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RELIGION AND PATTERNS
OF
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH – ZAGREB

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Irena Borowik, Dinka Marinović Jerolimov, Siniša Zrinščak

**RELIGION AND PATTERNS OF SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION – OR: HOW TO INTERPRET
RELIGIOUS CHANGES IN POST-COMMUNISM?**

Sociologists of religion agree there is a characteristic compatibility between religious institutions and social structures at any stage of social development. Changes in society are related to religious changes. These kinds of changes were a core interest of classical sociologists. Emil Durkheim (1902) discussed how changes of labour division accompanying the process of transformation from traditional to modern society affect the social status of religion. In discussing these relationships, he identified the moment of religious *individualisation*.

Weber (1920-22) devoted his research to the identification of social groups who carry religious traditions; he showed the relationships between the social structures of India, China, and Israel, and the development of Hinduism and Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism, and Judaism. In this, he also demonstrated the relationship between religious and economic processes, and found the evidence for the rationalisation of religion, in keeping with his view of the *rationalising* tendency of Western Culture. Robert Bellah (1964) summarised the development of religion as a process showing at each stage the relation between the form of religion and the features of a society. Niklas Luhmann (1982) admitted that modernity models religion and in consequence causes *the development of dogmatics*. These examples illustrate that there are many themes and motifs in sociological thought, but that their common feature is an acknowledged **relation and relevance between religious and social forms**. Having reflected upon these relations, the cited sociologists identified characteristic features of religions in certain periods, looking at them in longer or shorter temporal perspectives. It is also a good context to question the transforming society and the place of religion in it.

The decline of communism had its own symbols – terms like “glasnost” and “perestroika” – that narrated the politics of opening the Eastern Block to the world. They were easy to find on the international front pages in the late 1980s. The photos of the collapse of the Berlin Wall illustrated the ending of the ‘sphere of Soviet influence’. Terms like “round table” and “Velvet Revolution” epitomise the bloodless character of the transformations which resulted in the changes in Central and Eastern Europe.

Having in mind classical concepts of mutual relevance of religious and social processes, what could be treated as a good starting point to reflect on the “nature” of society being in the process of transformation, leaving the Communist past and joining capitalistic and democratic world of Europe?

One of the possible views is considering of the transformational changes from two different perspectives: systemic and subjective. In the first case, political change seems to be the most distinctive – the replacement of a one-party system with a multiparty democratic system. As a result, societies of Central-Eastern Europe became subjectively politicised. The last decade can be characterised as a great differentiation of the political scene into left-wing, Post-Communist parties, many right-wing parties, and a consequent variety in the composition of governments. Parliamentary and presidential elections expressed the mobilisation as well as the political attitudes of society. The possibility of having an influence on political reality was a real change in comparison to the past.

The other novelty could be observed in economics. After the collapse of communism a Communist, a centrally-managed, planned economy was replaced by a free-market economy and the system of capitalistic production. Its consequences increased unemployment and variation in salaries. For the first time these societies experienced social stratification based on strongly differentiated incomes. On the personal level, society divided into layers, moving from the shared poverty of communism to a society with a very prosperous elite and growing poverty. In the succeeding years, transformation affected other areas: the educational system, health service, and public insurance system. These changes are ongoing.

From a subjective perspective, the view of a normal ‘man on the street’ (or a component of social awareness of changing reality), the process is perceived mainly in the context of the problems it brings. Nostalgia is common, at least in those areas where the transformation process is perceived as having worsened the situation. Socially and economically underprivileged

groups experience fear of changes, fear of the entrance to the European Union and fear of an uncertain future.

Lest this analysis be considered one-sided, we must remember to mention the other side of transformation: the positive opportunities brought by change, and those who have benefited from them, those who have been the carriers – to use Weber's terms – of transformation and democratisation. The new economic possibilities presented by the free market have been utilised by those social groups predisposed to gain from them: the former political elite, who have made use of their knowledge of economics; the young, dynamic and qualified, who have introduced to the employment market such professions as manager, insurance agent, stock broker, advertising copywriter, and moreover the members of trades and guilds, those professions which during communism formed the exceptional enclave of 'private business'. Freedom therefore, pregnant with possibilities for all, has been exploited effectively by a few.

The change in the style of living has meant a change in values. Also significant is the growth of print media and the effect of that growth on public opinion. Journalists have exposed the corruption, penetrated the organised crime, critiqued and debated many aspects of the societal world-view: even such a sensitive issue as child abuse within the family, until recently the taboo in societies of the region.

In these transformations is religion present and if so – how? Does it relate to the objects that the classics of the sociology of religion dealt with? Are religions and churches involved in transformation of economy, politics, styles of life, values? Is religion the source of integration or desintegration in transforming society? Does it involve itself, own structures and modes of acting in the processes of adaptation or rather form expectations, directions and influence changes of other sectors of society in order to adapt them to its own aims? What are the social attitudes towards religions and churches and what are the differences in comparison to the Communist times? In these rolling transformations, this democratic life and all that it brings – pluralism, freedom, the rule of law, existing civil society and the formation of political society – are religion and its accompanying institutions appropriate to these changes?

These methodological dilemmas are strongly present in this book, but also in other studies that do not focus on Central and Eastern Europe but other areas, mainly on the Western societies. Two recently published books, written by James Beckford and Karel Dobbelaere, are here of a particular interest.

Elaborating already discussed question why during the second half of the twentieth century social science has marginalized religion (Beckford, 1989), in his latest book the author explains social-constructionist approach aimed at better understanding of the way how people understand, experience and use religion in their everyday life. Respectively: 'Without denying the existence of anything other than text and discourse – and building on well-established insights into the constructive and destructive possibilities of social interaction – I seek to analyze the processes whereby the meaning of the category of religion is, in various situations, intuited, asserted, doubted, challenged, rejected, substituted, re-cast, and so on' (Beckford, 2003:3).

Our intention is not to discuss the presumptions and consequences of using the social-constructionist approach towards sociology of religion, but to point at an attempt of the new approach to a contradictory and paradoxical reality, a reality in which religion plays various and often hardly comprehensible roles. This variance has been highlighted several times in the analyses of the Post-Communist reality where in many cases religion becomes the object of ideological and social struggles, what often hides its other, not less important, social roles. Therefore, it is not only the issue in which way religion (mainly dominant churches) is adapting to the new pluralistic social circumstances scientifically relevant, but in which way it builds (by means of various answers offering to various people at various levels) the new social reality, regardless how much this construction of the new reality is encumbered by social conflicts.

In order to understand the past, contemporary and future social roles of religion in Central and Eastern Europe, scientists often use the secularisation theory. If there has already been some skepticism regarding the features of Communist modernisation (and consequently about secularisation as an apparent manifestation of the process of the functional differentiation of society), the connection modernisation – secularisation in its entirety is on the agenda of the recent modernisation development (at least in the majority of Post-Communist countries). This is the reason why it is interesting a re-publishing of the fundamental study on secularisation by Karel Dobbelaere (1981, 2002), which is as having been impregnated by the notion of a necessity of returning to the original idea of complexity of secularisation, articulated in differentiating the three dimensions – societal, organisational and individual: 'The concept of secularisation should be only used if one referred to all three levels at the same time. However, this proposal did not produce the expected results' (Dobbelaere, 2002:13). Indeed, it is really a matter of a complex task

and a sensitive concept and the study itself indicates again how it is often difficult to associate the influence of one level to the second and third and vice versa. We can even say that an attempt of understanding the connection between the dimensions diverges a necessary attention from the processes within one dimension, for example, the processes that occur on the individual level where there is an evident tendency of not only individualistic-pluralistic relationship towards religious traditions (bricolage, religion à la carte, patchwork etc.), but also of recomposition that stresses the new human needs as well as the new religious answers. Another fact is pointed out in this new edition of the study that is specifically relevant for Post-Communist countries: bringing the actors back in! Consciously or unconsciously, the protagonists constantly re-shape and change social processes and relations and this dynamics has a considerable impact on the difference of the role of religion and the Church in different societies.

The very thing that associates not only these two studies but also a lot of others from this book that are emphatically focused on West-European societies, is the matter of validity of scientific reinterpretation of the social reality. Evident discontent with the existing theories within sociology of religion whose immanent reductionism can not explain without increasing difficulties the difference of the social roles of religion what is more evident in the analyses of Post-Communist societies as well.

The first issue that strikes and provokes researchers is the existence of an extreme variance in Post-Communist countries, from a very high rate of non-religious to those with an outstandingly low percentage of non-religious. As an addition to this, there are also differences within a particular country. The level of religious identification (answer on the question: "I am religious person") vary from 94.4% in Poland, 84.8% in Romania, 84.5% in Lithuania and 83.7% in Croatia to 43.2% in the Czech Republic, 41.7% in Estonia and 27.5% in Belarus (Halman, 2001). In this respect Poland is the most religious and Belarus the least religious country taking into account the whole Europe. Religiosity is higher in Italy, Austria or Portugal than in Slovenia, Hungary or Bulgaria. With some slight differences, the same image is produced by measuring religiosity through Church attendance. Malta is with Poland the most religious country (87.2% and 78.2% respectively of those who attend Church at least once a month) and the Czech Republic (11.7%), Estonia (11.2) and Russia (9.2%) are the least religious together with Sweden (9.3%), France (11.9%) or Denmark (11.9%). But, can we just conclude that Russians or Czechs are simply irreligious or secular? Or, can we say that Poles, Romanians and Croats

are not so religious that researches indicate because religion in these countries has different social roles, such as those connected with particular cultural and national identities? Are the indicators of religiosity, which are obviously an outcome of various social relationships – and for that very reason – of lesser importance? May we question the religious image of some country by doubting the motives of such religiosity? Ideological intricacy of religion and ideological interpretative matrix are linked with many threads and it is for sure a field of the future interest of the sociologists of religion in Central and Eastern Europe. We believe that the studies published in this book, especially in the first chapter, represent a solid base for this field. What comes under scrutiny now is a comparison of the Eastern European countries with Italy and Finland – the two countries where secularisation is at full work, but it can not entirely describe all religious tendencies, especially those more noticeable in these countries by the end of 20th century.

The next very intriguing issue, and which is also treated in various ways in the texts of this book (specifically the chapter: Challenges of Post-Communist Societies), is the matter of a consequential reach of an increased or revived religiosity in many Post-Communist countries. For example, approval of abortion for single women is not so consistent with the image of religiosity, in some countries almost completely unattached to religious views. Slovenia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, Belarus and Russia are the countries in which such approval is greater than 50%, in many cases higher than in Germany or Great Britain (Halman, 2001). Religiosity is also not able to shape socially acceptable behavior. Cheating on tax is according to opinions of respondents generally higher in Post-Communist Europe than in Western Europe.

In any case, theologically-normative image of a social role of religion does not correspond to the real role and functions of religion. Do the Post-Communist countries, however, share some specific features in this area, as the recent research of R. Stark (2001) suggests? Firstly, he contended that it is the image of God, and not attendance at church services, which helps religion maintain moral order. Secondly, he suggested that the link between religiosity and some moral norms is the weakest in the Post-Communist Europe, what is a consequence, as he explains, to a great extent, of the position of religion in communism. Stark's research was focused on only some of Post-Communist countries that took part in the World Value Study 1990-1991, but his findings and theses are very intriguing which will for sure incite a new research-work interest.

As in many other fields, the issue of the European integrations gains an increasing legitimacy. Namely, it becomes clearer that, in spite of many doubts and obstacles, New Europe affects many social relationships, even those that by the rule of subsidisation (what is, among other things, the topic of religious tradition and Church-State relations) are not in jurisdiction of the European supranational level. Europeisation, as a process of constructing the new supranational mechanisms and institutions, has a double effect: from the European level towards the national states (an example of the influence of the European Court of Human Rights), and then in reverse order (when the EU issue becomes an issue of social debates, even serious conflicts).

Many of mentioned problems are discussed in the studies published in this book. It is based (after discussions and suggestions have been made) on collection of elaborated and developed presentations from the International Conference, 'Religion and Patterns of Social Transformation' that was organized by the International Study of Religion in Eastern and Central Europe Association (ISORECEA) and the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb, Croatia in 2001.

The book consists of four topical units. The first chapter 'Religion and Social Transformation: East and West' consists of six papers which deal with religion, religiosity and spirituality in the countries of Central and Eastern, but also Western Europe. The first study is written by Eileen Barker in which the author, provoked by the issues resulting from the secularisation debate, discusses a plethora of different meanings of spirituality. She examines spirituality through three approaches: two ideal-type models of relations of spirituality towards conservative religiosity and secularism; by selection of some meanings people ascribe to spirituality and basis the results of Pan-European Study on Religious and Moral Pluralism (RAMP) conducted in 1998, which indicate some of the characteristics that were associated with the respondents' understanding of spirituality, thereby suggesting some directions for further investigation. Miklós Tomka analyzes religious changes in some Post-Communist countries and brings up a crucial matter before regarding the relations of religion and modernisation. Namely, the main controversy of modern sociology arises out of secularisation consequences of modernisation development. Tomka demonstrates that the connection between secularisation and modernisation is discernible in Post-Communist Europe as well, but he also takes into consideration some alternative hypotheses while interpreting religious revival. For example, he points to a substantial increase of religiosity of those born after 1960, as well as to the strong link of religion and culture in certain countries.

The complementary texts to the study of Miklós Tomka are those of Olaf Müller and Detlef Pollack who mostly examine data of comparative research 'Political Culture and Central and Eastern Europe' conducted in eleven countries in 2000. While Müller analyzes the three hypotheses on religious changes in Central and Eastern Europe (secularisation, privatisation and revitalisation), Pollack is focused on the relations of the institutional (traditional) and individual (subjective) religiosity. His conclusion is that individualisation is present but still marginal, especially in societies with strong traditional churches.

The next two texts examine the situation in two West European countries – Italy and Finland. They also raise an issue of unambiguousness of relation modernisation – secularisation. By wondering how come that Italian society, although highly modernized and individualized according values, continues to be in many aspects a traditional Catholic society, Enzo Pace introduces a term of 'soft secularisation'. It can be assumed that this concept, similar to the well known Grace Davie's concept on 'believing without belonging', which describes contradictory tendencies of religious changes on the European Continent, will draw the attention of the scientific community. Kati Niemelä examines the Finnish experience that is different from the Italian, but provokes similar questions: In comparison to many other European nations, the Finns are less religious but they identify themselves at an above- average level with the Lutheran Church. On the other hand, in the 90s, many indicators show an increase of privatized religiosity that the author observes in the context of the slump in social security (recession and rising unemployment).

Five papers of the second chapter 'Challenges of Post-Communist Societies' discuss the answers of religion to the new social issues within the frame of the process of Post-Communist transformation. Irena Borowik challenges the connection of religion, development of civil society and democratic transformation in general. The Catholic Church in Poland has been the prime social moving force of democratic changes. Now the Church can hardly respond to the challenges of those changes. The crucial query is how to act and have influence in pluralistic society, what means to use pluralistic-modern means of social power. Małgorzata Zawila analyzes the viewpoints of the Catholic Church in Poland on euthanasia and abortion, the old social issues that now appear in the new social framework. The results showing that there is no necessary a contradiction between the respondents' religiosity and their positive attitude towards abortion and euthanasia, which the author presents in order to illustrate this fact as supportive of the thesis on the presence of a

general process of secularisation and privatisation of religion. Barbara Theriault analyzes the attitude of different churches (in this case, the Catholic and Evangelistic) towards the social situation in former East Germany and which principles, strategies and arguments they used at the time. Marjan Smrke lays down an intriguing thesis saying that a part of religious changes in post-communism (firstly revitalisation of religion and strengthening of its social role) can be explained by the idea of proliferated social, respectively, religious mimicry. Ankica Marinović Bobinac, basis the results of an empirical research, analyzes a dimension of religious knowledge of the adult population in Croatia. She connects different socio-demographic indicators with an ascertained level of comprehension of religious facts and events in the Catholic Church. In the last text of this chapter, Keishin Inaba analyzes comparative data of the European Value Study on the relation of the altruism and religion, on the altruistic motives standing behind a certain religious action.

The third chapter 'Religion in New Europe' consists of the texts in which the role of religion from the perspective of Euro-integration processes is being studied. James Richardson and Alan Garay show in which way the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg reinterprets Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights and fundamental freedoms, and a possible influence of such reinterpretation on the Church-State relation in Post-Communist countries. Namely, some countries (as defending parties) have already appeared before this Court. A similar problem is a topic of the study of Aleš Črnič who takes Slovenia as an example of how different definitions of religion and different positions of certain social protagonists have very concrete consequences on the activity possibilities of some, mostly smaller religious communities. Katarzyna Leszczyńska, basis the results of an empirical research, analyzes the attitudes of the Catholic Church in Poland and the Czech Republic towards the European Union and the integration processes, all this from the perspective of characteristic social processes that are in progress – pluralism, liberalism, postmodernism and modernisation. This analysis may also be a starting point for a debate in other countries. Lucian Leustean examines a real process of building New Europe and the role of religious communities.

The last chapter presents the three studies in which the subject of research are New Religious Movements and ecclesiastical movements. Basis an analysis of several comparative empirical investigations, Tadeusz Doktor is testing the theories that focus on the consequences of modernisation, market models and the theory of invisible religion, especially having regard to the new trends which can be applied in the three fundamental forms of religiosity: traditional church

religiosity, sectarian religiosity and New Age religiosity. Stipe Tadić and Vine Mihaljević, basis the results of an empirical research, analyze an up to now uninvestigated theme of ecclesiastical movements within the Catholic Church in Croatia. The study of Péter Török is of methodological nature in which he discusses the problems of collecting data on New Religious Movements, what, as at the time when Gordon Melton started to collect such data, appeared to be the problem in former Communist countries. Researchers may use an example of the interview attached to this study.

A few final remarks.

ISORECEA is an international scientific association that as of 1991 gathers all those scientists interested in the study of religious situation in former Communist parts of Europe. The following books based on the International Conferences have been published so far: *The Future of Religion East and West* (1995, eds. Irena Borowik & Przemysław Jabłoński), *New Religious Phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe* (1997, eds. Irena Borowik & Grzegorz Babiński), *Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe* (1999, eds. Irena Borowik), *Religion and Social Change in Post-Communist Europe* (2001, eds. Irena Borowik & Miklós Tomka). This book is the fifth in a row of published books. An increasing attendance of the ISORECEA's Conferences, especially by the scientists coming from former Communist societies, speaks not only of the position and importance of religion in Post-Communist societies, but it also justifies the basic intention of this association – to allow the experts and scientists who live in these regions to speak about religious situation in their countries. The Conference *Religion and Patterns of Social Transformation* that took place in Zagreb in 2001, what was the basis of this book, showed all the heterogeneousness of theoretic approaches and the efforts to comprehend and explain a complex and multidimensional phenomenon of religion and its presence in different socio-cultural and political contexts.

The papers in this book witness the above said.

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I.

RELIGION AND SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION:
EAST AND WEST

Eileen Barker

**THE CHURCH WITHOUT AND THE GOD WITHIN:
RELIGIOSITY AND/OR SPIRITUALITY?¹**

1. Introduction

At the most general level, the questions pursued in this chapter arise out of the secularisation debate. They do not, however, deal with many of the issues associated with that debate. They are not, for example, concerned with the extent to which religion is involved with the state or with secularisation as a 'process whereby religious thinking, practice and institutions lose social significance' (Wilson, 1966:4). Nor are they particularly interested in the changing rates of church attendance. They are, for the most part, concerned with the possibility that those of us who are students of religion are ignoring, or at least not fully recognising, something important that is going on. The underlying proposition is that conventional methods of investigation have not yet developed the tools to explore this 'something' as fully as they ought – but that if we *were* to access it (the 'something'), we would be likely to consider it an integral part of the study of religion.

Such a claim risks raising the age-old question: 'What do you mean by religion?' I have discussed this question elsewhere (Barker, 1994) and do not want to debate definitions here, but I do want to suggest that, if we were to ask the right questions, we would reveal sets of beliefs and practices and/or an orientation towards the world that, at a commonsense level, few religious scholars would want to label *secular*. The 'something' I have been talking about is, for want of a better word, spirituality. But now, of course, we have shifted to another problem: What is meant by spirituality? The simple answer is

¹ I would like to thank Sally Stares for her invaluable help with the statistics and, in particular, the calculations resulting in Table 12. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Economic and Social Research Council for funding the British part of the RAMP research.

that we do not know – or, at least, that the concept gives rise to a plethora of different meanings. And that, in a way, is just what this chapter is all about.

Three approaches will be pursued in the search of possible meanings of spirituality. The first involves proposing two ideal-typical models that indicate what could be meant by spirituality in opposition both to conservative religiosity and to secularism. Being ideal types in the Weberian (1949) sense of the word, these models do not claim to describe what goes on ‘out there’; they are analytical tools intended to be used to facilitate comparing ways of being religious – or being non-religious. Actual groups and individuals will not fit neatly into any one type; they will, rather, exhibit a cluster of characteristics which, *comparatively speaking*, are closer to one type than to another. In other words, the abstract models are more or less useful, not more or less true, in helping us to chart and understand relative locations with reference to the particular characteristics we might observe in the messy miscellany of reality.

Secondly, there is a very brief selection of some of the meanings people have attached to spirituality. Finally, some findings are drawn from a pan-European study of religious and moral pluralism (RAMP) that was conducted in 1998. These indicate some of the characteristics that were associated with the respondents’ understanding of ‘spirituality’, thereby suggesting some directions for further investigation.


2. Spirituality: an Initial Orientation

2.1. Religion and patterns of social transformation

Just as processes such as industrialisation, urbanisation, modernisation, rationalisation, bureaucratisation and, to the east of the iron curtain, sovietisation led in their different ways to secularisation as defined by Bryan Wilson (1966) at the societal level throughout most of Europe, so have processes such as social and geographical mobility, globalisation, the growth of mass media, the collapse of state atheism and (most recently) the introduction of the Internet led to increasing multi-culturalism and religious diversity. Figure 1 represents, ideal-typically, something of the range and complex interplay between different manifestations of a (loosely defined) religious nature that have emerged and/or separated themselves from traditional, institutionalised religions – which, it must be stressed, are still responsible for the great majority of religious practices throughout Europe. The arrows indicate that there can be developments in many different directions, rather than there being a single direction in which religion is moving; but, in the absence of some kind of

political or military coercion, the overall trend in Europe (and, indeed, elsewhere) would appear to be towards increased diversity.

Figure 1: Religious Diversity



The top half of the diagram extends from (a) hard secularism (manifest as atheism), through (b) an apathetic secularism that is due more to disinterest in religious matters than to any strong antagonism, to (c) a soft, part-time secularism which might, when pressed, encompass a belief in some sort of god or special force and is quite likely to call on the traditional religions at times of crises and for *rites de passages*. The lower part of Figure 1 represents (d) the appearance of strong conservative revivals and fundamentalist innovations (not necessarily an oxymoron), and (f) at the other extreme, the emergence of beliefs and practices of a more spiritual orientation. Between the two poles are (e) numerous new religions that are more or less conservative or spiritual in nature. Spirituality is thus placed in opposition to conservatism on the one hand and secularism on the other.

2.2. Conservative religiosity and contemporary spirituality

The model depicted in Table 1 delineates two ideal-typical caricatures consisting of clusters of theological and social beliefs or orientations that allow us to locate, on a comparative basis, a particular movement or group of individuals nearer or further from one or other of the ideal-typical poles which are labelled respectively spirituality and religiosity. The underlying hypothesis is that groups or individuals who exhibit one or more of the characteristics belonging to the spirituality cluster are more likely to exhibit other spiritual characteristics than

characteristics associated in the model with the traditional religion cluster. If, for example, an unchurched individual, X, believes that the source of the Divine is within himself and that when he dies his soul will be reincarnated, then the model invites us to predict that he would be less likely to believe in Satan and original sin than another individual, Y, if she attends church and believes in a personal God who revealed Himself through the Old Testament. The possibility of falsifying such a prediction through empirical testing is, of course, part and parcel of the scientific enterprise (Popper, 1963:ch.1).

Table 1: An ideal-typical distinction between Scriptural religiosity and spirituality, indicating hypothesised oppositions in theological and social orientations

	Religiosity (of The Book)	Spirituality
<i>The Divine</i>	Transcendent & Particular	Immanent & cosmic
<i>Source</i>	Without	Within
<i>Origins</i>	Creation	Creating
<i>Source of Knowledge</i>	Scripture/revelation	Experience/mysticism
<i>Authority</i>	Dogma/Priesthood/Tradition	Personal experience
<i>Theodicy</i>	Evil/sin/Satan	Lack of attunement, balance &/or awareness
<i>Life after death</i>	Salvation/resurrection/damnation	Reincarnation/transmigration/Mokṣa
<i>Time</i>	Temporal/historical	Eternal/a-historical
<i>Change</i>	Lineal: past/present/future	Cyclical: then/now/then
<i>Perspective</i>	Analytical	Holistic/syncretistic
<i>Anthropology</i>	Man in God's image	Humans as part of Nature
<i>Distinctions</i>	Dichotomous: Them/us	Complementarity: Us (them=them/us)
<i>Sex/gender</i>	Male/(female)	Feminine~(masculine)
<i>Relations</i>	Controlling	Relating ('sharing')
<i>Social Identity</i>	Group (membership of tradition)	The inner 'me'/the 'true self'
<i>Control</i>	External authority	Internal responsibility
<i>Organisational unit</i>	Institution/family	Individual
<i>Place of worship</i>	Synagogue; church; mosque	Informal building; temple; shrine; open air
<i>Communication</i>	Vertical hierarchy	Horizontal networking

For a movement or individual near the religiosity pole, the Divine is seen as a transcendent, personal God, separate from the believer, although possibly also dwelling within. There is belief in a creation myth and an eschatological faith in an eventual end time. The world is likely to be divided into dichotomous distinctions (them and us; before and after; good and bad; male and

female; godly and satanic). Truth and morality tend to be absolute and are known through God's revelation in the Bible or through some specially chosen prophets. Human beings are considered inherently sinful and in need of God's grace to receive salvation. Following death, the body is resurrected into heaven (or damned to hell, possibly after a period in purgatory).

For the spiritually oriented type, 'the god within' is an integral part of the human individual, who may, in turn, be conceptualised as an integral part of nature and/or of the cosmos. Time tends to be perceived as basically cyclical, tied to the seasons and the natural cycle of birth, growth, death and rebirth. Truth and morality are likely to be seen as relative to the situation rather than absolute, universal laws or commandments. Concepts such as sin and guilt are alien; yin and yang complementarity and balance are stressed with, perhaps, a greater (rebalancing) emphasis on the feminine and on an awareness of environmental issues. A fundamental value is placed on personal experience and personal responsibility.

But, to repeat, these are methodological caricatures. The two clusters of characteristics are unlikely to be found unambiguously together in reality. It is perfectly possible that actual groups and/or individuals could be closer to one pole on one characteristic and to the other pole on another characteristic.

3. Uses of the concept of spirituality


3.1. Different meanings of spirituality

The concept of spirituality is, of course, by no means new; it has long been in common usage and is familiar to any English speaker. The most cursory survey of the literature immediately reveals a vast array of different meanings being promoted or assumed. Logically, there are five different kinds of relationships that could exist between the concepts of religiosity and spirituality. These are represented in Figure 2, with the two concepts being interchangeable in the first diagram (a). In diagram (b), spirituality is represented as one or more (possibly very different) sub-divisions of religiosity, examples could be the Spiritual Baptists (Shouters); religions involving spirit possession (Lewis, 1988); or Spiritualism, be it conjuring up pictures of elderly ladies summoning mediums to bring forth messages from Uncle Fred, now residing in the hereafter (frequently with a chronic cough), or more sophisticated beliefs in the spirit world (Nelson, 1969). A variant of this would be when spirituality is seen as the very core of religiosity, lying, perhaps, in the mysticism experienced by the 'truly religious', such as Meister Eckhardt, Hildegard of Bingen, or Julian of Norwich – or, more recently, persons such as

Thomas Merton, Bede Griffith, Mother Theresa or the Dalai Lama. Spirituality in this sense may be pursued by a variety of means such as the exercises of Ignatius of Loyola, the practices of Sufism, the devotions of the Indian siddha, or diverse forms of meditation, chanting or yoga, including practices associated with contemporary New Age and/or Human Potential groups.

Conversely, as in (c), religiosity may be seen as a subsection of spirituality, the latter being the all-encompassing concept. This is the position taken by some New Agers or Human Potential practitioners who see spirituality as embracing all aspects of life. There are, however, other New Agers who want to distance themselves from religion, which is seen as institutionalised and (therefore) dead. They (like some conservative religionists who are highly suspicious of New Age ideas and associate them with the idea of spirituality) would prefer to define the two concepts as entirely discrete phenomena, as represented in diagram (e). In diagram (d) the two concepts overlap, sharing some characteristics but not others. The overlap may be almost complete as in diagram (a), or it may be almost non-existent as in diagram (e) – as, for example, when the President of the Shri Ram Chandra Mission, Shri Parthasarathi Rajagopalachari (1992:104), declares ‘... spirituality represents everything that religion is not. The only thing we can say they have in common is the idea of God’.

Figure 2: Some potential relationships between religiosity and spirituality



Sometimes the distinction between spirituality and religiosity is used to fill an apparent overlap between the religious and the secular, particularly those segments of the population that are labelled 'the unchurched' (Fuller, 2001; Hay, 2000) or 'believers not belongers' (Davie, 1994). The modern (or, perhaps more cogently, the post-modern) understanding of spirituality in the kind of new-age manifestation outlined in Table 1 is widely associated with the USA – and California in particular; but although it is frequently assumed that the emergence of unchurched spirituality is a comparatively new phenomenon, it has a long history in different societies throughout the world. Turning the clock back two millennia, for example, we learn that the Gnostic Gospels were 'spiritual' in a number of ways not unlike those of some contemporary movements: they embraced mystical experiences, promoted the importance of the feminine and distinguished the false from the true church not in its relationship to the clergy but through the quality of personal relationships and 'spiritual fellowship with those united in communion' (Apocalypse of Peter, quoted in Pagels, 1982:118). Not altogether surprisingly, this account of Jesus' teachings was suppressed by some of the early Christian leaders because it lacked the dogmatic boundaries and hierarchical structures that were deemed necessary to hold the Church together.

