechanism of the creative ontological act, through which modality turns into reality.

Ivaylo Dimitrov

THE FALL OF TRANSCENDENTAL IMAGINOLOGIES AND THE RISE OF EPISTEMICULTURAL MEDIA THEORY

The odd-sounding title of this paper represents an attempt to imitate the neologisms and analyses of the sociologist Scott Lash in his remarkable *Critique of Information*[1]. There is no irony in my appreciation of this book. As a fortunate holder of PhD in philosophy and MD in public relations I was impressed how fruitful could be the synthesis of inhomogeneous philosophical strands of thinking (mainly in the paradigm of so-called 'continental' tradition) carried out into a general medium of leading interpretational schemes of contemporary theories of media communication.

I dare to mimic Lash's analysis following his example to mark the structure giving opposition to Kant via partial modernization of the heading of *Critiques*. However, my general purpose in this sketchy exercise is not related to some 'reflexive' defense of the need of Kantian critical 'third' way as a mediating alternative between the dogmatic and skeptical research methods. In fact, Lash's prime intention is to provide a reliable answer to the crucial question: How is critical social science, critical theory or critique as such possible in the information society?

My concern is focused on the fact that *Critique of Information* postulates[2] as methodologically justifiable the approach according to which answering the question above takes as a presupposed the detailed and valid response to another question: How is the transcendental critique al-

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[1] Formally the heading mimics the title of Al & Laura Ries's *The Fall of Advertising and the Rise of PR* – philosophically not so valuable but an influential book in the realm of marketing communication practices.

[2] Lash, S., 2002, p. 97-98. (Bulgarian edition).

ready impossible? Thus, becoming aware how influential Lash's research is nowadays easily allows one to anticipate even harder times ahead for transcendental philosophy's PR.

My exercise is formally an interpretation of Lash's intuitions how his invention -- the cutting-edge construct 'media theory' -- should looks like. This would result to a mosaic-like representation bearing a resemblance to the last popular i-media form (the weblog), i.e. attractive title before/over concise abstract functioning as a motivation tool for taking the decision to follow the hyperlink to its bigger generic narrative. Therefore it is just conversely to Lash's paper. In spite of the fact that *Critique of Information* is discursively organized as a typical scientific study, it is semantically structured as a 'mass *im*media'-like product. It represents a spectacular collage of apparently inhomogeneous theoretical viewpoints and thus it functions as a media phenomenon, i.e. as a space-time operational and symbols producing machine. My intention is to sketch the possibility of a different type of media theory acting as a space-time transcending and schematically reproducing machine.

Lash states that under the changing conditions into the global information society the social and cultural theory apparently becomes more and **more media-like** and consequently it should be named 'media theory'. This means that its scientific discourse should become colder, i.e. it has to be transformed from the novel-like narratives to icon/animation/advertising-like representations which are not light-emitting anymore but transparent to the light (pure information). Thus in my view, the media theory is actually becoming a pure medium of any possible 'epistemicultural' communication by means of its functionality as a 'cold media' which presents without re-presenting, which ex-cites without citing, which motivates towards action without explaining. And that is why in the long run I am excited and motivated by answering the following question: Is it really so impossible to reconstruct and to defense a transcendental media theory?

"It's too good to be a light". This popular ad slogan could be ambiguously used in an informal argumentation of my decision to choose the epistemological consideration of transcendental imagination as a key approach towards answering the question above. In my view some of the overall misunderstandings in interpretation of the term 'transcendental'

come from the failure of the transcendental epistemologies to reconstruct theoretically the crucial cognitive function of the imagination postulated by Kant's critical philosophy. So, I chose the imagination because it is usually defined as an 'obscure' faculty even by philosophers awaiting the answers about its cognitive functions and free play from the developing cognitive science. Another reason comes from the fact that orthodox Kantianism in all its varieties usually prefer to ignore this key conceptual construct because of its impurity and vulnerability to accusations of psychologism and/or subjectivism. This explains the fact that the main researches on Kant's theory of imagination are peripheral to post/neo Kantianism and most of them are strongly influenced by the interpretations of Fichte, Husserl and Heidegger which are truly original and thus distortional ('too light') to the undoubtedly obscure Kant's position. Finally, my intuition is that the issue of imagination is the focal point of all puzzles and difficulties of the Kantianism's 'anti-realist variety' and therefore it still deserves more intensive epistemological attention.

The Transcendental Appendix. Lash's analysis definitely gravitates towards a well-known operations performed by the critical theories in respect to the concept 'transcendental' in order to emancipate the critique from its historical philosophical roots in the Kantian transcendental project. I do not mean the traditional suspicion of the analytical epistemology concerning the term because of its superfluous metaphysical burden, a mistrust coming (according to Rorty's view[3]) from the side of the logical positivism. Lash's viewpoint on the transcendental is closer to the opposite part of the so-called 'neo-Kantian consensus' – the 'continental' tradition influenced by Husserl's transcendental phenomenology where the Kantian view of transcendental undergo a considerable transformation by means of epistemic foundationalism's interpretation. Thus Scott Lash has the philosophical legitimacy to speak about the impossibility of transcendental reflection in the global information era involving specific space-time definitions: the technological development reduces/compresses to annihilation the space and time of the constitutive transcendental level of reasoning, there is no other place ('outside') or there is not enough time anymore for such a reflection of the speculative observer – the spectator.

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[3] Rorty, R., 1998, p. 181 (Bulgarian edition).

Hence, after the explosion of the Kantian's dualisms the transcendental becomes useless to the critique which is already absorbed in the global flow of information and in this way becomes critique of information which should be 'critique without transcendental'.

Slashing the Kantian's knot. Scott Lash overcomes the Kant's aporetical puzzles choosing Hegelian type of dialectical critique which can exist in the global information flow in the form of Harold Garfinkel's radical empiricist phenomenology (not transcendental). This transition within his analysis becomes feasible via opposition with the 'transcendental ontologies' of Husserl and Heidegger which shaped the thinking of the whole generation of post-modern 'continental' philosophy. Therefore Lash prefers the lighter way of empiricism. He does not return to the Kantian 'aporetical' thinking, although he admits it is the original form of critique. Lash forgets the Husserl's crucial operation over the Kantian meaning of transcendental as genuinely inseparable from his view of finiteness. But the attraction of transcendental phenomenology to the philosophers of post-structuralism comes precisely from Husserl's postulation that the transcendental reduction is related to the 'Wissenschau' as a special state/level of reflection which in fact rehabilitates the possibility of intellectual intuition as trans-scientific act of acquiring an apodictical knowledge.

At this point the adequacy of interpretation of Kant's theory of imagination becomes crucial. It does not remain unnoticed within *Critique of Information*. However, the concept of imagination is mentioned as 'the third concept' produced in the process of Kant's attempt to bridge the first two Critiques via the Third one, i.e. by the medium of the 'force of judgment'. Imagination is represented as an attempt to bridge the aporetical gap between intellectual reasoning and intuition coming from Kant's postulate of absolute impossibility of intellectual intuition in reference to any cognitive finiteness. According to Lash Kant fails to provide the bridging function via the concept of imagination because this produces another aporetical pairs[4].

