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Editor
Vlasta Ilišin

CROATIAN YOUTH
AND
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH – ZAGREB

Zagreb, October 2007

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PREFACE

Empirical research on youth has been conducted continually by the Institute for social research in Zagreb since its very foundation that is, since the mid 1960s. During this period numerous projects aimed at gaining scientific insight into equally numerous issues relevant for studying youth have been realized. The last of a series of such scientific-research projects – *Youth and European Integration Processes* – whose implementation began at the end of 2002, has been conducted by: Vlasta Ilišin (project manager), Josip Županov, Furio Radin, Dejana Bouillet, Helena Štimac Radin, Ivona Mendeš and Dunja Potočnik. This scientific-empirical project is different from most others focused on the youth population, most of all because this investigation included a control sample of adult examinees. This form of coverage of examinees enables the analysis of possible inter-generational differences, where there are a great many assumptions, but not enough is known for sure.

This book is the first in a series of two scientific monographs that together represent an integral interpretation of the results gained from this project. The subject of analysis in this study is the relationship of youth toward the European integration process and their, in a wider sense, political readiness for inclusion in that process. The analysis includes, apart from inter-generational comparisons, comparisons with the results of previous research on youth in Croatia, along with results of European research conducted on youth or the general population. This book is conceived as a research study, and it is structured into eight chapters.

Youth, Croatia and Europe: An Introduction to the Research written by Vlasta Ilišin is the first, introductory chapter. It outlines the conceptual framework of the research and specifies the social context in which it was conducted, that is, the contemporary Croatian society, the process of European integration and risks accompanying the process of transition and globalization. It thus starts with the general hypothesis that tendencies and changes in Croatian, European and global settings leave a significant mark on the young generation in Croatia, that is, that all this influences the forming of attitudes of youth toward the phenomena researched. The introductory chapter also explains the research methodology, research goals, the instruments applied and the construction of the sample. An integral part of this explanation is the comparison of the structure of the basic sample of youth and the control sample of adults, and the analysis of youth as a foundation for understanding the later differentiations within this population.

The European Union has for several years been present in the Croatian public as an often exploited subject, but that is, for the most part, not accompanied by adequate analytical insights nor by argued and rational discussions about the meaning of the European integration process, as well as the European ambitions of Croatia in that context. Serious discussion have been suppressed into the background by the onrush of emotions, prejudice and stereotypes – and if they are conducted, they are mostly concentrated on the legal and economic aspects of European unification. This is why Damir Grubiša analyzes the genesis and development stages of the European Union in the second chapter, *Political Axiology of the European Union: The Goals and Values of European Integration*, accenting the political dimension of the integration process. Here, special attention is dedicated to the values this process of integration is founded on, which lead to the creation of a new Europe of values.

The following three chapters consider the subjective political preconditions, that is, the socio-political readiness of youth for Croatian integration into the European Union. Thus, in the third chapter, *Political Values, Attitudes and Participation of Youth: Continuity and Change*, Vlasta Ilišin analyzes the political values of youth, the changes in perceptions of social and political problems and forms of participation of youth in social and political processes and institutions. In this context, special emphasis was given to insights into the democratic potential and social capital of youth and an analysis of the perception of Croatian integration into the EU as a political goal, which is in an indicative discrepancy with the officially proclaimed priorities.

Human rights: The ticket towards a Democratic Europe is the title of the fourth chapter written by Dunja Potočnik. Starting with the hypothesis that human rights and freedoms are important for the democratic legitimating of Croatia on its road to a united Europe, she analyzes the evaluation of particular human rights and freedoms, and the perception of youth on the protection of those rights in Croatia, as well as the contribution of different social protagonists to their realization, along with changes that have taken place during the last several years in the dimensions investigated.

In the fifth chapter *National Identity and Attitudes toward Europe* Furio Radin analyzes the phenomena of national cohesion and social distances, changes taking place in that regard and their relation to the attitude toward Europe and Croatian integration into the European Union. In his analysis, along with intra-generational, special attention is dedicated to inter-generational variations in the level of national cohesion, all resulting in some interesting findings.

The sixth and seventh chapters consider the relationship of youth and the process of European integration, especially the perception of existing and

potential problems in the process of Croatian accession to the European Union. Vlasta Ilišin and Ivona Mendeš analyze the existing positive and negative expectations, as well as the perception of potential winners and losers, when Croatia is integrated into the European Union some day, in the chapter named *Youth and the European Union: Perception of Consequences of Integration*. Equal attention is dedicated to the perception of trends of development and potential difficulties in the European Union itself, in order to determine the image young people have about this desired association, because they are the ones that the future of the European Croatia will significantly depend on.

Ivona Mendeš analyzes the existing and desired level of information about European integration and institutions, as well as knowledge about certain aspects of the process of Croatian accession to the European Union, and the institutional configuration of the Union, in the chapter *Knowledge and Information about the European Union*. The disparity between the self-assessed good level of information and the weak knowledge about the investigated dimensions is a significant trend confirming that Croatian citizens are in dire need of education about the main political goal of the actual political option and the prevailing part of the Croatian political elite.

Finally, the *Summary* is also an integral part of this book.

Along with the researchers and the technical services at the Institute, almost one hundred surveyors, having to invest significant effort to reach and animate the examinees to cooperate, are to thank for the realization of the scientific-research project *Youth and European Integration Processes*. The effort to ensure the quality of work of the surveyors and their motivation to successfully finalize the task and within the deadlines was mostly made by the young members of the project, Dunja Potočnik and Ivona Mendeš. Their engagement in the preparation and implementation of the field part of the research by far surpassed the demands usually put before young assistants, and the fact should be emphasized with special pleasure that they proved to be up to all the challenges that faced them.

The project was financed by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Sport of the Republic of Croatia. However, special gratitude is owed to the Department for the Family of the Ministry of the Family, Veterans' Affairs and Intergenerational Solidarity, which, as a co-financer of the project, enabled the field research to be conducted in the planned scale.

Unfortunately, in the last stages of the realization of this project, in November 2004, a member of our research group and a long-standing honorable associate, the academician Josip Županov died. His parting from the social and scientific scene is a great loss for Croatian social sciences, particularly sociology. Regretting the fact that he could not finalize his engagement on our

common project in the form of a written contribution, we remain permanently grateful for all the intriguing and productive ideas he shared with us, as well as his selfless pedagogic advise, in the best sense of those words, that we could always count on when we encountered any research doubts.

In Zagreb, September 2007

Vlasta Ilišin

Vlasta Ilišin

**YOUTH, CROATIA AND EUROPE:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH**

The beginning of the 21st century in Croatia has been marked by significant changes, as well as the continuing of social trends formed in the first decade of the transition period. This is also a time when Croatian efforts to join the European Union are becoming more intense. The process of European integration and the European Union as an institutional expression of a united Europe have become the most important topics to the political and wider public. Citizens, who are burdened with a number of problems, especially those of the socio-economic character, are for the most part only passive observers of political moves undertaken by those in power, but that is sufficient for their attitudes to form towards European integration and Croatia's place in the united Europe. Specific issues are touched upon, including the questions about the readiness of Croatia and its citizens to join the EU, as well as the potential advantages and disadvantages, that is, winners and losers in the process of accession to the European Union. In this context, the young appear as the one segment of the population that is relevant in many ways as a research subject. To be more specific, an insight into the readiness and the relationship of citizens toward the inclusion of Croatia into the European integration process, requires that special attention be given to the young, for they should be the ones who will spend most of their lives in a new and different social and political surrounding. Thus, their attitudes to the European integration of Croatia and their readiness for adequate participation in that process become, if not decisive, then certainly important for the success of that process, both from the viewpoint of Croatia and its citizens and from the viewpoint of the EU. Besides, the young are that portion of the population which is most sensitive to different influences, which is why changes taking place in the modern society may be detected in them first.

In this introduction, we will specify the conceptual framework and the social context within which the social attributes of youth are being subjected to empirical research, as an indicator of their readiness for integration into a European environment, as well as their relationship toward European integration and Croatia's inclusion in the EU. We will also extend an explanation of the methodology used and the structure of the sample, while theoretical approaches

to the chosen research problems will be elaborated specifically in each portion of the research.

1. Croatia and the process of European integration

The first decade of transition in Croatia was more turbulent than in most post-socialist countries. Along with all the difficulties every country in transition faced more or less successfully, Croatia also experienced several years of armed conflict. War, fought on Croatian soil, left long-lasting economic and social consequences that the social sciences will explore for a long time to come. However, the changes brought about by the establishment of the new socio-political order are equally important for social sciences. These changes were all-encompassing, and they were especially deep in the political and economic systems. The new political order was normatively based on liberal-democratic values, and the economic system on the postulates of capitalism. This, in principle, signified the acceptance of the fact that the democratic social order means political pluralism, the rule of law, tolerance, the respect for human and minority rights, freedom of the press and so on, while the new economic system demands the inviolability of private ownership, and the development of entrepreneurship and a market-oriented economy. In the early 1990s there was a sense of euphoria among the Croatian citizens, instigated by state independence, national affirmation and the abolition of the totalitarian political system, which undermined the problems occurring from the very start of transition.

Namely, in spite of the given normative and institutional-political frameworks, the real processes in Croatia did not always occur in accordance with the proclaimed principles. Thus, an ethnically homogenous state with the domination of the concepts of national integration and renewal of traditional values was installed; the political monopoly of a single party, whose style of government included some elements of authoritarianism and clientelism, lasted for ten years; the public media were more in the service of the ruling nomenclature than the citizens; human rights and national minorities' rights were often violated without respective sanctions (Katunarić, 1995; Lalović, 2000; Kasapović, 2001; Zakošek, 2002).

The deficient democratization of the Croatian society, along with the Croatian involvement in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also contributed to the significant foreign policy isolation of Croatia. At the same time, the nationalization of social ownership was conducted, followed by privatization using a model that had enabled numerous malpractices.

Ownership conversion and the restructuring of the economy have resulted in the mass deterioration of economic subjects and in the loss of work places, in

the fall of living standards of the widest strata of the population as well as in a pronounced deepening of social differences. The new situation was reflected in the loss of the type of social security known to the generations that had lived under socialism, in the reduction of social rights and protection, on the deepening of inequalities in education opportunities and the general worsening of the quality of life. The end of the war and the experience of living in new circumstances have enabled dissatisfaction with the manner and dynamics of social transformation to surface, brought about even more because the citizens had great expectations regarding fast progress on individual and social plains at the beginning of the transitional period. Instead, Croatia lost its comparative advantages from the beginning of the period of transition relatively soon and found itself at the lower part of the success scale of transitional countries. The second decade of transition began with a change in power, and at the end of 2003 a third, peaceful political alternation, which undoubtedly signifies Croatia's entrance into a period of democratic consolidation. However, other political changes took place, such as the democratization of society, the liberalization of media space (along with the increase of criticism in the media), greater protection for human and minority rights. These trends started when the six-member coalition took over power in the beginning of 2000, and in a number of aspects they were accelerated and clearly articulated after the CDU and its coalition partners came into power at the end of 2003. Indeed, the coalition in power made several very important symbolic moves that sent a strong message – before all, to European partners – about the persistence of Croatia in building democratic norms and standards. However, the trends that seem to persevere are those in the economic sphere. Economic development of Croatia has not been initiated, propulsive entrepreneurship activity not achieved, the competitive abilities of the country have not been improved, the consequences of poorly run privatization have not been rectified, and falling into debt as well as the sale of valuable resources to foreign capital have continued. Most citizens are dissatisfied again, because their standard of living has not improved, the unemployment rate is still high, and with almost every new law and state budget, the already reduced social rights keep decreasing.

Within the stated continuity and changes relations between Croatia and the EU hold a specific position. After the 2000 elections Croatian isolation loosened and the relationship with the EU seemed to be constantly improving, which resulted in the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2001, and in receiving the avis in 2004, granting Croatia candidate status for accession to the European Union. However, in March 2005 Croatia did not manage to arrange the beginning of the desired negotiations about accession due to the assessment by the European partners of its unsatisfactory cooperation with the Hague Court. These negotiations started in October 2005. Croatian accession to

the EU is the greatest priority of this Government, and the agreement of almost all the relevant political parties has been achieved on this issue. The delay in starting the negotiations with the EU was reflected on political processes and relationships in the country, but furthermore on the attitudes of citizens toward European integration and the EU. The relationship of the EU towards Croatia and the potential advantages and disadvantages that Croatia's accession to the Union might cause are especially questioned. All this seems to lead to a greater disregard of the question of what the potential perspective of Croatia might be if it did not join the EU.

Even though the basic information about the EU is mostly familiar, it is not needless to recall the main stages of development of that association (Obradović, 2004). The process of European integration started in 1951 by the association of six European countries headed by France and Germany. The first enlargement took place in 1973 with the accession of three other countries, the second in 1981 with the joining of Greece, the third in 1986 with two other Southern European countries entering (Portugal and Spain), the fourth in 1995 when three countries joined the Union and finally, the fifth and the largest enlargement with ten countries, after which the EU consists of a total of 25 member countries. Among the newest members, eight used to belong to the group of socialist countries, and their accession has also symbolically signified the erasure of the ideological-political border between the former European West and East. Parallel to the geographic enlargement of the EU, there has been a process of deepening of the European integration. The initial motive for unification was economic in nature, and those reasons remain permanently important, which is easily recognizable in the set-up and functioning of the common market, the customs union, the economic-monetary union... However, at the same time, the need for the integrated European countries to establish deeper mutual cooperation on the political level and to build common political bodies, as well as regulate a way of making decisions that could overcome the "democratic deficit" present in the EU, was obvious (Mintas-Hodak, 2004:17). This dimension of the integration process culminated in the formulation of the European Constitution in 2004, but considering its grave problems with ratification it is questionable if it will ever come into power. The Constitution regulates the institutional structure and the composition of common bodies of authority and the manner of their functioning and decision-making, but it also promotes the values the united Europe is founded on. Independent from the destiny of the Constitution of Europe and the modifications it is bound to endure, those values cannot be doubted, and in this research project they are the aspect of European integration that interests us the most. Here it should be mentioned that these values originate from the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms from 1950, which has been amended and elaborated over time in

accordance with the social changes taking place in democratic societies, only to be included at last in the European Constitution as the basic document of an integrated Europe. Thus, it should be noted that the European Union is, at the declaratory level, based on the values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law and respect for human rights, all linked to pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men.

The EU guarantees the freedom of movement of people, goods, services and capital, and forbids discrimination based on nationality. The goals of the EU spring from the stated values, such as the preservation of peace and wellbeing of citizens, sustainable development, the promotion of scientific and technologic progress, the promotion of justice and social protection, gender equality, inter-generational solidarity and protection of the rights of children, along with the reduction of social exclusion and discrimination, and stimulating economic, social and territorial cohesion and solidarity among the EU members (A Constitution for Europe, 2004: 8). These values and goals of European integration represent, at the same time, a catalogue of general political demands that should be complied with by the countries wishing to join this association.

The criteria that the EU sets for future members emphasize the question of the influence of this association on the aspiring countries and the existing member countries. In other words, the initial dominant focus on research into the impact of the member states on the EU has, in analytic insights, been redirected to the process of Europeanisation, that is, to the realization of the influence of EU on the continent and changes in particular countries. As S. Hix and K. H. Goetz (2000) notice, political science studies of European integration are developing along with the progress of the process of integration itself. To be more specific, these studies have for years been in a gap between two political science disciplines: comparative politics (focused mostly on the comparison of institutions and processes in different countries) and international relations (oriented toward studying the international and regional institutions and relations). Since the long-term empirical influence of European integration on national political institutions and processes is still not transparent and seems minor, this might be the reason that it has been disregarded. However, with the development of the EU the potential influence of this association, and its institutions and decisions, on the economic development and political order of certain countries is increasing, so that the mutual influences become the object of analysis. Thus, we may say today that “European integration encompasses two mutually related processes: the transfer of political competences onto the supranational level for the purpose of achieving particular political goals, and the establishment of a new set of political institutions with executive, legislative and legal powers” (Hix, Goetz, 2000:3). At the same time, European integration is observed within

the context of the globalization process. The EU is then understood as a protagonist that contributes to creating a globalized economy, as well as an association that represents one of the leading powers in global political transformations with its institutional-political solutions (Hix, Goetz, 2000; Youniss and others, 2002).

The influence of the EU on member countries is realized mostly on the economic plain through market regulation (which includes the harmonization of existing national standards), macroeconomic stabilization and redistribution of common resources (Duch, Taylor, 1997; Gabel, 1998). This influence is direct because it demands the adjustment of national standards to the common European norms. However, the EU has an indirect influence as well that strengthens along with the enlargement and the deepening of the process of European integration (Hix, Goetz, 2000; Davies, 2003). That indirect influence may be recognized at the institutional level and in the patterns of political functioning and behavior, where certain changes can be stimulated or existing processes strengthened if they are in accordance with EU demands. However, the process of European integration can indirectly influence national electoral processes and political parties as well, including the choice of options in public policies, and the representation and mediation of the structure of interests (Hix, Goetz, 2000:11). At the same time, the enlargement and development of the EU and its institutions enables national political protagonists to enter a wider political arena where they will gain important informational leverage that can be used in their political activities on the domestic plain. The later statement suggests that the “political elites are equipped to better use the EU level to realize personal advantages, than regular party members or a mass electoral body” (Hix, Goetz, 2000:14). The main reason behind this is not that the project of European unification was thought of by the political elite, but because the political leaders are in charge of it and directly participate in the discussions and the decision-making. This is why their level of information is significantly better, and why their accountability is higher, if the citizens of their countries do not have sufficient information about the relevant events on the EU level.

How the EU is seen by the citizens of member countries and candidate countries is an important question, because citizens are the ones on whom the tempo and quality of development of European integration finally depend, and they have to endure the consequences of the decisions made by the political elite. Thus, public opinion surveys are being systematically conducted, and they have already demonstrated that the information citizens have on the EU, its institutions and decisions, as well as the perception of the potential advantages and disadvantages that membership in the EU brings to their country and them personally, vary in time and from one country to another. The findings of these researches are also one of the main contributions to a better insight into the

political dimensions of European integration, as well as into the indirect influences the EU realizes on the level of particular states.

When considering Croatia, the influence of the EU already acting on domestic economic, and especially political processes, is undoubtedly more important than the Croatian influence on the EU (especially because Croatia has yet to fulfill the conditions for accession). The Croatian political elite has decided that joining the EU is a primary strategic goal, but different social and political events put the citizens' support to constant strain and test. The ups and downs in the relations with the EU directly influence the oscillations in the support for Croatian accession to that community of states, as well as changes to the perception of potential losses and gains at the national, group and individual level after Croatia becomes a member of the EU. Also, the EU presented Croatia with demands that had to be met in order to begin the accession negotiations, and among the standard criteria appeared those that are actually based on the less than satisfactory recovery from the social and political consequences of the war. That is how Croatia found itself in a small circle of European countries that had to fulfill very concrete political conditions along with the usual adjustments, and it is not irrelevant that there was no consensus in the country about its fulfillment. This, of course, is the cooperation with the Court in The Hague, which most members of the political elite achieved a relatively satisfactory consensus about, while a large share of the citizens were verbally opposed to its fulfillment. Croatia found itself in a very paradoxical situation. Specifically, even though it is politically prepared to join the EU better than economically, the start of the accession negotiations with the EU was inhibited by a political condition. Also, the public is of the prevailing opinion that Croatia is both economically and politically better prepared for European integration than countries that had at the time already begun negotiating for the next round of enlargement (specifically, Bulgaria and Romania), as well as some countries that had already become full members in the last round of EU enlargement. All this affected to a great degree the perception about the EU and the support of Croatian public opinion for the process of European integration, and previous studies have shown that changes almost always start with the young.

2. Youth in a risk society

The young represent one of those segments of the European population that is said to be the potential winners of the European integration process, and whose attitudes, due to their (future) role in the development and stability of the united Europe, are followed especially avidly. However, the increased social and scientific interest in youth occurred in mid 20th century, about the same time the European integration process started. In the early 1950s, youth became an

important segment of the population because of the role it had in the renewal of the war devastated social resources and in the modernization processes induced by speedy socioeconomic development. With time, different theories about youth have appeared and have been empirically tested, and each of them has enriched the knowledge about this specific population group. A systematic overview of existing theoretic and empirical findings can, hence, be summarized in an extensive definition that the “young are a social group sprung from the industrial society, including the population aged 15 to 30, to which society, independent of its psychophysical maturity and socio-cultural stratification, attributes common specific social characteristics, based on which it determines its special social role and subjugates it to special social treatment, the consequence of which is the marginal social status of youth compared to the older population” (Ilišin, 1999:69).

In their approach to youth, two mutually complementary traditions are recognizable (Griffin, 1993; Roche, Tucker, 1997; Ule, 2000; Schizzerotto, Gasperoni, 2001). One sees youth as a resource, which means that the young are seen as representatives of a desirable future, the carriers of dominant social values transferred from one generation to another, as well as a potential source of innovation and a vital social asset and a segment of the population that needs

to be provided with the optimal social conditions for development. In this context, the young are observed both as a future social strength and as an important social resource in the present. In other words, the social importance of youth comes from its potential that should be activated immediately, without delay for the future. Aside from that, the constant reduction of the demographic share of the young in the populations of developed countries suggests that they should be, or soon will need to be, treated as a relatively rare resource. The second tradition sees youth as a problem (that is, a source of problems and/or a group that experiences problems), meaning that it is looked upon as a population in a sensitive stage of development, thus prone to different forms of deviant behavior, that is still not satisfyingly integrated into the given society and that the same society should protect. This viewpoint is often linked to a negative public image about youth and the mistrust of the society toward the young generation. The consequences are reflected in the marginalized social status of youth and the paternalistic relationship of the society toward it. Both approaches exist today, and the prevailing approach in a given moment depends not so much on the youth, but on the dynamics of social events and changes. It is indicative that the approach to youth as a resource is emphasized more in periods of social stability and economic progress, while the opinion about youth as a problem is more pronounced in socially unstable conditions accompanied by economic stagnation or decay. Still, independent of the prevailing approach, the common goal of all modern societies is the adequate social integration of youth, for whom

adequate social conditions should be provided (Furlong, Guidikova, 2001). To put it differently, the development of existing capacities of youth should be stimulated in unstable times marked by fast change as well, because “as always, it is the task of youth to create history, present and future, and it is a social obligation to give to youth sufficient resources and ensure an adequate basis for the fulfillment of that task” (Youniss and others, 2002: 121).

Young people are a very vulnerable segment of the population for a number of reasons, and changes taking place in the modern world, almost always and everywhere, before and more than others, seem to affect youth. The basic reason for this is that most young people are at a crossroads between the protected world of childhood and the competitive world of adulthood that expects from them adequate integration by taking over permanent social roles. However, this integration – today, and in the second half of the 20th century – is a complex process, in which the young often distance themselves from the society which, due to their vulnerability and specific living experience, they see as not friendly enough (Furlong, Cartmel, 1997). The ever longer duration of institutionalized education, the uncertain opportunities for employment (especially in safe and well paid jobs), the difficult socioeconomic emancipation and the delay in founding their own families are the characteristics of the phenomena known as prolonged youth (Ule, 1987; Griffin, 1993; Cavalli, Galland, 1995; Roche, Tucker, 1997; Brown, Larson, Saraswathi, 2002). Prolonged youth logically results in slow social integration and keeps the young in a dependant position toward society, and adults.

At the same time, modern society is rapidly changing, making it a risky place to grow up in and an environment where patterns of the view of youth as a stage in life that serves as a transition into adulthood are changing (Beck, 1992; Furlong, Cartmel, 1997; Ingelhart, 1997; Roche, Tucker, 1997; Wyn, White, 1997; Kipke, 1999; Miles, 2000; Mortimer, Larson, 2002). Globalization particularly contributes to these far-reaching changes, followed by the rapid development of the information-communication technology, economic changes, increased population migrations, which include increased risk and pressure for modernization, and reduces and transforms the existing forms of social reproduction (Larson, 2002; Youniss and others 2002; Ruddick, 2003). The global sources of risk – not just for youth – are the pollution of the environment, the instability caused by political crises and military conflicts, the crumbling of the bipolar world (the socialist vs. the capitalist bloc) with the constant deepening of the gap between the rich and poor parts of the world. (Ule, 2000; Ruddick, 2003). The modernization processes in the contemporary world contribute to the weakening of traditional ties and manners of transferring values and behavioral patterns from generation to generation, where the young are forced to search for

identity and individual strategies of social integration in a more difficult way (Giddens, 1991; Ingelhart, 1997; Wyn, Dwyer, 1999; Ule, 2000).

The risks the young are exposed to in a modern society are additionally expanded and deepened in transitional societies – both in comparison to youth from developed countries and to the earlier generations of youth in the socialist society. Growing up in this unique socio-historic period is marked by a double transition: first, the young pass through a universal transitional period from youth into adulthood and second, this process is taking place in a society that is itself in a process of social transformation. The socialization of youth is happening in conditions when institutions, processes and social norms that directed the transfer into the world of adults are gone, or are being fundamentally changed themselves. Even though it is thought that the young are “the natural winners of transition” (Young People..., 2000: 12), because they are more susceptible and better equipped for accepting changes brought about by social transformation – the existing analytic insights have shown that the young are still more prone to new and greater risks than to new and better perspectives. Thus it has been demonstrated that poverty is expanding and social differences are deepening, and the state and social support for social reproduction and promotion is decreasing; competition on the labor market is being reduced, unlike the permanently high rates of unemployment of the young; social insecurity is growing, including the increase of the crime rate and of different forms of deviant behavior; health protection is becoming less available even though the exposure to different forms of risky behavior is increasing; competition and pressure for achieving high levels of education are also increasing with the simultaneous reduction in the educational chances of youth from socially deprived classes; the previous social values depreciated, which is why the inter-generational transfer is losing its importance; the new values are being established and internalized too slowly, so the young are left to search individually for identity and integrity and to manage in choosing their goals in life (Wallace, Kovatcheva, 1998; Tomusk, 2000; Ule, 2000; Young People..., 2000; Kovatcheva, 2001; Roberts, 2003).

It is exactly the experiences and research into the social status and problems of youth in transitional countries that, according to K. Roberts (2003: 484) demand a reaffirmation of the traditional (conventional) paradigm of youth in sociology that investigates the link between social origin, orientations and goals of youth. The transitional societies have shown that the life opportunities of youth are not created primarily individually. In other words, individual life choices occur within an existing social structure and are limited by the accessibility of the necessary resources (Cote, 2002). An insight into the given structures, above all into the socioeconomic and socio-class dimensions, is a necessary foundation for the analysis of the cultural dimension of the lives of

youth, such as values, leisure, consumer behavior, sub-cultural patterns and lifestyles (Wyn, White, 1997; Miles, 1998; Wyn, Dwyer, 1999; Roberts, 2003). To put it shortly, great social changes in all post-socialist societies have clearly demonstrated that the achievements of youth and its future social status are predominantly caused by the starting positions that are, in turn, a consequence of existing socioeconomic and socio-structural reality.

The changes occurring in the process of globalization and, recently, transition, do not, however, impact only the young. This is a global and epochal experience the young share with adults that to a certain degree contributes to the erasure of inter-generational differences. After the rapturous social turmoil of the 1960s it was noticed that the gap between the young and the adults/older has started to narrow (Keniston, 1971), while modernization strengthened to a degree the social position of youth, thus alleviating the differences in the generational distribution of power (Eisenstadt, 1992; Ule, 2000; Ruddick, 2003). In the preceding decades the young profited from the lengthening of education, because it helps them prepare for adequate social integration and increases their chances for a higher social status later on; the specific knowledge that youth has more of, especially in the field of new technologies, increases their competitive abilities on the labor market; due to the rapid changes adults have become less important in the transfer of knowledge and tradition onto the new generations, and the new lifestyles promoted by the young influence in part the transformation of adult living patterns. These changes in the relationship between the young and the old question the economic, political and cultural monopoly of adults (Ule, 2000:23), but do not abolish it, nor does it seem that such an ambition exists. Namely, after one generation of youth shook the existing order and power relations, more pragmatic generations came onto the scene. As S. Eisenstadt (1992) explains, even though they are critical toward the modern society, the young are not interested in conflicts with the centers of power and in radical changes. It would seem that the resistance towards adults is weakening, as is the generational homogenization of youth, and the author believes that inter-generational association and solidarity are gaining in strength. This can certainly be supplemented by the fact that the circumstances in transitional countries, including Croatia, do not stimulate intra-generational linking. It is just that the new competition circumstances and the socio-structural changes encourage choosing individual strategies for achieving better social positions. The existing channel of social promotions can be used less and less for this purpose, because social support is inadequate, and family resources, that is, the socio-class defined opportunities and limitations, become more significant. The stated thoughts about youth in modern societies in general, and in transitional countries in particular, are the framework within which we observe today's generation of youth in Croatia. Here, research into the social characteristics of contemporary

Croatian youth aims at gaining insight into their readiness for integration into a developed European environment, that is, how they correspond to youth in the European Union in status, attitudes, values and behavioral patterns.

3. Research methodology and sample structure

Research goals

The subject of this research are the social attributes, attitudes and behavioral patterns of Croatian youth and their relationship toward European values, institutions and the process of integration. Within the research subject defined in this way, comparative analysis is conducted on two levels: a comparison of two generations of youth, and of youth and adults.

In line with that, five general research goals have been set:

1. to determine, describe and analyze the social attributes, problems, values and forms of behavior of the contemporary Croatian youth,
2. to determine, describe and analyze the relationship of youth toward European values, institutions and integration process,
3. to determine, describe and interpret the connection of the researched dimensions with the social attributes of youth,
4. to determine, describe and interpret the changes that have taken place in the researched dimensions in the population of youth from 1999 to 2004,
5. to determine, describe and interpret the similarities and differences between the young and adults in all the researched dimensions.

The stated general research goals have been elaborated into a larger number of specific goals and hypotheses in each particular portion of this research project.

Questionnaire

The instrument for gathering empirical data was construed as a structured survey with questions of the closed type, in the form of nominal and interval scales. The questionnaire covers a relatively large number of indicators that were operationalized into sets of variables that detect:

- the socio-demographic, socio-structural and socio-cultural characteristics of participants,
- the perception of certain social phenomena and problems and the means for their solving,
- the perception of problems and potential of youth,

- the reasons for satisfaction and dissatisfaction with different areas of life and the perception of future,
- forms of behavior in certain areas of everyday life (use of new technologies, leisure time, interpersonal communication, use of psycho-active substances),
- the value orientations, personality traits and social distance,
- the perception of importance and protection of human rights and freedoms,
- national cohesion and distance,
- democratic values and political attitudes and participation,
- the perception of different dimensions of European integration and expectations from Croatian accession into the European Union,
- knowledge and information about European integration and institutions.

This study uses the part of the applied questionnaire dealing with the social characteristics of youth, the perception of certain social phenomena and problems and ways of solving them, democratic values and political attitudes and participation, human rights and freedoms, national cohesion, the different dimensions of European integration, expectations from Croatian accession to the EU, and knowledge and information about European integration and institutions.

The questionnaire has been doubly adjusted to the demands of comparative analysis. First of all, over half the variables are in content and formally identical to the variables applied in the research of youth in 1999, and most other variables were conceived in such a manner to enable a comparison with other, mostly European, research. Second of all, an identical instrument was used for researching the young and the adults, that is, only three questions have different contents, due to the adaptation to the specifics of the population being surveyed.

The gathering of field data lasted from the beginning of February to the end of March 2004. The surveying was done in the participants' homes, and the questionnaire application was individual. After receiving instructions from the surveyor, each participant autonomously filled out the questionnaire, which lasted about an hour on average. Good cooperation by the participants was ensured, so that the proportion of those not answering certain questions does not exceed 5%. However, we must note here that the youth in 2004 demonstrated a lower level of readiness to participate in the survey than was the case five years earlier. According to the surveyors' estimate, it is becoming more difficult to persuade citizens – the young and the adults – to spare some of their time to fill out a questionnaire. Some of those refusing to cooperate, especially in larger cities, stated that they were saturated by constant questioning of their opinion on different issues, which sounds convincing considering the boom of different

research agencies, whether they be public opinion agencies, or those in the field of marketing. Another group of citizens is resigned and does not wish to participate in anything; unless concrete personal gain can be recognized, that is, calling upon a higher social interest causes cynical remarks that there is no use from research insights, because those in power do not care what citizens think anyway.

If these trends continue, it will become increasingly hard to conduct empirical research in Croatia, regardless if it is scientific or of some other nature. This is not encouraging for the researchers, or for the creators of social decisions, at the same time when changes in the public opinion of a country that aspires to join the integrated Europe should be followed more often and increasingly seriously.

Sample

This research used two samples: the basic sample of youth, comprising 2000 participants, and a control sample of adults, including 1000 participants. The sample of youth includes the population from age 15 to age 29, and the sample of adults the population older than 30 years of age. Before we explain the construction of the sample, we must indicate that according to the 2001 census, there were 903,000 young persons in Croatia, representing 20.6% of the total population. Demographic research has already demonstrated that in the modern society “the young population is decreasing both in absolute and in relative numbers” (Oliveira-Roca, 1993). This has been happening in Croatia as well, ever since 1953, when the proportion of youth was 27.7%, and each successive census has noted a decrease in the share of the young population.

Both samples were constructed as a three-phased probabilistic sample of persons fitting the given age segments of the population, and they were chosen by the same method and realized at the same surveying locations.

In the first stage the choice of 250 locations for surveying was made, with each location having 12 young and 6 adult participants (planned). The choice of location was made through systematic choice from a list of settlements in the Republic of Croatia, listed by counties and settlement size. The probability of choosing a particular settlement as the possible location for field work was proportional to the number of its inhabitants, with the possibility that the same location may be picked out again. This achieved a satisfying spatial arrangement and an adequate relation between the urban and rural populations. In the second stage, housing units where the surveys would be conducted, were picked in each of the locations. The choice was made from a list of telephone subscriptions by random choice without return. The third stage consisted of choosing a single participant within a chosen household. From the persons living in the household

in the given age category, one person was picked through a random choice method by Trolldahl and Carter (1964), thus achieving a balance by age and gender. The balancing of the sample of youth and the sample of adults was achieved by surveying a young person in the first two households, and then an adult in the following household. This sequence was repeated until the quota was filled for the given sampling location.

Through additional weighting, a correction of the covered sample of youth was made due to disproportions occurring, regarding the age segment and gender, which was a consequence of the unequal availability of all groups of participants to the surveyors.

As is visible from the description of the sample construction¹, the surveying was conducted in all the counties and the City of Zagreb. To be more precise, the research was conducted in a total of 175 settlements: 56 towns (four macro-regional centers and 52 other towns) and 119 rural habitats.

More detailed information on the structure of the realized samples is given in Table 1. It portrays those socio-demographic, socio-structural and socio-cultural attributes of the participant that will be used in further analysis as the so-called independent variables.

Before analyzing the most indicative tendencies that stand out from the inter-generational and intra-generational comparisons, it is necessary to explain several points in the sample structure portrayed. First, the nationality of the participants was not shown, because that attribute is not used in further analysis. The reason lies in the extreme national homogenization: among the young 94.9% (Croatian), and among the adults 93.1%. Among the other 10 registered nationalities, the most numerous is Serbian (1.8% in the sample of youth and 2.8% in the sample of adults), but that is not sufficient a number to make a valid calculation of the statistically significant differences. Second, the attribute of the participants' mothers' education was omitted – since there is a large relation to the father's level of education, we consider that it is sufficient to use the father's education level as one of the indicators of social origin. Third, some of the attributes have been presented in summarized form (adjusted to further analysis). So, the grouping of the counties into six regions is explained here. Thus, the city of Zagreb was kept as a separate region (area), and the remaining five wider regions were composed in the following way: Northern Croatia (Zagreb, Krapina-Zagorje, Varaždin, Međimurje, Koprivnica-Križevci and Bjelovar-Bilogorje counties), Central Croatia (Sisak-Moslavina, Karlovac and Lika-Senj

¹ The sample was constructed and described by dr. sc. Ivan Rimac, a senior scientific associate at the Institute for social sciences Ivo Pilar from Zagreb.

counties), Istria and Primorje (Istria and Primorje-Gorje counties), Eastern Croatia (Virovitica-Podravina, Požega-Slavonija, Brod-Posavina, Osijek-Baranja and Vukovar-Srijem counties) and Dalmatia (Zadar, Šibenik-Knin, Split-Dalmatia and Dubrovnik-Neretva counties).

The summarization was done for the party preference variable as well. The participants settled on 18 political parties in total, but for further analysis only the 5 parties preferred by at least 5% of the participants are used. The final list of parties in the variable of party preference/party identification is as follows: HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union), HNS (Croatian People's Party), HSP (Croatian Rights Party), HSS (Croatian Peasant Party), SDP (Socio-Democratic Party) and undecided.

The comparison of the structure of samples of youth and adults points to some significant tendencies. Before we touch upon these, we should mention that, of course, there are no differences regarding gender, place of residence and regional affiliation, because those were the attributes used to stratify the samples. There are no inter-generational differences when it comes to religious self-identification either, which is an indicator of the process of de-secularization and retraditionalization, that has revoked the previously existing differences between the young (as less religious) and adults.

On the other hand, the differences regarding age, marital and socio-professional status of the youth and the adults are logical. A calculation indicates that the average age of the basic sample is 23.02, and of the control sample – 50.05 years of age. Thus, it seems that the average age of the participants in the control sample is probably a little higher than would be the average age of the parents of the young participants, but the difference is not such that they could not be considered as representatives of the generation of parents. Aside from that, it should be mentioned that farmers (there are 0.9% of them among the young, and 3.5% of them among the adults) have been added to the contingent of employed, and that in the sample of adults the housewives (4.4%) were put into the category of unemployed persons. But, it is indicative that the share of unemployment is identical among the young and the adults, as well as that there are more retired persons in the adult sample than there is population that is older than 60. This data confirms the well known consequences of the relatively numerous bankruptcies that resulted in the lay-off of workers, and the mass premature retirement of the surplus of workers. In this, two fifths of those who are single among the adults are not married, or have never been married, and one fifth are divorced.

Table 1: The structure of the basic (youth) and the control sample (adults) – (%)

Attributes of participants	Youth	Adults
<i>Gender</i>		
Female	49.1	51.5
Male	50.9	48.5
<i>Age</i>		
15 – 19 years	33.2	–
20 – 24 years	34.0	–
25 – 29 years	32.8	–
30 – 39 years	–	27.6
40 – 49 years	–	28.7
50 – 59 years	–	21.0
60 and more years	–	22.7
<i>Socio-professional status</i>		
Employed	35.5	50.1
Unemployed	20.8	20.6
Pupils	22.8	–
Students	20.9	–
Retired	–	29.3
<i>Father's level of education (qualifications)</i>		
(Un)finished elementary school	19.0	54.9
Vocational school	29.1	19.8
High school	30.6	16.2
Junior college, university and higher	21.3	9.1
<i>Participant's level of education (qualifications)</i>		
(Un)finished elementary school	27.0	18.8
Vocational school	17.7	20.4
High school	43.8	36.0
Junior college, university and higher	11.5	24.7
<i>Place of birth</i>		
Village	43.3	58.0
Small town	30.4	22.4
Major city	11.3	9.1
Zagreb	15.0	10.4
<i>Place of habitat (residential status, type of habitat, domicile)</i>		
Village	43.3	42.9
Small town	29.3	29.8
Major city	10.1	10.3
Zagreb	17.4	17.0
<i>Regional status</i>		
Northern Croatia	22.8	22.8
Central Croatia	8.6	8.4
Istria and Primorje	12.2	12.0
Eastern Croatia	19.2	19.6
Dalmatia	19.7	19.6
Zagreb	17.6	17.6
<i>Marital status</i>		
Not married	80.8	24.6
Married	19.2	75.4
<i>Religiosity (religious self-identification)</i>		
Religious	73.6	75.8
Undecided	16.2	12.3
Not religious	10.2	11.9
<i>Party affiliation</i>		
HDZ	27.1	35.1
HNS	7.6	8.3
HSP	7.3	4.6
HSS	5.1	6.4
SDP	14.2	12.0
Undecided	38.8	33.6
N (number of participants)	2000	1000

The differences between the young and adults that testify to important trends have to do with the educational status of the participants and their fathers and the place of birth. It is visible that the fathers of young participants are on average more educated than their children, which is primarily a consequence of the age difference: there are over one fifth of those still in high school and two thirds of those that could not have graduated from the university among the young, meaning that the educational differences between the young and their fathers will be clearly defined only once they approach the age of 30. However, the comparison of the level of education of the fathers of the young and the adult participants is an indication of the real situation in Croatia (Ilišin, Mendeš, Potočnik, 2003:63), that is, that each new generation is on average more educated than the previous one. Based on that, we can assume that today's generation of youth will at the end of its education become averagely more educated than the generation of their fathers, and especially grandfathers. However, it should be pointed that the educational structure of the adult participant varies from the official statistical information (Ilišin, Mendeš, Potočnik, 2003:62), in the sense of overrepresentation of participants with university degrees, and under representation of participants with no qualifications. This warping of the sample is very common in empirical research in Croatia, as a consequence of the well-known fact that the less educated citizens are less prepared to cooperate in surveys. It is certain that such a selected sample of adults affected the research results obtained (to the degree where education affects the attitudes and behavioral patterns), most probably in the direction of convergence with the attitudes of youth. This way the possible inter-generational differences are probably mitigated, but the tendencies pointing to inter-generational similarities and differences are not changed significantly. The adults are noticeably more often of a rural provenience, a testimony to past processes of urbanization and modernization. Considering the relatively large share of rural population in the total population of Croatia, and compared to developed European countries, where that population makes up 5-10% of the total population, we can assume that these processes will continue – whether by the migration of the rural population into urban environment, or by the more intense urbanization and modernization of rural areas.

The mutual comparison of the observed attributes on the basic sample (the young) has also resulted in insights into interesting tendencies, and it is at the same time useful for explaining the differences that appear under the influence of particular attributes. Here we will only mention the most important trends. When it comes to the young, there is a great interdependence of age, level of education and socio-professional status. Thus a comparison of the age and level of education of the examinees ($\chi^2=1036.09$) indicates that out of all the young that only have primary education, 16.0% of them are older than 19 (probably indicating that a good number of those will never achieve any qualification),

while 76% of those having some university education are also older than 25. Or, to put it differently, in the youngest age cohort, two thirds have only finished primary education, and the same number in the 20-24 age cohort have completed high school qualifications. The most interesting here are certainly those older than 25, 8.8% of whom have no qualifications, 22.4% have vocational education, and 42.2% have a four year high school education, while 26.5% have graduated from college or university. This oldest group of youth is the most reliable indicator of educational tendencies among the young, and it is obvious that the number of those that remain unqualified is decreasing while the number of highly educated ones is increasing (there would probably be more of them if the efficiency of studying was better). When age is compared to the socio-professional status of youth, completely expected results are again yielded ($\chi^2=1395.10$): among pupils 98.5% are younger than 19; 63.9% are aged 20 to 24 (14.1% of them are in the oldest age cohort); two fifths of those unemployed are either in high school or in the oldest age cohort of youth; while two thirds of employed youth are older than 25, and one third is in the middle age cohort. Seen from the other side, among the participants younger than 19, pupils are dominant (67.7%); among those older than 25, the employed are dominant (64.2%); and the middle age cohort consists of students (39.2%), employed (36.4%) and unemployed (23.5%). The greatest relation is registered in the comparison of the level of education with the socio-professional status of the young ($\chi^2=1930.10$). Certainly, a large majority (80.8%) of those without qualification are among the pupils, just as a similar number of those with a university education (75.7%) are in the employed category, and among the employed there are also 53.8% of those with vocational degrees. Since the employed and the unemployed youth have already finished their education, it is useful to compare them in particular. Thus the educational structure of the employed indicates that there are 6.1% of those without qualifications, 26.8% have vocational education and 42.7% have secondary school degrees, while 24.5% are highly educated. At the same time, among the unemployed, there are 14.4% of those without qualifications, 37.5% of those with vocational degrees, 39.2% high school graduates and 8.9% with university degrees. This data indicates that the educational structure of the employed is better than that of the unemployed, as well as that the most difficulties in getting employment are experienced by the young without qualifications and those with vocational qualifications. The trend of more difficult employment of the unqualified workforce has been going on for several decades, to be more specific since more powerful industrial development hit Croatia, demanding a qualified work force. At the same time, with the development of the tertiary sector the demand for industrial and crafts qualifications has decreased, but the demise of industrial production in Croatia must contribute to the more difficult employment of youth with such qualifications today. All these findings unambiguously indicate that

with the increase in age of the young participants, there is a linear increase in the level of their education and employment. Observed integrally, this data also suggest that the youngest participants who are predominantly pupils and have no qualifications, are on one pole, and the other belongs to the older age cohort of youth who are mostly employed and have a secondary or higher education (where over four fifths of those with university degrees are also employed and the oldest group of youth). This group – especially when it is accompanied by the urban population of youth with better social background – can be labeled with the syntagm of a socio-culturally more competent youth, which is to a considerable degree linked to the attitudes of youth. In any case, the specified correlations are permanent in the population of youth and should be considered when the results are being interpreted.

Certainly, there are correlations among other attributes of the young, and we will look at only some of them. First, education is still less accessible to youth from rural environments ($\chi^2=140.23$): for example, among the young living in villages 35.8% have finished high school, and 6.4% university, while there are 59.1% of young people with high school diplomas in Zagreb and 18.6% with a university level of education. Second, there is a tendency for reproduction of social status observed through a comparison of the education of participants and their fathers ($\chi^2=265.53$), and the socio-professional status of youth and the education of their fathers ($\chi^2=185.48$). Thus, 37.4% of youth with higher education have fathers with the same degree of education (and another 33.0% come from families where the father has secondary education), while 42.9% of youth finishing vocational schools has fathers with the identical level of qualification, and 38.0% have fathers without qualifications. At the same time, 35.2% students come from fathers with university education and 36.9% have fathers with high school qualifications, whilst the unemployed youth is of a predominantly lower social background (35.4% have fathers without qualifications and 29.8% have fathers with vocational degrees). Future research will show if, parallel with the social stratification of the Croatian society, the accessibility of educational resources and adequate employment will decrease for young persons from lower classes. Thirdly, the correlation of marital status with the age and gender of the participants indicates at the same time that there are both changes and the survival of tradition.

To put it shortly, the analysis of the structure of the sample of youth has confirmed that among them there are tendencies already confirmed in previous researches in the field of sociology of youth, that is, that they are slow in taking over the permanent social roles and that their present and future social status depends primarily on their social background and the structural characteristics of the society they live in.

Data analysis

The data analysis was conducted on the basic sample of youth (N=2000) and the control sample of adult participants (N=1000).

The following analysis and procedures have been used on variables prepared for statistical processing:

1. univariate analysis – determining the distribution of answers,
2. bivariate analysis – computing the significance of differences by using the χ^2 test,
– computing the significance of differences by applying variance analysis,
3. multivariate procedures – hierarchic factor analysis under the component model, to the number determined by the Kaiser-Guttman criterion and by applying the varimax rotation,
– multidimensional scaling.

The comparative analyses on data gathered in researches conducted in Croatia were conducted on two levels: between the young and adults in 2004, and between the generations of youth in 1999 and 2004. Data from 1999 was gathered as part of the research *The Value System of Youth and Social Changes in Croatia*² on an identically constructed sample of 1700 young people from the entire Croatian territory.

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² The research was conducted by the following research team at the Institute for social research in Zagreb: Furio Rađin (project manager), Branislava Baranović, Jadranka Goja, Vlasta Ilišin and Helena Štimac Radin.

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Damir Grubiša

POLITICAL AXIOLOGY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE GOALS AND VALUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

1. The process of European integration

The process of European integration has been going on for more than half a century, specifically, since 1951, when the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community was signed in Paris, or 1952, when this Treaty was ratified by the six founding-states and when the first common institutions of that community, headed by the High Authority – a predecessor of today's European Commission, were set up. The European Union today has 27 countries with more than 450 million inhabitants with territory that covers more than half of Europe, while its economic strength makes it the second economic power in the world, following the USA. Still, regardless of the fact that the European Union, along with its predecessors – the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, the European Economic Community and the European Community – is a unique phenomenon of economic, political and social integration, its citizens, that is, the citizens of its member-states, still do not completely understand or know the goals of this process, nor the values it is based upon.

Everyone agrees – the theorists of integration and the politicians taking part in these processes, as well as the public observing it – that this phenomenon is unique in known history, and that this process has brought about the creation of a new political community *sui generis* and a new understanding of politics. Namely, so far politics has always been related to the state, so it has been synonymous with running a state. With the appearance of the European Union, new experiences and new forms of politics were born, not exclusively linked to the existence of a state, but appearing as forms of human activity at supranational and international levels. Politics is no longer government, but becomes a much more fluid process of political administration at several levels (*multi-level governance*) and is articulated through a system of public policies, whose initiation, formulation, decision-making and implementation procedures are a result of cooperation, not only of state protagonists, but also of numerous protagonists of non-state provenience and with hybrid compositions.

In this way, the European Union really is a political construct, a political community *sui generis* with many attributes of a state, but is not a state itself; expressing many attributes of an international organization, but is not an international organization *sensu stricto*. It is not a federation either, even though it has many of the characteristics of classic federations; nor is it a confederation, even though, again, it shares some attributes with the classic confederative states. Finally, we can say that the European Union is a peculiar hybrid that may be defined as a *politeia sui generis*, which is approximately reflective of the consensus among the political theorists of European integration. As such, it is not simply a political system without a state, but is at the same time a grand laboratory and experiment in action, with new forms of political administration – *governance*, with new processes and, finally, with new institutions. All these elements of the political system (again, by analogy – *sui generis*), these being institutions, processes and protagonists, function in a value system that, at the same time, preceded the very beginning of the integration process, and also appears and is modified during this process. Hence, we are dealing with a dynamic construct, a product of political engineering in constant emergence and change, that generates a new political experience, new ideas and new goals, and constantly questions the values it is based on, developing new ideas and values, adjusting them to practice, as the practice itself is adjusted and realized in accordance with these values and political ideas. This is why the European Union is fertile soil for political theory and its research. At the same time, it is the subject of research by economic theory, legal theory and sociological theory. And within the framework of political theory, the process of European integration has passed through several phases, where this process, as a research subject, has moved from one discipline into another: it began its existence as irenology – the science of peace, in order to find its haven in the discipline of comparative politics via the theory of international relations.

However, with the evolution of European integration, its political axiology, that is, its political goals and values, evolved as well. Developing from a form of international cooperation into an economic, and then political community, the protagonists of the European integration process adopted and developed the values and goals of this common endeavor they had embarked on. These values were with time modified and took the shape of political ideas and political principles with normative and prescriptive meaning for those participating in the process, articulated into accepted political standards for the participants of the process and their creations. The common determination of goals – what is aimed at – resulted, thus, in the establishment of primarily economic, and finally, political standards, that have had a backlash effect on these goals, in order for the new goals to evoke the elaboration of new standards (Boniface, 2004).

2. The “educational deficit” in the process of European integration

As we have already mentioned, the process of European integration has been going on for more than half a century now, and it encompasses today most European states and societies, including almost half a billion people. Still, regardless how hard the protagonists of this process try to make it more real to the inhabitants of this political hybrid, and regardless of how much effort they put into making it more understandable and transparent to the citizens involved in the current processes, whether directly or through the institutions and processes in the member states, the fact remains that one of the greatest, critical problems of this politeia is that the average citizen still knows much too little about the goals and values of the European Union. Just as little is known about the processes, protagonists and institutions of this political system that is constantly being built, rebuilt and remodeled and that engages a significant amount of energy from the decision and policy-makers, the public, scientific world, the protagonists of legal and political engineering and the creation of ideas and other forms of human creativity. This became clear at the end of the second and the beginning of the third millennium, when, in line with the dominant *fin-de-siècle* optimism (that is, actually, a characteristic of all previous eras, but at the end of the 20th century it had particular strength due to the fact that Europe, it is believed, is free of the remains of both totalitarian ideologies – fascism and communism – which had tragic results and were the causes of World War II and then the Cold War) comes a somber assessment of the opportunities of the new century, and in this case, an entirely new millennium. It would seem that after the “dark twentieth century”, a period of wars, totalitarianism, destruction, the holocaust and destruction that history has never seen before, the historic Minerva’s owl lived to feel satisfaction in the victory of the ideas of peace, the overcoming of divisions, cooperation and solidarity among peoples and nations, all symbolized by the European Union, after the end of the old and the beginning of the new millennium. But the insufficient knowledge about this integration process, its institutions, protagonists and values gives us enough elements to claim that one of the acute problems and shortcomings of the European Union is not just the widely mentioned “democratic deficit”, but also a form of educational deficit. This educational deficit consists of a deficit of knowledge, as much as mere information about what is happening, which is why the European public reacts to many events within the European Union with prejudice and stereotypes.

Thus, at the end of 2000, in the regular survey by Eurobarometer, a biennial activity of Eurostat – the Statistical Office of the European Commission, European citizens were asked how much they believe they know and are familiar with the existing European Union, its policies, goals, values and institutions.

Eurobarometer is usually used by the European Commission in its planning activities, and the survey includes a test of knowledge of European citizens about how EU institutions work, as well as questions related to the accessibility of information and the familiarity of EU public policies. On this occasion the participants were asked to assess their own knowledge and level of information about the EU on a scale from 1 to 10, grade 10 meaning that they know something best or most, while 1 means that they know the least about a topic. And while 8% of citizens admit they know nothing about all these things, no less than 68% of participants graded themselves with a 5 or less, which resulted in an average grade of only 4.51. Only 7% of citizens graded themselves with an eight or more. This brings us to the point that three out of four citizens of the EU admit they are poorly acquainted with and inadequately understand the European Union and its policies, institutions, processes and values (Eurobarometer, 2001; comp. McCormick, 2002).

When we analyze the categories of the population with most knowledge about the European Union, we see that they are mostly those with a university education, especially managers, higher officials in state administration, journalists, lawyers, student and university teachers in three departments: political science, law and economy, while those that know the least are manual workers, the retired and persons with a lower level of education in general. The most educated, when it comes to the European Union, is the group of European citizens aged 25 to 54. But where the distribution of knowledge and familiarity with the European Union among the member states is concerned, the citizens of countries with a longer democratic tradition and culture seem to fare better, such as the Scandinavians, the Dutch, citizens of Luxemburg, Germany and Austria, while the citizens of Greece, Spain and Portugal have the lowest level of information, along with – completely atypical – the citizens of Great Britain, a country that in political theory is a prototype of a consolidated democracy. It is also a country with a strong tradition of island isolationism that, after the United Kingdom joined the European Community in 1973 became sporadic, and then systematic euroskepticism. At the beginning of the third millennium, that is to say, just before the greatest enlargement that brought eight transitional and two Mediterranean countries into the EU, according to the findings of Eurobarometer, one third of the citizens had never heard anything about the Council of Ministers or the European Court of Justice, and a fifth had never heard of the European Commission, the most important policy-making body of the EU, or the European Central Bank, the consequences of whose actions citizens see every day in their personal or household budgets. But there is worse yet: along with the immense ignorance about the political community that directly or indirectly forms 75% of its member states' public policies, the citizens of the EU firmly believe in stereotypes that have no real basis, even though it is somewhat

understandable why these stereotypes are present in the consciousness of European citizens. One third of Europeans think that the greatest item in the EU budget is the cost of its administration in Brussels, Luxemburg and Strasbourg, while facts tell us that the costs of this EU administration, that is the “Brussels bureaucracy” and its functioning take up only 5% of the budget, and that the main item of the European budget is actually its agricultural policy, accounting for 45% of the total budget. The lack of information and knowledge about the EU are, thus, intertwined with misconceptions and disinformation, resulting in a negative feeling toward the EU, its institutions and functions, thus feeding the citizens' repulsion toward this political construction seen as a sort of political labyrinth and bottomless pit, into which the contributions of European taxpayers and member states disappear. This is a significant aspect feeding euro-skepticism and euro-pessimism, so the strength of the rejection of integrative, political and economic engagement increases, and the European Union is distorted into an image of a Moloch that gobbles down the funds of the European citizens and, from its nimbus of nontransparent institutions and processes, imposes decisions with far-reaching negative consequences, criticized in the public through scandals, disclosed once in a while – from the corruption of the members of the European Commission to the squandering of enormous amounts of budget money.

This is, by no means, encouraging information, for it testifies to the real basis for the formation of animosity toward the European Union and, conditionally, for criticism and possible rejection of such a model that in the opinion of the population is wrongly portrayed as an abomination. This does not mean that the European Union has no institutional or functional weaknesses and that it is immune to the bureau-pathological syndrome, that is the ailment of all political systems, nor that it is resistant to the phenomenon of corruption, maladministration and malversations of all types. However, the simultaneous lack of democratic legitimacy of most institutions of the European Union and the limited sovereignty of the European Parliament, along with the misconceptions about the European Union, all increase the democratic deficit, which usually works in such a way that decisions are made within the narrow circle of the European elite – the Eurocrats and the tight environment of the national elite and political leaders that have access to the European decision-making chambers and mechanisms. Thus, the lack of information and education about the European Union, in spite of all the efforts undertaken by the European institutions to make their work more public and transparent, may detonate a long-term chain reaction and a domino-effect, in the form of rejection or deceleration of the further process of European integration, due to the fear of *eurocratism* as a new form of non-democratic government, lacking the necessary democratic legitimacy. At the same time, such superficial reactions have a negative influence on the European and national elite that keep closing up for the fear of this uninformed

public, which constructs a vicious circle, *circulus vitiosus*, whose utmost effect is the increased democratic deficit of the European Union.

This is why, based on the data about the lack of information and education of European citizens, which have been confirmed every other year since the millennium public opinion research by Eurobarometer, it is necessary to reconstruct the stages of the development of the European Union and determine the evolution of its goals and values, for a better understanding of the course and substance of the European integration process, without mystifications and beyond the stereotypes and mistaken perceptions that cloud the processes and institutions of European integration. In order to do this, it is necessary to start with a retrospective, from the first ideas and goals that determined the beginning and the first steps of the process of European integration.

3. The evolution of European integration and different formulations of goals and values of the process

The destruction during the First and especially the Second World War caused the political leaders of European nations not only to consider seriously, but actually to work on the elimination of the causes that led to the two world wars. Even after World War I, it was determined that one of the main causes for the breakout of this world-wide conflict was the nationalism of the European peoples, caused by the conception of the national state. The atrocities of the Second World War only confirmed this assessment of the national state being an intrinsic cause of conflicts between national, ethnic groups internally, which became open wars in the system of international relations. However, unlike World War I and the analysis of its causes, that in the circle of democratic politicians and thinkers produced the conclusion that the national state and the national state system inevitably lead to wars, during and after World War II this thought was supplemented by the atrocities of the Nazi-fascist regimes and their ideology. Thus, the first document that is a precedent of the European integration idea, the *Manifesto of Ventoten*, appearing in 1941 within the Italian resistance movement, authored by Altiero Spinelli (a charismatic Europeanist, a member of the European Commission from 1970 to 1976 and the father of the Treaty on European Union) and Giorgio Rosselli, who along with nationalism as a main cause of the world wars, stated that the causes are also fascism, racism and xenophobia. The *Manifesto of Ventoten*, which was the basis for the *Declaration on Europe* of the representatives of European resistance movements gathering in Geneva in 1944, thus determines a need for a new Europe which states the four historic “no-s”: no to fascism, no to nationalism, no to racism and no to xenophobia. The *Manifesto of Ventoten* is a document in which a negative definition is predominant, thus producing the need to create an entire system of

permanent peace in Europe, which would not come into existence while there are national states. The ultimate goal of the *Manifesto of Ventoten* is the creation of a European federation as a political entity that will overcome the existence of national states, the causes of each future war in Europe. The idea of a European federation was taken on by other politicians and theorists, such as Winston Churchill, who, in his speech of 1946 at the University of Zurich, promoted the idea of the need to create a United States of Europe as a counterpart to the United States of America. The ideas found in the *Manifesto of Ventoten* and, later on, at the congress of representatives of resistance movements from occupied Europe, were inevitably infused with the idea of not only a European federation, but socialistic thought about the creation of a just society, based, not on capital, but on labor (thus, as a recipient of these ideas, the first article of the Italian Constitution defines Italy as a “republic based on labor”), which were hence, unacceptable to the representatives of the European democratic establishment. The alternative to the antifascist and socialist idea about a European federation was the idea of a democratic federation of Europe with democratic institutions and a market economy. Churchill's idea of a European federation was also limited to continental Europe, that indeed, in his opinion, should have been brought into such a condition that new wars would not be caused again. This is why it was necessary for the European states to enter a democratic federation and to join each other in controlling the nations and territories wars are fought over, in order to realize some national interests. The federalist movement flourished after the war, and it was led by the author of the *Manifesto of Ventoten*, Altiero Spinelli. This brought about the first Congress of European Federalists, that in 1949 grew into the first European organization that emphasized peace-making in Europe as its main priority – the Council of Europe. The proliferation of the Cold War made European politicians elaborate the idea of a functional community as a framework for cooperation and safety in Europe, as opposed to the idea of a federation with socialist attributes and utopian elements, which would somberly and pragmatically direct the European nations and their leaders toward the need for cooperation, instead of conflict. Instead of the pompous projects and excitement over the federalist formula, the pragmatic politicians turned to satisfying certain concrete interests. Instead of uniting Europe from above, the European politicians chose a road for building a cooperation system from the bottom, starting with the basic need for reconstructing a devastated Europe. The plan, elaborated by Jean Monnet, a former vice-secretary of the League of Nations and the director of the French Planning Office, along with Robert Schumann, a French foreign relations minister, foresaw the construction of a new Europe through a mechanism of small steps, the first being the common disposition of the resources that nationalist wars are fought over, the control of strategic raw materials – coal and steel.

The seemingly more modest, low-profile approach of the French technocrats joined by the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, and the Italian Prime Minister, Alcide de Gasperi, was focused on the realization of peace – by other means. Peace in Europe should be achieved, first, through the process of peaceful reconstruction and joint control of strategic resources; second, the French and German nationalisms should thus lose their *raison d'être*, because France and Germany would be permanently pointed towards cooperation and joint exploitation of the sources of these strategic resources, which bring about control of one country over another; and, finally, thirdly, other European countries were invited to join this bilateral agreement, creating in such a way a bloc of democratic countries against the safety threat represented by Eastern Europe and the communist bloc. This was the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, as a loose system of cooperation that, in order to function, set up common institutions, which the founding countries empowered to decide for them, creating the embryos of the first supranational European institutions. This limited integration model was only the first step in the process that spilled over the limits set by its founders. This is why the first process, entering political theory, enriching it with new findings, was the *spillover process* (Dinan, 1999).

The goal of this first step of integration was peace, and the manner of achieving this peace was cooperation in a limited area, gradually progressing through the spillover process into other areas as well. Cooperation in the joint exploitation of natural resources gradually demanded agreements in other plans – the plan of limiting or elimination of customs, simplifying transportation conditions, harmonizing the decision-making process in national contexts, widening negotiations about problems arising on an everyday basis, along with the pressure of other protagonists to join the process.

The primary goal, thus, was the establishment of peace and elimination of the causes of war, so in terms of political science, the first to take up the topic of European integration was the discipline of irenology. The values expressed by the *Manifesto of Ventoten* (defined negatively), as antifascism, antinationalism, antiracism and anti-xenophobia, turned into democratic political values in the *Schumann Declaration*: peace, cooperation, solidarity. Aside from that, the founding fathers of the European institutions were linked by a common ideological demo-Christian *millieu*. Schumann and Monnet, as well as De Gasperi and Adenauer, embraced the ideas of Christian democracy and promoted them in their political worldview and practice. As Robert Schumann stated, the democratic idea he started from was closely linked to Christianity. Christian values, such as the equality of human beings, freedom, dignity of work, tolerance and standing up to totalitarianism, lie in the roots of the Christian conception of democracy. But democracy cannot be introduced from above, it must go through a ripening process in people's minds in order to come

alive in political practice. This is why this future European federation cannot be built according to a preconceived plan, it will, if it ever comes to life, be the result of small steps and attempts that will be verified as right in practice, and not in the minds and ideas of great men: "Europe will not be created all at once, or according to a unique, general plan. It will be constructed through real achievements that will first create a *de facto* solidarity" (Schumann, 2000).

This is how the process of European integration began, from its starting position of a mid-range theory and practice, as a limited experiment that might transform later, through its confirmation in reality, as it has done, into a more permanent and irreversible process.

The basic goals of this integration were expressed in the preamble of the *Paris Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community*. The main goal was to achieve peace in Europe and the world, and this peace could be preserved only by "creative efforts that are comparable to the dangers that endanger it (that is, peace)". Thus, the founding countries decided to replace old, long-lasting and centuries old rivalries by conciliating and linking their important interests. This will be accomplished, in the wording of a resolution, by constructing an economic community that will set the basis of a wider and deeper community among people, long divided by bloody conflicts. Along with that, the signing countries are decisive to set the base for institutions that will determine the direction of a common destiny, to be "shared by all from now on". The achievement of peace was, hence, set as the main goal. But the means for its realization and preservation come from satisfying the basic needs of the population: economic expansion, development, employment and the growth of the standard of living in the member states. The goal of the community is peace. But this peace cannot be realized without the development and satisfaction of the citizens' interests for a higher standard, as stated in the founding Treaty establishing the ECSC. The instrumentalization of this goal is not through the abrupt abolition of national states, but through a process of creation of supranational institutions as a counterbalance to the national state, a sort of *check-and-balance* system that ought to guarantee that European countries will not slip back into nationalism, a lawful product of the existence of the national state. At the same time, this amalgam of a utopian-pragmatic approach, aptly illustrated by Jean Monnet when stating that Europe (this new Europe, unlike the old Europe, torn apart by national antagonisms) will not be created now and in an instant, according to a previously conceived, rational general plan, but will be constructed through a number of real accomplishments, followed by the process of maturing of awareness of the new values this process needs to be supported by. These words, built into the *Schumann Declaration*, quite accurately predict the way the future European Community was to develop, and become the European Union we know today (Schumann, 2000).

Besides, this process is consistent with the political ideas about the open society which were formulated at the same time by Karl Popper, criticizing the utopian, abstract engineering characteristic of rational dogmatism, preferring a pragmatic, step-by-step engineering. “Plans for step-by-step engineering are relatively simple. These are plans for individual institutions... If they do not work, the damage is not that great, nor is their reconstruction that difficult. They are less risky, and thus less controversial. But if it is easier to achieve a reasonable consensus about the existing evil and the means of fighting it than about the ideal good and means for realizing it, then there is more hope that, using the step-by-step method, we can overcome the practical difficulties of all reasonable political reforms, that is, using reason, instead of passion and violence, in achieving goals. There will be a possibility of achieving a reasonable compromise and, hence, the realizing of improvement by democratic methods. 'Compromise' is an ugly word, but it is important to learn its correct use. Institutions are inevitably the result of compromise with circumstances, interests, etc.” (Popper, 1993).

This is exactly how the institutions of European integration were developed, step by step, following the feeling of trust achieved by success of the steps previously taken. Parallel to this process is the process of adoption and codification of the basic political values of the West European democracy. An important part of these values is embodied in the European Convention on Human Rights adopted by the Council of Europe in 1949. Even though these process are parallel in the first phase of integration – initiated within an international organization, such as the Council of Europe, and then in the European Coal and Steel Community as not an international organization, but an embryo of a future European Community – and there is no apparent contact and interaction between them, these processes will later, with the transformation of the European Community into the European Union, be poured into the single process of building a “Europe of values” (*l' Europe de valeurs*), that is, Europe based on human, economic and social values (Boniface, 2004).

The basic document of the ECSC outlines the strategy of widening and deepening this process. This strategy will become the main attribute of the process, synthesizing the aim of deepening integration, as well as enlarging to other protagonists – the national states in Europe not among the narrow circle of founding states. Thus, for example, Great Britain was invited to the discussions of the six initiators (France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries), but refused to join the circle due to its colonial interests and trans-Atlantic axis, with the most powerful ally in the world and its close partner, the USA.

But the process of European integration set on such a pragmatic base was not linear. The attempts to create a European Defense Community in 1952

failed, as well as the creation of the European Political Community in 1953, due to resistance by the member states. These experiments were seen as premature and met the resistance of the rigid advocates of national interests – in the first case, the resistance of France, scared of the possibility of Germany rearming, and in the second case, the resistance caused by the fear of national states losing political autonomy. The integrationists, those wanting to rush further steps, had to sober up and realize that Europe cannot be built by applying pressure, but that the process must be gradual and must not create a feeling of national endangerment in the member states. This is why Jean Monnet was disappointed enough to resign from the position of President of the ECSC High Authority, and retreat from politics. But the fly-wheel of integration was already in motion and could not be stopped. The member states became aware of the advantages of gradual integration and this form of regional cooperation, recognizing their own interests in this process. This is why Monnet's resignation enticed European politicians from second-line countries (namely, the France-Germany axis was key in starting the integration, because, finally, it was all about the common management of resources that were up to then under the exclusive sovereign authority of France and Germany) to take the torch in the phase of blockage caused by France, leading to a conference of foreign affairs' ministers of the ECSC countries in Messina, in 1955. This conference was where the agreement of re-launching the European idea was achieved, that is, basically, the plan of European integration devised by Monnet and Schumann, which might better be named an anti-plan, because in its character it was the opposite of visionary (Popper might say – utopian) plans of a united Europe. On the contrary, opposite the declaratory vision, the “pragmatic vision” of Monnet, Schumann and others sharing their opinions, was much more efficient.

However, this attempt to “re-launch Europe” had to be even more pragmatic and limited by its scope and planned achievements, in order not to repulse the European national states and their politicians that might become afraid of losing part of their power and control over the political processes in their own countries. In order for this not to happen and to avoid other possible obstructions, it was decided that leverage be put on the real area of economic life, the creation of a common market and the emphasis on the economic advantages from this process of European integration. This orientation led to the takeover of the initiative by Italy and Belgium – Italy as the host of the Messina conference and Belgium in the form of its foreign affairs minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, who was authorized by the Messina conference to propose an action plan for the renewal of the idea of a “European plan”. After one year of working on it, Spaak came out with a concrete proposal that led to the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. One of these treaties founded the European Atomic Energy Community that was to be a modernized version of the ECSC, because it was

based on the principles of the common exploitation of atomic energy modeled by the ECSC, that was limited to classical strategic resources, dominant in the first phase of the post-war economic development. The second treaty founded the European Economic Community, whose goal, over a twelve year period, was to contribute to the building of a European common market through gradual elimination of all restrictions to internal trade and the setup of common external customs on all goods coming into the area of the EEC's member states. This was to eliminate the barriers to the free movement of people, goods, capital and services, and action – a synonym for integration – was to be taken only in areas where there was consensus among the member states. This was seemingly the end of the conflict of ideas between the federalists and the functionalists. The federalists have retreated before the functionalists, who prevailed, but this prevalence was possible due to the introduction of another set of values – the economic values of the free market. This synthesis of the supranational institutional engineering and the simultaneous retention of the national state system, that constructs the supranational level with a constant compromise with the national level of politics, through the national states, thus introducing a new system of multi-level governance, was best characterized by Andrew Moravcsik (1998), creating the term “liberal intergovernmentalism”.