Jumping to North America, Robert Fuller (2001:13) argues that, although the early colonists might have been very religious according to some criteria, this was not in the commonly accepted sense of the word. He provides a fascinating account of the history of alternative spiritual practices throughout American history, charting the interplay of such phenomena as the occult, witchcraft, divination, astrology, intermingled with alchemy, Hermeticism, Rosicrucianism, Swedenborgianism, Metaphysical religion, a variety of alternative medicines and world views, and psychological spirituality, ending up with what he terms the new eclecticism.

3.2. Some findings from the USA

Today there are numerous books, particularly those on the New Age and modern Paganism, that provide descriptions of how individuals and small groups use the concept of spirituality (see, for example, Anthony et al, 1987; Bowman, 1999; Cox, 1994; Crowley, 1998; Dillon & Wink, 2003; Ellwood, 1994; Fontana, 2003; Fox, 1991; Griffin, 1999; Hanegraaff, 1999; Heelas, 2000; Pennick, 1997; Wuthnow, 2001), but few studies have tried to test how a random sample of an entire population might understand the concept. There have, however, been some. In a telephone survey conducted in 1999 with a randomly selected national

sample of 100 adults aged 18 and over, respondents were asked what the word spirituality meant to them. The replies are summarised in Table 2.

Table 2: Selected responses ranked in order of frequency of mention to the question: ‘What does the word spirituality mean to you?’

1.	Belief in God/seeking to grow closer to God
2.	Belief in a higher power, something beyond oneself/sense of awe and mystery in the universe
3.	Inner peace/state of mind
4.	Seeking to be a good person/lead a good life
5.	Seeking the inner self/the being within your body/the essence of your personal being/evolving into a whole spirit/experiencing spiritual side of the natural order
6.	Reach human potential/to affirm sense of personal worth
7.	What has been learned from upbringing, school, church, the Bible
8.	A mystical bond with other people
9.	Sense of right and wrong/to know who you are and what you are doing is right
10.	Calmness to my life
11.	Going to church and being a good person

(Gallup & Jones, 2000:184/5)

Almost a third defined spirituality with no reference to God or a higher authority (Gallup & Jones, 2000:49). When asked whether they thought of ‘spirituality’ more in a personal and individual sense, or more in terms of organised religion and church doctrine, 72 per cent of the respondents said the former, and 21 per cent the latter (Gallup & Jones, 2000:185). It should, of course, be remembered that belief in God is higher in the United States than in most of Europe: 79 per cent of Gallup’s respondents said they had no doubt about God’s existence; but 12 per cent said that while they did not believe in a personal God they did believe in a higher power of some kind (Gallup & Jones, 2000:187).

Returning to the earlier discussion about the logical possibilities of the relationship between religiosity and spirituality as depicted in Figure 2, a study by Zinnbauer and Pargament (1997:555) found religiosity was perceived as, respectively, (a) the same as (3 per cent); (b) encompassing (10 per cent); (c) encompassed by (39 per cent); (d) overlapping with (42 per cent); and (e) separate from (7 per cent) spirituality. Three quarters (74 per cent) of their respondents (who were largely, though not entirely, selected from Christian churches) identified themselves as both-religious-and-spiritual, 4 per cent as

religious-but-not-spiritual, 3 per cent as neither-religious-nor-spiritual and 19 per cent as spiritual-but-not-religious. In other words, a total of 93 per cent identified themselves as spiritual, compared to 78 per cent identifying themselves as religious. When they compared the spiritual-and-religious with the spiritual-not-religious, the former were more likely to attend church, to follow some sort of religious orthodoxy, and to exhibit right-wing authoritarian tendencies, while the latter were more likely to be involved with New Age beliefs and practices; (Zinnbauer & Pargament, 1997:559).²

Those who identified themselves as spiritual-not-religious in Zinnbauer and Pargament's study were similar in many ways to the 'highly active seekers' identified by Wade Clark Roof (1993) from among America's baby-boomers. In the conclusion of a book Roof and others edited on the post-war generation in the West, late- or post-modern spirituality was summarised as exhibiting five main characteristics: (a) having an emphasis on individual choice; (b) mixing codes; (c) drawing on both New Age and Eastern religions *and* conservative, evangelical (often charismatic or Pentecostal) religions; (d) placing a high premium on religious experience and growth; and (e) displaying an anti-institutional and anti-hierarchical stance (Roof et al, 1995:247-52).

Perhaps at this point I could anticipate the discussion that follows in the rest of this chapter by mentioning that when Marler & Hadaway (2002:292) compared five American studies that asked about religiosity and spirituality, all of these had a higher percentage of respondents claiming to be spiritual but not religious than the percentage that emerged from the RAMP (Religious and Moral Pluralism) survey. This could be because: (a) the respondents were American rather than European; (b) not all the American samples were randomly selected from the population as a whole; (c) slightly different questions were asked; and/or (d) slightly different answers were open to the respondents, RAMP having offered a neutral option.

However, none of these American studies was available at the time I was invited to join the RAMP team. This consisted mainly of social scientists interested in exploring European religious and moral pluralism in greater depth than had been possible with the European Values Surveys (with which several of them were connected). Having become familiar with unchurched seekers and New Age practitioners in my qualitative research, I was eager to include

² It has been estimated that in the late 1600s less than one third of all adult Americans belonged to a church; then, by the start of the Revolutionary War, only about 17 per cent of Americans were churched. By 1980, however, church adherence was about 62 per cent (Finke & Stark, 1992:15).

questions that would enable us to explore the distribution and content of spirituality. My suggestions were, however, met with scepticism. We were Europeans, not Americans, and almost all my colleagues were scholars who focused primarily on large-scale surveys rather than in-depth interviews or observation. They said they did not really understand what I was getting at, and that not only would our respondents have no idea what we meant if we were to ask them about spirituality, but we would have no idea what they meant if they responded to such questions. It was gently suggested that perhaps I had spent too much time talking to ‘weirdoes’ in California. I, on my part, wondered whether perhaps they had spent too much time sitting in front of their VDUs. Eventually, however, they agreed to include one question on spirituality, and I had to content myself with adding some of the other questions in which I was interested to the end of the British questionnaire.

The English version of the question (number 39) that was included was formulated as: ‘Whether or not you think of yourself as a religious person, would you say that you have a spiritual life – something that goes beyond just an intellectual or emotional life?’ It was situated in a section where there were a number of questions about subjects such as belief in God, salvation, what happens after death, membership of a faith community, and attendance at a place of worship. The question immediately preceding Question 39 was about the extent to which the respondents’ religious beliefs influenced (a) their daily life and (b) how they made important decisions. Before that, question 37 had asked: ‘Whether or not you go to church or a place of worship, to what extent would you say that you are a religious person?’

4. The RAMP results³

As it turned out, both my colleagues and I had been right. They had been right in saying that the concept of spirituality had not been satisfactorily operationalised and we did not really know what it had meant to the respondents. Indeed, the question on spirituality had been translated in a slightly different way into the different languages, and even within any particular country it was clear that it had meant something different to different respondents. But I had been right in suspecting there was something out there that we needed to investigate.

³ Although five more countries were involved in the creation of the questionnaire, only 11 were successful in gaining funds. The British survey, which lasted just over an hour, involved a representative sample of 1466 respondents aged 18 or over and was conducted by the British Market Research Bureau in 1998.

The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they considered themselves to be religious and to have a spiritual life on a Likert scale ranging from 7 if they definitely thought of themselves as religious/spiritual to 1 if they definitely did not. In Table 3, responses 1-3 appear as ‘not religious/spiritual’ and 5-7 as ‘am religious/spiritual’. If respondents entered the neutral value of 4 in one or both of their answers, they were removed from the calculation. Of the remaining respondents, just over half (52 per cent) considered themselves religious, and exactly half (50 per cent) considered they had some sort of spiritual life. A quarter (26 per cent) of the non-religious and 71 per cent of the religious considered themselves spiritual. Had the question about spirituality not been asked, more than one in ten (12 per cent) of all these respondents – a quarter (26 per cent) of those who denied being religious – might have been classified as secular when in fact they considered themselves spiritual. Of course, we may not know what they meant by ‘spiritual’, but it is doubtful that many of them would have taken it to mean secular.

Table 3: Cross tabulation of self-assessments of religiosity and spirituality (%)

Q37 Do you consider yourself a religious person?		Q39 Do you have a spiritual life?		Total
		No	Yes	
Not religious		74	26	100
		70	25	
	Total	35	12	48
Am religious		29	71	100
		30	75	
	Total	15	37	52
Total		50	50	100
		100	100	
	Total	50	50	100

N=7,393. Due to rounding, numbers do not always add up.

Furthermore, it transpired that question 39 had not met with the mass rejection which had been predicted by some of the RAMP team. Overall, 92 per cent of the respondents were willing to answer. Respondents in Roman Catholic countries (which included the two central European countries) tended to be most confused by the term – Hungary (18 per cent), Poland (16 per cent) and Portugal (13 per cent) being most likely to say that they did not know what was meant by leading a spiritual life; Finns (10 per cent); Belgians (9 per cent); Norwegians (9 per cent); and Swedes (8 per cent) had some difficulty, but

Danes (5 per cent); Italians (4 per cent); Britons and the Dutch (both 3 per cent) apparently had few problems with the concept.⁴

As already intimated, a problem with Table 3 is that a third of the respondents were eliminated because they gave the neutral response of 4 to questions 37 and/or 39. The full spread of answers can be seen in Table 4.

Table 4: Religiosity and spirituality with neutral responses (%)

	Definitely not spiritual	2	3	4	5	6	Definitely spiritual	Total
Not at all religious	8	2	1	2	1	1	1	16
2	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	10
3	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	10
4	4	2	3	6	3	1	2	22
5	2	2	2	4	5	3	2	20
6	1	1	1	2	2	3	2	12
Definitely religious	1	0	0	1	1	1	4	9
Total	21	11	10	19	15	11	12	100

N=11,359. Totals do not always add up due to rounding.

One way of including the neutral responses (4) was to make a comparison between each individual's answers to see whether s/he claimed to be *equally*, *more* or *less* spiritual than religious.

Table 5 indicates that although over a third (38 per cent) considered they were more religious than spiritual, nearly a third (32 per cent) considered themselves equally spiritual and religious and only slightly less (30 per cent) saw themselves as being more spiritual than religious.

Another point of interest, however, is that (a) of those who were both-religious-and-spiritual, over half were both equally; with just over a quarter being more spiritual, and the remaining fifth more religious; and (b) again, just over half those who were neither-religious-nor-spiritual were equally so, with 17 per cent being more spiritual, and 28 per cent more religious.

⁴ For some reason the Catholic countries were the only ones to offer the option of saying that the respondent did not know what the term meant, while the other countries merely coded 'missing'. This suggests that the translation and/or administration could have had a role to play in the outcome. We might, nevertheless, want to investigate the availability of religious (widely defined) concepts as a cultural resource in post-communist countries, compared with the situation in Western Europe, which, in turn, could be compared with that in the USA.

Table 5: Relative religiosity and spirituality for individual respondents

	Frequency	%	Valid %
Spirituality greater than religiosity	3,378	27	30
Spirituality same as religiosity	3,614	29	32
Religiosity greater than spirituality	4,347	35	38
Total valid responses	11,339	92	100
Missing (no response to one or both questions)	1,003	8	–
N. (Total number of respondents)	12,342	100	–

Of those who assessed themselves as more spiritual than religious, 43 per cent were likely to say they were not religious, compared to 36 per cent calling themselves both, the remaining scoring low on both, though obviously lower on religiosity. Of those who saw themselves more religious than spiritual, nearly half were positively religious and negatively spiritual, while nearly a third were low on both, compared to less than a quarter being high on both. Those who assessed themselves equally religious and spiritual were just about as likely to score high on both as to score low on both. In other words, if spirituality is greater, then it is likely that both are high; but if religiosity is greater, then it is more likely that both score low. Frequencies indicate that spirituality received a slightly more emphatic yes or no, while religion received more moderate affirmations and denials.

For the purposes of brevity and clarity, despite the fact that it means eliminating around a third of the respondents, most of the discussion in this section will focus on the four groups of respondents (presented in Table 3) who fell clearly into one of the following four categories: (1) neither-religious-nor-spiritual ('neither'); (2) religious-but-not-spiritual ('only-religious'); (3) spiritual-but-not-religious ('only-spiritual'); and (4) both-spiritual-and-religious ('both').

4.1. Spirituality by Country

Table 6 shows that roughly the same proportion of Belgians, Danes, Finns, Britons, Hungarians, and Dutch (but a far larger proportion of Swedes and Norwegians, a considerably lower proportion of Italians and Portuguese, and almost no Poles) fell in the 'only-spiritual' category. But the total proportion who agreed to being spiritual ('both' *and* 'only-spiritual') was remarkably consistent between the countries – in other words, it was the extent to which they called themselves religious (with or without spirituality) that varied more dramatically (by 62 percentage points compared to 27 points for spirituality).

Table 6: Religiosity compared to spirituality by country (%)

Country	N.	Neither religious nor spiritual	Religious but not spiritual	Spiritual but not religious	Both spiritual & religious	Total	All religious	All spiritual
Belgium	940	45	14	12	28	100	42	40
Denmark	388	42	18	13	27	100	45	40
Finland	470	33	10	13	44	100	54	57
Great Britain	970	44	11	13	32	100	43	45
Hungary	526	40	13	15	33	100	46	48
Italy	1,374	18	16	8	59	100	75	67
Netherlands	694	41	19	12	28	100	47	40
Norway	310	50	8	22	20	100	28	42
Poland	548	13	34	2	51	100	85	53
Portugal	523	25	20	8	47	100	67	55
Sweden	649	53	5	24	18	100	23	42
Total	7,392	35	15	12	37	100	52	49

N=11,359. Totals do not always add up due to rounding.

4.2. Sex

Although, as might be expected, there was a clear difference between the sexes when asked if they considered themselves religious (44 per cent males; 60 per cent females) or spiritual (42 per cent males; 57 per cent females), Table 7 shows that there was almost no difference between males and females who considered themselves 'only-religious' (14 and 16 per cent respectively) or 'only-spiritual' (12 and 13 per cent).

Table 7: Religiosity compared to spirituality by sex (%)

Sex	Neither religious nor spiritual	Religious but not spiritual	Spiritual but not religious	Both spiritual & religious	Total	All religious	All spiritual
Male	43	14	12	30	100	44	42
Female	28	16	13	44	100	60	57
All respondents	35	15	12	37	100	52	49

N=7,391. Totals do not always add up due to rounding.

4.3. Age

As can be seen from the right-hand figures in Table 8, when age is held constant there was very little difference between the percentages of respondents

under 55 calling themselves religious and those calling themselves spiritual. Respondents over 55 were more likely to call themselves spiritual than those under 55, but they were far *more* likely to call themselves religious. Put another way, the majority of young people denied they were *either* religious or spiritual, while the majority of older people affirmed that they were one or other or both. Respondents under 25 were marginally more likely to call themselves spiritual than religious, however, ‘only-religious’ increases with age, and there are actually twice as many under-25s (17 per cent) as over-64s (8 per cent) calling themselves ‘only-spiritual’. A further breakdown by country indicates that this is a general pattern (albeit with a few wobbles), with a higher percentage of ‘only-spiritual’ the younger the respondent. This is especially evident among the Scandinavians, with over a third of Swedes under-25s compared to a fifth of the over-64s, and a quarter of Danish under-25s compared to less than a tenth of the over-64s claiming to be ‘only-spiritual’.⁵

In other words, while the additional use of ‘spirituality’ does not compensate for the drop in religiosity amongst the younger generations, when used as an *alternative* to religiosity it exposes an alternative way of being something other than secular.

Table 8: Age by religiosity/spirituality (%)

	Neither religious nor spiritual (a)	Religious not spiritual (b)	Spiritual not religious (c)	Both religious & spiritual (d)	Total	All religious (b+d)	All spiritual (c+d)
Under 25	41	14	17	28	100	42	45
25-34	41	14	13	31	100	45	45
35-44	39	13	13	35	100	48	48
45-54	35	14	13	38	100	52	51
55-64	28	18	9	44	100	63	54
Over 64	26	17	8	49	100	66	57

N=7378. Totals do not always add up due to rounding.

It might of course be that such patterns are related to changing age rather than any changes in society as a whole, and that not only would we have got similar results 50 years ago, we shall have a similar age distribution in the mid-twenty-first century. There was, however, no evidence that the older

⁵ There were too few ‘only-spiritual’ respondents in any cohort for there to be any significant pattern among either the Portuguese or the Polish respondents.

respondents were less religious when they were younger. Another possibility is that young people are not doing and believing something fundamentally different from their elders, but are merely using a different concept popularised within youth culture through such media as the Beatles and Californian counter-movements. More research needs to be conducted into both these possibilities, especially in Europe.

4.4. Beliefs

Moving from the ascribed variables of sex and age to questions that could provide some clues as to what clusters of beliefs might be correlated with the different combinations of religiosity and spirituality, Tables 9 and 10 show respondents’ answers to questions about their images of God and what they think is likely to happen to them after they die.

Table 9: Concepts of God: Q32 “Which of these statements comes nearest to your own belief?” (%)

	Neither religious nor spiritual	Religious not spiritual	Spiritual not religious	Both religious & spiritual	All
I believe in a God with whom I can have a personal relationship	7	45	9	62	33
I believe in an impersonal spirit or life force	15	14	28	11	15
I believe that God is something within each person, rather than something out there	28	37	35	26	29
I don’t believe in any kind of God, spirit or life force	29	1	15	0	12
I really don’t know what to believe	22	4	13	1	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100

N=7,313. Percentages do not always add up to 100 due to rounding.

Here a pattern emerges which clearly supports the suspicion that leading a spiritual life can mean at least two very different things to different respondents: those who report that they are *both* religious and spiritual would appear to be *more* traditionally religious according to the ideal-typical model set out in Table 1 than are ‘only-religious’ respondents, while those who are ‘only-spiritual’ are likely to be *less* traditionally religious than ‘only-religious’ (though more religious than ‘neither religious nor spiritual’). This was evident

so far as the item concerning the respondents' image of God was concerned: 62 per cent of 'both', compared to 45 per cent of 'only-religious' and less than one in ten 'only-spiritual' believed in a personal God, while for the 'only-spiritual' respondents the most popular option was the God within (35 per cent), followed by an impersonal spirit or life force (28 per cent) and not knowing what to believe (13 per cent); there were also 15 per cent who did not believe in any kind of God.

Table 10: Life after death: Q.33 "What do you think happens to us after death?" (%)

	Neither religious nor spiritual	Religious but not spiritual	Spiritual but not religious	Both religious & spiritual
Nothing – death is the end	43	17	24	8
There is something, but I don't know what	23	38	32	36
We go either to heaven or to hell	2	15	4	24
We all go to heaven	1	5	1	6
We are reincarnated – that is, after our physical death we are born in this world over and over again	3	5	12	8
We merge into some kind of eternal bliss after this life	1	4	3	8
Other	2	1	4	3
I don't know whether there is anything or not	26	15	22	8
Total	100	100	100	100

N=7,314. Percentages do not always add up to 100 due to rounding.

Not unexpectedly, the 'only-spiritual' respondents were the ones who were most likely to opt for reincarnation (12 per cent),⁶ but many more (32 per cent) chose the 'something, but don't know what' option. The pattern observed in

⁶ Those who are familiar with the European Value Surveys will notice that the percentage of RAMP respondents affirming that they believe in reincarnation is less than half that for the EVS (24 per cent of British respondents in 1990 (Ashford & Timms, 1992)). This is due to the EVS question asking whether the respondent believed or did not believe in reincarnation – and being able, as many did, to say that they believed both in reincarnation and, in another question, in resurrection. RAMP respondents were asked to choose *between* reincarnation and other possibilities. (For an interesting discussion about the ways the concept of reincarnation is used in Britain, see Walter & Waterhouse, 2001).

Table 10 also repeated itself with 30 per cent of ‘both’, 20 per cent of ‘only-religious’ and 5 per cent of ‘only-spiritual’ respondents believing we go to heaven or hell. The same pattern appears when we look at responses to questions added to the British survey as shown in Table 11 in so far as they were replying to questions about issues such as the return of Jesus, the existence of Satan and the power of prayer.

Table 11: Religious/Spiritual percentage agreeing with statements

	Neither religious nor spiritual	Religious not spiritual	Spiritual not religious	Religious and spiritual
I believe in the power of prayer	9	60	24	77
Jesus will return to the earth some day	6	37	8	52
One can see the work of Satan at work in the world today	11	33	16	50
People are responsible for everything that happens to them	51	50	49	39
Most churches are dead or boring	39	24	41	29
There are spiritualists who bring authentic messages from the dead to the living	28	23	28	32
People are so afraid of being thought to be racist these days that blacks and Asians are given preferential treatment	47	54	43	42
On the whole I trust alternative medicine more than I trust orthodox medicine	19	31	32	25
Crystals have a special power to heal or help us	11	20	25	21
Human beings have made contact with extra-terrestrials who have visited earth in UFOs	19	18	37	26
There is intelligent life on other planets	38	36	65	38

In other words, so far as conventional Christian beliefs were concerned, respondents who said they had a spiritual life and combined it with religiosity would be mapped close to the religiosity pole of the ideal types depicted in Table 1, but respondents claiming to have a spiritual life while denying that they were religious would be mapped at the spirituality end – and those calling themselves religious but not spiritual would be somewhere in the middle.

Patterns for other beliefs were less easy to detect, however. Clearly the variety of different meanings and characteristics related to leading a spiritual life were not going to emerge through cross tabulation alone, so, using the extra

data obtained from the British survey, factor analysis and principle component analyses were used to probe a bit further into the variety of profiles correlated with those who felt they had some sort of spiritual life.

4.5. Principle components from the British data

In a number of principle component analyses applied to the data (bringing back into the calculations respondents who had opted for a neutral response to questions 37 and/or 39), the first component always reflected general religiosity and spirituality, but there was quite a lot of variation between the different countries when it came to subsequent components, and within a country according to the items that were loaded onto the components. By applying the analysis to the British data, which had had an extra forty-one statements added to the end of the questionnaire, a three-component solution seemed to offer a fairly clear summary of the patterns of correlations in the data (albeit one explaining only just over a quarter (27 per cent) of the variance in the data). Component scores were computed during the analysis as summary measures of the dimension for cross-validation with other key variables in the survey. The numbers in Table 12 give the correlations between each item and each component.

Component 1: Traditional religiosity

The component that emerged most clearly accounts for 14 per cent of the variance. Correlating the component score with questions 37 and 39, it was found to be positively related both to religiosity (Pearson's correlation coefficient = 0.76) and to spirituality (0.50). Items with high loadings on this component indicated a strong acceptance of orthodox Christian dogma (around 70 per cent of Britons call themselves Christians of one sort or another), and the importance of religious practices. A conviction that both God and Satan are active in the world and that prayer can make a difference also loaded highly on this component, as did support for mainstream religious leadership and the belief that it should play a central role in the society as well as in individuals' lives.

Component 2: Unorthodox authoritarianism

The second component accounts for 6 per cent of the variance. There was no correlation (at the 0.05 level of significance) between the component score and either religiosity or spirituality. Mainstream religious beliefs did not load highly on this component; instead the dimension reflected a number of non-orthodox beliefs that could be described as superstitions and possibly science fiction. A generally negative reaction towards religious people and some quite strong ethnocentric, racist, and anti-minority-religion sentiments figured in this component.

Component 3: Liberal spirituality

The third component also accounts for 6 per cent of the variance. Its component score was uncorrelated with religiosity, but positively correlated with spirituality (correlation = 0.36), and it was the component that most clearly resembled the model of spirituality characterized in Table 1. Items with high loadings reflected unorthodox rather than traditional Scriptural beliefs, but these tended to be related to 'other worlds' and alternative perspectives rather than specific superstitions. Tolerance for minority beliefs and practices was reflected in high loadings for the relevant survey items, and statements in support of multiculturalism also loaded relatively highly. The racist and ethnocentric attitudes found in component 2 had negative loadings in this component.

Table 12: Principle Components Analysis from British Data (N=1058)

	<i>Components</i>		
	1	2	3
I believe in the power of prayer	0.80		
Jesus is both God and man	0.75		
In deciding between right and wrong, I am influenced by my religion	0.74		
Everyone should receive Christ into their lives	0.70		
Jesus will return to the earth some day	0.70		
A religious service is important for celebrating a birth	0.69		
A religious service is important for celebrating marriage	0.66		-0.25
A religious service is important for celebrating death	0.62		
Jesus was a prophet	0.60		0.22
There are angels	0.59	0.20	
One can see the work of Satan at work in the world today	0.56		
If people have no religious beliefs, it may become more difficult to have good moral behaviour in society	0.51		
Jesus never existed	-0.50	0.23	
Jesus was a religious leader	0.49		
The more science advances, the more difficult it is for me to believe in God	-0.49		
If you want people to tell the truth in court, then they should be made to swear an oath with reference to God	0.47		-0.26
In making laws about moral question, such as abortion and euthanasia, representatives of the main religions should be consulted	0.47		
Religious leaders should give a much clearer direction on moral behaviour	0.43		
I experience something beyond everyday reality all the time*	0.43		0.29
The main religions should have an influence on politics in my country	0.41		

	<i>Components</i>		
	1	2	3
My certainty about religious and spiritual questions is stronger than it was ten years ago	0.40		0.21
No one can know for certain that God exists	-0.40		
The mainstream religions should be more concerned with the Millennium	0.32	0.25	
Whether one is religious or not, one ought to support the national Church of the country one belongs to	0.32	0.27	-0.34
Nearly all religious people are hypocrites or fanatics	-0.32	0.31	-0.22
A holy object can protect or help people	0.31	0.36	
Most human suffering in this world is because of God punishing us for our sins	0.31	0.24	
There are spiritualists who bring authentic messages from the dead to the living		0.59	0.29
Human beings have made contact with extraterrestrials who have visited earth in UFOs		0.58	0.32
Crystals have a special power to heal or help us		0.58	0.20
Some people can remember a bit of what happened in a past life		0.58	
A talisman or lucky charm can protect or help people		0.44	0.26
I consult my horoscope daily*		0.43	
There is intelligent life on other planets		0.40	0.35
I trust alternative medicine more than I trust Orthodox medicine		0.37	
Most human suffering in this world is because of fate or destiny	0.24	0.36	
Women are more spiritual than men		0.33	
Science can, by itself, give meaning to life		0.30	
People are so afraid of being thought to be racist these days that blacks and Asians are given preferential treatment		0.30	-0.30
The increasing variety of religious groups in our society is a source of cultural enrichment			0.63
People should be allowed to take soft drugs if this is part of their religious ritual	-0.22		0.55
Jehovah's Witnesses should be allowed to practise their religion in the country		-0.21	0.50
Girls should be allowed to cover their heads in school if this is part of their religious tradition			0.50
Even if people belong to a particular religion, they should still feel free to draw on other religious traditions			0.49
People should be allowed to commit suicide for religious reasons			0.35
'New Age' ideas are a threat to our society			-0.34
The Church of England should stay as the Established Church in England	0.21		-0.33
For me, God is just what is valuable in human beings	0.29	0.23	
In deciding between right and wrong, I am influenced by the law	0.27		-0.20
Most churches are dead or boring	-0.26	0.25	

	<i>Components</i>		
	1	2	3
In deciding between right and wrong, I am influenced by my upbringing	0.22		
People are responsible for everything that happens to them		0.29	
I am less sure that freedom of religion for every individual is as important as I thought it was ten years ago		0.27	
In the final analysis, I should look after my own interests even if this means I spend less time looking after other people		0.26	-0.21
My conscience is the source of my morality		-0.24	0.21
If a nurse is asked to assist in a legal abortion, she should be allowed to refuse for religious reasons		-0.21	0.26
How you live is more important than saying you believe particular doctrines or attending a place of worship			0.25
More attention should be paid to environmental issues by the main religions			0.23
Parents should be allowed, for religious reasons, to prevent their children having a blood transfusion			0.22
Most modern cults/new religions are harmful			-0.22

Variables are mostly 1-7 scales (some 1-5, indicated with *). The response indicates the response category with the highest coding (e.g. typically 7 = strongly agree).

(Component loadings given for unrotated solution, correlation matrix analysed.)

5. Concluding remarks

This paper has reached no final conclusion. It describes an unfinished journey. But it does invite scholars of religion to pursue the path of understanding the beliefs and practices that are being subsumed under the general concept of spirituality, and of exploring the ways these relate to the diversity of religiosities and secularisms that can be found in contemporary society.

One thing that emerges quite clearly from the RAMP and other data is that the term ‘spiritual’ means different things to different people, some seeing it as complementary to religiosity, others in opposition to it, and yet others understanding the two concepts as having more complicated relationships, with one encompassing or overlapping with the other. The questionnaire was not, however, a sharp enough instrument to be able to identify and disentangle these diverse meanings.

The evidence indicates both that secularisation is not yet triumphant and that claims that secularisation is really a unidimensional shift from religiosity to spirituality are not viable - there is far more than that going on. Space permitted only three components to be described, but manipulating the data in a number

of different ways can result in the emergence of several further clues about different ways of 'being religious'. Some variations of the (widely defined) New Age understanding of spirituality caricatured in Table 1 are certainly to be found in contemporary Europe but, in both theory and practice, it is an amorphous, rather than systematic or well-developed package – New Age ideas by their very nature eschew both dogma and boundaries but celebrate individual choices and emphases which, at their non-extreme extreme represent the multiplicity of countless self-constructed 'Sheilaisms'.⁷ Yet, at the same time, there *are* clusters of beliefs and practice that cohere together – even if they are not recognisably captured by any unambiguous label.

The exact label is not, of course, important – it is people's beliefs and practices that we want to explore. But, although qualitative research can employ other tools, language is a fundamentally important medium through which beliefs and practices are transmitted. And, just as the sociology of religion had to learn that merely asking whether our respondents believe in God does not distinguish between many different kinds of beliefs in many different conceptions of gods, so we now have to develop yet more sophisticated and sensitive ways of distinguishing between different ways of being religious and/or spiritual that may owe as much to individual constructions as to institutionalised traditions. If we want to tap into this variety we have to devise ways of translating the concepts that we use in our interviews and, more challengingly, our quantitative research so that we communicate the same meaning to the Polish peasant and Armenian engineer as we do to the Californian student, the Swedish housewife, the Greek priest – and, perhaps, the Nigerian fisherman and the Chinese bureaucrat... It is a long and convoluted journey, full of unexpected twists and turns – but undoubtedly one that we need to travel if we want to find out what is going on out there.