So, my task is to show that Kant's concept of imagination is not aporetical. It is not a mere result or a derivative third concept from the 'force of judgment' because it does not pertain to thinking and therefore it is not an element of logic but rather it could be perceived as a pure content-giv-

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[4] Lash, S., 2002, p. 145. (Bulgarian edition).

ing and limiting act in the realm of the transcendental logic. That is why the construct of imagination does not lead to another aporias because it is not an effect of the transcendental employment of Reason named transcendental dialectics ('logic of illusion'). For this reason, the productive ⇔ reproductive dualism dominating the representations of the structure of cognitive faculty of imagination has to be clarified as imaginary aporetical and solvable within the media theory of transcendental imagination.

Milestones of my present past way. In my view, Kant's knotting of his own puzzle could be seen in his 1762 writing where he asserts that the knot of difference between rational and not rational animals could be resolved if a man is capable of insight to the 'mysterious force' (*Geheime Kraft*) which makes the judgments possible. Kant's prolonged invention of 'Einbildungskraft' is undoubtedly connected with his own anti-dogmatic insight inspired by Hume's skepticism and dated around 1769[5].

However, let me introduce some milestones of the way to my already defended dissertation which I believe form my anti-dogmatic sight to Kant's insight:

Milestones of difference: Often we are 'lost in translation' because even the best interpreters were not aware of the fact that the critical Kant always did a strict difference and did not use synonymous. Key example is related to the crucial term synthesis and it consists of this differentiation: Verknüpfung (nexus) ⇔ Verbindung (conjunctio)[6]. According to Kant's reflections the first mode (nexus) is the authentic synthesis as the unity-giving form. In this way there could be identified the need of interpretation of Kant's threefold synthesis via the difference above, as well as through the forms of the "unity of the base" (Verbindung) schematized in the usage of the prepositions 'in ⇔ durch ⇔ zu'[7]. This analysis could deliver better understanding of Kant's late transition project which concerns the possibility of transition from metaphysical nexus in the faculty of knowledge a priori to the nexus between the 'Dasein' of appearances in physical world[8].

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[5] Carl, W., 1989, S.154-155.

[6] Kant, I., 1956, S.216.

[7] Mörchen, H., 1970, S.84

[8] Förster, E., 2000, p. 1-23. Compare it with Kant's reflections interpreted in Mörchen, H., 1970, S.24. See also: Kant, I., 1956, S.216.

Milestones of confuse: In fact my research was inspired by the perplexing observation that Kant's presupposition of 'special form' of imagination -- the transcendental one -- comes from the side of its reproductive synthesis. The second (medium) synthesis in the structure of the threefold one always upsets Kant's scholarship[9] no matter of the fact that the proper character of imagination as reproduction is in conformity with the common definition of this faculty. That is why I perceive the synthesis of reproduction as the inherent synthesis (nexus) of the imagination.

Milestone of absence: It is an unnoticed fact that Kant speaks almost nowhere of 'transcendental imagination' (Transzendentale Einbildungskraft). Talking about 'transcendental faculty (Vermögen) of the imagination' it is unambiguously related to its reproductive synthesis[10]. However, there is a remarkable exception. The term is mentioned once in *Critique of Practical Reason* in reference to the schematizing imagination as the medium of transcendental philosophy's task to point to the case under laws a priory. It could also be named 'the banished second medium' from the realm of the practical Reason.

Milestones of purpose: It is related to Kant's necessary conjecture, i.e. the pure transcendental synthesis of the imagination under principles a priori which makes every experience (as empirical product of understanding) possible[11]. I relate this to another Kant's conjecture represented as secret nexus between imagination and reason as the force of evolution in *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* (1786). Thus the heuristic regulative employment of reason can be adequately understood as mediated by imagination and as preceding its own logical employment as well as the synthetic activity a priory of the understanding revealing itself in the intuition as the productive synthesis of imagination[12]. In this respect

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[9] Most eloquent is Heidegger's facing of an oxymoron in analysis of the medium synthesis, as well as Riehl's arbitrary removal of the prefix 're' from the crucial text when Kant introduced the transcendental faculty of imagination. Heidegger, M., 1997, p. 157 (Bulgarian edition). See also: Kant, I., 1956, S.149a.

[10] Kant, I., 1956, S.149a.

[11] Ebenda. S. 147a.

[12] Eckart Förster anticipates even more perplexities among the researchers concerning Kant's theory in its *Opus postumum* according to which the pure reason precedes the understanding with 'the projection of its forms' and not in its

I can envisage a fruitful interpretation based on Kant's heuristic model of epigenesis[13] applied to the system of pure reason where imagination ⇔ reason nexus could be viewed as a transcendental act of virtual preformation of productive faculties which originally specifies and thus provides as given any form of finiteness.

Epistemicultural construct. Why another neologism is needed? I am inclined to talk about 'epistemicultural' hyper-function of the imagination having in mind the EU concept "Knowledge-based society" and considering it as an appropriate object of a transcendental media theory. This hyper-function of imagination could be understood as functional in reference to the epistemic part and consequently as not pure as far as it is creative, productive, and theoretical under the guidance of understanding. But the pure transcendental imagination can be explained as genuinely dysfunctional (negative function), contra-productive and thus primarily as epigenetic and reproductive as far as it is in negative nexus with pure reason. Without having in mind the social and cultural implications of this issue even the most thorough exegesis of Kant's *Critiques* looking for theoretical reconstruction of the cognitive function of imagination should be viewed as condemned to stay intangible and fruitless. And when we assume that any society could be interpreted as an epistemic society perceived as given knowledge reproducing system or organism, there could be possible to replace the term 'social' with the term 'epistemic' as well as to consider any social theory as applied epistemology under the title 'media theory'.

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2. Rorty, R., 1998, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton University Press (Bulgarian edition 1998).

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logical employment but as an 'originator of itself'. Moreover, the nexus with the modes of imagination could be found in Kant's assertion that 'Ideas are images [Bilder] (intuitions) created a priori through pure reason'. Förster, E., 2000, p. 150.

[13] Sloan, P., 2002.

3. Carl, W., 1989, Der schweigende Kant: Die Entwürfe zu einer Deduktion der Kategorien vor 1781, Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, Göttingen.

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Vesselin Petrov

PROCESS PHILOSOPHY IN THE EUROPEAN CULTURAL TRADITION: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES

Process philosophy is a possible answer to the questions arising of the opposites of being against becoming and constancy against change which have been central for the metaphysics since the time of Ancient Greece. The present exposition will not have the task to explain the essence of process philosophy, nor will it discuss the variety of answers about its essence. As it is well known, contemporary process philosophy has as its founder or spiritual father Alfred Nort Whitehead with his philosophical works of the first half of 20th century. Through the combination of circumstances it has taken place in the USA after his going to work at Harvard University. That is why it is accepted usually that contemporary process philosophy has originated and developed first as a trend in the American philosophy in the face of Whitehead and his immediate pupils and followers. In the course of years the interest in process philosophy goes far beyond the boundary of the American continent as a result of the originality of the approach, of its significance for the development of contemporary philosophy in general and of the actuality of problems to which this approach is directed even outside of the sphere of philosophy. Nowadays it is an affirmed trend in philosophical and in general in humanitarian thought in America, Europe, Asia and Australia.