For a while European integration moved from the field of irenology and international relations into the field of economy. In the first phase of discussions and initiatives, the goal of irenology suited the philosophical approach to peace, expressed best by Kant in his concept of eternal peace through the creation of a world federation. This *pax philosophica*, since it was not real, was replaced by a more pragmatic approach that may be labeled as the concept of *pax oeconomica*. This period will finally transform, after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, into the age of *pax juridicae*, that should be definitely consolidated by the adoption, that is, ratification of the European Constitution.

But then, when the first cracks in the system dominated by the *pax oeconomica* occurred, an exit from the crisis needed to be found to strengthen it. The prevalence went to the new approach born in Messina and later labeled, according to Moravcsik, liberal intergovernmentalism. Along with the recognition and affirmation of the ideas of the liberal market with its four freedoms – the freedom of movement of people, goods, capital and services – the basic method of intergovernmental, intergovernmental decision-making is affirmed, thus counterbalancing the supranational institutions and mechanisms, because, without the counter-weights, they might sidetrack European integration into a federalist integration. And since the European states, or rather their national political elite, were determined to retain their prerogatives of government and power, a compromise was devised – a liberal European market and intergovernmental negotiations all the way to the point where the supranational way of decision-making starts to

endanger the reduced sovereign prerogatives of the national political class. Thus, liberal intergovernmentalism is still today considered the leading and valid political theory of European integration.

The Treaty establishing the Founding of the European Economic Community of 1957 put in the background the main goal of European integration, the achievement of peace. Peace slid into the seventh paragraph in the preamble of this document. Before peace as the goal of the European integration other, much more specific goals of this integration are numbered, suitable to the pragmatic turn toward the satisfaction of economic interests. The first goal of the European Economic Community is now to realize common actions that will, through the elimination of the barriers dividing Europe, ensure the economic and social progress of the member states. The second goal – or the essential goal, as the preamble of the document states – “the constant improvement of the living and employment conditions of the peoples of the member states”. As we can see, the population of the member states is still treated as “people”. The transformation of people into citizens will only take place in the Treaty on European Union (more popularly known as the Maastricht Treaty) of 1992. The third goal of this community is the realization of stability in economic expansion, a balance of exchange and loyalty of competition. The fourth goal is the harmonious development of the member states' economies that will take into account the decrease of disparity between different regions, reducing the falling behind of those at the low end. The fifth goal is the gradual reduction of restrictions in international trade, and the sixth is the realization of solidarity that links Europe to overseas countries and the declarative help in their development and prosperity. Peace is only in seventh position, which is completely in line with the “economic approach” promoted by Spaak's working material about the elimination of the lag in European integration (Verilli, 2004).

The Treaty on European Economic Community introduces the four market freedoms as political “values” in the fourth part: those are the freedom of movement of goods, the freedom of movement of people, services and capital, that become normative values, whose implementation is operationalized in the remainder of the Roman EEC Treaty.

A brief digression is called for here: as we can see, the sources from which the political axiology of the European Union, that is, European integration in the wider sense, is extrapolated, are mostly the preambles of the treaties on the founding of European Communities, or the European Union. An analysis of the preambles enables us, as in the case of an analysis of the preambles of classic constitutions, to determine those goals and values that infuse the entire constitutional act and which are operationalized in it through a system of institutions, procedures and through determining institutional protagonists. The preambles

represent, in the legal-political experience, an integral part of the constitutional act as its introduction, as a sort of incipit of the document explaining the bases and the deeper reasons and motivation for the act that they precede (Catannaro and Magnani, 2003; compare w. Pinelli, 2004). This is why both ideological options and philosophic-political ideas meet in the preambles with perceptive principles and hermeneutic criteria, together creating that *bloc de constitutionalité* without which the text of the individual articles is simply a technical norm. Thus, as Haberle puts it, in the preambles we recognize the formulation of values, historic-political goals, high ideas and motivational situations, as well as the institutional instruments that will be operationalized on the level of technical norms in the constitutional text itself (Haberle, 2002).

The implementation of the Treaties of Rome lasted for an entire thirty year period, long enough for the European citizens to invert the goals and values in their consciousness, thus giving prevalence to the perception that the basic purpose and goal of the European integration is the creation of a common market and that political action on the supra-state and interstate levels only follows the economy. Thanks to the successes in the gradual introduction of the common market, the European integration process managed to gain momentum, a new momentum and drive that overcame all the political reasons for the standstill. The project of eliminating barriers to trade, capital, services and labor turned out to be attractive to countries that had not joined the six founders of the ECSC in the first round. Insisting on the separation of the processes of enlargement and deepening, the EEC accommodated new members, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark in 1973. This group would have been joined by Norway if only its citizens had not refused to join the EEC. Associated membership in the EEC was requested by Sweden, Austria and Switzerland, and then Portugal, Spain and Malta. The EEC had, through the inversion of its priorities and goals, become a success story of international politics – even if it was slow and burdensome, it had a positive outcome. After the demise of the military dictatorship, the EEC was joined by Greece in 1981, and the post-fascist Spain and Portugal in 1986, thus increasing the European Community from the initial six countries to twelve member states. The enlargements in the 1980s resulted in political and economic consequences for the economic plan, the EEC became the largest economic bloc in the world. However, the joining of three undeveloped countries, compared to the existing member states, transformed the internal economic balance. The rerun of the Irish case was no longer possible, when the entire EEC supported the speedy development and reconstruction of the Irish economy, turning it into a country with the most dynamic development index in Europe. The regional and cohesion funds of the EEC were now divided between three users, meaning that these countries could not count on such a spectacular growth rate as Ireland, whose gross domestic product contained 5% financial

resources donated and invested by the EEC. Something similar now became practically impossible, but these three new members did still receive significant advantages in other areas; their recovery took longer, but it was still ensured by the EEC and its funds (Dinan, 1999).

Along with enlargement, a process of deepening was occurring, especially in the area of harmonizing the financial policies of the member states. A new initiative for creating a European Monetary System was launched, with the goal of introducing a common European currency. The creation of the Exchange Rate Mechanism created a zone of monetary stability and strengthened the European economy in comparison with the world markets. However, the attacks of inflation and unemployment, the actualization of the oil crisis, the transfer from the gold exchange rate to a fluid exchange and other economic de-balances, led European politicians to revive one of the main ideas of the Roman treaties, the realization of a unique market as a step further from a common market. However, the system of institutions serving the new EEC proved to be insufficient, demanding changes and adaptation to the new situation – an enlarged EEC. This signified the need for consideration of the reality of the spillover process and the creation of flexible institutions that have political, as well as economic prerogatives. In other words, the epilogue was the strengthening of supranational institutions with the parallel strengthening of the democratic decision-making structure. This is the reason why the EEC had to outgrow its initial framework imposed by economic pragmatism and embark into the field of political prerogatives and competences. This means that there was a need to return to the area of political ideas and values, which brought about the revival of old concepts about the “closer alliance of European countries”.

4. Political teleology in the process of European integration

The Single European Act of 1986 signified the transition back to politics. The European Economic Community grew in name into the European Community, recognition that European unity is no longer reduced to the economic sphere alone, but that it is spreading, slowly and gradually, into the political sphere. The Single European Act, which was ratified and came into power in 1987, confirmed the creation of the largest united market in the world. The business capability of the economic subjects was expanded to the territory of the entire Community, protectionism became punishable by law, while state and other monopolies were destroyed by the support for comprehensive market competition, by adopting harsh sanctions against violation of the rules of competitiveness. The institutions of the EC gained in strength in comparison with the institutions of the EEC: the Commission obtained new, wider jurisdiction in the field of environmental protection, scientific research, development

and regional policy. The judicial institutions of the EC strengthened, that is the European Court of Justice, and a First instance court was founded, that lifted the burden of the already overbooked European Court in Luxembourg, enabling it to put more energy into battling issues of violations of competitiveness and the unobstructed functioning of the market. The Single European Act gave more strength to the prerogatives of other European, supranational institutions: the European Council, known as the European Summit, was legalized as the highest decision-making body within the EC system. The Council of Ministers of the EC gained new responsibility concerning European Political Coordination, that is, the coordination of the foreign policies of the member states; finally, the European Parliament also obtained greater jurisdiction and moved from the level of consultation to a higher level of cooperation when it comes to decision-making forms. It still lacked a decisive role, but it had a strengthened status regarding other European institutions. Economic and monetary unity became a key formula that replaced the formula of “economic and monetary collectiveness” (Verilli, 2004).

This new situation reflected the political optimism among the EC members. This again had an influence regarding the reformulation of the main goals and values of European integration. In the preamble of the Single European Act, the member states expressed their decisiveness to work together on promoting democracy, the basis of fundamental rights recognized in the constitutions and rights of the member states, in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Social Charter, namely, based on the principles of freedom, equality and social justice. The original goal of European countries from the late forties and early 1950s – international peace and security – came back with a grand entrance.

The EC member states are aware, the preamble says, of the responsibility Europe has to promote the principles of democracy and the respect for law and human rights they are attached to, so that together they might themselves contribute to the preservation of international peace and security.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe signified a new phase of eurooptimism and euroenthusiasm. It seemed that the original goals of the European Union were nearing their realization, that peace in the continent was a done deal and that democracy and the rule of law and human rights had won, spreading a territory of freedom to the Eastern part of the continent. This euphoric optimism from the late 1980s is best reflected in the title of the book, written by Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History*. Only then, fifteen years or so after this epitome of the period was created, would a counter thesis appear in the form of the title by Joschka Fischer, one of the greatest advocates of the neo-federalist idea of Europe – *The Return of History*.

Out of this optimism arose the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, which turned European integration from an economic into a definitely political integration, a complex political system of multi-level governance with a conspicuous political ambition of uniting Europe in a political sense. The Treaty on European Union, as it was named, sets up a new architecture of Europe based on three pillars, and the entire construction of Europe is graphically portrayed as an ancient temple. The imagery of ancient democracy was conjured up intentionally, and the three pillars holding the roof of the temple are three areas sharing different types of competences between them. The first pillar consists of the three preceding communities – the Coal and Steel Community, the Atomic Energy Community and the European Community, that was a derivation of the European Economic Community. The first pillar is expressly supranational and decisions within it are made in supranational institutions, through a complex procedure of agreement, compromise and voting by a qualified majority. The second pillar consists of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the principles of intergovernmental cooperation and decision-making apply to it just as they do to the third pillar, which comprises internal policy and the judiciary. The ultimate responsibility for decisions made under the jurisdiction of the second and third pillars lies with the member states. The Maastricht Treaty also defined the schedule for introducing a common European currency, and expanded the areas of public policies to consumer protection, public health, transportation, education and training and social policy (with the exception of the United Kingdom). Under the guise of the third pillar, intergovernmental cooperation in issues of immigration and asylum was increased, and a common policing agency was created, Europol, in order to fight organized crime and the drugs trade. A new Board of Regions was created, and the regional funds for support for the poorer countries in the EU were increased. Maastricht launched a new concept of European citizenship: citizens of member states automatically become citizens of the European Union and have civil rights in all parts of the EU, as well as the right to participate in elections in their country of residence. The jurisdiction of the European Parliament expanded and the codecision procedure was deepened, increasing the role of the Parliament and giving it the possibility for a third reading of legal propositions before they are adopted by the Council of Ministers (Verilli, 2004).

The Treaty on European Union confirms the orientation and commitment of the Union to the principles of freedom, democracy and respect for human rights and basic freedoms, as well as the legal state. The orientation toward legal state principles was introduced for the first time, which is understandable due to the pressure from the new democracies in Eastern Europe to become EU member states. The emphasis on the legal state was to have its epilogue in the criteria for membership of new applicants, adopted at the EU Summit in

Copenhagen in 1993. They are the political, economic, legal and, administrative criteria adopted later on, at the Madrid Summit.

Along with these general principles in its constitutive treaty, the new entity, the European Union, is oriented toward the further development of democracy and the democratic functioning of political institutions in the member states, as well as the Union as a whole. The economic goals were reduced to the convergence of the member states' economies, whose best expression is the common currency, as well as to the emphasis on sustainable development, social and economic cohesion. Regarding social cohesion, this time the preamble mentions the European Social Charter, and the EC Charter of fundamental social rights of workers from 1989. This way the social elements corrected the perception of a liberal economy, which is why the EEC and EC were under the attack of criticism expressed by social constructivists over the years. The express mentioning of social rights and the related charters directed the new EU toward a model of a *social politeia* (since we cannot in this case discuss a social/welfare state, because there is no state).

Peace and security in this document were relegated to the boundaries of the common foreign and security policy, not because this is a less significant goal, but because the threats to peace have decreased in a Europe where the barriers between the East and West have disappeared. The political agenda changes with the times, and this is most visible in the hierarchy of goals of European integration and the changes it went through. In the Treaty on European Union, creating a political, not just an economic community, these goals already start from the general principles of human rights, democracy, basic freedoms and the legal state, only to enumerate the economic goals regarding welfare, development and progress. This Treaty, as the first article announces, signifies a new stage of an ever closer Union between the people of Europe, where decisions are made as transparently as possible, and as close to the citizens as possible, meaning at lower levels of power, in line with the newly established principle of subsidiarity. Thus Article 6 of the Maastricht Treaty repeats that the bases of the Union are the principles of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and basic freedoms and the principles of the legal state, common to all the member states.

With the Amsterdam Treaty from 1997 (ratified in 1999), also known as Maastricht II, the European Union undertook the first revision of the preceding Treaty on European Union, in order to adjust the European Union to the ever more skeptical and apathy-ridden citizens that saw Maastricht I as a step toward political union, but this document and its complexity and technical lingo already caused a first reaction in the form of an education and information deficit. The Treaty on EU was already a more complex constitutional document *ante litteram* than all the other treaties about the economic community, so it may be claimed

that its constitutional complexity contributed to the increase of the education deficit. Aside from that, the manner in which the entire work was nomotechnically executed was perplexing and nontransparent, because all the previous treaties remained in power, and their texts have been changed or amended, so in order to decipher them one needed the help of specialized conversion tables – which certainly did not contribute to the greater legibility and transparency of the texts, nor the transparency of the institutions Maastricht I was in favor of. In the preamble of the Amsterdam Treaty the first line accents the “important goal” in the form of the continual improvement of the living and working conditions of the population, confirms the solidarity that links Europe and the overseas territories and, as a goal, determines their development and prosperity. Article 2 determines in more detail the task of promoting the harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment and social protection, equality between men and women, a high degree of competitiveness and the convergence of economic performances, a high level of protection and improvement in the quality of the environment, the increase in standards and quality of life, and the economic and social cohesion among the member states.

Here, for the first time and on a number of occasions, the obligation of protecting the environment as a priority was highlighted, as it must be integrated into the public policies and activities of the European Union as an integral part of the concept of sustainable development. This is where and when the stage is once again taken by the set of values from the box of initial ideas of European integration: the Treaty expressly mentioned, again in the form of priorities, the fight against discrimination based on gender, racial or ethnic background, religion or opinion, age or sexual orientation. From this process a more sophisticated Europe seems to be emerging, based on a pluralism of values and turned toward the realization of multiple goals, in line with the increasing and changing needs and priorities, that is, preferences of its citizens (Moeller, 2004).

The 2001 Nice Treaty was mainly meant, as its preamble states, to prepare the European Union for the major enlargement that was to occur in 2004. In order for the European Union to adjust to the entrance of the new members – 12 candidates – the change and adjustment of its institutions was necessary: the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, the Board of Regions and the Economic and Social Board. The institutional reforms also included the European Court of Justice and decision-making mechanisms at all levels. The system of voting with a qualified majority was altered to absorb the new division of votes, but it was at the same time done so that the precarious balance in favor of the smaller countries was corrected to a new balance, that returns part of the lost importance and weight to the large countries, as was outlined and realized by the Maastricht Treaty. The Nice

Treaty additionally complicated the constitutional configuration of the EU, so it is not surprising that the voters in Ireland refused to ratify this treaty at the referendum, and only accepted it at the re-sit of the repeated referendum. As for the goals and values of the EU, they were not an issue in this treaty, but what happened parallel to the events surrounding the adoption of the Treaty is important.

Also in Nice, but a year earlier, 2000, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was signed, a unique document that, one might say, accepted the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms from 1949, put this time into the context of the creation of European unity. The EU thus has no need to mention any document that was created in another forum (the Council of Europe), but articulates its own value system in the field of human and basic rights.

This Charter's preamble mentions for the first time the resolution of the people of the European Union, in creating an ever closer, that is, firmer alliance, to share a peaceful future based on common values. This formulation will later serve for the launch of the idea of the “Europe of values”. This orientation toward “common values” is specified in a complex expression stating that the Union, aware of its spiritual and moral heritage, is based on indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law, that is, the legal state. Thus, the European Union puts the individual at the heart of its activities, establishing the citizenship of the Union and creating a territory of freedom, security and justice. This message about the “individual at the heart of the Union's activity” was not received with sufficient attention by the public. In contrast to this clear orientation toward the value of the individual, the general impression is, on the one hand, clouded by the bureaucratization of the EU, and on the other, by the numerous affairs of corruption and misuse of the EU resources, which is why this message was lost, in order to come to attention later on, in the Treaty on the Constitution, which establishes the European Union.

5. The goals and values of European integration in the European Constitution

The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed by the heads of state and prime ministers of the member states on October 28th 2004 in Rome, consolidates the goals and value system of the European Union. More clearly than ever before, the European Union defined its goals and values in this document, not leaving any room for the ambivalent interpretations of the past. The document signed in Rome is the third version in circulation: the first version

was finalized by the European Convention, made up of 108 representatives of EU institutions, the governments and parliaments of member states and distinguished individuals headed by the former French president, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. This version passed through two corrections, and the final version was defined by the Intergovernmental Conference in June 2004. Between the first and the final, third, version the text of the preamble was changed, an entire new passage was added so that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was incorporated into the text of the Constitution; a chapter about EU public policies was added, and the provisions regarding the functioning of EU institutions and the decision-making procedure in the Council of the EU were altered, which had been the cause of the disagreements between the member states (Grevi, 2004).

The grand discussion preceding the final adoption of the third version of the European Constitution revolved around the issue of whether to mention Christianity as a source of inspiration of the values that the European Union is based on, in the preamble, or not. In the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, dignity is apostrophized as the first and basic right, operationalized through the right to live, the right to personal integrity, the prohibition of torture and inhumane or degrading behavior or punishment and, finally through the prohibition of slavery and forced labor. The theme of human dignity infuses the entire history of Christian philosophy, ever since Pico Della Mirandola raised the issue and portrayed it as a fundamental question of the Christian worldview in his work *De dignitate homini (On human dignity)*. Human dignity was also referred to by the founding fathers of the European Union: Schumann, Monnet, Adenauer and De Gasperi. But through the passage of time and the changes in different attempts to experiment with the construction of European unity, this issue was lost from sight and it was thought that it was sufficient to refer to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This issue returned, if only to the surface, in the Charter of Basic Human Rights, in order to enter the text of the Constitution in full glory through that Charter. However, the controversy about the Christian ideological bases of the European Union raised a great amount of noise: in the original version of the preamble, as the main ideas of the European Union the Greek and Roman heritage, Renaissance humanism and Enlightenment, as well as the entire spiritual heritage of Europe lying in the foundations of the European identity were mentioned (Brennan and Hamlin, 2004).

In spite of the strong pressure exerted by the Catholic Church, that insisted on mentioning Christianity among the ideological foundations of European identity, in the end, because of the inability to achieve a consensus about it, an attitude of compromise and pragmatism prevailed, erasing from the preamble the mention of the Renaissance humanism and Enlightenment as a counterbalance to the refusal to introduce Christianity *expressis verbis* in the text of the Constitu-

tion. The new formula of the “European style of compromise” was worded so that the founders of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe state that they find their inspiration in the cultural, religious and humanistic heritage of Europe, which developed universal and inalienable values of humanity, freedom, democracy, equality and rule of law (Grevi, 2004; Ziller, 2004).

This was the way in which the *motto* under which Europe was to adopt the Constitution, a quote from Tukidid's *History of the Peloponnesian Wars*, was omitted: “Democracy is our constitution, because it is the rule of the majority.” The allusion to the ancient polis was, thus, erased from the European Constitution, and with it the link to the Greek and Roman heritage. In the discussions held during the Convention, the mention of the tradition of the Athens democracy were common, while the Roman tradition was received through the institution of citizenship open to all inhabitants of the Roman empire, including barbarians – if they accepted Roman laws. While the Greek tradition was unquestionably accepted as a source of modern European values, battles were fought over the Roman tradition. To be more specific, the “Roman tradition”, along with the institution of citizenship, includes two other components of Roman history: early republicanism that, even in Machiavelli's interpretation, was the ideal of the Renaissance political ideas of citizenship, while the latter component of Roman history, the Roman Empire, remained a synonym of non-democratic government and imperialism – the politics of force and conquering. In the end, the attitude prevailed that both the Greek and the Roman traditions should be rejected, which, on the other hand, according to the criticism from the lines of the Catholic Church, were the bearers of pagan values, along with the specific “Renaissance humanism” and Enlightenment. The term “the cultural, religious and humanistic heritage of Europe” was deemed wide enough to cover any possible controversy. This is how the votes of the representatives from Ireland, Italy and Poland, who took into consideration the plea of Pope John Paul II, expressed in the Papal letter *Exhortatio Apostolica Ecclesia in Europa* (Johannes Paulus II, 2003), at the intergovernmental conference, that the future European Constitution be amended by the Christian-Jewish values, remained a minority.

The second article of the preamble emphasizes the faith that Europe, reunited after “bitter experiences” aims to continue in the path of civilization, progress and prosperity for the good of all its people, including the weakest and least capable, hence, remaining a continent open to culture, learning and social progress. This is why it wishes to deepen the democratic and transparent nature of its public life and fight for peace, justice and solidarity around the world. It is interesting that peace here is understood as a finished, done deal for the people of Europe and that the achievement of peace, justice and solidarity is to expand to the entire world. This would signify that Europe is assigning itself a “mission”

in the world – to spread peace, justice and solidarity while, unlike the USA, it does not raise the issue of expanding democracy in the world as the main goal of its policy. Democracy is, completely accurately, intended for “public life”, meaning politics, whose democratic and transparent nature must be deepened around the Union, as well as in the member states. This is why the founders express their conviction that the peoples of Europe are deliberate in overcoming of their former divisions and are, united more firmly than ever, building their common destiny. Here, we arrive at the new *motto* of the European Union, which is offered in the fourth article of the preamble: Europe is “united in diversity”. Unlike the North American *politeia*, that as its motto uses the expression *e pluribus unus* – from different into single, the 21st century Europe is constructed with awareness of the richness of diversity and does not aim for unification through a melting pot of cultures and ethnic communities. Respecting the rights of every individual and aware of their responsibility toward the future generations of the world, Europe offers, as the Constitution proclaims, the best opportunity for realizing this great endeavor, that makes it a “special area of human hope”. This is an explanation of the missionary drive from the second article: the ambitions of this Europe are not reduced to mid-range goals or only to the realization of a common market and the welfare of the Union and its inhabitants, but is an ambition plan realizing “human hopes” (Pinelli, 2004).

The very text of the Constitution, that is Title I., determines the definition and goals of the Union. However, even if it was to be expected that the goals would hold first position, Article I.-1. tells of the establishment of the Union, about how the Constitution, reflecting the will of the citizens and countries of Europe to build a common future together, establishes the European Union to which the member states transfer their jurisdiction, in order to realize the goals they have in common. Thus, the Union will coordinate the public policies that the member states use to achieve those goals, and the entrusted jurisdiction will be used based on the “Community foundation”. This Community foundation signifies the “Community method”, that through common law became a manner of harmonizing policies in the European Union and assumes a procedure of policy formulation through the EU institutions, with the aid of what is known as committology – a system of deliberative decision-making through a pluralism of committees, advisory and regulatory, as well as permanent compromises achieved through negotiation and mediation.

The goals of the European Union are not stated until Article I.-3., which might drive one to believe that they are subordinate to the “common goals” and that they spring from them, that is the goals summarized from the national political level. However, they do have autonomous value: the reason they are not mentioned until the third article is, again, a result of a compromise achieved at the Convention devising the first version of the Constitution. In the first version,

the goals of the EU stood before the provision about the establishment of the Union, because it was believed that the Union itself – its establishment and purpose, is a derivation of the main goals of all its citizens and member states. Thus, the first and main goal of the Union is to promote peace, its values and the welfare of its people. Peace is conceived not as a situation where there is no war or threat of war, but is necessarily supplemented by the corollary of welfare and human progress, without which it cannot survive permanently (Bonde, 2004).

However, that the final text of the Constitution is a compromise is proven by the second paragraph of Article I-3., which states that the Union will offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal borders, as well as an internal market where market competition is free and undistorted. Only the third paragraph states that the Union will work on behalf of the sustainable development of Europe, based on balanced economic growth and the stability of prices, on a highly competitive social market economy, aiming for full employment and social progress and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It will also, in this declarative direction, promote scientific and technologic progress, fight social exclusion and discrimination and promote social justice and protection, the equality of men and women, solidarity among generations and the protection of children's rights. It will also promote economic, social and territorial cohesion and solidarity between the member states. Here, the values reflecting the previous concepts of the Europe of peace, the Europe of the market and the new, only recently established Europe of values, are all intertwined, in a not very logical order. However, economic goals were not portrayed as instrumental, procedural activities in the service of the main goal, peace, but as values *per se*, in the context of, naturally, achieving the welfare of European citizens (Brenan and Hamlin, 2004).

It is interesting that in the very first articles of the Constitution, one may detect the compromising nature of this document. This is why the concepts of the Europe of peace, the Europe of the market and the Europe of values intertwine with each other in what is not the most fortunate of orders. The same goes for the inserted provisions, such as the second section of the third paragraph of Article I-3 , where one may simultaneously read the obligation of the Union to respect the rich cultural and linguistic diversity and ensure that the European cultural heritage is preserved and enhanced. This section should, obviously, logically and by content belong to Title II, where fundamental rights in the European Union are discussed, since this subject matter is part of the collective human rights. However, the authors of the Constitution obviously decided to amplify the effect of the Union's insistence on this diversity, even if it was an inconsistent addition to the enumeration of the goals of the Union.

In its relationship toward the “wider world”, the Union will emphasize and promote its values and interests, meaning it will contribute to the peace, security,

sustainable development of the world, solidarity and mutual respect between nations, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and protection of human rights, especially children's rights, as well as strict adherence to and development of international law, including the respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The Union will, according to the fifth paragraph, realize these goals with appropriate means in line with the authority invested in it by the Constitution (Cremona, 2004).

This is how the Constitution of the EU inverts the relationship of goals and values: values are expressed first, and goals are enumerated later. The European Constitution introduces values labeled as the common values that the Union undertakes to respect. These values, enumerated in order, are:

- human dignity
- freedom
- democracy
- equality
- the rule of law
- human rights
- minority rights.

However, the second paragraph of Article I-2 states that these values are common to member states in a society where pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between men and women prevail. What are these, really, other than values closely linked to the enumerated values? It could be concluded according to the expression used in the Constitution, that these are “added” values, as Jens-Peter Bonde believes. But is it possible to imagine human dignity as a value that needs to be nourished, if at the same time it does not include equality between men and women. Certainly, in the times when Pico Della Mirandola wrote his tractate on human dignity, the issue of equality between men and women was not on the agenda. As democracy today is unimaginable without pluralism and tolerance, so are the rule of law and respect for human rights unthinkable without justice and freedom from discrimination, as well as equality between men and women. Thus, the core of the seven basic common values must be supplemented by these five additional values in order to create a complete whole (Bonde, 2004).

Truth be told, the discussion at the Convention was went on within the framework of this dilemma: are these, actually, equally important values or may a hierarchical ranking scale be established between them, according to which, the first seven values form the common values, and the additional five are values of individual societies, that is “society” in the singular, as the European Constitution provides.

The original approach to the values of the European Union was developed by Michael Emerson, who summarized the catalogue of values stated in the European Constitution in the form of a Decalogue, that is, the Ten Commandments. He claims that Article I-2, labeled as “The Values of the Union”, is a disappointing text, confusing and inconsistent. At the conference of the Brussels Center for European Political Studies, held in February 2005, Emerson offered his analysis of the values of the EU, under the title “Which Values for Europe?”, based on the critical reading of the European Constitution, and not just the initial explicit part, Title I, that covers values. Title II should also be considered, for it discusses the fundamental rights and citizenship of Europe, especially Article I-10, mentioning the institution of citizenship of the European Union as complementary to national citizenship, as well as Title III, “Union Competences”, especially Article I-11, speaking about the institute of subsidiarity (Emerson, 2005).

And still, one of the basic values of the Union, as Emerson sees it, is inclusiveness and openness to others, which is the subject of Title VIII and Title IX, as formulated in Articles I-57 and I-58 How is it possible, though, to mention the values of the European Union and fail to mention the basic values of a liberal society, that were for a long time the basic values of the “Europe of markets”, such as the four freedoms of movement of goods, people, capital and services? This is why Emerson believes it is not enough to be limited to a self-declaration of values as the European Constitution does, but a single “Decalogue” – the Ten Commandments (of the Lord), according to Moses’ Ten Commandments from Mt. Sinai – should be derived, based on the entire text. These ten commandments (addressed to the European Union!) should look like this, according to Emerson:

1. be truly democratic and respect human rights and the rule of law;
2. guarantee the four freedoms of movement – goods, labor, capital and services;
3. enable and care for social cohesion between people, regions and states;
4. ensure sustainable economic development to the benefit of future generations;
5. reject nationalism and stimulate the citizens' multiple identities;
6. ensure a federative, multi-governance administration;
7. ensure a secular rule and stimulate the multi-cultural pluralism of the society;
8. promote a multilateral order in international relations;
9. sustain from threatening or using force on others without just cause;
10. be open, inclusive and integrative toward neighbors that accept the above mentioned commandments.

The form of this Decalogue should, of course, be taken with a sense of humor. However, since all this was presented at a serious event of a serious institution, a leading *think-tank* (brain trust) of European policy, one should critically reflect on some of these values, formulated in this way and in this context. In the first line, “federative” multi-level governance, that is, political administration, is a questionable value. European Union is not yet a federation, and by all accounts it will not be in the near future. Multilevel governance is a specific of the European Union that needs to operate more adequately than it has functioned so far, but a decent incentive to that would come from the ratification of the Constitution and its coming into force. In the second place is the “threat or use of force” on others which requires a “just cause”. This cause is prone to differing interpretations, which was obvious between the European Union member states during the American intervention in Iraq, who interpreted differently the justification for their participation in the attack on Iraq. This is the reason the representatives of the peace movements, during the discussion about the draft of the Constitution, asked the European Union to explicitly distance itself from war, and declaratively reject it as a political means, even as a means of necessary defense. In some European constitutions, for example of Italy, there is a formulation about the rejection of war as a political means, so an analogous formulation was suggested for the European Constitution as well. However, the example of the territory of the former Yugoslavia, indicates how dangerous wars are, so their general rejection is unrealistic. On the contrary, the threat of using force might play a significant role in the prevention of the outbreak of conflicts, but it requires a common defense policy and a mechanism for the articulation of such a policy, which will only be enabled by the implementation of the European Constitution after it comes into power.

Returning to the goals of the European Union and how they were formulated in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and enumerated in Article I-3, one may say that they follow the formulations fixed by the Amsterdam Treaty. The main novelty consists of a summarizing formulation that the purpose of the Union is to “promote peace, its values and the welfare of the peoples”. Peace is a universal goal and not an exclusive goal of the European Union, while social welfare was elaborated as an instrumental key, as a means of achieving peace, where a more extensive paragraph about international relations was thus inserted. In this context it should be mentioned that the Union has the obligation to contribute to the “rigorous respect for and development of international law, especially regarding the principles of the United Nations Charter”. Article I-3 divides the European Union goals into two groups of goals: those that relate to the EU itself, its own goals, we might say, and goals it has in relation to the affirmation of its own values in the global context (Article III-292). We will portray these goals in a comparative outline.

EU goals regarding “itself” (internal)	EU goals regarding the “outside world” (external)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - promoting peace, its values and the welfare of its peoples - achieve an area of freedom, security and justice without internal borders - achieve a common market where competition is free and undistorted - achieve the sustainable development of Europe, based on balanced economic growth - achieve a highly competitive social market economy - achieve the stability of prices - achieve full employment and social progress - achieve a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment - promote scientific and technologic progress - achieve social justice and protection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - contribute to peace and security - contribute to the sustainable development of the world - contribute to solidarity and mutual respect between nations - contribute to free and fair trade - contribute to eradication of poverty - contribute to the protection of human rights, especially children's rights - contribute to strict adherence to and development of international law, including the respect for the principles of UN's Charter - contribute to equality between men and women - contribute to solidarity between generations - contribute to economic, social and territorial cohesion - contribute to cultural and linguistic diversity

As we can see, this is for now the most developed code of goals and values of the European Union. One may debate about the relevance of the goals and whether these values really create the coherent system of an “open society” Popper advocates; in a word, is it truly a finalized code, or will in time the need arise to add a few new values to the exiting ones? These values, *prima facie*, really do form the corpus of the constitution, which is synonymous to democracy, as Pericles says. However, we can immediately note that the imperative of democracy is somewhat limited by clauses that invite respect for the existing orders in the member states. Namely, Article I-5 is dedicated to the relations between the European Union and the member states. Through this article the European Union is obliged to respect the national identity of the member states, and the object of this respect is, aside from the “basic structure, political and constitutional” of the member states, the autonomous system

(meaning, the form of government and form of state), the “important functions” of preservation of territorial integrity, public order and national security. These specifications are not irrelevant, if the long-lasting discussions and polemics between the advocates of intergovernmentalism and supporters of supranationalism are taken into consideration. This formulation is preclusive regarding the development of democracy within the European Union. One may assume, for example, that the level of democracy achieved in transitional countries still lags behind the quality of democracy in the consolidated democratic systems of Western Europe. It is one thing to respect national identities and oblige the European Union to stimulate the affirmation of identities of the member states, including national, cultural and linguistic identities, and quite another to bring to life the principles of democracy, as well as respect for human rights, which are of a more universal character. So satisfaction with, for example, the level of democratic rights in one member state might mean the cementing of the internal development of the member states and the reduction of the effects of policy, legal and economic convergence towards higher, common standards. Also, it might happen that these constitutional directions reduce the effect of Europeisation, as a process of mutual infusion and transfer of the positive experience of constructing the political system of the European Union to the political systems of the member states. This would mean that the positive effect of “Europeisation”, as the *terminus technicus* signifying this process, is reduced only to the original impulse of adjustment to democratic principles at the moment of accession to the EU and adoption of the Copenhagen criteria that precede that accession. On the contrary, the process of Europeisation must continue in the case of the transitional countries that, in spite of their initial successes, differ by the degree of stability of their democratic institutions and procedures, which is why the possibility of a step back is not excluded, that is, the *post festum* destabilization of political systems, after EU accession. This might take place for different reasons, among which one should not exclude the negative effects of possible global recessions and crises, a decrease in the development of the European Union itself (for example, caused by a ratification crisis related to the Constitution), crises of institutions of the Union or blockage of the Union's bodies by one or more states, as was the case in the crisis of the “empty chair” of 1965 or a contingent set of circumstances that we cannot predict at the moment (Fraile Canton, 2004; Poettering, 2005).

The European Constitution is the codification of all the basic EU regulations, and not a radically new constitutional act. It satisfies the demands set by the Laeken Declaration of 2001, asking for a better definition and share of power in the European Union, a simplification of the founding treaties and legislative procedures, as well as the complicated voting system. The key slogan of the Laeken impulse for reform of the Union was *transparency, openness, clarity*. At

the same time, the Laeken Declaration demanded the introduction of more democracy to the functioning of the European Union, greater transparency of the work and efficiency of its institutions and procedures. All this is to be achieved through a single treaty that will replace all the previous ones and finish the initiated process of constitutionalization of the European Union. The result was the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, that indeed simplified the decision-making procedures in the EU, expanded the jurisdiction of the European Parliament, the only body of the EU with elective legitimacy, abolished the three pillars the European Union was founded on, according to the Maastricht Treaty, so that the competences that used to belong to the first pillar, the pillar of the European Communities, were extended. The forest of legislative procedures was replaced by a simpler nomenclature of regulations (the previous regulations and directives were replaced by the general “acts”), and participation in discussions about regulations that need to be passed was expanded to the national parliaments of the member states. The European Union, among others, became a legal entity, that is it gained the capability to be a subject of international relations, which gives the EU an autonomous appearance, and subsidiarity – the principle that decisions are made as close as possible to the citizens, was confirmed as a counterbalance to the elaborate system of transferring sovereignty to the supranational bodies of the Union in the form of the exclusive, divided and common authority of the EU. New institutions were introduced, that are supposed to symbolize the greater togetherness of the Union and its common foreign and security policy: the president of the European Union and the minister of foreign affairs of the EU. Finally, there are provisions about the greater transparency and accountability of the Union to the member states and the citizens, as well as provisions about the internal democracy in the EU, that now for the first time introduce participative democracy, even if in a very narrow form (Ziller, 2004).

The provisions about democracy represent another *novum* in the constitutional acts of the European Union. The “democratic life of the Union” received an entire separate part in the Constitution, Title VI (Articles I-45 and I-52). Starting from the principle of democratic equality of the citizens, that will with “equal attention” be respected by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union, special articles elaborate the principles of representative and participative democracy. The European Union is thus, expressly, based on representative democracy, manifested in the direct representation of citizens at the level of the Union in the European Parliament, while the member states are represented in the Council of the European Union, through their governments, who are democratically accountable either to the national parliaments or their citizens. In spite of the direct and indirect representation of the citizens of the European Union in the bodies and institutions of the Union, each citizen has the

right to participate in the democratic life of the Union as well, and decisions must be made in the most open manner and as close as possible to the citizens themselves. This is the first time that the European Union has spoken so openly about the object of fear (and critique) of the political public, the democratic deficit of the Union. The chapter about the democratic life of the EU tries to compensate for this deficit by expanding the catalogue of values of the Union, not only to democracy in the abstract sense, but pointing out how it is practiced as well. Representative democracy is, incidentally, the first and rudimentary form of democracy. This is why the Constitution takes a step further and also presents the principle of participative democracy. The institutions and bodies of the European Union are obliged, with adequate means, to offer the citizens and their representative organizations the opportunity to learn about and publicly exchange views about all the areas of activities the Union undertakes. The Union will uphold an open, transparent and regular dialogue with the representative associations and the civil society, as it will undertake wide consultations with the stakeholders, precisely in order to ensure the coherence and transparency of the political activities of the Union. The citizens may appear both as direct action initiators, as protagonists of an “agenda-setting” process and invite the Commission to undertake an action or issue a legal act, pertinent to the implementation of the Constitution. Of course, regarding the size of the Union, the minimal number of citizens necessary for such an initiative to be valid is “not less than one million”. The provisions about the social partners and autonomous social dialogue also belong among the provisions about democracy. In order for this democracy to function in the Union, the new institution of the ombudsman, appointed by the European Parliament, whose duty is to accept, investigate and report about “maladministration” in the activities of institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the EU, and the Constitutions, guarantees complete independence to this institution (Grubiša, 2005).

However, democracy cannot be realized without the transparency of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of such a huge machinery as the European Union, dominated by bureaucratic and technocratic procedures at the highest level, but which inevitably aspire to, exactly because of the high level of expertise they require, a sort of secrecy or at least surreptitiousness in the eyes of the public. Thus, the Constitution obliges the Union to promote “good governance” and the cooperation of the civil society, and this may be done only if all the EU bodies lead their business as open as possible. This way, the sessions of the European Parliament will be open, as will the sessions of the European Council when it discusses and votes on a legal act. And, in order for the publicity of the work to be complete, the Union must guarantee the accessibility and openness of access to the documents of the European Union, in the first instance, to the citizens themselves, and each institution, body, office or

agency must adopt their own procedural rules to regulate access to the documents. There was no need, nor has anyone ever felt the need for such provisions before now: the EU was addressed by critics for its non-democratic nature, and now it has turned into the initiator and stimulator of “good governance”, thus becoming a standard for member states and an integral part of the Europeisation of democracy.

Finally, we may conclude that with this Constitution, the European Union becomes a new Europe of values in the true meaning of the words: the European identity is not determined by geographical status or borders, the borders of the EU are now the borders of an area accepting a catalogue of values, enumerated in the EU Constitution, as well as the democratic standards of the political order. However, the adoption and signing of the Constitution opens another problem, returning us to the education deficit mentioned at the beginning: according to the newest Eurobarometer data, 15% citizens of the EU have not even heard about the EU Constitution, and over 60% do not know what exactly is written in it. This is why the process of ratification is going to be difficult and burdened by barriers, and the proclaimed transparency and clarity are not going to be that quick nor reach easily what we call the “average European citizen”. Educational and informative action, as well as the dissemination of values and goals of the European Union, and its democratic standards, will be the task of each member state. However, regardless of the problems this process will open and the numerous paradox-effects that will be manifested, the goals and values of the EU will remain noted forever, regardless of whether the process of European integration falters temporarily or falls into a crisis, they will remain a roadmap for the development of the human values of the political life in a new Europe.

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Vlasta Ilišin

**POLITICAL VALUES, ATTITUDES AND
PARTICIPATION OF YOUTH: CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE**

1. Introductory remarks

Integration into the European Union is a political issue and decision. In other words, the integration into this association, along with the economic, social and cultural, has its political dimension as well. This is not simply an issue of political conditions set before the aspiring countries by the EU, nor of decisions about accession made by the authorities and the citizens, but is also an issue of political consciousness and behavior of these political officials and citizens. These components are the elements that the political elite and the citizens bring with them into the community of countries based on a certain system of democratic values and rules of political conduct.

The demise of socialist systems on European soil and EU enlargement with countries whose experience comes from a totalitarian political order, raise the question of the democratic and integration potential of European citizens. This is especially true when youth is concerned, who are often regarded as potentially the greatest winners of the integration process and are expected to contribute to the future of a united Europe. The goals and dynamics of the integration process equally demand a research of the youth's relationship towards the democratic values and institutional politics in the old and the new EU members, as well as those that are in the different phases of preparation for accession to the Union (Ichilov, 1997; Furlong, Guidikova, 2001; Youniss and others, 2002; Adnanes, 2004). One can, therefore, state that the scientific interest in the political orientation and participation of youth in European societies, based on the necessity to explain the occurring changes and foresee the future of modern democracy.

The relationship of youth and politics is in this analysis observed and interpreted in the context of political culture that is understood as a relationship of individuals and political values, institution and participation, with emphasis on the civil (democratic) political culture as the type of political relationship

most appropriate to a democratic system (Almond, Verba, 2000). The democratic political culture is linked with the concept of citizenship, which implies a relationship of the citizen towards the society – and in this context, politics as well – and incorporates affiliation, membership, autonomy, equality, accountability and participation (Van Steenberg, 1994; Hall, Coffey, Williamson, 1999). The democratic political culture and the concept of citizenship are also linked to social capital, understood as a network of social relationships based on trust, reciprocity, cooperation and solidarity (Matić, 2000; Putnam, 2000), all of which contributes to the total development of the society, including the democratization of social relationships. An analytical matrix for researching the nature and dynamics of the relationship between youth and politics also includes the classical models of territorial and functional structural cleavages (Lipset, Rokkan, 1967), as well as newer patterns of ideological, cultural and socio-economic polarization (Kasapović, 1996; Zakošek, 1998, 2001). Considering the Croatian society as a “new democracy” the modified interpretative model includes three structural cleavages: territorial-cultural, ideological-cultural and socio-economic (Zakošek, 1998, 2001, 2002)¹. Also, age as an element of a social cleavage with political consequences can be included in the context of structural cleavages (Andersen, Heath, 2003). The assumption is that the existing structural cleavages are reflected in the group of youth as well, but, at the same time, age generates the profiling and polarization of political attitudes and behavioral patterns. However, in the analysis of age effects one should differentiate the temporary from the permanent, in order to detect the existence

¹ N. Zakošek (2001: 109) describes these three cleavages in a very concise manner: “In Croatia, the territorial-cultural cleavage (or the center-periphery cleavage) appeared as a consequence of a long-term historic conflict regarding the creation of the Croatian state, where the options directed toward the establishment of an autonomous Croatian state came into conflict with the options of Croatia’s integration into wider political entities. The ideological-cultural cleavage crystallized in a long-term process of secularization and modernization around the opposition between the religious and secular ideological and moral worldviews. Finally, the socio-economic cleavage is newer in origin and linked to the consequences of the market-capitalist transformation of Croatia economy; in this cleavage the conflict of interests between the winners and losers of the socio-economic transformation is manifested.” It should be added that the territorial-cultural cleavage appears in the form of rivalry of the bearers of the state-creation project (the center) and the minority and regionalist demands (representing the periphery). Along with the state-creationist, the center-periphery cleavage also has a cultural component, where the center advocates the conception of an “exclusive Croatian nationalism, hostile towards minority cultures, multi-culturalism and all forms of international integrations and outside cultural influences”, while the periphery is represented by cultural (ethnic and regional) minorities, which “negate the hegemony of the exclusive Croatian national culture” as well as protagonists that “today advocate the definition of a national identity and national culture open for interaction with other cultures and for Croatia’s international integration” (Zakošek, 2002: 89).

of potential new generational units and obtain elements for predicting whether the young generations will be the bearers of these same values and behavioral patterns in their mature age as well (Neimi, Hepburn, 1995).

Within this theoretical framework one can investigate the political awareness and behavior of individuals as well as groups, and in this case, this concerns youth as a social group. Several specific factors are at work, along with the influence of the social and political context, where the attitudes and behavior of youth are concerned. This is a combination of influences of the life cycle, the specific generational experience and the events of an era, where youth is only occasionally a recognizable and significant political protagonist of (Braungart, Braungart, 1989). The existing analytic insights have indicated that youth in almost every society and period of time different from the adult citizens by a number of politically relevant elements, however, these differences are usually not of the type or scope to allow for a diagnosis of a permanent conflict of generations (Braungart, Braungart, 1989; Ilišin, 1999, 2002; Henn, Weinstein, Wring, 2002).

As for certain generational differences, numerous researches conducted around the world are unanimous in their findings when youth and adults are compared according to the political dimension. Firstly, the young are more liberal (that is, less conservative) and more open for changes in their political viewpoints than the adults (Alwin, Korsnick, 1991; Watts, 1999; Andersen, Heath, 2003). Secondly, the young express a lower level of interest in politics, vote in elections somewhat less often, have a weaker affiliation to parties, and are extremely rarely members of political parties and authorities at all levels (Griffin, 1993; Bynner, Ashford, 1994; Hackett, 1997; Roche, Tucker, 1997; Ichilov, 1998; Jowell, Park, 1998; Matthews, Limb, Taylor, 1998; Schizzerotto, Gasperoni, 2001; Henn, Weinstein, Wring, 2002). Thirdly, it was demonstrated that the young are more likely to engage in social or extra-institutional politics, where the inclusion into civil associations and volunteer work is considered as one of the most efficient forms of political socialization of the young for their full and responsible civil (democratic) political participation, for it is assumed that it leads to a long-term political activism (Neimi, Hepburn, 1995; Youniss, Yates, 1997; Kluegel, Mason, 1999; Yates, Youniss, 1997; Kluegel, Mason, 1999; Yates, Youniss, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Youniss and others, 2002; Frisco, Muller, Dodson, 2004). Finally, the distance of youth from institutional politics is most often interpreted through the discourse of the life cycle theory, presuming that the young will be more active in their mature years and that their total social conditions and attributes will change. However, the explanations starting from the changes occurring in the post-materialistic society, where civil participation is in transit from the traditional political forms and institutions to the field of civil society, are common, as are the explanations regarding the

dissolution of youth with political elites as well as their preoccupation with the satisfying of elementary existential needs, along with the statement that lower participation is, as a rule, concentrated in the more marginalized groups, one of which is youth (Alwin and Korsnick, 1991; Helve, 1997; Inglehart, 1997; Wuthrow, 1997; Watts, 1999; Henn, Weinstein, Wring, 2002). We must keep in mind here that the political participation of youth becomes even more problematic after noting the decrease of participation of all the citizens in the electoral processes and political parties along with the decreasing trust into political protagonists in the developed democracies (Čular, 2003). It should also be taken into consideration that the social capital in modern society is weakening parallel to the strengthening of the trend of individualization and the increasing mistrust into the institutions of the system (Matić, 2000; Putnam, 2000). However, the existing solutions of organizing youth in democratic societies point youth towards institutions void of adults, which results in a sort of “youth ghetto-isation” distancing them from the world of institutional politics where decisions regarding youth are made (Matthews, Limb, Taylor, 1998; Schizzerotto, Gasperoni, 2001). The majority of the mentioned processes affect the relationship of youth towards politics directly but not stimulatingly.

Research has also registered the collapse of youth engagement in the former socialist countries, the reason for which is found in the disengagement of youth in developed democracies, as well as in the opinions that the interests of youth are not adequately represented in the political sphere in a formal manner (that is, the young do not play an institutionalized political role); that political socialization is aggravated because the adults cannot transfer the values and experience from the former political order; that youth is overly burdened with the race for accomplishment in the new capitalist environment, and simply have no time to engage in politics; that the poor organization of youth in the promotion of their interests is a reaction to the over-organization in the socialist era; that the young accept the new political system, which could be interpreted as a latent readiness for political activity, but only when they estimate it is necessary; and even that the lack of political engagement of youth is really a healthy consequence of normal politics (Tymowski, 1994; Ule, 1996; Wallace, Kovatcheva, 1998; Yates, Youniss, 1999; Mitev, 2001; Adnanes, 2004). Even though many of the previously mentioned hypotheses about the political (self)marginalization of youth in transitional countries, are debatable, the latter explanation must certainly be the most problematic. Namely, if it is observed from the viewpoint of repeated warnings that the extremely weak participation of youth in political events and activities, especially when it is lengthy, represents danger for the representative democracy even in the countries with a long democratic tradition (Jowell, Park, 1998; New incentives... 2001; Schizzerotto, Gasperoni, 2001; Henn, Weinstein, Wring, 2002; Andersen, Heath, 2003), then the “normalcy” of political passivity is very questionable. Therefore, we must again

emphasize that in the developed European countries, especially in the dynamic period of economic and political changes on the continent that had begun with the demise of socialism and continued with the process of EU enlargement, the young citizens are paid particular attention, because they are the ones the success/failure of the European integration project depends on greatly. Thus, the political disengagement of youth is not simply putting in question the future of representative democracy, but also the future of a united Europe. This is not to say that a passive youth is the greatest threat to European democracy and integration, but we must insist that ignoring the problem of insufficient political involvement of youth may in the near future turn up as a problem bigger than it would seem at this moment, burdened with grand and far-reaching changes with epochal meaning.

Croatia fits in completely into the image of a collapsed political engagement of youth in the post-socialist countries. This is without debate corroborated by the results of empirical research in the past fifteen years (Ilišin, 1999, 2002, 2003). Thus, the Croatian youth, in spite of the relatively satisfactory democratic potential identified through their attitudes and values, demonstrate a lack of readiness to vote, a lower level of party affiliation and inclusion into the work of political parties, while it is present in institutions of power in a negligible number. The situation is not much better in the organizational sense either: the numerous youth associations are rounding up a small number of the members of this generation and are having difficulties gathering around a common cause. The activity of the political party youth – where it exists – is mostly limited to party settings, and cooperation is weak. In a word, and based on the existing insights, the young in Croatia today are not a relevant political subject. This means that the interests of youth are not clearly articulated nor mediated into the public sphere, and the existing institutions of youth are atomized and fragmented, which greatly limits the possibility of generational political affirmation.

We should mention that the police marginalization of youth in Croatia, in spite of the fact that it had its own organization, was present in the socialist period, and became more pronounced as the years after World War II passed by, because the young then capitalized their contribution to the war by taking positions in the institutions of power. At the same time, youth was the social group that questioned the socialist order in its later stages the most (Santrčić, 1989) and the first to embrace the liberal values (Ilišin, 1999). Regardless of the fact that the young were least burdened by socialist heritage, the new political protagonists on the party scene at the time of the epochal upheaval in 1990, never looked for “new breed” politicians for a new time in this social group. Thus, the young entered the transitional period as losers, and they remained in the same position in all the electoral cycles and changes in power, in spite of the

saturation of the public with the same faces in the Croatian political elite. The absence of youth from institutions of power is linked also with the fact that its interests are very rarely in the focus of interest of political protagonists and institutions of power, which additionally confirms their marginalization. Still, such a marginalized political status of youth is not a reason for not researching their relationship towards politics – on the contrary.

There are three equally important reasons for researching the relationship of youth and politics now and here. The first is that Croatia is in a period of democratic consolidation, so it is assumed that the dynamics and quality of the democratization process greatly depend on the political awareness and activist potential of youth. The second reason is the fact that Croatia is (should be) intensively preparing itself for equal accession into the European Union. Starting from the point that young people will be spending a larger part of their lives in a new economic, social, political and cultural environment – which is why the development of Croatia in the new community will depend on them – it is necessary to gain insight into their political values and convergence with the dominant and proclaimed values in the EU countries. The third reason is the result of the fact that one of Croatia's obligations regarding EU accession is to ensure the institutional framework and mechanisms for implementing youth policy congruent to the principles accepted by the Council of Europe, the stimulating of active participation of youth in society is one of. In order to manage this in an optimal way, it is certainly necessary to enrich the scientific insights about the political awareness, participation and potential of Croatian youth.

The accent in this segment of the research is on the analysis of political values, attitudes and participation of Croatian youth as indicators of its readiness for European integration. These political components are tracked in their dynamics (changes) and specifics (comparisons with adults in Croatia, and partially youth in Europe). The goal of the analysis is, hence, to determine the distribution, structure, specifics and changes of political values, attitudes and participation of youth. Here, we start from three basic hypotheses: 1) youth in Croatia is different than adults or its European counterpart regarding its political values, attitudes and participation; 2) changes taking place on the social and political plain in the past five years affected the dynamics and direction of changes of political values, attitudes and participation of youth in Croatia; 3) political values, attitudes and participation of youth is significantly determined by its socio-demographic, socio-structural and socio-cultural attributes. The influence of the social and other attributes of youth on the examined phenomena will be detected by using the attributes of gender, age, socio-professional and residential status, provenience, regional status, education of participants and their fathers, as well as religious self-identification and party affiliation. We will only interpret the differences and

correlations (obtained through the χ^2 test and variance analysis) significant on a level of .0001 or less. The comparative analysis is conducted on three levels: between the young and adults, the youth from Croatia and Europe, and youth from Croatia in 1999 and 2004, and only the first order factors will be mentioned and interpreted as the results of factor analysis. For the purpose of saving space for the outline of the obtained results, the summary tables are mostly used, while a portion of the relevant findings is not even portrayed in the tables, but rather referred to synthetically in the text.

2. Party affiliation


Numerous scientific researches about the electoral behavior of citizens have been conducted in Croatia since 1990, as well as media surveys of public opinion that measure the rating of political parties on a monthly basis. The number of party supporters is susceptible to changes and in this regard, the data collected a year or two ago are obsolete. However, in this type of scientific research we are not interested into how many supporters a party has at the moment, for our attention is predominantly focused on the investigation of the structuring of political party sympathizers, that is, the social profile of the potential voters of all the relevant parties.

In order to illustrate, we will portray data about the support for political parties among youth in 1999 and 2004, as well as adults in 2004 (Graph 1). For a better understanding of the registered changes we must note that the first research was conducted at the beginning of 1999 (which was the last of almost 10 years of ceaseless monopolization of power by HDZ, that is, one year before the fourth parliamentary elections were held), and the second at the beginning of 2004, several months after HDZ won in the fifth parliamentary elections held at the end of November in 2003. These facts certainly eliminate the possibility of surprise regarding the registered changes in the political affiliation of youth. We should mention that in 2004 the young chose a total of 18 parties offered in the survey, as well as several others grouped in the category “some other party”, along with a significant number of those who do not explicitly support any party, or they cannot decide (categorized into the common group “undecided”). Five parties with at least a 5% support by youth, as well as the group of undecided participants, were chosen for further analysis.

It is visible at first site from data in Graph 1 that there were shifts in the function of time, as well as differences seen from the inter-generational viewpoint. Within that, it is evident that there is a greater convergence in the party affiliations of youth and adults than between the young today and five years ago. Hence, we can conclude that the social circumstances had a similar

influence on youth and adults, which can be linked with the thesis that the young are more likely to vote like their parents, especially fathers (Converse, 1976; Turner, 1989). However, as could have been expected, the young demonstrate a somewhat smaller degree of party affiliation, which could be explained from the point of view of the life cycle theory. In other words, with the process of maturing and gaining experience, a part of today's youth will to a greater or a lesser extent identify themselves with a certain party, or parties.

Graph 1: Party affiliation of youth and adults (%)²



The changes in the party affiliation of youth indicate a recent inclination toward the right-wing political pole (and the election results testify that the same is true of the adults), which must be a reaction to the failed expectations that the six-member coalition, coming into power in 2000, will implement the desired

² The choice of data for the needs of this comparison on the party affiliation of youth was based on the results obtained in 2004. This is the reason why the supporters of two liberal parties are excluded from comparative analysis, because their support fell under the threshold of 5% in the meantime. They are: HSLŠ, whose support plummeted from 12.5% to 1.7%, and LS, whose support decreased from 5.4% into 0.4%. On the other hand, HNS was included in the relevant parties, while five years ago it only had the support of 2.2% of youth (Ilišin, Radin, 2002: 344).

changes on the economic and social level. It would, therefore, seem that after the strengthening of the socio-economic cleavage, reflected in the “polarization of the electorate into the winners and losers of economic transformation” (Zakošek, 2001: 121), the influence of the territorial-cultural and ideological-cultural cleavages is revitalized, returning to Croatian political life issues that for a while might have seen overcome.

It is also interesting that the number of those politically undecided increased among the young in the observed period of time, which can be interpreted as an indicator of the disappointment with political parties (and it can only be assumed that the same took place with the adults, a relatively high number of which offers support to no political party). However, party preferences are a dynamic category and the repeated turn to the left-wing center political options in the near future is not something we should exclude, although we should count on the fact that most relevant political parties have a stable core electorate, salvaging them from a complete debacle in elections.

It was already mentioned that the primary investigative interest is to establish the subgroups of youth from which the supporters of the observed political parties is recruited, that is, what is the profile of young party sympathizers, shown by the summarized data in Table 1.

Based on the obtained results, and before discussing their meaning, it is possible to sketch out the social profile of young supporters of the observed political parties.

HDZ's supporters are mostly pupils and the unemployed, the young with a finished primary school whose father has the same level of education, those that were raised and living in rural areas, especially in Dalmatia and Eastern Croatia, and religious youth. At the same time, there are a lot less potential voters of HDZ among students and the employed, the young – who as their fathers – have a high school or academic education, inhabitants of major cities, Istria and Primorje, and non-religious participants.

HNS enjoys the greatest level of support among students and the highly educated, with academically educated fathers, those that grew up and live in major cities and in Zagreb, and among the non-religious participants. The potential voters of HNS are least likely to be recruited among pupils and unemployed youth, as well as those with no qualifications or three years of high school (the same goes for their father's education), who were raised and live in rural areas, especially in Eastern Slavonia, Istria and Primorje, as well as amongst those who are reportedly religious.

Table 1: Party affiliation regarding the attributes of youth (%)

Attributes of youth	HDZ	HNS	HSP	HSS	SDP	Undec.	TOTAL
<i>Socio-professional status</i>	$\chi^2=60.50$						
Employed	30.5	39.9	26.9	42.6	41.8	36.6	35.5
Unemployed	24.1	16.7	18.7	20.2	13.0	24.3	20.8
Pupils	28.7	17.4	25.4	17.0	18.4	22.4	22.8
Students	16.7	26.1	29.1	20.2	26.8	16.7	20.9
<i>Father's education</i>	$\chi^2=74.92$						
Primary school or less	24.6	13.1	15.7	31.2	8.6	20.3	19.0
Vocational school	31.9	21.9	36.6	28.0	26.8	29.4	29.2
High school	25.9	29.2	29.1	23.7	37.7	32.1	30.5
College, univers. or more	17.6	35.8	18.7	17.2	26.8	18.2	21.3
<i>Education</i>	$\chi^2=55.30$						
Primary school or less	35.4	19.3	25.4	27.7	20.7	26.9	27.7
Vocational school	19.1	10.7	20.9	19.1	12.3	20.2	18.0
High school	37.0	52.9	44.0	44.7	53.3	41.9	43.3
College, univers. or more	8.5	17.1	9.7	8.5	13.8	11.1	11.0
<i>Place of birth</i>	$\chi^2=108.60$						
Village	48.8	27.0	45.5	57.4	32.4	46.1	44.0
Small town	29.9	28.5	26.1	20.2	30.1	32.0	29.9
Major city	7.4	16.8	14.9	4.3	10.4	13.4	11.2
Zagreb	13.9	27.7	13.4	18.1	27.0	8.6	14.9
<i>Place of habitat</i>	$\chi^2=132.01$						
Village	51.1	25.2	40.3	55.8	34.1	45.9	43.0
Small town	28.7	27.3	27.6	20.0	23.4	32.0	29.4
Major city	5.2	14.4	16.4	4.2	11.5	11.9	10.1
Zagreb	15.0	33.1	15.7	20.0	31.0	10.2	17.5
<i>Regional status</i>	$\chi^2=188.98$						
Northern Croatia	24.4	22.3	15.8	40.0	25.7	23.1	23.4
Central Croatia	9.2	6.5	12.0	4.2	6.9	9.4	8.7
Istria and Primorje	4.8	7.2	7.5	2.1	11.9	17.6	11.0
Eastern Croatia	22.6	10.8	24.8	23.2	13.4	20.4	19.8
Dalmatia	23.6	19.4	23.3	10.5	10.7	21.0	19.8
Zagreb	15.2	33.8	16.5	20.0	31.4	10.2	17.3
<i>Religious self-identification</i>	$\chi^2=106.78$						
Religious	85.9	60.9	79.5	87.1	59.8	71.2	74.2
Undecided	10.5	18.1	17.4	8.6	24.1	17.3	16.1
Not religious	3.6	21.0	3.0	4.3	16.1	11.5	9.8
TOTAL	27.2	7.6	7.2	5.1	14.3	38.6	100.0

HSP is a party whose voters are above averagely recruited from the lines of student, the inhabitants of major cities, as well as Central and Eastern Croatia.

On the other hand, on average, the smallest number of supporters are from the lines of employed youth living in Northern Croatia, Istria and Primorje and the non-religious participants.

HSS can mostly count on the support of the employed youth, those whose father is without qualifications, who are born and living in the country, in Zagreb and Northern Croatia, as well as religious participants. There is a small number of this party's supporters among the pupils and inhabitants of major cities, Istria and Primorje, Central Croatia and Dalmatia and among the non-religious participants.

SDP has more potential voters in the lines of students, youth with a high school or academic education (whose fathers share the same qualifications), living in Zagreb, and the young who are not religious or are undecided when it comes to religiousness. This party has a considerably smaller number of supporters among the unemployed, young with a blue-collar education or without qualifications, among those whose fathers are unqualified, the inhabitants of villages in Eastern Croatia and Dalmatia and the religious participants.

The undecided participants when it comes to party affiliation come from the lines of the unemployed youth, those with a vocational education qualification, as well as those raised and living in major cities and Istria and Primorje. The young expressing their party affiliation are on the opposite pole, such as students, whose fathers have a college or university education, and those raised and living in Zagreb.

The data about the social profile of the supporters of the five observed political parties do not significantly vary from the previously established data, as on the sample of all citizens of age and on the sample of youth (Zakošek, 1994, 1998, 2001; Ilišin, 2002). Based on this, we can state that the social structure of political parties is recognizable and relatively stable in its basic outline. However, as is demonstrated by the direct comparison with the findings about the young party sympathizers from 1999 (Ilišin, 2002: 161), the social structuring is not definitely over – at least when youth is concerned. To be more specific, with the changes of the social context come the changes in party affiliation, which is why this process is never really over (Andersen, Heath, 2003).

In our comparison of the recent results with those five years ago, we will limit ourselves to several most important findings. Firstly, it would seem that there is a minimal degree of homogenization regarding party affiliations: in the existing situation, the gender and age differences within the young population have no more influence on the choice of political parties. Therefore, it follows that the potentially different (specific) experiences, dependent on the degree of maturity or on gender, are not reflected at this political level.

However, this might mean that the young simply do not recognize the elements of the party programs and activities which directly address, for example, women or specific age cohorts. This homogenization is also pointed to by the findings about the mild weakening of the differentiation of youth regarding its socio-professional and educational status and its narrow social background (observed through the father's level of education). However, since there was a deepening of differences regarding residential and regional status as well as religiousness, this brings us to the second important tendency. Namely, the strengthening of the aforementioned polarizations within the young population points also to the strengthening of the elements of the territorial and ideological cleavages with the simultaneous survival of the already strong socio-economic cleavage. The third important finding is that, in spite of the fact that the young electorate of most parties has most of the characteristics as five years ago, certain and significant shifts were registered. Before all, this regards the supporters of HSP, who are recruited more and more from the lines of students and urban youth, while the unemployed youth of a rural and lower social background were most inclined toward this party before, and in the territorial sense, there has been a widening of the electoral basis of HSP, because Eastern Croatia is joined by the Center (and this most probably is no accident, for these areas were under the control of the Serbian rebels in the early 1990s). It is impossible not to notice that the mentioned changes of the social structure of HSP's supporters are congruent with the efforts of this party to create a public image that no longer belongs to the extreme right-wing pole, where it was placed from its very founding, by changing its rhetoric. If we link this with the fact that HSP did not participate in power at the national level in the past 15 years, we can state that the increased support for this party is partially a result of the fact that is, simply, could not have disappointed its voters the way HDZ and SDP, along with their former coalition partners, did. Fourthly, the attributes of the young supporters of the observed political parties point to the significant convergence of the sympathizers of HDZ and SDP on the one hand, and to a somewhat weaker resemblance of the potential voters of HDZ, HSS and HSP. If HNS (as LS in the previous research) and SDP are seen as left-wing center parties, and HDZ, HSP and HSS (which was already closer to the right-wing than the left-wing center), as right-wing parties, we have an impression that there has been a certain bipolarization of the Croatian party space in the past five years. The total marginalization of HSLs, relevant in the first decade of transition, and also a member of the party center, also lead to this hypothesis. According to the recent data, the political party center was significantly emptied and the voters, to put it roughly, are aligned into one of two wide political blocks. Whether the tendency of further development of the Croatian political and party system will lead to a bipolarization or to greater pluralism is an open question, depending on the changes in the social and political context, both in the country and on a wider level. The fifth interesting trend comes from the changes registered in the group of undecided young participants. In this context,

the most intriguing thing is the absence of the influence of age and gender, considering that five years ago the young up to age 19 (most of them pupils) and women tended to above averagely declare their indecision regarding political parties. Previous data was completely in congruence with the results of earlier studies, which consistently indicated a certain political inferiority of the youngest members of youth and women, but the existing situation raises an issue regarding the usual interpretations offered by the life cycle theory and the feminist approaches. As for the influence of gender, it would seem that in Croatia, at least where the party affiliation is concerned, there has been a certain leveling of political interest and knowledge of young women and men. The absence of differences between age subgroups of youth may indicate an earlier maturing of the youngest, as well as the influence of a deepening dissatisfaction, which includes youth that has gained its first experiences in elections to a greater degree. Here, the results of the young from Istria and Primorje are also intriguing, because they now decided not to declare their party preference, so one might speculate that it is an indicator of their disappointment with IDS as a party that for years had no worthy opponent in this region – to simplify, they no longer wish to vote for IDS, but no other party seems to be an acceptable replacement. However, the fact that the young, summarily, decide on a political party somewhat less often than the adults, warns that age is still a dimension that affects the affiliation toward political parties (hence, probably the participation in elections) in the whole electorate.

In further analysis, party identification of youth is also used as a so-called independent variable. It is logical to expect that the comparisons of the political values of the supporters of the observed parties, their attitudes and participation, will also point to other dimensions of the political polarization of youth.

3. Democratic values

Mentioning youth as at least a potentially relevant subject in the processes of democratic consolidation and Croatia's accession to the EU demands an insight into their political values and attitudes – of course, with special emphasis on those with a democratic orientation. The acceptance of constitutional and democratic principles, trust in institutions, tolerance for certain social phenomena and groups, and the perception of the priorities of Croatian politics are used as indicators of the democratic potential of youth in Croatia.

Before the results about the acceptance of constitutional values among Croatian youth are shown, we must mention that it indirectly indicates the level of acceptance of the principles the united Europe and its Constitution are based on. As was portrayed in the introductory chapter, this document expressly states the values (A Constitution for Europe, 2004: 8) that are compatible with the declared principles of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (2001) to a

great degree. The later constitutional values were transcribed from the catalogue of the basic liberal-democratic values, and in this sense, at least at the constitutional level, they bring Croatia closer to Europe. Table 2 portrays the comparative data about the acceptance of 11 constitutional principles³ only for the answer “very important” (a four degree scale consists of answers from “very important” to “completely unimportant”).

Table 2: A comparative outline of the acceptance of constitutional values (%)

Constitutional values	Youth		Adults
	1999	2004	2004
Freedom	91.2	93.8	94.9
Respect for human rights	87.8	91.9	93.6
Equality	74.2	85.9	87.4
Social justice	75.7	81.9	89.3
Gender equality	–	79.2	79.5
Protection of nature and human environment	72.8	77.9	82.6
Pacifism	67.4	75.9	80.2
Inviolability of ownership	64.9	73.9	85.8
Ethnic equality	58.1	70.5	74.5
The rule of law	55.2	64.1	78.6
Democratic and multiparty system	60.8	58.5	71.9

Observing the obtained results as a whole, it is without question that all the constitutional principles are highly accepted, especially if we add that, for example, there are approximately 0.5% (freedom) to 12% (democratic and multi-party system) of young participants who consider these principles to be “mostly” or “completely” irrelevant. The high level of acceptance of the normatively proclaimed principles undoubtedly points to a high consensus among the citizens and the creators of the Constitution regarding the basic liberal-democratic values. This is certainly a necessary, although not a sufficient basis for the democratic development of a society that does not have a tradition of liberal-democratic values and standards in its heritage.