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⁷ Sheilaism is a term that owes its origin to a young nurse named Sheila Larson who described her faith as 'Sheilaism. Just my own little voice.' (Bellah et al, 1985:221)

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Miklós Tomka

**COMPARING COUNTRIES BY THEIR RELIGIOSITY IN
EASTERN EUROPE**

Country-by-country differences of religiosity cover a wider range in Eastern than in Western Europe (Halman, 2001). They include type and direction of recent religious development and the actual extent of religiosity in individual countries. These differences have their roots in history and in denominational structure, in political developments and in behavior of the churches, and not least in social conditions and changes.

One important, geographically dividing factor is the split between Eastern and Western Christianity (Huntington, 1996). Orthodox culture has a history different from Western Europe. In the fights between papacy and the empire Western Christianity became a co-producer of the differentiation of the church and the state. It contributed to differentiation processes in Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment both in a supporting and in an opposing way. It was one of the indispensable actors of socio-cultural differentiation and consequently of secularisation of Europe in a similarly ambivalent manner. It cooperated in the production of conditions necessary for democracy and pluralism and individualisation. In modern time Western Christianity and churches forwent previous ideological hegemony and accepted the dynamic of a basic cultural competition. In accepting their own classification as parts of a pluralist society and culture even their identity became dependent on profane reality.

Orthodoxy has a different history, lacking substantial events of social differentiation. Its unity with culture, society and the political power is founded on the conviction of a fundamental harmony between the church and the state. The thesis of such a harmony tempered tensions between both and conclusively did not contribute much to the growth of modern conditions. If Western Christianity preserved a balance between innovative, modernizing capacity and the function of socio-cultural and political preservation, in Orthodoxy the second

predominated. It can be assumed that this difference has an impact on the attractiveness of religion in general and especially in times of rapid social change.

Contemporary orthodoxy seems to be rooted basically in popular culture. Its strongholds are rather everyday religious practice and beliefs than dogmatics and juridical regulations; rather liturgy and representations in arts than rational teaching; rather monasteries, holy persons, pilgrimages and the religious calendar with many feasts and holy times than centralized church institution; rather the tradition of grandmothers, the 'babushkas' than organized church life and education. It is not our concern, whether the difference in character of Western and Eastern Christianity expresses different stages or rather a different way in historical development. It has to be yet stressed that sociology of religion emerged in Western culture. Concepts and indicators interpreting and measuring religion were derived from Western experiences and from the vision of a Western modernisation. This one-sidedness is reflected in non-European cultures (Bellah, 1965; Srinivas, 1969; Srivastava, 1969). It should be taken into consideration in respect of Orthodox societies too. The present study concentrates on the countries with substantial Catholic populations, following 'Aufbruch'-survey (Tomka and Zulehner, 1999; 2000). (From the only Orthodox country, which participated in this research, 'Aufbruch' investigated merely the Western region of the country, Transylvania, with its historical belonging to Western Christianity and with big Catholic and Protestant populations.)

Denominational structure can be a relevant factor in other respect as well. In denominationally mixed countries one can expect longer experiences of coping with differences than in mono-religious societies. The first type may be more inclined to pluralism and to competition than the second. Cultural diversity is no guarantee for a higher degree of tolerance and cooperation. It can be a source of polarisation and hostility too. Diversity represents, though, in any case alternatives and excludes the idea and experiences of one single possibility of thinking and behaving.

The different role of Catholicism and Protestantism in European history is sufficiently analyzed. The two branches produced specific patterns for sacred-profane-relations and for communal and social integration; indeed, they had dissimilar contributions to modernisation in Europe. This difference has its expressions and reflections in religious life and organisation as well, which are presumably relevant in contemporary times too. Catholic or Protestant dominance in a country may explain much from religious developments (Martin, 1978).

Another field of explanation is history and politics. Historical experiences may have long lasting effects. Memories, whether a specific church was traditionally an institution of power and dominance, on the side of the “ruler” or even “conqueror”, or on the contrary a vehicle of the opposition from below, a source of national identity obstructing assimilating attempts, may decide about their present reputation (Benavides, Daly, 1989; Houtart, Rousseau, 1973; Lanternari, 1970). Related to present developments the question is, how strong are the need for and the strife to socio-cultural regeneration, for recapturing a stable national identity and which chances and role wait for the church(es) in this endeavor. In the struggle to overcome inferiority complexes countries of Eastern Europe can not refer to their political or economic strength but to performances and qualifications in history and their cultural heritage, the remembrance of which has a very Christian frame of reference.

The extent of resenting religiosity may be influenced, further on, by the historical location of a society as political center or periphery. Centre-nations of big empires started earlier with modernisation and secularisation than populations on the peripheries of empires. Peoples on the periphery preserved, though, their traditions and religion not only because of their inferior status and the delayed development, but as instruments of opposition against oppression as practiced by stronger secularized centers (Spohn, 1998).

Communism created its own contexts. Totalitarianism suspended the differentiation of the social system and slowed down secularisation accordingly. On the other hand, religion with its institutional network offered alternatives to authoritarian systems. Both facts contributed to stabilisation and increase of the social function and presence of religion. Churches with a strong underground dimension in past decades can now apparently more successfully rely on their immediate political history than others which established a compliant cooperation with Communist systems. Religious opposition against the ruling system won sympathies even in non-religious strata. A stronger and longer religious persecution can be, on the other hand, an explanation for losses in religious culture and populations as well.

These and other factors may individually or in combination decide about the present religious situation and the course of religious development. Additionally to these, however, social conditions and changes may have their own separate relevance. A well known hypothesis stresses, that advances of modernisation influence religious change. This hypothesis could be tested by comparison of countries with specific values of modernity and of religiosity. This project required the creation of indicators of religiosity and of modernity.

Indicators of religiosity as used for comparison in the present study are factor values won from 10 individual indicators: belief in God; the image of God as a caring person; experienced closeness to God; the image of Jesus; belief in resurrection; membership in a church; the nature of relations to church; frequency of church-going; frequency of prayer; and finally religious or non-religious identity¹.

Modernity and modernisation can be conceptualized and operationalized in several ways. For the comparison of the countries included in the Aufbruch-survey, which measured religiosity in the countries of East-Central-Europe in 1998-1999, internationally comparative data allow the indication of three main dimensions, those of industrialisation, culture and population development (Human., 1997; The Sex., 1997). The index industrialisation is created out of data of the share of not agricultural employment from total employment and per capita consumption of electricity. The intended combination of both indicators required yet their standardisation. The present study looked for averages of the nine countries and expressed the values of each indicator in individual countries in per cent of the average. These percentages, as being similarly proportional expressions could be added and averaged. In a country-by-country comparison

¹ This set of indicators showed close correlations. A factoranalysis resulted in one factor, explaining 64,74 per cent. The questions and answers were as follows: **Q29**. "There is a God who takes care of each individual human being." - Agreement or disagreement expressed on a 5-point scale. **Q75**. "Do you belong to any church or religious community at present?" yes/no. **Q78**. "How closely do you consider yourself to be bound to your church/ religious community?" 1= isn't a member, 2= not closely at all, ... up to: 6=very closely. **Q184**. "Which of the following sentences best describes your own position?" 1- I do not believe in God, 2- I do not know if God exists and I do not believe that we can attain certainty in this regard, 3- I do not believe in a personal God but I believe in a higher power. 4- Sometimes I believe in God, but other times I do not. 5- Even though I have my doubts, I believe in God. 6- I know that God exists, there is no doubt about it for me. **Q196**. "Which one of these statements best expresses your own opinion?" 1- I am not quite sure if Jesus really lived or not. 2- I know that Jesus was merely an extraordinary man. 3- I cannot decide if Jesus was just a human being or also a divine person. 4- I do not understand it entirely but I believe that Jesus, who lived among us as a man, is also a divine person; 5- I am convinced and believe strongly that Jesus, who lived among us as a man, is the Son of God and a divine person. **Q197**. "How often do you go to church to worship, not including occasions like weddings, baptisms, funerals, etc...?" 6- daily or more often; 5- once or several times a week; 4- at least once a month; 3- several times a year (or: on important holy days); 2- less than this; 1- never. **Q198**. "Disregarding whether or not you go to church, would you say that you are..." 5- especially religious; 4- religious in some way; 3- neither religious nor non-religious; 2- non-religious to an extent; 1- strongly non-religious? **Q199**. "How often do you pray?" 6- daily or more often; 5- once or several times a week; 4- at least once a month; 3- several times a year (or: on important holy days); 2- less than this; 1- never. **Q201**. "How close do you feel to God?" 6- very close; 5- close in some ways; 4- I cannot say; 3- not very close; 2- not close at all; 1- I do not believe in God; **Q232**. "People will rise from dead with body and soul." - Agreement or disagreement expressed on a 5-point scale.

both individual indicators and the industrialisation-index correlate significantly with the level of religiosity.

Modernity in culture and communication were indicated by per capita expenses for public education, the copies of published books per thousand inhabitants and the ratio of internet-households. National values were transformed, once again, into percentages of the nine-country-averages and the values of two kinds of education were averaged. Individual indicators and index-values correlate with religiosity.

The characterisation of population development is based on the reproduction-rate of work-force in 1997, and on the growth-rate of the population between 1950 and 1995. An index is created by the same method as in the above cases. Individual and integrated indicators correlate with the degree of religiosity.

Table 1: Relative values of indicators of modernity and of religiosity in nine East-Central-European countries (In per cent of averages of the same countries).

	CZ	SI	H	SK	HR	PL	LIT	RO	UA
Not agricultural employment from total employment	106,7	112,6	101,9	105,5	100,7	87,5	98,3	91,1	95,9
Per capita consumption of electricity	146,6	142,7	90,6	116,1	68,1	89,6	78,3	63,1	104,8
Industrial development	126,7	127,7	96,3	110,8	84,4	88,6	88,3	77,1	100,4
Per capita expenses for public education	130,7	137,8	146,8	107,3	78,2	102,4	67,2	46,6	83,0
Copies of published books per thousand inhabitants.	136,7	226,9	150,3	97,7	88,6	42,1	115,7	27,0	15,0
Internet-households per thousand inhabitants	270,0	219,0	200,7	63,7	60,2	72,0	7,9	6,1	0,3
Culture and communication	133,7	182,4	148,6	102,5	83,4	72,3	91,5	36,8	49,0
Population-growth-rate between 1950 and 1995	68,8	98,7	81,7	116,4	88,4	117,0	110,0	105,2	105,9
Reproduction-rate of work-force in 1997	91,8	87,8	88,8	112,7	93,8	114,7	107,8	101,8	100,8
Population development	80,3	93,3	85,3	114,6	91,1	115,9	108,9	103,5	103,4
Religiosity factor	167,5	112,0	118,6	91,5	31,7	20,0	61,9	33,1	102,6

These figures are obviously in accordance with the secularisation thesis. There remain, however, questions for the interpretation of the above data. Country-by-country observations of Eastern Europe reflect not only varying completions of modernity, but specific histories of modernisation with differing social consequences. Is the perfection of modernity or rather the speed of modernisation the decisive factor of religious change? Do the present results express stable and enduring interrelations or do they indicate rather temporary arrangements of a cultural lag?

A related problem consists in a peculiar character of modernisation in Communism. Post-world-war-II systems promoted vehemently industrialisation and urbanisation in Eastern Europe. They transformed the family by obliging women to take a job. They persecuted religion both with ideological motives and because religion and churches were the most effective force of opposition. More important than anti-religious policy became the remodeling of human conditions and society. Especially the abolition of private property in agriculture, the organisation of Socialist state farms and "cooperatives" and the following rural exodus contributed to the destruction of local bonds and community ties. These changes corresponded at the best partially with economic aspirations of the people but limited their civil rights by the intensification of political centralisation. Party-states destroyed networks of civil society and limited the differentiation of the social system. Authoritarian state hindered and penalized public initiatives and the creation of independent clubs or associations. The lack of social autonomy created an obstacle for social adaptation to new socio-economic conditions and contributed to an increase of social problems accordingly. The combination of an enforced and unbalanced modernisation and of a tutelage by the state atomized society (Hankiss, 1990). The same politico-economic practice eliminated the meaning of individual endeavors. Individual endeavors and styles, if any, did not easily find communal support for themselves, because of disintegration of society and the official control over the life of citizens. Deviant behavior spread. The loss of individual meaning and the irrationality of authoritarian politics created anomy. One of the most peculiar measurable effects of "communist modernisation" was a phenomenon strongly deviating from global tendencies, the spread of stress-diseases and as a consequence, a decrease or at least a lacking increase of life expectancy all over Eastern Europe, beginning in mid-sixties and reaching in the mid-nineties (Vallin, Meslé, 2000).

One may argue, that in disturbing community relations and fighting tradition totalitarianism demolished the actual milieu of religious life too. As far as

religion is understood as a cultural system (Geertz, 1966) or as an institution of social memory (Hervieu-Léger, 2000), the weakening of systemic character of society includes the deterioration of religious conditions, independently of the autonomous or coerced character of this development. Religious community and organisation act often as entities counteracting social disintegration. Religious motivation may and in communist period did preserve and generate social bonds with better results than any other agency promoting community creation and civil society. This did not yet diminish the relevance of the fact, that the artificial and forceful decomposition of genuine social organisation severely impaired religious life in Eastern Europe. The destruction of socio-cultural autonomy and self-determination was possibly more harmful for religion and the churches than any explicitly intended and realized persecution of religion.

Religion is, however, by no means merely a stabilizing institution or custom and tradition only. On the contrary, it can be innovation, initiative, autonomous value orientation (Williams, Cox and Jaffee, 1992) and a disruptive social force as well (Houtart, 1992; Smith, 1996). Allport distinguishes intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. The first one expressing an independent final value and goal, the second one is an instrument for the sake of other values and interests (Allport, 1950). The two types emerge in combination. It would be, though, a mistake to underestimate the first part, the initiating, challenging and transforming capacity of religion.

In one of his early works Berger attributed only a dependent role to religion, - and came to wrong conclusions. Churches in modernity have to choose, according to this early idea of Berger, between the preservation of their faith or their flock. Stressing orthodoxy would initiate a loss of membership, whilst an emphasis on membership requires liberalisation of the teaching. In any case in the confrontation with socio-cultural changes religion and churches lose a part of their former substance (Berger, 1969). Since Weber and the Protestant-ethic-debate there should be, though, no doubt about the possibility of a genuine autonomous role of religion in social development. Not surprisingly Berger's thesis got vehement opposition from champions of a missionary church (Thung, 1976). And the American religious history in late sixties and seventies offered empirical disaffirmation of the above alternative (Kelley, 1972; Roozen and Hadaway, 1993). The dynamism of religious change is a relevant feature in the analysis of East-European developments too.

Social sources of religious dynamism can be traced both in the realisation of conscious religious options of mature individuals and in emotional religious fervor of socially or culturally uprooted people and in the strife for community

of like-minded people. Modernity creates conditions which dissolve tradition but are favorable to religious ferment. Modernity includes differentiation of life conditions, mobility, as well as promotion of rationality and individualism. Higher reflexivity and transitory life conditions are typical for younger adults, especially students and young graduates. Religious increase is just in these groups most significant in Eastern Europe. With the comparison of cohorts, i.e. groups defined by the years of their births, changes in the same groups can be compared over time. (Table 2).²

In older age groups some substantial religious change is not visible or religiosity even decreases in several countries. With the exception of two out of ten countries survey data prove a religious increase in the life of younger cohorts in past ten years. It demonstrates country differences too, which fit remarkably well into the argumentation about Communist modernisation. In the countries, where strong rural structures and culture were preserved (i.e. because the socialisation of agriculture remained partial, peasants stuck to their lands and industry could not fully absorb the population surplus), like Poland, Ukraine, Romania and – maybe – Croatia, actual generation differences in religiosity are small. Under such conditions in any of the cohorts a substantial change in religiosity over time can not be expected either.

Countries, like the Czech Republic, Hungary and to some extent Lithuania represent the opposite type with rapid socio-economic change in Communist time, with big generation differences as a consequence, but with a tendency towards equalisation after the collapse of Communism. This return to previous proportions includes the stability of religiosity among people born in and before World-war-II. (A small decline of religiosity in some countries is a consequence of the death of the oldest.) A more spectacular realisation of the same tendency is the increase of religiosity among younger people, born after 1960, who reached their maturity and started their life in the atmosphere of the decay of Communism and the emergence of social autonomy.

² 1990 and 1999 figures are taken from European Values Study data-file, 1995 data stem from World Values Survey, which was proceeded as a repetition of the European Values Study. (Halman, 2001, Inglehart, 1997, Zulehner and Denz, 1993) The selection of the countries followed the Aufbruch-survey, in which the same hypotheses as in present article were tested.

Table 2: Ratio of self-expressed religious identity and of belief in God in ten countries in East-Central-Europe, in 1990, 1995 and 1999, in groups discriminated by the respective years of birth. (In %)

Born:	... before 1941	... between 1941-1960	... after 1960	... before 1941	... between 1941-1960	... after 1960
year	Identifies himself/herself as religious			Believes in God		
<i>Eastern Lands of Germany, previously German Democratic Republic</i>						
1990	49,8	33,9	23,5	48,1	31,2	24,6
1995	43,1	23,6	16,6	41,2	23,2	21,5
1999	48,0	21,9	25,8	50,2	24,3	19,9
<i>Poland</i>						
1990	97,6	95,4	95,3	99,0	96,1	97,3
1995	95,5	92,4	92,9
1999	97,0	92,3	93,2	98,4	95,8	97,7
<i>Lithuania</i>						
1990	73,3	46,7	39,3
1995	88,7	83,2	79,1	93,0	83,6	81,5
1999	92,8	85,2	78,5	91,1	87,4	81,2
<i>Czech Republic</i>						
1990	97,2	31,0	21,2	58,3	24,7	20,0
1995	59,4	38,1	27,0	58,7	36,3	26,1
1999	62,5	39,5	33,9	56,9	33,0	33,3
<i>Slovakia</i>						
1990	90,1	72,5	69,9	87,4	67,0	64,0
1995	88,4	78,3	67,8	90,9	81,6	72,7
1999	92,8	81,2	76,1	93,1	82,4	77,7
<i>Ukraine</i>						
1995	67,2	60,9	65,3	78,1	74,0	78,2
1999	76,8	78,3	75,9	80,2	83,0	81,6
<i>Hungary</i>						
1990	76,9	46,9	31,6	86,1	52,7	40,9
1995	70,0	51,7	44,9	77,6	61,0	60,0
1999	73,8	50,3	51,8	84,9	62,6	58,6
<i>Romania</i>						
1995	87,8	83,2	81,1	98,1	96,7	95,8
1999	92,1	86,4	77,6	95,9	98,2	94,9
<i>Slovenia</i>						
1990	80,1	71,3	66,3	73,2	57,8	56,5
1995	78,6	67,6	62,4	72,3	62,0	59,5
1999	79,7	67,8	67,0	74,6	63,5	61,5
<i>Croatia</i>						
1995	80,7	69,3	66,3	90,0	77,3	78,0
1999	86,3	83,4	83,3	93,7	91,1	91,5

Source: 1990 and 1999 figures are taken from European Values Study data-file, 1995 data stem from World Values Survey, which was proceeded as a repetition of the European Values Study.

Available survey data are, however, insufficient for the indication of changes for one crucial dimension of religiosity. The extent of a possible transformation of religiosity from a passively participating and customarily institution oriented to an active and self-styled one is not yet established. Actual data and the knowledge concerning religiosity and religious change in Eastern Europe are therefore in final result highly unsatisfactory. Much evidence is available about modernisation and its economic, social and cultural dimensions. Country-by-country differences of secularisation in a sense of de-institutionalisation are well known. Evidences show how socio-economic and political developments shaped the religious landscape. Systematic research about autonomous processes within religion and the churches is rare yet. This lack hinders the understanding of the growth of new religious movements or of religious revival in general. The same ignorance obstructs any valid prognosis as well. The discovery of this new domain may be the key for future relevance of sociology of religion in Eastern Europe.

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Olaf Müller

**RELIGIOSITY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE:
RESULTS FROM THE PCE SURVEY¹**

1. Introduction

Looking at the state and development of religiosity in the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, one can see a quite heterogeneous landscape. Whereas in Poland and Romania the social significance of the churches as well as of religion in general seems to be as high as decades ago, in East Germany, the Czech Republic or Estonia a huge decline in traditional forms of religion can be observed. On the contrary, in Russia and Albania there seems to be a tendency towards a re-vitalisation of religion. Since all of these countries suffered from their communist past, this raises several questions concerning the causes of the national differences behind the pure fact of political repression of religion. What are the reasons for survival – or decline - of religion under these unfavourable circumstances during the communist period? What can we expect for the future development?

Generally speaking, there are 3 - partly competing – hypotheses, which are discussed in contemporary sociology of religion:

1. The **secularisation hypothesis**, which assumes a general decline of religion. Main cause is the worldwide modernisation process, which leads to a decline of the meaning of religion because of an antagonism of modern age and religion per se (Wilson, 1982).

¹ The project “Political Culture in Central and Eastern Europe” (PCE) is in charge of the project group of the same name at the European University Viadrina and at the Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies (F.I.T.), Frankfurt (Oder). Members are Detlef Pollack (head), Jörg Jacobs, Olaf Müller, and Gert Pickel. The PCE survey was carried out in September 2000 in 11 countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The main coordinator regarding the fieldwork was INRA Germany. The survey was founded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) and the Volkswagen Foundation.

2. The **privatisation/individualisation hypothesis**: According to this approach, there is generally an individual need for religion. The decline of institutionalised forms of religion is not denied, but religion will continue to exist in the private sphere (Luckmann [1967] calls it “invisible religion”).
3. The **re-vitalisation hypothesis**: A certain amount of societal need for religion is postulated. On the religious marketplace, the supply side determines the demand for religion (Iannaccone et al., 1997). According to this thesis, the removal of anti-religious repression should lead to a re-vitalisation of religion in Eastern Europe after the breakdown of communism (Jagodzinski, 2000:54).

In order to analyse the development of religiosity in Eastern Europe one has to take quite a lot of factors into account. Apart from socio-historical aspects (e.g. the state-church relations, especially the collaboration vs. resistance of the national churches during the communist period and World War II with/against the political authorities [Höllinger, 1996], the role of the churches during the transition process etc.), the degree of the socio-economic development and the dominant denomination are mostly emphasised in the literature (Haller, 1988; Pickel, 1998; Tomka and Zulehner, 1999). This contribution deals especially with the question of how modernisation effects and the religious socialisation within the families influence the development of religiosity at the individual as well as at the societal level.

2. Religiosity in the 1990s

The pattern of religiosity in Western Europe seems to support the argument concerning the influence of the dominant denomination quite well. As the development in Western Europe shows, de-churching occurred earlier and to a higher extent in Protestantism as compared to Catholicism (cf. also Haller, 1988; Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere, 1993). Indeed, the Protestant societies of Scandinavia show the lowest rates of church attendance and belief in God. Denominationally mixed countries, such as Great Britain, West Germany, or the Netherlands take a middle position. Predominantly Catholic states, such as Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal are characterised by considerable high rates of church attendance and belief in God.²

² Naturally, there are some exceptional cases: Strictly following our typology, we would expect Northern Ireland somewhere in the middle, whereas France should take a top or at least a middle

Table 1: Indicators of “traditional” religiosity in Europe

	Belief in God (%)		Church attendance p.a. (mean)	
	1991	1998/*2000	1991	1998/*2000
Italy	86	88	24	21
Portugal		92	20	22
Spain		82	18	19
Ireland	95	94	41	38
France		52	7	8
Austria	78	81	18	16
Netherlands	55	59	11	10
Switzerland		73	11	10
West Germany	67	62	13	10
Great Britain	69	68	11	10
Northern Ireland	95	89		27
Sweden		46	5	5,5
Denmark		57	5	5
Norway	60	58	5	5
Poland	95	95*	37	33*
Slovakia		77*	22	20*
Slovenia	61	61*	14	11*
Hungary	64	67*	8	8*
East Germany	25	24*	3	3*
Czech Republic		32*	9	5*
Latvia		72	6	7
Estonia		47*		3,5*
Albania		86*		8*
Romania		98*	17	14*
Bulgaria		66*	6	6*
Russia	47	66*	4	4*

Source: PCE 2000; ISSP 1991, 1998

position. The reasons why these countries do not follow the expected patterns are mainly determined by their specific historical background and will not be discussed here. – Although there is also some evidence for a correlation between the socio-economic development of a region and the level of religiosity of its population (e.g. Scandinavia vs. Southern Europe), denomination seems to be more important. However, these results do not contradict secularisation theory automatically. Assuming a correlation between modernisation and a decline in religion, secularisation theorists refer to a process in the long run that cannot be measured by single indicators such as current GDP rates adequately.

In East Europe, we can observe some similar patterns. Countries with a denominational mixed population (East Germany, Estonia) are characterised by low rates of church attendance and belief in God. They seem even more secularised than the highly modernised, Protestant societies of Scandinavia. Countries where the majority of the population belongs to the Roman-Catholic denomination, show some higher figures. Among these countries, Slovenia (which is at the same time the mostly modernised country within this group) is a bit more “secularised” than Slovakia. Due to the extremely high relevance of religion as a source of national identity, Poland takes an outstanding position (as well as Ireland and Northern Ireland in Western Europe).

Although being predominantly Catholic, the Czech Republic seems also to be one of the most secularised societies. Regarding belief in God, Bulgaria and Russia reach figures also to be found in the Catholic countries of Eastern Europe. According to this indicator, Romania belongs to the most religious countries. Generally, the church attendance rates in the Orthodox countries are rather low. Surprisingly high – and in sharp contrast to its image as “most secular country in Europe” - is the extent of religiosity in Albania, with an astonishing 86 percent who believe in God.

3. Religious socialisation within the family and religiosity in adulthood

One of the most common statements of the proponents of the secularisation hypothesis refers to the declining role of the main churches in the modern world, i.e. the disappearance of institutionalised and “public” religion (Martin, 1978).³ In East Europe, this process was enforced additionally by the anti-religious repression by the state. Although this repression could not destroy religiosity among the people altogether, it was forced into a very private sphere at least (similar to other non-conform positions or actions; Pollack, 1998; Tomka, 1991). Since an alienation from the church does not necessarily mean a disappearance of religiosity in general, such tendencies cannot be taken as an indicator of secularisation. According to Luckmann, we have to distinguish between institutionalised, public forms of religion, and more “invisible” versions (Luckmann, 1967). Nevertheless, we have to investigate the cumulative

³ This hypothesis is not let unchallenged within the sociology of religion: Some authors stress especially the increasing relevance of public religion during the last years (Casanova, 1994).


effect of a twofold secularisation process in Eastern Europe – forced by modernisation *and* by the political authorities. At least three of the five dimensions of religiosity identified by Glock (1954) – the ideological (“belief”), the ritual (“practise”), and the cognitive (“knowledge”) component – require a certain stock of knowledge or belief shared by a collective. The significance of supporting institutions should be obvious, if one refers to the plausibility of religious meanings. As a believer you need a steady social support, i.e. a socio-cultural context where the meanings “make sense” (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Usually, support is given by the religious community you belong to. However, it was the anti-religious activity of the communist regime that hindered the maintenance as well as the emergence of such a “plausibility structure”.

Assuming that the religious education or affiliation during childhood determines the further religious needs of a person to a considerable extent, the emergence of religiosity has to be seen as a part of the development of one’s personal identity (Erikson, 1950; Fowler, 1981). Generally, the family seems to be the most central agent of socialisation (Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle, 1997:98ff.). As already stated, the parents’ role was of particular importance during the communist period, when structures of religion were almost non-existent in public. During this time, the danger for religion was alienation through several steps: First, the families would not attend church services together anymore. Religious communication outside the family would be reduced. From an “optimistic” point of view, one could assume that religious practises would be exercised at home instead. However, what about the long-term stability of “hidden” religiosity within the families without functioning religious communities, and without personal experiences with public forms of religion? Thus, from a rather sceptical position one could also argue that the absence of public religion is merely a first intermediate state of the secularisation process.

In order to analyse such a scenario, one should take a look at the church attendance of the families during the last decades. Chart 1 shows the dramatic decline of the number of families, which went to church together at least once per month.

Regarding the strength of the church, Poland is once more a special case: The church is today almost as strong as it was 60 years ago. About 90 percent of the families are still going to church at least once per month.

Chart 1: Family ties with church




Poland is followed by the Catholic countries Slovakia and Slovenia, which have started from quite a high level of church attendance in the 1930s. But, a huge decline of church ties is visible. Whereas about 90 percent of the families had been monthly churchgoers between the two World Wars, today only every second family attends church services together. Even more dramatic is the development in Romania and Hungary. The Czech Republic, East Germany, Bulgaria, Estonia, and Russia show the lowest values today. One should notice, that the starting level was considerably lower than in other Catholic states and Romania. Therefore, the process went off more slowly - especially in the successor states of the Soviet Union, where the communist regime had already been installed in 1917. In almost all countries the period between the 1950s and the 1970s is characterised by the biggest decline.

Of course, an alienation from the church must not mean a renunciation of religiosity in general. As mentioned before, the religious life within the families became the most important factor for the survival of religion in communist

Europe. As can be seen in Chart 2, the anti-secular resistance of the families was the strongest in Poland, closely followed by Romania, where nearly all respondents tell about a religious education at home. If we remember the high rates of believers in Romania today (see Table 1), we can assume a survival of religion in an “invisible”, privatised form during the communist times – despite the fact that the political regime was very rigid. In Slovakia and Slovenia, almost 80 percent of people have been brought up in faith. A remarkable resistance against the anti-religious tendencies existed also in Hungary, which takes a middle position. Albania is once more a surprise: About 60 percent were brought up in faith (this cannot be completely explained by “rationalisation effects” or “failures of memory”). Remembering the fact that religion was officially forbidden, this is an astonishing number. Opposite to this, a minority of people has had a religious socialisation at home in East Germany, the Czech Republic, Russia, and Estonia. The different power of resistance of the dominant denominations and modernisation effects are noticeable again.