The subject of the present exposition is the discussion namely of the question when and how process philosophy has entered into the European cultural tradition. We could approach to this question in two ways: If it is considered in philosophical and historical perspective, it is clear that the roots of process philosophy are European because of both facts that a number of its predecessors in the history of philosophy as Heraclitus,

Leibniz, Hegel, etc. are Europeans, and also concretely because of the fact that the views of Whitehead himself has been moulded in the Great Britain in purely European cultural environment.[1] In that sense we can say that process philosophy has never leaved the European continent. But we shall keep in the focus of our attention not this aspect of the question.

The other aspect of the question – namely it will interested us in the present exposition – is, so to speak, the secondary coming back of process philosophy in Europe after its original moulding as a contemporary philosophical trend by Whitehead and his immediate followers. The fact of the great development of process philosophy in Europe recently is noted by many researchers[2] and cannot be questioned.

I would like to begin the exposition with a story: a real occasion which has taken place just 50 years ago.[3] In 1956, several years after the World War II, "Prof. John Smith of Yale University in USA has come in Europe and decided to pay a visit to the venerable Martin Heidegger. Their conversation lasted for three hours, during which time Heidegger expressed his passionate interest in turning toward a new, post-Hegelian pursuit of a philosophy of nature. Smith responded that in America A. N. Whitehead had already spawned such a movement. Heidegger was most pleasantly surprised and interested, and expressed a desire to read some of Whitehead's philosophy. It was, in fact, at Heidegger's request that the tremendous project of translating *Process and Reality* was begun at Suhrkamp Verlag (Frankfurt)." For a pity, the work of translation lasted longer and Heidegger died before the end of the work. But nevertheless it was carried to the end and the German translation has appeared in 1979.[4]

Many other examples could also be pointed out of expressed interest

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[1] As George Lucas, Jr. points out, Whitehead is "representing in fact a unique and functional blend of some of the main currents of English and American" tradition: **Lucas**, George R., Jr. *The Rehabilitation of Whitehead. An Analytic and Historical Assessment of Process Philosophy. Albany*: State Univ. of New York Press, 1989, p. 148.

[2] For example, **Lucas**, George R., Jr. Op. cit., p. 6.

[3] This story is borrowed from the paper: **Veken**, Jan Van Der. Process Thought From a European Perspective. – in: *Process Studies*, 1990, Vol. 19, No 4, pp. 240-247.

[4] **Whitehead**, A. N. *Prozeß und Realität*. Suhrkamp Verlag. Frankfurt am Main, 1979.

of eminent European philosophers and thinkers to the philosophy of Whitehead. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin had read Whitehead's *Science and the Modern World* while on an exploration in the Gobi desert and he had vowed to study in greater detail the ideas of Whitehead. Merleau-Ponty, toward the end of his life, read a French translation of *The Function of Reason* and declared Whitehead to be one of the most original and creative philosophers he had ever read.[5]

If we trace out and systematize chronologically the acts of influence of Whitehead's works on eminent scientists and philosophers in Europe, we can outline provisionally three stages. In the first one we are speaking of an early influence of Whitehead during his lifetime on thinkers as Bergson (1859 – 1941), the chemist and philosopher of science Emile Meyerson (1859 – 1933), the philosopher and mathematician Louis Couturat (1868 – 1914), the historian and philosopher Robin George Collingwood (1889 – 1943), the philosophers Charlie Dunbar Broad (1887 – 1971), Philippe Devaux (1902 – 1979) and Enzo Paci (1911 – 1976), etc.[6]

The second stage includes the next generation of European thinkers that had been influenced by Whiteheadian philosophy. Of course, the borderline between the first and the second stages is only conventional. We should point out here the philosophers Dorothy Emmett (1904 – 2000) and Wolfe Mays (1912 – 2005), the scientist Ilya Prigogine (1917 – 2003), the philosophers Jules Vuillemin (1920 – 2001), Jean Ladriere (1921 –), Gilles Deleuze (1925 – 1995), Volfhart Pannenberg (1928 –), Reiner Wiehl (1929 –), Jan Van Der Veken (1932-) and many others.[7]

The third stage can be dated conventionally as beginning from the first half of the 1970-ties, when translations of Whitehead's works began to appear into German, French and Dutch. For example, the first translation into Dutch appeared in 1974. During that time the interest in process philosophy in Belgium is increased. The students there began to study process philosophy and several doctoral dissertations have been defended in this area. One problem then was still finding of enough materials and

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[5] **Veken**, Jan Van Der. Op. cit.

[6] **Weber**, Michel. Introduction. Process Metaphysics in Context. – in: **Weber**, Michel (ed.). *After Whitehead. Rescher on Process Metaphysics.* Ontos Ferlag, Frankfurt – Lancaster, 2004, p. 45.

[7] Ibid.

documents in Europe, devoted to process philosophy which are necessary for an effective investigation. The investigator up to there had to travel to the USA, where there existed the Center for Process Thought at Claremont. So, it was decided to establish such center also in Europe. In 1978, during the visit of one of the most eminent representatives of process thought Charles Hartshorne in Leuven (Belgium), it was created the Louvain Center for Process Thought. Soon after that on the basis of this Center it was created the European Society for Process Thought. The task of the Center is to concentrate scholars from Europe with interest in process thought, to invite specialists in that field from all over the world for seminars, discussions and research work. One focus of the investigations in this Center is the correspondence of process philosophy to the state of affairs in the contemporary European philosophical stage.

We should mention also that the European Society for Process Thought already began to publish *European Studies in Process Thought*, whose first volume appeared in 2003, and the next two are in the press. This series is intended as a supplementation to the world-famous journal *Process Studies*, published in the USA.

Quite recently, in October 2005 there was created a Whitehead Metaphysical Society in Poland by a group of Polish philosophers interested in process philosophy. This society plans to organize conferences yearly and yet it began to publish its own journal "*Studia Whiteheadiana*". There are analogous societies also in other European countries, for example in France, Ireland, and the Netherlands.

As to the Bulgaria, we are a small country with comparatively small amount of philosophers, amongst which the number of philosophers with interest in process philosophy is still smaller, so for the present, it would hardly be effective to create our own Whiteheadian society. But we have a Bulgarian Ontological Society which already has established contacts with the European Society for Process Thought. I hope that these contacts will strengthen and that they will lead to a more fruitful collaboration.

International conferences devoted to specific problems of process philosophy, considered in European perspective, have begun to be organized in Europe during the third stage of the influence of Whiteheadian thought on European philosophy. The first conference has taken place in Leuven in 1978 and next conferences have been organized in Bonn

(1981), Bad Homburg (1983) and Switzerland (1987). Then followed the conferences "Whitehead and the Rythms of Education" in Lille (France) in 1994, and "The Future of Process Thought in Europe" in Kortrijk (Belgium) in 1997; "The Interplay between Science, Philosophy and Religion: the European Heritage" in Leuven (1998) and "The Philosophical Significance of Whitehead's Concept of Creativity" in 1999. We should observe also that there are International Whitehead Conferences, held every two years. The last two were organized in China in 2002 and in Korea in 2004, but during the present 2006 year there will take place the 6th International Whitehead Conference in Europe, in Salzburg University in Austria from 3-6 July. The discussions are envisaged to go parallel in more than 40 sections on philosophy, religion, and science and humanities. These facts speak about the great importance which process philosophy has already become in Europe.