The generational differences are very intriguing, for they clearly show that the adults accept all the principles – especially the rule of law, the democratic

³ The participants, of course, were not told that these principles can be found in Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, for it might have affected their answers. We should also add that the principle “gender equality” was not mentioned in the 1990 Constitution, which is why the level of acceptance of this value was only measured in 2004.

and multiparty system, the inviolability of ownership and social justice – more than the young. These, most obvious, differences are symptomatic to the interpretation that the attitudes of adults are greatly affected by their experience of life in socialism (when social ownership was protected at the expense of private ownership and when there was no political pluralism, but there were less social differences and insecurity). However, these findings raise an issue regarding the earlier research conducted in this country and around the world, which pointed to a more present liberal and democratic awareness of youth compared to adults. We do not have enough data for now, but we might assume that this is a consequence of a political socialization in a turbulent transitional period, which is why the young find it harder to deal with the discrepancy between the proclaimed principles and the often conflicting social and political practice.

However, we at the same time registered an increase in the acceptance of all constitutional values among the young (aside from the democratic and multiparty system). Thus, the acceptance of ethnic equality, as well as pacifism, the inviolability of ownership and the rule of law increased the most during these past five years. The higher validation of these principles must have been affected by a number of circumstances, including democratization and the change in the political priorities and rhetoric from 2000 until today. On the other hand, a mild decrease of the importance of a democratic and multiparty system might be a reflection of the saturation and disappointment with political protagonists and the (lack of) functioning of political institutions, and it might be that today's youth find political pluralism to be so “self-understandable”, that they miss the importance of its development and strengthening.

Since we are interested in the structuring of constitutional values, the observed values were submitted to factor analysis and variance analysis. Table 3 portrays the two obtained factors (with the total variance of 52.4%), which are in their configuration almost identical to the ones obtained in 1999 (Ilišin, 2002: 184).

The basic liberal-democratic values is the label of the first factor for it is primarily constituted by the classical values of equality and respect for individual rights and freedoms. As is evident, these are joined by values pointing to specific equalities (ethnic and gender equality as well as social justice) and the insurance of the basic conditions for the survival of a community and mankind in general (pacifism and environmental protection). The variance analysis indicated that the young are not differentiated by any of their attributes when it comes to accepting these values. If we look at the generally high acceptance of the constitutional principles and the absence of differentiation of youth, we can conclude that there is a high level of consensus among the young in accepting most of the basic constitutional values.

Table 3: The factor structure of constitutional values

Constitutional values	Factor 1	Factor 2
Equality	.772	
Respect for human rights	.704	
Freedom	.678	
Social justice	.599	.402
Ethnic equality	.590	
Pacifism	.534	.444
Gender equality	.512	.385
Protection of nature and human environment	.495	.390
The rule of law		.842
Democratic and multiparty system		.840
Inviolability of ownership	.371	.614
<i>% of common variance</i>	<i>29.2</i>	<i>23.2</i>

The second factor was labeled *values of a democratic order* due to the fact that the bases of its configuration are the principles of the rule of law, democratic and multiparty system and the inviolability of ownership. To be more specific, without these principles and respect for them, there is no democratic order. Regarding the acceptance of this value matrix, the young are somewhat less unanimous – the variance analysis yielded four significant differences, but with relatively low F-ratios (from 32.4 to 4.94). To be more exact, it turned out that the increasing age and education of youth increases the acceptance of these values, as well as that greater importance is ascribed to them by the employed (opposite the pupils) and youth from Central Croatia and Dalmatia (unlike the participants from Northern and Eastern Croatia). Based on the obtained results, we might suggest that the greater loyalty to the values of a democratic order is primarily linked with the social competence of youth, and only partially with the particular regional specifics.

The understanding of the principle of a democratic and multiparty system can be operationalized and investigated through different attitudes. We again use a scale for investigating democratic attitudes in this analysis, which was used in the previous research of youth (Ilišin, 2002: 178). The question was dichotomous, and Table 4 holds the distributions of affirmative answers (that is, agreement with the statements offered).

As before, the ranking scale of acceptance of contradictory claims causes confusion and difficulties for interpretation. On the one hand, all the participants accept the right to a democratic expression of different opinions with a high percentage – which must imply the existence of different interests, and hence the disagreements between some social groups and their political representatives – but

they also believe that individual and group demands should be subjugated to the collective and general interests. The young differ from the adults exactly by their lower level of acceptance of the domination of collective and general over special interests, and also by their lower glorification of the Croatian constitution and ascription of a lower significance to the necessity of an existing opposition. The later generational difference might reflect a critical attitude of youth toward the activity of political parties when they are the opposition, which are criticized by analysis for either their clemency and calculations or their radicalism, all for the exclusive purpose of attracting voters.

Table 4: A comparative outline of the acceptance of democratic attitudes (%)

Democratic attitudes	Youth		Adults
	1999	2004	2004
Everyone has the right to express their opinion, even if the majority thinks opposite	98.0	98.2	97.4
Every citizen has the right, if the need arises, to express his or her beliefs in the streets	79.0	74.4	70.2
True democracy cannot be imagined without opposition	80.7	71.1	82.4
Conflicts of different interest groups in our society are harmful to the general interest of the state	57.8	70.0	77.3
The interests of the whole nation must be above all specific interests	68.3	69.5	74.8
Every political party must have a chance of gaining power	74.8	65.1	68.3
The President, Parliament and the Government shared the power in our Republic according to the law	33.9	55.8	57.6
In his previous work, the President controlled what the Government did to a legally allowed extent	44.4	54.8	56.4
In his previous work, the Parliament controlled what the Government did to a legally allowed extent	38.6	45.6	46.1
The opposition's duty is not to criticize the government, but to support its work	35.2	44.8	46.0
Citizens have no right to strike if that endangers the public order	32.0	43.4	48.0
There are conflicts in every society, which must be resolved by force	24.7	24.6	22.9
The Croatian constitution has its weaknesses, but it is the best compared to all the others	22.1	23.3	38.2

The changes in the attitudes of youth are not grand, but are significant, because the agreement with the attitudes that conflicts of interests are bad for the general interest and that the right of citizens to strike should be limited increased considerably, as well as their institutional trust, parallel to the reduction of

support for the right of all political options to come into power and the necessity for an opposition to exist in a democratic system. These changes point to a slight shift toward the acceptance of an authoritarian model of political activity and behavior, that is, the acceptance of a narrowing of the democratic maneuvering space. Here, it is possible to speculate that the increase in the perception that the institutions of power function in accordance with the law partially leads toward the attitude that the manifesting of the citizens' dissatisfaction is not only aimed against certain actions of those in power, but against the very foundations the order is based on. On the other side, it is possible that some newer events, which might be seen as a risk to the determined or realized goals, stimulate a renewed gathering of the national ranks. Both finally lead to a narrower democratic potential of youth.

More elements for the explanation of the determined changes and differences will be yielded by the results of the multi-variate analysis (Table 5). In this case, the factor analysis yielded five first order factors (with a total variance of 53.2%).

The first factor obtained was labeled *institutional trust* because it consists of attitudes that might be seen as indicators of trust toward the highest institutions of power, and we have already noted that approximately one half of the young participants believe that the protagonists of state authorities are behaving in accordance with the law. We cannot tell from these answers whether those that believe the President of the Republic, the Croatian Parliament and Government do not control each other according to the legal system, believe that there is too little or too much of this control, that is, if there is any abuse of power. The variance analysis indicated that the young are very homogenous in their partial trust, for none of the observed attributes of youth could be correlated with this latent dimension.

The second factor – *harmonious unity* – clearly points to the preference of harmony in political relations, which implies a yearning toward a conflict-free society. The demands for subjugating of particular interests to the collective ones, testifies about the misunderstanding of political competition, as well as the lack of readiness to see politics as an art of finding compromises. Since the attitudes contained in this factor are very common (with a tendency of increasing), it is obvious that the young (as much as the adults) have difficulties with understanding of democracy and the way it works. This model of belief is above averagely represented by men (F-ratio=13.65) as well as youth from Central Croatia opposite those from Istria and Primorje (F-ratio=5.94).

Democratic participation, which is the name of the third factor, consists of three attitudes which undoubtedly speak in favor of acceptance of political pluralism and the right to the freedom of political thought and action. These

attitudes are best accepted in the researched population of youth, who are also completely unified in this, regardless of the different social attributes that might hypothetically influence the variations in the acceptance of this model of thought.

Table 5: The factor structure of democratic attitudes

Democratic attitudes	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
In his previous work, the President controlled what the Government did to a legally allowed extent	.806				
In his previous work, the Parliament controlled what the Government did to a legally allowed extent	.795				
The President, Parliament and the Government shared the power in our Republic according to the law	.780				
Conflicts of different interest groups in our society are harmful to the general interest of the state		.776			
The interests of the whole nation must be above all specific interests		.578			
Every citizen has the right, if the need arises, to express his or her beliefs in the streets			.737		
Everyone has the right to express their opinion, even if the majority thinks opposite			.711		
Every political party must have a chance of gaining power		.312	.348		
There are conflicts in every society, which must be resolved by force				.814	
Citizens have no right to strike if that endangers the public order				.488	
The Croatian constitution has its weaknesses, but it is the best compared to all the others	.372			.408	
True democracy cannot be imagined without opposition					.765
The opposition's duty is not to criticize the government, but to support its work		.315			-.656
<i>% of common variance</i>	<i>16.0</i>	<i>9.8</i>	<i>9.5</i>	<i>9.4</i>	<i>8.5</i>


The fourth factor was arbitrarily labeled *understanding of conflicts* because the most saturated attitude is the one about the existence of conflicts that must be

resolved by force, followed by the acceptance of a possible abolition of strikes in the interest of protecting the public order. The third attitude testifying to a lack of criticism toward the Constitution, seems to have wandered into this model of thought, but it is in some way linking the (mis)understanding of conflicts with institutional trust. However, the first two attitudes in this latent dimension are actually the most consistent with the attitudes constituting the model of harmonious unity. This is corroborated by the fact that regional status is again an influential attribute, but also the only one to produce any statistically significant correlation in the variance analysis procedure (F-ratio=7.5). To be more exact, youth from Central Croatia and Dalmatia accept the attitudes we interpret as an indicator of misunderstanding when it comes to conflicts above the average, while youth from Istria, Primorje and Zagreb are on the opposing pole because they accept this model of thought the least.

Finally, the fifth factor – *democratic rules* – consists of variables regarding the vision of the democratic role of an opposition, that is, the high acceptance of the attitude about the necessity of an opposition in a democracy and an equally high rejection of the attitude that the opposition should play a “constructive” role in the support of those in power. Again, we can notice that this factor is similar to another model – this time, democratic participation – but they are still separated, which suggests that significant changes in the conception of the opposition's function have occurred. However, the findings of the variance analysis are most intriguing here for they indicate a more significant differentiation of youth. Specifically, this model of democratic thought is influenced by the educational status of the participants and their fathers, as well as age, socio-professional status, gender and regional status of youth (with F-ratios ranging from 29.85 to 5.80). It seems that the acceptance of democratic rules (seen through the role of the opposition) actually increases in a linear manner with the educational degree of the participants and their fathers, as well as with age, and the highly educated, oldest subgroup of youth is joined by men, students (compared to pupils), and the population of Istria, Primorje and Zagreb (unlike the participants living in Northern and Eastern Croatia). The attributes of those who accept democratic rules more without a doubt indicate their higher social competence, which apparently seems to overcome the possible destructive influence of disappointment caused by the actual behavior of opposition parties.

The model of democratic thought which was marked as an indicator of institutional trust is supplemented by the following data, explicitly addressing the level of trust in social and political institutions. The participants answered on a five-degree scale, and Graph 2 portrays the answers for the degrees “complete trust” and “trust” (the other answers were the following categories: “undecided” and “mistrust” and “complete mistrust”).

Graph 2: The ranking scale of trust in institutions – youth and adults (%)



It is immediately evident that the Church is the only institution enjoying the trust of most citizens, in line with the fact that over two thirds of the participants declared they were religious. On the other hand, this information provokes the comment that the trust in the Church ought to be even higher, that is, congruent to the percentage of religious citizens. The relatively good position of television is interesting, because it is usually quite criticized for its lack of objectivity, manipulation of public opinion, advancing the ruling establishment, etc. When we focus on the political institutions, it is obvious that the institution of the President

of the Republic enjoys almost twice as much trust than the Parliament or the Government. This better placement must reflect the popularity and reputation of president S. Mesić, while the lower rating of the other two highest institutions of power is probably an indicator of the citizens' dissatisfaction with their work.

The low level of trust in the judiciary must be a consequence of the dissatisfaction with the functioning of the judicial bodies, burdened with a number of problems – from their slowness and inefficiency, to their lack of expertise and objectivity. The faults and mistakes of the judiciary cause a lot of attention as well as numerous objections by the national and international public, often ending in judgments about the poor construction of the legal state and the dubiousness of realizing the constitutional principle of the rule of law. The convincing last place of the political parties is not endemic to Croatia, because trust in political parties is the lowest in the democratically more developed countries (Čular, 2003: 4). If we observe the citizens' trust as a whole, we can state that the trust in the observed institutions is at a low level⁴, a witness to the deficit in this component of the social capital.

The differences between youth and adults are not enormous, but are symptomatic. The most pronounced one is that the adults express more trust in political institutions, while the young trust the mass media, especially television somewhat more.⁵ The reason could partially lie in the fact that today's youth is growing up with the media and use them quite a lot. It is also possible that most media's efforts to be a public corrective of the government in the past few years, who are least trusted by the young, contribute to their level of trust.

How the attitudes of youth are structured is demonstrated by the results of factor analysis (Table 6). Three factors were yielded (with a total variance of 60.0%), while the variance analysis indicated most differences in the case of the second factor.

The first factor was labeled *trust in the institutions of power and authority* because it deals with the political institutions and those, which, due to their monopoly (public services) or economic strength (large companies), have

⁴ This is pointed to the comparison with the finding that in Great Britain, for example, three fifths of the citizens trust the Church, the labor unions and television (Miller, Timpson, Lessnoff, 1996: 202).

⁵ The young in Croatia are much like their counterparts in the Mediterranean countries when it comes to mistrusting the political institutions, where, for example, the national parliaments enjoy the trust of 30-40% of youth, but they are also very different from their Scandinavian peers, whose trust ranges 50 to 60% (Schizzerotto, Gasperoni, 2001: 48). On the other hand, trust in the political institutions was especially low in the former socialist years during the first years of transition (Mitev, Riordan, 1996: 87).

significant power. The nongovernmental organizations do not really fit into this context, but we can presume that the young see their activity as politically influential (which is the ambition of these associations). The young are differentiated according to their residential and educational status, provenience and party affiliation (the relatively low F-ratios range from 8.89 do 5.93). In short, a greater trust in the institutions of power and authority is demonstrated by youth living and raised in Zagreb (opposite those living in rural areas), the highly educated (unlike youth without qualifications) and the sympathizers of HNS and SDP (compared to the supporters of HSS and HSP). The mentioned findings primarily point to the influence of social competence, while the greater trust of the supporters of the left-center parties could be linked with the participants' attributes, as well as reflect the fact that these parties were in power not long before the survey was conducted. Aside from this, a certain influence is exerted by the fact that the voters of these parties are mostly concentrated in Zagreb, since young people from Zagreb express a greater level of trust in the institutions of power and authority in general.

Table 6: The factor structure of trust in institutions

Institutions	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Croatian Parliament	.825		
Croatian Government	.815	.300	
Non-governmental organizations	.687		
President of the Republic	.670		
Political parties	.656	.303	
Public services	.603	.380	
Large companies	.575		
Church		.760	
Army		.741	
Police	.323	.709	
Judiciary		.548	
Labor unions	.372	.425	
Radio	.407		.901
The press			.843
Television			.832
<i>% of common variance</i>	<i>26.1</i>	<i>17.8</i>	<i>16.1</i>

Trust in the institutions of protection, as the second factor, is in its content somewhat linked with the first factor. However, different kinds of institutions are grouped together in this case, most of which represent segments of the

institutions of power – where their competence has to do with the protection of citizens – as well as the Church and the labor unions. More light on the meaning of this latent dimension is shed by the results of the variance analysis. The young are extremely differentiated according to their trust in the institutions of protection – all the observed attributes, aside from gender, are linked with advocating this factor (the F-ratio values range from 117.18 to 10.05). The greatest difference is the one between the religious and non-religious participants – the religious youth expresses a significantly higher level of trust in the institutions of protection, which must be dictated by the Church's position in the observed factor. They are joined by the participants with a lower level of education with a background in families where the father has no qualifications or a vocational education (opposite the young who, as their fathers, have a high school or university education), the young socialized and living in rural settlements (compared to the participants from Zagreb and major cities) and in Dalmatia, Central and Eastern Croatia (unlike the inhabitants of Istria, Primorje and Zagreb), as well as subgroups of pupils and the unemployed (as opposed to students), followed by the youngest participants and those supporting HDZ, HSP and HSS (versus the voters of HNS and SDP). The mentioned findings suggest that this is a certain form of authoritarian awareness, linked with a lower social competence of youth. This youth is more oriented toward the institutions of unquestionable authority (at least in its eyes), most of which have the exclusive right to use force and sanctions.

The third factor – *trust in the media* – is consistent in content, and therefore, easy to interpret. It would seem that the young perceive the media as an instrument of public control, where all the other institutions are suspects in advance. Considering the fact that the media, aside from the Church, enjoy the highest level of trust of youth, it was to be expected that it would be very homogenous in its advocating of this factor. The only weak, but statistically significant difference (F-ratio=5.29) was established regarding the regional status: more trust in the media is expressed by the young from Central Croatia as well as Istria and Primorje, while the participants from Eastern Croatia and Dalmatia are below the average (they also, as we noted earlier, trust the institutions of protection above averagely)

The values of youth with political implications were measured with the aid of their perception of the (un)acceptable phenomena in contemporary society. Table 7 shows the first two answers (“completely” and “mostly acceptable”) from a four-degree scale and, as an illustration, the data about the perception of

young Europeans about how much their peers (do not) accept some of the investigated phenomena (*Young Europeans in 2001*: 13).⁶

Table 7: A comparative outline of the acceptance of certain social phenomena (%)

Social phenomena	Youth		Adults
	Europe 2001	Croatia 2004	Croatia 2004
Sex before marriage	88	92.6	81.8
Sexual education in schools	–	88.9	84.5
Donating organs	–	85.4	83.2
Compulsory AIDS testing	61	78.4	76.4
Living in an extra-marital relationship	–	70.4	63.5
Having children out of wedlock	–	64.9	59.0
Divorce	–	60.7	51.5
Euthanasia	54	48.6	40.2
Decriminalizing prostitution	–	35.7	29.7
Forced surgical operation of pedophiles(castration)	60	34.2	30.6
Right of homosexuals to marry	59	33.2	19.6
Decriminalizing soft drugs	–	32.3	16.9
The poor should not have many children	30	31.3	32.2
Death penalty	27	30.0	31.3
Right of homosexuals to adopt children	41	17.1	9.7
Homosexual experiences	–	16.6	7.5
Genetically modified food	13	13.6	7.7
Cloning	12	9.7	5.6
Bribery and corruption	–	6.9	3.6

At the top of the scale are phenomena whose acceptance is witness to the liberalization of sexual behavior and the institution of marriage, that is, the significant shift from the traditional and patriarchal model of upbringing.

The donation of organs and the compulsory AIDS test are accepted by the majority, while all the other phenomena are not accepted by the majority of participants. They especially reject the right of homosexuals to adopt children, as they reject the homosexual experiences, genetically modified food, cloning,

⁶ The research was conducted in 18 West European countries, on a sample of 9.760 young people aged 15 to 24. This sample differs from the one used here because it did not include the cohort of youth 25 to 29. This influenced the obtained results, which should be taken into consideration in the comparison and interpretation of results.

and bribery and corruption. These phenomena can be characterized as the issues long-term public debates will be held about, when sooner or later, some of them will be more accepted than is the case today.

The generational comparison indicates that the young are consistently more tolerant and liberal than the adults, which is especially evident in the example of acceptance of premarital sexual experiences, extra-marital relationships, and parenthood outside of marriage, divorce, euthanasia, the decriminalization of soft drugs, genetically modified food, and rights of homosexuals, including the right to marry and adopt children. Therefore, it is obvious that in this aspect of the research, the values of the determined inter-generational difference confirm the findings of the existing research in the world.

However, the comparison of the Croatian youth with their European counterparts indicates that the young Croats are still notably under the influence of traditional values, and it is interesting that they are more permissive than their European peers only regarding premarital sexual experience (perhaps due to the age difference between the two samples of youth used) and pedophilia. The traditionalism of the Croatian youth is especially apparent in the attitudes about the rights of homosexuals to found a complete family – their acceptance is twice as small as that of the youth in Europe that mostly supports these rights. The Croatian young are also somewhat more prepared to violate the human rights by compulsory AIDS testing, and since this is a majority attitude with the European youth as well, it is obvious that the “moral panic” surrounding this disease is not ebbing fast or easily. Among the European youth the fear regarding pedophilia is very pronounced, for two thirds of it supports the forced surgical operation of pedophiles, which is almost twice as much as in Croatia. Lately, a number of scandals linked to this phenomena has made the European public much more sensitive than in Croatia, where it is only beginning to be publicly discussed, which is why we can assume that this is the reason for such a big difference between the attitudes of youth in Croatia and Europe. Let's also emphasize that approximately one third of the participants from each of the investigated samples, supports the death penalty, even though it has been abolished from the European and Croatian penal systems.

Since these are very different phenomena, it is not surprising that the factor analysis extracted five factors (with a total variance of 52.3%) and that some of them have structures which are very difficult to explain (Table 8).

The liberalization of family and sexual relationships is a possible label for the first factor, which is relatively consistently structured, and the majority of this latent dimension consists of phenomena linked with marriage and sexuality. They are joined by the more permissive relationship towards euthanasia and decriminalization of prostitution and soft drugs, problems actual in most modern

nations. It is especially indicative that the young are maximally different when it comes to this factor, that is, they differ among each other according to each analyzed attribute (the F-ratios range from 52.71 to 11.72). Thus, on the one side, are the ones with an above average acceptance of the offered phenomena: the non-religious participants, those with more education on average, much as their fathers, the urban youth (according to domicile and provenience), the oldest youth, men, students, inhabitants of Zagreb, Istria and Primorje, as well as the supporters of HNS and SDP. On the opposing pole are the ones who support the liberalization of family and sexual relationships below the average: the religious participants, without qualifications or with vocational education (the same goes for their fathers), of rural background and domicile, young women, pupils, the youngest age cohort, the population of Northern and Eastern Croatia, as well as the voters of HDZ and HSS. The mentioned trends plausibly illustrate the polarization of youth into the traditionalist and modernist orientations, so this requires no additional comment.

The situation is similar in the second factor, that is, *the rights of homosexuals*. The content of variables constituting this latent dimension is unambiguously testifying about the attitude towards homosexuality. Since this is an extremely disputable issue in Croatia, it is not surprising that the young are divided according to all the attributes used, aside from age (the F-ratios range from 50.38 to 7.60). The group more tolerant toward the phenomenon of homosexuality is very similar in its characteristics to the group of youth with a more liberal relationship toward family and sexuality. To be more exact, the rights of homosexuals are especially supported by women and non-religious participants, students and the highly educated, those raised and living in Zagreb, and supporters of HNS and SDP. Homosexual rights are especially refuted by men, the religious participants, the employed, those with vocational degrees, youth of rural provenience and domicile, the inhabitants of Central Croatia and Dalmatia, as well as voters of HDZ, HSP and HSS. Therefore, this is again a polarization on the conservative-liberal, that is, traditional-modern scale. In this case, the most interesting are the differences between genders, because it is already known that men express less understanding towards homosexuality than women, perhaps because the gay sexual orientation is more often attributed with men than women. However, regarding the findings linked with the first factor, we can state that the socially more competent youth – including a higher social background, educational and socio-professional status – is notably more tolerant toward the individual's free choice regarding sexual orientation and behavior as well as family and sexual life patterns.

The three remaining factors are of a partially residual character and are structured in such a way that makes finding the internal correlation of the grouped phenomena difficult, except perhaps for the phenomena where the

abuse of power is a strong possibility. Thus, the third factor was arbitrarily determined as *medical and educational intervention*, for it consists of compulsory AIDS testing and institutionalized learning about sexuality. Why is it that organ donation is linked with the previous two phenomena, it is difficult to discern. Only women are more likely to advocate this set of variables (F-ratio=72.90), which might point to their greater inclination for a safer and quality sex life and a more pronounced sense of solidarity (suggesting the greater acceptance of organ donation).

Table 8: The factor structure of (un)acceptable social phenomena

Social phenomena	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
Living in an extra-marital relationship	.718				
Having children out of wedlock	.714				
Divorce	.707				
Sex before marriage	.658				
Decriminalizing prostitution	.533		-.328		
Euthanasia	.517				
Decriminalizing soft drugs	.487		-.375		
Right of homosexuals to marry		.803			
Right of homosexuals to adopt children		.790			
Homosexual experiences		.696			
Compulsory AIDS testing			.613		.360
Sexual education in schools	.381		.605		
Donating organs	.444		.484		
Genetically modified food				.752	
Cloning		.301		.619	
Bribery and corruption				.485	
The poor should not have many children					.638
Forced surgical operation of pedophiles (castration)					.632
Death penalty				.384	.451
% of common variance	17.3	11.9	8.0	7.6	7.5

Socio-biologic experimentation (the fourth factor) is by content, primarily determined through attitudes regarding genetic manipulation with (un)foreseen social consequences. However, bribery and corruption turn up as the third element, which leads to the conclusion that this is simply a mathematical correlation between the least accepted phenomena. It is also difficult to explain


why these phenomena are somewhat more accepted by youth from Eastern Croatia, and less by those from Dalmatia (F-ratio=5.19). We could only partially assume that the young from rural areas were led by the thoughts about the greater crops from genetically modified plants and the experiences of the farmers who grew them, so their attitudes are somewhat milder.

Social repression is the label of the fifth factor because it includes the acceptance of attitudes that, without a doubt, point to repressive measures regarding certain social groups, primarily those who have committed crimes. The problem is that the attitude regarding the limiting of the right of the poor to procreate is linked with this (meaning, the violation of their human rights), which also implies the attitude that they are to blame for their own poverty. This is a way for the social community to significantly abolish the responsibility for the conditions which perpetuate poverty. Even though these phenomena are accepted by one third of the young – giving enough space for possible differentiation – the variance analysis indicated that they are completely homogenous in this regard.

The (in)tolerance of Croatian citizens is also demonstrated by the data about the personal (un)acceptance of particular social groups. Graph 3 portrays the summarized data from two (“completely” and “mostly acceptable”) out of the four degrees used.

As could have been expected, the mostly acceptable groups are those fighting to save the environment, fighting for animal rights and against racism. It is indicative, though, that the anti-racists do not enjoy more support, which could be an indicator of a certain degree of racial intolerance, as well as the result of situation related circumstances, that is, the fact Croatia is not a multi-racial society, and therefore, more sensitive to the problem of inter-racial relationships. Most citizens find the remaining groups to be unacceptable. For example, less than one fifth of the participants believe that feminists are acceptable. This, compared to the already analyzed high support for the constitutional principle of gender equality, and the success achieved by organizations founded on feminist principles in promoting women's rights, is very intriguing. Perhaps the term “feminism” itself causes resistance with the participants, associating it with a radical critique of male domination and the aggressive promotion of the female principle, while not being aware that an otherwise high level of acceptance of feminist ideas and practice is demonstrated by their other attitudes. As for the groups at the back of the scale of acceptance, the results are also quite expected, and it is obvious that Croatian citizens manifest certain repulsion toward the social groups with inherently violent methods and considered unacceptable on the global level.

Graph 3: The ranking scale of personal acceptance of certain social groups – youth and adults (%)



In the case of the relationship towards different social groups, as well as in the case of social phenomena, the young are more tolerant than the adults, especially evident in their acceptance of sports fan groups and homosexuals and lesbians. The later tolerant relationship is in line with the previously established higher support for the rights of homosexuals, suggesting a generally higher tolerance of youth for different sexual orientation. The groups of sports fans are, on the other hand, a generationally tinted phenomenon, because most of them consist of young people. They are also the members of the extreme cores of these groups who often manifest forms of violent behavior. It would simply seem that the young are more tolerant toward their peers, who express their need for identification and social visibility by fan rituals.

The factor analysis of the 12 observed social groups yielded four factors (with total variance of 59.8%), portrayed in Table 9, while the variance analysis indicated some significant differentiation among the youth (Table 10).

Table 9: The factor structure of (un)acceptable social groups

Social groups	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
Skinheads	.723			
Extreme groups (neo-fascist/neo-Nazi)	.710			
Terrorists	.668			
Islamic fundamentalists	.640	.450		
Sports fan groups	.499	-.366		.371
Communists		.761		
Feminists		.686		
Homosexuals and lesbians		.654		
Animal rights activists			.863	
Environmental protection activists			.806	
Anti-globalists				.768
Fighters against racism				.735
<i>% of common variance</i>	<i>18.4</i>	<i>16.6</i>	<i>13.0</i>	<i>11.8</i>

Violent groups is the label of the first factor because it consists of extreme political and sub-cultural groups who are infused – at least the majority of them – with violent forms of political rebellion and expression of disgruntles. Although, most of these groups are at the bottom of the tolerance scaly, it seems that there is a significant disagreement among the young in this regard. As shown by the data in Table 10, a somewhat higher level of acceptance of violent groups is expressed by the youngest participants, pupils with primary school education, men and participants from Northern Croatia, as well as voters of HDZ and HSP. Seen from the opposite standpoint, a higher level of rejection than the average is demonstrated by participants with an academic education, socialized and permanently residing in the most urban areas, women, students, inhabitants of Istria, Primorje and Zagreb, as well as supporters of HNS and SDP. These findings indicate a tolerance for political radicalism and violence by the less socially competent, which includes the social conditions for socialization and the effects of the life cycle. Namely, the research has shown that adolescence is a stage of life when aggressive political participation and readiness for political violence is most pronounced, and weakens along with the maturing process and with the gradual inclusion into the community (Watts, 1999: 488).

Table 10: Differences among the youth in accepting the factors of (un)acceptable social groups

Attributes of youth	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
<i>Gender</i>	<i>F-ratio=19.79</i>	<i>F-ratio=29.15</i>	<i>F-ratio=12.92</i>	<i>F-ratio=16.47</i>
Female	-	+	+	-
Male	+	-	-	+
<i>Age</i>	<i>F-ratio=25.31</i>	<i>F-ratio=15.85</i>		
15 – 19 years	+	-		
20 – 24 years	0	0		
25 – 29 years	0	+		
<i>Socio-professional status</i>	<i>F-ratio=15.23</i>	<i>F-ratio=15.49</i>		<i>F-ratio=14.02</i>
Employed	0	0		0
Unemployed	0	0		-
Pupils	+	-		0
Students	-	+		+
<i>Father's education</i>		<i>F-ratio=19.03</i>		<i>F-ratio=17.31</i>
Primary school or less		-		-
Vocational school		-		0
High school		0		0
College, univers. or more		+		+
<i>Education</i>	<i>F-ratio=19.76</i>	<i>F-ratio=23.38</i>		<i>F-ratio=8.50</i>
Primary school or less	+	-		0
Vocational school	0	-		-
High school	0	0		0
College, univers. or more	-	+		+
<i>Place of birth</i>	<i>F-ratio=6.84</i>	<i>F-ratio=17.25</i>		<i>F-ratio=5.97</i>
Village	0	-		-
Small town	0	+		0
Major city	-	0		0
Zagreb	-	+		0
<i>Place of habitat</i>	<i>F-ratio=8.32</i>	<i>F-ratio=16.00</i>		<i>F-ratio=7.37</i>
Village	0	-		-
Small town	0	0		0
Major city	-	0		+
Zagreb	-	+		+
<i>Regional status</i>	<i>F-ratio=7.58</i>	<i>F-ratio=17.17</i>		<i>F-ratio=6.30</i>
Northern Croatia	+	0		-
Central Croatia	0	0		0
Istria and Primorje	-	+		+
Eastern Croatia	0	0		0
Dalmatia	0	-		0
Zagreb	-	+		+
<i>Religiousness</i>		<i>F-ratio=64.39</i>		
Religious		-		
Undecided		+		
Not religious		+		
<i>Party affiliation</i>	<i>F-ratio=5.72</i>	<i>F-ratio=32.90</i>		<i>F-ratio=5.18</i>
HDZ	+	-		0
HNS	-	+		+
HSP	+	-		0
HSS	0	-		-
SDP	-	+		0
Undecided	0	0		0

Legend: - below common average; 0 within common average; + above common average

The second factor was labeled *ideologically characterized groups* because it primarily consists of groups with a clearly articulated ideology, who are also perceived as ideological, where even that very perception has an ideological predisposition. The placement of homosexuals and lesbians in the observed set is more difficult to explain, but the linking pin might be the fact that these are groups which radically change the established order of things. As for tolerance regarding the ideologically characterized groups, the young are again extremely differentiated (Table 10): a higher level of tolerance is verbally expressed by the non-religious participants, women, students, those (as their fathers) with an academic education, born and living in Zagreb, residents of Istria and Primorje, the eldest youth as well as the supporters of HNS and SDP. A significant level of intolerance is manifested by the religious youth, men, the youngest age group, pupils, the participants with a rural provenience and domicile, those who (much like their fathers) have a vocational education or are without qualifications, and voters of HDZ and HSS. The polarization of youth in this case is identical to the one established when the (in)acceptance of the rights of homosexuals were investigated, testifying to a consistent (in)tolerance toward different sexual identities. It is obvious that these attitudes are deeply influenced by the traditional values, which are at the same time, most widely spread in the socially deprived social classes and groups. Here, a significant role is played by religious convictions – since Croatia is predominantly Catholic, the convergence of the believers' attitudes with the attitudes of the Catholic Church (although, they are close to other religious as well) – which expressly condemns homosexuality, and does not really find communists or feminists to be very acceptable – is not unexpected.

Ecologically aware groups, the third factor obtained, is simple in content and certainly the most common among the young. There is only one significant difference in its acceptance – women accept it more.

The final, fourth, factor, was labeled *anti-globalists and anti-racists* because it is very difficult to try and look for a specific link between these two groups. One might say that they are connected by the activist potential, but the same goes for, for example, ecologically aware groups. The difference might be found in the fact that environmentally friendly groups put their effort into protecting nature, while the anti-globalists and anti-racists are trying to protect the society, human beings. However, even though the fourth factor is somewhat confusing, the young are not homogenous in accepting the included groups. On the one side are those who accept them more – youth with a higher level of education, with fathers who are similarly educated, inhabitants of Zagreb, Istria and Primorje, women, students and HNS's voters. On the other side are the young with a lower education (just like their fathers), of rural background and residential status, men, the unemployed, youth living in Northern Croatia and sympathizers of HSS. This polarization is largely similar to the one established

regarding the (in)tolerance of ideologically characterized groups, but this time, without the religious component.

The final group of variables in this segment about the political values of youth concerns the perception of the priorities of Croatian politics. However, the political goals or priorities might also be seen as an indicator of the perception of existing problems in the Croatian society, something we will discuss in the following segment. The participants could chose an answer from a four-degree scale regarding the measure in which the Croatian government should focus on the realization of the goals offered. Table 11 shows data regarding the highest level (“a lot”) for youth and adults.⁷

Table 11: The ranking scale of political priorities – youth and adults (%)

Political goals	Youth	Adults
Reducing unemployment	90.6	95.1
Fighting crime and corruption	86.1	94.5
Economic growth and development	81.4	89.2
Ensuring social justice and security for all	77.5	84.6
Ensuring human rights and freedoms	76.2	79.7
Improving the position of youth	76.2	76.3
Environmental protection	67.6	72.5
Improving the position of women	53.2	57.7
Improving the relationship with neighboring countries	52.8	55.9
Developing private enterprise	47.0	58.7
Stimulating population growth	44.2	52.3
Harmony between Croats and ethnic minorities	42.4	49.7
Protecting the dignity of the Homeland War	42.3	55.0
Croatia's accession to the European Union	41.8	45.3
Development of regions and decentralization of Croatia	40.2	47.1
Punishing war crimes and cooperating with Hague	29.4	33.0
Strengthening military power and security of the state	21.3	21.1
Supporting Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina	18.7	17.8
Spiritual renewal	18.0	29.7

⁷ In the 1999 research a question about political goals was also asked, however, methodological reasons do not allow for a direct comparison. In that research the question was not constructed as an interval scale, but as a multiple-answer question (out of the 12 answers offered, the participants were able to chose only 3). Still, the previous data might be used for an illustration of changes or continuity.

As is visible, almost a half of the goals offered are considered by most of the participants to be priorities. Among them the reduction of unemployment, the fight against crime and corruption as well as economic growth and development are especially emphasized. It is obvious that the Croatian citizens are burdened by existential problems, which is why the improvement of the socio-economic situation is their number one priority. The importance of these goals is supported by the high ranking of ensuring social justice and security, as well as improvement of the position of youth and women. The later data again provokes us to ask why the feminists are so poorly ranked on the scale of tolerance toward social groups when their basic goal is exactly to improve the social position of women, something the participants care about without a doubt. The bottom of the scale is interesting because it mostly consists of answers which cause great turmoil in the political public, while they are obviously less important to the citizens compared to other priorities. However, in the context of this research, the most interesting position is the one regarding Croatia's accession to the EU as a political goal. About the same time Croatia began to near its realization, and when it was declared as an unquestionable priority by those in power, less than a half of the participants emphasized this goal as the most important one. It would seem that there is a disagreement between the citizens and those in power concerning the determination of political priorities, so the difficulties which occur in the realization of EU accession might easily affect the citizens' support for this goal.⁸

The intergenerational comparison again demonstrated that the young express almost all of the political goals somewhat less than the adults. This is especially evident regarding the protection of the dignity of the Homeland War and spiritual renewal, the development of private enterprise, economic development, fighting corruption, ensuring social justice and stimulating the population growth. We might say that the consistently higher emphasis of almost all the suggested goals by the adult participants is witness to their greater interest in political events and a better understanding – based on experience – of the problems burdening the Croatian society. It is intriguing that the young express the need for population growth notably less, even though the society, completely naturally, expects the most in this regard from the young. The same goes for

⁸ This is testified to by the data on the changes in the importance of this goal, which was researched in the pre-election surveys since 1990, conducted within the project *Elections, Parties and the Parliament in Croatia 1990-2000* at the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Zagreb (research team: I. Grdešić, M. Kasapović, I. Šiber i N. Zakošek). Along with all the limitations regarding the methodological barriers, a rough comparison would indicate that in 1990 this was the most accepted goal, and its importance decreased systematically until 1999, when it somewhat increased (Ilišin, 2002: 175), only to fall again now.

spiritual renewal as a less accepted priority, which is deemed important because of the socialization of youth.

Otherwise there have been no significant changes in the priorities of the young in the past five years, regarding their rating – back then the upper portion, as well as a considerable part of the lower portion of the scale, was similar. The reduction of unemployment, ensuring social justice and individual rights remain constant among the political priorities, and it is indicative that the acceptance of these values increased permanently from the beginning of 1990 (Ilišin, 2002: 175). The reason for youth's sensitivity to these problems must lie in the constant increase of unemployment and social insecurity, as well as in the blatant examples of the violation of individual rights.

The factor analysis demonstrated that the political goals are structured into four factors (with a total variance of 47.2%), shown in Table 12, and the variance analysis indicated how and how much the young are different in their acceptance of certain priorities.

The first factor – *the value of equality and justice* – consists of goals that are primarily focused on the insurance of individual rights and social justice, along with the acceptance of the position of marginal groups, such as women and youth. These are already high priority among the young, so the high consensus among them is not surprising. To be more exact, only young women accept this set of values more than the men (F-ratio=55.02), most probably contributed by the goal regarding the improvement of the position of women

The national and traditional values is the label of the second factor consisting of political goals which reflect national affiliation, pride and concern for national survival, along with the demand for a spiritual renewal, based on traditional values (if judged by the public appeals about the necessity of a moral renewal of the nation). The included goals are among those least or averagely accepted, and since they constitute a specific model of political thought, it is not surprising that the young are different in the acceptance of these values according to their observed attributes (with F-ratios ranging from 95.75 to 9.25), aside from gender. These goals are above averagely accepted by the religious participants (opposite the non-religious), supporters of HDZ and HSP (unlike the voters of HNS and SDP), youth with a rural provenience and domicile (compared to the urban youth), living in Eastern Croatia and Dalmatia (versus the inhabitants of Istria, Primorje and Zagreb), participants who, as their fathers, are unqualified or have a vocational education (as opposed to the highly educated), pupils, the unemployed and those up to 19 years of age. These trends clearly indicate that these are the groups of youth where the traditional values have deep roots, and who are only partially influenced by the modernization processes.

Table 12: The factor structure of political priorities

Political goals	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
Ensuring human rights and freedoms	.727			
Ensuring social justice and security for all	.681			
Improving the position of women	.639			
Environmental protection	.620			
Improving the position of youth	.590			
Supporting Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina		.749		
Protecting the dignity of the Homeland War		.725		
Spiritual renewal		.613		
Strengthening military power and security of the state		.591		
Stimulating population growth		.588		
Croatia's accession to the European Union			.689	
Harmony between Croats and ethnic minorities			.667	
Punishing war crimes and cooperating with Hague			.651	
Improving the relationship with neighboring countries			.561	
Development of regions and decentralization of Croatia			.495	
Economic growth and development				.670
Reducing unemployment	.317			.638
Fighting crime and corruption				.530
Developing private enterprise			.332	.507
<i>% of common variance</i>	<i>13.3</i>	<i>12.7</i>	<i>11.5</i>	<i>9.7</i>

The third factor may be labeled *values of integration and cooperation* because it almost completely incorporates the goals aimed at Croatia's integration in the wider European environment and its coexistence within and outside of national borders. These values mostly have an average acceptance of youth, but there is a high level of consensus in among them. The only difference occurs regarding the party affiliation (F-ratio=11.26): integration and cooperation is something that the sympathizers of HNS and SDP care about the most, and HSP's voters the least. In this case, a convergence of party rhetoric and opinions of party supporters is evident, and we may assume that the anti-European attitudes of HSP attract new supporters to this party, who according to some other attributes do not belong to its "typical" electorate.

The fourth factor, that is *values of socio-economic development*, is very consistent in content and very common among the youth. However, in spite of

this, the young are not homogenous in accepting this value set, because they differ according to age, socio-professional, educational and regional status (the F-ratios range from 30.04 to 5.97). To be more specific, the acceptance of the values of the socio-economic development increases linearly with age and education of youth, and it is more expressed by the employed and students (compared to pupils) and inhabitants of Central Croatia, Istria and Primorje (opposite those living in Eastern Croatia). The mentioned characteristics indicated that the values of socio-economic development are to a certain degree an opposing pole to the national and traditional values, because similar groups of youth accept one above averagely, and the other below average. Behind it, we suspect a latent conflict of the modernist and traditionally oriented youth, reflected on their ranking of political goals.

4. The perception of social and political problems

In this segment we will analyze the perception of the problems of Croatian society, the perception of corruption, the vision of social inequalities and the estimate of the causes of the existing difficulties in Croatian society and the choice of protagonists that can contribute to overcoming of these problems the most.

The insight into the priorities of Croatian politics, as seen by the young, already sketched out the problems that might be perceived as most important. A comparison with the results of the 1999 research will indicate whether there were any changes in the perception of the most important problems of Croatian society today (Table 13). Here, we must mention that the participants were able to choose a maximum of three problems out of the 17 offered.

At the top of the ranking scale of social problems are those of the socio-economic nature, which is in line with the previously established ranking of priorities of Croatian politics. It is, therefore, obvious that Croatian citizens are burdened by existential problems so much that all others are less important, just as all other priorities lost the race against the ones regarding economic and development policies. The newly added problem of bribery and corruption has a high rating, in accordance with the emphasis on the fight against this phenomenon as a political goal, as well as the assessments of national and international organizations, putting Croatia high up on the scale of presence of bribery and corruption.

It is interesting that the young express most of the observed problems somewhat more than the adults, and this is especially true when it comes to the problems of bribery and corruption, unemployment, alcoholism and drug abuse. The particularity of these problems is undoubtedly a generational issue, because

it is common knowledge – which is corroborated by official statistics – that the percentage of unemployment is highest among the young, as well as that they are the most numerous victims of addictions. Why the young are more sensitive to bribery and corruption is an open issue, but one might speculate that the lack of life experience, in the sense of facing the “efficiency” and “usefulness” of corruptive behavior for those that need or want something, contributes to a harsher disapproval of this phenomenon. Some problems are, on the other hand, perceived by the young as less important, but this can also be explained with generational differences in mind. Thus, the adults express economic problems, privatization crime, social differences and the appearance of organized crime more often – most problems newer in date. It is not irrelevant that almost all the adults were socialized in a socialist society, and most spent a part or their entire working lives in that system. This must contribute to an increased sensitivity to the ruining of economic resources, which they created themselves, the consequence of which is the mass loss of employment, the decrease of the living standard and the enormous deepening of social differences. In other words, their immediate experiences make them more critical toward the phenomena occurring in the problematic transformation of a planned into a market economy.

Table 13: A comparative outline of the perception of the greatest problems in Croatian society (%)

Social problems	Youth		Adults
	1999	2004	2004
Unemployment	59.7	58.7	51.4
Economic problems	51.4	48.8	54.0
Bribery and corruption	–	28.2	23.1
Crime in ownership transformation and privatization	31.6	25.5	32.8
Social inequalities	24.4	19.7	24.1
Lack of work, discipline and responsibility	10.8	19.1	19.9
Low evaluation of work and knowledge	15.5	17.0	15.4
Morality crisis	16.5	15.1	20.0
Organized crime	11.8	12.8	16.6
Alcoholism, drug addiction, etc.	21.5	11.3	7.0
School and educational system	6.2	6.4	4.3
Disrespect for human rights and freedoms	14.1	6.2	3.4
Insufficient democratization of society	–	4.5	3.6
Housing problems	7.4	3.9	2.7
Pollution of the human environment	6.3	3.3	1.3
Inter-ethnic relations	3.7	2.9	1.3
Religious problems	0.7	0.6	0.5

As for the changes in the perception of social reality, it is symptomatic that there was a decrease in pronouncing of all the analyzed problems by the young, especially the violation of human rights and freedoms, crime in transformation and privatization (suggesting that the future generations will have forgotten how a part of the social elite got their wealth), social differences and addictions. Therefore, it follows that the young seem to notice certain improvements in these areas or that the conditions of “wild capitalism” (Županov, 2002) – during which they were socialized becoming the only ones they have immediate insight into – have blunted their critical blade. However, there is one problem that the young do express almost twice as often than before: lack of work, discipline and responsibility. This might actually be a rare indicator of a positive adjustment to the European environment, where the work ethics and discipline are stricter.

An analysis regarding the observed attributes of youth demonstrated that they are quite homogenous in the perception of social problems, because only six of those problems arise some statistically significant differences, most of them sporadically. The exception is the problem of unemployment, raising the most disaccord. The emphasis on this problem as the most important decreases linearly with age ($\chi^2=38.38$), participants' level of education ($\chi^2=21.39$), their fathers' education ($\chi^2=25.56$), and the urbanization of their place of habitat ($\chi^2=12.25$). Aside from the groups of youth with a poorer social status, unemployment is seen as a greater problem by the unemployed and pupils, opposite the employed and students ($\chi^2=35.29$), women ($\chi^2=12.25$) and the religious participants ($\chi^2=16.06$). Most of the mentioned attributes point to the fact that the situational circumstances dictate a great deal how unemployment as a social problem is seen – it is more felt by youth whose starting positions (social background, development of their place of residence) and competitive power on the labor market (education, gender) are lower. Paying attention to crime in transformation and privatization increases linearly with age ($\chi^2=22.71$), where it is more emphasized by the employed than the pupils ($\chi^2=17.74$). The poor validation of work and knowledge is expressed more with the increase of the youth's level of education ($\chi^2=30.55$), as well as the fathers' education level ($\chi^2=17.84$). The situation is different with alcoholism and drug abuse: the expression of this problem decreases with the increase in the level of education of the young ($\chi^2=37.25$), and it is most emphasized by the pupils, opposite the employed and students ($\chi^2=45.18$). Finally, the lack of work, discipline and responsibility is a somewhat greater problem in the eyes of men ($\chi^2=12.16$), and the moral crisis is more pronounced by the young from Istria and Primorje, unlike their peers from Northern Croatia ($\chi^2=22.37$). In most of these differentiations a decisive role is played by situational circumstances, which obviously contribute to the greater sensitivity of the young who are more

directly involved in one of these social problems or suffer the consequences of not solving them.

We assumed in this research that bribery and corruption will be at the top of the existing social problems, which is why we additionally examined the areas of social life in which the participants notice the existence of this phenomenon. The perception of the existence of corruption was investigated in seven areas, and the answers consisted of four degrees (from “a lot” to “none”). The answers for the degree “none” ranged from 3 to 8%, indicating that the participants noticed the existence of a certain degree of corruption, in all the analyzed areas. In this regard, the results of this research are completely in line with other surveys regarding the perception of the presence of corruption in Croatia, determining that the perception of corruption affects the negative dynamics of social capital (Štulhofer, 2004: 166).

Graph 4 only portrays the answers for the degree “a lot”, in order to gain an insight into where corruption has the deepest roots, according to the participant's judgment.


The data shown indicate that most Croatian citizens perceive judiciary to be the area laden with corruption, while the education system holds the opposite pole, with a quarter of the participants thinking it is corrupted. When these data are looked at generally, they look slashing and they partially explain the earlier established low trust in the Croatian judiciary, Government and public services. In this context, the most problematic is the judiciary, especially because we can assume, with great confidence, that the impression (or knowledge) about the spread of corruption among those dealing with justice, leads directly to the mistrust in the institutions of the system, the legal state and the rule of law.

The fight against bribery and corruption was more often stated as a political priority by the young than the adults, but regarding the concrete perception of the spread of corruption in the observed areas, it was shown that the existence of corruption is less perceived by youth than the adults, especially regarding the judiciary and health systems. However, they do notice it more in two cases: in the school system and police. These generational differences accurately reflect the differences in living experience, that is, they are linked with the greater immediate relationship with certain institutions. The young are forced to address certain services and institutions less than the adults, so they probably cannot estimate the scope of corruption as easily.

This tendency is confirmed by the differences within the youth sample. The statistically significant differences are generated by age, socio-professional status and level of education. The perception of a lot of corruption in the judiciary and health systems, local authorities and public administration increases consistently with age (χ^2 ranges from 31.54 do 17.61) and level of education of youth (χ^2

ranges from 28.03 to 17.91), and the oldest and most educated youth is joined by the employed and students, while pupils notice corruption in these four areas under the average (χ^2 ranges from 30.36 do 21.29). The perception of corruption, therefore, predominantly depends on the existing social status, and the level of maturity of youth is linked to this, while a significant role is played by competence mediated through more education. In other words, the concrete attitudes regarding corruption are not caused by differences in ideological orientations but, primarily, by the living situation and experience.

Graph 4: The ranking scale of the perception of a significant existence of corruption in certain social areas – youth and adults (%)



It was already demonstrated that the participants highly validate equality and social justice (both as constitutional principles and as political priorities) and that the social differences are considered to be one of the most important social problems. Even though social inequalities exist in all modern societies, this issue is raised with renewed strength in societies in transition, whose citizens still have memories of socialism, which was officially defined as a society with social equality. The participants were offered nine pairs of social groups in order to evaluate which of the compared social groups are in a worse, same or better position. Table 14 portrays which of the social groups in question are in a worse position compared to their counterpart groups.

Table 14: A comparative outline of the perception of a poorer position of some social groups (%)

Social groups in worse position	Youth		Adults
	1999	2004	2004
The poor vs. the rich	93.1	91.2	91.7
The unemployed vs. the employed	90.5	87.4	90.2
The uneducated vs. the educated	64.8	81.4	82.2
Living in villages vs. living in cities	54.2	62.4	59.5
Women vs. men	28.9	41.2	43.3
Youth vs. adults	34.2	39.5	43.8
Opposition members vs. ruling party members	65.4	38.4	38.8
Ethnic minorities' members vs. Croats	35.9	33.3	26.6
Atheists vs. religious believers	27.3	21.2	20.4

The obtained results demonstrate that the participants, without much dilemma, believe that the social groups of the poor, unemployed, uneducated and living in rural areas are more deprived. These social handicaps are difficult in their own right, and it is even worse that there is often a tight interdependence of poverty, lack of qualifications and employment. Exiting this circle of misery is difficult and uncertain, and the participants obviously recognize the set of circumstances which keep certain groups of citizens at the social bottom. In their perception of social inequalities, the young and adults are mostly unanimous, seen by the identical ranking of the social groups they think are in a worse position. Even though the young are inclined to perceive a little less inequality than the adults in most cases, the opposite is true in two cases: the young emphasize a worse position of national minorities and the rural population more.

The changes among the young are much more indicative. They tell us that the emphasis in their perceptions regarding social inequalities is changing, which might mean that in some areas they are deepened and in some they are

alleviated. In other words, the social inequalities exist and transform in line with the changes in the given time and space. Compared to the data from five years earlier, among the less perceived inequalities are the worse positions of the members of opposition compared to the ruling parties' members, and somewhat less of atheists compared to the religious population. The perceived reduction of political inequalities is most probably caused by the dynamic in the change of power during the observed period of time, which demonstrated that no party can monopolize power the way it was done in the first transitional decade. Since the five-party coalition was in power for four out of the five observed years, a portion of the perceived decrease of political inequality might probably be ascribed to the manner of the previous HDZ's government and the government of the coalition, headed by SDP, and it is possible that the very common assessment that "all politicians are the same" had its effect here. As for the reduction in the perception of a worse position of atheists, it is probably a consequence of the increase in the number of participants declaring their religiousness, which is why the inequalities of this type are out of their sight.

However, the data shows that the young perceive certain inequalities to a greater degree than before, which is especially true of the educational and gender inequalities. One might assume that the harsher competition on the labor market and demands for a more qualified labor force in the stumbling Croatian economy – and after the turbulent 1990s, where social status and wealth were (too) often acquired based on spoils and suitability, and not knowledge and merit – affected the youth's ability to see more clearly the inequalities between the educated and those without an education. Let's mention that this perception of educational inequalities raises the issue of inequalities of opportunities for education, which may also be expected to deepen in line with the changes of the social structure and stratification of the society. A greater perception of the worse position of women, on the other hand, suggests that the activities of women's associations and of state authorities in charge of promoting women's rights are achieving some results. Specifically, the position of women has not changed considerably in the past five years, certainly not for the worse (after it had deteriorated at the beginning of the transitional period), but this data indicates that the awareness of the public about the existence of gender-based inequalities has changed.

The factor analysis (Table 15) obtained three factors (total variance of 47.4%), logically configured and basically identical to the ones obtained in the research five years ago (Ilišin, 2002:164).

Table 15: The factor structure of social inequalities

Social groups in worse position	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
The poor vs. the rich	.718		
The unemployed vs. the employed	.619		
The uneducated vs. the educated	.598		
Ethnic minorities' members vs. Croats		.670	
Atheists vs. religious believers		.698	
Opposition members vs. ruling party members	.328	.464	
Youth vs. adults			.809
Women vs. men		.377	.537
Living in villages vs. living in cities	.340		.497
<i>% of common variance</i>	<i>18.1</i>	<i>14.7</i>	<i>14.6</i>

The first factor can be labeled *social inequalities* because it consists of the commonly known inequalities in all modern societies. Judging by the distribution of answers, this is the most common and very consistent type of inequality, and the young are quite unanimous about it. The variance analysis demonstrated that only those with a vocational education (F-ratio=8.34) and those from Istria and Primorje – opposite the participants from Eastern Slavonia (F-ratio=5.80) – perceive social inequalities less. The regional differences are easily explained by differences in development, but the question remains why the young with three years of high school education perceive social inequalities less. Perhaps the fact that most of them are already employed contributes to the greater sense of social security and numbs their sensitivity to equalities existing outside of the scope of personal experience.

Political inequalities (the second factor) are constituted by the perceived inequalities at the national, religious and narrow political levels. In a democratic society, inequalities based on ethnicity and religiousness should not have political connotations, but the Croatian experience and research (e.g. Vrcan and others, 1995; Zakošek, 1994, 1998, 2001; Šiber, 1998, 2001) indicated a significant correlation between political beliefs and the religious and national component. The distribution of answers already indicated that the perception of this type of inequality is already decreasing and that the young think it is emphasized the least, while the variance analysis shows that the young are quite different among each other in this regard (the F-ratios range from 29.03 to 4.54). Political inequalities are mostly perceived by women, youth from Zagreb (born and living in it), the highly educated (unlike those without qualifications) and supporters of HNS and SDP (versus the voters of HSP). This differentiation of the participants suggests that the sensitivity to political inequalities increases along with the level of education and development of the environment, as well as according to the identification with the left-wing political parties.


The third factor, *socio-cultural inequalities*, is constituted by the antagonisms youth-adults, women-men and rural-urban, with elements of traditionalism and patriarchalism with accompanying stereo-types in their roots. As was indicated by the distribution of answers, this type of inequality is on the rise, i.e. these inequalities are, as a rule, more perceived after the calming of great social and political turmoil. In other words, the age related stratification and gender equality usually come to the agenda when a society, including Croatia, enters a more stable phase. Regarding the inequality between the populations of rural and urban areas, it is a direct consequence of the continuing underdevelopment and depopulation of rural areas, opposite the higher quality of life in urban centers with a concentration of economic resources, educational institutions and a number of other benefits.

It is not questionable that the transition in Croatia was marked by numerous difficulties, and it was already shown how the young rate the existing problems. But, we were interested in who or what the responsibility for the existing economic and social problems is addressed to. Graph 5 portrays the distribution of the obtained results, noting that the participants could choose a maximum of two out of the eight answers offered.

Most of the participants believe that the war and its consequences are the main cause of the existing difficulties in Croatia. It is not surprising, because the war is often apostrophized in the public as the cause of Croatia's socio-economic regression. This is at least partially true, just as the fact that the war affected the dynamic of consolidation of the social and political system and the political awareness and behavior of Croatian citizens.

Aside from the war, the participants emphasize two other “culprits” – the immorality of new entrepreneurs and crime, and the bad politics of HDZ from 1990 to 2000. This is also not unexpected, because the Croatian privatization model was the object of numerous critics and the cause of unwanted consequences for the wider population. The new entrepreneurs appeared within this model, created by HDZ and used to restructure the economy for an entire decade. It is interesting that half as many participants address the responsibility for the existing difficulties to the coalition government, who was nonetheless defeated in the November 2003 elections, and HDZ got another chance to try and mobilize the social development. It would seem, therefore, that the overly high expectations regarding the correction of privatization and other irregularities and injustices, apparent at the beginning of 2000, transformed into an equally high level of disappointment four years later.

Graph 5: The ranking scale of the causes of economic and social problems in Croatia – youth and adults (%)



It is equally intriguing that only one out of eight participants sees the socialist heritage as the cause of today's problems, since at the beginning of transition, the Croatian citizens were the most critical toward the socialist regime, and its economic and political system, out of the citizens of all the post-socialists countries (Županov, 1996; Sekulić, Šporer, 1997). It is probable that the experience of living in new conditions during the last 15 years – characterized by poverty, social insecurity, unemployment, increasing crime, etc. – removed the etiquette of the “attending culprit” for all Croatian misfortunes, and the very passage of time brings new causes in the place of the old.

As is visible in Graph 5, the young state war and its consequences as the cause of difficulties more than the adults, which is understandable since they were raised during and after the war. Since the period of maturity is a time of increased vulnerability, it is expected that the war had a deeper impact on the young. On the other side, the young emphasize the immorality of new entrepreneurs and crime somewhat less, also explainable with the fact that they were not the ones whose right to manage the nationalized social ownership was stripped from, and the ones losing jobs, but the adults.

The young differ among each other regarding the emphasis on the first five causes of the problems, and the summarized results can be found in Table 16.

The obtained results are quite expected. It is logical that HDZ's responsibility for the problems is most emphasized by the supporters of SDP and HNS unlike HDZ's voters. They are joined by the non-religious participants opposite the religious, living in major cities, especially Zagreb, Istria and Primorje, contrary to the inhabitants of Dalmatia and Central Croatia, as well as students versus the unemployed. Along with that, criticism towards HDZ increases linearly with the father's level of education. The attributes of these participants are very similar to those established in the supporters of the opposition today (primarily HNS and SDP), which is the best explanation of the established ambiguous attitude of the young about HDZ's responsibility for existing problems in Croatia, which is also a cause of difficulties they are the least unanimous about. They are almost equally divided regarding the guilt of the former coalition government. In this case the signs are different – greater responsibility is ascribed by the sympathizers of HSP and HDZ (unlike the potential voters of DP and HNS, youth of rural origin and domicile, those with vocational qualification, opposed to the academically educated participants. Also, the support for the observed attitude decreases linearly with the increase of the father's level of education. Here, we can also see the convergence of the attributes of participants addressing the blame to the coalition government with those who are usually HDZ's supporters. All that was mentioned points to the fact that the political polarization among the young is consistent and significantly present. War and its consequences are above averagely emphasized by HDZ's supporters (versus the voters of HNS and SDP), pupils and the unemployed, and the support for this attitude decreases with age, and it is under averagely represented by the non-religious participants. Stating the immorality of new entrepreneurs and crime as the causes of the economic and social problems, increases with age and education, and peaks among the students and the employed (versus the unemployed and pupils). Therefore, it is obvious that the increasing social competence breeds more criticism toward the privatization model, and puts less emphasis on the negative effects of the war, as a sort of “vis maior”.

Political Values, Attitudes and Participation of Youth: Continuity and Change


Table 16: The perception of the causes of economic and social problems regarding the attributes of youth (%)

Attributes of youth	War and its consequences	Immorality of new entrepreneurs and crime	Bad politics of HDZ 1990-2000	Bad politics of coalition government 2000-2003	Condition inherited from socialism
<i>Age</i>	$\chi^2=24.48$	$\chi^2=32.19$			
15 – 19 years	68.2	33.6			
20 – 24 years	60.4	45.1			
25 – 29 years	55.0	48.2			
<i>Socio-professional status</i>	$\chi^2=30.27$	$\chi^2=25.46$	$\chi^2=21.60$		
Employed	56.3	46.3	44.1		
Unemployed	67.1	40.6	34.3		
Pupils	68.9	33.0	37.1		
Students	55.5	47.1	48.0		
<i>Father's education</i>			$\chi^2=20.96$	$\chi^2=23.61$	
Primary school or less			34.2	18.8	
Vocational school			38.1	18.5	
High school			43.4	12.1	
College, univer. or more			48.7	9.7	
<i>Education</i>		$\chi^2=22.03$		$\chi^2=20.12$	
Primary school or less		35.1		15.4	
Vocational school		41.0		21.5	
High school		45.0		12.9	
College, univer. or more		51.3		9.6	
<i>Place of birth</i>				$\chi^2=23.07$	
Village				19.1	
Small town				11.7	
Major city				12.0	
Zagreb				10.4	
<i>Place of habitat</i>			$\chi^2=23.29$	$\chi^2=19.68$	
Village			40.2	18.4	
Small town			35.3	11.3	
Major city			48.0	11.9	
Zagreb			49.9	10.1	
<i>Regional status</i>			$\chi^2=35.71$		
Northern Croatia			44.1		
Central Croatia			32.9		
Istria and Primorje			48.1		
Eastern Croatia			34.1		
Dalmatia			36.1		
Zagreb			50.4		
<i>Religiousness</i>	$\chi^2=20.65$		$\chi^2=54.62$		
Religious	63.6		36.8		
Undecided	60.2		50.2		
Not religious	47.0		60.9		
<i>Party affiliation</i>	$\chi^2=32.88$		$\chi^2=244.22$	$\chi^2=63.38$	$\chi^2=43.27$
HDZ	70.9		18.3	22.5	17.9
HNS	52.5		63.3	6.5	9.4
HSP	59.4		32.8	24.6	21.6
HSS	55.3		55.3	17.0	11.7
SDP	53.1		70.9	4.6	5.4
Undecided	61.9		39.7	13.3	9.6
TOTAL	61.3	42.6	41.6	14.7	12.2

Finally, socialism is considered more responsible by the sympathizers of HSP and HDZ, while this attitude is less present among the supporters of SDP and HNS, and the undecided participants. This polarization of the supporters of the mentioned parties is actually expected, because it quite accurately reflects the party rhetoric, as well as the positioning of the parties on the left-right continuum.

The final investigated attitudes in this segment are related with the social protagonists the participants believe might do the most for Croatia's exit from the existing difficult situation. The participants were again able to choose a maximum of two out of the eight answers offered, and their choices are portrayed in Graph 6.

Graph 6: The ranking scale of social protagonists that can contribute to overcoming of existing difficulties in Croatia – youth and adults (%)



Out of all the social protagonists offered, experts and intellectuals are the only ones most participants believe might contribute to the overcoming of existing difficulties, while youth, politicians, political parties and private entrepreneurs and managers have a solid rating. It seems that in the estimate of a potential contribution two approaches of the participants are used: what would be the ideal situation and what is given by the existing relations of power. namely, it is often debatable how much the knowledge of experts and intellectuals is taken into consideration when making developmental decisions, and it is evident that the inclusion of youth is minimal. On the other hand, although the politicians, and especially parties, do not enjoy the greatest trust of the participants, they still believe that political protagonists have the most power in Croatia, where the elements of “political capitalism” are still quite alive (Županov, 2002). However, there is also a budding entrepreneurial capitalism, objectively increasing the power of private entrepreneurs and managers, also expected to strengthen their own role in developmental projects. The participants have no high hopes for the workers, farmers and civil servants, and nothing is expected from the clergy. The later result probably reflects the people's conception that the Church is in charge of spiritual and moral issues, and not ensuring the material conditions for a life of dignity.

The differences among the young and the adults are small, but more than indicative – as much as the young trust the abilities of their own generation, the adults are more convinced of the possible contribution of experts and private entrepreneurs to. The discrepancy in the vision of a potential social contribution of youth is without a doubt an indication of a social mistrust in the young, which is proven by the adults' answers here.

The young themselves are symptomatically different in their emphasis of the potential contribution of the observed protagonists in overcoming of developmental problems. To start, we should mention that the young are completely homogenous regarding the estimated potential contribution of their generation. On the other hand, most disagreements were registered regarding the estimated contribution of private entrepreneurs and managers. The faith in this group increases linearly with the level of education ($\chi^2=18.61$), the level of urbanization of the place the participants were born in ($\chi^2=25.15$) and live ($\chi^2=25.15$), and the educated, urban youth is joined by the employed unlike the pupils and the unemployed ($\chi^2=25.58$), who in their lack of trust are joined by the young from Northern and Eastern Croatia ($\chi^2=38.69$). The characteristics of those that emphasize the potential contribution of experts and intellectuals are somewhat similar: this emphasis increases linearly with the participants' ($\chi^2=73.95$) and their fathers' level of education ($\chi^2=36.55$), they are joined by students – unlike the pupils and the unemployed ($\chi^2=43.62$) – as well as HNS's voters opposite the supporters of HDZ ($\chi^2=27.09$). As for the other analyzed protagonists, the


differences are sporadic. Thus, the faith in the contribution of civil servants decreases linearly with the increase of the participants' ($\chi^2=21.10$) and their fathers' ($\chi^2=19.39$) education; the young with a vocational education, versus the highly educated participants ($\chi^2=18.13$) trust the workers more; and the sympathizers of HSS and HSP put the least hope in the farmers, as opposed to the supporters of HNS and SDP ($\chi^2=22.77$). If we look at the established differences in general, the current social status and the conditions of socialization have an evidently significant influence. These factors are correlated with the party affiliation, which actually depend significantly on the mentioned attributes of the participants.

5. The political participation and potential of youth


For an improved understanding of youth and their relationship toward politics, an insight into their political participation is necessary. It is already well known that this participation is low, in general and in comparison with the adults. this phenomenon deserves our attention for at least three reasons: the optimal functioning of the democratic order and institutions depends on the adequate political participation of the citizens; in the process of democratic consolidation the engagement of all segments of the society is necessary (especially those which demonstrate an innovative potential); the participation of youth in political processes motivates and enables them to make decisions now and in the future. This segment shall analyze the interest of youth in politics, its perception of the representation of marginal groups in Croatian politics, the participation in different organizations, the readiness for personal engagement, the perception of the optimal forms for the political engagement of youth and the protagonists which might stimulate it to actively participate in the society.

We have already mentioned that the young express lest interest in politics, and we should add that it is believed they do not lack interest *per se* but, rather, react to politics, which is mostly not interested in the young, that is, their problems and opinions (Bynner, Ashford, 1994). In this research we measured the interest in politics in two ways: through the self-estimate of the participants regarding their interest in politics and political events (Graph 7), and the frequency of communicating with friends and parents (in the case of youth) or with friends (in the case of adults) about politics and society (Graph 8).

Graph 7: A comparative outline of the declared interest in politics (%)



Graph 8: The frequency of communication about political issues – youth and adults (%)



The declared interest in politics is, as was expected, smaller among the young. Still, in the observed five year period, there has been an increase of those

that are somewhat interested at the expense of those who are completely uninterested. This is still under the level of political interest of youth in the socialist period, which was within the range of today's interest of the adults (Ilišin, 2003: 49). Even when considering the communication about politics and society, it turns out the young are less inclined to this subject than the adults, where they communicate more with their friends than their parents. The communication about political issues is also higher than their declared interest in politics, probably because social events are included into these conversations. The widening of this subject outside of the narrow definition of politics obviously increases the level of interest in exchanging information and comments.⁹

The young are significantly different regarding their interest in politics, which is most evident in their conversations with friends. However, since all three examined indicators of interest in politics are linked with the similar attributes of youth, the obtained results are all portrayed in Table 17.

It is obvious from the summarized data that the interest in politics in all three of the examined forms is not only linked with religiousness and provenience of youth. It is also immediately evident that this combined political interests increases along with the age of the participants and their fathers' level of education, as well as that greater interest is expressed by the supporters of HNS and HSS, students and the employed, versus the participants without party affiliation, pupils and the unemployed. The declared interest in politics is also higher with men and those living in Zagreb. The communication about political issues – both with friends and parents – is also more intense the more educated the participants are. As for communication with friends, politics is a more common topic among youth from Zagreb (unlike the young from Northern and Eastern Croatia) and young men. Data summarized in this way confirm the well known tendency that maturing and achieving a higher social status (including education) increases the interest in politics. It is interesting in the context of Croatia, that the supporters of HNS and HSP are most politicized, which might be linked with the fact that a significant portion of these parties' voters are students (who are among the most interested), and it might be connected with the clear programmatic and rhetoric profile of these parties (also positioned on the opposing poles on the dimension of left-right ideological orientations).

⁹ We must mention that the declared interest in politics, along with military and defense matters, are at the bottom of the scale including 15 interests (of youth and adults), just as the conversation about politics is at the bottom of the scale regarding the frequency of conversations the young have with their friends and parents (along with talking about sex and love). This means that, in spite of certain shifts, politics is permanently at the margin of interest of youth (and, to a considerable degree, the adults) compared to other contents of everyday life.