Chart 2: Religious socialisation within the family



So far, the state and development of religiosity has been analysed on a very aggregated level. Naturally, a phenomenon like secularisation can only be

understood as a process. The deeper it is implemented in everyday life of the individuals, the more irreversible it will be. Thus, it is necessary to include the individual level into our analysis, and to look at the influence of religious socialisation in childhood on religiosity in adulthood.

Table 2: Religious socialisation as a child and “traditional” religiosity in adulthood

		Belief in God (%)	Church attendance p.a. (mean)	Trust in church (mean)¹	Religious self-assessment (mean)²
Albania	brought up in faith	93	10	0,75	0,97
	not brought up in faith	75	5	0,60	-0,10
Bulgaria	brought up in faith	89	8	0,70	0,92
	not brought up in faith	41	3	0,50	-0,89
Czech Republic	brought up in faith	75	13	0,52	0,41
	not brought up in faith	8	1	0,23	-1,84
Estonia	brought up in faith	83	7	0,74	0,49
	not brought up in faith	33	2	0,56	-0,87
East Germany	brought up in faith	58	6	0,52	-0,09
	not brought up in faith	6	0,3	0,29	-2,36
Hungary	brought up in faith	84	11	0,51	0,17
	not brought up in faith	36	2	0,30	-1,78
Poland	brought up in faith	96	35	0,56	0,99
	not brought up in faith	74	19	0,33	-0,39
Romania	brought up in faith	98	14	0,84	0,96
	not brought up in faith	92	8	0,75	0,19
Russia	brought up in faith	97	7	0,71	0,81
	not brought up in faith	50	2	0,50	-0,97
Slovakia	brought up in faith	88	25	0,60	0,49
	not brought up in faith	30	3	0,35	-2,05
Slovenia	brought up in faith	76	14	0,46	0,56
	not brought up in faith	21	2	0,22	-1,03

¹ Scale from 0 (no confidence at all) to 1 (great deal of confidence)

² Scale from -3 (extremely non-religious) to +3 (extremely religious)

Source: PCE 2000

The results from Table 2, where those who were brought up in faith are compared with persons that grew up without religious socialisation at home, support the assumption concerning the strong influence of the socialisation in

childhood. In all countries, those who were brought up in faith show a remarkably higher degree of belief in god, church attendance rate, and trust in church as an institution. Therefore, with regard to the development of “traditional” religiosity we must question the re-vitalisation hypothesis seriously. It is not the supply side that determines the need for religion: Without corresponding religious experiences in the past, there doesn’t seem to be such a need at all.⁴

4. The future of religion in Central and Eastern Europe

What can be expected regarding the development of religion over the next years? Will the next generation still – or again – grow up within a religious context, or will the secularisation process continue?


As long as one doesn’t distinguish between age cohorts, one cannot say much about the future process. In order to shed some light on that, we will compare families who experienced a “break” of the socialisation process within two generations (respondent as well respondent’s children), either from a secular toward a religious socialisation, or vice versa (Chart 3).

The proportions of those who were brought up in faith but don’t (didn’t/do not intend to) bring up their own children in faith had been subtracted from the proportion of those who did not have a religious socialisation in childhood, but bring up (brought up/intend to bring up) their children in faith. Those families, who didn’t experience such a change, were not included.

In Albania and Russia, the proportion of those families that turned back towards religion over three generations is clearly higher than of those who became secular (about 20 respective 10 percent of all families). In Poland and Romania (on a very high level) and Estonia (on a very low level) these groups are almost of the same size (this does not mean a lack of changes!). The number of families turned away from religion over the generations is larger in Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and especially in Hungary and East Germany. For the latter countries, a tendency toward a secularisation can hardly be ignored.

⁴ As exceptions we can notice Albania, Romania, and Poland. The differences between the religious and non-religious socialised persons are not so large there. Also those respondents who report not to be brought up in faith show considerable high rates of personal religiosity. On the macro level, it points to the fact that the social significance of the church as well as religion in general is obviously very strong in these countries. Thus, there are (still) social norms that are able to prevent a renunciation of the church and religion.

Chart 3: Religious socialisation within the family:
Secularisation/revitalisation index



Up to now, we haven't got any information about the dynamics of the disappearance of religious socialisation within the families over the last decades. In order to analyse this development, we have to consider the time period when the respondents were children. If we correlate the current age of the respondent with his socialisation when he was a child, cohort effects can be observed: Only in Poland and Romania a religious socialisation within the family is not correlated with the time period the respondent grew up in.

For all the other countries, we find a positive correlation between the age of the respondent and a religious upbringing – or, vice versa: The younger the respondents, the less they report a religious socialisation during their childhood. The strongest effects are to be found in East Germany ($\beta=.38$), the Czech Republic ($\beta=.34$), and Estonia ($\beta=.26$). The correlations appear to be the weakest (but still significant) in Slovakia ($\beta=.19$), Russia, and Bulgaria (both $\beta=.17$).

These results can be interpreted as evidence for a renunciation of individual religiosity over the last decades. The extent is not as large as it is with the church attendance (see Chart 1). And, in comparison with the decline in church attendance, the renunciation of individual religiosity seems to occur with a temporal delay.⁵ Thus, we can state for almost all of the observed countries (except for Poland and Romania) a second, ongoing process which follows the mainly politically forced renunciation of the churches: Due to the steady disappearance of religious education within the families, the younger generations do not have “religious roots” anymore.

As already mentioned, these tendencies are reinforced by the process of modernisation. The influence of modernisation effects on each individual becomes obvious, if we differentiate the respondents concerning some socio-demographic variables. Since modernisation is characterised by a general increase in the educational level and processes of urbanisation, the (formal) level of education and the region where the respondents live are useful indicators. And, as expected according to the modernisation thesis, the better educated, as well as the residents of the cities, are less religious and less tied to the church in almost all the cases (tables A and B in the appendix). Assuming that younger people are more influenced by modernisation processes than older ones (Inglehart, 1977), the differentiation between age cohorts confirms these results once more. The younger the respondents are, the lower are their church attendance rate as well as their religious self-assessments.⁶

And, especially among the younger generations the influences of modernisation effects are additionally reinforced by the lack of religious socialisation (which partially is an effect of modernisation, too). If we look at the trends of modernisation and religious socialisation, then there is a lot of evidence that a huge increase in traditional forms of religiosity in the most East European countries cannot be expected. But, at least one opposite factor should

⁵ Up to this point, this assumption is rather derived “indirectly” from comparisons of macro data by further analyses not shown here. In order to analyse this in detail, it needs longitudinal individual data, of course.

⁶ Bulgaria is the only one significant exceptional case. Here, the patterns regarding the dimensions such as age, education, and region are quite unclear. But, just because of its uniqueness Bulgaria refers to some other factors which cannot be discussed here in detail: Of course, at the individual level religiosity can emerge at any time in the life cycle, even without any experiences in childhood. This often happens in times of personal crisis or strokes of fate. If one takes into account the social situation of the majority of the population especially in Bulgaria (the similarity to Russia should be obvious), a turn towards religion seems to serve here as *one* means to cope with such crises (for the problem of religion and coping see Pargament, 1997).

be kept in mind that is stressed by the re-vitalisation theorists: Due to the disappearance of the political repression of the churches and religion, the “supply side” expanded since 1989/90. Maybe there is some demand for new offers? One indicator to analyse this question could be the number of those who turned toward religion after they have formerly been non-religious.

Chart 4: Turns towards religion in Europe




Chart 4 shows that there is a certain amount of such persons in every society. But, the figures for Western and Eastern Europe are not too different. In almost all countries there are about 5 to 10 percent of the individuals who turned to religion during their life. However, in Albania, Russia, and Latvia the rate is considerably higher and reaches about ¼ of the population or even more. In these three countries, a re-vitalisation of religiosity can hardly be overlooked.⁷

⁷ Regarding the future development of this tendency one has to notice that the numbers of those who became religious among the younger generation in the transition countries are slightly higher

Up to this point, the signs are not in favour of a re-vitalisation of traditional religion in the most countries of Eastern Europe. But, does this mean the end of religion? As some scholars argue, it doesn't. They do not deny the decline in institutionalised, traditional religiosity in general. But, the individuals would become by no means atheists. Instead, they are searching for more individualised, "newer" forms (Luckmann, 1967).

Table 3: Religious socialisation and "alternative" forms of religiosity in adulthood

		Belief in faith-healer (%)	Belief in effects of Zen meditations, Yoga (%)
Albania	brought up in faith	45	7
	not brought up in faith	19	3
Bulgaria	brought up in faith	26	8
	not brought up in faith	15	9
Czech Republic	brought up in faith	20	21
	not brought up in faith	8	21
Estonia	brought up in faith	26	25
	not brought up in faith	24	34
East Germany	brought up in faith	9	12
	not brought up in faith	4	15
Hungary	brought up in faith	34	22
	not brought up in faith	26	26
Poland	brought up in faith	27	7
	not brought up in faith	26	18
Romania	brought up in faith	9	11
	not brought up in faith	12	16
Russia	brought up in faith	50	30
	not brought up in faith	49	38
Slovakia	brought up in faith	39	17
	not brought up in faith	36	31
Slovenia	brought up in faith	17	17
	not brought up in faith	15	29

Respondents who believe "strong" or "to a certain degree". Source: PCE 2000

at best than in Western Europe (the only one exception is again Albania with about 40 percent among the persons between 18 and 29 who turned to religion). The results from our PCE study differ from the ISSP 1998 figures to a certain degree. But, generally, one has to be very careful concerning the interpretation of these figures due to the small n problem.

Table 3 shows, that considerable parts of the East European population believe in phenomena like faith-healers or in the effects of Zen meditation or Yoga at least “to a certain degree”. However, one has to distinguish rather “old” forms (here: faith-healers) and newer phenomena (here: Zen meditations, Yoga). The older forms are obviously more accepted by those people who have been brought up in faith. Remembering their higher degree of religiosity in a traditional sense, these forms seem to be accompanied by a “traditional” religiosity.⁸ Although new religiosity cannot be characterised as a mass movement, the pattern regarding more modern forms like belief in the effects of Zen meditation or Yoga are very interesting: Firstly, on the macro level, these phenomena seem to be more accepted in the countries where the people are less religious. Secondly, in every country (except the Czech Republic) mainly those without any religious socialisation during their childhood believe in Zen and/or Yoga.⁹ However, one has to remember that it is (still) a minority, which is attracted by such phenomena. It is still too early to make any general statements about this topic. The future will show whether it is more than a fashion.

5. Conclusion

In view of our results, we cannot expect a huge increase in traditional forms of religiosity in the most East European countries. The modernisation process, combined with anti-religious attempts by the political authorities, caused conditions not in favour of religion. The decline of traditional religiosity becomes apparent with regard to church attendance rates, but can be shown also for “private” shapes as like belief in God. The steady transmission of religious ideas from generation to generation is becoming increasingly interrupted. The process is far advanced in East Germany and the Czech Republic, but is also continuing to spread in most other countries. There are only very few exceptional cases, which resist this trend. Especially in Poland and Romania religion never lost its social significance; in Russia or Albania even a revival was experienced. Due to the fact that the younger, the well educated, and the town dwellers are mostly alienated from traditional religion, it is to be expected

⁸ This is also supported by additional analyses, e.g. individual correlations (Müller et al., 2003). Although the differences between the observed groups are not so clear as in Table 2, one cannot speak about a considerable turning to these forms of religiosity.

⁹ One possible explanation could be, that it is something like an effect of a rather post-materialistic movement against modernity. In any case, it is a phenomenon that is worth to be observed in further analyses.

that this trend will continue in the long run, too. On the other hand, exactly these social groups are mostly receptive to newer religious forms such as Zen or Yoga. However, one has to keep in mind that it is still a minority, which is attracted by such phenomena. Thus, there is little evidence that the de-institutionalisation of religion will be completely compensated by an increase in individualised, syncretistic religiosity (Pollack and Pickel, 1999; Pollack, 2000; Müller et al., 2003).

Of course, there are good reasons to avoid all too simple statements about the development of religion in general. Although we can observe some general patterns, we have to take into account differences determined by the national context of a country (denomination, modernisation, church-state relations, etc.). Furthermore, we have to differentiate between different forms of religiosity ("traditional" versus "alternative"). In order to get better answers concerning the future development of religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe, we have also to study generational differences (Tomka, 2001:26). If we want to find out more about general mechanisms how religiosity is transmitted, and if we want to know how it changes over time, the ideal design would be a long-term longitudinal cross-country study, which is representative for the general population. Since the carrying through of such a huge project is unfortunately not to be expected in the short term, we should use the studies we have to hand (ISSP, World Values Survey, *Aufbruch*, RAMP, PCE) even more systematically and in comparison to each other.

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Appendix: Social structure and religiosity

Table A: Church attendance

	Pop. Ø	Age cohort				Educational level			Region	
		18-29	30-45	46-60	>61	low	middle	high	urban	rural
Albania	8	6	6	10	13	13	7	6	7	8
Bulgaria	6	5	4	5	7	8	5	4	6	5
Czech Republic	5	3	4	4	10	12	4	3	4	6
Estonia	3	2	3	2	4	4	3	3	2	3
East Germany	2	1	2	2	3	5	2	2	2	3
Hungary	8	5	5	7	13	11	5	8	7	9
Poland	33	32	31	32	41	40	32	32	31	37
Romania	14	11	10	15	20	20	12	12	12	16
Russia	4	2	3	4	6	5	3	4	4	4
Slovakia	20	19	17	20	28	27	20	18	15	26
Slovenia	11	8	11	11	14	16	10	8	8	14

Church attendance p.a. (mean)

Table B: Religious self-assessment

	Pop. Ø	Age cohort				Educational level			Region	
		18-29	30-45	46-60	<61	low	middle	high	urban	rural
Albania	0,50	0,26	0,40	0,63	1,01	1,0	0,44	0,18	0,47	0,54
Bulgaria	-0,06	-0,29	-0,09	-0,23	0,23	0,40	-0,20	-0,22	-0,07	-0,05
Czech Republic	-1,07	-1,44	-1,39	-1,09	-0,14	0,11	-1,17	-1,34	-1,20	-0,86
Estonia	-0,55	-0,70	-0,62	-0,72	-0,16	-0,15	-0,65	-0,62	-0,58	-0,53
East Germany	-1,55	-1,81	-1,95	-1,56	-1,03	-0,91	-1,65	-1,72	-1,68	-1,33
Hungary	-0,54	-0,89	-0,83	-0,59	0,08	-0,04	-0,65	-0,78	-0,80	-0,10
Poland	0,91	0,87	0,80	0,90	1,20	1,19	0,88	0,77	0,81	1,04
Romania	0,92	0,72	0,81	0,93	1,26	1,25	0,83	0,76	0,80	1,06
Russia	-0,40	-0,61	-0,44	-0,58	0,05	-0,26	-0,60	-0,41	-0,41	-0,35
Slovakia	-0,07	-0,27	-0,27	-0,05	0,54	0,65	-0,08	-0,37	-0,39	0,33
Slovenia	0,15	-0,04	0,16	0,23	0,27	0,67	0,11	-0,14	-0,08	0,41

Scale from -3 (extremely non-religious) to 3 (extremely religious)

Source: PCE 2000

Detlef Pollack

**INSTITUTIONALISED AND SUBJECTIVE RELIGIOSITY
IN FORMER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL
AND EASTERN EUROPE**

1. Introduction

In assessing the development of religion in Western Europe, more and more sociologists of religion are using the concept of religious individualisation. According to these sociologists, we can observe not a secularisation but an individualisation, privatisation, and pluralisation of religion in Western Europe. The *individualisation thesis* (Luckmann, 1967; Hervieu-Léger, 1990; Gabriel, 1992; Krüggeler, 1993; Davie, 1994) points out that the decrease in the social relevance of institutionalised forms of religion in modern societies does not mean that religion is generally losing its significance, but that the individual will maintain his or her religiosity, but altering its contents and forms. Whereas in pre-modern societies meaning in life used to be provided by large, global religious institutions, in modern societies individuals choose their religious orientations autonomously, falling back on different religious traditions and merging these to form individual religious patchworks. Thus, individual religiosity and institutionalised church adherence are increasingly diverging in modern societies. Although many people have become estranged from the church, they have turned to new forms of religion like New Age, Zen-Meditation, astrology, occultism, esoteric and psychological groups, and other not so highly institutionalised forms of religion.

Regardless of whether this description of the religious development in Western Europe is accurate or not (see Pollack, 1996; Pollack and Pickel, 1999), I would like to raise the question of whether this theoretical model used for Western Europe can also be applied to the analysis of religious developments in Eastern Europe. In order to answer this question, we must distinguish between different religious dimensions. Building on the concept of religious dimensions provided by Charles Glock (1962), I differentiate between

church adherence, traditional, church-related religiosity, and religiosity outside the Church.¹ Certainly different indicators can express these dimensions. Usually, church attendance is used as an indicator for church adherence, and belief in God as an indicator for traditional, church-related religiosity. It is, however, difficult to grasp the diffuse forms of religion that exist outside the Church. I use astrology and belief in faith healers or lucky charms as indicators of older forms of religiosity outside the Church, and belief in the effects of Zen-Meditation and belief in the message of New Age as indicators of new forms of religiosity outside the Church. Most of the data I refer to are based on the project “Political Culture in Central and Eastern Europe” (PCE),² a representative opinion-survey carried through by me and my collaborators² in 11 Central and Eastern European countries in autumn 2000. This survey included Russia, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Eastern Germany, Hungary, and Albania.

2. An overview on the religious situation in Eastern Europe in comparison to Western Europe

The data presented in Table 1 give some first insights into the religious situation in Eastern Europe in comparison to the West. I would like to mention four features:

1) Compared to Western Europe there are some highly secularised countries in Eastern Europe in terms of traditional indicators of religion: church membership, church attendance, belief in God. The Czech Republic, the eastern part of Germany, Estonia, and Russia belong to these highly secularised countries. Undoubtedly, the high percentage of non-confessional people can, to a considerable extent, be attributed to the communist regimes’ repressive political measures against churches and believers during the time-period before 1989. In all of the countries mentioned above, the share of people belonging to a church and regularly attending Sunday services was considerably higher at the beginning of the communist era than at its end (cf. Pollack, 2001:138).

2) The confession that was able to resist the political and ideological pressure during communist times most strongly was the Catholic Church. In contrast, the political pressure most negatively affected the Lutheran churches.

¹ In Pollack/Pickel 1999 we discuss the question, how this concept can be elaborated and used in the form provided above.

² I thank Jörg Jacobs, Olaf Müller and Gert Pickel (Frankfurt/Oder) for their substantial help.

For example, consider the originally dominant Lutheran countries East Germany and Estonia, where church members now constitute only a minority (see Table 1). Church adherence and religiosity is also higher in the predominantly Catholic Western European countries like Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland compared to countries like Sweden, Denmark, Norway, in which the Lutheran confession prevails (see also Table 1).

Table 1: Indicators of church adherence, Christian religiosity, and religiosity outside the Church in Europe (%)

	Church membership 1998/*2000 (%)	Church attendance per year 1998/*2000 (mean)	Belief in God 1998/*2000 (%)	Astrology 1998 (%)	Lucky charms 1998 (%)
Italy	93	21	88		
Portugal	92	22	92	30	45
Spain	86	19	82		
Ireland	94	38	94	19	25
France	54	8	52	41	24
Austria	88	16	81	35	35
Netherlands	42	10	59	24	21
Switzerland	91	10	73	47	40
West Germany	85	10	62	45	46
Great Britain	50	10	68		
Northern Ireland	86	27	89		
Sweden	72	5,5	46		
Denmark	88	5	57		
Norway	90	5	58		
Poland	82*	33*	95*		
Slovakia	72*	20*	77*	49	48
Slovenia	65*	11*	61*		
Hungary	58*	8*	67*	40	34
East Germany	24*	3*	24*	27	34
Czech Republic	27*	5*	32*	53	50
Latvia	66	7	72	66	
Estonia	22*	3,5*	47*		
Albania	77*	8*	86*		
Romania	96*	14*	98*		
Bulgaria	44*	6*	66*	65	57
Russia	37*	4*	66*	56	72

Source: PCE 2000; ISSP 1998.

3) The level of modernisation in terms of industrialisation, urbanisation, Gross Domestic Product etc. also has a considerable impact on the vitality of church adherence and religiosity. If you take the Catholic Western European countries into consideration, you can detect that the more highly industrialised countries have a lower rate of church attendance and belief in God than the less developed countries (see also Martin, 1978). For example, compare Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland with France and Austria (see Table 1). The same holds true for countries that are not predominantly Catholic, and can be discerned by comparing Northern Ireland to the rest of the country. We can observe similar differences in Eastern Europe. Among the Catholic countries, Slovenia and Hungary – the most industrialised states – are at the same time the most secularised. In the group of the countries which are not predominantly Catholic, East Germany, the Czech Republic and Estonia as the most developed countries show the lowest rate of church attendance and religiosity.

4) Finally, figures measuring religiosity outside the Church in Eastern Europe are remarkably high. In Western Europe, affirmation of belief in God is always higher than acceptance of astrology or faith healers (see Table 1). In Eastern Europe, in some cases the acceptance of religiosity outside the Church is almost as high as belief in God, in others it is equal or even higher (East Germany, Czech Republic).

3. The change of church adherence and religiosity in Eastern Europe

Over the last few years, many sociologists observed an outstanding religious revival in the post-communist countries. It is quite reasonable to expect such a religious upswing. If we take into consideration the figures in Table 2, however, we observe great differences between the individual countries. In certain countries like Albania and Russia, indeed we can find a dramatic increase in church membership and belief in God. In Albania, for example, 44 per cent of the population confirmed that they now belong to a religious denomination but did not use to, and 33 per cent confirmed that they now believe in God, but that they did not use to. In contrast, only three per cent wholly withdrew from church or from belief in God. In some countries there is only a small increase in church participation and religious orientation, for example in Bulgaria and Estonia. In Estonia, the increase in the level of religiosity and church adherence is not very significant (see Table 2).

Table 2: Change of church adherence and religiosity (%)

	Change of church membership		Change of belief in God	
	Growth	Decrease	Growth	Decrease
Poland	3	5	2	4
Slovakia	5	14	7	11
Slovenia	3	15	5	14
Hungary	4	11	5	10
East Germany	1	19	3	15
Czech Republic	4	10	5	10
Estonia	6	8	13	5
Albania	44	3	31	3
Romania	4	0,5	3	1
Bulgaria	7	3	11	3
Russia	11	1	25	3

Source: PCE 2000

In most of the countries investigated in our survey we are confronted with a clear decrease in the social significance of religion and church in the long run. This is the case in Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, East Germany, and in the Czech Republic. Even if a certain upswing in the religious field took place in these countries immediately after the breakdown of communism, this religious revival is by no means able to compensate for the losses the churches had to suffer during communist times. It is not incidental that these processes of secularisation are especially striking in highly industrialised countries. If indeed there is a positive correlation between modernisation and secularisation (which many sociologists question, see for example Warner, 1993) then we have to expect an ongoing process of religious decline in these countries. Still, in some countries like Poland or Romania, indicators for religiosity and church adherence are virtually stable on a high level.

4. Religiosity outside the Church

What about religiosity outside the Church, the indicator we used to investigate those diffuse forms of religion which the critics of the secularisation thesis stress so strongly? Unfortunately, due to the lack of data we are unable to make any statements about the developments of religiosity outside the Church over the recent time-period. A look at Table 3 again reveals that forms of religiosity outside the Church are widespread in Central and Eastern Europe. In Estonia, Albania, Hungary and Slovakia almost one third, in Russia even more than one third of those questioned confessed their belief in astrology, faith healers, or the

effects of Zen-meditation. But only a small percentage declared that they believe in the message of New Age, which, by the way, was not familiar to most of the respondents. Similarly, only a few confirmed belief in occultism, spiritism, and mysticism. When distinguishing between older and newer forms of religiosity outside church, we detect clear differences between countries. In countries like Albania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, in which the percentages of people with traditional belief systems are high, older forms of religiosity like astrology or belief in faith healers are more broadly accepted (see Table 3). In more secularised countries like the Czech Republic, Estonia, East Germany, or Slovenia, the share of people believing in the effects of Zen-meditation is relatively high. At the same time the Czech Republic, Estonia, East Germany, and Slovenia belong to the most highly developed countries in the East. In these countries people can more easily afford to attend courses in Zen-meditation, Yoga, or energy training and people are more likely to develop a body- and wellness-culture in which religion is taking on a non-traditional, individualised function.

Table 3: Religiosity outside the Church (in %)

Country	Astrology/ Horoscope	Faith-healer	Effects of Zen meditation, Yoga	Message of New Age
Albania	25,0	34,6	5,4	4,6
Bulgaria	18,2	19,9	8,3	2,3
Czech Republic	17,4	12,4	20,7	2,0
Estonia	25,6	23,6	30,5	3,7
East Germany	10,9	5,6	12,6	1,6
Hungary	24,1	30,7	22,7	8,1
Poland	7,9	26,5	7,6	1,9
Romania	22,9	9,3	11,4	2,2
Russia	46,7	48,7	34,9	7,7
Slovakia	22,1	38,6	19,2	3,2
Slovenia	17,0	16,3	19,5	7,7

Source: PCE 2000

Percentage of respondents who “believe strongly” or “believe to a certain degree”.

5. Religious individualisation in Eastern Europe

Does this mean that we can observe a tendency towards pluralisation and individualisation of religion in former socialist countries? In order to test this

hypothesis, I have correlated the three dimensions of religion we have distinguished above. As one can see in table 4 (column A), there is a high correlation between traditional religiosity and church attendance in Eastern Europe. In column B, we can observe that traditional religiosity and religiosity outside the church (old and new) as well as church attendance and old forms of religiosity outside the church are also positively correlated in most cases. Concerning the relationship between church attendance and new forms of religiosity outside the church, we find either no significant correlation, or even a negative correlation. A negative correlation can again be detected in countries with predominantly traditional belief systems like Poland, Slovakia, or Albania. This indicates that in these countries traditional and highly institutionalised forms of religion do not support the emergence of new forms of religion. In the other countries, there is a stronger blending of traditional forms of religion and new, more non-institutionalised religious ideas.

Table 4: Intra-religious relations and individualisation in comparison

	A	B1	B2	B3	C1	C2	C3	C4
Poland	.31	n.s.	.24	-.09	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+.13
Slovakia	.47	n.s.	n.s.	-.19	-.12	-.11	n.s.	+.13
Slovenia	.47	.21	.27	-.09	-.08	n.s.	n.s.	+.17
Hungary	.32	.24	.14	n.s.	-.12	-.13	n.s.	n.s.
East Germany	.47	.28	.07	n.s.	-.15	-.09	+.09	+.26
Czech Republic	.55	.22	.12	n.s.	-.09	n.s.	n.s.	+.18
Estonia	.31	.33	.09	+.15	n.s.	n.s.	+.09	+.12
Albania	.16	.35	.12	-.13	-.08	n.s.	-.15	n.s.
Romania	.08	n.s.	-.14	n.s.	-.08	n.s.	+.07	+.20
Bulgaria	.29	.33	.11	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+.12	+.14
Russia	.28	.32	n.s.	n.s.	-.10	-.09	n.s.	n.s.

Source: PCE 2000

A = correlation belief in God and church attendance

B1 = correlation belief in God and religiosity outside the church (old and new)

B2 = correlation church attendance and religiosity outside the church (old – Astrology)

B3 = correlation church attendance and religiosity outside the church (new – Zen/Yoga)

C1 = correlation values individualisation and church attendance

C2 = correlation values individualisation and belief in God

C3 = correlation values individualisation and religiosity outside the church (old – Astrology)

C4 = correlation values individualisation and religiosity outside the church (new – Zen/Yoga)

Now, let us concentrate on the analysis of the correlation between different forms of religion and an indicator for individualised orientations. I used the intention to pursue an unusual and extravagant life as indicative of individualisation (see column C). As expected, the correlation between traditional religiosity, church attendance, and old forms of religiosity outside church and this indicator is mostly negative or insignificant. However, the indicator of individualised orientations correlates positively with new forms of religiosity. The more people are willing to pursue an extravagant life, the more they are likely to accept new forms of religiosity.

Table 5: Religious socialisation in childhood and religiosity in adulthood

	Belief in God		Church attendance p.a. ⁴		Trust in church		Religious self-assessment		Belief in faith-healer		Belief in effects of Zen meditation and Yoga (%) ³	
	(%)		(mean)		(mean) ¹		(mean) ²		(%) ³			
	Brought up in faith	Not brought up in faith	Brought up in faith	Not brought up in faith	Brought up in faith	Not brought up in faith	Brought up in faith	Not brought up in faith	Brought up in faith	Not brought up in faith	Brought up in faith	Not brought up in faith
Albania	93	75	10	5	0,75	0,60	0,97	-0,10	45	19	7	3
Bulgaria	89	41	8	3	0,70	0,50	0,92	-0,89	26	15	8	9
Czech Republic	75	8	13	1	0,52	0,23	0,41	-1,84	20	8	21	21
Estonia	83	33	7	2	0,74	0,56	0,49	-0,87	26	24	25	34
East Germany	58	6	6	0	0,52	0,29	-0,09	-2,36	9	4	12	15
Hungary	84	36	11	2	0,51	0,30	0,17	-1,78	34	26	22	26
Poland	96	74	35	19	0,56	0,33	0,99	-0,39	27	26	7	18
Romania	98	92	14	8	0,84	0,75	0,96	0,19	9	12	11	16
Russia	97	50	7	2	0,71	0,50	0,81	-0,97	50	49	30	38
Slovakia	88	30	25	3	0,60	0,35	0,49	-2,05	39	36	17	31
Slovenia	76	21	14	2	0,46	0,22	0,56	-1,03	17	15	17	29

Source: PCE 2000

¹ Scale from 0 (no confidence at all) to 1 (great deal of confidence)

² Scale from -3 (extremely non-religious) to +3 (extremely religious)

³ Respondent believe "strong" or "to a certain degree"

⁴ p.a. per annum = per year

This result is confirmed if we consider the impacts of religious socialisation during childhood on religiosity during adulthood. Table 5 reveals a clear picture. Regard the indicators belief in God, religious self-assessment, trust in church, church attendance, or belief in old forms of religiosity outside church like belief in faith healers or astrology. In every case, people who were brought up in faith are more likely to accept these religious attitudes and behaviours as adults than people without a religious upbringing. The opposite holds true for the effects of religious socialisation on the acceptance of new forms of religiosity outside the Church in adulthood. In this case, people who were not brought up in faith tend to believe in the effects of Zen-meditation more often than people who were religiously socialised. New forms of religion have gained a certain independence from traditional belief systems.