After this short review of facts and events which are evidences for the firm settlement of contemporary process philosophy in the European cultural space, it is relevant to say some words why process philosophy is interesting and attractive for the European philosophical thought. In answer to the last question should be pointed out the theoretical dialog between the Whiteheadians and non-Whiteheadians in the area of philosophy, as well as fruitfulness of process philosophy for other fields of knowledge. It is not an accidental fact that outstanding scientists as Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers have been attracted by the approach of process philosophy to such very important for the present day science problems as the way of the appearance of the order and of the novelty. David Bohm should be added to this number of scientists. Process approach is fruitful not only for physics, but also for biology, for the contemporary ecological and related ethical problems, and for medicine.[8]

Process philosophy is attractive not only for the philosophy of science. It offers a definite approach also to the philosophy of culture, philosophy of economics and philosophy of the political theory. Here should be mentioned such classical works of Whitehead as *Adventures of Ideas*

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[8] See papers of the book: **Griffin**, David Ray (ed.). *The Reenchantment of Science: Postmodern Proposals*. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1988.

and *Modes of Thoughts*, as well as publications of contemporary processualists.[9]

Process philosophy gives support also to intercultural dialogue. Its nonsubstantialistic approach is particularly attractive to Buddhists, claiming to be ancient predecessors of process philosophy. Such problems frequently are themes of the regular East-West conferences. This subject-matter is particularly interesting for the humanitarians from Europe.

Last but not least, process approach is related to the great challenges of our time, such as our attitude to nature, the problems with the population of people on the world, the calls for justice, and so on.[10] It is clear that this approach does not offer ready decisions of the problems, but it offers a conceptuality which is probably most suitable for their solving. One of the dangers for the contemporary world consists in efforts to solve the problems in isolation. In this respect process approach is most adequate with its stress on the interconnectedness of the things in the world (including problems of the day).

As to the philosophy in proper sense, contemporary process philosophy is a constructive way of thought, opposing to the deconstructive trend both in Europe (in the face of Derrida, etc.) and in USA (in the face of Rorty, etc.). In philosophy of the second half of the 20th century they began to talk about constructive postmodernism, one of the fathers of which is Whitehead.[11] Independently of the fact if we shall name them as constructive postmodernists, the representatives of process philosophy try very successfully to restore the trust amongst philosophers to the possibility on principle for a new type of metaphysics, and with their activity in this respect they earn sympathy both on the other side of ocean and in Europe.

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[9] **Cobb**, John B., Jr. *Constructive Postmodernism*. – http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=2220 (June 2002).

[10] Very indicative in this respect is the paper by John Cobb, Jr. from January 2006 dedicated to the current threats of USA to Iran for an air attack because of its nuclear programme: **Cobb**, John B., Jr. *Whieteheadian Reflections on a Possible Nuclear Strike on Iran*. – http://www.ctr4process.org/publications/Articles/nuclear_iran.htm (January 2006).

[11] **Griffin**, David Ray, **Cobb**, John B., Jr. (Eds.). *Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy: Peirce, James, Bergson, Whitehead, and Hartshorne*. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1993.

This is valid not only for Whitehead and his immediate pupils, but also for the present day followers of process philosophy.

On the other hand, the attractiveness of process philosophy to the European philosophers is also due to the fact, that Whiteheadian philosophy can claim for a number of important anticipations of problems and themes, which have been laid down and developed subsequently in the works of such eminent philosophers as Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Richard Rorty, Saul Kripke, John Searle, Hilary Putnam, John Perry and others.[12]

Generalizing the considered reasons for the interest to process philosophy in Europe, we should outline, to use the words of George Lucas, Jr., that "students of the Western philosophical tradition can perceive a recent, intelligible, and highly plausible attempt to forge a unified and coherent perspective on the problems and concerns that they themselves (and the contemporary culture in which they participate) share and seek to understand".[13]

We can say definitely that at present time there already exists an affirmed school of representatives of process philosophy in Europe. There is a great amount of publications by European process philosophers in different areas of process philosophy, many of them are big books.[14] They

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[12] This aspect of Whiteheadian philosophy is considered in detail by George Lucas, Jr. in chapter 8 of his book: **Lucas**, George R., Jr. *The Rehabilitation of Whitehead. An Analytic and Historical Assessment of Process Philosophy*. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1989, pp. 129-149.

[13] **Lucas**, George R., Jr. Op. cit., p. 11.

[14] Some of them are: **Veken**, J. Van Der (ed.), etc. *World Views and the Problem of Synthesis*. Springer, 1999; **Veken**, J. Van Der (ed.), etc. *Framing a Vision of the World: Essays in Philosophy, Science and Religion*. Leuven Univ. Press, 1999; **Jonas**, Hans, etc. *The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology*. Northwestern Univ. Press, reprint ed.,2001; **Poli**, Roberto. *Alwis. Ontology for Knowledge Engineers*. Ph.D. Thesis. Utrecht, 2001; **Decock**, Lieve. *Trading Ontology for Ideology: The Interplay of Logic. Set Theory and Semantics in Quine' Philosophy*. Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2002; **Debrock**, Guy (ed.). *Process Pragmatism: Essays on a Quiet Philosophical Revolution*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003; **Seibt**, Johanna. *Toward Process Ontology: A Critical Study in Substance-Ontological Premises*. Ph.D. Dissertation. Pittsburgh, 1990; **Seibt**, Johanna. *General Process Theory: A Study in Ontological Revision*. Habilitationsschrift. University of Konstanz, 2004; **Seibt**, Johanna (ed.). *Crossdisciplinary Studies in Dynamic Categories*. Springer, 2004; **Riffert**, Franz,

have already initiated many discussions in that direction. As an example we can point to the fact that when the American philosopher Nicholas Rescher created his own version of process philosophy, expressed in a series of his books[15], it was organized immediately a discussion published as a large book on different themes and versions of process philosophy, created by the initiative mainly of European process philosophers[16] who work in Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Italy and other European coutries.

In conclusion I would like to remember the observation of George Lucas, Jr. that parallel with the process of increasing of lively interest in Europe in process philosophy, there is also a process of "Continentalization" of philosophical (including process) thought in America through useful comparisons with the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and even with Hegel, Schelling and other European thinkers from the past.[17] It is clear that these are processes connected with the increasing of mutual influence of the different cultural (including philosophical) traditions in contemporary world. We can rightly expect that this mutual influence of the different cultural traditions will give creative stimuli for new authentic philosophical investigations.

Weber, Michel (eds.), *Searching for New Contrasts. Whiteheadian Contributions to Contemporary Challenges in Psychology, Neurophysiology and the Philosophy of Mind,* Vienna, Peter Lang, 2003; **Dietz**, Jan L. G. *Enterprise Ontology: Theory and Methodology*. Springer, 2006 and many others.

[15] **Rescher**, N. *Process Metaphysics: an Introduction to Process Philosophy*. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1996; **Rescher**, N. *Process Philosophy. A Survey of Basic Issues*. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 2000; **Rescher**, N. *Inquiry Dynamics*. New Brunswick. Transaction Publishers, 2000; **Rescher**, N. *Nature and Understanding. The Metaphysics and Method of Science*. Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 2001.