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Table 17: Interest in politics and political issues regarding the attributes of youth (%)

Attributes of youth	Interest in politics			Communic. with friends			Communic. with parents		
	High	Average	No interest	Often	Sometimes	Never	Often	Sometimes	Never
<i>Gender</i>	$\chi^2=18.74$			$\chi^2=26.74$					
Female	7.7	52.6	39.7	17.2	46.8	36.0			
Male	13.7	49.1	37.2	25.1	47.6	27.2			
<i>Age</i>	$\chi^2=27.20$			$\chi^2=101.20$			$\chi^2=71.09$		
15 – 19 years	10.4	45.2	44.4	17.9	36.3	45.7	13.0	42.6	44.4
20 – 24 years	10.9	49.3	39.9	22.0	50.1	27.9	17.9	53.1	29.0
25 – 29 years	10.9	58.1	31.0	23.9	55.3	20.8	16.9	59.5	23.6
<i>Socio-profess. status</i>	$\chi^2=27.48$			$\chi^2=100.40$			$\chi^2=64.18$		
Employed	9.5	55.2	35.3	22.0	54.6	23.4	15.0	59.1	25.9
Unemployed	7.7	51.4	40.9	19.6	46.2	34.1	14.6	50.9	34.5
Pupils	11.2	44.4	44.4	16.5	34.8	48.7	13.2	41.8	45.1
Students	15.3	49.6	35.0	26.9	49.1	24.0	21.9	50.8	27.2
<i>Father's education</i>	$\chi^2=25.28$			$\chi^2=27.64$			$\chi^2=55.55$		
Primary school or less	8.8	53.1	38.1	16.8	45.9	37.3	8.6	52.4	38.9
Vocational school	9.5	50.6	39.9	18.1	48.7	33.2	14.5	52.5	33.0
High school	9.7	47.7	42.6	22.5	46.8	30.7	15.1	51.3	33.6
University or more	15.6	54.3	30.1	28.4	46.9	24.8	25.8	50.9	23.2
<i>Education</i>				$\chi^2=103.70$			$\chi^2=82.49$		
Primary school or less				15.5	36.8	47.7	12.2	42.6	45.2
Vocational school				18.2	49.4	32.4	11.5	52.7	35.8
High school				24.5	51.2	24.3	18.2	55.0	26.8
University or more				27.1	53.3	19.6	23.0	58.8	18.1
<i>Place of habitat</i>	$\chi^2=27.98$			$\chi^2=38.22$					
Village	8.9	53.0	38.1	17.8	48.8	33.4			
Small town	9.3	50.4	40.3	20.4	45.2	34.2			
Major city	9.9	45.5	44.6	19.8	48.5	31.7			
Zagreb	17.9	49.3	32.9	32.3	45.7	22.0			
<i>Regional status</i>				$\chi^2=47.55$					
Northern Croatia				17.3	47.7	35.0			
Central Croatia				18.5	54.9	26.6			
Istria and Primorje				16.5	48.8	34.7			
Eastern Croatia				19.0	44.4	36.5			
Dalmatia				22.7	45.9	31.4			
Zagreb				32.2	46.1	21.7			
<i>Party affiliation</i>	$\chi^2=37.51$			$\chi^2=49.19$			$\chi^2=45.69$		
HDZ	12.5	53.5	34.0	23.0	45.5	31.5	18.2	50.4	31.4
HNS	15.3	54.0	30.7	32.1	46.7	21.2	18.1	60.1	21.7
HSP	16.4	53.0	30.6	30.1	45.1	24.8	24.2	50.0	25.8
HSS	4.3	56.4	39.4	21.1	43.0	35.8	10.6	46.8	42.6
SDP	11.9	52.3	35.8	21.5	55.0	23.5	20.5	52.5	27.0
Undecided	7.2	48.4	44.4	15.3	47.4	37.3	10.8	51.4	37.8
TOTAL	10.7	50.8	38.5	21.3	47.2	31.5	16.0	51.7	32.4

It was mentioned in the introduction that the young demonstrate a marginal participation in politics, especially true when it comes to institutions of power. We were, hence, interested in how the young perceive the representation of their own generation and of other marginal, but politically relevant political groups (Table 18), and whether they believe that there should be a legislative act, which should ensure the adequate representation of these groups in the Croatian Parliament (Table 19). Tables 18 and 19 portray the answers “yes” and “no”, while the answer “I do not know” was omitted in order to increase the visibility of the results.

Table 18: A comparative outline of the perception of sufficient representation of marginal groups in Croatian political life (%)

Marginal groups	Youth 1999		Youth 2004		Adults 2004	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Croatian "Diaspora"	–	–	31.0	18.9	39.9	20.2
Ethnic minorities	21.9	23.6	29.6	23.4	42.6	20.6
Women	20.7	41.9	15.9	52.3	22.0	56.7
Youth	8.8	60.6	5.4	73.8	6.7	74.6

As could have been expected, the perception of the need to legally ensure the representation of a certain marginal group decreases with the increased perception of the adequate political representation of this group. The data indicates that the participants believe that the best represented groups in Croatian political life are the “Diaspora” and national minorities – where most participants do not have a clear attitude – while women and youth are perceived as politically marginalized groups. Also, most participants believe that the legislative intervention for the ensuring their adequate representation is necessary, unlike the national minorities and the Croatian “Diaspora” (again, most participants do not really have a defined attitude about this). It would seem that the political representation of national minorities and the “Diaspora” presents an issue for, primarily, the politicians, while the participants believe that the participation of women and youth is a problem more related to their everyday experience.

The young and the adults are almost identical – only regarding national minorities there is a little more understanding for their right to political representation among the young. Even though the adults have demonstrated a significant skepticism earlier, regarding the potential of youth to contribute to resolving Croatia's problems, it is interesting that they now show a high compliance with the young, who see their generation as politically marginalized

and as the group which should be helped the most through legislation to achieve political affirmation.¹⁰

Table 19: The perception of the need for legal insurance of the representation of marginal groups in the Croatian Parliament – youth and adults (%)

Marginal groups	Youth		Adults	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Youth	68.5	10.1	68.7	13.4
Women	58.9	15.5	56.2	22.9
Ethnic minorities	35.6	21.0	35.9	27.8
Croatian "Diaspora"	27.4	27.0	29.3	33.6

If we look only at the results of youth, it is evident that the political position of women and youth is perceived less favorable now than five years earlier. Since there has been positive change in this period of time – at least when the representation of women is concerned – we can again assume that the consolidation of the social and political order revitalized the dissatisfactions and demands that were pushed in the background by the “grand” political topics and goals. This, actually, is one more indicator of the “normalization” of the social and political life, that is, the entering into a more stable period of social development.

The young are polarized regarding their perception of the existing representation of the “Diaspora” and the need to ensure its political representation in the Parliament. Namely, the attitudes that the “Diaspora” is present enough in the political life (the χ^2 range from 78.63 to 29.32) and that its political representation in the Parliament should not be guaranteed by legislation (with χ^2 ranging from 56.93 to 20.57), depend on identical attributes. We are talking about the young from Zagreb, Istria and Primorje, where the support for these attitudes increases with the urbanization of the place of provenience and domicile, age, level of education of the participants and their fathers. These are joined by the students, the non-religious participants and supporters of SDP and

¹⁰ These attitudes of the participants correspond completely with the reality. Specifically, the analysis of the age structure of the Croatian parliamentarians indicate that from the beginning of transition there was a maximum of 2.6% of members younger than 30 (while there is approximately 21% of youth in the electorate), and in the first mandate of the Parliament not one member was younger than 30 (Ilišin, 2003: 47). Such under-representation of youth in the parliament is one more indicator of the collapse of the engagement of youth after the fall of socialism (when the young were guaranteed political representation via the existing organization of youth, ensuring them 5-9% of parliamentary seats).

HNS as well as men. The “Diaspora” is more often perceived as insufficiently present in Croatian politics and as the group whose representation in the Croatian parliament should be legally stimulated, by the rural youth, especially in Dalmatia, the younger, less educated participants with a lower social background, and they are joined by the pupils and the unemployed, the religious participants and supporters of HDZ and HSS. These summarily mentioned attributes clearly indicate that the role of the “Diaspora” in Croatian political life is undoubtedly a political issue regarding which there is no consensus. However, since most young participants do not have a constructed attitude about this issue, a political campaign aimed at strengthening the political role of the “Diaspora” or at its exclusion from the parliament, would fall on fertile soil. There is, therefore, space for influencing the citizens if a serious public debate was conducted about the political status of the “Diaspora”. A certain indifference towards this issue might be linked with the earlier established weak rating of the support for Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because the political representatives of the Croatian “Diaspora” mostly come from the neighboring state. It is obvious that, with the passing of time and the ebbing of the demands for the homogenization of Croats wherever they are, the Croatian citizens are less and less interested in their counterparts who realize their civil and political rights and obligations in another country (for example, the often stated taxation).

Regarding the issue of political “visibility” and the guaranteed political representation of national minorities the young are considerably less differentiated. There is only a partial similarity of those who estimate that the national minorities participate in Croatian politics sufficiently (the χ^2 range from 61.13 to 21.07), and those who believe that they should not have a legally guaranteed entrance into the Parliament (the χ^2 range from 45.31 to 20.34). This is more often the judgment of men, the averagely older youth, and HSP's sympathizers, unlike the supporters of HNS and SDP. Aside from these congruencies, the non-religious participants express the need for a legislative regulation of the representation of national minorities more often ($\chi^2=22.57$), while the employed more often believe that the national minorities are already present enough in Croatian politics. This is also a political issue, but it is obvious that it causes less polarization and that the existing solution is accepted more than in the case of the “Diaspora”. Anyway, the preceding analysis of political priorities demonstrated that the coexistence of Croats and minority nations in the country seems more important to the young than solving the possible problems of the Croats in the “Diaspora”.

As expected, the young women more often estimate that the members of their sex are marginalized in Croatian politics ($\chi^2=91.67$), and that their participation in the parliament needs to be legally ensured ($\chi^2=81.65$). Along with that, the awareness about the insufficient presence of women at the political

scene increases linearly with education ($\chi^2=32.68$). As for the representation of youth, even though almost three quarters of the young participants agreed that it is insufficient, the legally ensured election of the young to the parliament is more supported by women ($\chi^2=30.12$) and participants from major cities and Zagreb ($\chi^2=28.78$). Based on the established trends we can state that the more favorable circumstances of socialization contribute to the awareness of the feeling of deprivation, which consequently increases the readiness to accept social intervention to improve the situation, without waiting for a spontaneous development that might alleviate or eliminate the political discrimination based on sex and, especially, age.

We have seen that both the young and the adults think that youth is most politically marginalized, mostly on the level of political participation. Testifying to the accuracy of this perception are the data about the inclusion of youth in different organizations, that is, associations (Table 20).¹¹

Table 20: A comparative outline of participation in organizations and associations (%)

Organization or association	Youth			Adults
	Europe 2001	Croatia 1999	Croatia 2004	Croatia 2004
Sports association or team	28	19.9	15.8	7.5
Cultural or art association	13	13.4	6.5	6.3
Political party	–	6.8	5.3	8.7
Youth association	9	7.5	4.7	0.0
Labor union	–	9.1	4.1	12.4
Organization for environmental protection	5	5.2	2.4	3.1
Organization for protection of human rights	3	3.2	0.6	0.9
Peace organization	–	2.9	0.6	0.9
Organization for protection of women's rights	–	2.2	0.4	0.3
Other association	5	4.8	2.3	5.1
No association	50	–	66.7	67.0

The indicators of participation of both youth and adults in different organizations and associations are surprising because two thirds of participants

¹¹ The data about the participation of young Europeans can be found in the study *Young Europeans in 2001* (p. 3). The comparison is lacking regarding the political participation, because the European research did not include the inclusion in the political parties and unions.

in both age groups are not included in any of the associations. It is possible to assume that among the participants who are formally not members of any of the observed organizations there are those who at least occasionally join some of their activities, but they are probably few. Within the obtained distribution, it is evident that the young manifest a greater social activism, while the adults are more prepared for political engagement (observed through the membership in political parties and unions). In a word, these tendencies may be seen as another indicator of the distance of youth from institutional politics.

It is somewhat surprising that in the past five years the already poor participation of youth was further reduced in all the observed organizations and associations.¹² This points to the assumption that the collapse of youth activism, diagnosed at the beginning of transition, is again increasing after a certain improvement. The question is why is this happening: it is possible that the young are disappointed with the activity of different associations and their role in it; it is possible that many associations and organizations, after the pioneering days, entered the established phase, when, as a rule, adults are taking over the dominant roles in them; and it is probable that the opportunity for active participation in certain activities are objectively reduced due to a reduction in the number of adequate organizations (suggested by the decreasing engagement in sports and culture and art). In any case, after the noted decrease in participation, the Croatian youth is even more distant from their European counterparts, even though they were quite similar to them five years earlier. This discrepancy in the expressed activism does not support the thesis which interprets the low level of social participation of youth by the influence of social stability – if Croatia is in a more stable period, it is certain that the young Europeans live in even more stable conditions. Indeed, social stability, in principle, works in favor of the engagement of youth in civil initiatives and activities for satisfying certain specific needs – of course, if the society as a whole and citizens as individuals are sensitive and wealthy enough to finance the building and maintaining of the necessary space, expert work and so on.

The participation in the three most represented types of organizations – to be more exact, those in which at least 5% of young participate in – along with the answer indicating that the young are not included in any association or

¹² It is especially indicative that the number of union members is decreasing – from a quarter of employed youth (Ilišin, 2002: 188) to one tenth. Such a minimal inclusion of youth in unions must imply the dissatisfaction with the activity of the existing unions, as well as the pressure of the owners and boards of companies, aimed at the de-stimulation of union engagement. The awareness about solidarity and the need for social action in order to protect the interests of the employed, is obviously at such a level that it is too weak a stimulus for youth to try to change the situation.

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organization, were submitted to further analysis. The summarized data portrayed in Table 21, shows that the differences among certain groups of youth are not numerous or large, but are significant.

Table 21: Membership in organizations regarding the attributes of youth (%)

Attributes of youth	Sports association or team	Cultural or art association	Political party	No association
<i>Gender</i>	$\chi^2=67.01$			$\chi^2=41.41$
Female	9.0			73.3
Male	22.3			59.7
<i>Socio-professional status</i>	$\chi^2=24.80$			17.93
Employed	13.5			64.1
Unemployed	10.6			75.1
Pupils	21.5			63.6
Students	18.5			64.6
<i>Father's education</i>	$\chi^2=24.33$	$\chi^2=31.52$		$\chi^2=35.99$
Primary school or less	9.0	3.4		74.5
Vocational school	15.7	3.8		68.9
High school	15.8	7.3		66.5
University or more	21.7	11.6		55.3
<i>Education</i>			$\chi^2=27.44$	
Primary school or less			3.0	
Vocational school			9.1	
High school			4.0	
University or more			9.6	
<i>Party affiliation</i>			$\chi^2=52.79$	$\chi^2=35.59$
HDZ			8.2	67.6
HNS			5.0	64.7
HSP			15.7	54.9
HSS			4.3	66.3
SDP			3.8	66.5
Undecided			2.1	75.3
TOTAL	15.8	6.5	5.3	66.7

The established differences are expected and confirm the already familiar tendencies. It is not surprising that men, pupils and students and participants with academically educated fathers are more active in sports. It is evident that certain traditional differences in affinities still prevail, such as the fact that sports facilities and props are more accessible to those in the process of obtaining an

education and those whose families are better situated, and who consider sporting activities to be important. The same is true when it comes to engaging in cultural and art activities, which are also stimulated more by the families where the father has a university education. On the other hand, membership in political parties depends more on whether the young have already finished their education, indicated by the above average inclusion of those with a vocational or university diploma. A higher political participation is also stated by the supporters of HSP, and partially HDZ, which can be used for an indirect conclusion that these parties have the greatest share of young members. It is interesting that approximately 2% of the young, who would not support any of the parties in elections, answered that they are members of a party (?!). This could be interpreted as an indicator of a self-passivity of youth caused by the dissatisfaction with the activity of their parties, but the question is why are they still members. It is possible that we are dealing with a start of a future instrumental and clientelistic behavior, that is, joining a political party in order to more easily realize certain benefits in their career or some other area of life.

The attributes of youth who least participate in the social life are also expected: women, the unemployed, those who are undecided when it comes to party affiliation, and their passivity decreases as the level of the fathers' education increases. The social activism of youth is obviously under a significant influence of family socialization, incorporating the stimulation of youth to join different activities and associations.

The mentioned data points to a low social capital of the citizens of Croatia, especially youth. The poor participation is caused by a number of moments, and one of them might be the (lack of) readiness to join different activities aimed at solving certain social problems. To investigate the potential readiness for civil engagement, we used a four-degree scale (from complete readiness to complete unpreparedness), and Table 22 portrays the summarized answers “completely” and “mostly prepared”.

The data indicate that the young and the adults are, in principle, significantly more prepared to join different activities for a greater cause, than they really are included in the work of existing organizations and associations. In their verbal expression of readiness for a concrete and often informal engagement, the young are predominant this time. It is especially expressed regarding the making of flyers (which is certainly closed to them than the adults), signing of petitions, organizing strikes (even though it was demonstrated that they avoid organizing in unions – perhaps, among other things, because they believe the unions are too weak and conciliate toward employers), communication with the media (in line with the already expressed higher trust in

the media), and even inclusion in the work of political parties.¹³ At the same time, the adults are somewhat more prepared to join the elections and participate in collecting financial resources for solving an existing problem.

Table 22: The ranking scale of personal readiness for participation in civil activities aimed at solving social problems – youth and adults (%)

Civil activities	Youth	Adults
Voting in elections	84.6	90.0
Signing petitions	68.0	63.2
Collecting financial resources	44.9	48.1
Joining the work of civil associations	42.5	41.3
Organizing civil actions	34.5	36.5
Making flyers	34.0	17.5
Contacting international organizations and pointing to a social problem	32.3	31.6
Contacting newspapers	29.5	23.6
Participating in TV shows	26.0	19.8
Contacting politicians personally	26.0	26.7
Starting new civil initiatives or nongovernmental organizations	25.4	27.6
Joining the work of political parties	21.4	18.7
Organizing strikes	20.7	15.1
Writing to politicians	20.7	20.8
Giving financial donations to political parties	6.8	7.7

¹³ Since the obtained statements are contrary to the real condition, it is useful to mention that in the research conducted five years earlier, the weak political participation of their generation was explained by the young with various reasons (Ilišin, 2002: 194). On the one hand, they can be summarized into the concept of critical distance, because the young equally stated the dishonesty of politics, the disregard of the problems of youth by political protagonists and the mistrust the adults harbor regarding the political engagement of youth. On the other hand, a part of the young found the reasons in the incompetence and lack of interest of their peers, who are preoccupied by existential problems and lack the time for politics, joined by the attitudes that politics is boring, that the young do not feel experienced or capable enough to be active in politics and thus believe it is only natural that only adults deal with it. We should also note that the last two attitudes were the least accepted by the young, and considering the previously stated attitudes, we can conclude that the political potential of youth is significantly higher than would be indicated by the manifested level of participation. Aside from that, the reasons for political distance are obviously complex and cannot be resolved by occasional campaigns.

As is visible from the data, most of the young are ready to participate in only two activities, the ones expressing their political will and demands directly. Between one and two fifths of the young are prepared to join different activities of the formal or informal type, while only one out of fourteen participants expressed the desire to financially support the work of political parties. This result logically corresponds with the already established mistrust of the young in political parties.

The 15 investigated civil actions were grouped into three factors (Table 23) with a total variance of 59.1%, while the variance analysis indicated that the young are quite homogenous in their preference for certain types of actions.

Table 23: The factor structure of civil activities

Civil activities	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Organizing civil actions	.806		
Starting new civil initiatives or nongovernmental organizations	.766		
Contacting international organizations and pointing to a social problem	.703		
Collecting financial resources	.699		
Organizing strikes	.694		
Making flyers	.663		
Participating in TV shows	.570	.405	
Joining the work of civil associations	.540	.351	.303
Contacting newspapers	.477	.420	
Contacting politicians personally		.781	
Writing to politicians		.779	
Joining the work of political parties		.724	
Giving financial donations to political parties		.622	
Voting in elections			.813
Signing petitions			.673
<i>% of common variance</i>	<i>29.4</i>	<i>19.6</i>	<i>10.1</i>

The first factor can be labeled *civil initiatives* because it includes actions, which presume taking action through civil associations, the *ad hoc* self-organization of citizens and activities through the mass media. This type of action is averagely distributed among the young. In this case, the influence of socio-demographic attributes is missing – the young are very homogenous in their expression of readiness to join one of the relatively numerous civil initiatives.

Political initiatives is the label of the second factor. It consists of the informal and formal political activities, but certainly with the ambition of influence over political protagonists who mediate the citizens' interests into the institutions of power. A greater readiness for such actions is expressed by the men (F-ratio=13.44), supporters of HDZ opposite HNS's voters (F-ratio=9.08), youth from Northern and Eastern Croatia unlike the inhabitants of Istria, Primorje and Zagreb (F-ratio=7.83). It is somewhat expected that men and HDZ's supporters are more politically engaged – at least verbally – while the regional differences are more difficult to interpret, aside from the fact that it is evident the young from the more developed regions feel the lowest level of need to communicate with politicians or to associate themselves with political parties.

The third factor could be arbitrarily labeled *formal political actions* because it primarily consists of the readiness to vote in elections. This is a basic form of the political participation of the citizens, and the expression of political will is linked with the signing of petitions, as another act which clearly demonstrates the political views of the signees. Even though the readiness to participate in this type of political actions is most common among the young, they are also most differentiated in its acceptance. The variance analysis demonstrates that the readiness for formal political actions increases along with the level of education (F-ratio=24.02) and age of the participants (F-ratio=21.75). Aside from that, a greater readiness is expressed by the employed and students compared to the pupils (F-ratio=18.97), the supporters of HSP and SDP versus the undecided participants (F-ratio=13.79) and youth from Zagreb and Central Croatia opposite those from Easter Croatia (F-ratio=4.95). The attributes of those preferring formal political actions indicate that they are the socially more competent youth. It would seem that it has more trust in the formal democratic forms of political influence, while those who are less prepared to participate in elections believe it is more efficient to act in other, usually informal ways (which can be guessed from the trends established in the political initiatives factor).¹⁴

The difference between the real social and political participation of youth and their readiness to join different civil actions warns of reasons that prevent the young from realizing their potential as citizens. The question about how they perceive the measures which might stimulate the active participation of youth in

¹⁴ It is useful to mention that approximately 85% of both the young and the adults estimate that their influence in the social and political life of the country is slim to none, while around two thirds of the participants believe the same for the local level. It is possible to assume that this perception of one's personal influence leads to a political passivity. On the other hand, it could be optimistically assumed that the awareness about the insignificant personal influence might motivate the young to be more politically active in order to change that fact.

the society should give us elements to estimate the possible inhibiting reasons. Table 24 shows the comparative data for 1999 and 2004, and the participants chose between answers “yes” and “no” for each of the measures offered. This data is accompanied by the findings about the attitudes of young Europeans, although they are not completely comparable.¹⁵

Table 24: A comparative outline of the acceptance of measures for stimulating the active participation of youth in society (%)

Stimulating measures	Youth			Adults
	Europe 2001	Croatia 1999	Croatia 2004	Croatia 2004
Addressing the young and considering their opinions when making decisions	45	–	87.9	88.4
Establishing youth clubs	28	–	81.8	80.1
Joining different youth interest associations	–	81.7	81.3	83.5
Introducing special youth information campaign	45	–	73.2	68.9
Stimulating volunteer work	19	–	72.9	80.6
Introducing compulsory education programs about civil rights and democracy	37	–	66.2	72.5
Individual inclusion in nongovernmental organizations	–	56.0	61.8	70.3
Youth organizations of political parties (party youth)	–	65.7	60.3	63.0
Legal introduction of obligatory representation of youth (so-called quota) on all levels of power	–	58.7	58.6	60.8
Autonomous political parties of youth	–	71.0	57.7	56.1
Individual activity in existing political parties	–	59.5	53.6	64.5
Lowering the age limit for voting in elections	13	–	15.0	12.7
No form of political organization of youth makes sense	–	18.8	19.4	17.0

It is interesting that most young and adult participants believe all the suggesting measures to be stimulating, with the exception of reducing the age limit for participating in elections.¹⁶ It follows that widely distributed measures and

¹⁵ The participants in the European research could only chose two measures, so the percentages are lower than in our research. Still, the data is comparable according to the ranking, so they are portrayed along with the Croatian results.

¹⁶ This attitude of the participants indicates that the recommendation in the *National Programme of Action for Youth* (2003: 63) to give active suffrage to the young at the local level at the age of 16, is in a certain way wrong or, at least, premature. On the other hand, the *National Programme* does not recommend introducing the so-called youth quota, even though it is supported by the young. However, for those realizing the youth policy it is important that there be an agreement between the young and the *National*

actions are necessary to improve the social integration of youth. Although almost all the measures are considered be purposeful, the young prefer the focused informative campaigns more, and volunteer work, civil education and individual inclusion in political parties less. The adults, on the other hand, believe that the young do not have the knowledge about democracy and the readiness to contribute to a society with difficulties with volunteer work.

When the attitudes of young Croats are compared with the data gathered in the research of young Europeans, the coinciding of the primary importance of including youth in the decision-making processes is obvious. Judging by the ratings, the youth in Croatia care more for youth clubs, and young Europeans prefer educational programs about civil rights and democracy (which are certainly set up much better than in Croatia).

It is also interesting that during the five year period there has been an increase in the validation of the non-governmental sector among the young, with the simultaneous weakening of their faith in the potential effectiveness of autonomous political parties of youth. It is certainly indicative that they mostly express the need to take their opinions into consideration, that youth clubs should be formed and that the young should start joining the organizations of youth. It is logical that the young put so much emphasis on participation in decision-making, because they are mostly excluded from this process – but it is intriguing that they do not care for the possibility to participate in elections at an earlier age (which is a classic and indispensable form of direct democratic decision-making) and it is possible to assume that they think their vote will change nothing. The same is true with the youth associations – the young think they are mobilizing, but they are also included in their work at an insignificant level. The insufficient number of youth clubs is a well known problem, and now we have a confirmation that the young feel this insufficiency is very pronounced.

How the proposed stimulating measures are structured was demonstrated by the factor analysis (Table 25; a total variance of 42.2%). The variance analysis, on the other hand, indicated that the young are very homogenous in choosing the adequate measures.

Programme regarding the stimulation of an active participation of youth in the society, especially regarding the importance of education for democracy. This is a measure which is more easily implemented than, for example, the change of the predominant climate of distrust toward the young in the society.

Table 25: The factor structure of measures for stimulating the active participation of youth in society

Stimulating measures	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Establishing youth clubs	.652		
Stimulating volunteer work	.631		
Addressing the young and considering their opinions when making decisions	.604		
Introducing special youth information campaign	.561		
Joining different youth interest associations	.507		-.354
Introducing compulsory education programs about civil rights and democracy	.474		
Individual activity in existing political parties		.730	
Youth organizations of political parties (party youth)		.672	
Autonomous political parties of youth		.613	
Individual inclusion in nongovernmental organizations		.496	
Legal introduction of obligatory representation of youth (so-called quota) on all levels of power		.469	
Lowering the age limit for voting in elections			.730
No form of political organization of youth makes sense			.613
% of common variance	16.3	16.2	9.7

It is possible to label the first factor *incentives for social integration* because most of the included measures are aimed at the stimulation of the social engagement of youth and their training for equal participation in social affairs. As the distribution of answers indicates, these are also the measures with the highest support among the young. Their content says that the young still do not feel competent enough for an optimal social activity, and that they would like society to grant them special treatment and importance, enabling them to act as a generation, instead of simply young individuals. A somewhat greater support for this factor is demonstrated by young women (F-ratio=31.73) and participants who were raised in small or major cities (F-ratio=6.27).

The second factor was named *incentives for political participation*. It, with the exception of joining non-governmental organizations, consists of different forms of participation in political institutions: parties and institutions of power. These are also generally accepted measures, but somewhat less than in the case of the incentives for social integration. The variance results indicate that the young from Zagreb – versus those from Istria, Primorje, Central Croatia and Dalmatia – accept this factor the least (F-ratio=6.66).

Formal political measures is the arbitrary label of the third factor. It includes the support for the reduction of the minimal age for the right to vote, as well as the agreement with the attitude that no political organization of youth makes sense. This could be a minimalist and defeatist perception of the political engagement of youth, exhausted in the act of voting. These attitudes are least present among the young, and their support decreases with the increase in the level of knowledge (F-ratio=20.73) and age of the participant (F-ratio=18.83). They are also most accepted by the pupils, compared to the students (F-ratio=16.47). Therefore, the young who have realized the right to vote, no longer believe that reducing the age limit might contribute to the active participation of youth in the society. The question remains: is it because they believe that those younger than 18 cannot reach rational decisions, or do they estimate, from their own experience, that the right to vote is not a sufficient incentive for a greater social and political engagement and influence?

The final question interpreted in the context of the relationship of youth and politics has to do with the estimated importance of social protagonists in stimulating the young to actively participate in the society. The young were able to choose only one answer out of the nine offered. Table 26 portrays the results, along with data about the attitudes of young Europeans (Young Europeans in..., 2001: 4).¹⁷

Table 26: A comparative outline of social protagonists that can motivate youth to actively participate in society (%)

Social protagonists	Youth		Adults
	Europe 2001	Croatia 2004	Croatia 2004
Family and friends	20	33.1	38.4
Education system	26	20.1	26.7
Television	12	15.1	9.5
Youth associations	20	14.6	9.8
Popular public figures	8	6.7	6.9
Political parties	4	6.1	5.8
Internet forums	3	2.2	1.6
Press / newspapers	1	1.2	0.6
Radio	1	0.9	0.5

¹⁷ The participants were also able to choose the answer “I do not know” in the European research. There was only a 5% acceptance of this answer, which allows for the comparison with the results of our research.

The young and the adults demonstrate most disagreements regarding the four most relevant protagonists: the young respect the primary (family and friends) and the most important agent of socialization (the education system) less than the adults, and believe in the effect of television and youth associations more. These are expected, typically generational differences.

At the same time, the young in Croatia believe more than their European counterparts in the contribution of friends and family, and less in the educational system and the associations of youth. The first could be interpreted by more preserved traditional family relationships in Croatia, which, again, might indicate a greater acceptance of the paternalistic relationship of the adults toward the young. As for the difference in the perception of the importance of educational institutions, we can assume that they must offer more content regarding civil education in Europe, which is why they are the most stimulating factor for young Europeans. The same is true of the potential contribution of the young associations, because we are able to presume that such organizations function in a more stimulating social *milieu* in the more developed European countries, aside from having a longer tradition and being more active.

As we can see, in spite of the fact that the young use the media, and are quite trusting of them, they do not see them as protagonists who can stimulate the social engagement of youth. It seems that their judgment is correct, because there are no media for youth (whose basic function should be their social promotion and mobilization), and the existing media are primarily commercially oriented, giving media space to topics and protagonists who cause more attention from their audiences. This is why the young only become a topic when excesses are involved, and this blowing out of proportion disturbs the already suspicious public, but does not make it more sensitive to an objective perception of the youth's total social status and real life problems.

The participants are very homogenous regarding the estimate of the potential contribution of different protagonists to the social mobilization of youth: only differences regarding the level of education and gender were established. The emphasis on the role of the educational system increases with the level of education, along with a parallel decrease of the importance of family and friends ($\chi^2=41.95$). Young women also put more hope in the influence of the education system and the youth associations, while men emphasize the possible positive contribution of television more ($\chi^2=26.42$).

6. Concluding discussion

The relatively extensive analysis of political values, attitudes and political participation of youth enables us to better explain the existing trends in the

relationship of youth towards politics. Especially helpful in this regard is the comparison with adults, as well as the longitudinal tracking of changes within the young population. Here, we will reflect on the important tendencies and try to understand their wider and far-reaching implications.

When we look at all the obtained results, it is evident that there are differences between youth and adults, but only a smaller part of them is significantly pronounced. Thus, the results indicate that the young express a higher level of trust in the media. Furthermore, they are more tolerant towards a number of social phenomena and groups causing debates in the Croatian and the European public, they are more sensitive to ethnic inequalities, they also perceive the war as the main cause of existing difficulties more, they have considerably more faith in their own generation as the social strength which can initiate positive trends, they express a greater readiness for joining different civil activities, and trust that television and youth associations might mobilize them to actively participate in social affairs. At the same time, the young less than the adults accept the values of a democratic order, but are less inclined towards the harmonious conception of politics, they are less socially sensitive, express less trust in the institutions of power, they more rarely express socio-economic goals and preservation of tradition among the political priorities, they choose immorality and crime in privatization as the causes of today's problems less, they perceive less corruption in all areas of social life (aside from the school system), they have less faith in the positive contribution of experts and entrepreneurs in overcoming the crisis trends, they are less interested in politics and participate in political parties less, and their trust in the mobilizing role of democratic education, volunteer work, political parties and nongovernmental organizations, as well as in the contribution of the family and educational system in the stimulation of the social engagement of youth, is much lower.

The enumerated differences between the youth and adults can primarily be interpreted from the discourse of the life cycle theory. This means that the witnessed differences are mostly the product of a different total social status of youth and adults, which presumes that most of the young have yet to take over their permanent social roles, and that their immediate experience is limited to some social areas. It follows that with their maturing and their full social integration, most differences from the adults will be erased. The common experience of a time in history, that is, life in a specific socio-historic period with a tendency to equalize differences, contributes to the convergence of youth and adults. The potential generational differences – which, as a rule, occur with the different reception of the same events and processes – are not very visible, and will be unambiguously detected only when today's generation of youth is in its mature age and when their attitudes are then compared with the attitudes of new young generations. Then, it will be more clear how much the existing

differences between the young and the adults are a consequence of the fact that most adults gained their experience in a different social order, which, to a degree, forms their existing system of political values, which in some elements, especially related to the social dimensions, are different from the system of political values of youth. The absence of deep inter-generational divides indicates that, in spite of the radical changes taking place in the dissolution of the old and the establishment of a new social and political order, the mechanism of transferring political values from the adult generations to the young functions considerably, along with the faults that exist in the constructed political awareness of adults. Here, we must notice that the adults are more resistant to the potentially unfavorable influences from the environment, which is especially evident in their better understanding of the democratic rules. This statement also suggests that Croatia is now in a more stable period of social development, which is expected when the early phase of transition is replaced by the democratic consolidation phase.

Therefore, it was demonstrated that the young in Croatia accept traditional values somewhat less than the adults, but also that in some areas they are just as more conservative compared to their European peers. Pointing to this is the greater orientation of Croatia youth towards family and the lower level of tolerance for some phenomena and groups in the modern society. Also, the social participation of Croatian youth is at a lower level, which testifies less to their lack of interest, and more to the inability of the Croatian society to meet the needs of youth for realizing its social necessities.

The third comparative level includes the tracking of changes occurring within the Croatian youth between 1999 and 2004. The recapitulation of the obtained results indicates that in the observed period of time there has been an increase in the already relatively high level of acceptance of all the constitutional principles, as well as in the harmonious perception of politics and institutional trust, while the lack of work, discipline and irresponsibility are now more perceived as a social problem than before. The recent data also indicate that the young today perceive the existence of educational, gender and age related differences more, as well as the worsening political representation of all marginal groups. On the other hand, the understanding of conflicts and democratic rules (especially the role of the opposition) is weaker, the emphasis of crime in transformation of ownership and privatization as problems is smaller, the young now perceive the existence of social and religious differences less, their social activism and political participation is reduced, and the perception of joining political party youths and establishing autonomous youth parties as forms of activities that might contribute to a more active participation of youth in society decreased.

The mentioned changes tend to lead to a further social, especially political, (self)passivity and marginalization of youth, and it is especially intriguing that it does not sufficiently understand political competition and its importance. If this was understandable in the first phase of transition, considering the war, stimulating homogenization, and the absence of a democratic tradition and the monopolization of power by one political party – the obtained results are no longer as understandable after spending more than 15 years in a multiparty democratic system. Therefore, we can presume that some elements of a functional political system and behavior of political protagonists is such that they convince the young that democracy, immanently inclined toward a conflict between political interests, is simply a less important form without obligating rules and procedures. This certainly points to faults in the process of political socialization of youth, which especially raises the issue of the need for an institutionalized education for democracy. In other words, if the adult generations, socialized in a different social order, still cannot optimally transfer their values in new generations, and if the functioning of political institutions is still marked by numerous “child illnesses”, than education, which can develop civil competence, is necessary. Anyway, in the countries that do not lack a democratic tradition, education for civil rights and democracy is a permanent process which takes place through appropriate school programs.

The data also show that there has been a certain decrease in the social sensitivity of youth, which must be a consequence of socialization in a society aiming at market competitiveness and maximizing profit. The accompanying consequences are – especially with the lack of developed instruments of a social state, and after the poorly implemented restructuring of economy – the deepening of social inequalities and the decrease of the living standards of a large portion of the population. Thus, maturing in a society that suppresses social sensitivity, the young also become insufficiently sensitive to the issue of social justice in the (re)distribution of significantly limited resources. The young are raised in an environment in which their immediate and indirect experience tells that personal success is important, and the responsibility for achieving or not achieving it, is also personal. The emphasized orientation on competition and individualization of achievements weakens the social sensitivity and solidarity with the losers of social transformation.

However, during the past several years the acceptance of the Constitutionally outlined basic political values has increased. This is a very important finding because such a high, and increased validation of liberal-democratic principles, leads us to assume that the Croatian society is overcoming the anomaly it was in since the transitional period began. Leaving aside many events from the social and political practice that are witnesses to the recurrent violation, disregard or reduction of the interpretation of constitutional

principles, we are left with an extremely high convergence of the political value systems of youth (as well as adults) and the officially proclaimed political values. This, of course, is no guarantee of a harmonized and appropriate behavior of those in power and of citizens, but it certainly represents the necessary level of consensus about the principles a pluralistic society and a democratic political order should be built on.

The continuity of the tendencies established in the previous research is confirmed by the findings that youth is not a monolithic group, regarding the acceptance of political values, expression of political attitudes and level of political participation. The systemized data indicate, however, that the young tend to be homogenous in their acceptance of constitutional values and democratic attitudes, the common perception of social and socio-cultural inequalities, the extreme perception of their political status as marginal, and their average readiness to join different civil actions. At the same time, the greatest level of differentiation occurs regarding the not especially present tolerance toward most of the observed social phenomena and groups, the perception of unemployment as the most important social problem and the cause of existing difficulties, the average perception of the existence of political inequalities, and the expression of a weak interest in politics as well as the perception of the role of the “Diaspora” in Croatian political life.

Looking at these results generally, it turns out that the young are mostly different regarding the level of achieved education and socio-professional status. The education level usually has the position of the attribute that affects the participants' attitudes the most in every social research, and it is interesting here because this is true even in the young population, many of which are still in the process of obtaining an education. Certainly, the basic division occurs between those with the lowest and highest qualifications, where a part of youth with high school education tends to get the same results as the academically educated youth. These are primarily students, and the fact is that education is very linked to the socio-professional position of youth, which has the same scope of influence on their differentiation. The results have manifested that students are usually on the one side, and pupils and the unemployed youth on the other in most situations. While with pupils we can assume that there will be a change with their maturing, the issue of the unemployed participants remains, because they seem to be a subgroup of youth that is placed more permanently on the social and political margins.

A significant influence on the differentiation of youth is played by party affiliation, gender, age, regional status and the father's level of education. This group of attributes points to the influence of different types of socialization, along with a degree of (im)maturity of youth. In other words, being raised in

families with different social statuses and in regions with different levels of development and cultural traditions, results in the formation of different attitudes of youth. It is also obvious that in the area of relationships towards politics, the differentiated models of socialization of women and men are still at work, contributing to the survival of the commonly known gender differences. As is logical when the political sphere is involved, party affiliation is an important element of polarization because it consists both of different ideological orientations, and of differences in the social profile of party supporters.

The least influential attributes are the residential status, provenience and religiousness. These trends indicate a certain weakening of the influence of rural-urban differences, which is to be expected in a modern society, where the media override the transportation, infrastructural, cultural and other differences. The poor influence of religiousness indirectly testifies to the weakening of the correlation between the adoption of religious beliefs and the manifestation of religious affiliation, resulting in the loss of certain differences between the religious and the non-religious youth. However, the share of religious believers is such that their attitudes predominantly determine the main direction of youth orientations, which then points to a strengthening of the influence of religion on a general level. It is therefore questionable if the weakest influence of religion on political attitudes of youth may be seen as an indicator of a weakening correlation between politics and religion, traditionally present in this area.

All the mentioned differentiation of youth can be summarized by sketching out two large, relatively polarized groups. One group consists of youth with higher education and social origin (an above averagely educated father, urban environment, and developed regions), students, averagely older, mostly non-religious and supporters of HNS and SDP – that is, the socially more competent youth, inclined to the left center ideological-political options. The other group consists of averagely younger participants, especially pupils and the unemployed with a lower education and social background (a father with lower qualifications, rural *milieu*, less developed regions), declared believers and sympathizers of HDZ, as well as HSP and HSS. In this case, we are profiling a socially more inferior youth inclined toward parties positioned at the right-wing pole of the ideological-political spectrum. The socially more competent youth is more liberal, critical toward social reality and political protagonists, and it manifests a greater consideration for democratic procedures and institutions, which is an indicator of the importance of more favorable circumstances in the process of political socialization. Since some of these circumstances are impossible to change by focused actions and campaigns, education is again the most appropriate channel of adopting knowledge and information that can contribute to the making of aware citizens, who are more difficult to manipulate and objectify for certain dubious particular political goals.

The changes in the polarization of youth indicate that the territorial-cultural and ideological-cultural cleavages deepened in the past several years, and there are indications that the socio-economic cleavage will grow stronger as well. The unequal access to existing social resources of today's youth will generate an unequal status in their mature age, that is, the advantages achieved at the start (youth), are a guarantee of achieving better social positions in the future. Therefore, we can expect a widening and deepening of the process of social differentiation, which, if it is not corrected through mechanisms aimed at ensuring equal access, at least in the process of enabling youth to take over the permanent social roles, in the approach to social resources (primarily education), can be disastrous for the optimal development of a relatively undeveloped nation with a small population. What we mean is that human capital is what such countries, including Croatia, need to treat with a lot of thought and responsibility and invest in maximally. Among other things, by stimulating as many citizens as possible, especially the young, to actively participate in the social processes and institutions.

Finally, the results obtained in this research may be summarized into tendencies and statements of a wider nature. Firstly, the political culture of youth testifies in a number of aspects that we are approaching democratic standards – especially regarding the acceptance of basic liberal-democratic values and the principle readiness for social engagement – but also that its social power and social capital are low. Secondly, the young are aware of their social and political marginalization, and recognize an entire spectrum of measures which might contribute to them achieving a certain amount of power and become active citizens, which is desirable in a democratic society, but they insufficiently use the channels of social and political promotion at their disposal. And thirdly, the young are not that different from the adults to enable us to mention a generational gap, let alone a conflict. However, the young did turn out to be somewhat more liberal, flexible and tolerant, which is certainly an argument in favor of them gaining and/or winning adequate social space for expressing their attitudes and desires. Their similarity to the adults might appease those social structures which fear that youth activation might end up in the radicalization of political life, which is difficult to control. This same inter-generational resemblance could be disappointing to those social structures that have high hopes regarding the innovative potential of youth and its ability to carry out the necessary changes. Independent of the potential fears and desires of the adults, one should assume that there is enough latent potential in the young population, which, in a more favorable social environment, might be more pronounced. The establishment of such an environment might be helped by the knowledge that the Croatian society, on its way to the European Union, needs the activity of all

social resources, as well as the potential of youth, as the most vital segment of the society, which is most open to changes.

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Dunja Potočnik

HUMAN RIGHTS: THE TICKET TOWARDS A DEMOCRATIC EUROPE

1. Introduction: Human rights development tendencies

The basic reason for regulating human rights is stated in a sentence by Isaiah Berlin (1978: 85): "It takes minimal rules to ensure the conditions of existence of human society." A more systematic regulation of human rights began at the end of World War One, by regulating procedures concerning the soldiers and population of enemy states or conflicting parties. However, the individual as such, was still not the subject of interest of international law. It took the horrific consequences of World War Two to attract a new view on individual rights, which had become the subject of international care and were of the opinion, that a state that does not respect the rights of its own citizens represents a threat to the population of other states, and thus world peace (Jurišić, 1999: 75). The process that may be associated with the development and spreading of the human rights belief is best described as being a shift from basic needs toward basic rights. "The development of an international standard of protection of human rights, from the Second World War to today, was in most part characterized by efforts to limit the expertise of the state over the individual" (Jurišić, 1999: 77).

The concept of human rights includes the protection of citizens from the overly broad rights of the state. However, the problem of human rights growth, consequently, by definition, is occurring today. It can be said that basic human rights have weakened by the growth of interest compared to the situation in 1948 when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted. There are numerous discussions on the definition of those rights. Some rights, labeled 'negative rights', are described by a 'non-action zone' and include those rights that the state should rarely involve itself in (such as the right to life and right to privacy). Other rights, known as 'positive rights', ensure the rights of individuals. For example, the right of children to an education. However, even though there is a differentiation between 'negative' and 'positive' rights, there are situations where it is difficult to separate the two. Both ideas of freedom have their place and their shortcomings in the modern thoughts of human rights.

According to the definition, each tolerant society must give freedom to the individual, that is, ‘negative freedom’. Politicians play a significant role in monitoring the actions of individuals so that they do not limit other individuals in their own freedom. Otherwise ‘negative freedom’ would quickly turn into anarchy (Berlin, 1978).

Originally limited to basic rights, the rights of individuals, through the parameters of their participation in the political life of the community and creation of a civil society, expanded to political and numerous civil rights (economic, social, cultural). The proliferation of rights is for the most part, along with the individual, related to collective rights, and the objects of legal protection are no longer only human beings, but nature and animals as well. Accordingly, this moment in time is known as the ‘human rights age’, and the ‘political culture of human rights’ as dominant characteristics of political culture of modern society (Baranović, Ilišin, 2004: 341). Analysts warn that such an expansion in the area of human rights, leads to their fragmentation and dispersion, which in turn contributes to the cheapening of those rights and weakens their real effectiveness (Kalanj, 1996: 58). On the other hand, the expansion of human rights is seen by the conservatives as a threat, because it nourishes the egotism of the individual, questioning his/her responsibility for their community. A. H. Birch even mentions “cultures obsessed by human rights”, such as, American society (Miller, Timpson, Lessnoff, 1996: 5). Still, the increased recognition of human rights through their protection on an international level is not simultaneously followed by progress in their opinion.

Globalization¹ is often stated as one of the factors of the human rights explosion. If we start with the assumption that the basic characteristics of the world we live in, are a change from the “normal” way of life, globalization can be understood as a process of a change of interests, and the care humankind manifests towards its territory and its traditional constitution of the system of societies (Jurišić, 1999: 71). The globalization processes have led to the development of a global civil society and their new heroes. International non-government organizations that are active in the promotion and protection of human rights and that seem to occupy an increasingly important role in this sphere. The international level of the UN organizations, national and local stages, are in turn affecting the expansion of traditional human rights protection,

¹ Globalization, in this research, is assumed to mean processes whose intensity has been on the increase in the last two decades: the movement of short-term foreign investments, long-term direct foreign investments, commerce on the global level with the policy to decrease its barriers, the increasing share of trans-national corporations in world production and trade, the global interdependence of production, the movement of people motivated by trade or search for employment and the development of new forms of communication.

their integration into domestic legislations and the development of international, regional and national actions for their protection (Dokmanović, 1997).

The new stage of globalization, based on new financial markets and global service markets on the rise, has been made possible by a strong development of new forms of communication and the development of faster and cheaper transportation. The removal of barriers in economy, commerce and transportation also led to an increase in the number of international agreements and conventions in this field, and, hence, to a development of international law focused on countermeasures of global linking of socially undesirable and adverse activities, such as international crime, international terrorism, trafficking of women and children, arms and the drug trade, all of which lead to the increased significance of internationally agreed action to protect human rights. "In the political sense, globalization alleviates the expansion of authority, politics and interest across existing, socially created, protective borders" (Jurišić, 1999: 71). By introducing international law, states transfer their expertise to international institutions and lose a part of their sovereignty, even though liberal democratic states are still independent protagonists in the global community of states (Skocpol, 1988).

However, the anticipation of the process of globalization as a trigger of significant positive, social, political and economic changes, has burst like a bubble. "The centers of power", that had expected to contribute to the positive effect of globalization have in the meantime failed in their respect for human rights, both on their own territory and on the territories of other countries (Havidan, 2004). Specifically, in the "beginning of the 1970s, the key problem became the issue of integrating the implementation of human rights into the entire notion of national security" (Jurišić, 1999: 79). For example, when speaking about American foreign policy, we may accept the opinion that the human rights issue has often been subjugated to a higher goal of American national security: once it was the fight against communism, today it is the war on terror. Another example that removes the legitimacy of the positive effect of globalization, can be found in Latin America, that has lately been experiencing another period of economic recession and the pauperization of the population, along with an increase in the violation of human rights.

The main pillars of globalization are linked to the communication process. The role of a modern communications system should, among other things, be focused on the spreading of information about human rights, and a systematic documenting of all the cases and their violation, aimed at preventing and sanctioning them. Due to the spread of poverty, most of the world's population still does not have access to the information necessary for preservation of their rights, which could be labeled as a kind of 'digital divide'. The current economic globalization is based on neo-liberalism and widens the gap between the rich and

the poor. The promotion of market freedom and the free movement of capital, investments and goods, have created a 'market fundamentalism' that melts the sovereignty of national states and creates a suitable ground for conflict of all types. Economic prosperity has an instrumental role in the preservation of human rights, but it is a well known fact that its violation occurs in most cases, due to shortage in resources and the fight for dominance over those resources.

The renowned 1945 study by Karl Popper, *Open Society and Its Enemies* (published for the first time in Croatia in 1998), advocates the widest possible freedoms, as well as warns, that social institutions should be created for the protection of the economically weak. However, institutions themselves are rarely adequate, if they are not rooted in tradition. Respecting traditions is necessary to create a link that connects institutions with the intentions and value systems of individuals. Among the most important traditions are those that create a 'moral framework' in society and embody its innate sense for justice and decency. The level of morality it has reached, must be included (Popper, 2003). Croatia is, in a sociopolitical as well as economic sense, on the cusp of negotiations for accession into the European Union. Human rights are the basis of EU's axiology; their definition of social values² is in the Preamble of the EU Constitution. It states that member states be aware of their responsibilities for the preservation of the principles of democracy and respect for human rights, in order to contribute to the preservation of world peace by joint efforts (*A Constitution for Europe*, 2004).

If we leave aside the fact that the protection of human rights is not at the stated level, even within the EU, Croatia needs to adjust its domestic legislation, as well as increase the awareness of its citizens regarding human rights. The

² Kluckhohn gave a definition of values that, because it is so concise, is often accepted in sociological research: "Values are the explicit or implicit conception inherent in an individual and characteristic for a group of something desirable that affects the selection of appropriate manners, means and goals of action" (Kluckhohn: 1962: 388-433). It is important, as Kluckhohn remarks, to perceive the three elements of values – affective (values as the desirable), cognitive (values as conceptions) and connative (values as criteria for selection). Aside from the emotional, cognitive and voluntary aspects, culture, group and relationships of the individual toward culture and his/her place in the group, are also important for the definition of value. D. Pantić (1977: 277) offers a definition of values that represents a modification and expansion of the one given by Kluckhohn: "Values are relatively stable, general and hierarchically structured characteristics of an individual (disposition) and of groups (elements of social awareness), formed by the mutual effects of historic, current-social and individual factors, that due to desirability proscribed in such a way, focus the behavior of its bearers toward specific goals". "The expansion regarding Kluckhohn consists of treatment of values as relatively stable characteristics of individuals or groups, meaning they are more permanent and more difficult to change than, for example, attitudes, but they are also not fixed for good, but may change depending on certain influences" (Čulig, Fanuko, Jerbić, 1982: 24).

belief and value systems of our youth are an important indicator of the trends in society. In the future, they will represent its backbone. The relationship of Croatian youth toward human rights is our prime interest, because of the accession negotiations with the EU, among other reasons, where positive validation of human rights is perceived as a 'ticket' into the Union.

Methodological explanations

The following results analysis is an attempt to clear up some aspects of the relationship of youth in Croatia towards human rights. The subject of this research, are their attitudes towards respecting particular human rights and the contribution of certain institutions, associations and significant individuals towards realizing human rights in Croatia. We understand that the perception of human rights, freedom and the respect for human rights in Croatia is part of political culture³. The youth are, as a social group, in the process of concept and attitude formation in all aspects of society, interesting for the analysis of the relationship toward human rights and freedoms.⁴ They are, therefore, at the center of this research. On a descriptive level their results are compared with the results of the research of adults and, where data is available, with the research of youth in Croatia from 1999 (Ilišin, Radin, 2002)

Human rights may be defined as basic rights and freedom, in which the government has a right to intervene (in some cases), such as their infraction by physical or legal subjects. The aims of such analysis of the relationship of youth toward human rights are conceived in such a way:

1. to determine how the young justify particular human rights and freedoms and how they assess the respect for human rights in Croatia and the contribution of different social protagonists to the respect of those rights,
2. to establish the changes taking place in the population of youth from 1999 to 2004, their perception of respect for human rights and the contribution of the observed protagonists,
3. to determine the similarities and differences between the young and the adult population in all the researched dimensions of the relationship toward human rights,
4. to establish the attributes and manner of differentiation among the young in their relationship toward the researched dimensions of human rights and freedoms.

³ Political culture is defined as the relationship toward politics and the role of the individual in the political system (Šiber, 1998: 144).

⁴ The term human rights and the term human rights and freedoms are used as synonyms because we believe that human freedoms also represent a form of rights.

The analysis starts with the hypothesis that states, there are differences among the youth regarding their attitudes about the desirable level of protection of human rights, as well as the perceived level of respect for human rights, the contribution of certain institutions and significant individuals to their understanding. In other words, we assume that the variation in attitudes about the respect for human rights among individuals, can be explained through the differences in their attributes. The attributes of youth in this case include gender, age, socio-professional status, father's education, education of the participant, regional status, permanent residence, religiousness and political party preferences.

The instrument contains several sets of variables that may be categorized into four basic groups:

1. variables for determining the attributes of youth,
2. variables for determining the level of desirability in the protection of particular human rights,
3. variables for determining the perceived level of respect for human rights,
4. variables for determining the perceived contribution of certain institutions and significant individuals to the realization of human rights in Croatia.

With the help of bivariate analysis, that is, through the calculation of the significance of differences by using the χ -test, an analysis was conducted to determine the correlation of the perceived level of respect for human rights and all the other previously mentioned attributes of youth. Only the significant differences on a level of .0001 or less were interpreted. In line with the aims of the research, the comparative analysis is conducted on two levels: on the results of the research conducted of the population of young and adult participants in 2003, and of the results of the population of youth in researches conducted in 1999 and 2004. Factor analysis has also been conducted, and first level factors are stated and interpreted as a result. The yielded factors were submitted to variance analysis, in correlation to the general life, satisfaction and social attributes of youth. The differences significant on a level of .0001 and less were interpreted in this case too.

2. Acceptance of specific human rights and freedoms

Through the normative proclamation in international conventions and declarations, constitutions and state acts, as well as political parties' programs and numerous other documents, human rights became an institutional mechanism for the regulation of political, economic and cultural life in society, with a significant influence on the public and private life of the individual (Baranović, Ilišin, 2004: 342). In turn, if the individual does not wish to be left

on the margins of society and categorized as a mere object, he/she must build a relationship of participation, toward different sectors of state power, as well as toward other citizens – entities. A democratic society demands a specific degree of political participation of all citizens. The youth are at the same time, those participating in the present, and the potential for the future, when they in turn will be the ones making the decisions.

The Croatian Constitution guarantees a wide band of civil freedom, economic, cultural and social rights, and is the basis for gaining their respect. However, an equally important element for the best possible implementation for the respect of human rights is the awareness of citizens about their rights and obligations when it comes to their personal freedom, as well as the freedom of others. Youth, as a ling just being formed in a specific social system, are one of the most important elements of a positive reception and application of basic postulates suggestions of human rights. However, in forming that awareness to citizens about the achieved and optimal level of protection of human rights, the periodical reports of international organizations are quite significant. For example, the Freedom House follows the progress or the regression of the election process, the civil society, media independence, governance and supremacy of the legal system and its independence, each year. The state of the categories is graded from 1 to 7, where 1 represents the highest level of democratic development, and 7 the lowest. In the most recent annual report of the Freedom House (*Freedom in the World 2004 Country Ratings – Croatia*) on countries in transition, Croatia received a total grade of 3.75 for the development of democracy in 2004, which indicates a certain improvement in comparison to the previous year, when it had achieved a 3.83 average. Progress was achieved in the election process through the passing of a new law during the presidential campaign, focusing on the increase of transparency in financing the campaign. In comparison to other Balkan countries, which Croatia is included in, it holds third place along with Serbia when it comes to the development of democracy, following Bulgaria and Romania which are in first and second place respectively.

Prior to the analysis of the acceptance of the chosen human rights and freedoms (a total of 16 among the young and elderly in Croatia), the relationship of participants toward human rights and freedoms as values, needs to once again be mentioned. Namely, in the chapter about political values, it has already been stated that the constitutional value ‘respect for human rights’ is considered to be of utmost importance by approximately 92% of the youth and 94% of the older participants (placing this value in second position, right after ‘freedom’). At the same time, about 76% of the young participants and 80% of the older ones, believe that the Croatian Government should put most effort into ‘realizing human rights and freedoms’ (putting this political priority into fifth place on the ranking scale out of 19 political goals). The cited data undoubtedly indicate that

human rights and freedoms represent one of the highest values for Croatian citizens. Such a stance surely determines the relationship toward specific human rights and freedoms, as it influences the estimates on their state in Croatia.

The acceptance of individual human rights and freedoms (Table 1) has been investigated through the answers ‘should always be protected’, ‘depends on the situation’ and ‘I do not know’. We have decided to interpret only the answers in favor of unquestionable protection of the observed rights and freedoms.

Table 1: A comparative outline of the acceptance of certain human rights and freedoms (%)

Human rights and freedoms	Croatia 2004		Croatian students 1998/99 ⁵
	Youth	Adults	
Right to education	95.4	97.1	96.8
Right to work	94.6	97.4	95.1
Personal safety	91.6	95.6	94.8
Right to privacy	89.6	93.7	91.4
Social protection of the elderly and those at risk	89.6	95.1	94.9
Equality before the law	89.3	92.2	93.9
Rights of women	89.3	91.6	90.8
Right of ownership	85.9	91.5	86.2
Freedom of speech	80.4	81.4	84.3
Freedom of information	79.7	85.7	88.3
Freedom of opinion	76.1	82.2	80.4
Freedom of media	68.4	77.9	81.6
Cultural autonomy	66.7	71.2	-
Freedom of association	60.6	62.2	60.6
National minorities' rights	60.5	66.7	67.5
Right to asylum	44.1	52.2	-

It is interesting that in the acceptance of all the rights and freedoms, the students⁶ surveyed five years ago, are considerably closer to the adult participants today than the younger population. Based on the comparisons of data, it is

⁵ The research was implemented on a sample of 870 students from the Universities of Zagreb and Split. The data has been taken from V. Vujčić (2001: 384).

⁶ We are conservative in using the comparison of participants from our sample and those from the research implemented in 1998/99, due to the different nature of the samples. However, a comparison is useful as an illustration of certain durability in evaluating human rights and freedoms.

easy to conclude that the unconditional protection of all the investigated rights, is most advocated by the adult participants, followed by students surveyed at the end of the last decade, and than the young population in our sample. The only exceptions are freedom of information, freedom of media and national minorities' rights, whose protection is advocated by students to a greater degree than the adult participants, which we will comment on later.

The young most of all accept the right to an education, the right to work, personal safety, the right to privacy, social protection of the elderly and those in need, equality before the law, the rights of women and the right of ownership, with answers averaging from 91.6 to 85.9%. Such a high acceptance of the right to an education is understandable, because it is the most important channel of social promotion, something the participants are obviously highly aware of. Aside from that, "in the wider sense, education is simply an aspect of socialization: it includes the gaining of knowledge and learning of skills. Intentionally or unintentionally, education often affects the creation of convictions and moral values" (Haralambos, Holborn, 2002: 774).

The right to work, as a continuation and a part of the right to an education, is warranted by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 23: "Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions at work and to receive protection from unemployment. Everyone, without discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. Everyone who works has the right to just and favorable payment, ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of their interests." This right is also guaranteed by the Constitution and legal acts of the Republic of Croatia, even though it is denied to a large portion of the population, not as much due to reasons that are within the limits of power of an individual person (not being ready to work), and more due to objective reasons coming from an unfavorable situation within the labor market. The process of transition defined as a transition from a planned, to a market economy in a global environment, assumes, among other things, the transition from a system that guarantees those employed a much higher security of employment into a system where the threat of losing a job is an integral part of the economic cycle. In Croatia, this has had an impact on the entire working population, most of all the young. To be more specific, the highest share of unemployment in Croatia (33.8%) includes citizens aged 15 to 24, while the 24 to 29 age group has a 12.7% unemployment rate (*Analitički bilten*, 2004).

The high ranking of personal safety is not surprising, because its endangerment brings into question the very existence of a human being. The somewhat lower ranking right to privacy is one of the basic human rights, but it may not be absolute, especially when public personas are in question. The right

to privacy may be defined as an aspect of safety that defines the protection from, and the sanctioning of infiltrating the personal rights of individuals by the government, different corporations or other individuals. The new legislation on privacy requires the protection of data through technical solutions that allow individuals to use their right to privacy by insuring quality, confidentiality and information safety.

The social protection of the elderly and those at risk⁷ is a concept whose unconditional respect nine tenths of our participants advocate, and it is interesting to find that this right is supported by 6% more adults than young participants. As well as that, this is a right whose protection is supported by 5% more students than the young in general. This finding probably finds its roots at the higher level of awareness about the need for inter-generational solidarity in students and adults, who know that the harsh days of retirement are waiting for them or who have already retired. The social protection of the elderly and those at risk, built into the foundations of our legislation, have lately found more public support and assertion. When this is the case, it usually has to do with an appeal to the citizens conscience, who themselves might at a moment in their lives, find themselves in the position of these marginalized groups. The social protection of the elderly, those at risk and their social inclusion, is a litmus test of the sensibility of society, and an indicator of the progress of civilization. It is expressed through a distancing from pure survival and by an increase in the quality of life.

The argument of equality before the law draws its heritage from history, when its original intention was to avoid the arbitrary behavior of rulers in treating their subjects. The internalization of the rights to equality is one of the bases of socialization of an individual, in line with the principles of democracy. When equality before the law is mentioned, it often precedes the principle of gender equality. Judging by nine tenths of our participants, the rights of women should always be protected. This indicates that the Croatian public is sensitized to a satisfactory degree, of the problems towards gender inequality, following the trend in developed democratic societies. To be more specific, since the era of the suffragettes, there has been a significant shift in the protection and promotion of women's rights at international levels. As the most significant shift, the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, (CEDAW, 1979) – translated several years ago in Croatia (Šimunović, 2004). “The First Report of the Republic of Croatia to the Commission on Gender Equality, as well as its concluding recommendations, all indicates where we were in 1994 when the report was issued, and in 1998 when it was considered by the Commission. From then to now the progress has been clear. Starting

⁷ This group of citizens includes both the elderly and disabled persons.

with the inclusion of the constitutional principle of gender equality as one of the highest values of the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia, the Gender Equality Act, the founding of the Office of the Croatian Gender Equality Ombudsperson and the Office for Gender Equality, to the Women's Network, a legislative and institutional governmental and non-governmental framework for the implementation of the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, has been set up” (Šimunović, 2004: 10).

The right to ownership is another right where the differences between the two age groups exceed 5%. The specified difference may be interpreted through the lack of knowledge on certain basic economic laws by the young, as well as through the situation in which a large number of those younger than 30 in Croatia, do not own private property such as, real-estate and thus give that right a lesser meaning than their adult counterparts do. In most transitional economies, privatization is still the central aspect of reform, which significantly influences the social stratification as an opportunity to gain what was once exclusively socially/state owned (Arriovich, Carruthers, 2004). The socio-economic modernization of transitional societies, often carries with it harsh consequences for the society and mostly its members, due to its slower dynamic, compared to the ‘modernization’ of conscience and the way of life of some of its members (those involved in privatization crime). The essential task of an economy and policies in transition, is to renew the broken civilization trends (if there were any), which should have a positive influence on both the economic efficiency and the quality of human life. The tendencies of current economic (anti)development, were noticeable in the very beginning of its transition, because the government had opted for a mixture of statism and a free market economy. ‘Conversion’ or privatization did not achieve the “...three basic social goals: a) justice; b) the inflow of fresh capital from the Diaspora and from other countries, and c) the technological, ecological, economic and social development” (Letica, 1998: 25). Also, *Amnesty International Report 2005*, states that even though the Croatian authorities had claimed that it was going to restitute ownership to Serbian refugees, (they avoided doing so during the Homeland war until the end of 2004), the pace of return is still slow. Such a breach of the right to ownership directed at one part of the Croatian population is one of the greatest hurdles Croatia had to pass in the eyes of the international community.

The next level of rights when it comes to acceptance (from 80.4 to 66.7%) is occupied by freedom of speech, freedom of information, freedom of opinion, media freedom and cultural autonomy, all of which are advocated by the adult participants much more than the youth. When it comes to freedom of information and media, students seem to differ quite a lot in accepting their unconditional protection compared to other observed groups. This has to do with specific conditions of the socialization of students, who, due to the sheer number

of social networks they are included in and their urban lifestyle and higher exposure to information, are a group, very inclined to freedom of media and information. Freedom of speech is often considered an integral element of modern democracies, and its key position is strengthened also by protection offered by international organizations, in a manner which was, for example, expressed in article 19 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. The implementation of the principles of freedom of speech varies from one country to another, it is not without limitations, states can punish (but not ban) certain harmful forms of expression. Also, people may hesitate to freely express their own opinions, not due to restrictions imposed by authorities, but due to pressures from the public. In other words, individuals can, by expressing their opinion, become the subjects of attack by their immediate community. To put it simply, freedom of speech is one of the fundamental human rights everyone can enjoy under the condition that there is a democracy and that human dignity is respected. However, it is at the same time, one of the 'most dangerous' rights (when it comes to the survival of non-democratic regimes), because it quite often signifies the wish for changing the existing situation.

For developed countries, freedom of information means the possibility of having access to contents based on free expression in written or some other form. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights states that everyone has a right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes the right to free expression of opinion without the intervention of other persons/organizations, as well as to search, receive and distribute information and ideas through different media, regardless of borders. This principle is usually followed by a legislation that ensures different levels of freedom of scientific research, publicizing and publishing, as well as limitless access to information. Today, the media are a democratic arena offering new forms and possibilities of political communication, so each politically aware citizen, wishing to be acknowledged as a person by other individuals and organizations, can use it in everyday life. Freedom of information and freedom of media are fully intertwined, and most modern outlines of new media forms, assume the possibility that their users may participate in democratic activity. Thus, the data that 11% of youth, and 8% of adult participants are less inclined to freedom of media than to freedom of information, is surprising. This discrepancy may be interpreted by the fact that the media, as information gateways, often seem to abuse their position in servicing information that does not sit well with its citizens, as well as the insufficient awareness of citizens about the importance of media in a liberal and democratic system. Aside from domestic governmental organizations and state institutions, some international organizations have also developed criteria for grading the freedom of speech and media. For example, *Reporters without Borders* state the number of journalists that were killed, banished or abused, and the existence of a

state monopoly over the media, the existence of self-censorship and the general dependence of media, as difficulties today's reporters have to deal with almost every day (*The 2003 Global Press Freedom World Tour*, 2004). Similar studies by Freedom House (*Freedom in the World 2004 Country Ratings*, 2004) contribute by giving general indicators of political and economic situations in every country, by determining the level of media independence and existence of freedom of expression in mind. Thus, the *Worldwide Press Freedom* index has been developed. Each year *Reporters without Borders* give their estimate of media freedom in countries all over the world. The list is based on answers given by reporters, scientists, lawyers and human rights' fighters. As countries with the highest level of media independence in 2004, the report states Finland, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Ireland, Slovakia and Switzerland. On the other hand, countries with the lowest ranking freedom of media are Northern Korea, then Cuba, Burma (Myanmar), Turkmenistan, Eritrea, China, Vietnam, Nepal, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Croatia does not occupy a very high ranking on that list – 54th place. Such a result, when compared to our findings about the acceptance of freedom of speech, media and information, does not provide any reason for optimism.

On our scale, freedom of opinion is placed between freedom of information and freedom of the media, with a 6% difference between the youth and the adults in Croatia. There are two key segments of freedom of opinion as an element of civil freedoms: the conscience's objection to serving in the military and the freedom of religious beliefs and performing religious ceremonies. The objection of conscience campaign has resulted in the legislative regulation of the right to serve in the military as a civilian. The second stated segment of the freedom of opinion – religious freedom – may be summed up as follows: no religious community may be more privileged than the other, for it would be contrary to the constitutional principle of equality, and each one should be ensured unlimited and autonomous activity. Hence, the right and freedom of ones beliefs (and non-beliefs) are among basic human rights and freedoms, springing from the very nature and dignity of each human being as an individual.

Cultural autonomy also enters into the normative definition of a free society. Modern developed countries are multicultural. Each larger French town has an Arabian community, each German town a Turkish one, and each town in England has Indian or Pakistani communities in it. Today the value of cultural activity for the purpose of raising social and economic vitality and sustainable development of smaller societies and communities is recognized in the key documents of UNESCO and the Council of Europe. Legal studies generally define autonomy as the right to local self-government, comprising two types: regional autonomy or right to limited sovereignty over a specific territory marked with clear borderlines, and cultural autonomy, as a non-territorial type of

self-government linked to the reproduction of a group culture. One must have in mind, though, that today's relationship between national culture and the globally proclaimed multiculturalism, does not spring only from the cultural hegemony of the developed, but also from the internal habits created through the tradition of cultural statism and conformity. Culture, which was in the function of the politics of emancipation and set-up of national states, soon becomes dysfunctional (Cvjetičanin, Katunarić, 1998: 22), by copying the hegemonious treatment of minorities from their 'large' neighbors. Our young participants seem to advocate the right to cultural autonomy a little less. Unfortunately, we do not have data on the acceptance of cultural autonomy by students from 1998/1999, but we may assume that their results would have been somewhat higher than those obtained by the youth in our sample.