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, we can state that new forms of religiosity outside the Church are emerging in Central and Eastern Europe. The upswing in these new forms, however, seems to follow different patterns than the development of traditional forms of religion. In predominantly Catholic countries, the new forms tend to stand in contrast to the Church. In more secularised countries, new forms of religiosity do not contradict the institutionalised forms of religion. In Estonia, they even merge with these institutionalised forms (see table 4, column B3). This implies that the more a country becomes “unchurched,” the more religiosity outside the church is merging with ecclesiastical forms of religion and constituting a syncretistic whole. To a certain extent, however, these new forms of religion are not based on the effects of religious socialisation processes, and can be understood as an expression of individualisation processes.

Nevertheless, we should not overestimate these tendencies towards religious individualisation. Firstly, only a small share of the population is interested in these new forms of religiosity at all (see table 3). Secondly, even if religious socialisation is not a necessary precondition for accepting these new religious orientations, many people who were brought up in faith also believe in the effects of Zen-meditation, Yoga, energy training, or New Age (see table 5). Although we should not exaggerate the processes of religious individualisation, one question remains. What are the social causes of this tendency? I would suggest attributing it to the processes of a belated modernisation that countries like the Czech Republic, Estonia, East Germany, or Slovenia are presently facing.

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Enzo Pace

CATHOLICISM IN ITALY. THE SOFT SECULARISATION IN A POST-IDEOLOGICAL SOCIETY

1. The last battle of the Counter Reformation. An introduction.

We are concerned here with a European country that, for different historical reasons, has been influenced by Catholicism, moulded deeply by the parochial civilisation, on the basis of the organisational schemes and socio-religious codes of the Counter Reformation (Davie, Hervieu-Léger, 1996). We will be dealing mainly with Italy, a case which will be used as a testing for the following working hypotheses.

In spite the strong effort made by the Italian Catholic Church, since the Vatican II, to *reform* the Counter Reformation model, the outcomes are not brilliant. If we assumed two strategic elements of the original project came up by the Vatican II, both of them have been missed. The de-clericalisation of the Church and, alternatively, the stronger participation of the laymen and women have been minimized by a “clerical party”, that has been able to fight the new movement of reform risen during the Seventies. This clerical party had not a real theological *soul*, but only the idea to impose discipline upon those Catholics (priests and laymen and women) who imaged an alternative model of church, less hierarchical and more *communitas*. So they tried, particularly during the John Paul II papacy, to re-establish the lost order. The reality is now completely different. The fear of the soft “protestantisation” of the Italian Catholicism (according, for instance, to the point of view expressed by “Comunione e Liberazione”, a new-integrist movement born at the beginning of the Seventies) encouraged some bishops and theologians (belonging to this “clerical party”) to promote a complete restoration of the clerical power in many aspects of religious life. The negative effect of this project is a fading of laymen and priests hopes of reformation of the Church. And, meanwhile the project was met with success, the features that persist are the crisis of vocation, the ageing of the clergy and a low turnover of replacing the priests in the parishes.

In spite of the genuine effort made by new catechistic movement – developed during the Seventies – to change the traditional Tridentine catechism, the reality shows the persistence of the same framework that traditionally has shaped the process of the transmission of the faith from a generation to another. If some contents have been changed and adapted to a new (modern ?) style of communication (less dogmatic, more narrative of the Christian event of salvation), the methods and practices go on according to the formal Tridentine scheme. What's the essence of this scheme? It assumed the fact that you were *naturaliter* believer and, the problem was how to bring you up with a coherent belief system (clearly based on the recognition of the ecclesiastical authority). The religious transmission system in the Italian parishes persists up to now according to the pattern invented four centuries ago. Every Saturday, in the afternoon, the children go to the parish and they are organized in classes with teachers (mostly women): as a rule, the teachers, following a schoolbook – a simple version of the official catechism- expound the doctrine according to a classical method question-answer, from generation to generation, the teachers used to do. The main focus of this method is not discovering the Christian event and sharing the communitarian experience of salvation, but reproducing the general scheme *magister-discipuli*, assuming that the truth is given for granted and the faith is not an emotional and rational experience, but over all a doctrine to be learned. Since the Counter Reformation (and, partially up to now) the main goals of the transmission have been : what's to be believed in (faith is a doctrine), what's to be achieved (the sacramentalisation of the life cycle), what you have to do (in moral terms) and what you have to ask for God's help (set of prayers and rituals). The results of the routinisation of the Tridentine model of catechism are: instead of a model of initiation to the Christian faith, it became and is still nowadays a conclusion of the Christian life for many adolescents. In fact, the collapse of the presence of adolescents in the parishes starts just after the sacrament of confirmation and represents an empirical evidence. The phenomenon reflects the soft secularisation of the Italian society that occurred in the past forty years: the adults are always confident towards the Catholic Church, in spite of their attitudes, their behaviour is shaped by “secular” values (not yet inspired by and in conformity with Catholic doctrine). And they usually think that it's important for their children to achieve a Catholic instruction. At the same time they think they have carried out their task by delegating it to the church to bring up their children in a Catholic environment. The absence of the spirit of the “community”, that in the past worked linking the family and the parishes,

represents one of the most important reasons of the crisis we are trying to explain. It's another face of the coin: the process of individualisation of belief.

2. The social and religious change

The secularisation of customs and lifestyles, conventionally dated in Italy from the referendum which passed the approval of the divorce with a substantial majority (over 60 per cent in favour) in 1974, did not reduce the space occupied by religion. It was the start of a process of individualisation of belief: believing, practising Catholics, who favoured the innovations of the second Vatican Council, began to discover that "obedience is no longer a virtue" and thus to render their religious faith more credible. The authority of the Catholic hierarchy no longer appeared absolute; people began to think differently, felt a growing need for independence which combined, due to favourable circumstances and ongoing changes, with modern ways of thinking and lifestyles, focussing on the assertion of the individual and his/her prerogatives. There was a shift from *inclusion*, which stratified individuals into the Catholic bloc of collective belief, to *breaking away* from the meaning networks which had protected and engaged individuals for a considerable length of time. This shift from stratification to differentiation meant that for the first time there was pluralism within Catholicism, producing schisms and fractures which still go unattended. New generations sprang up, who begin to "run their own businesses" as regards ethics, politics and religion. We move in Italy towards a type of secularisation we could sum up with the sentence like that: "I proclaim myself Catholic, but I do as I please". Catholicism persists as what Luhmann (1991) would call a code of symbolic generalisation, but is no longer a generative grammar for the life of the individual and society. It is collective memory, but no longer has intentions towards social action. The analysis which follows attempts to verify empirically the basic hypothesis set out above by reviewing the findings on the most recent studies on religiosity, and, at the same time, "letting them speak for themselves" as regards the central theme of the present paper: the eclipse of theology in favour of the routinisation of charisma.

3. Plural Catholicism

Let us now take a look at some indicators which measure the processes described above. The figures speak for themselves, and tell us about a society hovering between being *without* and *not against* the Church, i.e. between religious modernity centred on individual needs and somewhat feeble

faithfulness to church-oriented-religion. It explains why the majority of families delegate the religious instruction to the parishes.

Let us start with a simple statement: Italians no longer recognise the Catholic religion’s claim to absolute truth (Table 1):

Table 1: Opinions on religion’s claim to truth (per cent responses; item with a single mode of response)

Opinions	% n=4469
All religions are false	2,2
There is something true in all of them	32,8
There is only one true religion, the others contain only partial truths	32,5
There is only one true religion, the others are false	12,0
I am unable to reply	10,6
No data	2,0

Source: Cesareo *et al.*, 1995.

Only a very small minority are firmly convinced of the existence of only one true religion. Two other elements support the partial data in Table 1:

- a) the percentage of those who regard religion as the repository of absolute truth increases by six points (18 per cent) among those who state they believe in Jesus Christ and the teachings of the Catholic Church;
- b) six out of ten Italians endorse the statement: “I would like there to be a religion based on a few fundamental common beliefs, which would unite Christians, Moslems, Buddhists and other believers” (the figure rises to 70 per cent among those who believe in God or in a supreme being, but who do not belong to any specific religion).

To sum up, it could be argued that the Catholic Church is no longer capable of presiding over the symbolic boundaries of its system of belief (Pace, 1995). The widespread relativism among the population may be interpreted as an indicator of the tendency among the majority of Italians to “move freely” in the construction of their own belief system; a religious mobility which appears extremely modern (Hervieu-Léger, 1999; Berger, 1967, 1979, 1992). In predominantly Catholic societies, paradoxically, such a relativistic attitude to the religion of birth may be widespread. Therefore, it is a question of a more profound attitude which leads to “believing in the relative” and it may coexist alongside beliefs and religious practices which are clearly inspired and

influenced by the religion of birth, Catholicism. Ninety-three per cent of the Italian population continue to call themselves believers, and 84 per cent refer to Catholicism as their religion, but within the latter category, 53% profess, without doubt, their faith in Christ and the teachings of the Catholic Church, whereas the rest distance themselves partially from the doctrine of the Church.

If we focused on the adhesion to certain sacraments, we could accurately measure the type of post-traditional religiosity widespread in Italian society. I do not allude to the attendance at Sunday Mass, which has been stationary for a number years with a national average of around 30 per cent (with lowest percentages for those between the ages of 18 and 39), but to the permanent and extended breach of faith between believers and their Church, marked by the collapse in the practice of confession, as can be seen in the following table (Table 2).

Table 2: The practice of confession among the Italian population (%) (responses to the question “How often do you go to confession?”)

	Average	Gender		Age			
		M	F	18-21	22-29	50-64	65-74
Never	26	32	19	22	29	30	19
Years apart	22	25	19	24	25	23	18
1-2 times a year	15	16	15	17	15	14	14
Several times year	21	19	24	19	20	20	23
Once month	13	7	13	13	8	10	20
Sev.times a month	3	1	5	5	2	2	6

N=4474. Source: Cesareo et al., 1995

The fact that on average, nowadays, only a very small proportion of believing and practising Catholics (3.1 per cent) go to confession (a practice which the generations born in the 1940s and 1950s were told should be carried out on a weekly basis) means that a Catholic country like Italy has undergone a profound change. If we examine the reasons given by the interviewees in the national research study cited, we find that many of them (almost 40 per cent of responses) agree with the idea that “a priest is not needed, it is enough to repent before God”. It is interesting to note that women are well-represented here in statistical terms; indeed young women are most convinced of this attitude, a sign of independent belief. We should also note that the emerging trend towards independence of belief undermines the feeling of belonging to church-oriented-religion, since – at least in Italy – one in three Italians, albeit in different ways, says they feel part of an ecclesial institution (Cipriani, 1994; Garelli, 1995, 1991). It can therefore be

stated without undue emphasis that the weakening of the ties between believer and confessor in a predominantly Catholic society has produced a silent revolution in the hearts and minds of many people (including those who believe and faithfully keep to traditional religious practices). The unexpected effects of this silent revolution have manifested themselves over a relatively long period of time and involved at least two generations: the generation which directly – and enthusiastically – experienced the reforms of the second Vatican Council, and that of their children, often born and raised in a family environment where religion was still talked about, but in a liberal, critical and anti-authoritarian way (obviously with regard to ecclesiastical authority). What are the unexpected results we mentioned above? It is worth noting at least three:

- a) the weakening of the link in the transmission of erga omnes moral models which were originally drawn up by theologians and later translated into codes of conduct applied to people's concrete behaviour, which the priest would recommend to those who went to confession regularly;
- b) the deconsecration of the figure of the priest and his power to "bind and unbind" and "pardon sins", in exchange for the heightened value of the primacy of the individual believer's conscience in dealing directly with God;
- c) the progressive detachment of various spheres of the life of the individual (moral, economic, political and sexual) from the religious control of the Church, acting through its "specialists in the treatment of souls".

The first case involves the weakening of a means of religious communication which, in the history of Catholic countries such as Italy, has played a central role in the spiritual orientation of great masses of believers, be they poor or rich, peasant or king. In an institution like the Catholic Church, that "great mother" always willing to forgive her wayward children, confession was something of a "microphysics of holy power", placed in jeopardy by the principle of conscience's independence. With the loss of this practice, it is as if there were a generalised symbolic code of communication between the institution of the Church and the mass of the faithful. As a result the priest, according to the few studies which exist in Italy at least (Garelli, Brunetta, Pace, 1991; Garelli, Pace et al., 2003), is regarded increasingly as a witness to the faith and less and less as the bearer of holy functions, increasingly as a social group-leader and less and less as the mouthpiece of an eschatological message.

We are in front a paradox: on the one hand the deconsecration of the image of the priest and, on the other, a great effort made by a part of the Catholic Church to re-establish the supremacy of the sacred charisma of the

priest. The attempts made by the Italian Church to redefine its public role have so far been in vain; Italians pay great respect to what the Church says and does (in moral and social fields or themes to do with questions of life and death), but they have learned to choose for themselves which parties best represent their ideas and interests.

Indeed, despite everything we have so far shown, the image of the Catholic Church held by Italians is a largely positive one. On the scale devoted to trust in the institutions, the Church receives over 60 per cent; on their annual tax returns, 40 per cent of Italians assign a small proportion of their income to the Catholic Church; 90 cent of Italians entrust their offspring to the parish for instruction in the Catholic catechism; in the same way, Italians continue to get married in church, have their children baptised and ask for a church funeral. And the list goes on, producing a series of crude data which piece by piece begin to give the overall picture of religious belief. Further light is shed on the matter if we examine the following list (Table 3):

Table 3: Classification of the perceived importance of the actions the Catholic Church should perform (average value in per cent on the total responses in decreasing order; n = 4500)

1 st help the needy and the suffering	66.2
2 nd educate the young	47.3
3 rd announce Jesus Christ and spread the Gospel	38.9
4 th promote peace among nations	33.5
5 th give the sacraments	19.2
6 th fight the Mafia	17.3
7 th send missionaries around the world	17.1
8 th provide social services run by the Church	15.8
9 th take a stand on social question	13.2
10 th hold a dialogue with other religions	12.9
11 th clearly define what is good and what is evil	10.4

Re-elaborated data from Cesareo *et al*, 1995

Apart from certain oddities, such as the fact that “fight against the Mafia” precedes, by a statistically almost insignificant margin, “send missionaries around the world”, what is striking is the clean break between the socio-educational role assigned to the Church by the great majority of Italians and the task of redemption, recognised by a minority. This minority is further reduced when the moral authority of the Church is mentioned (10.4 per cent). This

figure is not an anomaly, but forms part of the cluster of data which confirms the growing distance between the individual's conscience and the doctrine of the Catholic Church in the moral field. These findings are supported by the data on moral questions, where Italians think differently from the official teachings of the Catholic Church, reported in the following table (Table 4):

Table 4: Indirect indicators of cognitive dissonance in the moral field between Italians and official Catholic doctrine (in % on total valid responses)

Do not disapprove of divorce	63.0	(n = 4492)
Do not disapprove of sex before marriage	69.0	(n = 4463)
Do not disapprove of cohabitation	64.5	(n = 4481)
Do not disapprove of contraceptives	71.7	(n = 4472)

Source: Cesareo *et al.*, 1995

On the more traditional questions, those for which the Church authorities have long tried to draw the line between what is licit and illicit, there is a high level of cognitive dissonance among Italians. Thus, the ethical and moral sphere also appears to be no longer governed by religious norms, at least not according to their definitions in official Catholic doctrine. The erotic sphere, to take up Weber's point again (Weber, 1971), especially among the younger generation, seems to be almost completely subjective and self-governed by the individual. Sexuality no longer appears to be functionally linked to procreation, going by what emerges from a recent in-depth study on the subject (Garelli, 2000). This explains, among other things, why the younger generation tends to delay getting married (average age for marriage is now 30-35 years, after a period of cohabitation) and plans their families, and why the birth rate is constantly decreasing (around 1.1). The models of procreation have changed (De Sandre *et al.*, 1998) and are not influenced culturally as pervasively as they used to be by the ethical models put forward by the Church.

The unsustainable lightness of being Catholic in Italy should by now be easier to comprehend.

4. The paradoxes of religious transmission in predominantly Catholic countries

To what has gone before, we could add one last series of data, which further highlights the paradox of a traditionally Catholic society, such as Italy. The data concerns the transmission of religion. Although no specific national

research is available, but only regional and local surveys, the glimpses which these afford us, are illuminating. The paradox is similar in many aspects to that noted above: the vast majority of the younger generation are today socialised in pre-adolescence (11 – 14 years) and partially in adolescence (15 –17 years) in a religious environment, in particular in Catholic parish organisations (95 per cent of the age-groups indicated). Attendance at Catholic catechism school (traditionally on Saturday afternoon) combines with the mass attendance (again 96% of the age-group in question) of the weekly one-hour (Catholic) Religious Instruction lesson, on a voluntary basis in all state schools. Up to the age of 15 –16, between parish and school, the younger generation come into contact with religious themes (very varied at school, more closely linked to the modern modules of the catechism in the parish) for a total of 60 hours per year exposure to religious communication. They form relations, sometimes close, sometimes not, with priests (less and less so, especially in state schools) and with religiously committed lay men and women. If we take into account the fact that religious socialisation in the parish starts at 6 years of age in a light and playful way, the total number of hours spent listening to people talking about religious matters becomes much greater. The most tangible result of widespread religious socialisation is Sunday Mass attendance, which is relatively high up to age 14, and then falls drastically from the age of 15 on, as can be seen in the following table (Table 6):

Table 5: Attendance Mass by pre-adolescents and adolescents in Italy 1993-94 (% of total, by age and sex)

		Regularly	Few times a month	Few times a year	Never
Age 11-14	Males	64.2	16.8	12.5	5.1
	Females	76.8	10.5	7.7	3.5
	Average	70.4	13.7	10.2	4.3
Age 15-17	Males	33.9	18.3	30.1	16.9
	Females	55.2	16.4	19.0	8.5
	Average	44.4	17.4	24.7	12.8

Source: Istat, 1996

There is nothing new about the drop in religious practices after pre-adolescence. What is noteworthy, however, is what is left unsaid in the data, but which can be intuited: the pressure exerted by families to ensure their children are socialised into religion. The children receive an impulse to go to the parish and attend Catholic Religious Instruction at school from the adult

world, from almost all adults, even those who, as our previous data shows, are non-practising and may be very detached from the world of religious belief. Almost all Italian adults approve or place a positive value on the fact that their children frequent “the church”. This is essentially because parents delegate the function of religious education to the Catholic Church, since they themselves are unable to undertake it. This explains both the trust which generally speaking Italians are willing to place in the Catholic Church and the attention – sometimes due to expediency or for ulterior motives – which Catholic, secular and left-wing leaders reserve for the Church authorities. To sum up, practising Catholics, Catholics “without a church” and non-confessionals all seem to be interested in preserving the socio-educational role of the Catholic Church in Italy. But – and here lies the paradox – this in fact reveals the family’s inability to transmit religious feeling and a sense of belonging to a religious community. Most adolescents never manage to perceive this feeling and this sense of belonging, because “religion” turns into just another “boring” school subject. Religion ends up boring most adolescents, as it can be seen from a study carried out on secondary school pupils in a region of Northern Italy in 1995-6 (Castegnaro, 1996) (see Table 6):

Table 6: Attitudes and behaviour of adolescents in the first three years of secondary school (11-13 years of age) in the Veneto Diocese (% of single items and total)

	11 years	12 years	13 years	Total
Mass every Sunday	72	66	63	67
Communion every Sunday	76	69	63	69
Follow the Sunday sermon	56	51	37	48
Confession once a month	67	63	42	57
Think that kids go to Mass because they are made to	27	36	56	40
Get bored at catechism	19	33	37	29
Pray every day	66	57	44	55
Feel the image of God is far away	46	54	69	57

Religious transmission, therefore, seems to be a loss-making enterprise: a substantial amount of energy is invested (families trustingly send their offspring religion-oriented activities, priests engage in mass catechism, Catholic teachers do their utmost to instruct the younger generation in religion, by making little mention of Christianity, and so forth). But the losses are considerable, since large

numbers of young people, at the turning-point between pre-adolescence and adolescence, choose to remain orphans of the “holy mother Church”.

In a survey, using qualitative methods (life stories), carried out by a researcher from the Pontifical Salesian University of Rome, we read: “the abandonment of ecclesial life by the young and adolescents ... almost always appears (from the life stories) to be unmotivated or without a specific cause. It often comes across as a sort of *evaporation*, which takes place either in the absence of the development of a significant religious maturity and sense of belonging to the Church, or because the experience of life within the Church or Catholic associations is not attractive enough to compete with other experiences in the daily life of young people” (Pollo, 1996:366). In other words, the places where religious transmission takes place have not been able to offer young people personal religious experiences (not influenced by others) and enable them to identify with a lively community (and not just with adults, teachers and priests). It is no by accident that the only associations for the young and adolescents which seem to be able to offset the inevitable increase in the number of “orphans of the holy mother Church” effectively are traditional organisations such as the boy scouts, on the one hand, and new emotional communities of a charismatic or neo-catechumenical nature, on the other. The former offers a well-trying training in interaction between adolescents and adults, through an educational experience which combines a play with the transmission of values which are increasingly widespread nowadays in the collective consciousness (public spirit, respect for the environment, team work, etc.). The latter, by contrast, aims for the emotive, and therefore more engaging, dimension; a dimension which breaks with the traditional roles of the clergy and laymen and overcomes the generation gap (Hervieu-Léger, 1999; 1993).

The Catholic religion is something of a luxury item which all Italians keep with them, in part because ever since childhood they had always taken its presence for granted, and in part because it acts as a perspective of meaning for the world of adult life (regardless of whether the adults are practising Catholics or not). It is a luxury item which may be used at moments in life of sadness or happiness (births, weddings and funerals), but which is unable to lend support and coherence to the various spheres of life, which have come to differentiate themselves in the minds and personal situations of many people. For the vast majority of Italians, reference to the Catholic religion remains a symbolic resource which gives the impression that what is in reality deeply divided is still united. The Italian political scene bears ample testimony to the fact that

“Catholics” are more divided than ever before on everything from economics to morality.

5. Conclusions

The case of Italy constitutes a kind of test-bed where we can put to the test the hypotheses and concepts expressed in this work. In Italy, Catholicism increasingly accomplishes the task of representing the collective identity of a nation afflicted with a weak sense of national unity, whereas it is no longer able, as it was in the recent past, to integrate the various spheres of individual and social life, orientate behaviour with respect to faith and morals, in economic and political fields. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Italy has become a post-Communist country: the two ideological totalities, which had faced each other from 1948 to the end of the Soviet regime (Michel, 1994), Communism, on the one hand, and Catholicism (a religious faith, society and political party at one and the same time), on the other, have ceased to integrate individuals and social groups. Politically, Italy has therefore also become a post-Catholic country; with the disappearance of the traditional enemy, Communism, the *raison d'être* of a Catholic party, more or less bound to the Church of Rome, was lost.

Because of the separatist claims of a new party, the Northern League (Diamanti, 1993), the Catholic Church in Italy managed to accredit itself as the guardian of national unity, under threat from separatism, and as the guarantor of values common to the Italian people, values, it would appear, deeply rooted in Catholicism. Thanks to this felicitous set of circumstances, the Italian Church has sought to wipe out the memory of its initial aversion to the liberal state after the *Risorgimento*, its historical compromise with Fascism and its direct support of the Christian Democrat party in the first twenty years of post-war Italian democracy. In Italy, post-Communist times led the Church of Rome to re-establish an equation which had never really existed in its integrity: national identity equals Catholic identity (Pace, 1993).

And there is another paradox in the case of Italy. If we consider the way in which the Italians' sense of belonging to the Church and adhesion to the system of religious belief have been progressively secularised, we cannot help but observe, as a substantial section of bishops and priests have done – speaking openly in these terms – that “authentic” Catholics are now in the minority. Probably due to an awareness of this weakness, the Catholic Church is trying to assert itself as a collective actor and make its presence felt in the public sphere

on themes which it feels are of crucial importance from the ethical and religious point of view (Pace et al, 2001; 2003).

We could sum up the Church's strategy as: fighting the individualisation of belief by reviving the public role (Casanova, 1994), which seemed bound to diminish after the collapse of the political hegemony of the Christian Democrat Party. It is, in truth, a complex strategy and one that has roused differing opinions within the Catholic world and among the bishops.

This strategy copes with two difficulties: a) on the one hand, it tries to reduce the complexity within the Italian Catholicism reconstructing and restoring the clerical power, but in the presence of a dramatic crisis of the personnel (decrease of vocations, aged priests, insufficient rate of the new ones for the turnover...), b) on the other, the desacralisation of the priest's "charisma" without a real involvement of the lay men and women in the religious life of the parochial communities stirs up the prevalence of the function over the charisma. In any case the silence of theology is deafening. Theology means not only the specialists of the science of God, but the reflection of a community of believers which are able to overcome the routine and imagine new languages for the salvation. Otherwise, it's very high risk to transform the Catholicism into a "comfort without soul" (theology and communitarian life), an ideological resource for imaging the unity of the Nation, in spite of the fragmentation and individualisation of the belief system, and the Catholic Church (in terms of clerical institution), the supreme National-Values-Keeper.

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Kati Niemelä

**BETWEEN EAST AND WEST – FINNISH RELIGIOSITY
FROM AN EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE**

1. Introduction

Finnish religiosity is characterised by a low level of public attendance, but a fairly high level of private religiosity. Even though the Finns are among the most passive participants in religious services in Europe, religiosity still has a strong hold on day-to-day life in Finland. In measures of private religiosity, Finland stands above the European average. A typical feature of Finnish religiosity is that the proportion of those practising religion privately, but not publicly is rather high.

In the beginning of the 1990s Finland was hit by an economic recession. This led to interesting changes in the attitudinal climate. At that time many measures of private – but not public – religiosity showed an increase.

This article examines religiosity and its latest changes in Finland from a European perspective according to EVS (European Value Study) data of 2000 and according to some other national research data.

People in Finland are categorised into four groups according to their religiosity: active believers (11%); basic believers (33%); passive believers (33%); and non-believers (16%). Compared with other European countries, the proportion of active believers in Finland is low while the proportion of basic and passive believers is relatively high. Religiosity among different groups of Finns is examined.

2. Historical background

Finland is a country with both eastern and western influences. Christian influences reached Finland around the year 1000 from both east and west. The missionary efforts of the Western Church were, however, stronger, and by the

end of the fourteenth century most of Finland was under the Roman Catholic Church as well as under Swedish rule.

In the beginning of the sixteenth century the Protestant Reformation reached Sweden and Finland. In 1593 Lutheranism became the state religion.

Russia ended Swedish rule over Finland by conquering Finland in the beginning of the 19th century. Finland became an autonomous Grand Duchy in the Russian Empire. Even though the ruler was now the Orthodox Tsar and not a Lutheran king, the Lutheran Church remained the state church of Finland. At the time of Russian rule Orthodox Christianity spread to western Finland chiefly through Russian soldiers and merchants. In the late nineteenth century some attempts were made to use the Orthodox Church as a vehicle of Russification (Murtorinne, 1992:397–400). At the same time an idea of the church as a defensive wall against the east was strengthened (Murtorinne, 1992:395).

In 1917 Russia plunged into the chaos of the Revolution: Finland seized the opportunity and on December 6, 1917 the Parliament approved the declaration of independence. Shortly after the declaration, civil war broke out in Finland. It was a war between the Government forces, known as The Whites, and extremist left-wing forces known as The Red Guards, inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution. The Reds wanted to create a socialist Finland, possibly in the union with emerging Soviet Russia. Virtually the entire clergy supported bourgeois Finland, the Whites (Murtorinne, 1995:117). The prototype of an ideal citizen was a white pietist soldier (Huhta, 2001).

At that time relations between the Finnish church leadership and the organised working class were distant. The organised labour movement was characterised by a church-opposing attitude. They saw the church as an ally of a capitalistic society, against which they should fight (Murtorinne, 1995:32–36:110–111). The Whites, therefore, saw the church as a bastion of the legal order, the national tradition, and Western culture. The church was expected to foster morally upright citizens, loyal to the state. The bloody war was won by the Government forces (the Whites) with the help of German troops sent to southern Finland.

Freedom of religion was gained in 1923 in Finland. Still the number of non-Lutherans remained low and only a small minority resigned from the Evangelical Lutheran Church.

Finland fought three interconnected wars during the Second World War. One of them was the Winter War against the Soviet Union in 1939–1940. During that war the church was seen as a source of support and unity in the struggle, which

was characterised as a struggle in defence of “home, faith and fatherland”. The Winter War was seen not only as a fight for the fatherland, but as a fight for the Lutheran faith against the atheist Bolsheviks (Murtorinne, 1995:233). Finland's stubborn resistance against a fifty-times larger nation seized the attention of the world press, which wrote about the “Miracle of the Winter War”. In the ensuing peace of Moscow, Finland was forced to cede large eastern parts of its territory.

As a result of the Winter War the position of the church as a folk church was strengthened and its links with the labour movement improved. Finland no longer was clearly divided into the Whites and the Reds (Murtorinne, 1995:234).

In the post-war period secularisation gained ground in all the Nordic countries. The position of religion at the centre of society's values weakened, and many areas of life adopted their own morality and sets of values with only tenuous links to religion and the church. Since the mid-sixties Finnish culture has been shaken by migration from rural to urban areas, emigration, growing influence from abroad, the pluralistic image of the world conveyed by the media, and the universal crisis of authority (Salonen et al., 2001:9).

The economic situation in Finland has showed mainly clear improvement in the post-war period except in the beginning of the 1990s, when the country was hit by an unusually deep recession.

Since 1995 Finland has been a member of European Union.

3. Church membership in Finland

Nowadays Finland is one of the most Lutheran countries in the world: in 2001 85 per cent of Finnish people belonged to the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland. Church membership, however, is a very neutral feature of religiosity in Finland as well as in other Nordic countries. Religiosity in Scandinavia is often described as “belonging without believing” (e.g. Davie, 2000). Most people in these countries do belong to the church but many do not believe in the teaching of the church. Scandinavian people find their identity in membership: Belonging to the Evangelical Lutheran Church is a part of national identity.