[16] **Weber**, Michel (ed.). *After Whitehead. Rescher on Process Metaphysics*. Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt-Lancaster, 2004.

[17] **Lucas**, George R., Jr. Op. cit., p. 203.

Iva Georgieva

THE NOTION OF HUMAN AND ARTIFICIAL SELF – DEVOTION AND DEPENDENCE IN ONTOLOGICAL ASPECT

The idea of human and artificial intelligence clashes into various problems, concerning formation of a concrete self. While we are human, we easily give out our presence, attitude, character, intelligence to the outer world, by devoting to certain areas, cognitions or individuals. This giving of self awareness sometimes even includes forgetting or loosing our own self in order to be complete in the process of devoting to something ideal.

In other hand, we are trying to create an artificial substitute of a kind of our self, thus this self will not be free to forget completely, as it has not got a whole idea of its self as complete and free, but it depends on the creative mind and its programming, and there is a dependant factor in forming of this kind of a self.

So, generally speaking, we allow ourselves to be lost, projected on something chosen else, but we still are not able to produce an entire free system that will choose to devote and depend on a creative principle, nevertheless the main notion of A.I. is built on that dependence of a product to a supportive system.

In this meaning, if we are getting in more humanistic point of view, we depend on too much complicated beliefs and ideas, but we still create a machine and intelligence that is depending on ourselves. This means that preliminary given program, hardware, mind is already learnt to feel loosing of a self, because of not creating by itself, only learning from distant sources.

Main perspective result will be in formation of a self that independently chooses its Self-ness, without forgetting the limits of human world as a whole. If we try to make artificial intelligence, we should not forget what

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is important for our intelligence through the centuries and to give it free to be used and interpreted by a mind, secondary created by our own.

The miracle of producing new things and results can happen here, because we are researching area that has not been thought out before and has unique meaning of sense what is human, natural, supernatural and so on…

A strong ontological apparatus that helps distinguishing these problems can help merging dependence from devotion in human and artificial points of view by using ontological vocabulary as a whole library for such notions to clear out what we understand by self and the projecting it into the reality.

The idea of self is a constitution of stable principles that have individualistic aspects and reach according to preliminary expected circumstances – area of being, thought out kind of reactions, specific for the self certain attitudes, beliefs, concepts and ideas.

The devotion of self-awareness is based on a whole or entire chosen giving on something desired and preliminary subjectivated. In other hand loosing one's self in dependance can be particular giving on a habit or learned behaviour that creates boundaries.

The first situation includes the essential of the human beings self notion, the second can be found in the existence of humans, pets, or artificial minds and the types of self that they have.

The first stage of human self indicates characteristics of consciouss clear purpose of a free self. The investigation of the second condition results in specific unconsciouss fixed idea of a given self. These discriminative features propose the main differences between in a first sight not very common human and not-only-human conditions.

The mind-body problem in this case is on two levels – the devotion and the dependance only on mental or also on physical level. Ontological aparatus can give particular distinction between them.

In ontological point of view devotion has a moral and higher state of acceptace as a condition. The dependence in the very beginning is connected with negative connotation. The two concepts are not exact omonyms and that is why their connection here must be explained by presenting them in applied ontological view.

When we act in accordance to our human self we are deliberately devoting our self to some ideas, goals, persons, acts. We are teaching devo-

tion in religious point of view, in our family's values and in our interpersonal relationships, also in medical conditions for example.

We are using devotion very often in our child-parent interactions, strong-weak person, old-young people, pet-human connections etc.

In strong artificial intelligence point of view devotion is very difficult to be learnt, because we as humans have difficulty to lose something from our inner freedom and to give it out deliberatively to something else. So to teach an artificial self to act not so economically envalued can be a strange task.

In other hand we very easily depend on something – consciouss or not in our everyday life. The dependence on something from the matter around us is something without doubt – food, clothes, warmth, understanding, acceptance, power, love, health etc. We sometimes depend on more than needed substances and that is deliberately chosen or lost in the process of giving free will to our needs and desires. But that is the very human part in this equation.

That is why in the field of A.I. that we can create something that depends very strongly on us, but itself can not loose this dependance, because it is given in its preliminary in its nature. The very great fear of human intelligence is that it can create something independant that will eventually control our own self someday.

So, it is difficult not to predicate dependence on an artificial self, but not so easy to add some dependence features with negative connotations to it as well. I mean that teaching bad habits is the least expected result in creation of mechanical mind and the perfectness is the desired result in this endeavour with at least possible negative features.

That is why the understanding of human and artificial freedom and connection from and to some things is very important preliminary investigation in such attempts. Moreover, the understanding of them in our own nature can explain how to develop or avoid them in future creation workings.

The devotion is traditionally connected with belief. The dependence – with human disability to be independent and *free* from something. We, humans, are meant to be devoted on ideas and to be dependent on things. That sometimes clashes with the very idea for freedom in ourselves. That is a kind of an equilibrium of necessity vs. freedom.

So, finally, this is a matter of values as in the headline of this conference. Devotions is a matter of love, while dependence can create hate to its object. Devotion to a cause, people, care; dependence on a substance, relationship, circumstances... There are many kinds.

When we make most of the precious steps in our lives we devote – when we marry, even if we are not free sometimes – for example when we die. The same can be true about dependence – we could make a marriage like a cage for eachother; we could be struggling for life when death is near. We are concerned with in dealing with these two stages of the notion of the self.

How it is possible for example to teach an A.I. mind to be devoted to a fashionable style but not to be dependent on this like sometimes it happens with humans. Can we explain the fan-attitude to an artificial self and can we implement it (having in mind that for example the word for fanatic in Japanese 'otaku' literary means crazy, forgetting one's own culture)?

If we have to generelize the notion in human and in artificial sphere – the devotion is based on one freely chosen intentional object of admirance, while dependence can create interaction between several factors that make a system difficult to be destroyed.

The connotation between devotion and dependence in human and artificial point of view can be very vague. These are fields of study directed to the most hidden parts of our inner self and the explanation of their acting and impact is mostly individual question.

In creation of artificial self we should be able to distinguish our consciouss and benevolent desires and needs and to include only the useful parts of this knowledge. The problems in our self's nature should be avoided in future created super-self.

While very broad theme of devotion and dependence here it is taken as a part of possible investigation in avoiding and perfection of the best possible artificial adequacy of our self.

We devote ourselves to life by all means and we depend on our life to be as we are. Nevertheless all the difficulties, we are learnt to deal with these two perspectives of our self and the notion of it can be very much altered when we alter them as well.

So, now we depend on computers and we are devoted to science, while we are gathered here to think about our selves and our future self in the best way. I hope this research only starts the investigation of this subject.

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Vladimir Stoychev

WHAT DOES SCIENCE COGNIZE OR PROLEGOMENA TO PHILISOPHY OF SCIENCE

To answer the question what does contemporary science cognize we have to ask in what consists its essence which would mean to search for what perception of being and truth determine this essence.

Obviously the contemporary science is neither the Greek *epistheme* nor the medieval *doctrina* or *scientia* and this suggests that the essence of contemporary science scarcely can be deduced from the cognition of ancient Greeks. At the same time the allegation that it differs from the pre-modern science only in degree of progress would sound somehow unsubstantiated. Something is certain though: the essence of what we call today science is represented by the research work.[1] Therefore we have to see in what the essence of the research work consists.