Freedom of association and national minorities' rights are ranked at the bottom of our scale, even though they are accepted by most participants. Freedom of association relates to both the economic sphere, where it is covered by economic rights, and to the freedom of association at civil society level. Civil society does not exist as an integral entity within the global society, but as a mosaic of forms and elements that may only *post-hoc*, for purposes of analysis, be recognized as a whole. The basic characteristics of civil association are the lack of belonging to the sphere of economic life, that is, a non-profit orientation, and an autonomous position regarding the state. Freedom of association defined in such a way, offers a base for a positive relationship of the state, the economic and the civil spheres of society, without which, neither state nor society may be considered free.

Today's political context of the relationship toward minorities may be interpreted through the manner in which Croatia left Yugoslavia, followed by a rhetoric which was from the very beginning extremely nationalist. The political party that before and during the Homeland war expressed most convincingly this nationalist rhetoric was the Croatian Democratic Union. The ideology that came onto the scene in 1990 ('thousand-year dreams of a nation'), had very successfully replaced the previous one ('the historic interests of the working class'). At the core of the need for such a change laid, among other things, the search for national identity. Croatian citizens had then, strongly identified with national symbolism, strongly supported by the 'revolution of symbols' (Pusić, 1992) that was in place at the time. "Modern states are, as a rule, states as representatives of a community of citizens (civil states) and at the same time a reflection of national identity (national states). The concept of national states often only has declaratory value. In democratic countries it gives no special rights to the nation whose national identity is expressed in the state" (Caratan, 1998: 22). The primary role of patriotism is the integration of citizens into the state. The irrational form of patriotism – nationalism – prevents the fulfillment of this role

at the very beginning, because it institutes a division among the citizens. The state should provide protection to minorities as a collective, because members of the minority suffer discrimination precisely because they are members of a minority community, so it would be hypocritical to claim that they have the same rights as all the other citizens, unless there is a statement in the constitution that encompasses the particular minority rights (Caratan, 1998). However, the dominance of a nationalist ideology was not an exclusively Croatian characteristic, because the events of the previous decade have shown that this ideology is present in most other post-socialist countries whose constitution of a pluralist democracy is slow in pace (Pogany, 1995). "In Croatia's case, a great role in the protection of ethnicity and ethnical homogenization belonged to the war conflicts on the territory of the former Yugoslavia that Croatia was involved in, while waiting for five years to realize its sovereignty of the whole territory. Thus, it is, in principle, presumed that the political awareness of the youth was formed under the influence of its value framework and the liberal-democratic and nationalistic ideology" (Baranović, Ilišin, 2004: 343). This situation has reflected on the attitudes of citizens, who advocate the rights of national minorities in two thirds of cases, most of all the students, then the adults, with an insignificantly lower result, and finally the young participants with a 7% smaller acceptance compared to the student population. Such a trend imposes a conclusion about the necessity for affirmative action and programs for the protection of human and minority rights, especially through the education system as one of the most important agents of socialization.

The right to asylum⁸, by its low level of acceptance, contrasts all the other rights: the youth accept it in 44.1% of cases and the adults in 52.2% of cases, and it would be interesting to have an insight into the attitudes of students, but that right was not included in the 1998/1999 research. These findings could be disappointing when it comes to the prognosis of the democratic development of Croatian society. At international level, in spite of the differences, the basis of refugee treatment is linked to the rule that each state must ensure the possibility of seeking asylum, and those seeking it, may not be coerced into returning to their country of origin. However, everyday politics offers ample evidence in order to state that the rights of those seeking asylum are constantly endangered, something that does not discriminate the developed democratic countries from the countries that asylum seekers come from. It is not rare to find the practice of

⁸ International law considers refugees to be persons outside of their state of residence; with well founded fear of persecution due to their race, religious belief, nationality, membership of certain social groups or political attitudes; and they cannot or will not put themselves under protection of the state they had fled from, or return to that state, for fear of persecution. Among those demanding refugee status, there are sometimes asylum seekers, whose main attribute as refugees is one related to political or religious reasons.

retaining asylum seekers in holding centers in some countries, where living conditions are not much different from those in prison. Sometimes they are also sentenced to prison sentences under criminal charges. Instead of creating a supportive environment in which individuals would not feel pressured or threatened, an environment similar to the one those individuals have escaped from is often created. However, some alternative approaches have already been tested: for example, monitoring if the asylum seeker fits into community life, accommodating entire families and temporary forms of asylum. It was shown that it is most important to ensure conditions becoming of a human life to asylum seekers, with special emphasis on personal freedom (Mollica, Silove, Steel, 2001).

In further analysis we were interested in the structuring of particular human rights and freedoms, so they were subjected to factor analysis (Table 2), yielding three factors (with a total variance of 52.0%) as well as a variance analysis.

Table 2: The factor structure of certain human rights and freedoms

Rights and freedoms	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Right to work	.782		
Right to an education	.712		
Right to privacy	.667		
Personal safety	.639		
Equality before the law	.590		
Social protection of elderly and those at risk	.589	.352	
Right to ownership	.580		
Rights of women	.552		
National minority rights		.785	
Cultural autonomy		.693	
Right to asylum		.692	
Freedom of opinion		.660	
Freedom of speech			.726
Freedom of media			.694
Freedom of association			.642
Freedom of information			.642
<i>% of common variance</i>	<i>22.4</i>	<i>15.8</i>	<i>13.8</i>

The first factor – *individual rights* – is constituted by classic values of equality and respect for individual rights and freedoms. If the generally high acceptance of individual rights and freedoms with the absence of differentiation among the youth is observed together, it can be said that there is a high consensus among the youth in accepting most of the basic human rights.

The second factor – *cultural-political rights* – is made up of national minority rights, cultural autonomy, right to asylum and freedom of opinion. The youth have again proven to be very homogenous, even though not to a degree found in the other two factors: the variance analysis has indicated differences in this factor only when it comes to the education of participants (F-ratio=6.32). Differences are directed in a clear line – participants that have (not) finished primary school, as well as those with vocational secondary education, are under-averagely inclined to this dimension, and other participants are average. This finding clearly points to the significant effects of socialization and the importance of including human rights into the education system. This interpretation of results may also be considered as an appeal to official institutions in order to start a public awareness campaign on the stated rights. Otherwise, Croatian society will be very slow in reaching the countries of the Western civilization circle that truly cherish the spirit of multiculturalism. For now, only the Scandinavian countries really belong to that circle of countries, even though multiculturalism is a proclaimed principle in all the significant charters and laws in the European space.

The third factor – labeled freedom of speech, information and association – belongs to the domain of civil society development. Through it, the outside observers find it easiest to determine the position of a particular society on the scale of democratic potential. In this context, we can say that all the groups of youth agree when it comes to this dimension of human rights and freedoms.

3. The perception of respect for human rights in Croatia


A politically conscious individual who is aware of his/her state and civil laws and obligations, takes responsibility for the state and development of the community he/she lives in, as well as cares for his/her own existence, taking into account the interests of other individuals and the entire community. The development of a democratic political culture is especially important for transitional countries, which is accented when it comes to youth that, both as an integral part of modern society and as an exponent of the future, take responsibility for a democratic social development (Baranović, Ilišin, 2004: 343). Putnam (1993) emphasizes the importance of participation in socio-political processes in society in order to ensure the social capital, which will enable the development and preservation of the democratic potential of the entire society.

The sociopolitical context of integrating youth into modern Croatian society, is marked by post-war and transitional problems that led to a neglect of youth as a specific group, and caused the maintenance and transfer of prejudice, discrimination and patterns of violent behavior within it. Even though the situation has improved in the last several years, the manifestations of xenophobia, violence, racism and discrimination based on different attributes (religion,

nationality, age, gender, sexual orientation and other) are still notable in society. This environment inevitably affects the formation of attitudes and values of youth. Young people are very often under pressure of latent, and sometimes explicit violence, prejudice and stereo-types, that they cannot or do not know how to tackle affirmatively or adequately (Bačić and others, 2004: 69).

In this segment of analysis we will limit ourselves to the assessment of youth about the respect towards human rights and freedoms in Croatia in 1999 and 2004. Graph 1 gives an overview of the distribution of answers of youth to the question about the perceived level of respect for human rights in Croatia at the two stated points in time.

Graph 1: The comparative overview of the perception of respect for human rights and freedoms in Croatia – youth 1999 and 2004 (%)




Compared to 1999, in 2004 there is a noticeable difference in all the categories of answers, aside from those regarding ‘mostly not respected’ and ‘completely respected’. The percentage of youth that believes that human rights in Croatia are not respected at all, was under 10% in 1999, only to fall under 5% in 2004. There is an interesting distribution of answers in the remaining three categories. Our neutral category (I do not know/ I cannot estimate) has assembled about 7% less participants than in 1999. This is a positive trend, but of very limited reach. To be more specific, the percentage of undecided participants is still close to 20%, indicative of an insufficient knowledge of the youth about human rights and/or their lack of interest in the issue. This can be illustrated with the data that only 6% of the youth participate in the activities of an organization dealing with human rights’ protection, which was the subject of

a more detailed analysis in the preceding chapter of this study. However, we may conclude that a higher level of engagement and a better structuring of certain factors of socialization may in an organized manner, contribute to the increase in the democratic potential of youth, especially the education system that has, for now, shown a minimum preoccupation with education about human rights⁹. According to the assessment of the young participants, school has a significant influence on the development of their opinions about humanity and society: it holds third position, preceded only by family and friends, and followed by the Church and television, that are also considered to be relatively influential agents of socialization (Baranović, 2000: 15). Those that believe that human rights are mostly respected, have witnessed an increase of 13%, raising their percentage to almost 50%. Through an insight into the existing data, we notice that the highest increase occurred in the two opposed categories – with the participants that consider human rights to be mostly respected and those that believe they are mostly not respected.

Graph 2 contains a comparative outline of the distribution of answers of the youth and adult populations regarding the perceived level of respect for human rights in 2004.

Graph 2: Perception of respect for human rights and freedoms in Croatia – youth 1999 and 2004 (%)



⁹ In Croatian public schools, the human rights program, even though it has been written (*The National Program of Education for Human Rights, 1999.*), is performed only experimentally in a part of secondary schools.

The first conclusion that arises is the higher level of criticism of youth. Specifically, even though the number of youth and adults that are at opposing poles of this scale (answers ‘not respected at all’ and ‘completely respected’), as well as the inclination to the answer ‘mostly not respected’ is approximately the same (the differences range from +/-4%), a higher number of adults believe that human rights are respected. However, the influence of age is more noticeable with undecided participants: there are approximately 5% more undecided participants among the youth that can be ascribed to the higher knowledge of legal regulations and the social situation of adult participants. Although, it is interesting that this assumed higher competence of adult participants swings in favor of the attitude about the prevailing respect for human rights: 9% more adults than youth express their agreement with the prevailing respect for human rights, that is, the adult participants have already crossed the 50% threshold, even though the youth are not significantly far from it.

In the analysis of respect for human rights and freedoms, we are interested in the distribution of responses of youth considering its attributes (Table 3). To simplify the interpretation of results we have merged the answers ‘mostly not respected’ and ‘not respected at all’, as well as ‘mostly respected’ and ‘completely respected’.

Out of the nine independent variables used, only three demonstrate a statistically significant influence on the perception of respect for human rights and freedoms. They are gender, regional status and party affiliation. Gender turned out to be the least influential variable ($\chi^2=21.543$): both genders express a similar indecisiveness in their assessment of respect for human rights – more than a third of the members of each gender. However, women state that there is disrespect for human rights more often, that is, they are more critical than men. On the other hand, men are more inclined to assess that there is a prevailing respect for human rights, and their total number exceeds 50%. Such gender differences may be interpreted by the still existent higher social marginalization of women, and a wider spectrum of their rights that are being breeched, which is why they, even when their rights are not endangered directly, are more sensitive to the violation of human rights.

Regional status seems to be the most important attribute that discriminates against the youth, in the direction of a more positive evaluation in Central Croatia and in the City of Zagreb; two thirds of the inhabitants of Central Croatia and one half of those from Zagreb, believe that human rights are completely or mostly respected. The data range around 40 percent in other regions and the lowest percentage can be found in Istria and Primorje. The City of Zagreb, Istria and Primorje as well as Central Croatia are interesting regarding another matter – the smallest number of undecided participants ranges from

23.8% in Dalmatia to 18.2% in Northern Croatia. This information might serve as an indicator of emphasized needs for investment in democratic and human rights education, in the counties with the highest percentages of undecided participants. As for the inclination toward a more critical evaluation of the human rights' condition in Croatia, the most criticism can be found in Istria and Primorje with 40%, followed by Northern and Eastern Croatia, the City of Zagreb and Dalmatia with approximately 30 percent. While the least participants that answered human rights are mostly not respected or not respected at all, live in Central Croatia. This direction of influence of regional status to the attitudes regarding the level of respect for human rights and freedoms is a reflection of developmental tendencies in certain regions, as well as experiences in the respect for the observed rights and freedoms.

Table 3: The perception of respect for human rights and freedoms regarding the attributes of youth (%)

Attributes of youth	Mostly or not respected at all	I cannot estimate	Mostly or completely respected
<i>Gender</i>	$\chi^2=21.54$		
Female	34.3	21.8	43.9
Male	32.6	14.8	52.6
<i>Regional status</i>	$\chi^2=36.04$		
Northern Croatia	35.4	18.2	46.4
Central Croatia	22.7	15.1	62.2
Istria and Primorje	41.2	15.2	43.6
Eastern Croatia	33.1	20.1	46.9
Dalmatia	30.9	23.8	45.3
Zagreb	34.2	13.4	52.4
<i>Party affiliation</i>	$\chi^2=33.78$		
HDZ	24.7	21.7	53.5
HNS	36.0	12.2	51.8
HSP	27.6	17.9	54.5
HSS	40.4	12.8	46.8
SDP	38.1	14.2	47.7
Undecided	35.1	20.3	44.6
TOTAL	33.4	18.2	48.4

There is a clear connection between ideology and party preference as one of the main determinants of political attitudes and clear indicators of the relationship toward human rights. According to our results, party identification follows regional status when it comes to the strength of its influence. In our case

it means that the most critical, are participants sympathizing with HSS, then SDP, HNS and the politically undecided. The least criticism was expressed by participants inclined toward HDZ and HSP. One of the possible conclusions is that we can compare the declared goals of political parties, to the attitudes of their sympathizers. In this context, it would mean that HDZ, as the party in power, is less inclined to criticize its own treatment of human rights, while HSP is a party that traditionally does not have much space in its program for human rights protection, especially regarding cultural autonomy and national minority rights. The distribution of participants that are not certain, according to parties, provides a wider image, portraying a higher level of uncertainty of participants inclined toward HDZ and those who are politically undecided. The least uncertain participants are sympathizers of HNS and SDP that are once again grouped into a single category. One of the possible reasons for this grouping can be found in the civil option the two latter parties advocate, and thus the option their sympathizers are inclined to as well. The third option, signifying the respect for human rights, is the one mostly chosen by sympathizers of HDZ and HSP, and they are joined by participants inclined toward HNS. On the other hand, the participants more inclined to HSS, SDP and the undecided opinion, respect human rights and freedoms in Croatia somewhat less.

If we sum up the stated tendencies, we may conclude that the ability of assessment and a higher criticism toward the status of human rights is related to the attributes indicative of the female population, the general left-wing ideological-political orientation, and in the region of Istria and Primorje. On the other side, the most benevolent attitude belongs to the inhabitants of Central Croatia and the City of Zagreb. The general comparison of the distribution of answers, leads to the conclusion, that there has been an improvement in the perception of respect for human rights and freedoms among the youth in the five years since the 1999 research. Compared to the adult participants, the youth in 2004 express a greater criticism toward the existing respect for human rights and freedoms, which are encouraging findings because youth are the link toward the future respect for human rights, and where respect for human rights and freedoms are concerned, criticism is never redundant.


4. Perception of contributions to the protection of human rights

After investigating the perception of the degree of respect for human rights and freedoms, we will focus on the factors of their promotion. This research is observed through a prism of both institutional and individual contributions. Institutions are represented by members of legislative, executive and judicial powers, non-governmental organizations, the Church and the media, while individuals are present as distinguished non-political persona. Out of the initial

scale consisting of options ‘contributes a lot’ to ‘does not contribute at all’, we have portrayed and interpreted the combined answers ‘contributes a lot’ and ‘mostly contributes’.

We will first look at the tendencies in perception of the said factors of promotion of human rights and freedoms in Croatia, of the population of youth in 1999 and 2004 (Graph 3).

Graph 3: The ranking scale of estimated contribution of institutions, associations and significant individuals to the realization of human rights in Croatia – youth 1999 and 2004 (%)




For most protagonists, most of the youth estimate that they completely or mostly contribute to the realization of human rights in Croatia. Compared to 1999, there has been an increase in all the observed categories, except for the opposition that experienced a decrease, and the Church (religious communities), which remained on the same level. We cannot speak of differences regarding the media and the judicial system, because there is no data from 1999.

The youth, in 2004 ascribed the highest contribution to the protection of human rights to the media, the Church (that is, religious communities), the Government and the President of the Republic. Following them are the Parliament, the distinguished non-political individuals, non-governmental organizations and parties in power. It shows that the contribution of the opposition and the judiciary is perceived least by the youth. Both categories should be, and are defined as, the basis of a 'healthy' democratic political concept. The proactive role of the opposition is a necessary condition for the existence of a democratic and pluralistic political process. To put it simply, the opposition should play a role of *checks and balances* in political life. Specifically, decisions and processes may spin out of control without it, endangering the rights of minorities, due to the dominance of the majority (the party in power). It seems needless to emphasize the role of the judiciary, and the perceived low level of its contribution in the preservation of human rights and freedoms points to possibly perilous tendencies for the basis of a free society.

The changes in perception, occurring after five years, point to an improved protection of human rights and freedoms in Croatia, or at least to an increased number of participants that have the impression that improvement has taken place. As was already mentioned, the youth in 1999 have expressed a significantly lower level of trust in the abilities of most observed protagonists than in 2004. The most significant increase occurred with the President of the Republic and the parties in power – from the last position they held in 1999, they are now close to the top. At first glance, the result that there was an increase in the opinion that parties in power contributed to the protection of human rights is puzzling, because HDZ was in power both in 1999 and in 2004. We can assume that the political convergence of HDZ towards more liberal values, has led to a better perception of the contribution of that party to the development of human rights. However, it might also be a reflection of the experiences from the time when a coalition of a five party coalition was in power (to the end of 2003) when there was a significant democratization of social and political life. At the same time, an increase in the validation of the contribution of the President of the Republic is undoubtedly the consequence of the personal changes at the head of state, where the acting president, S. Mesić, is perceived by the youth, to be a more devoted protector of human rights and freedoms in Croatia than his predecessor, F. Tudman. On the other hand, the weaker results of the opposition are surprising. It would seem that the opposition-position seesaw has consequently reduced the significance of the opposition by the transfer of a higher contribution to the parties in power.

After an insight into the assessment of the contribution of institutions, associations and significant individuals of the youth population from 1999 and 2004, we will look at the differences between the youth and the adult participants in 2004 (Graph 4).

Graph 4: The ranking scale of estimated contribution of institutions, associations and significant individuals to the realization of human rights in Croatia – youth and adults (%)



We have already established that adult participants believe, to a higher degree, that human rights and freedoms in Croatia are respected, and it is the same regarding the perception of the contribution of institutions, associations and significant individuals to rights and freedoms. It is apparent that all the differences between the youth and the adults are within a +/- 4-10% range, with the emphasis being on the differences in the case of the Parliament, the President of the Republic, non-governmental organizations and the opposition. These generational differences may be the consequence of a higher level of trust that adults seem to have toward political institutions, as well as non-governmental associations whose activities are also politically colored.

As we were interested in the possible structuring of youth, according to their perception of the contribution of certain institutions and associations to the contribution of human rights in Croatia, we have conducted a factor analysis, the results of which are portrayed in Table 4. The factor analysis has yielded three latent structures (factors) that interpret 66.4% of the total variance, within which

the second and third factors have an almost identical variance percentage, while the first factor has gathered as much as the previous two have together.

Table 4: The factor structures of the evaluation of contribution by institutions, associations and significant individuals to the realization of human rights and freedoms in Croatia

Positive contribution	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Sabor (Parliament)	.869		
Government	.868		
Parties in power	.805		
President of the Republic	.663		.328
Opposition	.635		.422
Church (religious communities)		.753	
The media		.696	
Judiciary/ Croatian legal system	.476	.611	
Non-governmental organization			.832
Distinguished non-political individuals		.326	.773
<i>% of common variance</i>	<i>33.0</i>	<i>16.8</i>	<i>16.6</i>

The first factor was labeled *political institutions* due to the nature of the institutions it includes. The most saturated items in this factor are the Parliament, the Government and parties in power, while the President of the Republic and the opposition, have a lower level of saturation. This type of factor structure is a reflection of both the basic principles of the way parliamentary democracies work, and the day-to-day political situation in Croatia. Specifically, an almost equal saturation of the Parliament and the Government springs from the position that the legislative and executive powers have in the political process. It is equally understandable that the significance of the parties in power follows the Parliament and the Government, as well as the ranking of the President of the Republic behind those institutions, but preceding the opposition as a protagonist that, in Croatian political conditions, still has a limited influence.

The second factor is quite non-systematic and not so easily interpreted; which is why it was labeled *sacral, judicial and media institutions*. The judiciary and the media are clearly corrective institutions of the nomenclature in power, but the Church does not fit in at first glance. On the other hand, if we recall that the Church is also a sort of corrective institution, due to its referral to conscience, especially considering that it, as well as religiousness, are often still the light-motives of everyday life and politics, we arrive at a different perspective that with some limitations, allows for the Church to be put side by side with the media and the judicial system.

Even though the last factor – civil sector – gathered an almost identical percentage of the common variance compared to the previous factor, it differs from it both by its homogeneity and simple interpretability. To be more specific, the third factor consists only of non-governmental organizations and distinguished non-political individuals that are often associated by their very nature. Even if distinguished non-political individuals are not directly related to non-governmental organizations, they do advocate very similar aims in the perception of an average citizen.

We were interested in the attributes that differ the youth in its acceptance of the three yielded factors, so we conducted a variance analysis, the results of which are in Table 5.

The acceptance of political institutions (factor 1) as those that contribute to the protection of human rights varies only in regard to the regional status. Thus, the population of Northern Croatia, Istria and Primorje seems to be under-averagely inclined to appreciate the contribution of political institutions, while Central Croatia and the City of Zagreb note an above-average inclination. Eastern Croatia and Dalmatia are positioned in the center of this dimension, with an average inclination to assess that political institutions are a significant factor in the improvement of the state of human rights. The fact that only the variable of regional status achieved a statistically significant influence on the political institutions dimension is intriguing, while, for example, party preferences ‘failed’ in this case, even though they had been confirmed by numerous research studies to be a significant indicator of the relationship toward political institutions. We may conclude that the youth population is relatively homogenous, aside from the differences in regional status as an indicator of developmental-cultural differences, in the case of their relationship toward the contribution of political institutions to the realization of human rights and freedoms in Croatia.

Religiousness, regional status, the father's education and party affiliation affected the inclination toward sacral, judicial and media institutions (factor 2). In line with this dimension's name, religiousness is the strongest predictor, which is easily explained due to the saturation of one part of public life with religious elements, where the “religious orientation has the strongest influence on the choice of party in a Catholic and countries with a mixture of confessions” (Vujčić, 2001: 329). Seen in total, this dimension had an above average attraction to participants whose fathers had not finished their primary education, the inhabitants of Eastern Croatia and Dalmatia, religious participants and sympathizers of HDZ and HSP. Contemplating the attributes of those that have an average inclination to this factor, we reach a profile of youth whose fathers have a vocational degree, are inhabitants of Northern or Central Croatia and sympathizers of HSS or are politically undecided. On the opposing pole from

those with whose advocating this dimension is above average, are the youth, whose fathers have an academic education, who live in Istria, Primorje and the City of Zagreb, who are religiously undecided or not religious at all, and are inclined to HNS and SDP when it comes to political preference. The profile of those that are inclined to this factor below average is somewhat distinctive, if we take into consideration that the factor also consists of certain sacral elements. But difficulties arise when we contemplate the link with the media and the judiciary. The lack of trust in the judicial system by the previously described participants is easily explained by a number of scandals in that system, as well as by its low effectiveness, causing numerous cases to remain unsolved for years. However, when it comes to the media as protagonists in the contribution to human rights' protection, higher education and non-religiousness should also signal a higher democratic potential, linked to trust in the media, which of course changes in conditions where the media are not free. We have already stated that Croatia was in 54th place in 2004 when it comes to freedom of the media (*Freedom in the World 2004 Country Ratings*, 2004), which does not give a great basis for these participants to trust the great contribution of the Croatian Media to the protection of human rights and freedoms.

The third latent dimension (civil sector) influenced by all the observed attributes of youth aside from regional status, are in the following order: education, age, party preference, religiousness, socio-professional status and education of the participant's father. The opinion that the civil sector is an important factor in improving the state of human rights and freedoms in Croatia is expressed above averagely by older participants (25-29 years of age), students, youth whose fathers have a higher or academic degree, and who themselves have the same level of education, those undecided when it comes to religion, and voters of HNS. All these attributes indicate a higher democratic potential of participants inclined toward this factor. The other extreme is occupied by the youngest participants (15-19 years of age), unemployed, fathers who have some primary education, and who have themselves finished primary school or vocational school, as well as being sympathizers of HDZ and HSP. Education was once again shown as a strong indicator of the relationship toward the civil sector, when it comes to the degree of its influence: ascribing merit to the civil sector increases with the level of education. Equally, the perception of the effects of the civil sector grows with age, belonging to liberal political options, religious non-denomination and the father's education. These attributes point to a higher democratic potential of participants inclined to perceive the civil sector as a factor contributing to the respect of human rights in contemporary Croatia.

Table 5: The differences among the youth in the acceptance of the factors of contribution by institutions, associations and significant individuals to the realization of human rights and freedoms in Croatia

Attributes of youth	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
<i>Age</i>			<i>F-ratio=12.73</i>
15 – 19 years			–
20 – 24 years			0
25 – 29 years			+
<i>Socio-professional status</i>			<i>F-ratio =8.90</i>
Employed			0
Unemployed			–
Pupils			0
Students			+
<i>Father's education</i>		<i>F-ratio =5.95</i>	<i>F-ratio =6.17</i>
Primary school		+	–
Vocational school		0	0
High school		0	0
College, university		–	+
<i>Education</i>			<i>F-ratio =14.28</i>
Primary school			–
Vocational school			–
High school			0
College, university			+
<i>Regional status</i>	<i>F-ratio =10.66</i>	<i>F-ratio =6.65</i>	
Northern Croatia	–	0	
Central Croatia	+	0	
Istria and Primorje	–	–	
Eastern Croatia	0	+	
Dalmatia	0	+	
Zagreb	+	–	
<i>Religiousness</i>		<i>F-ratio =49.46</i>	<i>F-ratio =9.51</i>
Religious		+	0
Undecided		–	0
Not religious		–	+
<i>Party affiliation</i>		<i>F-ratio =5.57</i>	<i>F-ratio =10.62</i>
HDZ*		+	–
HNS		–	+
HSP		+	–
HSS		0	0
SDP		–	0
Undecided		0	0

Legend: – below common average; 0 within common average; + above common average

The youth are only at the beginning of their life and work cycle when they, as individuals, become aware of the necessity of mechanisms systems for the

protection of human rights and freedoms. To what degree their political awareness will be realized, depends, not only on the primary agents of socialization, but, to a great degree, on the institutions that create and implement everyday policies. Adding up all the previously stated findings we conclude that the recognizable effectiveness of certain institutions, associations and individuals when it comes to improving human rights and freedoms in Croatia, is influenced not only by their objective effects, but by the democratic potential of youth – that is education – and their inclinations toward specific political options.

5. Conclusion

It is possible to efficiently implement the systematic proclamation of human rights on a global scale that began in 1948, with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and in our times, among other places, expressed by the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (*United Nations Millennium Development Goals by the Year 2015*, 2000), only through an orientation of the governments of certain states on the areas of education, preservation of health and an increase of income levels. Countries must construct partnerships on a global level, not to determine political and economic agendas so much, but to promote and protect human rights. The polarity between rights-freedoms and rights-claims has made relative the “original greatness of human rights, but at the same time, it has expanded the area of their types and meanings, and increased the social mass of those interested in the rights of life. It has made them an instrument of the developmental and social dynamic of the industrial society, through an argument of great clashes between democracy and totalitarianism, of the developed and undeveloped, etc.” (Kalanj, 1996: 50). These tendencies are exacerbated by globalization, even though, seen as an ideal-type, globalization is meant to imply an ever widening implementation of the hypothesis of human rights, that is, their universality. However, we are unfortunately, witnesses of constant deviations in the process of their protection.

“Institutions are necessary but not enough. They need to be filled with content, used for the improvement of all sectors of human rights. This content and this path will lead Croatia toward the European Union and its high standards in eliminating discrimination” (Šimunović, 2004: 10). Modern thoughts on the development of human rights move in the direction of linking social development with increasing the protection of human rights – the emphasis is on prevention (instead of late intervention), social participation, activities of self-organization and self-help, promotion of autonomy and development of social skills, and need for greater transparency of public policies. In this context, it is very important to work on affirmation, promotion and implementation of values and ideas of civil society, of the culture of non-violence and tolerance, human

rights, dialogue, cooperation and trust, as well as awareness-raising about the opportunities for social change. It is also very important to inform and stimulate the youth to get engaged, to question and educate themselves on those values and opportunities of work and life based on them, in order to propel them forward and contribute to the realization of positive shifts in society. Youth in our analysis are perceived as a link, just being formed in a specific social system, thus making it one of the most important elements of a positive reception and implementation of the basic postulates of human rights.

The results of the research on validating specific human rights and freedoms, indicate that the greatest number of young persons accept the right to an education, right to work, personal security, right to privacy, social protection of the elderly and those at risk, equality before the law, rights of women and ownership rights. The comparison of acceptance of the observed human rights and freedoms of the population of youth and adults in Croatia, demonstrates that adults accept most rights to a higher degree than the youth, which can be interpreted through their better social integration. The analysis has shown that the preference of Croatian youth for certain human rights and freedoms is not conditioned by their observed socio-demographic and socio-structural attributes, aside from education, which points to the significance of the education system as an agent in improving the condition of human rights.

Approximately one third of youth participants, were not satisfied with the respect for human rights in Croatia today as well as five years ago, while the number of those undecided has decreased, which can probably be attributed to the positive effect of public campaigns and some changes occurring during that period of time. There has been an increase from 1999 to 2004 in the number of youth who believe that human rights in Croatia are mostly or completely respected. The youth, compared to adults, express a higher level of criticism toward the existing degree of respect for human rights and freedoms. The results of analysis according to the social attributes of youth, demonstrate that the capability of assessment and higher criticism for the status of human rights in Croatia, is related to living in more economically prosperous regions, as well as the left-wing ideological-political orientation and female gender.

Through an insight into the assessment of the contribution of institutions, associations and distinguished individuals by the youth population in 1999 and 2004, we have determined that today's generation of youth perceives to a greater degree, the contribution of all institutions, associations and significant individuals (except for the opposition) to the protection of human rights and freedoms in Croatia. To be more precise, most young people assess that all the protagonists completely or partially contribute to the realization of human rights in the country. There has been a significant increase regarding the perception of the

contribution of the highest institutions of power compared to 1999. The adults differ from the youth by emphasizing the contribution of all the observed protagonists even more. Regional status, religiousness, the father's education and political party affiliation, notably affect the perception of the contribution of the observed protagonists of the realization of human rights in Croatia.

Summarily, our analysis indicates that the youth accept human rights and freedoms decidedly, when they are discussed on a level of principles, but that there is a certain disharmony where specific rights and practices in Croatia are concerned, which can partially be interpreted as their insufficient competence regarding certain elements of social and political processes. As human rights and freedoms constitute universally accepted international standards and criteria of democracy in the modern world and its institutions today, the relationship of youth toward them, represents an indication of its social awareness and a precondition for its democratic activity. Even though the level of acceptance of human rights and freedoms as values seems to be high, there is wavering, indicating a need for additional engagement of some agents of socialization, especially the education system and the political protagonists. Freedom and human rights in Croatia are normatively regulated and are given to the individual at birth. However, freedom is not just a right, but a permanent mission, put before each young person, making all the difference for those that manage to gain entry into the world of active citizens, capable of making good their own, and others resources in the best possible way, thus contributing to the development of the world we live in. The first step in this ambitious plight is for the youth to contribute as much as possible to the democratization of Croatia, which would prepare them, as well as the country, for joining the united Europe.

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Furio Radin

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ATTITUDES TOWARD EUROPE

1. Introduction

This share of the analysis will be dealing with the relationship toward one's nation and certain attitudes toward European integration, as well as differences between basic social subgroups of youth in that context. Put in this way, the question is apparently simple and gives the impression that the answer might be unambiguous, however, as is often the case, such questions present the greatest challenge to science by producing the most doubts and almost regularly ending, not in answers, but in an entirely new set of questions.

Actually, the question itself is only apparently simple, because there are no theoretically sustainable reasons that would allow us to set a directive hypothesis about the affect of ethnocentrism or cosmopolitanism on the relationship toward European associations. However, it can be assumed that Europeism will have a positive correlation with the relationship toward the European Union, but such a hypothesis would make no sense, for in this political moment, those two concepts are mostly coherent.

The relation between the national and "supranational" relationship with the idea of a united Europe represents one of the basic questions discussed not only during the process that precedes a country's integration into the European Union, but later on as well, each time there is a conflict of interests between the Union and certain states, or social groups within those states (fishermen, farmers, truck drivers, etc.). We can assume that a change of balance in such relationships occurs due to pressure from specific interests, but, as is the case whenever attitudes are in question, the affective component might have a strong influence. A set of emotions produced by ethnicity deeply penetrates the irrational dimension of an individual's personality and the collective perception, so it is often very difficult to differentiate between the influence of interests in the first place, of tradition in the second, and finally, of subconscious factors in third place, on the power of the idea of nation in the social life of an individual or a group.

The solemn deeds and crimes undertaken in the name of the nation are evidence of the influence of that concept on the life of individuals and the functioning of groups, and we can assume that this effect is even stronger when it comes to youth. Something similar to that is not possible, at least at this social moment, when talking about the affective relationship toward Europe, where something we might call soft power is in action, that is the power of inclusion, or, in other words, the greater or lesser involvement of individuals in the idea of the need for something that is for the most part considered a value. One does not die by the sword nor for love of Europe, because the very process of inclusion in the European Union is subject to criteria that are pragmatic, and the process of integration is democratic. Perhaps the association process represents the greatest reason for the aversion of certain political options towards European integration, because the lack of coercion in this integration, replaced by acceptance of the rules of the game, is something that represents a sort of twist when compared to national integrations that were, almost as a rule, infused by romance. And perhaps the acceptance of the European idea is understood by some exclusively as the relinquishing of national sovereignty, hence, as a subtraction and not addition of value, exactly because the concept of the European Union is not associated with strong emotion, or at least not as much as is usually dedicated to a nation, a region or a city.

2. Basic concepts

It is necessary to define several basic concepts, mostly due to the constrictions of the research subject.

Let us, then, return to the subject itself, determining that in this section we will be dealing with the relationship between national identity and attitudes toward European integration. Since our approach is psycho-social, we shall disregard the definitions of concepts related to institutions and concentrate on the discussion of phenomena that have to do with individuals or groups.

The concept of national identity is narrowly correlated to the phenomenon of ethnic identity. The central importance of this concept for understanding the individual and interpersonal aspects of ethnical affiliation is present in many authors. Phinney and Rotheram (1987) define ethnic identity as a feeling of belonging to an ethnic group, i.e., as that part of opinions, beliefs, attitudes and values in each of us, that is ascribed to such belonging. The authors emphasize that ethnic identity is articulated in different components and serves the individual by self-recognition within his ethnic group, that is, to determine the value that the unique culture has for that individual's development and functioning. The creation of such an emotion presumes a certain level of interethnic contact. Ethnic identity, to be specific, takes on its true meaning only in those contexts

that require necessary everyday contact between different cultures, that is, in multiethnic environments, especially when dealing with a certain relationship between a majority nation and minority groups. In these cases, ethnic identity becomes a factor of differentiation.

Weinrich (1988) thinks that ethnic identity is not an entity, but a process through which an individual builds his/her ethnicity, decides and estimates the value that culture has for his/her development. Erikson (1974) considers that achieving identity is a result of a period of research and experimentation during adolescence through different options and in different fields – religious, political, interest, etc. Marcia (1980) believes that this process takes place in four different ways: without engagement (diffused identity), engagement without research, that is, based on inherited values (blockage of identity), research without engagement (expectation period) and engagement with research (complete identity).

Phinney (1990) suggests three phases along a continuum that on the one hand presumes an unresearched identity, on the other holds a formed identity with engagement, while research points are found in the middle. It is interesting that minority groups face two additional problems: recognizing the differences between their culture and the culture of the ethnic majority, and realizing that those differences often presume social disparity, often economic in nature.

Even though identity is formed during adolescence, there are phases that come earlier, even in childhood. Ethnic categorization, that is, the ability to understand differences between ethnic groups, is possible in children that are only three-four years old, who can sort photographs of individuals into groups based on skin color (Rice, Ruiz, Padilla, 1974; Goldstein, Koopman, Goldstein, 1979). Ethnic identification is the ability of an individual to identify with his/her ethnic group. It is possible from the age of five, but is complete in children at the age of nine (Laosa, 1984).

Ethnic stability presumes the consciousness of ethnicity being a man's attribute that is consistent in time. The understanding that ethnicity is stable in time occurs at the age of seven, and is complete at eight or nine years of age (Aboud, Skerry, 1983; Aboud, 1984). Aside from those, there are other characteristics of ethnic identity visible in childhood: knowing and manifesting behavior related to identity through socialization in the family (acceptance of alimentary styles, religious practices, etc.); the perception of the family's involvement in a wider (original) ethnic community, which accentuates the differences between the in and out groups (Phinney, Rotheram 1987; Phinney, 1990).

The final characteristic of ethnic identity, and at the same time, the most interesting for our research, is the ability to develop attitudes about one's own and other ethnic groups (Phinney, Rotheram 1987). Ethnic attitudes are the

characteristic manner of reacting to one's own and other ethnic groups. Such reactions may be positive or negative and may vary in intensity.

The inclination to positively value members of one's own ethnic group is known as ethnic preference, and in extreme cases, that is, when one's own nation is preferred at all times and in spite of everything else, it is called ethnocentrism. A negative attitude towards other ethnic groups is called ethnic prejudice (Aboud, 1987).

Ethnic attitudes are characterized by a cognitive component, that is, by beliefs about a certain ethnic group, an affective component that relates to emotions accompanying such attitudes, and a conative component that relates to behaviors and activities we undertake regarding the ethnic identity of an individual or a group.

Two theoretic-methodological approaches have developed in the last three decades regarding research of the development of ethnic attitudes. The first is socio-cognitive, which studies the development of ethnic attitudes as a result of social and cognitive evolutionary changes (Katz, 1976; Phinney, Rotheram 1987; Aboud, 1988). The second is based on SIT, or the social identity theory (Tajfel, Turner, 1979, 1986; Turner, 1982) and the SCT, that is, the auto-categorization theory (Turner and others, 1987).

The socio-cognitive model sees ethnic attitudes as “an inevitable, but not a permanent dimension of development” (Aboud, 1988), and that ethnic preference and prejudice reach a maximum of intensity between the ages of five and seven, and that their strength decreases between ages seven and nine, later developing attitudes of criticism toward one's own ethnicity, that are less discriminating toward other ethnicities (Katz, Sohn, Salk, 1975).

Perhaps the most productive framework, for our needs, is the one set up lately by different researchers (Vaughan, 1987; Milner, 1996; Nesdale, 2000), studying the development of ethnic attitudes through the integration of the SIT and SCT models.

This approach presumes that ethnic and inter-group attitudes in general are the function of social categorization and identification with one's own group (Brown, 1995; Powlishta, 1995; Bigler, Jones, Lobliner, 1997). This categorization enables the forming of simplified perceptions of the social environment in which the differences between social groups are amplified, and those within a group disregarded. Identification enables the determination of one's own social, in our case ethnic, belonging, by choosing one of the available categories. In other words, preferences and prejudices are visible as a consequence of belonging to a certain social group.

This approach is also important because it does not assume it is possible to reduce prejudices and ethnical preferences after a certain age of childhood, but,

however, believes that such findings are more a result of the methodology used than an expression of phases of development, and that after childhood prejudices, including ethnic prejudices, and preferences of in-groups may increase in certain social contexts (Rice and others, 1974; Nesdale, 2000).

Finally, a certain degree of national identity exists in all social groups and is considered to be normal, for it is a form of direct cohesion. An almost inevitable product of “normal ethnocentrism” is the rejection or non-respect for out-groups, but while ethnic groups that exist with mutual contact keep their values and normative autonomy, a satisfactory level of tolerance and coexistence may be achieved.

Conflict, on the other hand, occurs when there is competition based on cultural differentiation, focused on achieving certain specific goals (material goods, power, prestige, economic security, autonomy, etc.). However, the effect of irrational motives, myths and personal frustrations and political manipulations cannot be neglected, which may have an important role in creating inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts.

3. Attitudes toward one's own nation

The relationship toward one's own nation was investigated with the same battery of 11 attitudes that was (with the exception of one item, investigating the relationship toward Yugoslav ethnicity) used in our first research of youth, a long time ago, in 1986 (Flere, 1986; Vrčan, 1988). This instrument was again applied in 1999 (Baranović, 2002), giving us the opportunity to compare the generations of youth of the past twenty years.

Special value belongs to data gathered in the last research on the sample of adult participants, which for the first time enable the comparison of attitudes of the young to those that are typical of older generations, including those that coincide with their parents' age.

The participants reacted to the offered attitudes by using answers at the Likert scale consisting of five degrees: from “I completely disagree” (1) to “I completely agree” (5). The frequencies of the results were analyzed first and compared to those from 1986 and 1999; we accepted as relevant the percentages of complete acceptance (grade 5 on the scale), the middle grade (arithmetic averages of answer degrees) and the standard deviations (Table 1). A similar comparison was done between the young and adult participants in the 2004 research (Table 4).

A factor analysis reduced the 11 statements from the scale to the main components with the use of the Kaiser-Guttman criterion of extraction with an orthogonal rotation (varimax), suitable for additional autonomous factor analysis (Table 2). This is why we were able to compute the factor points by the regression

method and then, through variance analysis, the significance of differences for several socio-demographic “independent” variables: gender, age, regional status, socio-professional status, residential status, education, religious self-identification, marital status and party preference (Table 3). Since the statistical analysis applied is identical to the one used in 1999 and partially to the one from 1986, the results are comparable. We have also factorized the results of the answers given by adult participants, in order to show if there are any age related differences in the latent structures of national identity (Table 5).

The first conclusion that arises is that extreme identification with a nation can be found in the second half of the scale, while the attitudes of moderate national identification and openness toward other nations are more represented (Table 1). The very well accepted attitudes, that is, those whose strongest form is accepted by more than 50% of youth, with an average grade above 4, reflect moderate national identification. Those are statements on the need for nurturing and renewing national ideals, and on the simultaneous acceptance of national and global citizenship.

Table 1: National identity of youth in 1986, 1999 and 2004

Attitudes	1986			1999			2004		
	(%)*	M	S.D.	(%)	M	S.D.	(%)	M	S.D.
Each nation needs to renew and cherish its national ideals. (A)	26.4	3.66	1.15	32.5	3.73	1.16	53.0	4.28	0.92
I feel like a member of my own nation as much as a member of the community of the human kind. (B)	46.3	4.15	0.98	42.2	3.95	0.97	52.7	4.20	1.00
No relevant trait comes out of one's national affiliation. (C)	44.2	4.00	1.08	33.1	4.08	1.00	39.7	3.72	1.28
Every nation needs to be open to the world and the influence of other cultures. (D)	40.5	3.95	1.10	40.6	3.26	1.29	38.0	3.89	1.10
I feel like a member of my nation and that feeling has priority.** (E)	–	–	–	18.6	2.23	1.18	30.9	3.62	1.23
Every member of my nation should always and in every way appreciate our nation more than others. (F)	9.5	2.45	1.33	19.4	3.36	1.20	30.7	3.48	1.37
Humanity is the only real human community so every division into nations is harmful of meaningless. (G)	33.8	3.76	1.12	21.7	3.40	1.16	24.8	3.31	1.32
Even the flaws of one's nation should be loved. (H)	16.0	3.00	1.34	17.8	2.44	1.25	23.3	3.24	1.34
One should always be cautious and restrained toward members of other nations, even when they are friends. (I)	6.3	2.27	1.28	7.6	4.10	0.94	8.9	2.40	1.32
Openness to the world brings every nation more harms than benefits. (J)	6.6	2.19	1.23	2.7	2.14	1.09	7.1	2.40	1.22
Nationally mixed marriages are doomed to failure in advance. (K)	3.7	1.90	1.13	4.7	3.19	1.28	5.4	2.00	1.23

* Complete agreement

** The content of this item was adjusted in 1986 in order to measure Yugoslav ethnicity.

It is also a fact that the orientation toward national ideals is for the first time at the head of the hierarchy in this research: in 1986 this attitude was accepted by only every fourth young Croat (26.4%), in 1999 every third (32.5%), and in 2004 every other (53%). It is evident as well that, in general, nationally tinted attitudes are significantly more present in this research compared to the previous two.

The third and fourth attitudes in the rank belong to an open ethnic mindset as evidence that some of today's young generation accept the value of tolerance and coexistence. Almost 40% of participants believe that the nation is not one of the important human personal traits (39.7%, 5% more than in 1999, but also 5% less than in 1986); 38% think that we must be open to other cultures.

The first attitude that signifies a firmly positive attitude toward one's own nation, but not necessarily a negative attitude toward others, is in fifth position, accepted by almost one third of participants (30.7%). It means a national emotion that gives priority to one's own nation. This attitude is the only one that was not measured in 1986, but we do know that it was much stronger than in 1999, when it was accepted by 18.6% of youth (that is, the mean increased from 2.23 to 3.62, from being under average to slightly above average).

Similarly, the attitude about the uncritical preference of one's own nation is accepted by the same percentage of youth (30.7%), by a third more than in 1999 (19.4%) and by two thirds more than in 1986.


Only one quarter of youth accept the typical attitude of cosmopolitanism (24.8%, with a mean of 3.31), somewhat more than in the late 1990s (21.7%), but less than in the 1980s (one third).

With other ethnocentric attitudes, serious acceptance is present only for the statement about the need to love even the shortcomings of one's own nation (23.3% with the mean of 3.24). This attitude increased significantly from the 1980s, when it was accepted by 16% of youth and the 1990s (17.8%). Other attitudes of extreme orientation toward one's own nation are at the back of the ranking scale, represented by less than 10% of youth.

The frequency analysis moved us to construct a map of ethnic attitudes based on multidimensional scaling before the factor analysis (Graph 1). The map is portrayed noting that the complete meaning of the abbreviations used may be found in Table 1 (in parentheses behind each respective attitude).

The map, constructed by using the method of computing of the Euclid distance between variables, without additional standardization and with the given 2x2 dimensions, produces axes labeled closed-open (horizontal) and cosmopolitanism-ethnocentrism (vertical).

Graph 1: The map of national identification of youth



The lower right quadrant signifies an emphasis on openness and cosmopolitanism. Three attitudes are positioned here: cosmopolitanism, insignificance of a nation for the life of an individual and, on the cusp, openness toward other ethnicities.

The upper right quadrant determines openness and ethnocentrism. One attitude is placed here: the need to renew national ideals, while the attitude about the connection between the nation and the human community is at the border.

Between the right and left upper quadrants, that is in the area of ethnocentrism and an unspecified, that is diffused open-closed, there are three attitudes: the priority of national emotions, the need to appreciate one's own nation more than other nations and to love even its shortcomings.

The lower left quadrant, safely within the "closed" area and diffuse in their relationship toward cosmopolitanism and ethnocentrism are the final three attitudes: about the harmfulness of mixed marriages, about caution toward members of other nations and about the harm of opening to the world. Hence, these are the least accepted attitudes that might characterize a general pathologic relationship toward the environment the individual is living in, rather than a formed national identity.

The multidimensional scaling regularly demonstrates the complexity of the relationship between worldviews with many borderline areas that are not immediately visible.

The classic method defining such complexities is factor analysis. It has demonstrated here that the correlation between the answers of all the participants and all the attitudes, that measure the relationship toward ethnicity, produce three latent dimensions (factors) that explain 55.4% of the total variance. Table 2 portrays the structures of the three obtained factors.

Table 2: The factor structure of national identity – youth

Attitudes	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
I feel like a member of my nation and that feeling has priority.	.760		
Each nation needs to renew and cherish its national ideals.	.719		
Every member of my nation should always and in every way appreciate our nation more than others.	.708	.306	
Even the flaws of one's nation should be loved.	.637		
One should always be cautious and restrained toward members of other nations, even when they are friends.		.745	
Nationally mixed marriages are doomed to failure in advance.		.737	
Openness to the world brings every nation more harms than benefits.		.733	
No relevant trait comes out of one's national affiliation.			.722
Humanity is the only real human community so every division into nations is harmful of meaningless.			.720
Every nation needs to be open to the world and the influence of other cultures.			.624
I feel like a member of my own nation as much as a member of the community of the human kind.	.331		.600
<i>% of common variance</i>	<i>20.9</i>	<i>17.8</i>	<i>16.7</i>

The first factor delineates the *national identification*, that is, the non-extreme model of relatedness to the nation that does not *a priori* exclude consideration of other ethnicities and coexistence with them. A mild saturation of this factor with the attitude that determines a similar value of national and supranational (cosmopolitan) identities proves that this is a dimension that used to be known as patriotism. From the similar factor derived in the 1999 research, this factor, aside from the reasons mentioned, differs by the lack of one item (the need for caution towards other, even “friendly” nations), that contributes to its moderation.

The second factor can, without a doubt, be labeled *ethnocentrism*. It is also very similar to the identically labeled factor from the previous research, differing from it only by the lack of one negatively saturated item (about the need for nations to be open to other cultures).

The last latent dimension is indisputably *cosmopolitanism* and also differs from the similar factor in 1999 due to the lack of, in this case a mildly positively saturated item about the need for openness towards others.

We can, thus, conclude that the results obtained confirm the ability of the instrument to discriminate the population based on national identity into three models: moderate national identification, radical ethnocentrism and pronounced cosmopolitanism.

We will now, using the variance analysis method, test the differences that these three models of national identity produce within the basic social groups of the young population.

Table 3 portrays the existing differences among the young in accepting the patterns of national identity. Two pluses (++) stand for categories significantly above average, one plus (+) stands for those that are above average, 0 means those that are within the average of the common results. Analogous to that, two minuses (--) signify groups that are significantly below average, and one minus (-) stands for below average. As significant differences, those with a level of significance lower than 0.01 were analyzed. Such differences were marked with symbols (++,+,0,-,--) in Table 3, while the other fields are empty.

The F-ratio values indicate that the discriminating attributes are religious self-identification, regional status and the education of the participants (the latter only in relation to ethnocentrism). The weakest differences are produced by gender and age.

The factors of national identification and ethnocentrism are far more discriminating than cosmopolitanism.

The pattern of national identification is more present with the young from Dalmatia and Central Croatia, with sympathizers of HDZ and HSP, those with a lower level of personal and paternal education, and the youngest. The extremely low values are accepted by the non-religious and religiously undecided participants and those coming from Istria and Primorje.

Ethnocentrism is stronger with the youngest participants, that is, pupils, as well as the unemployed, with a lower level of personal and paternal education. Also, it is stronger in the rural population, in continental Croatia (with the exception of Zagreb) and Dalmatia, and in religious youth and sympathizers of HDZ, HSS and HSP. A low level of ethnocentrism is more commonly found in youth from Istria, Primorje and Zagreb and in the urban population in general, with a higher level of education, both personal and paternal, in non-religious and religiously undecided participants and with youth close to HNS and SDP.

Table 3: Differences among the young in accepting the factors of national identity

Attributes of youth	National identification	Ethnocentrism	Cosmopolitanism
<i>Socio-professional status</i>	<i>F=6.37; Sign.: 0.00</i>	<i>F=14.64; Sign.: 0.00</i>	<i>F=2.80; Sign.: 0.04</i>
Employed	0	0	
Unemployed	0	+	
Pupils	+	+	
Students	+	--	
<i>Gender</i>	<i>F=0.85; Sign.: 0.36</i>	<i>F=1.22; Sign.: 0.27</i>	<i>F=16.74; Sign.: 0.00</i>
Female			+
Male			-
<i>Age</i>	<i>F=5.27; Sign.: 0.01</i>	<i>F=6.56; Sign.: 0.01</i>	<i>F=2.78; Sign.: 0.06</i>
15 – 19 years	+	+	
20 – 24 years	0	0	
25 – 29 years	0	0	
<i>Father's education</i>	<i>F=7.31; Sign.: 0.00</i>	<i>F=13.85; Sign.: 0.00</i>	<i>F=1.24; Sign.: 0.29</i>
Primary school or less	+	++	
Vocational school	+	+	
High school	0	-	
College, university, higher	-	-	
<i>Participant's education</i>	<i>F=6.44; Sign.: 0.00</i>	<i>F=27.63; Sign.: 0.00</i>	<i>F=2.90; Sign.: 0.03</i>
Primary school or less	+	+	
Vocational school	+	++	
High school	-	-	
College, university, higher	-	-	
<i>Place of habitat</i>	<i>F=2.26; Sign.: 0.08</i>	<i>F=13.20; Sign.: 0.00</i>	<i>F=1.40; Sign.: 0.24</i>
Village		+	
Small town		0	
Major city		--	
Zagreb		--	
<i>Regional status</i>	<i>F=18.13; Sign.: 0.00</i>	<i>F=12.35; Sign.: 0.00</i>	<i>F=3.98; Sign.: 0.01</i>
Northern Croatia	0	+	-
Central Croatia	+	+	+
Istria and Primorje	--	--	+
Eastern Croatia	0	+	0
Dalmatia	++	+	-
Zagreb	0	--	0
<i>Religious self-identification</i>	<i>F=52.53; Sign.: 0.00</i>	<i>F=25.71; Sign.: 0.00</i>	<i>F=1.46; Sign.: 0.23</i>
Religious	+	+	
Undecided	--	--	
Not religious	--	--	
<i>Party affiliation</i>	<i>F=13.75; Sign.: 0.00</i>	<i>F=11.68; Sign.: 0.00</i>	<i>F=4.29; Sign.: 0.01</i>
HDZ	++	++	-
HNS	-	--	+
HSP	++	+	--
HSS	++	++	0
SDP	-	--	0
Undecided	-	0	0

Finally, cosmopolitanism, as a separate and autonomous factor, cannot be defined only as the opposite of ethnocentrism. It can be a thoughtful value orientation, as well as a consequence of globalization, so it is not surprising that it produces a structure of differences that is unlike the ones in the previous two factors. The basic segments of youth actually differ poorly regarding the (lack of) cosmopolitanism, which proves that openness to the world may coexist in (more moderate) forms of national identity. In this case, the exception is made by three attributes of youth. The first is gender, where women demonstrate a more open attitude toward the world than the men. Regarding the regional status we regis-

tered mild, but significant differences: Istria and Primorje, as well as Central Croatia produce a somewhat more pronounced cosmopolitanism, while Dalmatia and Northern Croatia accept a lower level of cosmopolitanism. Sympathizers of HSP and HDZ are not cosmopolitan, and those partial to HNS are somewhat more inclined toward it.

Before moving on to the comparison of national and European identity, we shall turn our attention to the results achieved from the sample of adult participants and their comparison to the previously analyzed data from the sample of youth.

Table 4 indicates the frequencies of the adult participants' sample along with the already portrayed data for the young population.

Table 4: The national identity of youth and adults in 2004

Attitudes	Youth			Adults		
	Complete agreement (%)	M	S.D.	Complete agreement (%)	M	S.D.
Each nation needs to renew and cherish its national ideals.	53.0	4.28	0.92	61.8	4.37	0.94
I feel like a member of my own nation as much as a member of the community of the human kind.	52.7	4.20	1.00	61.0	4.31	1.04
No relevant trait comes out of one's national affiliation.	39.7	3.72	1.28	44.7	3.80	1.33
Every nation needs to be open to the world and the influence of other cultures.	38.0	3.89	1.10	46.8	4.02	1.14
I feel like a member of my nation and that feeling has priority.	30.9	3.62	1.23	43.9	3.84	1.28
Every member of my nation should always and in every way appreciate our nation more than others.	30.7	3.48	1.37	35.1	3.48	1.45
Humanity is the only real human community so every division into nations is harmful of meaningless.	24.8	3.31	1.32	30.7	3.34	1.42
Even the flaws of one's nation should be loved.	23.3	3.24	1.34	29.7	3.30	1.47
One should always be cautious and restrained toward members of other nations, even when they are friends.	8.9	2.40	1.32	13.7	2.58	1.42
Openness to the world brings every nation more harms than benefits.	7.1	2.40	1.22	7.9	2.37	1.29
Nationally mixed marriages are doomed to failure in advance.	5.4	2.00	1.23	7.2	2.19	1.29

The comparison between the adult and young participants indicates a more pronounced level of results by the adults both in percentages of answers, and in their mean values. The ranking of the answers is almost identical (except for the third and fourth attitudes) and, to summarize, we notice it shows several tendencies.

1. Both groups of participants predominantly accept the attitude that signifies national identification, but the adults accept it somewhat more often (61.8% compared to 53.0%, that is, 4.37 versus 4.28).
2. Three attitudes that belong to a more tolerant worldview or cosmopolitanism follow, but they are more strongly accepted by the adults.
3. After that come the attitudes that signify a pronounced national identification and ethnocentrism, and here as well, the adults accept the more extreme answers better.

We can conclude with sufficient reliability that both the young and the adult participants demonstrate a very similar hierarchy of attitudes related to national identity and that all these attitudes are increasingly accentuated with age.

The results of the factor analysis on the sample of adult participants (Table 5) indicate that the very structure of orientations of national identity is very similar in youth and in the adult age, where three of the yielded factors explain 55.6% of the total variance.

Table 5: The factor structure of national identity – adults

Attitudes	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
I feel like a member of my nation and that feeling has priority.	.764		
Every member of my nation should always and in every way appreciate our nation more than others.	.718	.362	
Each nation needs to renew and cherish its national ideals.	.700		
Even the flaws of one's nation should be loved.	.654		
Nationally mixed marriages are doomed to failure in advance.		.762	
One should always be cautious and restrained toward members of other nations, even when they are friends.	.323	.707	
Openness to the world brings every nation more harms than benefits.		.701	
Humanity is the only real human community so every division into nations is harmful of meaningless.			.713
I feel like a member of my own nation as much as a member of the community of the human kind.			.663
No relevant trait comes out of one's national affiliation.			.659
Every nation needs to be open to the world and the influence of other cultures.			.635
<i>% of common variance</i>	<i>21.2</i>	<i>17.6</i>	<i>16.8</i>

The factors are very similar to those obtained from the sample of young participants, both in their structure, and in the interpretation of the total variance.

A certain difference is noticeable only in the first component, where, unlike the structure obtained from the young population, there is an attitude missing – the one that determines an equal sense of belonging to one's own nation and the human community in general – and instead of it we find, even if it is less saturated, a typical ethnocentric claim that members of other nations should be doubted, even if they are friends. In other words, this factor outlines a more radical pattern of national identity in the adult population compared to the young (which is why it can be labeled as “emphasized national identification”), while the remaining two – ethnocentrism and cosmopolitanism – stay the same.

After looking at the new findings gained through the comparison of adult and young participants, let us return to the analysis of our basic sample (youth) with the intention of determining possible differences and correlations between the factors of national identity and attitudes about European integration (Tables 6 and 7). For this purpose, we will use the most representative attitudes from each of the factors (the highest saturated statement for each latent dimension summarized into three categories of answers), and by the χ^2 test analyze the significance of differences in regard to the two attitudes toward the European Union: the one signifying a perception of the European Union (“What is your general perception of the European Union?”) and the one measuring the support of Croatian accession to the EU (“Do you support the Croatian accession to the European Union?”). The correlation will be tested through regression analysis.

The item that signifies the factor of *national identification* is: “I feel like a member of my nation and that feeling has priority” (0.76).

The factor of *ethnocentrism* is best represented by the attitude: “One should always be cautious and restrained toward members of other nations, even when they are friends” (0.74).

Cosmopolitanism is best represented by the attitude: “No relevant trait comes from one's national affiliation” (0.72).

With these three attitudes the answers were summarized into three categories: “I completely or generally disagree”, “I neither agree nor disagree” and “I completely or generally agree”.

The attitude that measures the perception of the EU was also simplified into three degrees of answers: “very or mostly negative” perception, “neutral” and “very or mostly positive”.

Finally, the participants' support for Croatia joining the EU was dichotomized into Yes or No.

Table 6: The representative attitudes of national identification and the perception of European Union (%)

Representative attitudes of national identity		General perception of EU		
		Negative or very negative	Neutral	Positive or very positive
<i>NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION</i>		$\chi^2=12.58; s.s.=4; p=.01$		
I feel like a member of my nation and that feeling has priority.	I completely or generally disagree	13.6	47.6	38.8
	I neither agree nor disagree	10.7	56.6	32.8
	I completely or generally agree	15.6	50.1	34.3
	<i>Total</i>	<i>13.9</i>	<i>51.4</i>	<i>34.6</i>
<i>ETHNOCENTRISM</i>		$\chi^2=24.26; s.s.=4; p=.001$		
One should always be cautious and restrained toward members of other nations, even when they are friends.	I completely or generally disagree	12.3	49.2	38.5
	I neither agree nor disagree	12.2	57.3	30.6
	I completely or generally agree	18.9	51.3	29.7
	<i>Total</i>	<i>13.7</i>	<i>51.6</i>	<i>34.7</i>
<i>COSMOPOLITISM</i>		$\chi^2=11.04; s.s.=4; p=.03$		
No relevant trait comes from one's national affiliation.	I completely or generally disagree	19.2	47.7	33.0
	I neither agree nor disagree	14.0	52.1	33.9
	I completely or generally agree	12.1	52.4	35.5
	<i>Total</i>	<i>13.8</i>	<i>51.5</i>	<i>34.6</i>

If we apply stricter criteria of significant differences, from 0.01 and less, we will conclude that the attitude of national identification and ethnocentrism statistically significantly discriminate the participants regarding their perception of the EU, while cosmopolitanism does not yield any differences. In other words, the ethnocentric participants and, to a lesser degree, those with a pronounced national identification, have a negative perception about the European Union more often than others. The percentages are visible in the Table, and we do not insist on them, since they vary too often to be relevant, while the tendencies will probably remain the same.

This approach is especially important when we consider the attitude toward joining the European Union, for it depends on many social and political factors, or simply on the estimated amount of time that separates a country from the beginning or the end of the EU integration process, and as such are, actually, a non-scientific category. The directions and tendencies are, on the other hand, permanent, because they rely on the relationship between phenomena.

Thus, the relationship between attitudes that best represent the national identification, ethnocentrism and cosmopolitanism and the attitudes toward Croatian accession to the EU are portrayed in Table 7.

Only ethnocentrism statistically significantly differentiates youth regarding their support for Croatia's accession to the European Union, where the nationally exclusive participants refuse to support that accession more often than others.

Table 7: The representative attitudes of national identity and attitude toward Croatia's accession to the European Union (%)

Representative attitudes of national identity		Support for Croatia's accession to the EU	
		Yes	No
<i>NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION</i>		$\chi^2=0.79; s.s.=2; p=.06$	
I feel like a member of my nation and that feeling has priority.	I completely or generally disagree	87.1	12.9
	I neither agree nor disagree	88.5	11.5
	I completely or generally agree	87.0	13.0
	<i>Total</i>	<i>87.47</i>	<i>12.6</i>
<i>ETHNOCENTRISM</i>		$\chi^2=20.47; s.s.=2; p=.001$	
One should always be cautious and restrained toward members of other nations, even when they are friends.	I completely or generally disagree	89.1	10.9
	I neither agree nor disagree	89.5	10.5
	I completely or generally agree	81.0	19.0
	<i>Total</i>	<i>87.5</i>	<i>12.5</i>
<i>COSMOPOLITISM</i>		$\chi^2=0.73; s.s.=2; p=.70$	
No relevant trait comes from one's national affiliation.	I completely or generally disagree	86.1	13.9
	I neither agree nor disagree	87.5	12.5
	I completely or generally agree	87.8	12.2
	<i>Total</i>	<i>87.5</i>	<i>12.5</i>

We can, then, conclude that cosmopolitanism most probably lacks the predictive value about the attitude of youth toward Croatia's accession into the EU, while a strong national identification and especially national exclusiveness might contribute to the negative perception of institutionalized Europe and a negative attitude toward European associations.

Finally, it remains to note that, at the moment the research was conducted, only one fifth of the more ethnocentric participants expressed a negative attitude toward Croatia's accession to the European Union, which is a far cry from those values today.

4. Attitudes toward other nations

One of the interesting ways to research the problem of national identity is social distance, understood as an active dimension of prejudice, that is, the readiness to undertake certain actions toward a specific social object. To be more precise, it measures the acceptable degree of intimacy in relationships with members of a certain social group. The concept, as is well known, was operationalized by Bogardus in 1925, when the famous Bogardus scale of social distance was constructed, which was later used in thousands of research projects in the original or a modified form. In its original form the instrument measures the readiness of the participant to have one or more of the following types of relationships with a certain group (not its better or worse members, that he/she is personally acquainted with, but with the group in general, that is with its ideal-type representatives): marriage or being closely related, personal friendship in the same circle or club, neighborhood, common work environment, citizen of the same country, visiting my country, complete exclusion from my country.

Our research used a similar instrument, but corrected so that it does not have any negative relationships, that is, it does not offer exclusion from the country as an answer, but rather different forms of relationships, from the least to the most intimate: from marriage or close relation (7), through performing key functions in the political life of a country (6), being companions and visiting each other (5), being one's superior at work (4), cooperation at work (3), neighborhood (2) and permanent life in the same country (1). Social distance was measured in regard to Croats and 13 other nationalities (Albanians, Americans, Bosnians, Montenegrins, Czechs, French, Italians, Hungarians, Macedonians, Germans, Russians, Slovenians and Serbs).

Even though the list of nationalities is identical to the one in the 1999 research, the data, unfortunately, are not comparable because in 2004 it was only possible to give one answer for each nation, while the number of answers was not defined before. The results obtained are portrayed in Table 8.

Table 8: The social distance toward the members of certain nations – youth

Nationality	Readiness to be closely related (%)	M	S.D.
Croats	64.6	5.71	2.13
Italians	19.2	3.64	2.23
Germans	16.6	3.60	2.15
French	17.9	3.56	2.22
Americans	15.9	3.43	2.15
Hungarians	12.8	3.06	2.13
Czech	12.3	2.93	2.13
Bosnians (Muslims)	11.4	2.92	2.13
Slovenians	12.5	2.85	2.16
Russians	11.1	2.84	2.11
Macedonians	10.8	2.77	2.11
Montenegrins	9.4	2.51	2.06
Serbs	9.7	2.44	2.10
Albanians	8.4	2.38	2.02

At the end of the ranking scale are nations from the former Yugoslav federation (except for the Russians) – from Albanians, which are last, with an average grade of 2.38 (out of the possible 7) and 8.4% from the young citizens of Croatia that would have the most intimate relationships with them (marital or close relations), to Bosnians, with an average grade of 2.93 and 11.4% who are ready for all forms of personal relationships. The Czechs and Hungarians are in the middle of the ranking scale, but still with an under average grade (approximately 3). Americans are the first nationality that young Croats demonstrate something we might call an average social closeness to (average grade 3.4 and 15.9% of those ready for the most intimate relationships), and in that same group, but with somewhat higher grades, are also the French, the Germans and (as the most acceptable from all the other nations) the Italians (3.64 and 19.2% respectively). The degree of social closeness that young Croats show to other Croatian men and women indicate that they are not so kind to their own nation either: 5.71 and less than two thirds of participants with an affinity toward the most intimate of relationships with, for the most part, their own nation (that is, 35.4% believe they do not have any!).

Similar data was obtained from the adult participants, with two relevant differences: that they prefer German over Italians (3.21 compared to 3.12, or 13.9% versus 13.3% regarding their readiness for close relations) and that they, on average, demonstrate a greater ethnic distance than the young. So, while the mean value of answers for Croats is 5.62 as opposed to 5.71, it is indicative that no other nation achieved even an average value of ethnic closeness (3.5):

Germans, Italians, the French and Americans reach medium values from 3.06 to 3.21, while every other nation is below that grade, where Russians, Montenegrins, Serbs and Albanians share values under 2.5.

It is our conclusion that, regarding the distance toward members of other nationalities, some old prejudices have yet to be overcome in Croatia, especially with citizens of middle and older age. Table 9 illustrates these claims.

Table 9: The social distance toward the members of certain nations – adults

Nationality	Readiness to be closely related (%)	M	S.D.
Croats	64.0	5.62	2.23
Italians	13.9	3.21	2.15
Germans	13.3	3.12	2.15
French	12.5	3.07	2.1
Americans	13	3.06	2.17
Hungarians	11.6	2.83	2.11
Czech	11.7	2.79	2.11
Bosnians (Muslims)	10.7	2.6	2.07
Slovenians	10.9	2.6	2.08
Russians	9.9	2.57	2.04
Macedonians	9.7	2.43	2.03
Montenegrins	9.5	2.33	2.02
Serbs	10.1	2.31	2.06
Albanians	9.1	2.16	1.97

Finally, the claim that the participants from older generations are more ethnocentric than today's youth is corroborated by the inter-generational differences in the assessment of inequality between certain social groups in Croatia, as well as the differences in the perception of danger to national identity caused by Croatia's accession to the EU. The final two tables (10 and 11) indicate that the participants from the adult population believe that national minorities are a privileged group somewhat more often than the young, and more often think that Croatia's accession to the European Union is going to endanger the Croatian national identity.

Table 10: The assessment of the position of members of national minorities in comparison to Croats – youth and adults (%)

Age	Worse	Same	Better
Youth	33.3	51.8	14.9
Adults	26.6	57.3	16.1

Table 11: The attitude that joining the EU endangers the identity of the Croatian nation – youth and adults

Age	Complete agreement (%)	M	S.D.
Youth	16.3	2.26	1.05
Adults	21.1	2.37	1.11

5. Conclusion

In this chapter we have analyzed the national identity and linked it to the attitudes toward European integration. The relationship toward one's own nation was investigated with a battery of 11 attitudes that participants reacted to on a Likert agreement scale with five degrees.

The answers indicate that the attitudes most accepted by the young are moderate national identification, followed by those that signify openness to the world, while ethnocentric statements are the least represented of the obtained hierarchy of attitudes.