The Lutheran church has a very special status in the lives of Finnish people, even more special than in other Scandinavian countries. Even though only a minority of Finns are active members of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, the vast majority of Finns belongs to it. This is related to the issue of national integrity. One reason of the strong connection between being a Finn and a Lutheran has been seen in the fact that Finland was under Russian

rule throughout the nineteenth century. At that time and after gaining independence, for the majority of Finns, Lutheranism was and is what distinguishes them from the Slavs. Acting as a guarantor of ethnic identity gives religion an additional purpose and appeal (see also Bruce, 1999; 2000).

According to the Gallup Ecclesiastica 1996 – survey, 78 per cent of Finns regard themselves as Lutheran, while only 45 per cent regard themselves as believers. Being a Lutheran is clearly more a part of a national identity than a religious confession. The same trend can be seen in Russia in the 1990s. Orthodoxy has a certain function as kind of a basis for ethnic identity (Kääriäinen and Furman, 2000:65–68).

In addition to the Lutheran Church, the Orthodox Church is another religious denomination with a status of a folk church in Finland. One per cent of population belongs to the Orthodox Church, and the same amount of Finns belongs to all the other religious denominations. 13 per cent of Finns are not members of any registered religious denomination. The challenge to the Evangelical Lutheran Church does not come primarily from other religious communities, but rather from an increase in the number of those with no religious affiliation.

Table 1: Finnish population by adherence to religious communities 1920-2000. Statistics Finland (%)

Year	Lutheran	Orthodox	Other	Unaffiliated
1920	98.1	1.6	0.3	0.0
1940	95.9	1.8	0.3	2.0
1960	92.4	1.4	0.7	5.5
1980	90.3	1.1	0.7	7.8
2000	85.1	1.1	1.1	12.7

4. Finnish religiosity at the beginning of the third millennium

According to the EVS data from 2000, three out of four (74%) Finnish people believe in God, while the corresponding figure for all Europeans in the sample is 71 per cent. Half (49%) of all Finns believe in a personal God (39% of all Europeans in the sample) and 64 per cent of Finns regard themselves as religious (66% of all Europeans). Even among those not belonging to any religious community, a substantial proportion is religious. Only one fifth (22%) of Finns say they never pray, compared to 33 per cent of all Europeans.

In most indicators of private religiosity, Finland stands above the European average, but when it comes to public attendance the case is different. Even

though most Finnish people regard themselves as religious and tend to pray, the Finnish people are passive in attending religious services. Finland is among the most passive countries in religious service attendance in Europe together with the other Scandinavian countries, Russia and Estonia. Only 12 per cent attend a religious service at least once a month, while the corresponding figure among all Europeans in the sample is 31 per cent. A marked falling-off in religious service attendance has occurred over a long period of time. However, this has not resulted in abdication of religious belief (see also Grace, 1999).

If we compare Finland with other European countries, a basic feature of Finnish religiosity is that the proportion of those who practise religion privately, but not publicly is relatively high. For example, only one third (33%) of Finns who pray more than once a week also attend religious activities at least once a month, while two out of three (66%) of all Europeans who pray actively do so. Although the Finns are not very active participants in public religious activity, Christianity is nevertheless a significant component in many people's daily life.

4.1. Increase in private religiosity in the 1990s as a response to economic recession

At least since the Enlightenment, many Western intellectuals have anticipated the death of religion. As late as in the 1980s, many intellectuals remained confident that religion was not going to survive for long. This seemed to be also the case in Finland: In the beginning of the 1990s most indicators showed that the trend was toward secularism and toward the ever-decreasing meaning of religion in the lives of Finnish people. Values based on religion had lost their status in society and they had been replaced by the whole new sets of values and morals that have only loose links with religion and the church.

However, in the 1990s reawakening of interest in religion in Finland was noted. The economic recession in the beginning of the 1990s marked a turning point. At that time there was, for example, a marked increase of unemployment. Before the recession many indicators of religiosity had showed lowest figures ever in Finland. But during and after the recession, many indicators showed an increase in Finnish religiosity. For example, the number of those who regard themselves as religious and the number of those believing in God in accordance with Christian doctrine increased. According to the Gallup Ecclesiastica 1999 survey, half of the population said they believe in God as taught by Christianity, while at the beginning of the 1990s only a third had expressed such a belief. The number of those trusting the church and seeing the church capable of giving adequate answers to the problems of today increased as well in the 1990s.

Table 2: Number of those trusting in the church in Finland, 1981-2000, according to EVS surveys (1981, 1990, 1996 and 2000) and Gallup Fennica surveys (1986 and 1993)

Trust in church	%
1981	54
1986	52
1990	32
1993	38
1996	55
2000	57

Table 3: Belief in God among Finns, 1976–2001 according to Gallup Ecclesiastica and Monitor surveys (%)

	1976	1982	1984	1987	1991	1993	1994	1999	2002
I believe in God as taught by Christianity	51	44	47	44	33	37	38	47	39
I believe in God, but in a way that rather different from what is taught by the church	22	23	24	27	30	30	25	27	31
I don't really know whether I believe in God or not	17	13	15	15	18	17	18	12	17
I doubt the existence of God	4	4	5	4	5	7	8	5	5
I do not believe in the existence of God	5	6	5	9	8	7	8	6	6
Unable or unwilling to reply	1	10	4	1	6	2	3	3	1
<i>N</i>	1301	1026	974	499	2007	1989	1226	992	1024

The uncertain economic situation in Finland in the beginning of the 1990s led to the growing importance of shared communal values, particularly in the early part of the decade people needed security and seemed to be convinced that traditional Christianity could provide it (Heino et al., 1996:10–11; Salonen et al., 2001:14). Many scholars (e.g. Bauman, 1990; Giddens, 2001) view the decline of certainty as a basic feature of the society today, and as a factor that favours a resurgence of religion. The arguments of contemporary scholars differ from each other, but they stress several common features which favour religion and are regarded as typical in contemporary "advanced" societies: the importance of moral and existential questions and the need for security in a complex reality (Bauman, 1990; Giddens, 2001). During the 1990s, an increase in religiosity has also been reported in several other Western European countries.

In the 1990s the role of the Evangelical Lutheran Church became more public, and religion, the Church and faith became in many ways more a public matter as many Finnish celebrities spoke openly about their faith and some influential figures (including Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen) joined the Church. This encouraged ordinary citizens to discuss spiritual issues and declare their faith in God.

Privatisation is generally regarded as one aspect of secularisation. However, according to Casanova (1994:215) privatisation is only an option, not a modern structural trend. Therefore, religion has also an option of entering the public sphere anew and deprivatize. This requires, however, that religion ceases to defend its own privileges and focus more on defending human rights instead. In the 1990s the Church participated in the public media discussion in society openly defending the Finnish welfare state and highlighted the need for it. As a result of the recession in the first half of the 1990s, the problem of social exclusion had become more severe, particularly as a result of the increase in long-term unemployment and severe indebtedness. While traditional welfare services were scaled down, the so-called “third sector” was faced with the challenge of taking up a greater share of the responsibility in the welfare area. Parishes, Christian organisations, and other citizens associations were thus obliged to reassess their role in public life as service providers and as defenders of civil society.

This kind of increased public role and a new entrance into the public sphere requires religion to have either through doctrine or through cultural tradition a public, communal identity like the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Finland has. So it can be capable of resisting the pressures to become solely or primarily a private “invisible” religion of individual salvation. With the increasing social services during the recession, the church attained a very visible, public role (Yeung 2003). By transferring the defense of their particularistic privilege to the human person and accepting the principle of religious freedom, the church can be in a position to enter the public sphere anew, this time to defend the institutionalisation of the modern universal rights, the creation of a modern public sphere, and the establishment of democratic regimes. Casanova calls this a transformation of the church from state-oriented to society-oriented. However, whichever position it takes, the church will have to justify it through open, public, rational discourse in the public sphere of civil society (Casanova, 1994:220–224).

To sum up: the time of recession reinforced the public role of the Church in several ways: First, the growing insecurity at the time of crisis strengthened communal values: people needed security and were convinced that the Church

could provide it. Second, partly as a response to this need, issues of faith were discussed in the media more openly than previously. Third, the Church took more active role in social issues and became a strong defender of civil society. Fourth, the media responded very positively to this role change and the Church attained a very visible role in the media.

In spite of the reinvigorated public role of the Church, the growing publicity and reawakening of religious interest in Finland did not result in more active participation in traditional religious activities. For example, regular church attendance did not increase in the 1990s. Only measures of private religiosity showed an increase.

The changes reported above are also consistent with several arguments of the secularisation theory. According to them, the modernisation of a society leads to secularisation, which can be seen, for example, in a decline in interest in religions (Berger, 2002; Bruce, 2001). However, the figures regarding private religiosity in the 1990s in Finland do not show a decline. This raises a question whether the time of recession can be seen as a time of de-modernisation. From certain aspects, a period of recession (and the economic and societal changes occurring during it) can be seen as a time when society does not develop toward greater modernism. Therefore, the recession can be seen as favorable to de-secularisation.

Steve Bruce (1999:17) argues that modernisation makes the church form of religion impossible and therefore re-enforces denomination and cult forms of religion. During the recession, a reverse process can be seen. The Finns' perception of the Evangelical Lutheran Church became more positive in many ways, while the attitudes toward many other religious groups (which in the Finnish context can be seen as denomination or cult forms of religion) became more negative. Thus, it seems that the time of recession favored especially the church form of religion. This can be seen as consistent with statements of Bruce, but in an opposite way.

The latest figures from 2002 show that the reawakening of religiosity has been temporary. With the improvements in economic welfare and the stabilized economic situation in Finland the number of those believing in God in line with Christian doctrine has diminished again to the level of the beginning of the 1990s.

But was there any real change in the content of the Finns' faith during the recession? Statistics show that the share of those Finns who believed as taught by the Church increased during the recession and again declined after the turn of the new millennium. But probably the change is not as remarkable as the

impression given by the statistics. It is obvious that the Finns' perception of the Church and their attitudes towards it became more positive during recession, but was that all? Do the changes in proportion of those who say they believe in God as taught by the Church only reflect the Finns' general perceptions of the Church? If we look at the proportions of Finns who regard God as a very important part of their lives before the recession, during it and after it, there are no changes in numbers. This supports the view that the only thing that actually changed were the attitudes towards the Church, not the content of faith.

4.2. Religiosity among the different groups of Finns

At the end of the 20th century the attitudinal climate in Finland was characterised by increasing fragmentation. Many values and attitudes were no longer shared by the whole nation. On the contrary, different groups shared different values and attitudes. Groupings according to attitudes were more complex than before and the group divisions were not necessarily based on traditional categories of gender, age, or class. There were for instance, numerous different subgroups among the young (RISC Monitor, 2001:3; Helve, 1996). Even though the group division has become more diversified, some common trends among the traditional groups can still be seen.

4.2.1. Regional differences

The area around the capital of Finland, Helsinki forms a deviating area from the rest of the country in its religious climate, which is characterised by secularisation more clearly than elsewhere. Central and northern Finland comprise the most religious areas. Half of those living around the Helsinki area regard themselves as religious, compared to almost three out of four of those living in central and northern Finland. The same trend can be seen in all the other measures of religiosity as well.

Even though people living in the Helsinki area are far more passive in practising religion than other Finns, the number of those thinking about the purpose of life is almost as high as in other parts of Finland. About half of Finns in all areas think of such things often. But the number of those who find the church capable of giving adequate answers to the problems of today is far lower in the Helsinki area than in other parts of Finland. The people in the Helsinki area also think that other religions, not only Christianity, can provide answers in seeking the meaning of life. According to EVS data from 2000 only 24 per cent of Helsinki area residents think that it is important to stay in one faith, compared to 35 per cent of other Finns. 21 per cent of people in the Helsinki area think that it is important to study the teachings of other religions,

while the corresponding figure among other Finns is only 16 per cent. This is connected to the clearer pluralisation of the capital area: People do think about the deeper meaning and purpose of life, but answers are not sought only from Christianity or not even from religions in general. The authority of Christianity in giving answers to people's question about life has diminished in the Helsinki area more clearly than in other parts of Finland.

However, Christianity still has a strong ritual position in the capital area. People there do wish religious services to be held to mark occasions such as birth, marriage and death nearly as often as other Finns. The difference between the percentage of people wanting such services held in the capital area versus other parts of Finland is far lower than could be assumed by the differences in religious attitudes.

Table 4: Number of those regarding themselves as religious among different groups of Finns according to the EVS 2000 survey (%)

	%
All	61
Women	72
Men	50
18–24 years old	37
25–34 years old	51
35–49 years old	61
50–64 years old	68
65– years old	79
Helsinki area (Uusimaa)	52
Southern Finland	63
Eastern Finland	56
Central Finland	70
Northern Finland	73
Entrepreneur	69
Upper clerical employee/manager (white collar worker)	54
Lower clerical employee (white collar worker)	62
Blue collar worker	51
Pensioner	75
Full-time mother	74
Student	54
Unemployed	51

Table 5: Belief in God among different groups of Finns according to the EVS 2000 survey.

	There is one God	There is some sort of spirit or life force	I really don't know what to think	I don't think there is any sort of spirit, God or life force	Can't say
All	49	31	11	7	2
Women	55	32	8	3	2
Men	41	30	14	12	3
18–24 years old	32	35	17	13	4
25–34 years old	40	42	9	7	2
35–49 years old	46	32	12	7	3
50–64 years old	51	28	11	7	3
65– years old	68	24	5	3	0
Helsinki area (Uusimaa)	41	36	14	8	1
Southern Finland	47	33	10	7	3
Eastern Finland	46	34	11	6	3
Central Finland	60	24	7	7	2
Northern Finland	62	18	9	7	4
Entrepreneur	57	27	12	3	1
Upper clerical employee/manager (white collar worker)	43	34	14	8	1
Lower clerical employee (white collar worker)	52	31	7	8	2
Blue collar worker	37	36	14	10	4
Pensioner	62	26	7	4	1
Full-time mother	60	29	10	0	1
Student	37	35	13	11	4
Unemployed	40	36	10	9	5

4.2.2. Gender differences

Finnish women are clearly more religious than men. The gender differences in Finland are greater than in Europe in general. Three out of four women regard themselves as religious, compared to only half of men. Two out of three women find comfort and strength in religion, compared to a little more than one third of men. Christian beliefs as well as religious activities are also more common among women. 58 per cent of men say they attend religious services less than once a year or never, while the corresponding figure among women is only 33 per cent.

Even though men are more passive in practising religion both publicly and privately, they still think, nearly as often as women, that religious services should be held to mark birth, marriage and death. Therefore, even though religion seems to have lost its meaning in the lives of Finnish men, religious rituals still have a strong hold on their lives.

4.2.3. Age differences

The worldview of the contemporary youth can help us make some predictions about the future of religiosity in Finland. If we look at their worldview and religious attitudes, it is easy to predict that Christianity will probably lose its impact in the years to come.

Youth and young adults are characterized by secularisation in many ways clearly more than older age groups. Christianity does not play as big a role in the lives of young people as in the lives of people in older age groups. Only 37 per cent of those 18–25 years old regard themselves as religious, while 79 per cent of those 65 or older do. Among the young, there are clearly more of those who do not believe in the existence of God or are uncertain about it than in other age groups. According to the Gallup Ecclesiastica 1999 survey, 12 per cent of those 15–24 years old do not believe in the existence of God, while only 5 per cent of those in older age groups do. 26 per cent of the young doubt the existence of God or do not know whether they believe in God or not, compared to 15 per cent of older people.

Christianity is no longer the only religious option among young people. While more than half (58%) of those 65 years old or older think that it is important to stick to a particular faith – a faith which is most often regarded as Christianity – of those under 25 years old only 16 per cent do so. On the other hand, young people are more open to the teachings of other religions. It is probably partly due to their better knowledge of other religions. For the young, Christianity is no longer the only truth; therefore, the individualistically thinking young people see that they can construct their own worldview from different sources.

The young do not see the church as very capable of giving answers to contemporary problems. Especially in other than spiritual matters, the trust in the church among the young is very vague. Concerning social problems, only 16 per cent of the young think that the church can give adequate answers. One third of the young believe that the church can give adequate answers to moral problems, one-fourth to family problems. However, half of the young still regard the church as capable of giving answers to spiritual problems, and

therefore, see that the church still has a certain authority in spiritual matters. After all, it seems as though the church, and religion in general, has been strongly compartmentalized into its own narrow life area in the minds of young people. The church is seen as capable of being responsible only for spiritual matters, and not capable of handling any other life matters.

The differences between the younger and older generation are not only due to the age difference. Young people today are not only less religious because they are younger, but they are also less religious than the older generation was at their age. Thus, a generational shift has also occurred.

4.2.4. Religiosity and social class

There are some clear differences between the social classes in Finland. Those having less education and belonging to the group conventionally known as the working class – a term which is no longer very appropriate – are the most passive both in private and public religious activities and the most seldom express Christian beliefs. Among the supporters of the political parties that attract the working class, there are fewer religious people than among other parties. The supporters of the Left Alliance Party are the least religious, while the supporters of the Finnish Centre Party are the most religious. If the effect of age is eliminated from the level of education, those with a high level of education appear to be clearly more religious than those with low or no education. In Western Europe, Christianity in general appeals more to the well-educated population than the less educated (see Davie, 2000:68–69).

5. Types of Finnish religiosity

Using different indicators of religiosity, the Finns were categorised into four groups according to their activity in practising religion publicly and privately and according to their belief in God. The classifying variables were:

- Religious service attendance,
- Frequency of prayer and
- Belief in God.

1. ACTIVE BELIEVERS: 14% of Finns (25% of all Europeans)

- Believe in God
- Attend religious services at least once a month
- Pray weekly

Active believers attend religious services regularly and they are active prayers. They regard themselves as religious and find comfort and strength in religion. They believe in life after death and in other typical Christian doctrines. Most of them (90%) believe in a personal God, others in some sort of spirit or life force. God is an important part of their lives; two out of three answered 10 on a 1–10 scale when asked the importance of God in their lives.

Active believers are convinced that the church can give adequate answers to people's problems. Almost all of them consider it important to hold religious services for birth, marriage and death.

The majority of Finns falling into this category are female (60%). Over half of active believers are over 50 years old.

2. BASIC BELIEVERS: 35% of Finns (23% of all Europeans)

- Believe in God
- Attend religious services at least once a year
- Pray at least sometimes
- (Do not belong to “Active believers”)

Basic believers attend religious services typically during specific holidays like Christmas and Easter. Most of them regard themselves as religious and find comfort and strength in religion. Two out of three believe in a personal God, one third believes that there is some sort of spirit or life force.

The majority of basic believers regards God as rather important in their lives (four out of five answered at least 6 on a 1–10 scale when asked the importance of God in their lives). Two thirds believe in life after death and in most other Christian doctrines. However, basic believers tend to believe also in non-Christian beliefs, such as re-incarnation, telepathy and lucky charms.

Basic believers think that the church is quite capable of giving adequate answers to people's problems. Almost all of them consider it important to hold religious services for birth, marriage and death.

Almost two thirds of those falling into this category are female. Basic believers are equally found in all age groups.

3. PASSIVE BELIEVERS: 25% of Finns (22% of all Europeans)

- Believe in God or do not know whether they believe or not
- Attend religious services less than once a year
- Pray at least sometimes

Passive believers have a positive attitude towards religion, but are passive in practising it. Two thirds regard themselves as religious and half of them get comfort and strength from religion. They either believe in God or are not sure whether they believe or not. Half of them believe in a personal God and almost half of them believe in some sort of spirit or life force. They think that the church can give some answers to contemporary problems. Almost all of them think that it is important to hold religious services for birth, marriage and death.

There is an equal proportion of men and women among passive believers. The vast majority of passive believers are under 60 years old.

4. NON-BELIEVERS: 16% of Finns (19% of all Europeans)

- Do not believe in God
- Do not attend religious services OR do not ever pray

Non-believers do not believe in God, and either never attend religious services or never pray. Most of them never attend religious services and those who do attend, do so only on special occasions. Nine out of ten never pray. Most non-believers regard themselves as non-religious, one fifth as convinced atheists. They do not find comfort and strength in religion nor does God play any role in their lives. They do not believe in the teachings of the church and do not see the church as capable of giving adequate answers to people's problems. Only half of them think that it is important to hold religious services for birth, marriage and death. The majority of non-believers are male (70%). They are over-represented in young age groups: Almost half of them are under 30 years old. Most often they are young men.

Ten per cent of Finns and eleven per cent of all Europeans in the sample do not fit into any of these four categories (mostly due to incomplete answers).

When comparing Finland with other European countries, the number of basic and passive believers is relatively high, while the number of active believers is low. In that sense Finland comes closest to Iceland, Belarus, and Latvia (see Table 6).

Table 6: Number of active believers, basic believers, passive believers and non-believers in different European countries

	Active believers	Basic believers	Passive believers	Non-believers	Other or non-specified
Malta	80	11	6	0	3
Poland	69	20	7	2	8
Ireland	64	21	8	3	4
Northern Ireland	49	15	25	6	5
Italy	46	30	12	6	6
Portugal	46	16	30	4	4
Slovakia	44	18	19	14	5
Croatia	42	30	12	7	9
Romania	41	40	8	2	9
Austria	31	29	23	10	7
Spain	28	23	31	11	7
Greece	27	50	3	7	13
Lithuania	22	28	16	10	24
Belgium	21	19	27	25	8
Netherlands	20	15	21	38	6
Germany	19	17	15	39	10
Luxembourg	18	26	21	23	12
Ukraine	16	32	23	15	14
United Kingdom	15	12	43	22	8
Hungary	15	20	29	28	8
Belarus	12	37	25	14	12
Finland	14	35	25	16	10
Latvia	11	32	27	17	13
Bulgaria	11	27	16	27	19
Czechia	10	11	21	48	10
France	9	15	33	35	8
Iceland	9	37	33	11	10
Denmark	8	21	30	27	14
Estonia	7	17	20	37	19
Russia	7	22	35	24	12
Total	25	23	22	19	11

6. Discussion

Finland is an exceptionally religiously homogeneous country. Only a few percent of Finns belong to religious denomination other than the Evangelical Lutheran Church. A typical feature of Finnish religiosity is that public attendance in religious services is very low, but in measures of private religiosity Finland stands above the European average. A typical Finn does practise religion privately, but not publicly.

Many new religious denominations have faced difficulty in recruiting members in Finland. This is partly due to the fact that the Lutheran church has a very special status in the lives of Finnish people. Partly it is due to the fact that the Finns are not very willing to be actively and strongly religiously engaged, which is often presumed on the part of the new religious organisations. For the Finns, religiosity is a private matter. They do want to practise religion privately, but are not willing to be very actively involved in any public matter of religiosity.

Even though most Finnish people attend religious services rarely, they have not abandoned their deep religious attitudes. This is the case also in many other West European countries. Davie (1999:68) describes West Europeans more as unchurched rather than simply secular. Even though many Europeans have ceased to participate in religious activities organised by religious institutions, they have not abandoned many of their deep-seated religious inclinations. However, using the term *unchurched* is not very appropriate in describing Finnish religiosity. The Lutheran church still has a very special status in the lives of Finnish people, even more special than in other Scandinavian countries. Even though it is easy to leave the church and thus save taxes, very few people do so. The vast majority of Finns belong to the Evangelical Lutheran Church, even though only one in ten are its active members. This is related to the issue of national integrity.

We have to be cautious when using the term secularisation in discussing the Finnish case. It is true that attendance in religious services is falling and religion has become more and more a private matter in Finland, but when it comes to measures of private religiosity, there was an increase in various aspects of it in the 1990s as a response to economic recession and religion still plays a certain role in a day-to-day life of most Finns. The newest figures show, however, that the reawakening of religiosity was temporary. With the improving economic welfare and stabilized economic situation in Finland, the figures regarding religiosity have diminished again to the level of the mid 1990s.

But was there any real change in the content of the Finns' faith during the recession? It is obvious that the Finns' perception of the Church and their attitudes towards it became more positive during the recession, but was that all? Do the changes in faith seen in statistics only reflect the Finns' general perceptions of the Church? This question remains partly open. In any case, the changes in Finnish religiosity at the turn of the millennium show the sensitive connection between religiosity and changes in society. During times of economic and social uncertainty, people have a tendency to seek security in traditional institutions such as the church.

If we examine the worldview of the young, it is also easy to predict that the chain of collective religious memory is becoming weaker. Christianity no longer plays the same role in the lives of the young as in the lives of older age groups. Especially among young men there is a substantial proportion of "non-religious" persons.

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II.

CHALLENGES OF POST-COMMUNIST
SOCIETIES

Irena Borowik

**RELIGION AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN POLAND IN THE
PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION**

1. Introduction

There are three important notions in my article so that each of them could become a sufficient subject of the article itself: transformation, religion and civil society. Is it possible to discuss some of them while neglecting the other? I don't intend to go into details in understanding and analysing the concepts of transformation and its features. In this matter I would like to make only a few preliminary remarks that do not pretend to be nothing more but a kind of introduction to discussion of "civil society". Understanding of transformation depends quite obviously on understanding of society. Those sociologists who look at society in a rather structural perspective put stress on systemic changes (for instance in economy) and on the structure of society – for instance appearing of middle class and weaknesses of its formation (Staniszki, 1999:168-174). Those who pay more attention to the social consciousness express an opinion that the easiest part of the reform is systemic institutional and legal reform, and that the transformation of social awareness poses the greatest problems (Ziółkowski, 1995:177). Others warn that transformation proceeds at its most fundamental level in neither economics nor politics, but at the level of culture. They perceive a 'break' in peoples' world-view, that in the light of the changes brought by globalisation, the ordinary person feels without stability or trust, briefly – traumatized (Sztompka, 1996). In all perspectives it is clear that transformation brings a lot of problems that could not be solved neither from night to night nor from decade to decade. In some features of transformation society we can discern a state of anomie: rising levels of crime and unemployment, a decreasing birth-rate; hardening conditions of living; a high level of suicide (usually for previously unknown economic reasons – losing one's job, a lack of resources); the emergence of homelessness. In spite of these difficulties experienced by societies in transformation and in spite of the different perspectives in understanding of

problems, one thing seems to be certain and – after 1989, the societies of Central and after 1991, the societies of Eastern Europe – define their own way in transformation as democratisation. This self-description gives an additional argument for considering transformation in the context of civil society as quite frequently the term is used in this political context.

Transformation time is a period of formation of new identities at many levels of social life: institutions (in the structural sense of organisations: schools, hospitals, factories, churches, foundations etc.), social consciousness, procedures of acting etc. All levels of changing identities relate one to each other and quite frequently they contradict. It concerns also civil society transforming itself in democratisation process. It is worth to ask about direction (directions) of those changes and its interference with religious field and the Church. It is worth because in the opinion of many sociologists of religion including mine, the presence of religion at the level of civil society has an impact on the future of religion in the sense of its positive and reciprocal accommodation and co-operation with modernising social reality.¹

2. Understanding of civil society

Civil society is mostly seen in opposition to some other realities: to the state, to the privacy, to political arrangements or to economy. Jurgen Habermas for instance sees the roots of civil society in opposition of public and private spheres that appeared by the end of XVIII century, where “carriers of the representative publicness” by polarisation finally split into private and public elements (Habermas, 1989:11). In the same process “Elements of occupational status group organisation, to the degree that they have already been involved in the urban corporations and in certain differentiations within the estates of the land, developed into the sphere of “civil society” that as the genuine domain of private autonomy stood opposed to the state.” (Habermas, 1989:12). In his understanding, formation of civil society started in coffee bars and pubs, as the places where public affairs and problems were discussed. Later it has developed

¹ The process of modernisation is inevitable future of post-communist central part of Europe. One can argue that modernisation has already taken place under communism. On the one hand it could be true, especially as far as such processes as industrialisation, mass education, migration from villages to the cities and political rights of women are concerned. On the other hand social consciousness staying under pressure of communist ideology and mythology did not confront rationalisation and individualisation, what is typical for modernity. Collectivity went before individual and unquestioning belief went before rational debate, ideals (of communism or socialism) went before pragmatism.

in different orders, chambers, and academies that were “Transcending the barriers of social hierarchy, the bourgeois met here with the socially prestigious but politically uninfluential nobles as “common” human beings” (Habermas, 1989:34-35). “Common” human beings are gradually transferred into “common good” of “human rights” of human beings.

J.L. Cohen and A. Arato see civil society as the “third realm” differentiated from the economy and the state. It has “cross-cutting cleavages, overlapping membership of groups, and social mobility” and as such “is the presupposition for a stable democratic polity, a guarantee against permanent domination by any group and against the emergence of fundamentalist mass movements and antidemocratic ideologies” (Cohen & Arato, 1992:18).

Similarly as opposing the state to civil society John A. Hall was relating to the historical opposition to despotism, “a space in which social groups could exist and move – something which exemplified and would ensure softer, more tolerable conditions of existence” (Hall, 1995:1).

As an intuitively “obvious” definition of civil society, Ernest Gellner proposes to understand it as “that set of diverse non-governmental institutions, which is strong enough to counterbalance the state, and, whilst not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent the state from dominating and atomising the rest of society” (Gellner, 1995:33). Perez-Diaz understands civil society as “social institutions such as markets and voluntary associations and a public sphere which are outside the direct control of (...) the state” (Perez-Diaz, 1993:57).

Thus in the broadest perspective civil society could be understood as horizontal linkages between people and groups of people grouped together, sometimes organised, acting in favour of “common good”. Rising of civil society and discussion concerning it is related to political issues and to the theories and ideologies of democracy.

Civil society is seen as an enemy of authoritarian rulers and powers. Important and interesting analysis by Robert Putnam (1995) concerning civil society in Italy proves the truth of this statement. He discovered that Northern Italy historically better developed forms and the institutions of civil society while Southern part, for many reasons not. In his opinion civil societies “cause better efficiency and stability of democratic government” for their “internal” influence of single members and “external” influence on broader social spectrum (Putnam, 1995:137).