The essence of the research work is that knowledge constitutes itself in a given domain of the being as an *actio* ("undertaking", "activity", "action", "manner of acting"). This *actio* includes in itself not only a method (image of the action) but also something else as far as every *actio* primarily needs a revealed sphere for its display. That is, the founding step in the research work is exactly the revealing of such sphere. This founding step is realized as in some domain of the being, for example, the nature, is projected a definite comprehensive scheme of the natural phenomena. This project prescribes how knowledge as *actio* has to be bound to the revealed sphere and at the same time this mutual bind secures the stringency of the scientific research work.

On the one hand, science is a research work mainly by virtue of the project (the all-embracing scheme), and of its securitisation by the strin-

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[1] Heidegger, M (1954). *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Pfullingen, 45-70.

gency of the scientific *actio*. On the other hand, in exact sciences the research work is carried out through the experiment but it is not science that turns into research work due to the experiment, but the experiment becomes possible only where knowledge of nature had already turned into research work.

As it was mentioned above, neither the Greek *epistheme* nor the medieval *doctrina* are sciences in the contemporary sense of the word. Major reason for that is that they are neither "research" nor "experimental". It is a fact that Aristotle created the notion of *empeiria* (*experientia*) – observation of things under varying conditions. But not only for him, whereas for all ancient and medieval observers, even though working with numbers and measures and utilizing in the process of observation different devices and instruments, *experimentum* is something other than the modern experiment which came into existence with the hypostasis of a foundational law. The founding of such a law means an introduction of an overall picture of the "object sphere" which is a source of criteria and presupposes anticipating concept for the conditions of the experiment. The experiment is an image of action and is founded and guided by underlying ground law and has for its object to express the facts confirming or rejecting this law. The contemporary research experiment is not merely an observation but a specific method for confirmation of the law within the framework of the exact project of nature.

At the same time the contemporary science began to be valued as science not only because of its modern characteristics – research work, method, stringency, premised project, foundational law, experiment – but also as a consequence of its transformation into institution. When the science turns into institution, the scientific research work acquires the character of production. On the other hand, the scientific production became possible only when the project of nature as an "object sphere" is finally applied to the "texture" of the being. Or, put in otherwise, the institutionalization of science ensures a leading role to the method regarding the being (nature or history) which this way is objectified in the research work.

The present text has for its object to show what does science cognize and thereby to rise the question of the logically-analytical, pragmatic, Anglo-Saxon understanding of philosophy of science which, as a research program, and as an academic profile legitimates itself rather as "philoso-

phy of natural sciences" (Naturphilosophie). In order to have full reason to call itself "philosophy of science", before to be engaged with logic and methodology of scientific knowledge, with analysis of scientific theories, with epistemic standards in science or with the problems of demarcation and confirmation of scientific knowledge[2], it has to put itself the question of essence of the modern science. That would mean to ask what type of perception of the being, and what very understanding of truth have translated contemporary science into research work.

Many people believe that contemporary science is a product of the spirit of the Enlightenment which expresses itself in man's liberating himself from the medieval dogmas and thus becoming free. Partially true as it is, this understanding is inexact since what is most important in this case is that a change has occurred in the essence of man who had turned into a subject.

How in fact we come to this exclusiveness, to this absoluteness of the subject as lying at roots of everything? This becomes possible due to the pretension of man to possess *fundamentum absolutum inconcussum veritatis* (the absolute foundation of the immovable truth). This pretension is a result of the emancipation of the man when he liberates himself from the obligations to the truth of Christian Revelation and turns his steps towards a self-laying legislation. At the same time the liberation from the truth of

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[2] "Philosophy of science, the branch of philosophy that is centered on a critical examination of the sciences: their methods and their results. One branch of the philosophy of science, *methodology*, is closely related to the theory of knowledge. It explores the methods by which science arrives at its posited truths concerning the world and critically explores alleged rationales for these methods. Issues concerning the sense in which theories are accepted in science, the nature of the confirmation relation between evidence and hypothesis, the degree to which scientific claims can be falsified by observational data, and the like are the concern of methodology […] Typical problems are the nature of scientific laws, the cognitive content of scientific theories referring to unobservables, and the structure of scientific explanations. Finally, philosophy of science explores specific foundational questions arising out of the specific results of the sciences." – in: Audi, Robert (gen. ed.) (1999). *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press, 700.

the Revelation (certifying and securing the Salvation of the Spirit), that is, the liberation from the reliability of the Salvation given in the Revelation, translates itself into liberation for such reliability in which the man himself secures the truth as something known to his own knowledge. Thus the man who liberates himself transforms himself into guarant for the reliability of the knowable. This happens when he, on his own, and all by himself decides what does it mean for him the knowable, what knowledge and certification of the known is, that is, what reliability is. The pathos of Descartes is that he puts metaphysical foundation under the liberation of the man for a liberty understood as a self-certifying self-determination. This metaphysical foundation has to be reliable not only by itself but as far as it is unapproachable to external criteria, through which the essence of the demanding freedom confirms itself as a self-reliability. However, what certifies itself *nolens volens* secures at the same time the reliability of that being (the subject) for which such knowledge is reliable, and through which everything reliable certifies itself. *Fundamentum*, the foundation of this freedom, the underlying, the "subject", is that reliable which satisfies the upper requirements. And this is *ego cogito ergo sum*. That is, the reliable is a thesis telling that simultaneously (as togetherness) and at the same time (synchronically) with its thinking man by himself in incontestable manner is a givenness for himself. In fact the thinking is a re-presentation establishing the relation to the represented. That is, the *idea* (the "prototype", the "archetype", the "original", the thesis *cogito ergo sum*) is *perceptio* ("collection", "comprehension", "understanding").

In this context the representation is grasped as to put something in front of us and to certify the re-presented as such a thing. Such certifying can only be an account in view of the fact that only a calculation of the represented can guarantee its permanent and incontestable certitude. The representation is already not revealing of the things for us but their comprehension and their understanding – we already can not speak about the power of the present but about the domination of its interpretation. The representation is a self-founding invasion in the sphere of the secured data in which, however, the subject has to confirm itself. The being is not already present at its sojourn but is determined by the objectifying work of the representation. The representation is an apodictic determination of the object. Also, it reduces everything to oneness of the objectiveness. It is "gathering", "closeness", "co-motion", that is, *co-agitatio*.

Every relation to whatever it may be – will, opinion, sensation – from the very beginning is a representation, a *co(a)gitation* which is translated as "thinking". The subject, the foundational reliability is every time one re-secured self-representation of the representing man together with the represented. The foundational reliability, the subject, is every time an apodictic equality of the representing and the represented: *me cogitare = me esse*. Due to the foundational reliability man is assured that his reliability and his truth determine themselves and this no longer guarantees that he **is**. Exactly because man is necessarily co-represented together with the foundational reliability (the subject, the "*me cogitare = me esse*") – what transforms itself into protagonist of the self-liberation from the truth of the Christian Revelation – he, on his own, can and has to be an exclusive being, that is, a "subject".