The fact is that the attitude that best represents national identification is, for the first time in our research projects, at the top of the rank, as is evident that the nationally infused attitudes, both moderate and the extreme, are more represented in comparison to 1986 and 1999. It would be arbitrary to ascribe this increase in national identity in the young to some isolated factor. It can be assumed that the growing uncertainty regarding the future, the decreasing trust in political leadership, the more and more pronounced existential problems, the growing differences between the rich and the poor, and narrowing perspectives all result in a search for a safer model of relationship toward others, to the society as a whole and to some of its parts. The nation represents the only safe haven, such as the family and the Church, and it is understandable that in the context of social instability, they gain importance.

Aside from that, we need to mention that the attitudes of openness to the world, that are often complementary and not opposed to attitudes of national identification, remain stable and strong. This, at the same time, points to the complexity of the problem of national identity and the fact that it does not have to be exclusive, but it may coexist along with attitudes that contribute to the European association processes.

Regarding their national identity, of course, the young are not homogenous, but rather different subgroups react in different ways. The three obtained factor structures of national identity (moderate national identification, radical ethnocentrism and pronounced cosmopolitanism) produce the strongest differences

regarding religious self-identification, regional status and the party preferences of the participants. Thus the nationally oriented youth are significantly more religious than others; they vote for the conservative parties and live in Dalmatia, Central and Eastern Croatia. They are more often than others from rural areas, from families in which the father has a lower level of education, they are themselves less educated, and within the youth sample, they belong to the youngest cohort (15-19 years of age) and the pupil group. A greater national identity is also demonstrated by the unemployed, which is in line with the view of ethnocentrism as a protective mechanism of an individual's personality. An extremely low national identity is expressed by young participants of an Istrian, Zagreb and Northern Croatian provenience, by those that are religiously undecided or atheists, from an urban area and with a higher level of family and personal education.

On the other hand, the young demonstrate much more homogenous results with regard to cosmopolitanism.

The control group of participants (those older than 30) produced a similar hierarchy of attitudes related to national identity, with an analogous structure, with the specific of almost all the attitudes being more strongly expressed, which might have to do with the polarization and, most probably, petrification of internalized attitudes. The phenomenon of polarization is a necessary by-product of an accumulation of experience, while petrification on the one hand is a product of age and the psycho-physiological changes it brings with it, and on the other, channels experience in one direction and enhances its selective accumulation.

National identity was related with the perception of the European Union and the support for Croatia's accession to the EU. Aware of the mutability of such attitudes, that must often be treated primarily as an expression of public opinion, we decided to approach them with caution and include only the main tendencies.

Thus, we can conclude with a sufficient amount of reliability that the more ethnocentric participants and, to a lesser degree, those with a pronounced national identification, have a negative perception of the European Union more often than others, while cosmopolitanism again fails to produce any statistically significant differences.

In regard of the need for Croatia to enter the EU, only ethnocentrism differentiates the young in a statistically significant manner, where the nationally more exclusive participants tend to refuse to support Croatia's accession to the European Union more often than others, while cosmopolitanism and (a moderate) national identification have no predictive value.

Finally, we decided to investigate the social (ethnic) distance toward certain nations, both those that Croatia built with the former Yugoslav federation, as well as Western and Central European nations.

In general, the nations of the former Yugoslav federation and the Russians are at the end of the rank, with low grades, while as somewhat under averagely validated, are the members of some Central European nations (Czechs and Hungarians), who are in the middle of the ranking scale. The inhabitants of the European West and Southwest, especially Italians, who take up the first position after the Croats themselves, and Germans, demonstrate satisfactory results just by being evaluated with average grades. The degree of social closeness young citizens of Croatia feel toward other Croatian men and women, finally, indicates a certain dose of self-criticism, because approximately one third of the young participants have no personal affinity toward, in the most part, their own nation, who they would rather not form more permanent institutionalized intimate relationships with.

Similar data was obtained from the adult participants: the ranking of social distance is for the most part identical; however, they on average demonstrate a greater social distance than the young. Thus, it is significant that no nationality, aside from Croats, reached an average grade of ethnic closeness (3.5). We conclude that in regard of the distance toward persons of other nationalities, as well as ethnic attitudes toward them in Croatia, some old habits have not yet been eliminated, especially in citizens that are of middle or elderly age.

This more emphasized ethnocentrism in the adult generations would, theoretically speaking, corroborate the theory of integration of the SIT and the SCT models, versus the socio-cognitive model. The integrated SIT and SCT model does not presume it is possible to reduce prejudice and ethnical preference after a certain age in childhood, after which prejudice might increase, including ethnic prejudice, and preference of the in-groups in certain social contexts. It is obvious that we belong to just such a (multi-ethnically burdened) social context.

We must emphasize the fact that, in spite of the intergenerational differences in national identity to the benefit of the adult group, we found intergenerational differences that focus on the youngest participants in our sample (15-19 years of age). Several authors have already noticed this phenomenon and have described it with a so-called U-curve, which vividly illustrates the higher national focus of an individual in the earlier and later stages of life, as an expression of, respectively, an adolescent transitional crisis and a long-term perseverance in perceiving and producing (obviously) negative experiences with a certain out-group.

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**YOUTH AND THE EUROPEAN UNION:
PERCEPTIONS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF
INTEGRATION**

1. Introduction

European integration is a complex, dynamic and relatively long-lasting process. It is common knowledge that ideas and initiatives about integration appeared just after World War II, and that the process of unification progressed continually in spite of occasional standstills and difficulties (Mintas-Hodak, 2004; Obradović, 2004). It is also undeniable that the European Union has its roots in economic interests, but from the initial economically oriented unification of six European countries, this process is gradually extending the areas of integration, as the number of European countries joining the Union also grows (Davies, 2003). Therefore, the European Union today is a community of 25 countries, and with the dominating economic aspect, the political, social and cultural dimensions of integration have gained in strength. In the half century of its existence, the institutions, competences and policies of the European Union have been formulated to solve the problems the governments of individual countries could not solve themselves, but the discussion on whether these institutions, competences and policies solve the existing problems more successfully, and what the future will bring in this regard, might be a long one (Kraus, 2000; Pinder, 2003).

The sector and geographic expansion of the European Union causes changes in research into the phenomenon of European integration. As S. Hix and K. H. Goetz (2000: 2) state, from the beginning of this process, the theoretical and empirical efforts were primarily focused on the findings and an analysis of the influence of the institutions and protagonists of the member countries on the development of the EU, while recently – initiated by the enlargement of EU to the less developed European South in the 1980s – greater emphasis is being placed on an analysis of the EU's influence on the pace and scope of changes in the member countries. It is certainly possible to add that this shift in the

researchers' interest was especially clear after the single biggest enlargement of EU in 2004, when eight post-socialist countries were among the 10 new members. These countries were as little as 15 ago, in an economic and political sense, completely incompatible with the states that created and developed the EU, and the transitional processes obviously occurred at such a pace and quality to prepare them for full membership. In spite of the admitted readiness, it is logical to assume that the EU can and is acting in a number of areas in those countries directly, as those that ultimately demand certain adjustments to existing European standards and norms, as well as indirectly, as a strengthener of existing or new trends and as a catalyst in the creation of new institutional forms, all aimed at achieving institutions and their functions more appropriate to the Union.

As for the influence on the member states, the best researched area is certainly the influence of integration on public opinion, most of all the perception of the EU among the citizens of the countries it includes. This research is constantly stimulated by the EU and there is a very logical reason for this. Namely, European integration is a project primarily initiated and led by the political elite (Hix, Goetz, 2000: 14), but since the key role in its acceptance and development belongs to the citizens of member countries, it is necessary to monitor their reactions to the events occurring both on the European and the national level. Most research of this kind starts with a utilitarian hypothesis, suggesting that individuals and groups in the member states evaluate the EU from the viewpoint of their real or assumed concrete interests (Eichenberg, Dalton, 1993; Gabel, Whitten, 1997; Gabel, 1998). According to a number of authors, the reason for this is the fact that the EU is dominantly perceived among the European citizens as an economic community, while the citizens outside Europe – for example, the USA – primarily view this Union as a political community (Duch, Taylor, 1997; Gabel, Whitten, 1997; Mitev, 1999; Topalova, 2000). However, when the creation, processes and relationships within the European Union are put in the context of game theory, citizens seem to understand them more and more as a non-zero-sum game, instead of a game with a specified “amount of cake” (Perko-Šeparović, 1975; McLean, 1997) – in other words, the winnings of one protagonist (whether it is a national state, the European Union itself, a local authority or an individual) brings about an increase in the total power and welfare of the system, while the competitive conception of the enlargement and deepening process of the EU still exists, but emphasized to a much lesser degree.

The numerous pieces of research of European public opinion have resulted in the determination of several basic tendencies. It has been demonstrated that the attitudes about the EU change, under the influence of internal and external factors (that is, events and processes in individual countries and at the EU level);

that the reception of the EU differs from country to country, depending on the peculiarities of each country; that different social and interest groups in member countries have different expectations from European integration; that the support for European integration is predominantly under the influence of the economic component, that is, the relationship of national and economic conditions toward expected measurable benefits is decisive; that citizens from countries and regions thought to have comparative advantages, also expect greater benefits and express stronger support for the EU (Eichenberg, Dalton, 1993; Duch, Taylor, 1997; Gabel, Whitten, 1997; Gabel, 1998; Green, 1999; Nelsen, Guth, 2003). However, it is believed that, aside from these socio-economic elements, the positive attitude toward the EU is affected by political and cultural factors, that is, the perception of the need for the democratization of certain countries and societies, the existence of a larger amount of social capital, especially in the dimension of trust (where the trust in national institutions is transferred to the EU level), a greater openness toward other cultures and nations (along with a positive attitude toward immigrants) and the increase in cultural awareness about the European identity that is, incidentally, stronger among the young than among the adults (Turner, 1994; Mitev, Riordan, 1996; Žagar, 1998; Green, 1999; Hix, Goetz, 2000; Putnam, 2000; Topalova, 2000; Nelsen, Guth, 2003; Adnanes, 2004, Pinterić, 2005). These tendencies may be summarized in a statement that the attitudes of citizens towards the EU are in a very dynamic and permeable category that is predominantly under the influence of the specific political, socio-cultural, social and especially socio-economic circumstances, both at the national and European levels.

Croatia is a good example of these outlined trends. Some research findings have already indicated that the support for the EU and Croatia's accession oscillates (Baranović, 2002; Ilišin, 2002). Thus, at the very start of the transitional period, there was the greatest support for accession, but under the influence of the war and disappointed expectations about the behavior of the international community and the EU, as well as the national homogenization and isolation of Croatia in the 1990s, it decreased steadily until 2000 (Sirotić, 1992; Ilišin, 2002), while the newest media research of the public opinion note the lowest level of support. Most analysts believe that the later plummeting of support for the European project is a direct consequence of the postponement of negotiations (in March 2005) on Croatia's accession to the EU due to the dissatisfaction of the Union with Croatia's cooperation with the Hague Court, which among other things, revitalizes the process of national homogenization in Croatia. However, this indicates that, where Croatia is concerned, both external and internal political conditions are key, the consequence of which is a certain neglect of economic, social and cultural components of the process of accession to the EU. As for the young in Croatia, five years ago it was stated that most of

them, in spite of certain reservations and fears, thought that Europe is an “attractive social space, making possible for both Croatia and them personally better conditions for development” (Baranović, 2002:152).

Five years is a relatively long period in terms of research into public opinion about a phenomenon, especially regarding something as dynamic as the process of European integration. During this period, considerable changes occurred in the EU, increasing Croatia's chances for joining, as well as in Croatia itself, making possible the acceleration of the accession process. This process – for many insufficiently or semi-informed observers – stopped suddenly at one moment, and this certainly significantly influenced the attitudes of the citizens (including the young). However, one should keep in mind that this research was conducted at the beginning of 2004, hence, in the period of expectation of the *avis* that gave Croatia a candidate-country status in April that same year, which could have certainly caused an increased expression of positive attitudes toward the EU.

In this analysis we are focusing on the investigation of the relationship of youth toward the EU. The goal of this research is to determine the expected advantages and disadvantages from Croatia's inclusion in the EU, how the potential winners and losers in the process of European integration are perceived, what is the perception of Europe and the European Union, and have there, and in which direction, been changes in the relationship towards the European integration. Within this formulation of the research goal, the differentiations among the young are investigated in terms of their different socio-demographic, socio-structural and socio-cultural attributes. In an analysis conceived in this way, we will try to give an answer to five questions: 1) are the young different from adults in their relationship toward the EU; 2) what kind of relationship do the young have regarding the dimensions of European integration investigated, that is, do they expect more gains or losses from Croatia's accession to the EU; 3) has the relationship of the young toward the EU changed, and in which direction, in the five-year period observed; 4) is there a differentiation among the young regarding their social attributes; 5) do the Croatian participants, most of all the young, differ from the young and the general population in the European Union. To determine the possible differences within the young population, a total of 10 attributes is used: age, gender, socio-professional status, provenience, domicile, the level of education of the participants and their fathers, regional status, religious self-identification and party affiliation. Aside from these attributes, some analyses used seven other attitudes of the participants to determine possible differences within the young population: the perception of the young of the European Union, the perception of possible personal gain from Croatia's accession to the EU, the prediction of the year Croatia will join the EU, satisfaction with one's own life, the vision of

one's own future and the future of society and the desire to leave the country. A comparison based on these, so-called independent variables, should demonstrate which of the observed attributes influences the perception of the EU among the young the most, at the individual level. Only those differences and correlations (obtained by the use of the χ -test and variance analysis) significant at the level of .0001 and less will be interpreted. As is visible from the goals of the analysis, comparative analysis is used on three levels – the first is a comparison of the young and adult participants, the second is a comparison of the research results of youth from 1999 and 2004, and the third is a comparison of the research conducted in Croatia in 2004 with European research into youth in 1997 and 2001 and research into the general population in the European Union in 2004 (after enlargement) and in candidate countries in 2003, before enlargement (however, we only have available a relatively limited number of variables for these comparisons, except in the case of the comparison between the young and the adults).


2. The advantages and disadvantages of Croatia's integration into the EU

In this part of the analysis we are dealing with certain issues regarding the processes and possible consequences of Croatia's accession to the European Union. To be more exact, we are talking about the general perception of the EU, the support for Croatia's accession to this community, the estimate of the year Croatia might join the EU, and the assessment of the potentially positive and negative effects of Croatia's inclusion in this association, as well as the circumstances that aggravate the accession process.

Graph 1 portrays the general image about the EU the participants had at the beginning of 2004. Since this is no longer an impression but a firm attitude, and since events have taken place in the last three years that will have certainly influenced the attitudes about the EU, the results would most likely look different today.

Most young people had a neutral attitude towards the EU, whilst every third participant expressed a positive, and every seventh a negative attitude. The domination of a neutral relationship toward the EU, gives us the inkling that the subsequent events must have reduced the neutrality of the young – mostly in the direction of negative attitudes. The young are in this regard almost identical to the adults, whose attitudes are somewhat more defined in both directions.

Graph 1: The general perception of the European Union – youth and adults (%)



The young are quite homogenous in their relationship toward the EU, because gender and party affiliation exert the only influence (Table 1).

Table 1: The general perception of the European Union regarding the attributes of youth (%)

Attributes of youth	Positive perception	Neutral perception	Negative perception
<i>Gender</i>	$\chi^2=36.17$		
Female	30.1	58.3	11.7
Male	39.0	44.8	16.3
<i>Party affiliation</i>	$\chi^2=39.53$		
HDZ	37.7	50.1	12.2
HNS	42.0	47.5	12.3
HSP	26.1	44.8	29.1
HSS	36.6	53.8	9.7
SDP	37.5	50.4	12.1
Undecided	31.4	55.4	13.2
TOTAL	34.6	51.4	14.0

Gender differences clearly indicate that women have an above average neutral attitude toward the EU, while men state both positive and negative attitudes somewhat more. The party-related differentiations are expected: the supporters of HNS are dominant in their positive attitudes toward the EU, and the sympathizers of HSP in the negative. Such attitudes are convergent with the party rhetoric and it is visible that the young have recognized the parties that are most convincing in the promotion of their program directions regarding the EU.

The participants were also asked whether they support Croatia's accession to the EU, where short elaborations of potential support were offered (Table 2).

Table 2: Reasons for supporting Croatia's accession to the EU – youth and adults (%)

Support for Croatia's accession into the EU	Youth	Adults
Yes, because I believe this will greatly benefit Croatia	21.1	18.3
Yes, because I believe that inclusion in wider integrations and associations is inevitable for the survival of small countries	16.9	20.7
Yes, although I believe too much is expected from this accession	49.5	46.9
I do not support it	12.5	14.2

As is visible, at the beginning of 2004 Croatia's accession to the EU was in principle supported by almost nine tenths of participants. This is a very high percentage, and was probably caused by the increasingly good relationship between Croatia and the EU, the crown of which was receiving candidate-country status. It is also visible that the young and the adults differ amongst each other only slightly, where the young support accession only a little more, both as Euro-enthusiasts and Euro-skeptics (the first and third attitude), while the adults are a bit more inclined to the Euro-realistic (i.e. second) attitude.

However, the elaboration of support is still more interesting. One fifth of the young that expect benefits from accession could be labeled Euro-enthusiasts; one sixth that believe that joining wider associations is necessary for the survival of small countries, might be qualified as Euro-realists; one half that expresses a certain reservation may be described as Euro-skeptics; and the attitudes of an eighth that do not support entry into the EU might be called anti-European. The most intriguing must certainly be the skeptical participants, not only because they are the most common, but also because it is a group that that may be most influenced by events in the EU and Croatia – whether under the influence of new findings they accept the project of integration as Euro-enthusiasts or Euro-realists, or whether some of them accepts an anti-European attitude. Observed from the viewpoint of the goals and role of political protagonists (especially those in power), one may state that almost half of the young population is waiting for plausible arguments to be presented on the benefits of joining the Union. If some other protagonists on the political scene are more convincing –

especially if aided by events that make the initiated accession process more difficult than many had hoped – it is logical to expect that some of the skeptical participants will have crossed over to the camp of anti-European oriented citizens in the meantime.

The young are noticeably different from one another considering the reasons for their support of joining the EU. This is indicated by the aggregated data in Table 3.

Table 3: Support for Croatia's accession to the EU in terms of the attributes of youth (%)

Attributes of youth	Euro-enthusiasts	Euro-realists	Euro-skeptics	Anti-European attitude
<i>Gender</i>	$\chi^2=18.22$			
Female	18.5	16.3	54.1	11.1
Male	23.6	17.5	45.0	13.6
<i>Age</i>	$\chi^2=33.13$			
15 – 19 years	27.7	15.3	45.3	11.7
20 – 24 years	19.1	15.2	53.5	12.2
25 – 29 years	16.7	20.3	49.5	13.5
<i>Socio-professional status</i>	$\chi^2=33.13$			
Employed	17.2	18.8	51.1	12.9
Unemployed	26.0	13.5	46.2	14.4
Pupils	28.6	16.1	45.8	9.5
Students	14.9	18.1	54.0	13.0
<i>Education</i>	$\chi^2=63.72$			
Primary school or less	28.4	16.7	44.5	10.4
Vocational school	26.6	9.9	47.9	15.6
High school	15.9	17.9	53.2	13.1
College, univ. or more	15.0	24.8	50.0	10.2
<i>Regional status</i>	$\chi^2=53.12$			
Northern Croatia	18.7	16.7	50.7	13.9
Central Croatia	22.5	15.6	52.0	9.8
Istria and Primorje	14.5	21.5	53.3	10.7
Eastern Croatia	27.0	14.2	45.4	13.4
Dalmatia	29.1	14.5	44.6	11.7
Zagreb	12.8	20.5	53.8	12.8
TOTAL	21.1	16.9	49.5	12.5

The differentiation of the young is most influenced by the level of education achieved: with its increase, Euro-enthusiasm grows weaker, and Euro-realism prevails. At the same time, young people educated for a blue-collar occupation seem to choose the Euro-realistic elaboration the least, and have an above average demonstration of an anti-European attitude; the young with a high school education are Euro-skeptics above average, and the highly educated are

Euro-realists (and, accept the anti-European orientation the least, just like those with the lowest levels of education). The regional differences are interesting: most Euro-enthusiasts are from Dalmatia and Eastern Croatia, and least from Zagreb, Istria and Primorje, where there are most Euro-realists and Euro-skeptics, while anti-European attitudes are most rarely expressed by the young from Central Croatia and Istria and Primorje. The differences based on socio-professional status are also intriguing: pupils and unemployed youth demonstrate the most enthusiasm, and the least Euro-skepticism, however, the pupils express the least and the unemployed the most anti-European opinions; students are Euro-skeptics above average, and below the average when it comes to Euro-enthusiasm. The differences regarding age are partially followed by the differences in the socio-professional status and the differences in the level of education. It was therefore, demonstrated that with the increase in age, Euro-enthusiasm decreases and Euro-realism, and somewhat the anti-European orientation decrease, while most Euro-skeptics may be found in the middle aged cohort of the young. Finally, young women express more Euro-skepticism, and young men more Euro-enthusiasm and anti-European attitudes.

The stated differences observed together indicate that the choice of the reason for support of entering the EU is linked to the social competence of youth – the more competent the young are (more educated, older and inhabiting more developed regions), their Euro-enthusiasm is weaker, and Euro-realism or Euro-skepticism grow stronger. This tendency opens the question about what the expressed attitudes are based on. Namely, one gets the impression that a weaker knowledge of the social processes and relationships relevant to the accession process results in greater Euro-enthusiasm. Also, there is the issue of whether those that are presumably more socially aware (more educated, older) really have a better insight into the relevant occurrences, or if their skepticism indicates that the manner in which the project of European integration and Croatia's place in it is presented to the citizens, is probably not appropriate.

The estimated year of Croatia's accession into the EU is observed here as an indicator of Euro-optimism and Euro-pessimism, where the concrete results belong to the group of those that would surely look quite different now than at the beginning of 2004. Table 4 portrays the answers to the question about the year that the participants believe might be the one Croatia joins the EU.

In the beginning of 2004, there were two thirds of Euro-optimists among the young – if we combine all those expecting Croatia to join the EU by 2010, 12% were Euro-pessimists, one fifth could not estimate and about 5% of them ignored the issue completely. This was a period when the highest political spheres disseminated optimism regarding Croatia's accession to the EU along with Bulgaria and Romania by 2008, so it is logical that most young people decided on closer dates. It is interesting though, that the adults seemed to be

greater optimists, and more likely to be able to assess. This generational difference suggests that the young might have been somewhat more critical toward the preparedness of Croatia for accession, so they were a little more reserved regarding the potential accession year.

Table 4: Estimated year of Croatia's accession to the EU – youth and adults (%)

Estimated year of Croatia's accession to EU	Youth	Adults
2007/2008	29.1	35.6
2010	33.9	34.2
2015	7.6	5.9
After 2015.	4.4	3.0
I do not know	20.2	16.7
I am not interested at all	4.8	4.6

As for the young, the estimate of the date of entry into the EU varies only in terms of the socio-professional status and party affiliation (Table 5)¹.

Table 5: Estimated year of Croatia's accession to the EU regarding the attributes of youth (%)

Attributes of youth	2007/2008	2010	2015 and later	I do not know	I am not interested
<i>Socioprofessional status</i>	$\chi^2=44.26$				
Employed	29.8	31.5	11.7	21.9	5.1
Unemployed	27.9	33.4	10.1	22.8	5.8
Pupils	35.2	33.4	8.8	17.6	5.1
Students	22.7	39.0	17.9	17.7	2.6
<i>Party affiliation</i>	$\chi^2=73.46$				
HDZ	34.5	32.7	9.0	18.5	5.2
HNS	26.6	43.2	12.9	13.7	3.6
HSP	26.9	38.1	17.9	14.2	3.0
HSS	35.1	20.2	17.0	24.5	3.2
SDP	30.4	41.9	11.2	15.4	1.2
Undecided	25.1	30.3	12.3	25.2	7.2
TOTAL	29.1	33.9	12.0	20.2	4.8

Unlike the reasons for supporting EU accession, the estimate on when this is to occur depends on party affiliation. This suggests that this is a politically infused attitude. The greatest optimists seem to be the voters of HDZ and HSS,

¹ A partial summarization of results was conducted for determining the statistically significant differences, that is, the answers “2015” and “after 2015” were combined into the answer “2015 and later”.

and a somewhat subdued optimism is expressed by the supporters of HNS and SDP. On the other hand, the greatest pessimists are the sympathizers of HSP, and a similar opinion is shared by voters of HSS, who, aside from that, are the ones that cannot assess above averagely. Certainly, the politically undecided participants are more often unable to assess or are not interested at all in the year of accession (while the sympathizers of SDP seem to express the greatest interest). As could have been expected, the pupils are most optimistic, while the students are more careful with their optimism and will more often be pessimistic in their estimate, and less likely not to be able to estimate.

To put it briefly, the optimistic estimate of the year Croatia joins the EU at the beginning of 2004 was more based on wishes and faith in the rhetoric of the ruling political elite, and was less a result of consideration about how much Croatia satisfies the set criteria.

This is exactly what the following analysis will consider. To be more specific, Tables 6, 7 and 8 outline how the participants estimate the circumstances that aggravate Croatia's accession to the EU, and the positive and negative effects they expect from this process. Aside from the comparison between the young and the adults, these tables also register the changes in the attitudes of youth in the past five years, and the results are ranked based on the answers the young gave in 2004. Here, the answers at degrees 4 and 3 were summarized ("completely aggravates" and "mostly aggravates", that is, "I completely agree" and "I mostly agree"), for it is our goal to portray the dominant direction of the participants' relationship toward the EU.

The perception of the circumstances that aggravate Croatia's accession to the EU (Table 6) indicates that the participants ascribe the responsibility to Croatia and the EU equally². Even though the economic unpreparedness of Croatia is in first place according to the young, the political conditions are placed quite high as well. The changes that occurred from 1999 to 2004 among the young are especially indicative. The tendency is unambiguous: the emphasis on the difficulties the EU is responsible for³ increased, while the accent on the

² An almost identical ranking scale would have been gained if only the highest degree was portrayed, that is, the degree "very aggravating" (decided on by around 40 to 17% of the young). Namely, only the first two aggravating circumstances would switch positions, while the order in the rest of the scale would remain identical.

³ The dissatisfaction with the EU due to the inadequate cooperation of Croatia with the Hague Court was not suggested as an aggravating circumstance in 1999. Namely, Croatia was still too far from accession in order for a greater discussion of any specific demand in public, even though there were indications that this problem might escalate. Today, it is the second most important aggravating circumstance, which along with the perception of overly difficult criteria and conditions unjustly imposed by the EU, must stimulate the increase of the negative attitude toward the Union.

difficulties Croatia is responsible for decreased. It would seem that the young are more satisfied with the situation in Croatia – especially at the political level (which might be an indicator of the true achievement of democratization of Croatian political and social life) – and that at the same time, they are less satisfied with the EU's relationship towards Croatia. The adults in this regard have even more pronounced attitudes: they see Croatia as the culprit for the aggravated approach less often than the young, while ascribing greater responsibility to the EU itself. These attitudes, both of the adults and the young, and especially the changes within the young population, indicate that there has probably been a change in the perception of the possible advantages and disadvantages of Croatia's accession to the EU.

Table 6: A comparative outline of the perception of aggravating circumstances for Croatia's accession into the EU (%)

Aggravating circumstances	Youth		Adults
	1999	2004	2004
Insufficient economic development of Croatia	83.4	79.5	74.5
EU's dissatisfaction with Croatia's cooperation with the Hague Court	–	76.3	74.4
Insufficiently democratic social and political system in Croatia	83.7	75.4	71.3
Strict EU criteria set for future members	56.1	69.8	75.1
Incapability of the government to adapt to EU demands and standards	73.1	64.3	60.3
Unjustly imposed conditions for Croatia's accession into the EU	50.6	63.3	70.2
Insufficient respect for human and minority rights in Croatia	62.6	57.7	54.6
The interests of some ruling groups in Croatia not joining the EU	60.6	50.1	51.2

The data in Table 7 indicate that from two thirds to over four fifths of the young believe that in each of the offered areas Croatia will gain some advantage by integration into the European Union⁴. The greatest benefits are expected in an individual and socio-cultural sense, then the socio-economic, political and least of all the area of military protection. Even though most of the young expect

⁴ In this case, complete agreement with the potential benefits was expressed by 52 to 28% of the young. The ranking scale based on just those answers would be different, because the middle of the scale would be less shifted in favor of the possibility of employment, a higher standard of living and better knowledge of other cultures and religions.

comprehensive positive effects from accession, a comparison with the 1999 data indicates that there has been a reduction in the perception of the possible advantages in most aspects, and especially regarding the expectation of a higher standard of living, faster economic development and accelerated democratization and better protection of human rights. It is debatable whether these changes indicate disillusionment or whether the young today are somewhat more satisfied with the level of socio-economic and democratic development achieved in Croatia. If that is the case, the aid of the Union must seem less important. Judging by the previous data on the perception of the aggravating circumstances, the first assumption seems more probable. On the other hand, the expectations on the individual, that is, socio-cultural plain increased. The young wish to travel and meet new people, learn about cultures and religions, which points to the increase in the acceptance of the value of multiculturalism.

Table 7: A comparative outline of the perception of positive effects of Croatia's accession to the EU (%)

Expected positive consequences	Youth		Adults
	1999	2004	2004
More opportunities to travel and make friends	79.5	83.7	79.4
Better quality education	84.5	83.5	77.3
Better quality and faster economic development	96.0	82.2	79.6
Better employment opportunities	87.8	80.5	75.7
Better protection of human and minorities rights	89.8	79.5	75.7
Higher standards of living	91.5	77.5	72.6
Faster democratization of the society	89.8	77.2	76.7
Better knowledge of cultures and religions of other nations	65.2	76.2	75.2
Better military protection of Croatia	67.5	66.2	62.4

As might have been expected, the adults observe all the potential advantages of Croatia's accession to the EU to a smaller degree, even though a great majority of them believe that there will be positive changes in all the observed aspects. One may say that they expect Croatia to achieve the desired benefits to the same degree as they perceive Croatia as responsible for the difficulties that are in the path of accession.

The trends visible in Table 8 are logically linked to the previously considered findings. Therefore, where the potentially negative consequences of integration are concerned, two thirds of the young are afraid of Croatian dependence on the developed European countries, while three fifths believe this increases the possibility of economic exploitation. Almost another half of the young think that European measures and standards limit Croatia's development,

while the least of them (but, still about a third) is concerned about the endangerment of national identity and state sovereignty⁵.

Table 8: A comparative outline of the perception of negative effects of Croatia's accession to the EU (%)

Expected negative consequences	Youth		Adults
	1999	2004	2004
Makes Croatia dependent on the developed European countries (culturally, politically, economically, etc.)	37.9	66.4	70.3
Increases the possibility for the economic exploitation of Croatia	36.9	59.8	66.7
Limits the economic development of Croatia with economic standards and measures	25.3	48.2	50.6
Endangers the national identity of the Croatian people	20.5	38.4	44.4
Infringes on the sovereignty of the Croatian state	18.5	34.8	40.2

This hierarchy of possible negative consequences is in line with the perception of the aggravating circumstances – to be more specific, if Croatia is not developed enough economically, its inferiority and dependence on the help of the rich will be even more apparent with the entrance into a far more developed environment. Even though, based on the examples of other less developed countries, Croatia might count on considerable aid after entering the EU, it would seem that the existing experience with the entry of foreign capital into Croatia causes the young to fear that similar processes might be continued later on. And since it was demonstrated that the young are more inclined to ascribe greater responsibility for the difficult process of accession to the European Union than to Croatia, without putting great hope in the ability of the government to adjust to EU demands (therefore, to adequately negotiate the accession), their fear for the socio-economic development of Croatia in the EU environment seems understandable. It is more difficult, however, to understand why the number of young that to a certain degree perceive all the potentially undesirable consequences of integration has almost doubled from 1999 to 2004. Namely, even if at the beginning of 2004 certain positive changes in the transitional countries that formally became members of the European Union in the spring of that year became apparent, it would seem that our young

⁵ Observing the answers only at the degree of complete agreement, the mentioned fears are expressed by 31 to 13% of the young, which indicates that most of those observing the potentially negative effects are not completely convinced that matters must end so poorly for Croatia. Based on just this degree of agreement, the ranking scale would look completely identical.

population either did not know about them or observed matters only from the viewpoint of the situation in the country and the relationship between Croatia and the EU in which even then – in spite of the optimistic atmosphere and the impression that this relationship was on the up – there was an inkling of significant problems.

The adults have in this case also demonstrated their consistency: as much as they observed the potential advantages, they emphasized the potentially negative consequences of accession to a somewhat higher degree.

The preceding comparative analysis may be summarized in the statement that a significant majority of both the young and the adult participants expect positive results from joining the EU, as well as that they equally observe the aggravating circumstances in the accession process, while both express fears due to the potentially negative circumstances to a smaller degree. Here, the young are the ones with the higher positive and lower negative expectations, as well as those that are somewhat less inclined to observe the EU as the side that aggravates Croatia's inclusion into EU. These trends enable us to conclude that the young, compared with the adults, have a somewhat more positive attitude toward the European Union and the integration process.

This part will be concluded by a factor analysis of the 22 variables observed as an indicator of the relationship toward the European Union. Table 9 portrays the structure of factors obtained (with total variance of 57.4%), and Table 10 portrays the summarized results of the variance analysis.

The factor analysis produced some very interesting factors, and in the first two cases factors with unambiguous tendencies, while the variance analysis indicates that there is a limited number of differences among the young.

The first factor may, without calculation, be labeled as a *pro-European orientation*, and it is especially interesting that it includes all nine of the suggested advantages of Croatia's accession to the European Union. This means that the young advocating the pro-European orientation above averagely find all the dimensions of integration to be equally important – the socio-economic, socio-cultural and political. The young are very homogenous in accepting the pro-European orientation, and only their party affiliation contributes to statistically significant (albeit weak) differences. It is visible in Table 10 that the HDZ voters above averagely, and sympathizers of HSP below averagely advocate the pro-European orientation. The position of the HSP voters is expected, while the attitudes of HDZ's sympathizers might be clearer after an examination of other results.

Table 9: The factor structure of the difficulties and consequences of Croatia's accession to the EU

Difficulties and consequences of Croatia's accession to the EU	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
Better quality education	.754				
Better employment opportunities	.739				
Higher standards of living	.722				
Better protection of human and minorities' rights	.720				
Better quality and faster economic development	.690				
Faster democratization of society	.681				
Better knowledge of cultures and religions of other nations	.648				
Better military protection of Croatia	.631				
More opportunities to travel and make friends	.618				
Makes Croatia dependent on the developed European countries		.779			
Increases the possibility for the economic exploitation of Croatia		.764			
Limits the economic development of Croatia		.757			
Infringes on the sovereignty of the Croatian state		.740			
Endangers the national identity of the Croatian people		.739			
Integration is aggravated by the insufficiently democratic social and political system in Croatia			.742		
Integration is aggravated by the insufficient economic development of Croatia			.721		
Integration is aggravated by the EU's dissatisfaction with Croatia's cooperation with the Hague Court			.563		
Integration is aggravated by the strict EU criteria set for future members				.820	
Integration is aggravated by the unjustly imposed conditions for Croatia's accession into the EU				.803	
Integration is aggravated by the interests of some ruling groups in Croatia not joining the EU					.760
Integration is aggravated by the incapability of the government to adapt to EU demands and standards			.466		.561
Integration is aggravated by the insufficient respect for human and minority rights in Croatia			.434		.560
<i>% of common variance</i>	<i>20.0</i>	<i>14.3</i>	<i>9.0</i>	<i>7.5</i>	<i>6.6</i>

The second factor is also unambiguous in content, and thus labeled the *anti-European orientation*. It includes all five attitudes related to potentially negative consequences of Croatia's accession to the EU, which testifies to the consistency of the anti-European orientation. In this case as well, party identification is what differentiates the youth, joined by their religiousness. To be more exact, both the sympathizers of HDZ and HSP express an above

average anti-European orientation, as well as the more religious participants. The voters of HNS, HSS and SDP and the non-religious and the religiously undecided participants are at the opposite end of the spectrum.

Table 10: Differences among the young in accepting the factors of difficulties and consequences of Croatia's accession to the EU

Attributes of youth	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
<i>Place of birth</i>				<i>F-ratio=6.61</i>	
Village				+	
Small town				0	
Major city				-	
Zagreb				-	
<i>Place of habitat</i>				<i>F-ratio=8.36</i>	
Village				+	
Small town				0	
Major city				-	
Zagreb				-	
<i>Regional status</i>				<i>F-ratio=8.72</i>	
Northern Croatia				0	
Central Croatia				+	
Istria and Primorje				-	
Eastern Croatia				+	
Dalmatia				0	
Zagreb				-	
<i>Religiousness</i>		<i>F-ratio=9.24</i>	<i>F-ratio=8.88</i>	<i>F-ratio=21.85</i>	<i>F-ratio=9.49</i>
Religious		+	-	+	-
Undecided		-	+	0	+
Not religious		-	+	-	+
<i>Party affiliation</i>	<i>F-ratio=4.94</i>	<i>F-ratio=7.62</i>		<i>F-ratio=15.71</i>	
HDZ	+	+		+	
HNS	0	-		-	
HSP	-	+		+	
HSS	0	-		+	
SDP	0	-		-	
Undecided	0	0		0	

Legend: - below common average; 0 within common average; + above common average

The three remaining factors were produced by the grouping of the perceived circumstances that aggravate Croatia's accession to the EU. The third factor was, therefore, labeled as *political and economic aggravating circumstances*, because it is constructed by attitudes ascribing the responsibility to Croatia, most of all because of the insufficient democratization of the society, economic development and cooperation with The Hague Court. These

circumstances are above averagely expressed as aggravating for the desired integration by the non-religious and undecided participants (versus the religious ones) and the inhabitants of Northern Croatia, Istria and Primorje (contrary to the participants from Dalmatia).

Imposed barriers to integration (the fourth factor) is again unambiguous: it consists of attitudes that see the EU as the main culprit for the existence of aggravating circumstances in the accession process. This is a latent dimension that, in a certain sense, might be seen as close to the anti-European orientation, although in this case, the young are less homogenous. As seen in Table 10, the responsibility of the EU is emphasized more often by the youth of a rural provenience and domicile, those living in Central and Eastern Croatia, the religious participants and those more inclined to HDZ, HSP and HSS. At the same time, the perception of the EU as the party responsible for the existing difficulties in Croatia's accession process is shared far less often by the young born and living in larger urban centers and Istria, Primorje and Zagreb. They are joined by the non-religious participants and sympathizers of HNS and SDP.

Finally, the fifth factor – *obstruction and lack of preparedness for integration* – again determines Croatia's responsibility for the existence of aggravating circumstances on the way to EU. Here, certain society groups are recognized as deliberately acting toward keeping Croatia out of the EU, followed by the inability of the government to adjust to EU demands, as well as insufficient efforts put into the protection of human rights. The only difference was based on religious self-identification – the religious participants attribute less responsibility to Croatia, unlike the non-religious or the religiously undecided participants.

After an examination of the trends obtained, the participants' orientation according to party identification certainly deserves to be commented on, especially since it turned out to be the most influential attribute when it comes to the investigated segment of youth toward the EU. The HSP voters (consistently anti-European oriented), or the sympathizers of HNS and SDP (as those most inclined toward the EU) are not the surprise, however, those supporting HDZ invoke some confusion.

This group of youth is actually noticeably divided into those pro-European and anti-European oriented regarding the possible positive and negative consequences of Croatia's accession to the EU. Namely, the supporters of HDZ are dominant in expressing Euro-enthusiasm (choosing a nearer date for Croatia's entrance into the EU with greater perception of potential advantages of this act), which might be interpreted as an unreserved acceptance of the new policy of the party and government leadership. At the same time, the HDZ voters are among those that above averagely demonstrate anti-European

attitudes (that is, perceive the potential undesirable consequences of integration more and blame the EU for imposing barriers more), which is actually similar to the attitudes expressed by the sympathizers of HDZ in 1999⁶, when the party leadership also manifested a distance, to say the least, from Europe and European values and standards. This division of HDZ's young electorate coincides with analytical insights warning that the convergence of attitudes of HDZ voters and the party elite is seriously endangered precisely because of their relationships toward the EU. It would mean that based on this – especially if Croatia's accession to the EU is a lengthy process – one might expect further differentiation (and political splits) in HDZ, as well as dispersal of the party electorate. Finally, the results of the 2003 parliamentary elections and 2005 local elections clearly indicated that the support for HSP (as an advocate of the anti-European policy) is increasing at HDZ's expense. It is logical to assume that this process is not yet finalized and that the portion of HDZ's supporters, harboring an anti-European orientation, might redirect their sympathies toward HSP. To put it briefly, HDZ's shift toward the right center caused dissatisfaction in their right-wing supporters, who then decided in favor of a more appropriate political option.

The second most significant, and interesting, is the influence of religious self-identification on the relationship toward the EU. It was clearly shown that declared religiousness – which in Croatia can be identified with the Catholic denomination – is related with the increased advocating of an anti-European orientation, as well as criticism regarding the EU's role in the process of Croatia's accession to this association, and at the same time, with a decreased acceptance of Croatia's responsibility for slowing down this process. This tendency is in line with the change in the population of youth in Europe, indicating that among the young Catholics – who have for decades supported the European integration process more than the Protestants and atheists – this support has been decreasing over the last few years (Nelsen, Guth, 2003: 110). Indirectly, this means that certain signals arriving from the top of the Catholic Church, were interpreted by believers as a sign of disapproval (for example, the dissatisfaction with omitting the Christian tradition from the bases of the proposed European Constitution was quite explicitly expressed). However, certain specific moments must be at work in Croatia as well, such as the link

⁶ Five years ago, HDZ supporters, as well as today, accepted the anti-European orientation more than the others, and emphasized the issue of imposed barriers, and accepted the responsibility of Croatia for aggravating the integration process much less, while they did not differ from the supporters of other parties regarding the pro-European orientation (Baranović, 2002: 148). It is worth mentioning in this context that the supporters of HSP evolved in the direction of a more consistent advocacy of the anti-European orientation from 1999 to 2004.

between the religious and national identity. Therefore, it is possible to assume that believers have a stronger national identification as well, which includes concern regarding national identity and sovereignty, as well as a certain dose of non-criticism toward one's own nation and state. In this constellation, a supranational and seemingly bureaucratic and rigid institution, such as the EU, causes fear and a certain amount of repulsion as a consequence.

All the other observed attributes of youth are really sporadically related to the analyzed dimensions of the relationship toward the EU, which indicates that it is still not rationally founded, that is, it is not a result of a utilitarian consideration of the potential consequences of Croatia's accession to the EU. In other words, the relationship toward the EU is determined more by the ideological than the economic-developmental dimension. One should expect this to change once negotiations on a number of concrete solutions commence, which will launch socio-economic issues onto the front line, and also offer citizens, as well as the young, more information and argumentation for constructing a rational relationship toward European integration.

3. The social and political consequences of Croatia's integration into the EU

In this section, the objects of analysis are issues linked to certain political, social, economic and cultural consequences of Croatia's accession to the European Union. These issues include the perception of the potential advantages and disadvantages that the construction of Europe and the EU might involve in the following decade, then the fears of the participants related to the construction of the EU, the mutual negative and positive influence of the member states on the EU and vice versa, the areas in which the member states are autonomous or share their autonomy with the European Union in making decisions, the potential winners and losers of future Croatian membership and, linked with this, the citizens that have one of the skills that alleviates their adaptation – the knowledge of foreign languages.

Regarding how the European Union might look in the next 10 years, in general, youth has a more positive vision than the adult participants. Table 11 portrays a ranking scale of answers both by the young and the adults in Croatia (the participants were able to choose a maximum of three out of the 11 answers offered) and data for the EU youth.

The ranking scale only indicates that one answer was chosen by most participants in Croatia – the claim that the EU will in the future bring its citizens easier travel, work, studying and living. However, a significant number of youth expect the use of the Euro, a better quality of life and more employment

opportunities. In other words, their expectations are largely oriented toward improvements in the socio-economic plain. When these expected changes are joined by less discrimination towards foreigners and greater gender equality, one might say that a large majority of youth expects positive changes in the EU in the coming decade. Undesirable changes, such as aggravated decision-making and an increase in the number of social problems and unemployment, are expected by a significantly lower number of participants. The number of those considering that the EU might come to a demise is completely negligible. Summing up this data, one can state that the young in Croatia expect that there will be changes in the EU in the coming ten years that will bring more benefits than difficulties to the citizens of the member countries. These findings are thus in accordance with the already established majority expectation that Croatia will realize significantly more benefits than difficulties by joining the EU.

Table 11: A comparative outline of expected changes for EU citizens in the next ten years (%)

Changes for EU citizens in the next 10 years	Youth in EU		Croatia 2004	
	1997 ⁷	2001 ⁸	Youth	Adults
Easier travel, work, study and life in Europe	47.7	45.1	65.5	57.4
Use of the Euro as the only currency	41.8	48.1	45.0	44.4
Better quality life	23.3	25.0	43.1	40.2
More employment opportunities	29.9	28.3	42.4	41.8
Less discrimination of foreigners	28.8	27.4	17.3	16.0
Aggravated decision-making process	22.5	21.6	14.9	14.9
More social problems	17.8	13.3	13.1	17.4
More gender equality	16.1	16.7	12.3	9.3
More unemployment	14.6	10.7	7.4	9.7
Disappearance of the EU	-	-	1.3	2.2
Something else	-	-	1.1	1.7

The young and adults in Croatia mostly do not differ in their expectations of possible changes in the EU. The only inter-generational differences are visible

⁷ The data is taken from the Eurobarometer 47.2 *The Young Europeans* (1997: 107-108), and are related to youth from 15 EU member states (before the May 2004 enlargement), aged 15 to 24, so not completely comparable to our findings, but may serve as a rough comparison.

⁸ The data is taken from the Eurobarometer 55.1 *The Young Europeans in 2001* (2001: 17) and also relate to youth from the 15 EU member states (before the May 2004 enlargement), aged 15 to 24.

in the case of easier travel, work, studying and living in the EU – which is more accentuated by the young, and expecting there will be more social problems – more often stated by the adults.

In comparison with their Croatian peers and their own opinions four years before, the young in the EU in 2001 more often emphasized the use of the Euro as the only currency. Even though 1997 was the year the Euro was introduced, the young then thought that the EU would bring greater opportunities for easier travel, work and live anywhere in Europe in ten years. A better quality of life, as a possible consequence of the existence of the European Union, is mentioned almost twice as often by the participants in Croatia as the youth in the European Union. The next attitude, advocated by a significantly smaller number of Europeans, regards the expectation of more employment opportunities, which is in fourth position for the Croatian youth. The negative consequences that the EU might cause in the coming decade, is less often perceived by the youth in Croatia than their counterparts in the Union, even though the attitudes of young Europeans about these problems became somewhat less pronounced four years after the first research.

Regarding the observed attributes of Croatian youth, the analysis indicated that they are quite homogenous in their perception of the EU's future, because statistically significant differences consistently occur only when it comes to the first item, while they are sporadic in all the other answers. Thus, the attitude that the EU will bring easier travel, work, study and life to its citizens in the coming 10 years is mostly advocated by the participants from Dalmatia, Istria and Primorje ($\chi^2=34.13$), the young that grew up and live in Split, Rijeka and Osijek ($\chi^2=36.50$; $\chi^2=27.20$), followed by pupils and students ($\chi^2=35.62$), the supporters of HNS and SDP ($\chi^2=34.55$) and those with a positive perception about the European Union ($\chi^2=56.82$). In contrast to them are the participants from Northern Croatia, who were raised and live in the country, are unemployed and support HSS. Logically, this group also consists of those that harbor a negative image about the EU, but regardless of this, 50% of them believe that the EU might signify an improvement in their chances in life in the near future. As for the use of the Euro as the only currency, the only difference is that the youth aged 20 and 24 consider this turn of events to be more probable ($\chi^2=16.03$), especially compared to the youngest cohort of participants. A significant difference is present regarding the better quality of life, where the participants that perceive the EU positively emphasize this outcome more often ($\chi^2=132.33$) compared to those with a negative image of the Union. Similar differences exist with more employment opportunities, more advocated by those with a positive perception of the EU ($\chi^2=70.27$). On the other hand, those that perceive the Union negatively expect a difficult decision-making process ($\chi^2=117.37$), more social problems ($\chi^2=116.72$) and higher unemployment ($\chi^2=60.46$).

These, of course, are certain fears people feel about a so complex, and sometimes unintelligible process such as the construction of a united Europe and the European Union. This is why we particularly examined certain fears related to this process. Table 12 shows comparative data on the possible negative consequences of European integration and the construction of the EU, only on the “yes” degree (a three-degree scale consists of answers “yes”, “I do not know”, “no”). Data about the perception of the examined fears of the participants from the 25 European Union member countries relate to their own nations.

Table 12: A comparative outline of the participants' fears related to the construction of a unified Europe and the EU (%)

Fears	EU 25* 2004	Croatia 2004	
		Youth	Adults
The end of the Croatian Kuna	56	58.9	64.6
Increased drug trade and international organized crime	65	52.2	65.5
Increased difficulties for Croatian farmers	65	45.3	56.3
EU membership will cost Croatia too much money	64	44.6	55.4
Transfer of employment to countries with lower production costs	74	39.5	47.2
Loss of power by smaller member countries	46	39.1	49.2
Richer countries pay more than others	-	29.4	34.2
Less use of the Croatian language	40	20.4	24.3
Loss of Croatian national identity and culture	42	20.3	25.1
Loss of social privileges	52	12.8	21.1

* European Commission, 2005: 141

Observing all the obtained results, one can say that the young participants in Croatia are most afraid of the abolition of the national currency and an increase in criminal activity, while other fears were expressed by less than a half of the participants. Among them, the most pronounced fears are mostly linked to the socio-economic area, and they are the aggravated position of agricultural workers, the high costs of accession and the loss of employment due to differences in production costs. A significant number of youth is also afraid of the potentially inferior position of Croatia as a small country, but half as many expressed fear regarding the loss of national attributes, such as language and culture. It is interesting that the loss of social privileges is feared by only one out of ten young persons, possibly because they have yet to face the worst consequences of such a loss.

It is obvious from the data mentioned that there are no major differences between the young and adult participants regarding the ranking of the consequences they fear, but the differences are obvious in the level of fear expressed – the adult participants consistently demonstrate a higher level of fear

than the young. This is not surprising, for it is logical that the young, when compared to the adult population, have higher reserves of optimism in general, and in this case in particular. The most visible difference is again at the bottom of the scale, where it is obvious that the adult participants are twice as afraid of losing social privileges, because they have already been faced with that situation – through the demise of the socialist system and the consequent breakdown of the social welfare and protection system.

Unlike the Croatian participants, and after the “big bang” enlargement of May 2004, the European participants expressed the greatest fear when it comes to the transfer of employment to other countries, where the production costs are lower, and two third were afraid of the increase in crime and the drug trade (corresponding with the answers given by Croatian citizens), difficulties for farmers and the price of constructing Europe their countries have to pay. Compared to the relatively high level of fear in Europeans linked to national identity, the use of language and social privileges in the European Union, the participants in Croatia are significantly less concerned, and it is quite possible that this derives from different experiences. The greatest level of fear of different consequences of building Europe, is expressed in the Union by women, older participants with a lower level of education and those that know little about the EU (European Commission, 2005: 145).

Since we were not only interested in comparison with European countries but also in the possible negative consequences of constructing Europe and the EU, the previously analyzed fears underwent a factor analysis and variance analysis. Table 13 portrays the three factors obtained (with total variance of 49.8%).

Table 13: The factor structure of fears from the construction of a unified Europe and the EU

Fears	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Loss of Croatian national identity and culture	.841		
Less use of the Croatian language	.816		
Loss of social privileges	.560		
EU membership will cost Croatia too much money		.740	
Increased difficulties for Croatian farmers		.639	
Increased drug trade and international organized crime		.606	
Richer countries pay more than others			.711
Transfer of employment to countries with lower production costs			.592
Loss of power by smaller member countries		.370	.549
The end of the Croatian Kuna		.325	.485
<i>% of common variance</i>	<i>27.6</i>	<i>12.0</i>	<i>10.2</i>

The loss of national identity is the label of the first factor, for it is primarily constituted in the fear of loss of Croatia's uniqueness (identity, culture and language), and social privileges. The variance analysis indicated that in advocating these attitudes the young differ among each other the most, but with relatively low F-ratios (from 39.6 to 6.93). To be more specific, these negative consequences of constructing Europe and the EU are above averagely accepted by the youngest participants (as opposed to the oldest age cohort), those with a primary or secondary school diploma (unlike the highly educated youth), then pupils (compared to the employed and students), from Northern and Eastern Croatia (versus the participants coming from Central Croatia, Istria, Primorje and Zagreb, supporting HDZ, HSP and HSS (opposite the sympathizers of HNS and SDP) and religious participants (unlike the non-religious ones), those with a negative perception of the European Union (as opposed to those that have a positive opinion about it) and young people who believe that Croatia's accession to the EU would bring them no personal advantages (unlike those considering that they might have personal gains from Croatia joining the EU)⁹.

The second factor obtained may be summed up in the common label *the increase in socio-economic costs and insecurities*, because it mostly has to do with the influence of the construction of Europe and the European Union on certain economic processes, as well as organized crime, and smuggling and sale of drugs as a major social problem with unforeseen consequences for society and its economy. This factor is above averagely represented by young participants living in rural areas (F-ratio=6.06), the religious compared to the non-religious participants (F-ratio=12.85), those with a negative perception about the European Union (F-ratio=45.62) and participants not certain whether Croatia's membership in the European Union would bring them any advantages or not (F-ratio=56.53) versus those who are certain that this course of events would bring them no advantages whatsoever.

The third factor consists of consequences that may in short be described as *the increase of inequality between EU member states*. It deals, therefore, with the differences that might occur between the large and rich countries and the small and poorer states entering the Union, which may deepen the gap of inequality between them, instead of bridging it. This, of course, is linked to the problem of the political power of small countries – a problem even more pronounced by the enlargement of the Union and the inability of small countries to maintain an equal position in the decision-making process that affects all. The variance analysis demonstrated that in the perception of this possible scenario of

⁹ More detailed information about the results linked with the issue of the perception of the personal advantages that the participants might have from Croatia's accession to the EU is in Table 25.

the European Union, not one observed attribute differentiates the young from each other.

The attitudes examined next deal exactly with the consequences of European Union enlargement with new members, including Croatia. Table 14 portrays the comparative data about the possible consequences of EU enlargement when it comes to the degree of answer “yes” (otherwise, a three degree scale was used, consisting of the following answers “yes”, “I do not know” and “no”) for young and adult participants in Croatia, as well as for participants from the 15 countries that were candidates for joining the European Union in 2002.

Table 14: A comparative outline of attitudes about EU enlargement (%)

Meaning of EU enlargement	CC-15 2002*	Croatia 2004	
		Youth	Adults
Europe will be culturally richer with more member-states	64	60.5	65.9
The more member-states the EU has, the more important it will be in the world	69	55.9	60.6
The more member-states the EU has, the more peace and security will be guaranteed in Europe	67	51.1	58.3
My country's membership in the EU would lead to a better quality life	64	49.7	52.6
My country has much to offer to the EU	53	49.5	60.6
Membership in the EU would help the national economy	67	49.3	48.6
My country's membership in the EU is historically and geographically natural, justified	64	46.2	58.2
With enlargement, my country would have its own voice that would be heard louder in Europe	62	45.1	50.3
My country's leadership is doing everything possible to become a member of the EU in the near future	54	32.0	42.8
With enlargement, unemployment in my country would increase	23	14.4	21.1

* European Commission, 2002: 117

It is visible in Table 14 that all the participants from Croatia emphasize the positive consequences of enlargement in the European Union itself, when it comes to the increase in cultural wealth, importance, peace and safety in Europe. They are followed by positive consequences regarding Croatia, such as the higher quality of life, the improvement of the situation in the national economy as well as improvement of Croatia's status in Europe. The relatively low validation of the efforts the Croatian leadership is investing in Croatia's future accession to the EU is interesting: only one third of the young believed that the Government of Prime Minister Sanader was doing everything necessary at the moment for Croatia to be a member of the EU soon.

The differences between the young and adult participants in advocating certain attitudes were obvious; as in the previously interpreted question, here the

adults agree with each attitude more than the young, but there are also certain differences in the ranking of these attitudes. The adults believe more often that Croatia has much to offer to the European Union, as well as that its membership is historically and geographically natural, that is, justified. Also, significant differences can be noticed when it comes to the efforts of the Croatian authorities to include Croatia in the EU (also 43% of adults believe this is the case) and the increase of unemployment in Croatia after enlargement (an attitude advocated by every fifth participants of an older age).

In the case of the participants from countries that five years ago were candidates for joining the Union, approximately two thirds believe that seven of the stated claims are valid, statements that have to do with improvement of the situation in their own countries and in the European Union itself. Somewhat more than a half of all the participants believed that their countries' leaderships were doing everything in their power to become a part of the Union and that they have something to offer to it. Only one quarter of the participants believed that the enlargement process might cause an increase in unemployment in their countries. The most visible difference from the participants in Croatia is in the fact that all these statements were more accepted in the former candidate countries. The only statement this does not apply to is the feeling of national pride ("my country has much to offer the EU") – the young participants in Croatia gave a similar answer to the participants from the candidate countries, while the adults expressed this attitude even more.

Considering that certain groups of attitudes were already formed when they were ranked, it would be interesting to see how these attitudes are really structured. This is the reason for applying factor analysis, which resulted in three factors of a total variance of 52.2%, portrayed in Table 15, while the results of the variance analysis of the obtained factors is in Table 16.

The first factor obtained was labeled *multifaceted benefits from EU enlargement* because it consists of attitudes linked with the increase in power of this association, both internally (when it comes to cultural wealth, peace and security), and externally (the global importance of the EU). These attitudes are joined by two attitudes linked to Croatia's membership of the Union: the one about the justification of that membership and the one about the strengthening of Croatia's political power. Explained by the language of game theory: a greater power of one player (Croatia) increases the power of the entire system (EU) in the so-called non-zero-sum game. This attitude is above averagely accepted only by those who also have a positive perception about the European Union (and under averagely by those that have a negative image of the EU), while the young do not differ from each other in its acceptance regarding the other attributes observed.

Table 15: The factor structure of attitudes about the meaning of EU enlargement

Meaning of EU enlargement	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Europe will be culturally richer with more member-states	.713		
The more member-states the EU has, the more important it will be in the world	.687		
Croatia's membership in the EU is historically and geographically natural, justified	.596		
The more member-states the EU has, the more peace and security will be guaranteed in Europe	.579		
With enlargement, Croatia will have its own voice that would be heard louder in Europe	.493	.357	
Membership in the EU would help the national economy		.743	
With enlargement, unemployment in Croatia would increase		-.721	
Croatia's membership in the EU would lead to a better quality life	.401	.673	
The Croatian leadership is doing everything possible to become a member of the EU in the near future			.862
Croatia has much to offer to the EU			.638
<i>% of common variance</i>	29.9	12.3	10.0

The second factor was labeled *the positive influence of enlargement on Croatia*, for it consists of two attitudes that reflect the possible positive effects of Croatia's accession to the EU (the aid to the national economy, a higher quality of life – backed by the attitude about the increase of Croatian political power in Europe), and the rejection of the attitude that there will be an increase in unemployment in Croatia after the accession, indicating a positive relationship toward Croatia joining the EU. There are certain differences in accepting this latent dimension: it is above averagely accepted by youth born in both small and large cities (unlike those born and raised in Zagreb), as well as those with a positive perception of the European Union (as opposed to those who harbor a generally negative opinion), and under averagely – unlike the sympathizers of other parties – it is accepted by HSP's supporters (which is completely in line with the proclaimed attitude of this party about entering the Euro-integrative processes).

The justification of Croatia's accession to the EU is the label of the third factor, explaining one tenth of the total variance. This factor consists of two attitudes often heard on the national public scene when discussing Croatia's joining the EU: the Croatian authorities are doing all it takes for Croatia's membership in the EU and Croatia has a lot to offer the Union. It is interesting that this factor also consists of the attitude regarding the justification of Croatia's

membership, both historically and geographically, which is often associated with the previous two. As for the observed attributes of youth, this is the factor that yielded the most differences among the young participants. It is most accepted by participants born and raised in rural areas and in major cities (unlike those from Zagreb), those living in villages (again contrary to the inhabitants of Zagreb), that is, Central Croatia and Dalmatia (Zagreb is different here too), the religious participants (in contrast to the undecided and the non-religious) and finally, the supporters of HDZ, HSP and HSS (all the parties stressing Croatian comparative advantages regarding Europe) versus the sympathizers of HNS and SDP, who accept this attitude under averagely.

Table 16: Differences among the youth in accepting the factors of the meaning of EU enlargement

Attributes of youth	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
<i>Place of birth</i>		<i>F-ratio=6.32</i>	<i>F-ratio=5.47</i>
Village		0	+
Small town		+	0
Major city		+	+
Zagreb		-	-
<i>Place of habitat</i>			<i>F-ratio=8.42</i>
Village			+
Small town			0
Major city			0
Zagreb			-
<i>Regional status</i>			<i>F-ratio=7.83</i>
Northern Croatia			0
Central Croatia			+
Istria and Primorje			0
Eastern Croatia			0
Dalmatia			+
Zagreb			-
<i>Religious self-identification</i>			<i>F-ratio=11.97</i>
Religious			+
Undecided			-
Not religious			-
<i>Party affiliation</i>		<i>F-ratio=7.46</i>	<i>F-ratio=7.92</i>
HDZ		+	+
HNS		+	-
HSP		-	+
HSS		+	+
SDP		+	-
Undecided		0	0
<i>Perception of the EU</i>	<i>F-ratio=114.88</i>	<i>F-ratio=161.39</i>	
Negative	-	-	
Neutral	0	0	
Positive	+	+	

Legend: - below common average; 0 within common average; + above common average

It is certainly important to investigate the citizens' opinions about different decision-making areas regarding their own life and its quality. Therefore we examined what the participants think about 25 specific issues that have so far only been decided upon by the Republic of Croatia. Joining the EU means that this practice is certainly going to change, so some issues will require decision-making by the Union as well, and some will remain in Croatia's exclusive competence. Table 17 portrays a comparative outline of the attitudes about the examined issues, and only the data for the answer “national government along with the EU” are shown (the answer “only national government” was offered as well). Regarding the fact that the European Commission researched the same question on a sample of the general population in the 25 EU countries, we are showing its results as well.

From the obtained results, the fact is most visible that more than one half of all participants believe 20 out of the 25 observed areas should be the subject of joint decision-making by the Croatian government and the European Union. Two out of the last five areas also belong within what is known as the classic administrative fields – the judiciary and police, which was correctly recognized by the participants – however, it is interesting that the first of these fields is what the supra-national character of the European Union is based on (the *acquis communautaire*, its common rules), while the police is the second of the three pillars the EU rests on, which obviously did not impress the participants very much. Agriculture and fisheries are what battles are fought over regarding Croatia's accession to the EU, so it is not surprising that this seems to be recognized as an issue Croatia should make decisions on autonomously. The same goes for cultural policy, which can be understood as a warranty for the survival of Croatian culture and diversity in the “great Europe”. It is also interesting that both the young and the adults emphasized the acceptance of refugees (and the adults added the immigration policy to this), as one of the areas Croatia should make its own decisions about. It is presumably the result of recent experience with the refugee problem, that additionally wore Croatia out economically and socially during and after the war, so it is a problem the participants believe should be decided upon by our authorities alone.

As for the upper portion of the scale, one might conclude that out of the first nine areas, five belong to the field of prevention and the fight against various evils of modern life: organized crime, adolescent crime, urban violence, trade and exploitation of human beings and the drugs trade. It is clear that the participants recognized an exceptional need for supranational action in these areas, because these criminal activities are not familiar nor do they recognize national borders, so taking action according to the sovereignty principle will neither repress them nor eradicate them. Two other areas at the top of the list also have to do with a fight that is a precondition for success in the previously

mentioned areas, albeit a different kind of fight – against poverty and unemployment (the basis and even the cause of all forms of crime). Along with all this, informing about the EU and scientific and technological research are also at the top of the scale, which is not especially difficult to explain. Specifically, research has shown that scientific and technological research activities demand joint effort, work and financial support, if top results are to be achieved.

Table 17: A comparative outline of attitudes about areas in which the national government should make decisions along with the EU (%)

Decision-making areas	EU-25* 2004	Croatia 2004	
		Youth	Adults
Fighting organized crime	76	89.3	85.8
Fighting the trade and exploitation of people	81	87.3	83.5
Fighting drug abuse	73	85.1	83.5
Information on the EU	71	83.5	79.9
Fighting poverty	58	81.2	75.4
Prevention of juvenile crime	39	77.3	74.6
Scientific and technological research	67	76.4	75.5
Fighting unemployment	47	75.8	71.7
Prevention of urban violence	32	68.4	60.9
Foreign policy toward countries outside of the EU	68	67.7	64.4
Humanitarian aid	72	67.3	62.7
Support for regions with economic difficulties	60	64.6	65.9
Currency	63	59.0	62.9
Environmental protection	67	58.2	56.3
Education	33	58.1	52.6
Defense	57	56.6	54.6
Basic regulations for electronic media / the press	34	55.1	57.8
Regulations for political asylum	58	54.5	52.1
Health and social care	33	52.0	50.5
Immigration policy	58	50.5	46.6
Accepting refugees	56	45.7	49.2
Judiciary	36	44.3	38.6
Cultural policy	34	37.3	31.7
Agricultural and fisheries policy	50	37.1	37.6
Police	30	36.0	31.8

* European Commission, 2005: 35

The middle of the ranking scale consists of heterogeneous areas, three of which might be joined under a common denominator. These are areas that belong to the classical conception of the modern state: foreign politics, national currency and defense. The process of dilution of this conception and the creation of new relationships, stimulated by the process of European integration as well as globalization, is obvious. Included in these same processes are the issues of humanitarian aid, education (with the not so negligible influence of the Bologna Declaration on Higher Education, enabling students of any university based on this declaration to attend or finish their studies at any other such university) and especially environmental protection (the consequences of endangering the environment have no regard for state borders, as in the case of crime, so they require a joint effort and common standards). It is no accident that the issue of support for regions with economic difficulties is among the mentioned areas, for it is one of the areas that most funds from the common European budget are dedicated to, via the so-called regional/structural/cohesion policy. At the same time, this issue is extremely significant for Croatia, where the differences in the level of development of different regions are evident (for example, Zagreb and the Zagreb County compared to Lika or Eastern Slavonia) and where these common funds will mean a great deal where equal development and increasing living standards are concerned. Other issues in the middle of the scale have to do with certain regulations the Croatian government ought to set up along with the European Union: in the field of the electronic media/the press, political asylum, immigration policy and health and social care – accepted by every other participant.

The European data regarding subsidiarity, that is, the division of competences so that they belong to the lowest possible level of authority which may implement them efficiently and effectively, demonstrate certain differences compared to the Croatian results. Specifically, the majority of Europeans believe that two thirds of the observed functions should be performed by their country in cooperation with the EU, while the participants in Croatia share this same opinion when it comes to four fifths of these areas. Differences in the ranking of certain issues are also evident: the population of the EU support joint decision-making somewhat less when it comes to the prevention of adolescent crime and urban violence, education, basic rules for the media and press, health and social care and the fight against unemployment. Issues the Europeans believe might be best resolved by joint efforts, unlike the Croatian participants, are environmental protection, immigration policy, accepting refugees and, of course, agricultural and cultural policy. The cause for this last finding could be in the “panic” certain structures of the Croatian society are creating when it comes to Croatian agriculture and fisheries in the EU, while the population of the EU has for years,

decades even, enjoyed certain rights achieved through the common agricultural and fisheries policy, thus being less protective of their fishermen and farmers.

The cross-analysis of attitudes about the mentioned areas with the observed social attributes of youth was only performed for the answer “national government along with the EU”, and the obtained results only sporadically produce statistically significant differences. Thus, gender differentiates youth only regarding information about the European Union ($\chi^2=21.01$), where women are more in favor of joint decision-making. Regarding regional status, those from Istria and Primorje accept joint decisions about the currency more than those from Dalmatia ($\chi^2=31.48$), while participants from Central Croatia believe that the agricultural and fisheries policy should be decided upon together, unlike the participants from Dalmatia ($\chi^2=15.72$). This is probably the difference between the position of farmers (farmers in the EU receive high subsidies from agricultural funds) and the position of the fishermen (the participants from Dalmatia are probably conveying the fear of Croatian fishermen that the fishing resources in the Adriatic will be less protected and more open to the influence of fishermen from other countries, such as Italy and Slovenia, once Croatia is in the EU). The attribute of the young participants that demonstrated statistically significant differences in each of the observed area (except for environmental protection and cultural policy) is the perception of the European Union. The young with a positive perception of the EU without exception advocate each form of cooperation between Croatia and the EU more, while those with a negative perception of the Union accept any form of their cooperation consistently less (the χ^2 ranges from 15.29 to 60.86).

The question of potential losers and winners from Croatia's membership of the European Union was researched separately. Table 18 has the comparative data about the specific groups the participants were to estimate whether they would be “better off”, “neither better nor worse” or “worse off”.

The upper third of the Table consists of groups that will presumably fare better in the situation appearing with Croatia's accession to the EU, than the rest of the population. They are experts, persons that know foreign languages, the young, managers and large companies. Both the young and the adult participants equally ranked their potential success, that is, benefit. In the middle of the scale are those that both the young and the adult participants believe will significantly improve their current position with Croatia joining the EU: they are entrepreneurs, the unemployed and different minority groups. It can be assumed that the participants recognized their momentarily disadvantaged position and its potential improvement that, with Croatia's accession to the EU, might be caused by the expanding of markets and cultural perspectives.

Table 18: The perception of potential winners/losers of Croatia's membership of the EU – youth and adults (%)

Groups of winners/losers	Better		Neither better nor worse		Worse	
	Youth	Adults	Youth	Adults	Youth	Adults
Experts	78.0	81.3	20.1	17.7	1.9	1.0
Those who know foreign languages	75.4	77.9	23.7	21.5	0.9	0.6
Young people	67.8	77.1	28.4	25.4	3.8	3.4
Managers	64.9	66.8	30.5	28.5	4.5	4.7
Large companies	62.0	56.8	30.5	35.4	7.8	17.2
Entrepreneurs	48.8	51.3	41.1	38.2	10.1	10.5
Unemployed	46.4	41.3	39.4	42.2	14.2	16.6
Members of cultural, religious and other minorities	40.8	36.2	53.8	57.7	5.4	6.2
Politicians	38.0	34.0	44.8	42.8	17.2	23.3
Some parts of Croatia more than others	35.3	36.8	54.5	52.2	10.3	11.0
Workers	33.6	31.0	50.5	48.5	15.9	20.4
Inhabitants of Zagreb	32.9	32.3	60.3	61.9	6.8	5.8
All Croatian citizens	32.4	32.7	58.4	57.0	9.2	10.3
Teachers	32.2	30.1	62.4	64.4	5.3	5.5
Civil servants	28.7	25.2	63.9	63.7	7.4	11.0
Farmers	28.0	26.7	41.1	33.9	30.8	39.4
Retired persons	28.0	26.7	61.5	60.5	12.8	15.1

The remainder of the scale is taken up by groups whose status, the participants believe, will remain more or less equal to the existing one – teachers, civil servants, retired persons, the population of the capital and Croatian citizens in general. However, no great differences between the opinions of the young and adult participants exist, except perhaps regarding the farmers, that the adults believe will gain or remain in the same position by entering the EU, somewhat less than the young. The most interesting part of the table must be the one regarding the so-called losers, that both the young and the adult participants primarily see as the farmers (almost one third of youth and 40% of adults support this attitude), while less than a quarter of the participants believe the positions of the other groups will worsen. They are headed up by the politicians, perhaps because the participants believe that with Croatia's accession to the EU, the accountability system might start functioning, making them responsible for the effects of their own (in)action. Along with them, there are also groups that are in a less favorable position as it is, such as manual workers, the unemployed and the retired, and one out of ten participants are certain that this relates to all the citizens of Croatia.