Putnam opposes the types of local social relation based on the civil network and the type of relations he calls patron–client, based on personal dependence,

limits of freedom, not equal rights of participation in social life etc. (Putnam, 1995:152). This second type of arrangements is typical, for example, for regions influenced by Mafia. It could be also compared to a totalitarian rule where the individuals were forced to seek support from those who were rulers and stood higher at any level of social hierarchy. It could be also compared to a totalitarian rule where individuals were forced to seek support from those who were rulers and stood higher at any level of social hierarchy. Then in his opinion civil society is a clear condition of development of democracy. Victor Perez-Diaz, while thinking of Spain, is of the same opinion. Explaining conditions of successful transition to democracy he mentions four “causal factors” starting from that of traditions of civil society, that in his opinion “accustomed the population to polycentric forms of order such as markets, social pluralism, and public debate” (Perez-Diaz, 1993:39)

3. Civil society and religion in Polish history

Scientists while talking about civil society quite frequently use the expression “return”, for instance the title of the excellent book by Victor Pèrez – Díaz is “The Return of Civil Society. The Emergence of Democratic Spain” (1993). How the birth of civil society could be seen in Poland? How religion and the Church are related to the birth of civil society before the partitions? Answering to these questions would require more research in history.

Looking at the more recent past, namely at the time before the collapse of communism, in Polish context rise of civil society is associated with political opposition towards communist state and government. J.L. Cohen and A. Arato are right while saying that the “opposition of civil society and state made its most dramatic return in East Europe, particularly in the ideology of the Polish opposition from 1976 to the advent of early Solidarity and beyond” (Cohen & Arato, 1992:31). Victor Perez-Diaz is convinced that emergence or development of civil society as such in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes “prepares the way for its transition to a liberal democracy and a full-fledged market economy” (Perez-Diaz, 1993:56) so to say structurally. In Cohen and Arato’ the opposed terms are used: “Society *against* the state, nation *against* state, social order *against* political system, pays real *against* pays legal or official, public life *against* the state, private life *against* public power, etc.” (Cohen & Arato, 1992:31). On the other hand one of the most influential Polish sociologists, Jerzy Szacki, is of the opinion that the term “civil society”, invented in Western scientific and democratic tradition was simply implemented to political events and processes in Poland. As he pointed out that “from its Western friends dissidents from Central-Eastern Europe got knowledge that process initiated by

them is 'revival of civil society'" (Szacki, 1997:17). The other important specificity of the rise of civil society in Central-Eastern Europe was "morality" of it, that was civil society of "dissidents, democrats and clerics" in comparison to the middle class aiming at getting more independence from the state in Western Europe (Szacki, 1997:27).

On the one hand it was expressed by real presence of the Catholic priests among dissidents, on the other – the Catholic Church as an institution played a significant role in formation of civil society. One of the powerful symbols directed against the communist state and the party was the cross. As one of the sociologists counted there were over 1000 masses organised in 1980 at the factories fields. The Church and its members were, to a large degree, midwives of civil society. Pulpits, catechism classes, cloistered conference rooms, became arenas for debate of questions of the day. Religious ritual became the central expression and manifestation of civil society: procession, pilgrimages, attending mass, meetings with a pilgrim Pope.

Making an attempt to summarise the role of the Catholic Church in the last two centuries we see a lot of functions played by the Church, not limited to religious field.

The first field – the Church and the State

The Roman Catholic Church in relation to the state played in the Polish past different functions: support of the state, replacement and opposition towards it. The mutual co-operation of the Church and the state was typical for many medieval countries, including Poland. In modern Europe two major models of relations between the Church and the state developed: in some countries religion has a national, state status (Great Britain, Scandinavian countries) and some countries introduced separation between them following the first example given in this matter by French revolution. In Poland the Roman Catholic Church as an institution has replaced the state through two centuries. Partitions provoked this function of the Church that was the only institution legally surviving and existing as unified structure. In this way the Church played the role of political body and structure unifying the regions of Poland cut into pieces by partitions. Simultaneously over two centuries of partitions trained the Church in Poland and formed around it civil society opposing to the state that continues to be seen as hostile after 1945. Thus relation of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland towards the state was contradictory – replacement of the state and playing the role of the state in times of partitions and – tradition of hostility towards the state, hostility supported by society.

The second field – the Church and political society

The Church through times of partitions and communism represented political society of the oppressed. Representatives of the Church were institutionally and privately involved in Polish uprisings of 1830 and 1863. Formation of political society in Poland is strictly linked to such values as patriotism, taking part in uprisings in fighting for independence and building of the Polish state. The Church and religion were important elements of it. Importance is reflected in significant Polish stories and dramas, such as that of Mickiewicz or Wyspiański. An image of Poland suffering in history as crucified Jesus Christ is a source of Polish Messianism, i.e. romantic vision of the important and mysterious role of Poland in European future. This function of representation of political society by the Church was continued after 1945, as totalitarian system did not allow forming political society as such. Religion and church in Poland acted in the name of political society and instead of it. It opposed to one-party system and political elite that did not represent political society but only party elite.

The third field – the Church and civil society.

The Church as an institution co-created civil society in Poland and the churches as buildings maybe played a role comparable to that by pubs in Western Europe as seen by Habermas. As a moment of the birth of civil society in Poland could be taken the institutionalisation of political opposition known as Workers Defence Committee (KOR) in 1976 and the rising of Solidarity Movement in 1980. Again the Church played a contradictory role – not only the Church did support development of civil society and legitimated opposition towards the state but also mediated between it and the society.

Looking at it we may see a kind of “schizophrenic roles” in political and social practice of the Church in Polish history. In other words the Church as an institutional power played the role of a substitute of the state under partitions and a substitute of political society under communism. But it also mediated between the opposition and the state, helping in this way to find an agreement between the legitimated opposition and the state. All contradictions in the role of the Church placed between society and the state got their full importance after the collapse of communism making difficult for the Church in finding a new way. Thus the important question is what has happened to Polish society in transformation period and what has happened to civil society, religion and the Church. At first I would like to look at relations between civil society and the Church and then – more broadly, at relations with religion.

4. Civil society in Contemporary Poland and the Catholic Church

Interdependencies between creation of civil society and religion in Poland as everywhere else are linked to the history, namely to the basic facts that start from strong relation of national identity with Catholicism that is historic choice of belonging to Western Christianity and Western – European culture.

Post-communist transformation has brought radical changes to the institutional face of Poland. Above all the political structure has changed: the ‘monocentric’ PZPR (Polish Unified Party of Workers) has been replaced by a broad spectrum of parties with an equally wide range of programmes, initiating the formation of political society. The civil society that emerged from the totalitarian pressure receives back its own voice and creates different agenda of social discourse: feminist groups, radio stations, television and print media, and pressure groups – for example *Neutrum* (Association for a People with a Neutral World-View, 1990), “*Without Dogma*” (Association for Law and Freedom), ecological groups, committees organised to discuss public questions, for example the Committee for a Referendum on Abortion, and numerous Catholic anti-abortion organisations.

What characterises this ferment is a great degree of direct reaction to the activity of the Church – introduction of religious instruction to schools, initiatives to draw up a total ban on abortion, engagement with the campaign to quickly sign the Concordat with Vatican, and the resulting debates about the new constitution. Civil society, as every social phenomenon, has to be articulated. How is articulated civil society in Poland? What is, if it is at all, then the place of religion in public discourse?

First of all transformation brought a natural, rapid and overwhelming process of differentiation of society. From day to day, in a revolutionary way, the state, political society and civil society became separated. The state got independence and political society rose as a result of democratisation, elections and system of representative parliamentary elections. In other words, political society received a chance of gaining self and every member of society received a chance to be a subject of political life by active membership in a chosen party or by simpler participation in elections. Political activity and some political knowledge necessary for it became a new task for everybody, unlike in the past where the basic political orientation lied fundamentally in dualistic vision, i.e. being with the communists or against “them”. Majority of Poles were against the communist regime as Solidarity movement proved it but members of the communist party together with their families counted also quite significant 3

million of supporters. New political scene is much more differentiated. There are parties with programmes addressed to different groups of interests: farmers, young business groups, former communists and workers et cetera. There are populist parties and the parties having sophisticated elite programmes, these having wide social support and quite insignificant one, presenting Catholic views and liberal ones. Together with differentiation of political scene it became necessary to learn it, following the changes and educating people in their rights.

Civil society is in the re-creation, reformation. In all possible fields of activity people need to learn about their needs and ways of expressing it. Some movements can support it; for instance feminists movement support the fight for equal rights of women at the job market. Civil society visibly pointed at the problems engaging almost everybody. Abortion has become one of such hot issues in Poland for almost a decade. One additional problem became quite visible on this occasion: different pro-choice groups and movements in favour of referendum on this issue were born freely just as a result of civil activity of citizens while anti-abortion and pro-life groups arouse under very strict institutional activity and support of the Roman Catholic Church. It is not certain that the Catholics themselves wouldn't act, maybe they would. In any way it proved that the Church and its hierarchy either do not trust to believers from the street or – they do not know how to stay aside and to allow people to act “from the bottom” just as civil society convinced that some values should be actively and visibly supported.

Introduction of religious instruction to public school looked even more paternalistically. The way of this introduction was important, namely, on the 2nd of August 1990 Polish government took a decision about the return, as some interpretations say, or introduction – as others say, of religious instruction to the state school. One day later Ministry of education signed it up and the new decision came into life. Nobody, neither religious communities of Catholics nor members of other religious groups, was consulted. It proved again that the Church, two decades earlier giving support to the rise of civil society, and political opposition in Poland “forgot” the basic law of civil society-consultation, discussion, searching of “common good”. This way of introduction of religious instruction was criticised not only by anticlericals but also by Catholics. Jarosław Gowin, the Catholic journalist and the editor of “Tygodnik Powszechny”, a Catholic newspaper addressed rather to elite, wrote that instruction was introduced without waiting “for the results of an on-going debate and without going through the necessary long statute procedures”

(Gowin, 1995:14). He also agreed with the general opinion that most of the activities of the Church at that time revealed a desire for actual privileges.” As examples he mentioned: “Beginning to return the wealth of the Church before general agreement on re-privatisation; speedy granting of a Catholic radio station before criteria for their distribution had been settled by law; undertaking to resume religious lessons in schools before any discussions with other smaller churches etc.” (Gowin, 1999:116-117).

Primate Cardinal Glemp responded eloquently to such criticisms by commenting that “We always want to serve the nation any way we can, and no-one can preach us how to do it. We understand the nation and we wish to serve it to the best of our understanding” (Gazeta Wyborcza 28.06.1992).

Let me raise the argument that the Episcopal Communiqués and the above statements of various Bishops, including the Primate of Poland, Jozef Glemp, comprise two elements. Firstly, they perceive as identical the Polish nation, Polish Catholics and Polish Society. Of course, this is in the form of an appeal to Polish historical experience, the union between national identity and Catholicism, the role of the Church in the defence of Polishness, and from this eloquent historical circumstance comes the opinion explicitly expressed that the parliament elected in free elections should represent the Catholic values of a Catholic people, firm in their defence and serve their consolidation.

The second element I perceive is the presupposition not only of single-minded Catholic thinking in different matters, but a basic agreement of that opinions with that presented by the Church hierarchy. A message is very slowly reaching the Church hierarchy that there is a differentiation not only in society but also among declared Catholics. It seems as Miklós Tomka could be right expressing the opinion that for participation of the Churches in creative impact of religious aspect on social life and civil society could be quite difficult for – as he calls – big churches. In his opinion “Even if churches contribute to the emergence of civil society, they may hinder the rise of other participants in the public scene because of their dominance (and perhaps because of their exclusivist behaviour)” (Tomka, 1999:57). In Poland – as majority of Poles belongs to the Catholic Church – not only outside differentiation but “other participants” inside the Church are important, so allowing them express different opinions would support civil society discourse. Obviously this kind of development would require a mutual confidence. On the side of believers confidence that bishops would allow to act in favour of Catholic values even if this acting was not planned together with bishops and – on the other hand, bishops

have to believe that their faithful have their own Catholic sensitivity, imagination and will act in favour of Catholic values and not against the Church.

Interesting comparison of two churches acting under different circumstances and in different ways is made by Katarzyna Gilarek, comparing the Catholic Church in Poland and the Church of England in Great Britain. After considering different items she concluded that “The Church of England in Great Britain seems to employ a completely different strategy in which democratic decision making and compromise is the main way of solving the controversial issues of the modern world” (Gilarek, 1999: 203).

This situation was given attention by probably the most critical thinker in the Catholic elite, Father Professor Józef Tischner, who wrote “This political and even partisan We starts to overweight We, The Church. What does the Church do in this situation? Of course, it tries for identity, autonomy. It does not come easily, because it is easier to fight enemies than over-zealous friends” (Tischner, 1998:24).

In the same manner, the secular elite criticised the politicised Church. Summarising voice in this discussion has been that of respected philosopher Leszek Kołakowski who states that if “the Church participates in political games – even if priests do not stand for Parliament – it must bear political defeats” (Kołakowski, 1996:10). The defeat of President Wałęsa was seen as a joint defeat of the Church.

Kołakowski’s thoughts are an unusually accurate criticism of the Church’s engagement in politics, criticism that has been expressed by almost all possible circles in society: Catholic and secular elite and typical parishioners. Poles argue about which government – right or left – is better. They both exchange in leading the state. There are many important questions yet to be settled – legalisation of abortion or entry into the EU. The need to reduce the political engagement of the Church is one issue on which a consensus exists. Throughout ten years of transformation, polls and surveys have shown three-quarters of the public think the Church is too involved in politics.

We can summarise these considerations by formulating some propositions on the Catholic Church in Poland under the conditions of transformation.

1. The methods and styles of organisation from the heritage of the past are incorporated into the reality of transformation: Messianism, Ritualism, ease of social engineering and turning against the state;
2. Treating itself as an infallible institution, being in possession of the only true indisputable knowledge on what is “the best for the nation”. It is the

- feature of authoritarian institution, relating infallibility not only to religious doctrine but to all matters including politics;
3. It is unaware of multicultural society: either those who do not hear the 'admonition' of the Church are outside the Catholic nation (because with regard to whom the Church is addressing, the Church has not reached a consensus), or Primate Glemp's statement that he understands the nation is not true;
 4. It does not accept basic democratic rules: free choice, minority rights and pluralism. It uses the language of struggle and insulting epithets against its critics: post-communists, feminists, New Religious Movements. We can interpret this in two ways – either as a continuation of a fortress mentality or, the exact opposite, as a sign of a triumphal unwillingness to divide the 'governing spirit';
 5. Specifically, the current head of the Polish Church – Primate Glemp embodies every feature of the 'People's Church'. Unwillingness and lack of skill in discussing other ways of thinking; ignorance in relation to other religions; unwillingness to embrace change (for example, to increase involvement of the laity in the work of the Church), an emphasis on organisation, verticalisation of the functions of the Church, patriarchy in relation to new social movements, like feminism and organisations of defence of children's rights.

In the process of transformation there is an ongoing differentiation of society which touches religion and a following differentiation in all Catholic positions, in the Church hierarchy as well as the laity. This process tends to leave aside the bishops. The Church hierarchy in these changes finds itself in an uncomfortable position: for conservatives they are 'not radical enough' and 'too progressive' when they accept entry to the EU and try, not very skilfully, to defend our 'elder brothers', the Jews. At the same time they are too cowardly and backward-looking for more open Catholics when growing contemporary problems are concerned.

The sociologists of religion in many ways consider adaptation of the religious institutions to the processes of modernisation, secularisation and privatisation of religion. Taking their considerations into account the Catholic Church in Poland presents a more conservative than liberal face (Beyer, 1994), rather 'entrenching itself' than 'marketing itself' or 'surrendering' (Berger, 1992). There is no doubt that it will continue to be important; the Church in the last decade has been very sharp in creating itself as a political institutional actor

and simultaneously put itself outside the discourse of civil society, which seems to be much more important for the future of religion.

5. Transformations of social life, civil society and religion

Looking at relations between civil society and religion understood in its institutional dimension we see fields of conflicts – between civil society and the Church, between political society and the church. Situation is changed as soon as we move to religion understood by its communitarian and individual dimensions.

Transformation brought a lot of novelties in which religion is involved quite simply differentiating some areas of social life. Reformation of education system brought important change. Private and social schools were established, including Catholic ones. The latter enjoy popularity because of common high level in it and many additions to the programme, as languages. Additionally parents are convinced that the catholic school guarantees a proper moral level and control. More frequently Catholic school is led by male and female orders.

Thanks to returning of church properties, to the monastic orders, hospitals were re-established. Some of them are very famous and have long-term traditions, operating very well in community, helping people. Apart from hospitals, mostly nuns lead the institutes of permanent care of old, ill and disabled.

Reform of mass-media system meant again differentiation. Instead of two TV state programs and 3 radio programs, new and very different ones were established, including private and commercial TV channels, as POLSAT or TVN. It helped to create Catholic mass media – TV channel and two radio programs, including Radio Maryja that enjoys high popularity. Radio Maryja is a good example of present stage of developments in religious field in Poland. The owner of radio is monastic order in Toruń and it acts not only independently of Polish Episcopate but quite clearly it continuously opposes Episcopate. It seems that Polish bishops do not have influence on it and can not control it as the monastic order is subordinated directly to Vatican. Father Rydzyk is a leader of the Radio having all features described as a phenomenon of a charismatic leadership. About 5 million of listeners share majority of opinions presented there: anti-European and anti-Jewish, anti-communist, anti-Masonry feelings and attitudes. Radio Maryja and Father Rydzyk established a movement around radio – Families of Radio Maryja. The father played an important role in politics. On the base of this movement he unified divided representatives of many small right wing fractions into a coalition of parties called Liga Rodzin Polskich (LRP – League of Polish Families) that entered

parliament in the last elections with 5% of support. Notwithstanding how it could be taken ironically, now this party could be seen as political representation of civil society formed by those Catholics who are rather traditional, conservative, anti-European, representing rather clear rejection of modernity, re-assessment of Polish tradition and fundamental view on those who have different opinions as strictly wrong. Ironically, because one of the virtues of civil society is at least being open to the dialog with those who are of different opinions in order to discuss issues and to listen to others. For LRP, the dialog is neither possible nor desirable and it is decidedly rejected.

6. Conclusion?

In my opinion it is not by chance that in Poland manifestation of civil society so much involves either religion (various groups representing either Catholics or Catholic Church as institution) or opposition towards religion, in other words, pro-religious or anti-religious sentiments. In other countries it doesn't look like that. For instance in Italy, what Andrzej Rychard found striking, civil ties are "prevalingly secular ties – in other words, Italian Catholicism participates in building of civil relations to a low degree" (Rychard, 1996: 314).

Something similar is noticed in respect to Spain, where "Spanish Catholics could be Catholic in church and perhaps at home, but they did not feel subordinate to the will of the church in the public sphere, that is, in most political, economic, or cultural matters" (Perez-Diaz, 1993:136). In Poland, although general observation could go in similar direction – Catholics frequently oppose an official teaching of the Church, at least significant number of Catholics oppose political engagement of the Church and so called moral teaching. On the other hand a lot of Catholics are ready to engage in manifestations of civil unity with the others directed by the Church in case it is organised on the national level. Members of parishes sign letters opposing unwanted exhibitions or movies or are engaged in manifestations of pro-life group et cetera. The priests teaching religion are the second persons after director in the public school and the most influential members of local communities. Maybe Srđan Vrcan is right when saying that the most important religious change in the nineties in the countries of CEE could be described as a shift "from privatisation of religion to its de-privatisation, from secularisation to de-secularisation of society", indicating a turn from religion as theism with no public function whatsoever to religion as theism with very important public functions, and from religion located outside the preceding dominant social

system to religion having recently become an important part of the actually functioning social and political system in a basically twofold position by being at the same time both, an integral part to the system and standing above the system (intra and extra-systemic position and role) (Vrcan, 2001:98).

At present stage in Poland this mixed character of civil society proves being in transitional period. Civil society as such, as the whole society, is in the process of transformation and a kind of reformation. The past was devoted to the fight against communism and communist domination. Negative mobilisation was co-organised and supported by the Church. The Church and the representatives of civil society have now a new lesson and part of it is forgetting the past and learning new models and ways of operation.

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Malgorzata Zawila

**RELIGIOSITY AND MORALITY: ATTITUDES TOWARD
EUTHANASIA AND ABORTION AS A MANIFESTATION
OF RELIGIOSITY AND MORALITY RELATIONS IN
CONTEMPORARY POLAND**

1. Introduction

In this paper I consider attitudes toward euthanasia and abortion in the context of morality and religiosity in Poland. The main aim of this study is to answer the question: can attitudes toward abortion and euthanasia be understood as an indication of contemporary religiosity and morality in Poland? What can we say about the religiosity and morality of Poles, knowing their views on these matters? Is the process of modernisation apparent when considering moral attitudes? And, if it is, then in what way is it present in the morality and religiosity of Poles?

My analysis in this study is partly based on the results of research conducted at the end of 2000 and beginning of 2001, studying 60 Polish physicians. Apart from the issues of abortion and euthanasia, the questionnaire used in the research also included questions measuring attitudes toward different aspects of death and dying: frequency and circumstances of thinking about their patients' deaths, the deaths of the physicians' relatives and their own death. The physicians researched were mostly of the following specialisations: surgery, anaesthesiology, intensive care, paediatrics, internal medicine, oncology-chemotherapy, oncology-radiotherapy, neurology, geriatrics, cardiology and others working in hospice, intensive care units in hospitals and palliative care wards.

2. Features of Modernisation

There are various ways of interpreting the changes that are taking place in contemporary society, including the issues of religiosity and morality. Prominent among them are theories of secularisation and privatisation. Both are processes

that accompany the modernisation of societies. Sociologists like P. Berger, D. Martin, T. Luckmann and many others have discussed those processes already for decades (Berger, 1967; Martin, 1978; Luckmann, 1967). The process of secularisation can explain some of the transformations that are taking place in modern society, including matters of religiosity and morality. However, as I will try to show in this paper, secularisation is not the only process that explains the changes in relations between religiosity and morality in contemporary societies.

According to some functional definitions of religion, one of its main functions is creating and legitimising the world order, including the moral order (Berger, 1967). All the major religions have their sacred laws with their rights and wrongs. They all reveal which behaviours and thoughts are permitted, and which ones are forbidden. In traditional societies, breaking some sacred rule might lead to expulsion from the Church and society and, consequently, to social death. It was not possible to deny the Church's morals without social consequences. Religiosity and morality used to be regarded as inseparable. Breaking some moral rule, according to many religions, had its consequences not only in this world, but also after death in the form of divine judgement that assigns eternal reward or punishment. In traditional societies, the main reason for obeying moral rules was that of a religious character. The connection between religion and morality was obvious then.

However, in contemporary society the situation seems to be different. There are many sociological theories concerning the character of the society that we live in and its transformation. There are many other processes like individualisation, pluralisation and fragmentation that accompany the modernisation of society. There is a wide range of values, ideas, religious systems and lifestyles out of which everyone is able to pick and choose the ones that are most suitable for them. Everyone has to make the decision by him or herself. Some even claim that endless decision-making and individual choices are not just a possibility, but a necessity, in contemporary society (Bauman, 2000:236).

There is no one right kind of food, house, music, political system, religious system or moral system. There are almost as many varieties as individuals. The existence of common values is questioned. There are many individual values instead. Of course, there are people and institutions telling us what is the best for us, but we must make all the decisions. Yet how many of us, members of modern or rather post-modern society, want to make all the decisions related to our lives by ourselves? How many of us want them to be independent and how many rely on someone else's choice? We do not want anyone to tell us what to

do, say, think etc. From the wide offer of goods, lifestyles and moral values addressed to us, we chose only the most convenient for us. That is what is called the society of choice as opposed to the society of fate.

In the realm of sociological considerations of contemporary society, a theory of systems and subsystems of social existence has been developed and is widely used (Luhmann, 1995). According to this theory, politics, science, education and religion are separate spheres of social life today. Of course, they are in some relation with each other, but generally they are separate. Far-reaching differentiation and specialisation are other hallmarks of contemporary society. For instance, a shaman, faith healer or priest is no longer the only or most common health, birth and death specialist. Now there are physicians, experts for almost every little part of our body and its various afflictions. In every sphere of people's activity there are some highly specialised experts.

3. Abortion and Euthanasia in the Polish Legal System and in the attitudes of Polish society

The purpose of this paper is to present the moral condition of Poles and its relation to religiosity in its cultural and legal context. I will illustrate it with the Poles' attitudes toward abortion and euthanasia – both issues of men's and women's moral choices and decisions. In the last decade, the matters of abortion and euthanasia have been widely discussed in Poland at the public and academic level. These problems are present in daily magazines, popular TV talk shows, radio programmes as well as in scientific literature and academic lectures. The character of these discussions (especially the public ones) implies that they are very controversial issues.

Polish law, laid down in 1956, allowed the termination of pregnancy for several reasons: medical, social and when the pregnancy was the result of a crime. Medical and social reasons had to be confirmed by a doctor and a crime by the public prosecutor's office. In 1959, the law was changed and a woman's written declaration of her unfavourable social or financial situation was sufficient for a legal abortion. Since 1989, Polish Parliament has been engaged in the problem of abortion several times. Just after arranging the most important issues of government, in April 1990, the Upper House of Parliament made the first arrangements for a new abortion law. In the years 1990–93, the Lower House of Polish Parliament took into consideration four proposals for a new abortion law (two liberal and two restrictive) and a proposal for a public referendum. None of these was ever brought into effect. After those years of

heated public and political discussion, a new abortion law was finally passed on 7 January 1993. It allowed an abortion for the following reasons: eugenic, medical and when a pregnancy is a result of a crime. After the elections in September 1993, the new Parliament tried to amend the law by adding a social reason for a legal abortion but the President put his veto on the amendments. In 1995, the Parliament obliged the government to present a yearly report on the implementation of the abortion law. In 1997, the Parliament once more amended the law and, among others, added a clause allowing a social reason for having a legal abortion. The Upper House of Parliament appealed against the last amendments to the Constitutional Tribunal and, in consequence, the changes were withdrawn¹.

As we see, the process of laying down a new abortion law in Poland was quite long and complicated. Every attempt to liberalise the abortion law in Poland met many difficulties. The argumentation, especially from the opponents of liberalisation, was usually very far from scientific nature and rationality².

The laws on euthanasia have never caused as much public discussion as those on abortion. Euthanasia, defined as the practice of killing someone in order to relieve their suffering when nothing can be done to help them, is illegal in Poland and is treated in the courts as 'privileged homicide.' According to the Polish penal code for euthanasia, one can be punished with 3 months to 5 years of imprisonment. In some special cases, the judge may commute a sentence or desist from executing the punishment, however the code does not specify in which cases it is possible.

There is a wide range of reasons for and against euthanasia and abortion: ontological, social and ethical – of religious and of lay character. The Roman Catholic Church's position on abortion and euthanasia is clear. There are special encyclicals on these issues: *Evangelium Vitae* concerning abortion and *Lura et Bona* concerning euthanasia, the Catechism of the Catholic Church, the Pope's letters and other Church documents. The Church's attitude toward the discussed moral issues is negative. However, as it may be inferred on the basis of sociological researches, there are believers who do not share that opinion.

¹ The reason for appealing was a constitutional right to live of every human being without differentiating and defining human being.

² A wide presentation of both sides' argumentation in a public sphere show J. Heinen and A. Matuchniak-Krasuska in their publication *Aborcja w Polsce. Kwadratura koła*. Also published in French.

As the research conducted in 1999 by the Public Opinion Research Centre in Poland (CBOS) show: 86% of all Poles are for the legalisation of abortion when the mother's life is in danger, 61% of those who participate in religious practices more than once a week are of the same opinion. 77% of all Poles on question: "What do you think, should terminating pregnancy be allowed by law?" answered "Yes" when the mother's health is threatened (46% of practising religious Poles), 72% are for abortion when the child is a result of a crime (30% of practising religious Poles), 62% when the child will be handicapped (36% of practising religious Poles), 38% when the mother is in a difficult economic situation (19% of practising religious Poles) and 27% when the mother simply doesn't want the child (7% of practising religious Poles) (CBOS, 1999). As we see, the difference between the practising religious Poles and non-practising Poles is clear but the attitude of some part of religious people, including those attending church more than once a week, differs from the official moral teachings of the Church. In fact, 34% of people attending more than once a week have a restrictive attitude toward abortion (do not agree with abortion in any situation) and 19% of this group agree with abortion for economic reasons and when the woman doesn't want the child. The approval of abortion is more frequent when people attend once a week – from 85% when the mother's life is in danger to 20% when the mother simply doesn't want the baby. The numbers are significant when we consider the Church's attitude toward the issue.

According to Libiszowska-Żółtkowska's research, over 4% of Polish intellectuals declaring themselves as 'strongly believing' and over 22% of those declaring themselves as 'believing' have a positive attitude toward abortion in situations of economic difficulty (Libiszowska-Żółtkowska, 2000:172). 42.5% of 'strongly believing' and over 11% of 'believing' are completely against abortion (in every case). Those people do not find any reason justifying abortion. Over 36% of 'strongly believing' and 66% of 'believing' intellectuals accept abortion for the same reasons as are allowed in Polish law.

Research conducted in 1999 on Polish physicians shows that 69% of them have a positive attitude toward abortion in cases where the mother's life is threatened. 75% approve of abortion when a child has a genetic defect. Over 16% accept abortion for economic reasons (Grabski, 2000). Over 38% of all studied physicians consider abortion in general to be an ethical practice and 58% consider it to be an unethical practice. According to the results, some doctors accept abortion at the same time as considering it to be unethical. All research conducted in Poland shows that Poles' attitude toward abortion is more compatible with the Polish state's law than with the moral teaching of the Roman Catholic Church.

According to my research, which was conducted among Polish physicians in 2001, negative attitudes toward abortion in all cases occur among physicians declaring themselves as 'strongly believing' or 'believing.' 7 out of 11 physicians who were against abortion in all cases while answering to question: "Please tell what do you think; should woman have an opportunity of terminating pregnancy because of following reasons?" were 'strongly believing' and the remaining 4 were 'believing.' On this basis, we may infer that the negative attitude toward abortion has its main source in religiosity. However, not every physician from these two groups of 'strongly believing' and 'believing' was of the same opinion. The majority of 'believing' approve of abortion for medical, eugenic and legal reasons. The most important argument against abortion in other cases and alternative to it, for these interviewees, is the use of contraceptive devices. For example, a 46-year-old anaesthetist says: "Nowadays, the alternative for abortion is contraception." (10)³. Those physicians do not take into consideration the Church's standpoint in this matter and they are not influenced by it in making their moral decisions and choices.