As a subject man is *coagitatio*, gathering of everything around his ego. Man constitutes himself as legislator of all measures which make possible the supervenient calculations and measurements, as something that has the right to consider itself as reliable, that is, as true, consequently as existing. In *coagitatio* the representation gathers all objects in the totality of the representedness. The *ego* of this *cogitare* acquires its essence in the certifying itself reduction of all representable in one, in *con-scientia*, in "consciousness". The consciousness is a co-representedness of the "object sphere" and the representing man in the field of force of the secured by them representation. All present acquires from the consciousness meaning and appearance of its presence. That is, the present has its secondary birth in the representation.

Wolfgang Hofkirchner

THE CHALLENGE OF COMPLEXITY.
SOCIAL AND HUMAN SCIENCES
IN THE INFORMATION AGE

On the one hand not only the most industrialised countries, but also less developed countries, are subject to transformation processes in the sphere of the technological organisation of society, due to the development and diffusion of modern information and communication technologies, which are supported and furthered by national and regional policies which set up a tremendous number of technology-advancement programmes. These policies are still confined to a view that looks upon technology as an independent factor of societal development.

On the other hand there has been growing awareness that technological determinism is too myopic, since the belief in technological progress, which *per se* entails social progress, has diminished. Development in technology is not accompanied by an equally rapid growth of scientific insight, let alone foresight, as to the impacts of technology on levels of society, other than that of technological organisation. Attempts to observe and understand the basic nature of this change are still second place.

With the words of Manuel Castells, famous writer of the trilogy of the information age: "The dream of the Enlightenment, that reason and science would solve the problems of humankind, is within reach. Yet there is an extraordinary gap between our technological overdevelopment and our social underdevelopment" (1998, 359-360).

This gap is due to the fact that a scientific understanding of the development of society in the information age has not had time to develop. There is not yet a "science of the information society" which is a science for, about and by means of the information society. Sociology of technology which deals with the impact of information and communication tech-

nologies on society and with the task of shaping them through design as well as all social and human sciences need to undergo a paradigm shift that makes them part of science of the information society.

1

The information age is a time of bifurcation – the Great Bifurcation (Hofkirchner/Maier-Rabler 2004): either humanity manages the breakthrough to a new organisation of world society or it faces the breakdown of civilisation.

Edgar Morin has stressed that the *conditio sine qua non* for success is a reform in thinking: "The Planetary Era demands that we situate everything in the planetary context. Knowledge of the world as world has become an intellectual as well as a vital necessity. It is the universal problem of every citizen: how to gain access to global information, and how to acquire the possibility of linking together and organizing it. To do so, and thereby recognize, acknowledge, and know the problems of the world, we need a reform in thinking" (1999a, 124).

The basic obstacle to accomplishing that paradigm shift throughout sciences and everyday thinking is "blind intelligence". "Incapable of seeing the planetary context in all its complexity," says Edgar Morin, "blind intelligence fosters unconsciousness and irresponsibility. It has become the bearer of death" (1999a, 128).

Blind intelligence comes today in three different ways of thinking which can be seen as ways of considering the relationship of identity and difference (cf. Hofkirchner 2004). Regarding identity and difference while approaching complexity, the question arises as to how the simple does relate to the complex, that is, how less complex problems or objects or phenomena do relate to more complex ones.

Given the less complex and the more complex, there is, in terms of ideal types, one way that eliminates identity by establishing the difference for the sake of each manifestation of complexity in its own right; it abandons all relationships between all of them by treating them as disjunctive; it dissociates one from the other, it dichotomises and yields dualism (or pluralism) in the sense of diversity without unity. The often bemoaned cleft between the so-called two cultures of hard science and soft science (humanities) is the most striking example for this way of thinking. In fact,

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this is a description of the state of the scientific adventure as a multiplicity of monodisciplinary approaches that are alien and deaf towards each other. "Intelligence that is fragmented, compartmentalized, mechanistic, disjunctive, and reductionistic breaks the complexity of the world into disjoint pieces, splits up problems, separates that which is linked together, and renders unidimensional the multidimensional", as Edgar Morin points out (1999a, 128). It fails to put the abstract in the context again from which it has been abstracted, it fails to relink it to the bigger picture.

Dissociation in that sense is the first fallacy of blind intelligence. There are two other ways of thinking that are opposed to dissociation and pretend to accomplish unification. So unity is their aim – but as they lose sight of diversity they are just another variety of fallacies.

The first of these two ways of thinking establishes identity by eliminating the difference for the benefit of the less complex side of the difference and at the cost of the more complex side; it reduces "higher complexity" to "lower complexity"; this is known as reductionism. Reductionism is still the main stream of natural science. In an attempt to preclude nonmaterialistic assumptions it fails to do justice to the emergent properties of higher complexity.

The counterpart of the reductionistic fallacy is what might be called projectionism. It establishes identity by eliminating the difference for the benefit of the more complex side of the difference and at the cost of the less complex side; it takes the "higher" level of complexity as its point of departure and extrapolates or projects from there to the "lower" level of complexity. It overestimates the role of the whole and belittles the role of the parts.

Both fallacies yield unity without diversity. What is needed, however, is "*unitas multiplex*" as Edgar Morin calls it (1999b, 25), understanding unity-in-diversity and diversity-in-unity, unity-through-diversity. "It means understanding disjunctive, reductive thought by exercising thought that distinguishes and connects. It does not mean giving up knowledge of the parts for knowledge of the whole, or giving up analysis for synthesis, it means conjugating them. This is the challenge of complexity which ineluctably confronts us as our planetary era advances and evolves" (1999b, 19). This is a way of thinking that establishes identity as well as differ-

ence favouring neither of the manifestations of complexity; it establishes identity in line with the difference; it integrates both sides of the difference (yielding unity) and it differentiates identity (yielding diversity); it is a way of thinking that is based upon integration and differentiation; it is opposed to both dissociation and unification and yields unity and diversity in one. It integrates "lower" and "higher complexity" by establishing a relationship between them that, in particular, might be characterised by the following criteria: firstly, both sides of the relation are opposed to each other; secondly, they depend on each other; thirdly, they are asymmetrical. When all these criteria are met the relationship is usually called "dialectic". This way of thinking opposes dualism as well as reductionism and projectonism.

The unity-through-diversity principle is itself a kind of dialectical sublation of dissociation and unification, of dualism and reductionism and projectionism. A dialectical sublation eliminates the dominant role of the preceding quality rather than the quality itself. This quality is kept, that is, continued, but it is continued under the dominance of a new quality and is therefore – as Hegel put it – lifted onto a next level. All of that holds for the unity-through-diversity thinking with regard to the fallacious ways of thinking. Dualism, reductionism as well as projectionism are not totally negated but taken *cum grano salis*. Each of them has an aspect of overexaggeration that has to be abolished but, by the same token, it has an aspect that is right once the onesidedness is removed. Doing justice to these aspects is carried out through the novel integrative view – hence unity is established among the diverse confligating views. Duality, reduction, or projection are justified within certain boundaries and when taking into account the legitimate claims of each other.

2

The perspective of these different ways of thinking can be applied to social and human sciences. Their central theme is known today as the dualism of agency and structure (see Reckwitz 1997). How are they related to each other?