Considering the fact that we were interested in the sets of observed groups, we conducted a factor analysis and variance analysis. Four factors explaining 53.9% of the total variance were obtained, and are portrayed in Table 19, while the variance analysis results are in Table 20.

Table 19: The factor structure of potential winners/losers of Croatia's membership in the EU

Groups of winners/losers	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
Farmers	.713			
Teachers	.685			
Retired persons	.682			
Civil servants	.643			.429
Workers	.643			
Unemployed	.601			
Entrepreneurs	.391			.385
All Croatian citizens		.745		
Inhabitants of Zagreb		.721		
Some parts of Croatia more than others		.697		
Young people		.560	.445	
Those who know foreign languages			.717	
Experts			.673	
Managers			.520	.403
Members of cultural, religious and other minorities			.389	
Politicians				.748
Large companies				.586
<i>% of common variance</i>	<i>29.4</i>	<i>10.2</i>	<i>7.9</i>	<i>6.4</i>

The first factor obtained was labeled *potential losers of integration* because these are groups previously identified as those whose status will not improve compared to the rest of the population (headed up by the farmers), and who are mostly perceived as groups that are in a disadvantaged social position as it is. However, pupils and those with a positive attitude toward the European Union, compared to those that perceive it negatively, are the ones that above averagely believe these groups will improve their status as well by joining the EU. Along with them, this attitude is above averagely represented by youth believing they will gain personal advantages from Croatia's accession to the EU (F-ratio=55.55), unlike those thinking they will gain nothing by it.

Table 20: Differences among the youth in accepting the factors of potential winners/losers of Croatia's membership of the EU

Attributes of youth	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
<i>Age</i>			<i>F-ratio=12.11</i>	
15 – 19 years			–	
20 – 24 years			0	
25 – 29 years			+	
<i>Socio-profess. status</i>	<i>F-ratio=6.14</i>			
Employed	–			
Unemployed	–			
Pupils	+			
Students	–			
<i>Education</i>			<i>F-ratio=7.44</i>	
Primary sch. or less			–	
Vocational school			–	
High school			0	
University or more			+	
<i>Regional status</i>		<i>F-ratio=5.40</i>		<i>F-ratio=4.65</i>
Northern Croatia		–		–
Central Croatia		+		+
Istria and Primorje		0		–
Eastern Croatia		0		+
Dalmatia		+		0
Zagreb		0		–
<i>Religiousness</i>				<i>F-ratio=8.70</i>
Religious				+
Undecided				–
Not religious				–
<i>Party affiliation</i>			<i>F-ratio=4.86</i>	
HDZ			0	
HNS			+	
HSP			–	
HSS			0	
SDP			+	
Undecided			–	
<i>Perception of the EU</i>	<i>F-ratio=47.69</i>	<i>F-ratio=81.37</i>	<i>F-ratio=23.79</i>	
Negative	–	–	–	
Neutral	0	0	0	
Positive	+	+	+	

Legend: – below common average; 0 within common average; + above common average

The potential winners of integration is the title of the second factor obtained, since it consists of those social groups the participants believe will be the winners of Croatia's accession to the European Union. They are the inhabitants of the capital and some Croatian regions at the expense of others, youth and interestingly, all the citizens of Croatia. Two statistically significant differences are obtained by comparing this factor with the observed attributes of youth: the population of Central Croatia and Dalmatia accept this factor more than others, in contrast to the population of Northern Croatia, who choose it under averagely; the young with a positive perception of the European Union are more than averagely in favor of this factor, unlike the participants with a negative image of the EU. Also, above average acceptance of this factor may be found in youth believing they personally will profit from Croatia joining the EU (F-ratio=77.17), compared to those thinking nothing will change for the better for them because of it.

The third factor could be labeled *sure winners of integration*, because it is primarily made up of those with specific knowledge and skills that will help them cope better with the new situation. Hence, these are persons with foreign language skills, experts, managers, and interestingly, different minorities (obviously perceived as more capable of adaptation), as well as young people. When this factor is compared to the observed attributes of youth, we find that it is more than averagely accepted by the oldest participants compared to the youngest age group of youth, followed by the highly educated in contrast to participants with a primary or vocational school degree, the supporters of HNS and SDP, unlike the sympathizers of HSP and the politically undecided participants, and finally, those with a positive image of the EU, as opposed to the youth whose perception of the EU is negative. Here, there is also a statistically significant difference between participants convinced they will have some personal gain from Croatia's accession to the EU (F-ratio=27.59), who accept this factor more than average, and the young believing that this will not bring about any positive shift in their lives.

The fourth factor is the easiest to explain, and it is least heterogeneous in terms of the observed attributes of youth. It may be labeled *the political-economic elite as a winner of integration*, for it includes politicians and large companies, who are accompanied by civil servants, managers and entrepreneurs. Only two attributes of youth differentiate those that accept this factor above the average from those choosing it somewhat less often: they are the inhabitants of Central and Eastern Croatia compared to the population of all the other Croatian regions (with the exception of Dalmatia) and the religious participants, unlike those that are non-religious or religiously undecided.

Considering that persons speaking foreign languages were mentioned among those who are the probable winners of Croatia's future membership of the

European Union, it is interesting to observe how many such persons there are in Croatia and which attributes differentiate them. Table 21 offers a comparative portrayal of data about the knowledge of a foreign language on the degree “I actively use” (the other answers on the three-level scale are “I passively use” and “I do not use”).

Table 21: A comparative outline of the knowledge of foreign languages (%)

Foreign language	Youth in EU		Croatia 2004	
	1997*	2001**	Youth	Adults
English	54.0	50.4	44.0	14.7
German	11.0	13.2	11.0	9.6
Italian	-	3.5	4.7	6.5
French	20.0	17.5	1.1	1.6
Other	-	-	3.0	3.1

* European Commission, 1997: 40

** European Commission, 2001: 8

The data about the active knowledge of foreign languages in Croatia are not especially flattering, at least regarding the young participants, who know English and German more or significantly more than the adult participants, but in the case of French, Italian and “other” languages (consisting of Russian, Spanish and certain other languages) the situation is reversed. Considering the languages most often used in the European Union – English and French – the situation is very interesting. The former *lingua franca* – the language of diplomacy and high culture – and today almost exotic, the French language is spoken in Croatia only by 1.1% of youth and 1.6% of adults. On the other hand, the language of modern, global and globalized communication, English, is actively spoken by somewhat fewer than one half of youth in Croatia, while 30% fewer adult participants use it with the same level of skill. It is thus, not surprising that those who speak it are perceived as the potential winners of European integration. Also, a considerable number of young participants, one out of ten, use the German language, while the same goes for somewhat less than one tenth of the adults. From the data of the European research on the knowledge of foreign languages in the young population, one can conclude that the differences are significant. Specifically, the active knowledge of the English language among the youth in Croatia is 6-10% lower than in the observed European countries, while the active knowledge of the French language is very low.

For comparison according to the social attributes of youth, the original data about the knowledge of foreign languages are summarized so that the values for active and passive knowledge of foreign languages were added (the total values are 82.7% for English, 42.1% for German and 6.0% for French). When the data

about Croatian young people's knowledge of foreign languages are compared with the observed attributes of that group, we conclude that the participants are most differentiated by their knowledge of English. Therefore, it is more used by the young from Zagreb compared to those in Central and Eastern Croatia ($\chi^2=143.59$), students as opposed to the employed ($\chi^2=199.31$), the youngest participants unlike the young from the oldest age cohort ($\chi^2=21.59$), the young living in Zagreb and major cities, unlike the participants from rural areas ($\chi^2=178.34$), those born and raised in Zagreb or other major cities, compared to those born and raised in villages ($\chi^2=190.0$), the highly educated in comparison to the participants with a vocational school diploma ($\chi^2=192.26$), the non-religious unlike the young that are religiously undecided ($\chi^2=29.16$), and finally, the supporters of HNS as opposed to the sympathizers of HDZ ($\chi^2=59.48$). As for German, it is least familiar to the population of Dalmatia, and better known by those from Zagreb ($\chi^2=77.05$), then the young who are employed compared to the students ($\chi^2=51.69$), it is less known by men than by women ($\chi^2=15.89$), as well as participants with three years of high school compared to the highly educated youth ($\chi^2=30.27$). The knowledge of the Italian language causes statistically significant differences in the sense that it is more often spoken by youth from Istria and Primorje, and less often by those from Eastern and Central Croatia ($\chi^2=515.02$), then students compared to the unemployed ($\chi^2=30.44$), the youth from major cities compared to participants living in the country ($\chi^2=67.61$) and those born and raised in major cities compared to those born and raised in rural areas ($\chi^2=73.32$), the highly educated unlike the young with three years of high school ($\chi^2=52.98$) as well as voters of HNS opposite the supporters of HSS ($\chi^2=40.03$). When the French language is concerned, it is only spoken more in Dalmatia, compared to the youth from Central Croatia ($\chi^2=32.79$). The knowledge of the other languages researched did not yield any statistically significant differences regarding the observed attributes of youth.

4. Perception of the consequences of Croatia's integration into the EU on a personal level

In this segment we analyze the answers of the participants linked to the perception of the consequences of Croatia's EU membership on them personally. This has to do with the general feeling of identity, both Croatian and European, with what it means to be "a citizen of the European Union", with the potential personal advantages of Croatia's accession to the EU and with the advantages and disadvantages this entails, and finally, with the opinion of the participants about going abroad and living and working in one of the European Union countries.

In order to analyze the data about the perceived personal, positive or negative, consequences of Croatia's integration into the EU, first we need to see

how the identity of the Croatian citizens is linked to the Republic of Croatia, or Europe as a wider geographic concept and the reference civilization circle. The question regarding identity was asked similar to other such research in Europe – the participants were asked to determine whether they are and how proud they are of the fact that they are citizens of Croatia, or Europe. Table 22 offers the comparative data for the young and adult participants, summarized in the following manner: “yes” (consisting of answers “very proud” and “proud”), “no” (consisting of answers “not very proud” and “not proud at all”) and “does not feel” for those that do not feel like they belong to the offered identities.

Table 22: A comparative outline of data regarding attachment to national and European identity (%)

Citizen of one's own country	EU 25* 2004	Croatia 2004	
		Youth	Adults
Yes	86	73.1	75.4
No	11	24.3	22.9
Does not feel	2	2.6	1.7
European			
Yes	68	54.4	50.1
No	26	31.9	35.1
Does not feel	7	13.7	14.9

* European Commission, 2005: 99

It is easily discernible from the portrayed data that approximately three quarters of all participants, young and adults, are proud or very proud of the fact that they are citizens of Croatia. Here, the young are somewhat less proud, and more expressive of a negative attitude toward this identity. The data about the lack of Croatian identity are almost negligible. This, however, is not the case with the European identity, where 15% of all participants (adults accept this attitude somewhat more than the young) do not feel a part of it. Regarding pride in their European identity, every other young and adult participant is very proud or proud about it, while approximately one third of all the subjects state that they are not especially proud or not proud at all. While the adult participants demonstrated a stronger attachment to their Croatian identity, it is interesting that the young head the positive validation of their European identity.

It is interesting that both the young and the adult participants in Croatia feel less national pride than the inhabitants of EU member countries. The question is what caused this, perhaps a greater dissatisfaction with their own life and the situation the country is in – which is surprising considering that Croatia

mobilized its national pride recently, during the war. The Croatian answers are most similar to the participants from Germany, a quarter of whom are not especially or not at all proud of their nationality (European Commission, 2005: 100), while the highest level of pride is expressed by the Irish, the Greek, Finnish and Slovenian populations (about 97%). On the other hand, it is understandable that the European participants express their pride of being European more, for they have had the time and opportunity to experience what it really means. However, we should certainly mention that the citizens of the 15 old member countries are less proud of their Europeism (approximately two thirds) than the citizens of the new EU members (78%). Most attached to their European identity are the young, the highly educated, those born in the EU and those who believe they know very much about the Union (European Commission, 2005: 102).

Comparing this with the observed attributes of youth in Croatia, one can integrally say that they cause no statistically significant differences regarding their European identity, but the situation is quite different when it comes to their Croatian identity. Thus, the men are more proud of being Croat than women ($\chi^2=23.14$), the inhabitants of Dalmatia are more proud than those from Istria and Primorje ($\chi^2=41.64$), the religious participants express their pride more often than the non-religious ($\chi^2=92.75$), and the sympathizers of HDZ and HSP feel proud to be Croatian citizens more than HNS supporters ($\chi^2=66.0$).

Aside from the social attributes of youth, the issue of identity is linked to some other variables, especially satisfaction with one's own life and the perception of one's own future and the future of the society. The data is shown in Table 23, and the variable of satisfaction with one's own life is summarized into three levels (it consisted of five degrees, from "I am completely satisfied" to "I am completely dissatisfied"), as well as variables of the personal and social future (the original scale consists of five degrees, starting with "the future will be much worse than the present" and ending in "the future will be much better than the present").

From the stated data one can conclude that those more satisfied with their own lives, expecting their own future and the future of society to be better, also express a higher level of pride in being citizens of Croatia and the fact that they are European. On the other hand, the young feeling dissatisfaction with their own lives and a pessimistic view of their future and the future of the society, express a lower level of pride, or even completely reject one or other identity (this is visible to a greater degree with the European identity, and less with the Croatian one).

Table 23: Attachment to national and European identity regarding certain attitudes of youth (%)

Attitudes of youth	Citizen of Croatia			European		
	Yes	No	Doesn't feel	Yes	No	Doesn't feel
<i>Satisfaction with one's life</i>	$\chi^2=73.83$			$\chi^2=50.13$		
Satisfied	78.3	19.2	2.5	59.2	28.3	12.6
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	67.1	30.4	2.5	49.8	34.1	16.1
Dissatisfied	50.0	45.8	4.2	33.5	51.5	15.0
<i>Perception of one's own future</i>	$\chi^2=20.79$			$\chi^2=34.3$		
Better	75.5	22.3	2.2	58.8	29.0	12.2
Same	71.0	25.3	3.8	48.3	36.7	14.9
Worse	61.8	34.9	3.3	40.5	39.5	20.0
<i>Perception of society's future</i>	$\chi^2=20.06$			$\chi^2=36.18$		
Better	76.3	21.8	2.0	59.2	29.9	10.9
Same	72.1	24.7	3.2	51.4	34.0	14.6
Worse	64.6	31.7	3.7	44.1	34.7	21.2
TOTAL	73.1	24.3	2.6	54.4	31.9	13.7

In order to explain better and add content to the variable of European identity, the participants were offered seven answers, out of which a maximum of three could be chosen, about what it means to “be a citizen of the European Union”. Table 24 portrays a rank scale of answers for the young and adult participants as well as data about the attitudes of youth in the EU.

Table 24: A comparative outline of attitudes about what it means to be a “citizen of EU” (%)

Being a citizen of the European Union means	Youth in EU		Croatia 2004	
	1997*	2001**	Youth	Adults
The right to work in any country of the European Union	62.4	57.4	70.9	71.8
The opportunity to study in any country of the European Union	45.7	41.9	53.7	42.4
The right to permanent residence in any country of the European Union	51.5	50.8	41.8	33.8
Access to health and social care anywhere in the European Union	34.6	31.7	37.3	48.4
The right to vote in elections for the European Parliament in the member-country of residence	20.3	21.9	12.6	12.2
The right to vote in national elections in the member-country of residence	17.7	17.4	11.5	12.8
The right to vote in local elections in the member-country of residence	19.9	20.8	9.6	10.2

* European Commission, 1997: 112-115

** European Commission, 2001: 18

The right to work and the opportunity to study in any country of the European Union are the only answers accepted by more than a half of the young participants, while the mentioned right to work is, understandably, most important to the adults, followed by the access to health and social care. A high percentage of youth also consider the right to permanent migration to any EU country is an important part of the content of “European citizenship”. Both with the young and adult participants, the general active suffrage proved to be the least important, whether the elections are held for the European Parliament, on a national or local level in the country a person has residence in – about every tenth participant emphasizes these rights as important for the concept of “citizen of the EU”.

The right to work, live and study in any EU member country is also the key element in the understanding of the “European citizenship” for the young from the Union. The ranking of these attitudes has not changed over the years observed, but the level of their acceptance has decreased. There is also no great difference between the young in Croatia and the young in the EU when it comes to access to health and social care. However, differences between the counterparts from different countries appear regarding the different electoral processes, whose importance is rarely recognized by the Croatian participants, while it is especially indicative that the European youth value local elections higher than state elections, because that is the level where the authorities are elected who will determine the quality of life of the population. In Croatia, the situation is reversed, and it is assumedly caused by the high level of polarization of local politics and the inability of local self-authority units to take care of the basic needs of their inhabitants.

Considering the comparison of the answers offered with the observed attributes of youth, statistically significant differences only occur sporadically and with certain answers. Therefore, the socio-professional status of the participants influences the emphasis on the right to vote in state elections in such a manner that it is less accepted by the pupils and students as opposed to the employed and unemployed participants ($\chi^2=18.71$), and the opportunity to study in any country is stated more by the students and pupils than the employed participants ($\chi^2=60.56$), which is logical. The opportunity to study in any EU country is also more often accepted by youth supporting HNS and SDP in contrast to supporters of HSS or HSP ($\chi^2=32.01$). Education influences the acceptance of the right to vote in the elections for the European Parliament, which is accented more by the highly educated participants versus those with a primary school diploma ($\chi^2=18.21$). The perception participants have of the European Union influences the acceptance of the right to work in any EU country – those with a positive image of the EU accept this right more often than those with a negative perception of the EU ($\chi^2=26.99$) – as well as the acceptance of access to health and social care anywhere in the EU – the young with a positive perception emphasize this attitude more often than those that harbor a negative opinion ($\chi^2=17.62$).

As has been noted several times now, the perception of the participants about the personal advantages of Croatia's accession to the European Union might bring them, is very important. So, 28% of youth (and only 23.2% of adult participants) believe that they will experience personal benefits from Croatia's membership of the European Union. On the other hand, an approximately equal number of youth (and 43.2% of adults, even) consider that this will bring them no advantages at all. 44.4% of youth (and one third of the adults) do not have a defined opinion about this issue, that is, they do not know the answer. Regarding the statistically significant differences in the acceptance of the mentioned attitudes, Table 25 offers an outline of the relevant tendencies among the young.

Table 25: The perception of personal benefits from Croatia's accession to the EU regarding the attributes of youth (%)

Attributes of youth	Personal benefit		
	Yes	No	I do not know
<i>Gender</i>	$\chi^2=18.17$		
Female	23.8	28.1	48.1
Male	32.0	27.3	40.7
<i>Socio-professional status</i>	$\chi^2=24.51$		
Employed	26.9	32.0	41.2
Unemployed	25.7	30.5	43.9
Pupils	29.5	19.8	50.7
Students	30.4	26.0	43.6
<i>Religious self-identification</i>	$\chi^2=25.73$		
Religious	25.4	28.7	45.9
Undecided	36.6	20.5	42.9
Not religious	32.8	31.3	35.8
<i>Party affiliation</i>	$\chi^2=38.01$		
HDZ	29.0	24.3	46.7
HNS	40.3	20.9	38.8
HSP	16.5	36.8	46.6
HSS	27.7	23.4	48.9
SDP	33.7	29.1	37.2
Undecided	23.6	29.4	47.0
<i>Perception of the EU</i>	$\chi^2=410.59$		
Negative	10.5	63.3	26.2
Neutral	17.8	26.9	55.3
Positive	49.7	14.4	35.9
TOTAL	28.0	27.7	44.4

It is evident that the young that accept the attitude that Croatia's accession to the European Union will bring them personal gain significantly more, have the following attributes: they are male, coming from the student or school population, they are religiously undecided and support HNS and have a positive perception of the EU. On the other hand, the young believing they will have no use from Croatia's membership in the EU are mostly young women, employed, unreligious participants who are supporters of HSP and harbor a negative perception about the EU. The undecided, when it comes to their future once Croatia is in the EU, are usually female, pupils, the religious participants and those supporting HSS and, of course, those with a neutral image of the EU.

Narrowly linked with the issue of potential gains from Croatia's accession to the European Union is the question of the personal meaning the EU has for the participants. The participants were able to choose a maximum of three statements about what the EU means to them personally, out of the ten offered answers. Table 26 portrays the ranking scale of answers for both the young and adult participants, along with the findings about the attitudes of youth in the EU.

Table 26: A comparative outline of the participants' attitudes about the meaning of EU (%)

Meaning of European Union	Youth in EU		Croatia 2004	
	1997*	2001**	Youth	Adults
A way of creating a better future for young people	34.2	28.1	54.5	51.1
A way of creating employment	29.4	24.4	43.1	34.0
An opportunity to go anywhere I want within the European Union	34.8	39.1	40.5	26.9
Guaranteed and lasting peace within the European Union	24.1	22.7	23.0	27.8
A way of improving the economic situation in the European Union	34.0	31.1	21.8	27.4
A way of protecting the citizens' rights	13.1	15.9	19.1	22.7
A lot of bureaucracy, a waste of time and money	14.4	11.9	12.4	17.7
Risk of losing cultural diversity	12.0	11.0	10.3	9.7
European Government	26.2	31.2	9.7	9.4
Just a dream, a Utopian idea	7.6	5.1	8.8	11.6

* European Commission, 1997: 103-106

** European Commission, 2001: 16

The data portrayed suggest that neither the young nor the adult participants in Croatia have a homogenous perception of the meaning of the European Union. Only one answer occurs in both the investigated population in an above average number of cases – the EU as a way of creating a better future for youth. More than 40% of youth emphasize that this is also a way to create employment

and an opening of opportunities for free movement within the EU. These attitudes are significantly less perceived by the adult participants as decisive for the meaning of the EU. Each fifth young participant believes that the EU is a manner of improving the economic situation and a way to protect the citizens of the countries that are its members. On the other hand, the adult participants believe more than the young, that the EU is a warranty of economic prosperity, but also stress Euro-bureaucracy as an important element of the Union more than the youth. One out of ten young people believes that the European Union signifies over-bureaucratization, the risk of cultural equalization and just a dream. The adults, on the other hand, emphasize the Utopian character of this association more often, while neither the young nor the adult participants believe that the European Union might mean a “European Government”, superior to the national states who are the Union's members.

Unlike their counterparts in Croatia, the young from the 15 EU member states emphasize the freedom of movement within the Union as the most important, and the acceptance of this attitude increased from 1997 to 2001. The concept of a “European Government”, relatively neglected by the Croatian youth, is becoming more pronounced in the attitudes of European youth, while the understanding of the EU as a means of improving the economic situation, creating a better future for the young and creating new employment, experienced a mild decrease. The youth in Croatia and in the European Union are equally unafraid of a large bureaucracy, the loss of cultural diversity and the Utopianism of the European idea.

The comparison of the examined attitudes with the observed social attributes of youth only resulted sporadically in statistically significant differences. The most accepted attitude, the one about a better future for youth, is most accepted by pupils, compared to the employed participants ($\chi^2=33.20$), which is logical, then the participants who have finished primary school in comparison with the highly educated youth ($\chi^2=21.05$), followed by the young from Dalmatia, unlike the participants living in Zagreb and Central Croatia ($\chi^2=25.64$). The importance of the EU for creating employment is emphasized by participants with the lowest level of education compared to the highly educated ones ($\chi^2=20.61$), and the supporters of HDZ and SDP as opposed to the sympathizers of HSP ($\chi^2=25.64$), which is difficult to explain. This might be attributed to the fact that both HDZ and SDP, at least on a declaratory level, are parties that support Croatia's accession to the EU, while HSP voters, in line with their previously determined negative perception of the Union, refuse more often to admit any positive effects of the Union. The opportunity to go anywhere in the Union differentiates the young only by one observed attribute – youth from Istria and Primorje are especially accepting of it, unlike the participants from Northern Croatia ($\chi^2=25.07$). That the European Union will bring about a better

economic situation to its members is believed above averagely by the employed participants, compared to pupils ($\chi^2=18.57$) and by youth with a higher level of education, versus the participants who have only primary school education ($\chi^2=21.65$). The European Union is more often perceived as a mode of protection of citizens' rights by the non-religious participants compared to the religious ($\chi^2=18.33$), and as a dream, that is, Utopia, it is more often mentioned by HSP's supporters, in contrast to HNS or SDP voters ($\chi^2=23.44$).

A somewhat greater heterogeneity among the participants regarding the meaning of the EU was caused by their attitudes about the European Union itself. So, to improve revision, this data is offered separately in Table 27 (only the answer "yes").

Table 27: The perception of the meaning of the European Union regarding the attitudes of youth about the EU (%)

Attitudes about the EU	Better future for youth	Creating employment	Freedom of movement	Better economic situation	A lot of bureaucracy	Loss of cultural diversity	European Government	Dream, Utopia
<i>Perception of EU</i>	$\chi^2=184.8$	$\chi^2=38.93$		$\chi^2=54.14$	$\chi^2=134.99$	$\chi^2=70.4$		$\chi^2=128.08$
Negative	22.2	25.7		9.8	31.6	22.5		24.4
Neutral	51.7	44.0		19.3	11.9	10.9		9.3
Positive	70.0	47.2		30.1	4.5	4.4		1.6
<i>Year of Croatia's accession to EU</i>	$\chi^2=42.35$			$\chi^2=36.33$				$\chi^2=37.57$
2007/2008	61.3			26.3				5.8
2010	54.7			24.6				5.9
2015 or later	44.4			20.0				10.4
I do not know	49.9			14.1				14.6
Not interested	36.8			7.4				15.8
<i>Personal benefit from Croatia's accession to EU</i>	$\chi^2=204.08$	$\chi^2=99.52$	$\chi^2=25.97$	$\chi^2=21.82$	$\chi^2=124.34$	$\chi^2=45.62$	$\chi^2=21.91$	$\chi^2=116.19$
Yes	74.4	55.0	47.2	27.3	2.5	5.7	5.7	1.6
No	31.7	26.1	32.2	15.8	24.3	17.4	13.9	19.2
I do not know	55.0	45.4	40.5	21.5	11.0	8.6	9.2	6.7
TOTAL	54.5	43.1	40.5	21.8	12.4	10.3	9.7	8.8

The largest differences regarding the examined attitudes are created by the perception of potential personal gains from Croatia's accession to the European Union. The participants that believe they will benefit from Croatia's accession are more likely to believe that the EU means a better future for the young, creating employment, freedom of movement within the Union and a better economic situation, while the young who believe Croatia joining the EU will bring them no personal advantage will more often think that the EU suffers from a high level of bureaucratization, that it is simply a Utopia that will only cause a loss of cultural differences and, interestingly, the belief that the European Union means a sort of "European Government" – a supranational body making

decisions about the lives of its citizens instead of their national governments. Along with these attitudes of the participants, influence is also exerted by the youth's perception of the European Union, so that all those with a positive perception of it are more likely to assume that its existence will improve the future of youth, create new employment and improve the economic situation. In contrast to them are the participants with a negative image about the EU, so they are more likely to emphasize the high level of bureaucratization, its Utopian character and the fear of losing cultural diversity.

Regarding the young who are optimistic about the year Croatia will enter the Union, we can conclude that they more often believe it will have an influence on the improvement of the future of youth and the economic situation of its members, and the number of those thinking the EU is simply a Utopian idea is insignificant. In contrast to them are the young participants not interested in the year that Croatia will become an EU member.

Another important indicator of the attitude of Croatian citizens about the European Union is precisely the question relating to their readiness to spend a part or their entire lives in one of the EU member countries (in the case of adult participants the question was related to their readiness to accept such a decision made by their children). Table 28 offers a comparative outline of the data for the young and adult populations for the positive answer (the participants were able to choose answers “yes” and “no” for each offered statement).

Table 28: A ranking scale of attitudes about going to one of the EU countries – youth and adults (%)

Attitudes	Youth*	Adults**
Work for a while	71.2	60.6
Study, train	54.9	68.0
Start a family with a citizen of that country	23.7	20.9
Permanent residence	19.0	14.3
Spend entire working life	17.1	13.3

* The young answered about what they personally would like to do in one of the EU countries.

** The adults answered about what they would like their children to do in one of the EU countries.

The obtained results indicate that the young in Croatia are relatively ready to abandon their own country and search for better employment conditions in one of the European Union countries (more than two thirds of young people would engage in temporary work in the EU) as well as study (something every other young participant is ready for). The values linked with the more permanent forms of residence in one of the European countries are considerably lower – approximately every one out of five young participants would start a family with a citizen of one of the EU member states, as well as become a permanent resident or work their entire working lives. Compared to the interpreted data for

youth, the adult participants demonstrate a more conservative attitude towards their children leaving for one of the Union countries. They are most prepared to allow them to study or train (even more so than the young participants), somewhat less than them taking temporary employment, and they are considerably less prepared to accept marriage between their children and foreign citizens, as well as permanent residence or their children spending their entire working lives in one of the member countries of the European Union.

It is certainly interesting to confirm whether there are statistically significant differences among the young participants regarding their observed attributes. The results obtained in Table 29 relate to the answer “yes”.

The desire for temporary employment in one of the EU countries is more often expressed by the youngest participants (aged 15 to 19), unlike those in the oldest age cohort, followed by students and pupils as opposed to the employed and unemployed participants, the young that are not married and those that would go abroad forever or for a longer period of time anyway, in contrast to the participants who would not leave their own country for good. When it comes to studying or training, the most significant differences occur between participants with different attributes. This opportunity would be used less by men, the unemployed (and the most by students), those born and living in the country (unlike the young, born and living in Zagreb), youth with a vocational education (compared to the highly educated participants), the population of Central Croatia compared to those from Istria, Primorje and Zagreb, those already considering the possibility of going abroad for a longer period of time or forever, and finally, participants who are not proud of being European – in contrast to those who are proud or very proud of their European identity ($\chi^2=22.45$). Marrying a citizen of one of the EU member countries is more preferred by men, the employed compared to students, the religiously undecided and the non-religious participants, unlike the religious ones, youth with a positive perception of the EU versus those with a negative perception, and participants who would like to go abroad forever with an adequate opportunity, as well as regardless of opportunity, compared to youth who would not leave Croatia either for a long period of time or forever.

The participants who expressed a lesser desire to reside permanently in one of the EU countries are those living in major cities (while youth from small cities wish to live permanently outside of Croatia the most), then the religious participants (in contrast to the non-religious), the young with a positive perception about the EU (unlike those that harbor a negative image), the young who are satisfied with their life in general (opposite the participants who are dissatisfied with their living situation) and participants who believe that, in general, they would like to go anywhere abroad (compared to the young who would only leave for a short period of time).

Table 29: Attitudes about going to one of the EU countries regarding the attributes of youth (%)

Attributes of youth	Work for a while	Study, train	Start a family w/ a citizen of country	Permanent residence	Spend entire working life
<i>Gender</i>		$\chi^2=15.37$	$\chi^2=26.28$		
Female		59.3	18.8		
Male		50.6	28.5		
<i>Age</i>	$\chi^2=17.45$				
15 – 19 years	74.8				
20 – 24 years	73.5				
25 – 29 years	65.2				
<i>Place of birth</i>		$\chi^2=39.24$			
Village		47.2			
Small town		59.9			
Major city		57.6			
Zagreb		64.8			
<i>Place of habitat</i>		$\chi^2=38.0$		$\chi^2=22.84$	
Village		47.3		15.4	
Small town		59.2		24.3	
Major city		58.4		14.4	
Zagreb		64.3		22.1	
<i>Socio-professional status</i>	$\chi^2=26.31$	$\chi^2=119.63$	$\chi^2=20.10$		
Employed	66.1	47.9	19.2		
Unemployed	67.5	39.4	21.4		
Pupils	77.1	64.7	27.7		
Students	77.0	71.7	29.2		
<i>Education</i>		$\chi^2=101.90$			
Primary school or less		58.0			
Vocational school		32.0			
High school		58.1			
College, university or more		70.2			
<i>Regional status</i>		$\chi^2=32.69$			
Northern Croatia		50.1			
Central Croatia		42.8			
Istria and Primorje		62.6			
Eastern Croatia		53.3			
Dalmatia		54.3			
Zagreb		64.1			
<i>Religious self-identification</i>			$\chi^2=22.89$	$\chi^2=36.63$	$\chi^2=17.29$
Religious			20.9	16.0	15.1
Undecided			31.9	26.5	22.2
Not religious			30.2	30.2	24.3
<i>Perception of EU</i>			$\chi^2=38.85$	$\chi^2=21.35$	$\chi^2=18.50$
Negative			14.5	12.0	10.9
Neutral			21.2	17.5	15.6
Positive			31.5	24.0	21.5
<i>Satisfaction with one's life</i>				$\chi^2=32.29$	$\chi^2=34.63$
Satisfied				32.5	31.3
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied				21.4	19.0
Dissatisfied				15.4	13.8
<i>Going abroad</i>	$\chi^2=333.23$	$\chi^2=113.44$	$\chi^2=190.65$	$\chi^2=656.17$	$\chi^2=500.55$
Not for longer, or forever	41.1	36.9	8.3	1.8	2.9
Yes, for longer	88.4	63.6	23.3	7.9	8.5
Yes, forever	76.7	63.6	43.4	57.1	48.8
I've not thought about it	60.7	42.3	11.2	6.6	3.7
TOTAL	71.2	54.9	23.7	19.0	17.1

Finally, the non-religious participants would rather spend their entire working lives in one of the countries of the European Union, which is the opposite attitude of the religious young, the participants with a positive perception about the EU, unlike those with a negative attitude toward the European Union, as well as those who are, of course, not satisfied with their life in general, compared to the satisfied youth, and those who would go abroad forever, whether to one of the EU member countries or some other country all together.

What the distribution of answers regarding going abroad in general (not just linked with the European Union member countries) looks like, is shown in Table 30. In this regard, the possible answers made up a five degree scale, however, the degree “yes, I would go forever” is a sum of the following answers “I would go given an adequate opportunity” and “I would go forever regardless of everything”, while all the other degrees are presented in their original form.

Table 30: A comparative outline of the participants' attitudes about going abroad (%)

Attitudes about going abroad	Youth		Adults
	1999	2004	2004
I would not go for a long period of time or forever	18.1	22.5	51.4
I would not go forever, but I would go for a long period of time	39.7	39.4	20.2
I would go forever	21.3	25.9	15.3
I have not thought about it	21.0	12.2	13.1

As is visible in Table 30, almost 40% of youth would like to live and work abroad for a long period of time, and a quarter would like to leave Croatia forever. These are high percentages warning of a latently present danger of a “brain drain” of the most vital part of the population, which is extremely undesirable for small and relatively underdeveloped countries. The young today are different from the generation of youth at the end of the previous millennium, mostly by being half as likely to claim that they have not even considered going abroad. Also, the percentage of those who would go abroad forever, with an adequate opportunity or without it, has increased.¹⁰

¹⁰ Since there are no drastic differences between the expressed desire to go abroad when it comes to youth from 1999 and 2004, it is interesting to compare the same data from the research conducted in 1986 on the young population. Specifically, it was found that there “has been an increase in the degree of readiness to leave the country (...). The number of young persons who are resolved to refuse to go abroad decreased significantly” in the meantime (Štimac Radin, 2002: 250). The number of young persons who would not go abroad either temporarily or forever decreased from 33% to

On the other hand, a majority of the adult participants emphasize that they would not go abroad either for a long period of time or forever (not surprising, because they are probably more linked to Croatia than the young, due to business or family reasons), and only somewhat more than 15% believe that the idea of leaving the country forever is attractive.

The young are statistically significantly different regarding the examined attitudes in terms of several observed attributes, as is evident in Table 31.

Youth that is less prepared to leave the country (for a long period of time or forever) more often belong to the oldest age cohort, live in the country (compared to the young in Zagreb), are employed with a higher or vocational education (and both groups are presumably the ones that have managed to find adequate employment in Croatia), then those whose fathers are without qualifications, the religious participants, and those with a negative perception about the European Union and who are proud of being Croatian citizens. The greatest level of readiness for temporary residence abroad is expressed by youth from larger urban centers, students and pupils (compared to the unemployed) and youth with four years of high school (unlike those with a vocational degree), while those least prepared are the oldest participants, those whose fathers have no qualifications and the young who do not feel like Croatian citizens (which is surprising). The young who wish to live abroad forever are above averagely recruited from the ranks of the unemployed (least of all the student population) and those with a positive perception of the EU (compared to the young with a negative attitude toward the EU) and do not feel like citizens of Croatia (opposite those who are proud to be its citizens). As for those not even considering going abroad, it was shown that thinking about this increases linearly with age, urbanization of the place of residence, and the education of both the participants and their fathers. Possible emigration from the country is also dwelled upon more often by the students, the non-religious participants and those with a negative perception of the EU who are not proud of being Croatian citizens.

The tendency of more favorable circumstances of socialization to stimulate the creation of the desire to leave the country for a long period of time is evident from these indicators. It is possible that the youth here feel more capable of continuing their education abroad (especially visible with the students) or building a professional career resulting in adequate material compensation. We can, at the same time, assume that the participants are thinking of the developed

approximately 18%. An identical trend was noted in other transitional countries as well (Adnanes, 2004), which is seen as a consequence of the political liberalization of the former socialist countries and the increased aspirations to attain the material standard of the inhabitants of developed European countries.

Western countries when considering countries to live in, the majority of which are European Union countries, so the correlation between the perception of the EU and the desire to go abroad is not surprising.

Table 31: Attitudes about going abroad regarding the attributes of youth (%)

Attributes of youth	Going abroad			
	Neither for a longer time, nor forever	Yes, for a longer time	Yes, forever	I have not thought about it
<i>Age</i>	$\chi^2=41.01$			
15 – 19 years	17.9	42.3	25.0	14.8
20 – 24 years	19.5	42.3	26.6	11.5
25 – 29 years	30.2	33.4	26.2	10.3
<i>Place of habitat</i>	$\chi^2=36.30$			
Village	25.6	35.7	23.7	15.0
Small town	20.5	38.2	29.3	12.0
Major city	20.3	49.0	23.3	7.4
Zagreb	19.1	45.4	27.2	8.4
<i>Socio-professional status</i>	$\chi^2=82.32$			
Employed	27.2	35.2	25.2	12.3
Unemployed	25.5	28.4	33.5	12.6
Pupils	16.0	44.1	24.1	15.8
Students	18.5	52.5	21.6	7.4
<i>Education</i>	$\chi^2=52.99$			
Primary school or less	19.2	38.6	27.2	14.9
Vocational school	27.3	28.4	27.8	16.5
High school	20.5	45.1	24.0	10.4
College, university or more	30.4	36.1	27.4	6.1
<i>Father's education</i>	$\chi^2=41.08$			
Primary school or less	30.7	29.9	24.0	15.5
Vocational school	19.9	40.9	24.6	14.6
High school	20.2	42.0	26.6	11.2
College, university or more	21.9	42.3	28.3	7.6
<i>Religious self-identification</i>	$\chi^2=44.90$			
Religious	24.9	39.6	22.6	12.9
Undecided	14.4	39.5	34.4	11.6
Not religious	18.4	35.8	37.8	8.0
<i>Perception of the EU</i>	$\chi^2=37.01$			
Negative	33.0	38.0	19.2	9.8
Neutral	21.6	39.6	24.4	14.4
Positive	19.5	39.5	31.0	10.0
<i>Croatian citizen</i>	$\chi^2=47.43$			
Does not feel like a citizen of Cro	11.5	23.1	48.1	17.3
Not proud	17.0	39.5	33.7	9.7
Proud	24.7	40.0	22.6	12.7
TOTAL	22.5	39.4	25.9	12.2

It is also not surprising that the unemployed youth have the greatest desire to leave forever, because this step must seem to them the only way left to make a living. The finding that the highly educated youth head up those that do not wish

to live abroad either for a long period of time or forever is certainly an important finding. When these trends are adjusted according to the data that students are most willing to leave for a long period of time (but not forever), it might be suggested that providing adequate work and training opportunities for young experts in Croatia might be an efficient way of reducing the danger of a “brain drain”.

5. Concluding remarks

The citizens' relationship toward the European integration process and the European Union is a dynamic category, varying from country to country and from time to time. The changes in attitudes are affected by occurrences at the EU level, as well as processes taking place in each individual country. However, in spite of the differences and changes, there are tendencies of a more permanent character, which explain the relationship of citizens toward the processes and institutions of the united Europe. Therefore the data collected on the sample of youth and adults in Croatia at the beginning of 2004 give an insight, not only into the attitudes of that moment, which are more or less susceptible to changes, but into trends that enable us to gain scientific insights about the subject of our research.

In this analysis the relationship of the participants towards European integration and the EU was investigated through numerous indicators, with emphasis on the perception of the consequences of Croatia's accession to the European Union. However, other aspects of the relationship toward Europe and the EU, which represent a wider context for the understanding of the perception of consequences of entering Europe, were also investigated.

The results obtained demonstrate that most young and adult participants in Croatia actually had a neutral perception of the EU – even though there are more of those with a positive than a negative image – and it is logical to assume that this neutrality might be relatively easily changed under the influence of different factors. Nine out of ten participants even supported Croatia's integration into the European Union at the beginning of 2004. Among them, most were Euro-skeptics, that is, those who believe that too much is expected from accession. At the same time, the Euro-enthusiasts (expecting comprehensive benefits from accession) and Euro-realists (believing that integration is inevitable for the survival of small countries) were considerably less numerous. The domination of Euro-skeptics again warns of the instability of the relationship towards the EU, which can be influenced by different events both in the EU and in Croatia. However, in spite of the expressed skepticism, two thirds of participants expected that Croatia will be an equal member of the Union by 2010 at the latest.

The experiences of other transitional countries also demonstrated that there are numerous obstacles on the road to a united Europe. Our participants ascribed these obstacles equally to Croatia and the EU, however, the number of young participants emphasizing the EU's responsibility increased from 1999 to 2004, while the number of those stressing Croatia's responsibility decreased. Also, to determine the relationship towards European integration and Croatia's accession to the Union, the findings about the expected positive and negative consequences, once Croatia is integrated into the EU, are most important. Again, both the young and the adults expect more advantages than undesirable consequences. However, there was a mild decrease in the expectance of positive, and an increase in the expectance of negative consequences in the five year period between the two pieces of research. In spite of all these tendencies, the expectations of youth are more positive than those of the adults. The greatest positive expectations were registered on an individual and socio-cultural level, while socio-economic enthusiasm waned. Indeed, it is because of the socio-economic unpreparedness of Croatia for joining a developed European environment, that most negative consequences are expected.

An insight into the perception of the social and political consequences of Croatia's integration into the European Union was gained with the aid of a number of indicators. Thus, research into the expected development of the EU in the coming ten years demonstrated that only the opportunity for easier travel, work, study and life in Europe is something most participants expect, where this opinion is accepted by two out of three young participants. However, they are quite afraid of the costs of integration for Croatia and the worsening of the farmers' position. The adult participants expect more social problems than the young, including a higher level of unemployment. The negative consequences for their own countries are also less perceived by the young in Croatia than was the case with their counterparts in the Union. Related to the fears from the building of a united Europe and European Union, we determined that the young in Croatia are most afraid of the abolition of the Croatian currency and an increase in crime, and least afraid of the potential loss of social privileges. The adult participants, on the other hand, are consistent in demonstrating a higher level of fear in all the examined elements. The fears of the participants from the enlarged EU are somewhat different – the greatest fear is that of employment transferring to other countries, as well as an increase in crime and the drug trade, difficulties for farmers and the price their country will have to pay due to the construction of the EU. Both the young and the adult participants in Croatia are less worried about losing their national identity, language and social privileges than the Europeans.

One of the most important components of the construction of Europe and the EU is the enlargement process, although the current crisis that the European

integration process is going through, may result in an intermission in its tempo and scope. All our participants emphasize the multifaceted benefits from EU enlargement, followed by the positive influence of that enlargement on Croatia, while the efforts the Croatian authorities are putting into joining the Union were evaluated quite poorly. The adults accept all these attitudes more than the young, as well as valuing Croatia qualities more. Almost two thirds of the participants from the EU candidate countries, on the other hand, gave high marks in 2002 to all the potentially positive consequences of EU enlargement, but one quarter also demonstrated a fear of the possible increase in unemployment in their countries.

The potential accession of Croatia to the European Union will also signify a change in the way decisions are made, in the sense that some will be made at the national level, and some along with the EU. Our participants have in this regard turned out to be very prepared for integration, for most of them believe that four fifths of all the observed areas should be the subject of joint decision-making by Croatia and the EU. The only areas in which, according to the opinion of the young participants, Croatia should decide autonomously, are the acceptance of refugees, the judiciary, culture, agriculture and fisheries and the police. The European share a different opinion on this issue, and believe two thirds of the stated areas should be decided upon by their country along with the EU, while it should be autonomous in the fields of preventing juvenile crime, urban violence, then education, basic rules regarding the media, health and social care, as well as unemployment.

The perception of the potential winners and losers of Croatia's membership in the EU is especially indicative. Different social groups were, based on the perception of the young participants, structured into the potential losers from integration (e.g. farmers, retired persons, manual workers, the unemployed), potential winners of integration (such as the inhabitants of the capital and some regions, youth and all Croatian citizens), and sure winners of integration, who are also best prepared for Croatia's accession to the EU (experts, those who speak foreign languages, the political elite, managers and large companies). Indeed, it was demonstrated that the young believe the greatest winners from EU integration are those that are today in a relatively better position in Croatian terms, and those whose existing position is not invidious and who most need a better future, were seen as potentially the weakest winners. It is encouraging that the young put themselves in the group of potential winners, meaning they believe that the existing capabilities and potentials of their generation only need optimal circumstances to be fully expressed. Since people that speak foreign languages are perceived as certain winners of joining the Union, we have particularly examined this aspect of readiness for accession. The data about the knowledge of foreign languages is less than thrilling, especially compared to the knowledge of foreign languages of the young in the EU. The first position, of

course, belongs to the English language. However, unlike the European results, where the knowledge of French is next in line, in Croatia the second most common foreign language is German. The young speak both these languages more than the adult participants, while they are in a worse position regarding other foreign languages researched (Italian, French, and Russian).

In this research, we also determined that approximately three quarters of our participants are proud of the fact that they are Croatian citizens, while somewhat more than half of the young and slightly fewer adults are proud to be European. The young are those with a slightly more critical attitude towards their national identity and are especially avid in the positive validation of their Europeism. However, the most interesting finding is that all the Croatian participants feel less national pride than the population of the European Union, while it is understandable that the EU participants emphasize their pride in being European more often. The answers of the participants regarding the content of the “citizen of the European Union” indicate that neither the young nor the adults have a coherent conception of citizenship in the EU. Still, the right to work, live and study in any EU member country is the key element of understanding this citizenship, with the young in Croatia, as well as youth in the Union itself. Also, both the young and the adult participants in Croatia chose as the least important the general active suffrage, regardless of elections being held for the European Parliament, the national or the local representative bodies.

Only one out of four participants from Croatia believes they will have some personal benefits from Croatia's membership in the EU, while almost half of the young and a third of the adult participants have no defined opinion on this issue. This feeling is clearly very much linked to the issue of the personal meaning the European Union has for the participants, where neither the young nor the adults have a homogenous perception. Only one answer occurs in the majority of cases – the EU is a way of creating a better future for the young, while little support was given to the claim that the EU signifies a “European Government”, superior to the national states who are the Union's members. Unlike the youth in Croatia, those from the Union countries mostly emphasize the freedom of movement, while in time the concept of the “European Government” grew more pronounced in their attitudes. Like the Croatian youth, the young in the EU have an equal fear of Euro-bureaucracy, the loss of cultural diversity and the Utopianism of the European idea.

Intrigued by the often publicly expressed concern about the emigration of young, especially highly educated people, to other country, we deemed it necessary to explore the readiness of our participants to spend a certain period of time or their whole life abroad. According to our data, two fifths of young people would like to spend a long period of time (working and studying) abroad,

while a quarter of Croatian youth would leave forever. The desire of youth to gain certain knowledge, material wealth and experience in other countries is not in question, especially if it is taken into consideration that the young are also the most mobile and flexible segment of society. However, the information that a quarter of youth wishes to abandon this country forever (while not all of them will do so), is worrisome, seen from the point of view of human capital, which is extremely important for the survival and optimal development of a small country such as Croatia. Also, it is important to mention that the percentage of youth that would go abroad forever, with or without an adequate opportunity, increased over the five year period, which is an indicator of the unfavorable trends in the social development of Croatia. The adult participants, on the other hand, demonstrate a more conservative attitude toward the possible emigration of their children to one of the Union countries, but are still prepared to accept their studying and training in the EU, and only 14% of them would like their children to reside permanently or during their working life in one of the European Union member countries.

The analysis of the differentiation of youth regarding European integration and the EU indicated the limited influence of the social attributes used. In other words, the young are relatively homogenous in their perception of a unified Europe as well as expectations from Croatia's accession to the European Union. However, there are certain differences, and they are mostly caused by party identification, socio-professional status, regional status and religiousness. The conclusion is that the most influence is exerted on the attitudes toward the European integration process by ideological-political orientations and existing social status as well as the specifics of the wider environment. It was, hence, shown that the supporters of the left of center parties, the pupils and students, the inhabitants of more developed regions and the non-religious participants are more inclined to the EU and the integration process, and emphasize the positive consequences and potential gains from Croatia's accession to the Union more than they express their fears from the negative consequences. This also applies, although to a lesser degree, to young men, the academically educated youth, with an urban background and/or domicile, while the age related differences within the young population are inconsistent. Therefore, we can say in short that the higher social competence of youth is reflected in the formation of a stable and consistent pro-European orientation. Since this group still consists of a minority of youth, it is obvious that a great effort on the part of the advocates of integration is necessary, especially the political protagonists, to attract the majority of youth that are vacillating and, thus, susceptible to influences often opposite in nature.

Finally, two most important tendencies may be stressed, which are the result of the research data about the relationship of youth towards the European

integration process. The first indicates that the young generation in Croatia is recognized – both by themselves and by the adults – as one of the potentially greatest winners of the European integration process and, in that context, of Croatia's accession to the European Union. The second trend demonstrates that the young, in relation to the adults, consistently demonstrate a more definite pro-European orientation. Both these tendencies suggest that the potentials of youth are a resource to be taken into serious consideration on Croatia's path to the EU, and then in its adequate development in the new circumstances that will arise. Hence, along with all the other damage, which would occur by stopping the EU enlargement process, one of the undesirable consequences would also be the weakening of the motivation and Euro-optimism of youth in Croatia. This would, therefore, additionally aggravate the negative consequences, because they might be used as one of the more important motors for the development of this country, which does not seem to be going in the right direction, in more favorable circumstances – which the assured accession of Croatia to the EU would contribute to.

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KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN UNION

1. Introduction

A world without the media in today's networked and intertwined society is almost impossible to imagine. Their expansion is unstoppable and they have, almost inconspicuously, become a part of everyone's life. Along with the recent appearance of new forms of communication, the news, Internet and mobile communications seem to be gaining momentum and spreading the influence of a process that marks all that is happening in the contemporary world, whether it is for or against this process – the process of globalization.

Some simple premises that need to be given thought when discussing the media have to do with the right of citizens to complete and objective information, that is, their right to receive clear and objective information regarding political, economic and social issues pertinent to their everyday lives. It is obvious, of course, that these “purely informative” media do not exist separately, in a sort of vacuum, but have other functions as well – such as education, entertainment, etc. Aside from that, the ever stronger intertwining and integration of different types of media is the consequence of the globalization process and of the opening of markets in different countries to outside influences, so we are constantly witnesses of identical or equal contents around the globe (Ilišin, 1988; 2002; Kevin and others, 2004).

The media are also factories of their own products that have a specific effect in society, both in a cultural and political sense. The media create the content of the so-called mass culture, which would be “a culture created according to mass norms of industrial production, expanded by technical means of mass diffusion (...), addressing (...) a giant agglomeration of entities, brought together independently of the internal structures of the society” (E. Morin, according to: Ilišin, Marinović Bobinac, Radin, 2001: 16). This “opium for masses” causes the stripping of cultural values from most contents or, on the other hand, the neglect of those values in favor of simplification and fine packaging of what is being listened to, watched, read, that is, consumed. Due to the reasons mentioned, it is unrealistic to expect that there is a media system in which complete and objective information is always accessible regardless of the issue at hand.

As for media and democracy, they provide information to a system aiming to be democratic about political life, about the creation and implementation of public policies and about decision making. Here, the assumption is that the system is transparent and it allows for access to information. Aside from that, the media are expected to provide citizens with an entire spectrum of opinions and analysis regarding politics and society, along with argumentation for discussion about those issues. The media have, therefore, been dubbed by some authors “the fourth power” in the state (along with legislative, executive and judicial), because they have the role of guard dogs in the name of the public when it comes to the behavior of political institutions and protagonists (Inglis, 1997; Peruško Čulek, 1999; Kevin, 2004).

The public perception of the role and activity of the media plays an important role because it can demonstrate how much and what kind of influence they have on “the average” viewer, what he/she is interested in, in a sea of information and how that fact affects his/her opinion about a number of different issues and problems of the social life. Here, the so-called proximity law, claiming that all equal phenomena, things and events have fewer repercussions the further away they are from a specific viewpoint, should be taken into account – an individual is interested in his/her everyday life, an event that is “close”. Factors that affect the assessment of closeness are, certainly, personal interests, geographic proximity, the time of the event, psycho-social factors (for example, life, health, security and so on), and political-ideological (people are interested in beliefs close to their own), socio-professional, socio-cultural and generational factors (Bobić, 1987:15).

A special group of the population in terms of information are precisely young people. In trying to perceive how youth are informed and why, it would be useful to note that many authors believe that “mass” is wrongly identified with “passive”. To be more specific, a central part of interest of the uses and gratifications theory relates to the activity of the individual receiving information, in this case, youth. In other words, the media are used for gratifying some special human needs, firstly, the need for information, and then, education, confirmation of one's own identity, entertainment, escape from reality and so on (Ilišin, 2001). This is why it is understandable that youth, a population whose identity is still not fully formed, that is to a large degree they are still at some level of acquiring education, that place a lot of importance on entertainment and show business, and that, finally, faces the causes and consequences of social marginalization, use the media for all the purposes mentioned (Ilišin, 1988; 1999; 2002).

All of the above is true for countries in transition, such as Croatia, that face an additional challenge of incorporating the *acquis communautaire* of the European Union into its own legal, political and social system. In this context, it can be said that the media have, as the main source of information for citizens, undergone rapid changes in the way they gather and provide that information.

New or reestablished national states are at the same time caught in a dilemma between issues regarding “national interest” and issues of “public, that is, general interest”, which directly affects the role of the media as “builders of the nation”, as those that develop or stimulate the development of national identity and the role of the media as guardians of everything that has to do with the public good (Kevin, 2004).

The existing results regarding information about the European Union, its policies and institutions, state that television and the daily press are the main sources of information about those issues, while the radio lags behind, even though trust in the information heard on the radio is the highest (European Commission, 2003c). Besides, the level of use of those media was similar in countries that were, in May 2004, candidates for accession to the EU (European Commission, 2003a). In spite of any skepticism that might exist regarding the media, it could be claimed that European citizens clearly rely on the media to obtain information from political, social, cultural and other realms of life. The use of new technologies for gathering information, that is, the use of the internet, is constantly increasing in this context, but only 12-15% of citizens state that this mass media is a source of information about the EU for them. The situation regarding youth and the European Union indicates a higher use of the internet, especially in countries that were or still are in the accession process (European Commission, 2003b). Findings by the World Internet Project also indicate that internet users believe it to be a very important source of information. However, the reliability and truthfulness of the information distributed by this medium is an issue for debate and causes concern for experienced internet users in almost every country (Kevin, 2004).

In this analysis we focused on investigating the general relationship of youth toward information on social and political issues, as well as their specific attitude toward information about the European Union, its public policies, institutions and processes related to it. The goal of this research is to establish the level of knowledge and information youth have about the European Union and the European integration process. In this context we analyzed the use of specific media, the following of specific content in the media, the information about the European Union and Croatia’s accession process to this association as well as real knowledge related to the process of Croatian accession to the Union, which issues related to the EU arouse greater or lesser interest, which sources of information play a role in this and how well known some institutions of the European Union are. Within the operationalization of the research goal, the differentiation of youth in regard to the adults, as well as youth among themselves are also analyzed, in terms of their differing socio-demographic, socio-structural and socio-cultural attributes. The analysis constructed in this way is intended to answer four questions: 1) whether the young differ from adults in their level of information in general as well as in terms of information

related to the EU, specifically; 2) how much the young are interested in certain issues from political and social life and issues regarding the EU; 3) whether the young are differentiated regarding their different social attributes; 4) wherever a comparison is possible, whether the Croatian participants, specifically the young, differ from participants in former EU candidate countries and in the European Union itself. A total of 10 attributes is used for determining the possible differences within the young population: age, sex, socio-professional status, provenience, domicile, level of education of the participants and their fathers, regional status, religious self-identification and party affiliation. Aside from the stated attributes, certain analysis used the following attitudes of the participants: the perception of participant about the European Union, the perception of potential personal gain from Croatian accession to the EU, following the news on television, radio and in daily newspapers as well as the internet, following of issues related to the EU, NATO and Euro-Atlantic organizations in the media, an assessment of the participant's own knowledge about the European Union, events related to it and the process of Croatian accession to the EU, support for Croatian accession to the Union and ownership of a personal computer. A comparison based on these variables is intended to indicate which of the observed attributes influence the knowledge and level of information about the European Union and the integration process the most, at the individual level. Differences and correlations significant on a level of .0001 and less (yielded from the implementation of the χ^2 - test and variance analysis), will be interpreted. A comparative analysis is used on two levels – the first is a comparison of youth and adults, and the other compares the research conducted in Croatia in 2004 to some European research conducted in 2002 on a sample of the population older than 15 in 13 European Union candidate countries (including the countries that have just entered the European Union: Bulgaria and Romania, and one that has not yet become a member: Turkey), as well as to research conducted of the general population of the European Union in 2004 after enlargement (it should be noted that there is a relatively limited number of variables at our disposal for the latter comparative analysis).

2. Youth and information

In this section we seek to determine the basic data about information and gaining information of youth in Croatia. In this sense, the approach will be analyzed of the participants to the media in general, and following the news on television, radio, daily press and on the internet specifically, along with the frequency of tracking specific subjects from social and political life,.

In any research regarding informing, it might be most important to examine the general position of the media in the lives of the participants, that is, if they come in contact with the media and how often. This is why we have tried to

determine the reach of the most common media the participants might have encountered, and we have measured the frequency of following the news in those media with a five-degree scale (“every day”, “several times a week”, “once or twice a week”, “rarely” and “never”). In order to handle and interpret the data more easily and simply, the first two degrees were merged into a single answer “often”, and the last two into the answer “rarely or never”. The comparative data for young and adult participants in Croatia 2004 and for participants from the 13 countries that were candidates for membership in the European Union at the end of 2002 are portrayed in Table 1.

Table 1: A comparative outline of the frequency of using the media (%)

Media	Often			Sometimes			Rarely or never		
	CC 13 2002*	CRO 2004		CC 13 2002	CRO 2004		CC 13 2002	CRO 2004	
		Youth	Adults		Youth	Adults		Youth	Adults
Television	84	70.9	87.9	7	14.6	5.7	9	14.6	6.4
Daily press	41	48.5	50.5	17	21.6	16.6	43	29.9	32.9
Radio	48	47.2	59.6	9	14.0	12.0	42	38.8	28.4
Internet	–	24.0	9.8	–	13.6	5.5	–	62.3	84.7

* European Commission, 2002: 34-35

From the portrayed data it is simple to notice that the dominant position in the frequency of using the media for getting news is occupied by television as the most accessible media, but also the one demanding the least amount of engagement by its audience. The percentage of regular readers of daily newspapers and listeners to radio information broadcasts should not be neglected either, and the internet, as a new media whose accessibility is, for different reasons (more financial resources are needed, as well as knowledge) smaller, records a significantly smaller percentage of regular users.

Perhaps the most interesting results portrayed in this table have to do with the somewhat drastic differences in the use of certain media between the young participants and those older than 30. The first difference regards the frequent use of television news – almost 20% more adults claim to follow informative shows on television compared to the young. Even though the difference is not that marked, it is still present in the use of radio for gaining information; specifically, three fifths of adults and somewhat less than half of the young participants state that they often listen to news on the radio. The differences in using the internet as a news following media are more visible when the answer “rarely or never” is observed – there are 20% more adults than youth that do not use the internet to keep informed, while almost one quarter of youth use this new media frequently (compared to only a tenth of adults).

Regarding the data from those countries that were EU candidate countries in late 2002, in other words, countries that were approximately in the same

situation that Croatia is in today when it comes to accession to the European Union, it is interesting to observe that our participants (this especially relates to the adult population) are much more frequent viewers, readers and listeners of different media and information sources.

In order to check for the existence of certain statistically significant differences within the young population in Croatia in the frequency of use of the stated media, only the data presented in the previous table regarding the positive answers of the participants, were compared to the observed attributes of youth. The results of the analysis are portrayed in Table 2.

It is visible from the portrayed data that gathering information through certain media causes significant differences among the young. This is primarily true when it comes to reading daily newspapers and frequent use of the internet for news. Since television sets are an integral part of 92.8% of households in Croatia (Basic characteristics..., 2003), it is to be expected that most of the young population uses that medium as a source of information without many exceptions. The only two attributes that differentiate between the young are age (those in the oldest age cohort make up a greater part of the regular television audience unlike the youngest participants) and education (the least frequent or no use of television for news is indicated by the young with a vocational diploma, while the highly educated youth frequently watch informative content on the TV in four out of five cases). Radio news shows also do not discriminate youth that much when it comes to the observed attributes. There too the young participants differ by age – again, the older participants are often those that listen to the news on the radio, while almost every other young participant avoids the radio as a source of information; then by education: there is an even greater difference than in the case of television news shows between the most educated participants and, in this case, the young that only have primary education; and finally, by socio-professional status – the listeners of radio news are mostly employed participants, and in line with the previous data related to education, the least attention to radio news is paid by school pupils.

Most of the differences have to do with keeping informed through daily newspapers. It may be said that their faithful reader has the following characteristics: he is a man, born, raised and living in Zagreb, Split, Rijeka or Osijek (participants with rural origin are on the opposing end), studying or working (unlike the pupils and unemployed participants), has a tertiary education degree (unlike those with the lowest qualifications), living in the most developed regions in Croatia – Istria and Primorje, or Zagreb (on the other end there are participants from Eastern Croatia), votes for HNS or SDP (while those supporting HDZ are among the least regular readers of daily newspapers) and own a personal computer.

Knowledge and Information about the European Union

Table 2: Using certain media regarding the attributes of youth (%)

Attributes of youth	Television	Daily press	Radio	Internet
<i>Gender</i>		$\chi^2=33.89$		
Female		42.3		
Male		54.3		
<i>Age</i>	$\chi^2=24.23$		$\chi^2=42.97$	
15 – 19 years	66.4		39.4	
20 – 24 years	68.5		46.4	
25 – 29 years	77.7		55.9	
<i>Place of birth</i>		$\chi^2=48.96$		$\chi^2=59.38$
Village		43.4		17.7
Small town		45.9		24.4
Major city		60.4		33.8
Zagreb		58.5		33.7
<i>Place of habitat</i>		$\chi^2=53.84$		$\chi^2=51.37$
Village		42.2		18.3
Small town		47.2		24.8
Major city		58.9		29.7
Zagreb		59.8		33.4
<i>Socio-professional status</i>		$\chi^2=50.94$	$\chi^2=42.94$	$\chi^2=102.16$
Employed		52.1	52.8	19.06
Unemployed		40.1	50.2	15.6
Pupils		42.2	35.4	28.9
Students		57.3	47.7	34.4
<i>Education</i>	$\chi^2=43.94$	$\chi^2=63.39$	$\chi^2=38.39$	$\chi^2=97.72$
Primary school or less	65.7	38.5	38.9	24.1
Vocational school	64.7	44.9	49.0	11.3
High school	73.1	53.3	47.9	25.4
College, university or more	83.9	59.0	61.1	37.6
<i>Regional status</i>		$\chi^2=94.97$		$\chi^2=36.58$
Northern Croatia		43.2		19.1
Central Croatia		41.9		20.9
Istria and Primorje		62.1		26.7
Eastern Croatia		34.7		20.9
Dalmatia		51.9		23.6
Zagreb		60.1		33.6
<i>Religious self-identification</i>				$\chi^2=28.35$
Religious				22.5
Undecided				25.5
Not religious				32.7
<i>Party affiliation</i>		$\chi^2=38.57$		
HDZ		44.4		
HNS		56.8		
HSP		53.0		
HSS		46.8		
SDP		57.5		
Undecided		45.9		
<i>Owning a PC</i>		$\chi^2=48.38$		$\chi^2=377.55$
No		39.9		6.8
Yes		55.1		37.6
TOTAL	70.9	48.5	47.2	24.0

It may be roughly claimed that the most common internet “surfers” are very much like the daily newspaper readers in their attributes, except in this case the most regular visitors to the world's widest network are students and pupils (while the unemployed and employed participants, those in the world of labor,

obviously seem to have less opportunity to use new technologies to keep themselves informed), then the most educated participants (compared to the young that have graduated from a three-year vocational school), those from Zagreb (versus the young from Eastern, Northern and Central Croatia) and non-religious participants (where the young that state a high level of religious belief rarely if ever use the internet as a tool for keeping informed).

In order to deepen the insight into the manner of keeping informed, the participants were supposed to answer questions on the most common issues from social and political life that they follow in the media. The comparative data for youth and adult participant from our research and for participants from the 13 candidate countries before the enlargement of the European Union are portrayed in Table 3.

Table 3: A comparative outline of the issues from social and political life followed by the participants (%)

Issues	Often			Sometimes			Never		
	CC 13 2002*	CRO 2004		CC 13 2002	CRO 2004		CC 13 2002	CRO 2004	
		Youth	Adults		Youth	Adults		Youth	Adults
Entertainment and show business	-	64.3	34.5	-	30.4	52.0	-	5.3	13.5
Sports	34	48.8	35.3	34	36.4	39.9	33	14.8	24.8
Science and education	-	31.2	29.3	-	51.4	54.5	-	17.4	16.2
Daily chronicles	-	30.9	28.3	-	48.2	50.7	-	20.9	21.0
Culture and art	38	20.0	23.3	45	53.6	55.2	17	26.4	21.5
Economy	45	19.5	44.7	41	52.1	46.0	14	28.4	9.2
Social problems	61	18.4	44.0	31	58.6	46.6	8	23.0	9.3
Environment	38	18.3	26.2	46	58.5	56.9	19	23.2	16.9
Foreign policy	32	13.2	25.1	44	48.5	53.2	23	38.3	21.7
Local politics	37	12.8	28.7	44	48.8	52.2	19	38.4	19.1
Party and political life	48	11.4	32.6	39	52.2	50.2	14	36.4	17.2
The work of the Government, Parliament and President	-	10.9	33.4	-	47.0	49.6	-	42.1	17.0
European Union	37	10.8	19.8	45	57.6	59.0	18	31.5	21.2
NATO, other Euro-Atlantic organizations	-	5.8	10.0	-	44.8	51.1	-	49.4	38.9

* European Commission, 2002: 112

At first sight we can state that the young follow issues regarding some questions and problems from social life much more often than is the case with the political issues. The only issue that gains more than 50% of the attention of the young population has to do with news in the field of entertainment and show business. The adult participants do not pay that much attention to any of these issues, but their interests are much more equally distributed between different issues, and they follow issues from the political sphere more than twice (in the cases of the work of the Government, the Parliament and the President this goes up to three times) as much as the young. The subject that occasionally attracts the attention of about three fifths of all participants is the European Union, but

other Euro-Atlantic organizations and NATO (that are also the least interesting subjects for both the young and the adult participants) do so somewhat less.

As for the data from countries that were candidates for accession to the EU in 2002, it can roughly be said that the participants from those 13 countries were more often consumers and much more interested in all comparable issues, aside from sports, which is followed by young people in Croatia far more, and the economy, where the level of attention given by the adult participants and participants from the candidate countries is identical. The demographic data analysis from Central and Eastern Europe has indicated that men pay more attention to news about the European Union (87% compared to 77% of women). The youngest and the oldest participants pay less attention to any type of information compared to the population in EU member countries at the time. Also, the most educated follow all types of issues (91%) far more, in contrast to those who left the education system before the age of sixteen (74%) (European Commission, 2002: 113).

As we were interested in the structuring of the observed issues, factor analysis and variance analysis were conducted according to the observed attributes of the young population. The factors yielded (total variance of 55.3%) are portrayed in Table 4, and the results of the variance analysis may be found in Table 5.