One possible answer to that question is to grant autonomous existence to phenomena of individuals and society respectively. Here individuals are cut free from societies and vice versa. It is dualism, en vogue in

postmodern thinking. Niklas Luhmann's theory of social systems, e.g., is dualistic since his social systems (subsystems of society) are made up of communications only while the psychic systems (individuals) belong to the environment of the social ones.

Another solution is individualism. Theories belonging to that kind of conceptualisation methodologically, ontologically and ethically give priority to individual action and related phenomena and postulate that societal facts and related phenomena are to be logically derived from the individual ones, are in a modular way built up by the latter ones and do not inhere values different from values on the individual level. The way of thinking underlying individualism is reductionism and makes it positivistic. Societal phenomena are reduced to phenomena on the individual level. Knowledge of individual phenomena is necessitated by and suffices for getting knowledge of phenomena on the society level, the second results from the first. The most well-known example for individualism is rational-choice theory in economics. The whole paradigm often is labeled action theory or subject theory. Agent-based modeling methods may suit this approach.

Contrary to individualism, the opposite might be called "societalism". By this the tradition is meant that goes back to Emile Durkheim who insisted on the autonomous existence of social facts. Recent representatives of this variety are functionalist and structuralist theories. Starting point is dealing with social facts or social functions or social structures which is deemed necessary and sufficient to describe, explain or predict what is going on on the individual level. Instead of being reductionist, this way of thinking extrapolates or projects phenomena which are found on a higher level onto a lower level where these phenomena cannot be found. Insofar as it stresses some whole to be examined in order to understand phenomena, it is interpretivism. Several systemic approaches belong to that category.

As Mario Bunge puts it (2003, 75): "Individualism sees the trees but misses the forest, whereas holism sees the forest but overlooks the trees. Only the systemic approach facilitates our noticing both the trees (and their components) and the forest (and its larger environment.)"

That is, there is a dialectical solution too. Thus, individuals and society are interdependent (none of them can be understood without the other), they oppose each other (none of them is fully understandable by

understanding the other), and they build a hierarchy (society plays the dominant role). They form parts and a whole which is a dialectical relationship. Dialectics is said to apply whenever two correlates build a mutually dependent relationship between themselves as opposites in an asymmetrical way.

The dialectical relationship between agency and structure being a process whose products freeze into structure, which in turn influences further processes of action as it enables them and constrains them at the same time, can easily be retheorised in terms of a feed-forward and feedback loop between society as a (supra-)system, and individuals or systems of individuals as elements or (sub-)systems: a loop that does not mediate strictly deterministic causations, but allows for the emergence of new qualities instead (see Hofkirchner 1998).

Evolutionary systems theory – a term coined by Ervin Laszlo (1987), Vilmos Csanyi (1989) and Susantha Goonatilake (1991) – as a theory about evolving systems and as a theory that is the result of the merger of systems theory and evolutionary theory which nowadays not only applies to biotic and human or social systems but also to physical systems, that is, to the cosmos itself (Layzer 1990, Smolin 1995), is the most recent elaboration of General System Theory of which Ludwig von Bertalanffy is known as one founder (Hofkirchner 2005). It revolves around the notion of self-organisation. It provides a transdisciplinary framework for consilience throughout science thereby positioning social science within the orchestra of disciplines.

It distinguishes between different levels of self-organisation, i.e. self-organisation has aspects that are common to all types of systems as well as aspects that are particular to each concrete type of system. In each self-organizing system there is this relationship between elements and system. In a social system, as distinct from a living system or a physical system that is prehuman, self-organisation refers to the so-called re-creation (Jantsch 1992) of such a system. Re-creation means that social systems do not only have the capacity to modify themselves (as physical self-organizing systems do) and to maintain themselves (as living self-organizing systems do), but they also have the capacity to re-invent themselves, to shape themselves, to produce a specific character by which the individuals that are parts of a social system can strive to realize themselves in a more or less self-de-

termined way. That is to say, systems at the evolutionary stage of human society are just another – but new – way of metabolism nonhuman living systems carry out (just as systems at the evolutionary stage of living beings are another way of making use of energy that nonliving material systems do). It is the specifics of that way sociality is about. But it would narrow the possibilities of understanding to neglect the roots of sociality.

The core of evolutionary systems theory is a stage model. It is a phase model and a layer model in one. The stage model of evolutionary systems is based upon the principle of emergentism and the principle of asymmetrism. Emergence takes place in transitions in which by the interaction of proto-elements systems are produced. Asymmetry describes the suprasystem hierarchies in which subsystems are encapsulated.

The shift from one phase to a subsequent phase is tantamount to a shift onto a new layer. The new system includes this additional layer. It encapsulates what previously were autonomous systems as subsystems and shapes them to reflect the dominance relation. However, the newly formed system will always depend on the functioning of its subsystems. When they cease to support the system, it will break down.

In that way, evolutionary systems theory resembles dialectical thinking as to "sublation" ("Aufhebung") in Hegel's sense. The first connotation of sublation which is to break, to cancel, to nullify, that is, to discontinue, is reflected in the stage model by the point that marks the end of a certain stage of evolution. The second connotation which is to keep, to save, to preserve, to store, that is, to continue, comes to the fore when the scheme concedes that each new layer is built upon a preceding one and that the new stage comprises not only the new layer but parts of the old one. The third connotation which is to raise, to lift, that is, to leap in quality, is depicted by the notion of the higher level that exerts downward causation onto the lower ones.

3

Evolutionary systems theory, thus based upon dialectical philosophy, sketches the framework of social self-organisation in a critical theory of social systems which might serve as the core of the required science of the information society. Given that contemporary society undergoes a critical phase of evolution – marked by global challenges – which might

end up in devolution, this phase can be conceived of in terms of complexity: there is a bifurcation between a breakthrough towards a stable path of societal development that is based upon a novel principle of organisation of society, on the one hand, and a breakdown of the system at all, on the other. Furthermore, since information, in terms of complexity as well, is defined as that which is functional for the orderliness of the system in question, ICTs in contemporary society gain a new meaning: it is not the acceleration of cognitive, communicative and co-operative processes in society by ICTs per se but their inherent potential to facilitate the generation of innovative information that might enable society to trigger its re-organisation onto the sustainable path provided by the Great Bifurcation.

Being critical can be ascribed to this theoretical framework in that it is normative and doing justice to the factual at the same time. For it includes not only an account of the potential that is given with the actual but also an evaluation of the potential which sorts out the desired. Thus this theory embraces an ascendence from the potential given now to the actual to be established in the future as well as an ascendence from the less good now to the better then which altogether yields the Not-Yet in critical theorist Ernst Bloch's sense. These processes aimed at the Not-Yet are at the core of the dynamic of social self-organisation. That systems theory inheres values does not come as a surprise when looking back to the forerunner of evolutionary systems thinking, the General System Theory of Ludwig von Bertalanffy who took a normative stance – system theory, in his opinion, had to be based upon humanism (see Hofkirchner 2005).

It is only this last way of thinking that can cope with complexity. It is only this last way of thinking that provides the basis for successful changing the world. It is only this last way of thinking that contests the fallacies of blind intelligence and fosters responsibility for the fate of humanity. With the words of Edgar Morin: "We need a kind of thinking that relinks that which is disjointed and compartmentalized, that respects diversity as it recognizes unity, and that tries to discern interdependencies" (1999a, 130).

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