Table 4: Structure of factors of issues from the social and political life in the media

Issues	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Foreign policy/international relations	.788		
European Union	.758		
Party and political life	.755	-.327	
The work of the Government, Parliament and President	.703		
Economy	.682		
Social problems	.677		
NATO and other Euro-Atlantic organizations	.669		
Local politics	.660		
Science and education	.559	.446	
Environment	.526	.522	
Entertainment and show business		.634	.394
Culture and art	.479	.515	-.410
Daily chronicles			.631
Sports			.438
<i>% common variance</i>	<i>35.6</i>	<i>11.4</i>	<i>8.3</i>

Table 5: Differences among the young in accepting the factors of issues from social and political life in the media

Attributes of youth	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
<i>Age</i>	<i>F-ratio=63.601</i>		<i>F-ratio=13.636</i>
15 – 19 years	–		+
20 – 24 years	0		0
25 – 29 years	+		–
<i>Place of habitat</i>	<i>F-ratio=8.907</i>		
Village	–		
Small town	–		
Major city	–		
Zagreb	+		
<i>Socio-professional status</i>	<i>F-ratio=32.146</i>	<i>F-ratio=12.402</i>	
Employed	0	–	
Unemployed	–	–	
Pupils	–	0	
Students	+	+	
<i>Education</i>	<i>F-ratio=36.641</i>	<i>F-ratio=24.713</i>	<i>F-ratio=6.942</i>
Primary school or less	–	–	+
Vocational school	0	–	+
High school	+	0	0
College, university or more	+	+	–
<i>Regional status</i>	<i>F-ratio=9.423</i>		<i>F-ratio=5.133</i>
Northern Croatia	0		–
Central Croatia	+		–
Istria and Primorje	–		0
Eastern Croatia	–		–
Dalmatia	–		+
Zagreb	+		–
<i>Religious self-identification</i>			<i>F-ratio=7.780</i>
Religious			+
Undecided			0
Not religious			–
<i>Party affiliation</i>	<i>F-ratio=10.819</i>		
HDZ	0		
HNS	+		
HSP	+		
HSS	–		
SDP	0		
Undecided	–		
<i>Perception of the EU</i>	<i>F-ratio=12.388</i>		
Negative	+		
Neutral	–		
Positive	+		
<i>News on TV</i>	<i>F-ratio=131.861</i>		<i>F-ratio=11.393</i>
Rarely or never	–		–
Sometimes	0		0
Often	+		+
<i>News in daily newspapers</i>	<i>F-ratio=65.211</i>	<i>F-ratio=7.871</i>	<i>F-ratio=31.40</i>
Rarely or never	–	–	–
Sometimes	0	0	0
Often	+	+	+
<i>News on the radio</i>	<i>F-ratio=37.443</i>	<i>F-ratio=9.514</i>	
Rarely or never	–	–	
Sometimes	0	+	
Often	+	+	
<i>News on the internet</i>	<i>F-ratio=16.822</i>	<i>F-ratio=36.458</i>	
Rarely or never	–	–	
Sometimes	+	0	
Often	+	+	

Legend: – below common average; 0 within common average; + above common average

The first factor yielded is labeled *interest in socio-political issues*, and it is a factor containing most subjects already determined to be rarely followed by the young, related to different forms of political activity (foreign policy, EU, NATO, political party life, the Government, the Parliament, the President of the Republic, local politics) or to controversial issues in social life, which are an integral part of the political sphere (the economy, social problems, science and education, the environment).

The young that pay an above-average amount of attention to socio-political issues are within the oldest age cohort, live in Zagreb, study, have a high school or university education, are from the Zagreb or Central Croatia regions, vote for HNS and HSP (their political body seems to be the most politically infused), have either a positive or a negative image about the European Union (both “extreme” attitudes obviously cause a greater interest in political issues, corresponding to the previous finding related to party identification), frequently watch the news on television, listen to it on the radio or read it in the newspapers and on the internet, while even occasional informing through this latter media causes an above-average interest in socio-political issues. In contrast to youth with these characteristics we have the youngest participants who live in rural areas, towns and cities, the unemployed and pupils, then the young with a primary school diploma, coming from Istria and Primorje, Dalmatia and Eastern Croatia, the non-religious youth, sympathizers of HSS or politically undecided, participants with a neutral perception of the EU, and of course, all those that rarely or never use one of the observed media.

Interest in issues from cultural life and entertainment is the label of the second factor, because it consists of just these areas of interest, with the addition of science, environmental issues and lack of interest in political and party spheres. This factor yields the least statistically significant differences according to the observed attributes and is above-averagely represented by students (compared to participants that are part of the working population), then participants with higher levels of education (unlike the youth with only primary or vocational school degrees), as well as youth that frequently read news in daily newspapers and on-line and those that occasionally or very frequently listen to radio news (compared to participants that rarely or never use those media to keep informed).

The final, third factor was labeled *interest in sports and daily chronicles*, and has to do with topics the young pay most attention to (with the addition of entertainment and show business and the lack of interest in topics regarding culture and arts), that demand the least amount of engagement when it comes to understanding and attitude creation. The characteristics of the young are quite discriminating when it comes to accepting this factor. It is above-averagely accepted by the youngest that have a primary or vocational level of education,

those that live in Dalmatia, the religious and frequent newspaper readers. On the opposing end there are highly educated participants from the oldest age cohort, from all other parts of Croatia (with the exception of Istria and Primorje), the non-religious and participants that rarely or never reach for daily newspapers.

3. Information about the European Union

Considering the fact that main topic of our research is the relationship of youth toward the EU and the European integration processes, it is logical that we were interested in how far the participants are informed about the European Union. This is why the results yielded by the following questions are portrayed and analyzed here: the general level of information of the participants regarding the EU and events pertaining to it, the more specific issue of Croatian accession to the Union, subjects linked to the policies and institutions of the European Union and the ways of gaining information regarding these topics.

Table 6 consists of a comparative portrayal of the subjective assessment given by the participants about how well informed they are about the European Union and events pertaining to it. The original answers to the question were constructed as a five-degree scale (“very good”, “mediocre”, “very little”, “not informed at all” and “I am not interested in this issue”) that was summarized in such a way that the first two original degrees now form the answer “well informed”, the third and fourth are now “poorly informed”, and the fifth kept its original form.

Table 6: A comparative outline of the self-assessed level of information about the EU and events pertaining to it (%)

Level of information about the EU	EU 25* 2004	Croatia 2004	
		Youth	Adults
Well informed	25	54.2	63.5
Poorly informed	73	37.9	30.5
Not interested in the EU	2 ¹	7.9	6.0

* European Commission, 2005: 37

Two significant things are immediately obvious: somewhat more than one half of the young participants stated that they are well informed about the European Union and events pertaining to it, compared to two thirds of the adults, thinking they are well informed. In order to put the level of information about

¹ This answer in the research of the European Commission does not pertain to “I am not interested” but to “I do not know”.

the issue in a wider context, it suffices to note the data on the population of the 25 European Union member countries, which would be expected to dispose of a better level of knowledge about the system they live in, and see that 73% of believe themselves to be poorly informed about this topic. In fact, participants in Croatia older than 30 claim that they are far more informed about the European Union, than the European population older than 15. As for the percentage of young and adult participants in Croatia stating that this topic does not interest them at all, it is relatively small, but unfortunately, we have no identical, that is, comparable data for participants from the European Union in order to contextualize it.

According to the data on the participants from 25 European Union countries, a lower level of information about the Union itself is indicated by women, older participants (it is assumed that the young come in contact with information regarding the EU during their education, while Croatia has a completely different situation, because the young have no education about the structure and processes in the EU) and the less educated participants (European Commission, 2005: 38). It will be interesting to observe if some statistically significant differences appear with the Croatian young population, according to the observed attributes, when it comes to information regarding the European Union. The results of the analysis may be found in Table 7.

Up to eight investigated characteristics of youth demonstrate differences regarding their level of information about the European Union. It can, thus, be seen that the well informed young are male from the oldest age cohort, then students (compared to the unemployed), those that have, like their fathers achieved a high degree in education, the young with a positive perception of the EU, and participants that often follow issues related to the European Union, the Euro-Atlantic organizations and NATO in the media, while, on the other side, those poorly informed are women and the youngest participants, the unemployed, and participants with a primary school education, like their fathers, participants with a neutral image about the European Union and those that never follow subjects related to the EU, NATO and other such integrations.

Participants that claim that the issues related to the European Union do not interest them at all share the following characteristics: they are female, still teenagers and go to secondary school, or have, as their fathers, finished only the primary level of education, they have a negative image about the EU and they never follow subjects related to it in the media.

Table 7: The self-assessed level of information about the EU regarding the attributes of youth and events pertaining to it (%)

Attributes of youth	Well informed	Poorly informed	Not interested
<i>Gender</i>	$\chi^2=22.50$		
Female	48.5	42.6	9.0
Male	59.7	33.4	6.9
<i>Age</i>	$\chi^2=22.86$		
15 – 19 years	49.2	39.9	10.9
20 – 24 years	53.5	39.6	6.9
25 – 29 years	60.1	34.1	5.8
<i>Socio-professional status</i>	$\chi^2=49.60$		
Employed	56.6	37.3	6.1
Unemployed	44.4	46.5	9.1
Pupils	50.5	37.4	12.1
Students	64.2	31.0	4.8
<i>Father's education</i>	$\chi^2=36.29$		
Primary school or less	43.5	47.2	9.3
Vocational school	51.4	40.7	8.0
High school	58.0	33.7	8.3
College, university or more	62.6	31.8	5.7
<i>Education</i>	$\chi^2=60.65$		
Primary school or less	48.6	39.0	12.4
Vocational school	43.3	47.3	9.3
High school	58.7	35.6	5.7
College, university or more	67.0	29.6	3.5
<i>Perception of the EU</i>	$\chi^2=101.77$		
Negative	63.3	24.0	12.7
Neutral	44.7	46.0	9.3
Positive	65.1	31.3	3.7
<i>Following the EU in the media</i>	$\chi^2=352.37$		
Never	28.4	53.2	18.4
Sometimes	61.7	35.0	3.3
Often	88.8	10.7	0.5
<i>Following NATO in the media</i>	$\chi^2=252.37$		
Never	37.5	49.1	13.3
Sometimes	67.7	29.7	2.6
Often	88.8	9.5	1.7
TOTAL	13.6	77.7	8.7

Are there participants that might not be especially interested in the European Union itself and do not wish to keep informed, but consider themselves to be well informed about the process of Croatian accession into the European Union? In order to find out the answer to this question, we have collected data portrayed in Table 8.

The participants were able to choose between four answers (“well informed”, “sufficiently informed”, “insufficiently informed” and “completely uninformed”), here summarized into two degrees “sufficiently informed” and “insufficiently

informed". The same relates to the data gathered at the general population older than 15 in 2002 in countries that were candidates for joining the EU.²

Table 8: A comparative outline of the self-assessed level of information about the process of accession of the participant's country to the EU (%)

Level of information about the accession process to the EU	CC 13* 2002	Croatia 2004	
		Youth	Adults
Sufficiently informed	28	44.0	48.9
Insufficiently informed	70	56.0	51.0

* European Commission, 2002: 126

The results of young and adult participants when it comes to this question indicate somewhat different trends than the results on the level of information regarding the European Union itself, where the self-assessment of the level of information was much higher. Even in this case the young are somewhat less informed than the adult participants, where satisfaction with their level of information was expressed by 44% of the young participants.

In comparison, almost a half of the adult participants are satisfied with their level of information about the process of Croatian accession to the EU. However, we believe that this result is not very good and that the institutions in charge of providing information to the public about the European Union, its institutions and policies as well as Croatia's accession process, might need to devote more attention to just these issues, because it is obvious that the Croatian population, especially the young, is in need of such information.

By comparing the data on participants in Croatia and the former EU candidate countries, it is easy to conclude that the participants from our research assess their level of information as much higher than the population of the candidate countries in 2002. Specifically, only one quarter of them believed they were well informed about the accession process of their countries to the European Union. The demographic analysis of their results indicated that one third of the men were confident enough to claim to be well informed, unlike only one fifth of women. Also, the level of information in candidate countries increased dramatically with the increase in the participants' education level. (European Commission, 2002: 127).

We were again interested in whether there were significant differences related to the level of information about the process of Croatia's accession to the

² Note: the European Commission data relate to the accession processes of each of the countries that were candidates for joining the European Union in 2002.

European Union regarding the observed characteristics of the young population. The results obtained may be seen in Table 9.

Table 9: The self-assessed level of information about Croatia's accession to the EU regarding the attributes of youth (%)

Attributes of youth	Sufficiently informed	Insufficiently informed
<i>Gender</i>	$\chi^2=32.19$	
Female	37.6	62.4
Male	50.2	49.8
<i>Place of birth</i>	$\chi^2=19.94$	
Village	40.3	59.7
Small town	44.2	55.8
Major city	57.0	43.0
Zagreb	44.8	55.2
<i>Place of habitat</i>	$\chi^2=22.92$	
Village	40.5	59.5
Small town	42.5	57.5
Major city	58.2	41.8
Zagreb	47.3	52.7
<i>Socio-professional status</i>	$\chi^2=19.28$	
Employed	44.0	56.0
Unemployed	37.6	62.4
Pupils	42.3	57.7
Students	52.4	47.6
<i>Education</i>	$\chi^2=30.70$	
Primary school or less	40.3	59.7
Vocational school	35.4	64.6
High school	46.4	53.6
College, university or more	56.8	43.2
<i>Perception of the EU</i>	$\chi^2=52.88$	
Negative	47.5	52.5
Neutral	36.4	63.6
Positive	54.0	46.0
TOTAL	56.0	44.0

In the case of the level of information the young have about Croatia's accession to the EU, those that think they are well informed are mostly male

born, raised and living in a large city, students or highly educated, and have a positive image about the European Union.

Unlike them, the young stating they are insufficiently informed about Croatia's accession to the Union share the following attributes: they are female, born, raised and currently living in rural areas, they are unemployed with a vocation qualification, and they have a neutral perception about the European Union.

Considering our belief that it is necessary to determine individually the areas, problems and issues related to the European Union that the participants want to know more about, we asked a question about those issues where participants could choose a maximum of three items that interest them the most. Table 10 holds the results obtained for the young and adult populations in Croatia, as well as data for participants from countries that were candidates for entrance into the European Union in 2002.

Table 10: A comparative outline of the issues related to EU, that the participants want more information about (%)

Issues related to EU	CC 13* 2002	Croatia 2004	
		Youth	Adults
Youth policy	61	56.0	28.7
Education policy	57	24.9	17.2
EU economy in general	53	24.4	47.0
Social policy	52	21.8	39.2
Environment	47	17.6	11.9
Consumer protection	47	17.5	20.8
Euro	54	16.8	10.8
Common European market	46	13.5	12.7
European citizenship	54	12.0	6.3
Agriculture	–	12.0	21.6
EU enlargement	47	9.5	7.6
Cultural policy	48	8.6	6.1
EU international relations	–	8.4	8.2
Common foreign and security policy	46	7.2	10.9
Regional policy	53	6.7	9.5
European budget	–	5.6	4.7

* European Commission, 2002: 114

The finding that Croatian youth is most interested in European policies directed toward the young is not surprising, because most of them are still of an age when they might hope these particular policies might include them, under

the assumption that Croatia joins the European Union within a reasonable number of years (five to ten). However, unlike this, the area mentioned most often, all other issues offered enticed a relatively small amount of attention from the young participants. One quarter of them wish to find out more about education policies (again, a finding that is not surprising) and about the European economy in general. Aside from social policies, all other issues spark the interest of less than one fifth of the young participants.

Opposed to this, the adult participants are much more interested in the economy of the European Union, then in social policy (this interest is also stimulated by the specific situation the adults are in – the need for better employment, quality of life, retirement, health and social care, and so on), followed by the interest in youth policies (it might be assumed that this is important to all that have children). Aside from this, one of five adult participants indicates an interest in consumer protection, agricultural problems and education policy. The least interest of the adult participants is shown in the issues of European citizenship, cultural policy and the European budget.

Considering that the way the question was asked in the research conducted in the candidate countries in 2002 is not identical to the manner we used in our research, a direct comparison of the data is not possible, but they can be generally analyzed to some extent. The first four issues are, thus, identical to the order we had seen with the young participants in Croatia, indicating that the opinions of the Croatian youth is in line with some general European trends. With the exclusion of this finding, the participants from the former candidate countries gave a higher position to issues related to the euro, European citizenship and regional policies, all of which vary from our research. We did not have data on the issues of agriculture, European Union international relations and the European budget, so any comparison in those areas is impossible.

The analysis of the obtained data considering the observed attributes of the young population indicates that in some cases the statistically significant differences are randomly distributed. Thus, youth policies more often interest the youngest participants ($\chi^2=63.77$), pupils ($\chi^2=45.26$), those with a primary school or vocational degree diploma ($\chi^2=36.36$), and all those that never follow news related to party and political life ($\chi^2=18.05$), social policy ($\chi^2=16.00$), economy ($\chi^2=39.78$), foreign policy and international relations ($\chi^2=15.31$), local politics ($\chi^2=23.76$), the work of the Government, the Parliament and the President ($\chi^2=26.88$), and often follow news related to entertainment and celebrity lives ($\chi^2=31.72$). Knowing more about the education policy in the European Union is a wish expressed by young women ($\chi^2=52.23$), pupils and students ($\chi^2=37.75$), participants with primary or higher levels of education – obviously interested in continuing or supplementing their existing education ($\chi^2=27.71$), all those that

often follow news from the world of science and education ($\chi^2=113.97$), culture ($\chi^2=50.30$), social policy ($\chi^2=22.03$) and news about the European Union ($\chi^2=16.71$). The economy of the European Union is interesting to the oldest age cohort of youth ($\chi^2=44.36$), the employed ($\chi^2=34.60$), the young that often follow news from party and political life ($\chi^2=63.91$), social policy ($\chi^2=28.31$), economy ($\chi^2=174.42$), foreign policy and international relations ($\chi^2=55.22$), local politics ($\chi^2=40.62$), European Union ($\chi^2=39.86$), the work of the Government, the Parliament and the President of the Republic ($\chi^2=54.50$) as well as NATO and other Euro-Atlantic organizations ($\chi^2=30.84$). Interest in the social politics of the EU is shown more often by youth from the oldest age cohort ($\chi^2=15.48$), and those living in Zagreb or some other big city ($\chi^2=19.81$) and, of course those that are usually more interested in issues related to social policy in the media ($\chi^2=77.64$). The youngest participants ($\chi^2=22.16$) and pupils ($\chi^2=22.72$) – probably because those issues are usually tackled in school – and those that have finished primary school ($\chi^2=24.32$) and, logically, young that usually follow the environmental issues in the media ($\chi^2=58.16$), would all like to know more about issues related to the European Union and the environment. Issues regarding the euro is more interesting to men ($\chi^2=24.17$) from Dalmatia ($\chi^2=22.34$). The problems of agriculture in the European Union is something that the oldest cohort of youth wants to know more about ($\chi^2=15.47$), as well as those born, raised ($\chi^2=66.69$) and living in rural areas ($\chi^2=50.72$), with a vocational school diploma ($\chi^2=19.65$) and HSS supporters ($\chi^2=59.99$) and youth that often follow issues related to economy in the media ($\chi^2=49.05$).

The following part is focused on sources of information through which Croatian citizens gather information on the European Union, its policies and institutions. Table 11 consists of five answers offered to the participants and one (answer “other”) consisting of answers “specialized information offices of the state government”, “contact with members of Parliament”, “political gatherings”, “state institutions”, “labor unions”, “professional associations” and “something else” – thus, all the sources of information that young people use less than 5% of the time. Along with that, the percentages for answer “yes” were given for participants from the enlarged European Union, however the answer “nongovernmental organizations” was not offered to them, and the answer “other” is a summary of the following answers that were offered: “other press”, “meetings” and “something else”.

Certainly, regarding the previous results, it is not a surprise that most participants both in the countries of the European Union and in Croatia receive information about the EU through the electronic media and the press. Here, the adult participants in Croatia use that very source of information to in a high percentage. Second place is taken by discussions and conversations with relatives, friends and colleagues both with the adult and the young participants,

as the mode through which they find out new information related to EU policies and institutions. Even here the young use the Internet more than twice as often as the adult participants in order to find out information about the European Union. Books, brochures and flyers are used by one out of five young and 15% of adult participants – this being the most common way of giving information about some of the more complex issues related to the EU used by the former Ministry for European Integration, that is by the existing Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration. Considering we do not have information about the level of data dissemination that the Ministry wants to achieve through its publications for citizens, we cannot claim to know if their proclaimed goal has or has not been achieved. Finally, the only remaining answer chosen by more than 5% of all participants relates to gathering information through civil society activities, that is, the actions of nongovernmental organizations. Considering this sector is relatively new in Croatian society, the percentage of effectiveness it has achieved, at least regarding the issues related to policies and institutions of the European Union, is by no means insignificant.

Table 11: A comparative outline of the sources of information about the EU, its policies and institutions (%)

Sources of information about the EU	EU 25* 2004	Croatia 2004	
		Youth	Adults
The media (press, television, radio)	77	91.7	95.0
Discussions with relatives, friends and colleagues	23	50.0	48.0
Internet, World Wide Web	21	29.1	13.1
Books, brochures, informative flyers	16	18.8	15.5
Non-governmental organizations	–	7.3	6.5
Other	9	20.6	28.4

* European Commission, 2005: 51

A comparison with participants older than 15 years from EU member countries indicates that Croatian citizens are more likely to use all the sources of information offered than the European population. This might be explained by the fact that Croatia is currently “bombarded” by a variety of information related to the EU due to its membership aspirations, while countries in the EU do not find this a number one political priority. Along side this, citizens of the European Union who use these sources more are mostly men (except for discussions with family and friends), adult participants are more regular users of the electronic media and the press, while the young tend to rely more on conversation, and especially the internet as the source of information. The highly educated use more of all these sources compared to participants with a lower

level of education, and finally, participants that claim to know a lot or enough about the European Union use every source mentioned more than the participants claiming to know little or nothing (European Commission, 2005: 52).

We wished to determine if there are some statistically significant differences in the manner of gaining information about the European Union, its policies and institutions, regarding the observed attributes of the young population in Croatia. The results of this analysis may be found in table 12, and it needs to be mentioned that the category “other” was omitted here, as a summary of the answers offered that were too heterogeneous to allow analysis. The results obtained through this analysis do not differ from the data available on the citizens of the European Union. Indeed, it is interesting that gaining informed through the electronic media and the press causes differences only regarding the general perception about the EU (the young with a positive general image of the EU follow the offered sources more than those with a negative perception), about following EU related issues in the media, which is logical (those that are informed about such subjects will more often use this source of information as well), and about the general estimate of one's own level of information about the Union (the well informed, as is the case in the European Union research as well, use this source of information more often than those not interested in the subject matter). Regarding discussions and conversations with those who are nearest and dearest, it is obvious that this mode of gathering information is used more often by participants born, raised and living in Zagreb (compared to the young from rural areas), students (unlike the unemployed and the pupils), young people with four years of high school or university education, those sympathizing with HSP, versus the HSS voters, participants that do not harbor a neutral image of the EU and, just like with the previous source, the young that believe themselves to be well informed and usually follow issues related the EU in the media.

The use of the internet for gathering information about the Union causes the most significant differences regarding the observed attributes of youth. Hence, it is most commonly used by men, who were born, raised and live in large cities (unlike the participants from rural areas), students compared to the unemployed, the highly educated versus those with a vocational degree, the young from the Zagreb region, unlike those from Central Croatia, participants that usually watch news related to the EU in the media, and those considering themselves to be well informed about the subject at hand. Books, brochures and flyers are generally more commonly used by women, students or persons with a higher level of education, the well informed participants and those that often follow issues related to the EU in the media.

Table 12: sources of information about the EU, its policies and institutions s regarding the attributes of youth (%)

Attributes of youth	Media	Relatives and friends	Internet, www	Books, brochures	NGOs
<i>Gender</i>			$\chi^2=16.40$	$\chi^2=12.53$	
Female			24.9	21.9	
Male			33.1	15.7	
<i>Place of birth</i>		$\chi^2=26.85$	$\chi^2=27.48$		
Village		44.9	23.5		
Small town		50.0	30.6		
Major city		54.0	36.9		
Zagreb		61.7	36.2		
<i>Place of habitat</i>		$\chi^2=21.17$	$\chi^2=30.75$		
Village		44.8	23.5		
Small town		50.9	29.8		
Major city		54.2	38.6		
Zagreb		58.6	36.3		
<i>Socio-professional status</i>		$\chi^2=38.76$	$\chi^2=62.01$	$\chi^2=30.96$	
Employed		50.6	26.7	16.5	
Unemployed		43.6	16.9	12.7	
Pupils		43.6	33.8	20.4	
Students		62.1	40.2	26.9	
<i>Education</i>		$\chi^2=25.99$	$\chi^2=74.96$	$\chi^2=35.34$	$\chi^2=21.45$
Primary school or less		43.0	28.1	18.6	4.5
Vocational school		44.9	12.8	8.5	4.5
High school		55.7	32.4	21.1	8.8
College, university or more		52.2	44.1	26.1	12.2
<i>Regional status</i>			$\chi^2=22.34$		
Northern Croatia			29.6		
Central Croatia			20.6		
Istria and Primorje			34.0		
Eastern Croatia			24.9		
Dalmatia			26.8		
Zagreb			36.5		
<i>Religious self-identification</i>					$\chi^2=19.73$
Religious					6.0
Undecided					8.4
Not religious					14.4
<i>Party affiliation</i>		$\chi^2=27.51$			
HDZ*		49.8			
HNS		57.6			
HSP		58.2			
HSS		36.2			
SDP		57.5			
Undecided		44.7			
<i>Perception of the EU</i>	$\chi^2=27.29$	$\chi^2=21.36$			
Negative	87.7	55.4			
Neutral	89.8	44.8			
Positive	96.0	55.1			
<i>Following the EU in the media</i>	$\chi^2=105.06$	$\chi^2=115.75$	$\chi^2=118.92$	$\chi^2=96.77$	$\chi^2=58.91$
Never	82.3	34.5	14.7	9.9	2.9
Sometimes	95.8	54.8	33.0	19.6	7.7
Often	97.2	72.9	50.7	40.2	18.7
<i>Level of information about EU</i>	$\chi^2=155.93$	$\chi^2=95.88$	$\chi^2=101.72$	$\chi^2=50.47$	$\chi^2=32.52$
Well informed	97.4	59.3	38.3	24.1	10.2
Poorly informed	88.1	41.8	19.8	13.8	4.5
Not interested	70.1	25.3	10.8	5.7	0.6
TOTAL	91.7	50.0	29.1	18.8	7.3

And, finally, non-governmental organizations are sources of information about the European Union for the young that are highly educated, non-religious, and also relatively avid as an audience when it comes to EU related issues in the media, and consider themselves to be well informed about that subject. Based on the stated findings, we might only conclude that there are no large differences regarding the young participants in Croatia and the citizens of the European Union when it comes to the form of gathering information about policies and institutions of the EU.

4. Knowledge about the European Union

We determined previously what the participants' level of information looks like regarding Croatian accession to the European Union based on a personal estimate. In other words, this was a subjective measurement of the level of information a participant has about the process of Croatian accession to the EU. Table 13, on the other hand, portrays a comparative outline of their objective knowledge, based on specific questions regarding Croatia's accession process to the European Union. Specifically, this research was conducted in early 2004, before Croatia became a candidate for accession to the European Union. After the primary analysis of the results obtained, data in the form of a three level scale will be used further on in this text: "correct answer", "incorrect answer" and "I do not know".

Table 13: Knowledge about Croatia's accession to the EU – youth and adults (%)

Participants' knowledge		Youth	Adults
Correct answer	Croatia submitted an application for full EU membership	32.6	35.6
Incorrect answer	Croatia is an EU membership candidate	22.4	20.3
	Croatia is negotiating its membership in the EU	25.6	28.0
	Croatia is a member of the EU	1.0	1.1
I do not know		18.4	15.0

Observing the obtained results, the level of knowledge, or lack of it, regarding this initial aspect related to Croatia's relationship with the European Union, is somewhat cumbersome. This is especially the case given that the research was conducted at the peak of strong media coverage of this issue, since Croatia had just submitted the *avis* to the European Commission, whose response was then awaited for several months. Namely, the general conclusion might be that about one third of the young and somewhat more of the adult participants knew the answer to the question, while two out of three participants

did not. It would be interesting to question the citizens again to determine if their level of knowledge has increased in the meantime.

In order to determine the attributes of the young that knew, were wrong or did not know the correct answer, an analysis regarding the observed characteristics of the young population was conducted, and the collective data is portrayed in Table 14.

Based on this analysis, it might be claimed that the young that offered a correct answer to the question about Croatia's accession to the EU had the following common attributes: they were male, living in Zagreb (compared to participants from rural parts of Croatia), are studying (versus the young that are still pupils) or have already obtained a higher education degree (in comparison to youth with a three-year vocational degree), are from the Zagreb region (unlike the young from Eastern Croatia), follow the news on television, in daily papers and on the internet, often use all the media to gain information about European Union related issues, have a positive image about the EU, believe themselves to be well informed about Croatia's accession to the Union, and support Croatia in joining the Union, because they believe it to be inevitable.

On the opposite side are the participants that answered our question incorrectly. They are more often men living in one of the three large cities, they are also pupils or are employed, with three years of high school education, living in Central and Eastern Croatia, often watching news on television, and occasionally reading it in a daily newspaper and on the internet, all the while supporting the process of Croatian accession to the EU because they believe Croatia will greatly benefit from it. In terms of all the other observed attributes, these participants do not differ from the young that answered the question correctly. As well as this, there are differences regarding those immediately claiming they do not know the correct answer. They are young women, living in rural areas, unemployed or pupils, they are also persons with a vocational education degree, from Northern and Eastern Croatia, persons that rarely or never watch the news on television, the daily newspapers or the internet, so their level of common knowledge is relatively low, the young that neither have a positive nor a negative perception about the EU, participants that never follow issues related to the EU, NATO or the Euro-Atlantic organizations in the media, the young stating that they are otherwise insufficiently informed about the process of Croatian accession to the European Union and, finally, the participants that do not support Croatia in joining the Union.

Table 14: Knowledge about Croatia's accession to the EU regarding the attributes of youth (%)

Attributes of youth	Correct answer	Incorrect answer	I do not know
<i>Gender</i>	$\chi^2=22.72$		
Female	46.0	31.4	22.6
Male	51.7	33.9	14.4
<i>Place of habitat</i>	$\chi^2=46.67$		
Village	49.1	27.5	23.4
Small town	49.3	33.2	17.5
Major city	50.8	35.7	13.6
Zagreb	46.6	43.1	10.3
<i>Socio-professional status</i>	$\chi^2=33.87$		
Employed	49.5	33.1	17.4
Unemployed	47.6	29.0	23.4
Pupils	49.9	27.6	22.5
Students	48.2	41.0	10.8
<i>Education</i>	$\chi^2=61.21$		
Primary school or less	48.4	27.4	24.2
Vocational school	51.0	23.6	25.4
High school	49.3	36.7	14.1
College, university or more	45.6	43.4	11.0
<i>Regional status</i>	$\chi^2=52.81$		
Northern Croatia	47.1	29.7	23.1
Central Croatia	56.6	25.4	17.9
Istria and Primorje	47.5	34.7	17.8
Eastern Croatia	52.5	24.5	23.0
Dalmatia	47.1	36.6	16.4
Zagreb	46.7	43.0	10.3
<i>News on TV</i>	$\chi^2=74.58$		
Rarely or never	44.1	24.1	31.7
Sometimes	45.4	26.8	27.8
Often	50.6	35.6	13.8
<i>News in daily newspapers</i>	$\chi^2=111.12$		
Rarely or never	47.3	22.9	29.8
Sometimes	51.5	28.5	20.0
Often	48.8	40.4	10.8
<i>News on the internet</i>	$\chi^2=37.77$		
Rarely or never	47.4	30.1	22.4
Sometimes	52.8	34.1	13.1
Often	50.7	38.2	11.1
<i>Perception of the EU</i>	$\chi^2=49.95$		
Negative	48.7	32.0	19.3
Neutral	45.9	30.4	23.7
Positive	53.6	36.3	10.1
<i>Following the EU in the media</i>	$\chi^2=126.62$		
Never	44.1	24.4	31.6
Sometimes	50.0	35.8	14.2
Often	56.5	41.1	2.3
<i>Level of information about Croatian accession to the EU</i>	$\chi^2=125.05$		
Sufficiently informed	52.5	39.8	7.8
Insufficiently informed	46.1	27.1	26.8
<i>Support for Croatian accession to EU</i>	$\chi^2=30.06$		
Yes, high benefits	51.9	31.4	16.7
Yes, inevitable	51.0	38.6	10.4
Yes, but expectations are too high	48.1	32.1	19.9
No	44.1	29.1	26.7
TOTAL	49.0	32.6	18.4

Along with the previous question regarding the participants' knowledge about Croatia's accession process to the European Union, we have researched whether participants were familiar with the existence of some of the main institutions of the EU. The offered answers were dichotomous: "yes" and "no". Comparative data for young and adult participants from our research and for participants from the 25 EU member countries, for the answer "yes, are available in Table 15.

Table 15: A comparative outline of the familiarity of some EU institutions (%)

Institutions	EU 25* 2004	Croatia 2004	
		Youth	Adults
European Parliament	92	84.7	87.3
European Commission	82	65.9	72.8
Council of Ministers of the European Union	66	64.3	74.4
European Central Bank	71	52.7	63.0
Court of Justice of European Communities	75	30.2	43.0
European Union Board of Regions	28	18.5	25.7

* European Commission, 2005: 106

As in Europe, the best known institution in Croatia, regardless of the participants' age, is the one whose function is to protect the citizens from the so-called democratic deficit of the European Union – the European Parliament. The second best known institution, but probably the first when it comes to the scope of different issues regarding the European Union, the European Commission, caused a reaction with two thirds of the young, and somewhat more of the adult participants, while in Europe four out of five participants are familiar with this institution. The Council of Ministers is similarly familiar to the Croatian young population and to the participants from the EU, while the adult participants seem to recognize this institution a little more often. The European Central Bank is the last of the stated institutions whose familiarity with the young, as well as with the adult participants in Croatia, is more than 50%, with almost two out of three adult participants claiming they are familiar with this institution. The greatest discrepancy appears between the researched population of young and adult citizens in Croatia, and participants from the EU, regarding familiarity with the Court of Justice of the European Communities. The cause could most probably be found in the more frequent number of encounters with the decisions of that court by the citizens of the European Union. The Board of Regions is relatively poorly known to all three of the investigated populations, even though, with its contribution to the structural, cohesion policy of the European Union, it is a very influential and important institution.

Knowledge and Information about the European Union

In order to determine if there are differences regarding the characteristics of the young claiming to know of these institutions, we analyzed their answers according to the observed attributes, and the findings may be found in Table 16.

Table 16: Familiarity of some EU institutions regarding the attributes of youth (%)

Attributes of youth	EU Parliament	EU Commission	Council of Ministers	Central Bank	Court of Justice	Board of Regions
<i>Gender</i>		$\chi^2=14.72$			$\chi^2=12.57$	
Female		61.8			26.5	
Male		69.9			33.8	
<i>Age</i>		$\chi^2=55.63$	$\chi^2=19.40$	$\chi^2=25.01$		
15 – 19 years		57.0	59.7	45.4		
20 – 24 years		64.5	62.4	53.8		
25 – 29 years		76.3	70.8	59.0		
<i>Socio-professional status</i>	$\chi^2=20.71$	$\chi^2=23.21$		$\chi^2=29.82$		
Employed	86.4	67.8		56.9		
Unemployed	80.5	66.1		47.8		
Pupils	81.1	57.2		44.4		
Students	89.9	71.9		59.7		
<i>Education</i>	$\chi^2=26.58$	$\chi^2=37.05$	$\chi^2=19.65$	$\chi^2=24.73$		
Primary school or less	79.9	57.8	58.4	44.7		
Vocational school	80.7	62.8	60.6	51.6		
High school	87.8	68.9	67.4	56.0		
College, university or more	90.7	78.5	71.9	61.4		
<i>Regional status</i>		$\chi^2=22.92$		$\chi^2=29.38$		$\chi^2=29.34$
Northern Croatia		66.2		50.9		17.6
Central Croatia		63.0		57.6		19.7
Istria and Primorje		72.4		65.8		29.2
Eastern Croatia		60.7		44.5		15.5
Dalmatia		61.1		52.5		20.2
Zagreb		73.5		52.9		12.9
<i>Perception of the EU</i>			$\chi^2=26.81$			
Negative			65.8			
Neutral			59.4			
Positive			71.6			
<i>Following the EU in the media</i>	$\chi^2=49.66$	$\chi^2=62.53$	$\chi^2=46.06$	$\chi^2=45.99$	$\chi^2=30.21$	$\chi^2=26.95$
Never	76.7	55.7	55.9	43.1	23.5	14.0
Sometimes	87.8	68.5	66.1	54.9	31.6	18.8
Often	92.5	83.6	80.8	68.2	42.7	29.9
<i>Following NATO in the media</i>	$\chi^2=27.21$	$\chi^2=54.70$	$\chi^2=50.41$	$\chi^2=39.66$	$\chi^2=30.74$	$\chi^2=18.26$
Never	80.7	59.2	58.0	46.2	24.9	15.3
Sometimes	88.7	70.6	68.6	57.4	34.3	20.6
Often	91.4	88.7	87.1	70.7	44.3	29.3
TOTAL	84.7	65.9	64.3	52.7	30.2	18.5

Familiarity with the European Commission and the European Central Bank cause most of the statistically significant differences. On the other hand, the European Parliament is most familiar to the students (compared to pupils and the unemployed), that is the highly educated participants (as opposed to young with a basic primary school education) and the young that often watch EU, as well as

NATO and Euro-Atlantic organization-related issues in the media, ($\chi^2=27.21$). In their better recognition of the European Commission as an EU institution, the young with the following attributes are distinguished: men from the oldest age cohort, students (compared to pupils) and the highly educated participants (unlike those with a primary school diploma), the young from Zagreb, Istria and Primorje (as opposed to those from Dalmatia and Eastern Croatia) and, finally, the young that often follow issues related to the EU, NATO and other similar integrations in the media ($\chi^2=54.70$). The Council of Ministers of the European Union was recognized the most by the oldest participants with a higher education institution diploma, those with a positive image of the EU (in comparison to participants with a neutral perception of it) and the young that often follow issues related to the EU, NATO and other such organizations ($\chi^2=50.41$). The European Central Bank was most familiar to the oldest participants, the students and the highly educated youth from Istria and Primorje (compared to youth from Eastern Croatia) and the young that, as was the case with previously mentioned institutions, follow related issues in the media ($\chi^2=39.66$). The young that have more often than others heard of the Court of Justice of the European Communities are mostly male, showing an above average interest in these subjects in the media ($\chi^2=30.74$). The Board of Regions of the European Union, as the least well known institution out of the six used in the research, was most often recognized by youth in Istria and Primorje (not surprising, given that Istria is one of the European regions in Croatia), and least often in Zagreb (a surprising piece of data, that is difficult to interpret), and, of course, all the participants that follow EU, NATO and Euro-Atlantic organization-related issues in the media more often ($\chi^2=18.26$). To summarize, the young at a higher socio-professional, socio-economic and educational levels seem to be the ones with a greater knowledge about the institutions of the European Union.

5. Concluding remarks

The level of information of citizens about important social, cultural and political issues is important for any society, including Croatia. In our case, it is specifically linked to the problem of being informed about the European Union, its structure and processes and Croatia's position in that context. Since joining the European Union was set as Croatia's political priority, achieving an almost complete consensus of all the relevant political protagonists on the Croatian social scene, it is not irrelevant to see how well Croatian citizens are informed about important facts and how they assess their interest in these issues.

When it comes to gaining information and being informed, the results from the Croatian youth indicate that they often follows news in every media, but lag

behind both the adult participants and participants from the former EU candidate countries. This finding does not apply to the use of the internet as a source of information, where the young are far ahead of the adult population, and given the data from the introduction, ahead of the inhabitants of the European Union today. However, the young differ among each other mostly in their use of internet and their reading of daily newspapers, with the socially more qualified young people (more educated, coming from an urban background and richer regions, and older on average) being the ones to use both these media to keep informed.

Regarding the content the participants follow in the media, it is visible that the young are much more interested in events from social and cultural life, and a lot less interested in subjects with political connotations. The adult participants follow almost equally all subjects from social, political and cultural life, and are much more interested in those with a political character. A comparison with participants from 13 EU candidate countries indicates that they are far more interested in all the issues in question (aside from sports) than the Croatian participants. A deeper analysis of following the content offered, yielded three factors labeled interest in socio-political issues, interest in issues from culture and entertainment and interest in sports and daily chronicles. The young following issues comprising the first factor, are mostly among the socially and culturally more competent ones, the second group of subjects is followed by about the same profile of youth (with less pronounced differences regarding the observed attributes), and the third group of contents is what interests the young with a lower level of education that are religious and live in Dalmatia.

The second group of subjects this analysis deals with is information and interests related to the European Union. In the case of the personal estimate about the level of information about the EU, somewhat more than a half of youth claims that they are well informed about the European Union and events regarding it, in comparison to two third of adult participants who believe they are well informed. On the other hand, the results from both the young and the adult participants are surprisingly high compared to data about the level of information of the population in the 25 countries of the European Union, where 73% participants claim to be poorly informed about the issue. As for differences among the young, the most informed, in their own opinion, are men, from the oldest age cohort, students and highly educated participants, the young with a positive perception of the European Union, and those that usually follow issues related to it.

A narrowly linked question to the one about the level of information about the European Union, was a question about the general level of information about Croatia's accession to that association. The results indicate a somewhat different

trend than the previous results. In this case, 44% of the young, unlike almost half of the adult population, believe they are well informed about the process. It is surprising, though, that the identically gathered information from the former EU candidate countries revealed a much lower assessment when it comes to the level of information about this issue. The young in Croatia that believe themselves to be well informed are mostly male, coming from large cities, studying for or have received a higher education degree, and have a positive perception about the EU.

Regarding issues and problems related to the EU the participants wish to know more about, the results indicate that both the young in Croatia and the participants from the former candidate countries find the issues related to youth and education policies of the EU to be the most interesting, followed by economy and social policies. On the other hand, the adult participants seem to be far more interested in the last two subjects. Along with that, the issues related to EU enlargement, cultural policy, international relations, regional policy and the EU budget are the least interesting to the young population. The differences among them are mostly randomly distributed regarding all these subjects linked to the EU.

The ways of gathering information about the European Union and the previously mentioned contents primarily consist of the mass media (the press, television and radio), followed by other forms of gathering information such as discussions with friends and family, surfing the internet, specialized books and other published materials, as well as the activities of non-governmental organizations. Use of these sources shows no great differences between the young and the adult participants, except in the case of internet use, as was determined previously. Regarding the participants from the 25 EU member countries, they state all the mentioned sources as a way of keeping informed about the European Union, its policies and institutions, to a smaller degree.

The final part of this text consists of some control questions, linked to the objective knowledge of the participants about specific issues related to the European Union. Thus, the question about where Croatia was in its accession process to the EU at the moment the research was conducted, actually demonstrated some disappointing results: the correct answer was given by approximately one third of the young and adult participants. The second question asked had to do with the familiarity of certain institutions of the European Union. The young and adult participants are not that different in their knowledge about this issue: both find the European Parliament to be the most familiar institution, followed by the European Commission, then the Council of Ministers of the EU, and the European Central Bank, while other institutions were recognized by less than 40% of Croatian participants. The participants

from the European Union are more familiar with each of the mentioned institutions, which is not surprising, given they have had more opportunities to deal with them in everyday situations. However, the ignorance of the Croatian participants about the accession process of their own country casts a shadow of doubt over their assessment related to their level of information about the EU and its institutions. It is realistic to assume that this level of information is lower than might be concluded just from their statements, and this assumption is supported by the finding that participants from European Union member countries estimated their level of information to be poorer than the Croatian participants. It is difficult to understand where such a non-critical opinion about the Croatian participants' level of information derives from. One of the possible explanations might be, since they realize the subject of the European Union is so important for Croatia at the moment, that they refused to admit in the research that they are actually not adequately informed, and the other explanation could be that the participants mistook the fact that the media increasingly cover the subjects of European integration and Croatia's relationship with the EU, with their own knowledge and coverage of those issues.

The social characteristics of youth in Croatia that cause the greatest differences in acceptance of the observed attitudes and perceptions, are primarily those that relate to the level of socio-cultural qualifications (the socio-professional status and education of participants), followed by gender, provenience, regional status and finally, the participants' age. The lowest effects on the differences among the young population come from the fathers' education, then religiosity and domicile, followed by party identification. The highest level of information and knowledge is shown by men from the oldest age cohort of the young participants, those born and living in large cities (including Zagreb), inhabitants of the most developed regions (Zagreb, Istria and Primorje), students and the employed and those that have a higher level of education, the non-religious and sympathizers of liberal and left-wing oriented parties (HNS and SDP), sometimes accompanied by young supporters of HSP, due to the fact that this is the party that builds a part of its image on its loud opposition to Croatia associating with the European Union. Along with all that, it is important to mention that better knowledge and a higher level of information about the European Union, its policies, institutions and enlargement process, is linked with the positive attitudes about the different aspects of the European Union (its image, following of EU related issues in the media, support for Croatian accession to the Union, etc.), which, most probably, means that they are mutually conditioned.

As a conclusion, we can state that the participants' answers demonstrate that Croatian citizens – both young and adult – are not as interested in the European Union as its presence in the media and the political agenda might

imply, while their knowledge about the relationship between Croatia and the EU is at an even lower level. Hence, there needs to be a stronger and more comprehensive public campaign focused on the increasing the level of information and level of knowledge the citizens have about the European Union and what it represents, so the Croatian population might make an informed decision about their county joining this community of European countries, when that moment arrives. Such a campaign is even more in line as the newest events regarding the European Constitution demonstrate that the EU citizens have problems with a deficit of knowledge and information when it comes to matters related to the Union, that they are supposed to decide on. A lesson about the much greater effort that the European elite needs to make, to include citizens in this very important political project – the construction of a united Europe – is a useful alarm to the domestic political elite that needs to animate its citizens for Croatian inclusion in the process of European integration. Since the young are the natural winners of Croatian accession to the EU, who are to start the most productive part of their lives in this new environment, it is especially important to create an information campaign that is close and convincing to the young generation.

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SUMMARY

The subject of this study – *The Youth in Croatia and the European Integration* – is the relationship of youth toward the European integration process, including the Croatian accession to the European Union, as well as their sociopolitical readiness for integration into a united Europe. The analysis is based on a section of data gathered in early 2004, on the entire Croatian territory, and conducted within the scientific and research project *Youth and the European Integration Process*. The basic sample of youth, aged 15 to 29, consisted of 2000 examinees, and the control sample of persons older than 30 consisted of 1000 examinees. The obtained findings on youth have been systematically compared to results from the previous research project, *The Value System of Youth and Social Changes in Croatia*, conducted in early 1999, on an identically structured sample of 1700 young examinees. Data on Croatian youth has also been compared to the corresponding findings of several European researches.

European integration is a dynamic and multidimensional process, and in this research, the accent was on the political and normative dimensions of integration. The genesis of the political development of European Union has indicated that, in spite of the oscillations in the process of integration, there is a recognizable progress toward the construction of a Europe of values, where all the included countries meet with equally high democratic demands. The existing research into the European integration process has undoubtedly shown that the relationship of citizens toward the EU varies as a function of time, and depends on the specific situation in certain countries or societies. Croatia is a transitional country that has stepped into the process of democratic consolidation, and after the year 2000, it had also stepped out of a certain kind of international isolation. Today, Croatia is a country trying to join the united Europe, which has managed to obtain the status of a candidate country for accession into the EU, albeit with an uncertain date for accession negotiations. Even though the main obstacle for the start of negotiations is supposedly the lack of satisfaction of the EU with the Croatian cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, the existing tendencies and events in the country indicate that Croatia is not adequately prepared to join the Union: not at the political, nor the social, and especially not at the economic plain. The indicated findings are also the starting points in the research of the relationship of Croatian youth toward the European integration process.

A valid analysis of this relationship demands a previous insight into some aspects of the political readiness of youth for European integration of Croatia.

With that in mind, special attention was dedicated to political values, attitudes and participation of youth, whose longitudinal monitoring enables a detection of changes that took place during the past five years. The data comparison showed that during the observed period of time, the young people's otherwise relatively high acceptance of almost all the constitutional values, as well as the harmonious perception of politics and institutional trust have increased, while the lack of hard work, discipline and responsibility are now perceived as a social problem to a greater extent than before. The recent data also indicates that today's youth perceive the existence of educational, gender and age inequalities in the Croatian society to a larger degree, as well as the worsening of political representation of all marginal groups. On the other hand, the understanding of conflicts and democratic rules (especially the role of the opposition) has weakened, the perception of crime in ownership conversion and privatization as a problem has decreased, there is also a weaker perception of the existence of social and religious inequalities, the social activism and political participation have decreased, and the attitude about inclusion into youth organizations of political parties and the establishment of independent youth parties as forms of activities that might contribute to a more active participation of youth in the society has decreased. From hence comes the conclusion that certain changes tend to lead to further social, most of all political, (self)passivization and marginalization of young people.

The continuity of tendencies established in the previous research projects, confirm the finding that the young are not a monolithic group when it comes to acceptance of political values, expression of political attitudes and the level of political participation. The greatest differentiation is present regarding the not so present tolerance toward most observed social phenomena and groups, the perception of unemployment as the most important social problem and the cause of existing difficulties, the perception of existence of political inequalities and the stated interest in politics, as well as the perception of the role of the "diaspora" in the Croatian political life. When these results are observed integrally, it is obvious that the young are mostly differentiated by the level of obtained knowledge and their socio-professional status, then party identification, social origin and the phase of maturity. All the mentioned differentiations of youth can simply be summarized by outlining two large, relatively polarized groups: one consists of socially more competent youth, inclined to the ideological and political options of the left center, and the other consists of a socially inferior youth, inclined toward the right pole of the ideological-political spectrum. The socially more competent youth is more liberal, more critical toward the social reality and the political actors, they manifest a greater respect for democratic institutions and procedures, which is an indicator of the importance of favorable circumstances in the process of political socialization.

The recent data enabled us to establish the existence of inter-generational differences, which are not enormous but are significant. The comparative analysis of the attitudes of both the young and the older examinees, demonstrated that the young state a higher degree of trust in the media than the older examinees, that they are more tolerant toward a number of social phenomena and groups, which cause dispute both in the Croatian and the European public opinion arena, as well as more sensitive regarding ethnic inequalities. The young perceive war as the main cause of current difficulties to a greater extent than the elders, they have considerably more trust in their own generation as a social force that could initiate positive trends, they express a greater readiness for inclusion in different civil society activities, and believe more that television and youth organizations could mobilize them into active participation in social affairs. At the same time, the young are slower than the older examinees to accept the value of a democratic order, however, they are also less prone to have a harmonious understanding of politics, they are less socially sensitive, they express less trust in the institutions of power, the socioeconomic goals and the preservation of tradition are less often among their political priorities, they less often think immorality and criminal activities in the privatization process are the cause of current problems, they perceive a smaller level of corruption in all areas of social life (aside from education), they believe less in the positive contribution of experts and entrepreneurs to overcoming the trends of crisis, they are less interested in politics and participate less in political parties, and they have a smaller level of faith in the mobilization role of education for democracy, volunteer work, political parties and non-governmental organizations, as well as the contribution of the family and education system in the stimulation of the young people's social engagement. The established inter-generational differentiation can be explained through the life cycle theory, meaning the mentioned differences are mostly the effect of differing social statuses and the complete experiences of the young and the older examinees. That means that most young people have not assumed some of the permanent social roles, and that their immediate experiences are limited only to some social areas among which politics do not have a prominent place. The existing inter-generational differences are also the result of the fact that most older examinees draw on their experience gained in a different social and political regime, which to a certain measure forms their existing system of political values that is, in certain elements, especially those related to the social dimension, different than the youth's system of political values. On the other hand, the congruence of the young and older examinees is contributed to by a common experience of an era, that is, life in a specific socio-historic period. The absence of deep inter-generational ambiguities also indicates that, in spite of the radical changes that have appeared through the decomposition of the old and the set-up of a new social and political order, the mechanism for transposing

political values from the older generations to the young ones, functions to a considerable degree, along with the transfer of the shortcomings that exist in the structured political awareness of the older generation.

Even though it was established that the youth in Croatia accept the traditional values to a smaller degree compared to the elders, the young are at the same time somewhat more conservative in certain areas than their European counterparts. Pointing to this finding is the greater orientation of the Croatian youth toward the family and a smaller extent of tolerance of certain phenomena and groups in the contemporary society. At that, the social participation of the Croatian young generation is at a lower level than the participation of their European peers.

The attitude toward human rights is also one of the indicators of political preparedness of Croatian youth for integration into a democratic Europe, which promotes high standards in the protection of human rights and freedoms. The research results about the evaluation of individual human rights and freedoms, show that the youth accept the right to an education, the right to work and personal security, the right to privacy, the social protection of the elderly and those in other precarious situations, the equality before the law, the rights of women and the right to ownership the most. The analysis has shown that the preference of individual human rights and freedoms is not caused by the observed socio-demographic and socio-structural characteristics of the young, aside from education, which points to the significance of the education system as an agent of improvement of the state of human rights. Approximately a third of the young examinees were not satisfied with the respect for human rights in Croatia today nor were they satisfied five years ago, the percentage of the undecided has decreased in that period of time, and the number of those that think human rights in Croatia are mostly or completely respected has increased. The results of the analysis of social attributes of youth indicate that the ability of assessment and a higher degree of criticism toward the status of human rights in Croatia is related to life in economically more prosperous regions, a left ideological-political orientation as well as the female gender. The comparison of the evaluation of the contribution of institutions, organizations and significant individuals in the population of youth in 1999 and in 2004, established that the generation of youth today perceives a higher level of contribution of all observed participants (except for the opposition) to the protection of human rights and freedoms in Croatia. More precisely, most of the young assess that all the participants, completely or mostly, contribute to the realization of human rights in Croatia, which especially refers to the perception of the contribution of the highest institutions of power. The perception of the status of human rights in Croatia and the contribution of the observed actors to the realization of those rights, are considerably highly influenced by regional affiliation and party

identification, followed by their social background, their gender and the religious self-identification of the young.

The comparison of acceptance of the observed human rights and freedoms of the populations of young and older examinees in Croatia, indicates that the elders accept most individual human rights and freedoms more than the young, and that they also express less criticism toward today's respect for those rights and freedoms in Croatia, while validating the contribution of all the observed actors to a higher degree.

To summarize, the analysis has shown that the young accept human rights and freedoms very highly at the level of principle, but that there is a certain disagreement when it comes to concrete rights and practices in Croatia. Even though the degree of acceptance of the value of human rights and freedoms is high among the young, there are also deviations indicating an increased need for additional engagement of certain agents of socialization, especially the education system and the political actors.

The national affiliation of youth is another indicator relevant to its relationship toward the European integration. The research has shown that the attitude most represented with the youth is one of moderate national identification, then the ones signifying an openness toward the world, while ethno-centric statements are at the back of the obtained hierarchy. The attitude that had demonstrated the highest representation of national identification is for the first time at the top of the rank in all our research projects, just as it is evident that nationally tinted attitudes, both moderate and extreme, are more represented now than in 1986 or in 1999. Such an increase of the national affiliation of the young can be interpreted by the fact that there is more emphasis on existential problems and that there is a higher uncertainty regarding the future, then the increase of differences between the rich and the poor, as well as a smaller degree of trust in the political leadership. The immediate confrontation with this type of social instability, results in a search for safer modes of relationships with other people, the society as a whole and some of its parts, where the nation represents one of the safe havens, much like family and church. However, it is necessary to emphasize that the attitudes of openness toward the world are quite stabile, and that they are often complementary instead of being opposite to attitudes of national identification. At the same time, this points to the complexity of the problem of national affiliation and the fact that it does not have to be exclusive, but can actually coexist with attitudes that enhance the process of European association.

Regarding their national affiliation the young are, of course, not homogenous. The results of the analysis have shown that the nationally oriented youth is significantly more religious than the others, they prefer the conservative

parties, live in Dalmatia, Central and Eastern Croatia, they originate more often from rural areas and families, where the father has a lower degree of education, they personally have a lower level of education and, within the youth sample, they belong to the youngest age cohort (age 15 to 19), and the groups of pupils and the unemployed. On the other hand, a significantly lower national affiliation is expressed by youth coming from the Istrian, Zagreb and Northern Croatia provenience, those indecisive about religion or atheists, youth of urban background and a higher family and personal education status. However, regarding cosmopolitanism, the young demonstrate significantly more homogenous results.

It is especially indicative that the more ethno-centric examinees and, to a smaller degree, those with a pronounced national identification, more often have a negative perception of the European Union, while the nationally more exclusive examinees refuse to even support the accession of Croatia into the European Union.

The examination of the social (ethnic) distance toward certain nations has demonstrated that the young have put members of the former Yugoslav federation and Russians at the back of the scale, while, with an under-average evaluation, the center of the scale is occupied by members of certain Central and Eastern European nations (the Czech and the Hungarian). Inhabitants of the European Western and Southwestern territories, especially the Italians, which occupy the first position after form the Croats, and the Germans, demonstrate satisfactory results just by being evaluated by average grades. However, the degree of social closeness that the young citizens of Croatia feel toward other Croatian men and women, indicates a certain dose of self-criticism, because approximately one third of the young do not feel an especially high level of affinity toward, for the most part, their own nationals.

The older examinees differ from the young in that they more pronouncedly represent attitudes at the center of the national affiliation scale, as well as indicate a higher ethnical distance on average. However, the fact is that, in spite of the existence of inter-generational differences when it comes to national affiliation where the older examinees dominate, there are also inter-generational differences that indicate a better position of the youngest examinees in our sample (aged 15 to 19). This phenomenon has already been described in literature by the so-called U-curve, which vividly illustrates a higher national affiliation of individuals at their earlier and later periods of life. Thus, the greater national affiliation, on the one hand, seems to appear as an expression of an adolescent transitional crisis, and on the other, as a consequence of a long-term perseverance of the perception and production of (most probably) negative experiences with a specific out-group.

The relationship of the examinees toward the European integration and the European Union has been investigated via numerous indicators, where the emphasis was on the perception of the possible consequences of Croatian accession to the EU. However, other aspects of the relationship toward Europe and the EU have been the object of research, presenting a wider context for understanding the perception of consequences of joining the Union. The obtained results demonstrated that most of the young and of the older examinees in Croatia actually had a neutral image of the EU, even though those with a positive image exceed those that perceive the EU negatively. Actually, nine tenths of the examinees have in the beginning of 2004, supported the Croatian integration into the Union, but among those examinees, there is a highest number of euro-skeptics, that is, those that believe that too much is expected from the accession. At the same time, there were considerably less euro-enthusiasts (those that expect all-around benefits from the integration) and euro-realists (who believe that integration is inevitable for the survival of small countries). As for the difficulties standing in the way of the Croatian road to a united Europe, the examinees had equally addressed them to both Croatia and the European Union, however, the number of young emphasizing the accountability of the EU has increased from 1999 to 2004, and the number of those accenting Croatia's responsibility has, in the same period of time, decreased. The finding that the young expect significantly more positive than negative consequences after the Croatian accession into the European Union, is especially important. However, in this regard, there has been a mild decrease in the expectation of the positive, and an increase of the negative consequences among the young during the last five years. The highest positive expectations have been registered at the individual and the socio-cultural planes, while the optimism regarding the socio-economic progress has decreased. Indeed, the lack of socio-economic preparedness of Croatia for the entrance into the developed European surrounding is expected to yield the most negative consequences.

The research of the expected development of the EU in the coming ten years, has shown that only the possibility of easier travel, work, study and life in Europe is expected by most of the examinees, especially the young ones. The young are quite fearful of the costs Croatia might have from the integration and of the worsening position of the agricultural population. The negative consequences expecting their own country are, however, less perceived by the youth in Croatia, than by their counterparts in Europe. Related to the fears from the construction of a united Europe and European Union, we have established that the youth in Croatia is most afraid of the abolition of the Croatian currency and the increase of crime, and its smallest fear has to do with the potential loss of social privileges. The fears of examinees in the enlarged Europe are somewhat different – the most expressed fear is that of labor transfer into other countries, the increase of crime

and drug trade, the difficulties expecting the farmers and the price their country has to pay due to the development of the EU. Both the young and the old examinees in Croatia are less worried about the loss of national identity, language and their social privileges than the European examinees.

All our examinees emphasize the multiple benefits of the EU enlargement, followed by the positive effects of that enlargement for Croatia, while the efforts of the Croatian government, regarding the accession to the Union, are valued quite poorly. The potential accession of Croatia into the European Union shall also signify a change in the decision-making process, meaning that some of those decisions will be reached at the national level, and some jointly with the EU. Our examinees have, in this regard, demonstrated a high level of readiness for integration, because more than half of them believes that four fifths of the observed areas should be the object of joint decision-making by the EU and Croatia. The only areas in which, in the opinion of the young examinees, Croatia should decide autonomously are the acceptance of refugees, the judiciary, culture, agriculture, fisheries and the police. The Europeans differ in their opinions on these issues from the Croats, and believe two thirds of the observed affairs should be decided on jointly by their country and the EU, while their country should be autonomous in deciding about education, basic rules about the media, health and social care and unemployment.

Different social groups have, based on the perception of youth, been grouped into potential losers of the integration (farmers, the retired, workers, the unemployed), potential winners of the integration process (such as the inhabitants of the capital and certain regions, the young, as well as the Croatian population as a whole), and certain winners of the process of integration, which are also the best prepared for Croatian accession into the EU (experts, foreign language speakers, the political elite, managers, large companies). Actually, it was shown that the young consider the social groups which are in a relatively better position in the Croatian society today to be the greatest winners of EU integration, and those whose current status is unenviable, who are in the greatest need of a better future, were perceived as those that will potentially gain the least. The only encouraging fact is that the young are seeing themselves as the potential winners, meaning they believe the existing abilities and potentials of the young generation only need optimal circumstances in order to reach their peak. However, the data about the knowledge of foreign languages in Croatia are not very exhilarating, especially compared to the knowledge of foreign languages of the youth in the European Union countries.

Within this research, we have also found that approximately three quarters of our examinees are proud of being Croatian citizens, while around half of the young, and somewhat less of the elders are proud to be European. The young are

the ones to be more critical toward their national identity, and at the same time they lead in the positive validation of their European identity. However, the most interesting finding concerns the fact that all the Croatian examinees feel less national pride than the inhabitants of the European Union, while it is understandable that the examinees in the EU emphasize their pride of being European more. The answers of the examinees regarding the question about the contents of the concept “being a citizen of the European Union” indicate that neither the young, nor the older examinees possess a coherent understanding of the EU citizenship. Still, the right to work, live and study in any EU member, represents the key element for the understanding of EU citizenship, both with the young people in Croatia and with the youth in the Union. The young and the older Croatian examinees believe that active suffrage is the least important, regardless of whether the elections in question include the European Parliament, the national or the local representative bodies.

Only one out of four Croatian examinees believes the Croatian membership in the EU might benefit them personally, while almost half of all the young and a third of the older examinees do not possess a defined opinion on this issue. It is clear that this feeling is closely related to the question of the personal meaning the European Union holds for the examinees, where neither the young nor the elders have a homogenous perception of the meaning of the EU. A single response appeared in an above-average number of cases – the EU is a way of creating a better future for the young – while the claim that the EU signifies a sort of “European government”, superimposed to the national states which are members of the Union, received a small level of support. Unlike that, the young from the Union countries emphasize the freedom of movement most often, while in time, the very concept of “European government” became more pronounced in the attitudes of the European youth. The young people in Croatia, as well as in the EU, express an equally small level of fear of the euro-bureaucracy, the loss of cultural diversity and the utopian idea of Europe.

Considering the readiness of the young to live outside of Croatian borders, we have found that almost two fifths of them would like to live (and work and study) abroad for a while, while a quarter of the Croatian youth would like to leave the country forever. The older examinees, on the other hand, demonstrate a higher level of conservativeness toward the possible departure of their children into one of the countries of the Union, but they are, however, ready to accept their possible studying and training in the EU, while only one out of seven examinees would like his/her children to permanently live or spend their entire working life in one of the countries, which are members of the European Union.

The analysis of the differentiation of the young in their relationship toward the European integration and the EU, has indicated that the used social

characteristics have a limited influence. In other words, the young are relatively homogenous in their perception of a united Europe and the expectations from the Croatian accession to the European Union. However, certain differences do exist, and they are mostly caused by party identification, socio-professional status, regional affiliation and religious self-identification. This means that the most influential attributes, when it comes to attitudes toward the European integration process, are the ones consisting of ideological-political attitudes and the current social status along with the specifics of the wider environment. Thus, we have found that the sympathizers of parties that belong to the left center, then pupils and students, the inhabitants of the more developed regions and the non-religious examinees are more inclined toward the EU and the integration process, and at that, they emphasize the positive consequences and the potential gains from the Croatian accession into the Union, more than they express their concerns with the negative consequences. Hence, the concise conclusion would be that the greater social competence of the young is reflected in the establishment of a stable and more consistent pro-European orientation. Otherwise, the young differ from their older counterparts in their higher expectance of positive effects from the Croatian integration into the EU and, at the same time, in the lower perception of expected problems and undesirable consequences.

Considering information sources and the level of information of the young in Croatia, the results show that the young follow the news in all the media outlets relatively often, but that they do lag behind the older examinees, and the examinees coming from the former EU candidate countries. This finding does not apply only to the use of the Internet as a source of information, where the young people are far superior to the older examinees. With that in mind, it is interesting that the young differ the most among each other, in the use of Internet and the reading of daily newspapers, where the socially more qualified young examinees (the more educated, coming from an urban environment and richer regions and averagely older ones) are the ones that use both media for obtaining information more often. As for the contents the examinees look for in the media, it is visible that the young are much more interested in events from the social and cultural life, and much less in issues related to politics. A comparison with the examinees from 13 countries that were EU candidates, demonstrated that they are far more interested in all the contents (aside from sports) than the Croatian examinees.

Regarding the assessment of their own level of information about the EU, somewhat more than half of the young have stated that they are well informed about the European Union and events in it, compared to two thirds of the older examinees believing they are well informed. On the other hand, the results of both the young and the older examinees are surprisingly high, compared to the data on the level of information of the inhabitants in the 25 countries of the

European Union, where three quarters of the examinees thought they were poorly informed about the issue. Closely related to the question of the level of information about the European Union itself, is the question about the general level of information about the Croatian accession to that association. The results demonstrate a somewhat different trend than the previous finding. In this case, less than half of the young consider themselves to be well informed about the process. It is interesting that the identically gathered data on this issue, from the former EU candidate countries, yielded a much lower evaluation by the examinees on their own level of information. Regarding issues and problems related to the EU that the examinees would like more information on, we have established that both the youth in Croatia and the examinees from the former EU candidate countries, find issues related to the Union's policy on youth and education to be the most interesting, followed by the economy and social policy. Along with that, the issues regarding the enlargement of the EU, the cultural policy, the international relations, the regional policy and the EU budget are the ones the young find to be the least interesting. The manner in which the examinees gather information on the European Union mostly include the mass media outlets (the press, the television and the radio), and only then other forms of information gathering, such as discussions with their families and friends, surfing the Internet, specialized books and other published material, and the activities of non-governmental organizations. There are no significant differences in the use of the stated sources of information between the young and the older examinees, except in the case of the Internet. Considering the examinees from the 25 EU member countries, they use all of the observed sources as a way of getting information about the European Union, its policies and institutions, in a smaller amount.

The examination of the objective knowledge of the examinees on specific issues related to the European Union has yielded devastating results. Thus, when asked about the phase Croatia was in, regarding the accession process into the EU, at the moment the research was being conducted, the correct answer was given by only a third of both the young and the older examinees. The second question asked, dealt with the familiarity of certain institutions of the European Union. The young and the older examinees do not differ very much from each other regarding their knowledge of this issue: the most familiar institution to both of them is the European Parliament, followed by the European Commission, then the EU Council of Ministers, then the European Central Bank, while all the other institutions were familiar to less than two fifths of the Croatian examinees. The examined citizens of the European Union are, understandably, more familiar with each of the observed institutions.

The social attributes of the young, causing the greatest differences regarding their level of information, are mostly the ones connected to their level

of socio-cultural qualifications (the socio-professional status and the level of education), followed by gender, and then provenience, regional affiliation and the age of the examinees. The highest level of information and knowledge belongs to men from the oldest age cohort of youth, those born and living in large cities, the inhabitants of the most developed regions, students and the employed examinees, as well as those with a higher education degree, the non-religious and examinees preferring liberal and left-wing parties. Along with all that, it is important to stress that a better level of knowledge and information about the European Union, its policies, institutions and enlargement process, correlates to positive attitudes about the different aspects of the European Union (the image of the EU, the following of issues related to it, the support for the Croatian accession to the Union, and so on), which, most probably, means that they are mutually determined. The inter-generational comparison has, on the other hand, indicated that the older examinees are more interested in most issues appearing in the media, especially politics, and that they assess their level of information to be better than do the young examinees.

To put it shortly, the results of the research on the information level and knowledge of the Croatian citizens – both young and old – about the European Union, have indicated that they are not that interested in the European Union issues, as much as their level of presence in the media and the political agenda might imply, and the examinee's knowledge about the relationship of Croatia and the EU is at an even lower level. Henceforth, it is necessary to conduct a strong and comprehensive public campaign directed precisely at the increase of the level of information and knowledge of the citizens about the European Union and what it represents, so that when the issue comes to the agenda, the Croatian inhabitants might make an educated decision about their country's accession to that community of European states.

The research results presented above may be summarized into a number of tendencies and statements of a wider nature.

The political culture of the young testifies, in a number of aspects, to an approximation to the desirable democratic standards – especially regarding the acceptance of basic liberal-democratic values and the readiness for social engagement, at least in principle – however, their social power and social capital are at a low level. At that, the young are aware of their own social and political marginalization, and recognize an entire plethora of measures that might help them gain a certain measure of power and become active citizens, as is desirable in a democratic society, but they do not use sufficiently the channels of social and political promotion, which are at their disposal.

Today's generation of youth expresses a lower level of social sensitivity and is more oriented toward individual efforts and family resources in the

realization of life goals. At that, it seems that the young are not aware of the fact that an unequal access to existing social resources of the young generation today will have generated an unequal social status when they come of age. Hence, we can expect a widening and deepening of the process of social decomposition, that should be corrected through mechanisms that are supposed to ensure the highest possible equality of chances in the access to social resources (most of all, education). What we mean to say is that human capital is what Croatia, as a small and an insufficiently developed country, should deal with very thoughtfully. This, at the same time, signifies a maximum of investment into the development of human potentials, where the young generation certainly comes first.

The inter-generational differences regarding the readiness of Croatia for accession into the European Union, and the relationship toward the European integration, are not of such a type and scale that there could be any mention of a generational gap, however, they are indicative. The most visible fact is that the young have demonstrated a more liberal, tolerant and flexible disposition, that they have a higher belief in the potentials of their own generation, and that they are consistent in their pro-European orientation, where they see their own generation as one of the certain winners of the Croatian accession into a united Europe. These trends suggest that the potentials of the young are a resource to be seriously reckoned with on the Croatian road into the EU.

The process of the Croatian accession into the European Union is linked to different difficulties that affect the attitudes of citizens about the importance of Croatian entrance into the EU. Through this research, we have clearly detected that, unlike the Croatian political elite, both the young and the older citizens do not consider the Croatian integration into EU, to be the most important political goal. The political priorities of the citizens seem to be quite different, and their support to the project of European integration is weakening. It is, then, realistic to expect this trend to continue if the problematic events in the European Union persist, just as the difficulties in the relationship of Croatia and the EU, as well as the unfavorable economic and social trends in Croatia itself. This is why there are two equally important political tasks facing the ruling political elite: the initiation of the development of Croatia and an well-argued explanation to the Croatian citizens why the country's integration in the united Europe is purposeful.



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