Another moral issue and the attitudes of Polish people toward it, considered in this paper, is euthanasia. From recently conducted research we know that 49% of Poles are for the legalisation of shortening a terminally ill patient's life when he or she requires it. 37% are against and 12% do not have any opinion on this matter (CBOS, 2001). Since 1988, the attitude toward euthanasia has been changing. In 1988, 30% had a positive and 47% had a negative attitude towards euthanasia. In 1999, 40% had a positive and 44% had a negative attitude toward euthanasia. According to these results, approval of euthanasia has increased since 1988. When the word "euthanasia" is used in the question, the results are different. 37% of all interviewed are definitely for and 38% are against euthanasia. The remainder are ambivalent toward this issue. Remembering that over 96% of Poles declare themselves to be believing Roman Catholics, the result of only 38% against euthanasia is very interesting (CBOS, 2001).

Research conducted by Libiszowska-Żółtkowska (2000:188) showed that over 22% of Polish intellectuals are for euthanasia and 60% against this practice. According to the results of this research, negative attitude and religiosity are directly proportional. Nonetheless, over 17% of those declaring themselves as 'believing' and 'strongly believing' have a positive attitude towards euthanasia.

³ In brackets after quotation from an interview I put a consecutive number of the interview and the interviewee's specialisation.

My interviews with physicians conducted included many open-ended questions that enabled a thorough analysis of their argumentation and reasons for and against euthanasia. The most frequent argument against euthanasia used by physicians was of an ethical but lay character. Here are some illustrating statements: 'Because it's tantamount to homicide.' (39, geriatrician), 'One simply can't cause someone else's death.' (32, anaesthetic) and 'it's immoral' (57, ophthalmologist working in hospice). In this category of arguments, interviewees very often compared euthanasia to homicide, talked about the legal consequences of this practice and considered it as immoral, but without referring to God, religion or the sacred character of life. There are 16 statements classified in this category.

The next largest category of arguments against euthanasia numbers 11 statements. In this category, physicians talked about their job and duties as medical doctors. They also talked about medical ethics. Here are two examples: 'a physician cures not kills' (13, general practice) and 'it's against the rules of medical ethics' (58, surgeon).

The third largest category (seven interviews) includes arguments of a religious character. Interviewees whose arguments were classified in this category talked about God and religion. Here are some statements exemplifying this category: 'I am not the Lord of life and death.' (53, paediatrician), 'I'm not God to decide whether somebody is to live or not.' (47, general practice), 'I don't approve of euthanasia for religious reasons. I believe that the only life-giver is God and we cannot decide about somebody else's life.' (43, dermatologist working in a hospice).

There were also three opinions concerning physician's responsibility and conscience and three arguments that death should come in a natural way. The rest of the arguments weren't classified in any particular category. As we see, the arguments of strictly religious character are not the most common ones. Interviewed physicians tend to use ethical argumentation, but more that of a lay character than of a religious character.

As these results show, the connection of religion and morality is no longer as clear and obvious as it once was. Poles' morality depends on their individual choice or state law more than on the moral teaching of the Roman Catholic Church. The contemporary moral order has more of a lay character than a religious character. The process of separating morality and religiosity can be observed recently. Today, moral issues are matters of independent and individual choice and not only thoughtless obedience to moral rules taught by

the Church. Believers seem to select only some of the values required by their religion, the ones that suit them. They tend to obey state law rather than sacred law – as we can see in their attitude towards abortion. I consider the religiosity of some part of Polish believers to be declarative and theoretical rather than ‘real’, practical and having an influence on their everyday life.

4. Concluding comments

Secularisation theory may be used to interpret the empirical data presented above. The moral choices of Poles, even those who are believers, are no longer solely dependent on the Church's teaching but rely mostly on their own, individual choice. Morality, like many other spheres of human existence, is in the process of separation from religion. It has not yet reached its conclusion as in other spheres (law, education, science, politics) but the process can already be easily observed. We can search for the origins of obeying state law rather than religious law in the characteristic of modern society called ‘consumer society.’ It describes a society whose characteristic feature is impatience (Bauman, 2000) and expects almost immediate results for all its activities. Today, people do not think of the future consequences of what they do and in what way. Bauman claims that for post-modern man or woman there is no past and no future time; only the current moment is valuable and important. Contemporary life strategy is based on sudden, current needs and constant independent choices without perspective thinking (Bauman, 2000:142). The religious consequences of people's moral choices are mainly very distant – of an eschatological character – and that may be the reason for a 'consumer' not obeying religious morals. The lay costs and benefits of people's activity are less distant and more present than a promised hell or heaven. That may be one of the reasons for today's morality. However, in my opinion, this thesis requires more empirical confirmation. What is more, according to Bauman, people these days don't make their choices in the name of abstract values, which are considered to be devalued (2000:141). Instead of this, what people take into consideration while making their decisions are the present costs and benefits. That also may be one of the reasons for such a division between faith and morality.

Another possible explanation for the state of relations between morality and religiosity in contemporary society is also connected with the processes taking place in it – pluralisation and individualisation. Every moral issue, value and rule is now a matter of the individual's choice and the Church's moral teaching is only one of many directions that people can follow in their lives.

According to Borowik (1997:248), selectivity in accepting some of the moral norms taught by the Church, together with similar selectivity in choosing certain dogmas, is a feature of the privatisation of religion. The results of research show that Poles frequently express their need for individual choice, independent of the Church's expectations, not only in moral matters but also in strictly religious ones (Borowik, 1997:251). At the same time, the religious function of legitimisation of the world order, including the moral order, has been reduced. Instead there are other, lay systems fulfilling this function.

As some other sociologists have claimed (Mariański, 1999:376), today in Poland we are dealing more with 'the process of the disintegration of moral values (moral crisis) than with a transformation of values'. According to my research, when considering physicians' arguments against euthanasia, we cannot say that there are no values at all or even that they are weakened. In my opinion, only the character and origins of the values have migrated into non-religious realms. Compared with other professional groups, physicians very often refer to the rules of some kind of ethic (medical or other). At the same time, they do not refer to the moral norms taught by the Church.

To conclude, I would claim that the issues of abortion and euthanasia and Poles' attitudes toward them are good examples of a social, including moral, transformation. The relations between religiosity and morality should be considered in the wider context of social change, modernisation with all the accompanying processes. However, the considered problem is multidimensional and needs further empirical and theoretical study. What is more, the relations between morality and religiosity can be explained with many more general processes accompanying the modernisation of contemporary society, and it seems that these explanations do not exclude but complement each other. That is why this matter needs some more general, theoretical studies based on sociological research. By understanding the morality of modern society and its relations to religiosity, we understand a part of social existence. Through this example, we can also observe the transformation of the role of religion in contemporary society as a whole.

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Barbara Thériault

**‘LE ROUGE ET LE NOIR’.
THE GERMAN CHURCHES AFTER RADICAL
POLITICAL CHANGE¹**

1. Introduction

The Protestant and Catholic churches were the only organisations in East Germany to retain strong ties and organisational structures with their West German counterparts. As such, they were both expected to undergo smooth and rapid institutional consolidation. Yet, the churches experienced difficulties at the beginning of the 1990s. Protestants and Catholics in the former GDR, people who are often remembered for their opposition to the communist regime and the role they played in harbouring the ‘Wende’ (the peaceful revolution of 1989) were, in the context of unified Germany, critical of western church practices. This attitude was also more generally matched with criticism towards the market economy and military intervention abroad. Somewhat ironically, some Christians have become the defenders of some of the ideas borne by the former socialist party they once opposed to. This is the starting point of this paper in which we examine the rhetoric and strategies religious actors adopted in the re-establishment of the churches’ unity and, more broadly, German unification. Drawing on conceptual tools such as guiding metaphors and their related organizing principles, special attention is paid to the de defenders of East German guiding metaphors and what they reckon to be the ‘most modern definition of the church and its public role.’ We argue that their attitudes in the new Germany relate to their position in the ‘religious field’ after the implosion of state socialism and German unification.

¹ The material used in this chapter is largely based on an article published in *European Societies* in 2003 (volume 5, number 3) as well as a forthcoming book ‘*Conservative Revolutionaries: Protestant and Catholic Churches in Germany after Radical Political Change in the 1990s* (New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books).

This analysis is an attempt to explore the transformation of the churches' guiding metaphors or conceptions of their public role after the collapse of the institutional order and 'the *religious work* carried out by specialist agents' (Bourdieu, 1987:119) in bringing them about. The framework developed by Albert O. Hirschman in *The Rhetoric of Reaction* (1991) enables us to delineate and compare the patterns of argumentation and the various strategies advanced by the advocates of East German conceptions and their opponents. Through the analysis of the debates that accompanied the re-establishment of the churches' unity, we attempt to show how religious entrepreneurs manipulated definitions to either change or maintain the church's definition of its public role, what we refer to as the 'politics of institutionalisation.'² As the genesis of the guiding metaphors is to be found in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), let us briefly outline the institutional order of the former GDR and the emergence and consolidation of church metaphors and their related principles. Once these are identified, it should be possible to follow their evolution after the collapse of the socialist state.

2. The genesis of church guiding metaphors in the GDR...

The GDR can be characterized by the fusion of all institutions and organisations, monopolisation of decisions and resources achieved through the Socialist Unity Party's (SED) and legitimated by a particular philosophy of history, Marxism-Leninism (Arnason, 2000:72). This endeavour was not complete though, religion – and with it, its carriers – being an exception. The regime could in theory attempt neither to influence nor to incorporate their substance since it rejected religion (Lepsius, 1994:19). However, the SED attempted to curtail the churches' and religion's influence through political repression, bureaucratic harassment, constant monitoring as well as through the discrimination against Christians and the superposition of church practices with socialist rites.³ The churches' presence in public organisations was notably

² We have reviewed the main church publications in which the debate took place: *Evangelische Kommentare*, *Lutherische Monatshefte*, *Kirche im Sozialismus*, *Herder-Korrespondenz*; *ost-west Informationsdienst*; the publications of the churches and their welfare agencies among which *Diakonie*, *Diakonie Jahrbuch*, *Caritas*, *Caritas Jahrbuch*; theological journals such as *Evangelische Theologie*, *Zeichen der Zeit*; journals related to specific issues such as *Christenlehre*, *Katholische Blätter*. The *epd-Dokumentation*, where newspaper articles related to churches are reproduced, also proved to be a reliable source of information.

³ The introduction of a civil youth consecration ceremony (*Jugendweihe*) coincides with membership decline and was certainly instrumental in limiting the churches' capacity of reproduction and influence on large segments of the population (see Pollack, 1994b:276).

curtailed and their membership dwindled. The Protestant churches’ membership dropped from 81 percent of the population at the outset of the GDR to 25 percent at its demise (Pollack, 1994a:373). Catholics, a minority in the eastern territories ever since the founding of the first German national state (Langewiesche, 1999: 304), accounted in the early 1990s for only between four and six percent of the population depending on the region (Pilvousek, 1993). These *figures* contrast sharply with church membership in western Germany, which is estimated at some 80 percent – the percentage of Catholics being slightly higher than that of Protestants (Pollack, 1997:395). In spite of lower membership and reduced public activities, the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches remained the only organisations in the GDR to enjoy any degree of internal autonomy.

State socialism, conflated with the creation of the GDR in 1949 and the membership loss, compelled the churches to take position on their situation and role in the new context. They adopted different strategies towards the state as reflected in their guiding metaphors and translated into organizing principles. The Protestant Church leadership coined the formula of the ‘Church in socialism’, a metaphor that simultaneously encompassed the principles of accommodation and opposition to the state (Goeckel, 1990:247). In contrast, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church stressed the principle of ‘political abstinence’. However, both churches increasingly concentrated their activities in the parish. New organisational forms such as a religious or catechetical instruction, pastoral care of military conscripts, family circles, and counselling activities were created. Metaphors such as the ‘Minority church’ and the ‘Church in the diaspora’ also came to define the Protestant and Catholic Church respectively (Pollack, 1994a:165; Pilvousek, 1999). These symbolic representations combined to define religion’s public role and departed from the West German model of church-state relations. In the West, the Catholic and Protestant churches enjoy a special position: they are corporations of public law which give them access to a church tax levied by the state⁴ and public organisations (schools, army, prisons, hospitals, youth and counselling centres) as well as giving them the possibility to influence policies.

3. ... and radical political change

Periods of radical political change – such as the ‘Wende’ – are characterized simultaneously by confrontation, polarisation, and reflexivity. Following the

⁴ This tax is paid by church members and collected by the state tax authorities; it represents about 9 percent of an employee’s income tax. The *Kirchensteuer* is the churches’ main source of income.

collapse of an institutional order and the emergence of a new one, new metaphors 'filter' individual conducts: what had once been taken for granted is now challenged. As Nedelmann stresses, 'processes of institutional demise [such as the collapse of the GDR] are easily extended to other institutions (and persons) which occur as a result of the fall' (1995:29). Indeed, the collapse of the institutional order of the GDR brought down church metaphors. They have lost their validity or, in other words, their binding capacity. The legitimacy of a motto such as the 'Church in socialism' was severely questioned while the principle of 'political abstinence' became obsolete. If most Christians shared the opinion that the churches should strengthen their links with their western counterparts, there was no agreement as to the form this rapprochement should take. Whereas most Catholics, who had until then played a minor, unobtrusive role in the country's political life, promoted and actually undertook significant reforms,⁵ a considerable number of Protestants seemed to have problems coming to terms with the new situation – a phenomenon that has hindered the re-establishment of the church's unity and inner consolidation. In this period of radical social change, both commentators and actors have often criticized the East German Protestant churches for not being prepared for unification. It was alleged that they neither had new models for church and society in a future GDR nor a unified Germany (see for instance Schröder, 1994:261).

German unification through 'institutional transfer' (Lehmbruch, 1994), that is the extension of the structures of the Federal Republic to the East according to Article 23 of the Basic Law and the formal restoration of the Protestant federation of churches as well as the re-integration of Catholic dioceses,⁶ set the parameters within which the churches' guiding metaphors underwent a redefinition. In theory, the churches did not have to re-unite, let alone at the speed it was carried out. Nevertheless, it was promptly executed.⁷ Following German unification and the re-establishment of the churches' unity, debates emerged that opposed religious actors on the issue of the church tax, the pastoral care of soldiers in the army, religious instruction in state schools, and social welfare provisions, in which the religious actors contested the churches' new public

⁵ Reforms that have been polemically described as a 're-Catholisation' of East Germany (Neubert quoted in Lange, 1996:96).

⁶ Another possible alternative, Article 146 of the Basic Law, foresaw the formation of a constitutional assembly and the drafting of a new constitution.

⁷ An agreement could not be found on the issue of the Protestant Military Chaplaincy Treaty and was left to be dealt with at a later stage.

role. In spite of the maintained links, the churches in East Germany had developed new conceptions of their public role. The conflict between religious actors is, we argue, a conflict between these conceptions as to their legitimacy and as to whether to maintain or to challenge the organizing principles. The Protestants, who had developed stronger institutions in the GDR, were more affected than Catholics. This is paradigmatically illustrated in the 'Berlin Declaration of Christians from the two German States' and in many articles in the press at that time. In the document signed by some 600 Protestants from East and West Germany on 9 February 1990 as a response to the 'Loccum Declaration' (BEK/EKD, 1990), a statement issued three weeks earlier by the eastern and western church hierarchies with the aim of promoting a speedy political and ecclesiastical unification, Protestants criticized the idea of a people's church financed by and dependent on the state; on the contrary, the churches' frugality, their status as a critical and alternative organisation and their commitment to peace and a 'third way' between capitalism and socialism were strongly emphasized. For their part, Catholics issued no counterstatements to the East German bishops' declaration of 20 February 1990 on the societal role of Catholics in the new context (reproduced in Lange, Pruß et al., 1993:402-403).

At first blush, the debates following the collapse of the GDR seem to oppose eastern and western actors as well as Protestants and Catholics. However, differences within all churches came to the forefront when state socialism collapsed. Pluralism and the introduction of the new legal framework for German unification also blurred the situation and made it difficult to identify 'eastern metaphors.' In order to circumvent problems entailed by an East/West or Protestant/Catholic dualism and the evolution of discussion within the new framework, we suggest drawing on Albert O. Hirschman's analogy (1991) and distinguishing the 'defenders of the status quo' from the 'proponents of reform'.⁸ From this viewpoint, the East German metaphors correspond to what religious actors considered worth maintaining for the future, what they routinely called the 'positive experiences of the GDR and the "Wende"' or, in the context of this study, the status quo, while reform corresponds to a departure from the status quo. The strategies of the actors are characterized by a conception of the church

⁸ In his writings on conservative politics, Hirschman uses the terms 'reactionary' and 'progressive.' His distinction is a reminder of Weber's analogy between priests and prophets. According to Weber, the priests are the guardians of an institutionalised order and its principles, the prophets those without – or outside the sphere of – authority. The prophets question and criticize the application of the principles safeguarded by the priests. In this way, they can eventually become carriers of innovation (Weber, 1988 [1920]:268).

and specific patterns of rhetoric. They relate, to paraphrase Bourdieu, to the actors' position in a *field* after radical political change.⁹ In the following, we will review the debates that followed the churches' unification over the 1990s. The patterns of argumentation and the various strategies advanced by the advocates of the status quo and their opponents are delineated and compared in an attempt to reconstruct the 'politics of institutionalisation,' that is the conscious attempt at institutionalising and deinstitutionalising the guiding metaphor and their principles to a certain degree and direction (Lepsius, 1995:400). In so doing, the transformation of churches' guiding metaphors and their organizing principles in the new context will become manifest.

3.1. The Rhetoric of Institutionalisation and Deinstitutionalisation

In his book, *The Rhetoric of Reaction*, Albert O. Hirschman (1991) provides a powerful instrument to analyse the rhetoric of Protestants and Catholics. Based on a study of conservatism, Hirschman shows that discourse is not shaped by 'conservative personalities' but by what he calls the 'imperatives of the arguments.'¹⁰ He distinguishes three patterns of argument that are typically invoked by reactionaries seeking to maintain the status quo: *jeopardy*, *perversity*, and *futility*. The arguments can be used 'by any group that opposes or criticizes new policy proposals or newly enacted policies' (1991:7) and can be embraced by actors regardless of their actual validity or efficiency.¹¹ These patterns of argumentation are matched with another triad characteristic of the advocates of reform: the *synergy illusion*, the *imminent-danger thesis*, and, once again, the *futility argument*. These pairs of arguments, he writes, 'have considerable intrinsic appeal because they hitch onto powerful myths ... and influential interpretative formulas' (Hirschman, 1991:166). Furthermore, they draw on scientific authority as the patterns of the arguments are invoked by actors and social commentators in a double hermeneutics (Giddens, 1984:284) that informs the ongoing discussion. This is particularly true if they are simultaneously actors and commentators, as is often the case for theologians.

⁹ Bourdieu defines a field as 'a system of objective relations between social positions and a place of competition for the specific prize of monopoly as [religious] authority defined both as [religious] ability and social power' (1981:270).

¹⁰ In a similar way, Bourdieu (1981:270) evokes necessary strategies related to the actors' structured interests and their position in a 'field'.

¹¹ From this viewpoint, self-proclaimed 'progressives,' the leadership of the SED for instance, can also be described as conservatives. Conversely, Giddens (1996 [1994]) has qualified contemporary conservative parties as the sole carriers of a radical project.

The three pairs of arguments described by Hirschman are materialized through interactions: they respond to each other. The first argument identified by defenders of the status quo, jeopardy, states that the proposed reform threatens older reforms that have proven their worth. Reactionaries therefore argue that there is no need for quick change. They may also state that no one knows what the new reform will bring. Jeopardy’s counter-argument, the synergy illusion, advocates that new and old reforms will mutually reinforce each other (Hirschman, 1991:167). The second argument, the perversity thesis, claims that reform will not bring the intended effect, but its exact opposite. The attitude is concisely epitomized in the formula ‘ceci tuera cela’ or the ‘zero-sum game’ and the belief that ‘everything backfires.’ Advocates of the antithesis of perversity, the imminent-danger thesis, point to the potential dangers of inaction. The third line of argument, futility, is invoked by advocates of both status quo and reform. It asserts that the status quo-or reform depending on the point of view – is bound to be ineffective in the end for it runs counter to the laws of motion-or inertia (Hirschman, 1991:155). The typology allows for the reconstruction of debates from an East German point of view to see which organizing principles become manifest and are advocated, while pointing to the differences between Catholic and Protestant patterns of argumentation. Further, it prevents the injection of the narration with a value judgment. Although the rhetoric is contextual and materialized through interaction, we shall, for clarity’s sake, present the arguments of the status quo, followed by those of reform, in the following account.

Table 1: The Rhetoric of the Advocates of the Status Quo and Reform

Reaction	Change
<p>Jeopardy thesis</p> <p>The new reform will jeopardize the older one.</p>	<p>Synergy illusion</p> <p>The new and the old reforms will mutually reinforce each other.</p>
<p>Perversity thesis</p> <p>The contemplated action will bring disastrous consequences.</p>	<p>Immanent-danger thesis</p> <p>Not to take the contemplated action will bring disastrous consequences.</p>
<p>Futility thesis</p> <p>The contemplated action attempts to change permanent structural characteristics (laws) of the social order; it is therefore bound to be totally ineffective, futile.</p>	<p>Futility thesis</p> <p>The contemplated action is backed up by powerful historical forces that are already ‘on the march’; opposing them would be utterly futile.</p>

Adapted from Hirschman (1991:167).

3.2. The Defenders of East German Status Quo

Marshalling the arguments of the proponents of the East German status quo in the discussions that set religious actors against one another, one cannot fail to notice the use of the jeopardy, perversity, and futility theses. Defenders of the status quo often argued that the consequences of reform, in this case the extension of western institutions to the East, is unacceptable as they may entail great loss. They argued that the reforms undertaken in the GDR, above all the separation of church and state and the conception of a ‘minority church’ and its related principles – the voluntary character of the church’s offers, the critical stance of the organisation, and its preference for the poor and the weak – might be deinstitutionalised, in other words, jeopardized. They portrayed their experience as a milestone in church history, especially within German Protestantism.¹² Falcke, a prominent Protestant from Thuringia (East), observes that the cultural and religious symbiosis between church, society, and the state had ended during the GDR (Falcke, 1997:101). In contrast as what they referred to as a ‘people’s church,’ the defenders of the status quo pledged for voluntary contributions from parishioners as opposed to a state-levied church tax; parish religious instruction as opposed to religious education in state schools; and pastoral care of military conscripts and soldiers in the parish as opposed to ‘military chaplaincy.’¹³ They advocated that these activities were genuinely church activities, should be integrated into local parish life and conceived as a service to people, and not as a church privilege.

In line with the perversity thesis, advocates of the East German metaphors pointed to the vicissitudes of the western model of church-state relations. Cooperation with the state, they contended, imperilled the credibility that the church had gained in opposing the party-state in the GDR and left the impression that the church had sold out in exchange for privileges (*Evangelische Kommentare*, 1993: 705). For example, defenders of the status quo argued that the western model of military chaplaincy represented a threat to the churches’ independence and critical stance and even interfered with the biblical message. It was believed that the chaplaincy in the army tacitly supports military intervention and entails a loss of their position on peace (‘the ethics of peace’),

¹² The Protestant Church had until then been a national church very close to the Prussian administration.

¹³ Under the western Military Chaplaincy Agreement, chaplains have the status of civil servant for the duration of their five-year contract, work within the *Bundeswehr* and depend on the Ministry of Defence.

an issue particularly close to the hearts of eastern Protestants. To be sure, defenders of the East German status quo agreed in principle to the necessity of providing spiritual care to the soldiers and the population at large. However, the practices established in the GDR, had, their defenders claimed, withstood the test of time and were best suited for the secularised situation in the East.

Given secular modernity, advocates of the status quo contended that it would be futile to engage in reform. In the discussion on the introduction of a religious instruction in state schools, they preached realism. They repeatedly stressed that they were not enough teachers of religion, not enough children to be taught to and, for that matter, no interest in religion for justifying the introduction of religious instruction in the former territory of the GDR. Furthermore, it was argued that the religious instruction as stipulated in the Basic Law was bound to be ineffectual as it came too late.¹⁴ Indeed, secularisation was described as an irreversible phenomenon that the churches were impotent to modify – a point also often made in academic discussions on the future of religion. Against this backdrop, the defenders of the East German status quo championed what they judged to be a modern interpretation of the church's role and a promising, if not inevitable, path for the churches in the West as well.

In contrast to a negative guiding metaphor, the 'people's church,' the Protestant proponents of the status quo drew in discussions on the metaphor of the 'Minority church' while the Catholics emphasized the 'Church in the diaspora.' The voluntary nature of church activities, their autonomy and critical stance in society, as well as the value of the parish as the locus of religious life, were presented as 'positive experience of the GDR and the "Wende"' and important principles to be retained. By defending East German experiences, the guardians of the status quo become, in the pan-German context, the challengers of the West German system. As such, they are 'conservative revolutionaries.' The label does not echo some intellectuals of the interwar period;¹⁵ instead, it

¹⁴ According to Werner Simon, between 13 and 16 percent of the young people in the East are members of a Protestant Church while some 4 percent are said to be Catholics (Simon, 1998:563-564). The number of children taking part in the religious instruction at the beginning of the 1990s was estimated at some 20 percent – 2 percent in cities (Ritter, 1992:35). The low number of Christian children actually confers strength on the argument.

¹⁵ The expression was used in interwar Weimar Germany to relate to a group of radical, antimodernist intellectuals whose number included Martin Heidegger, Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt, and Hans Freyer (Fraser, 1989:35; Lenk, 1989). Of course, the notion is here conferred on a different definition, as it is associated with an attitude to change.

points to the religious actors' attitude to change in a given social space, Germany after its unification. This generic category does not correspond to real groups; it points to the actors' structured interests or their position in a 'religious field' in which the defenders of reform hold more power (in terms of financial and organisational resources as well as prestige) in the struggle for the definition and the shaping of the church's role. Although the category does not correspond to any real groups, 'conservative revolutionaries' nonetheless share some statistical characteristics such as being predominantly Easterner, Protestant, and relating to the Theology of Karl Barth. They are more represented among Protestants than Catholics. Nevertheless, in discussions of church activity in the new organisational fields, Catholics also stressed the positive experiences made in the GDR such as the importance of the parish as the locus of religious life, new pastoral concepts and the fusion of pastoral and caritative activities. As with the Protestant case, many Catholics were sceptical of a church characterized by a wide network of associations and a greater public role.

3.3. The Challengers of the Status Quo

Unlike exponents of the status quo, proponents of reform were convinced of the value and necessity of the western model of partnership with the state as in the case of the church tax, the military chaplaincy, the religious instruction in schools, and the provision of welfare services funded by the state. Those who are often referred to as the 'liberal Protestants' and a majority of Catholics pleaded for reform. They were for the most part, though not exclusively, West Germans and more likely to be numerous among bishops than pastors and laymen. They drew alternatively on the imminent-danger thesis, the synergy illusion, and the futility argument. German unification, they argued, represented the opportunity to undo the acts of an illegitimate regime. From this perspective, the advocates of reform argued that the provisions of the Basic Law and various legal texts of the FRG constituted a solid foundation for their work and therefore pleaded for their re-assertion so to catch up to the past. The model of the church as practiced in the West, they argued, presented a unique chance for mission in East Germany and a challenge for the church readily available to everyone as the people's church, that is a church *for* the people (Neubert, 2000b).¹⁶ In making their arguments, the liberal Protestants alleged an intimate

¹⁶ Similarly, Gerhard Robbers, professor of church law in Treves, claims: 'Even more than in the old Federal Republic, it will be up to the churches in the new federal states to consider and defend

connection between democracy, bourgeois liberal values and principles, as represented by the Federal Republic and Christianity (Rendtorff, 1990).¹⁷

In accordance with the imminent-danger thesis, the antithesis of perversity and the leitmotiv of German unification, reformers – both Catholic and Protestant – pointed to the risks of inaction. They stressed that the opportunities available after the demise of the GDR were unique and should not be missed. Failing to extend and re-assert the principles would bring disastrous consequences for the mission of the church, the parity and cooperation of the Catholic and Protestant churches as well as the financing of church activities (Binder quoted in Mehrle, 1998:100). Indeed, they argued that giving up on military chaplaincy, religious instruction, and extensive welfare services would sound a death knell for the 'people's church'. In sum, the defenders of reform did not accept the relegation of religion and morality to the private sphere (Thierse, 2000).

Catholics decidedly strove for reform. They exhibited a positive attitude as well as faith in the future (see Wanke, 2000:120; Thériault, 1999:6). The episcopacy focused on the continuity of action and attitudes (Thériault, 2000:169) and typically portrayed the church as a diaspora church with a promising future (Wanke, 1992).¹⁸ Echoing the late 1980s, Bishop Wanke of Erfurt, notably recalls the motto of 'the chance of the small number' and stresses the proxy role of the small church for the whole community.¹⁹ Unlike those who saw the positive experiences of the GDR endangered, they advocated in the lines of the synergy argument that the new and old reforms would mutually reinforce each other. To sceptics, proponents of reform replied with a peremptory question: 'can we not trust God?' (see for instance Steinke, 1992:37; Beck, 1998:71). In

the church's legal institutions and regulations not as privileges... but to actively take up possibilities offered by this legal system' (*Herder-Korrespondenz*, 1991:514).

¹⁷ In contrast, the 'conservative revolutionaries' did not confer a normative status on modernity and advanced an antimodern or post-modern critique of contemporary society. They maintained that there is, to be sure, a connection between the idea of Enlightenment and the Christian message but also tensions that are at the core of their critique (see Falcke in Findeis and Pollack, 2000:459-460).

¹⁸ Given the policy of 'political abstinence' of the Catholic episcopacy in the GDR, this could be seen to symbolize a new ecclesiastic paradigm although, as Richter rightly points out (1989:1240), the episcopacy would probably not use this terminology. In the pastoral letter issued after the 'Wende,' the episcopacy stressed continuity. No mention was made to justifying the Catholic Church's past silence nor to acknowledging the role of Protestants in the 'peaceful revolution.' The letter was received with much disappointment by the Catholics who expected from their bishops a clear position on the political and social change.

¹⁹ Similarly, sociologists of religion talk of a 'vicarious religion' (see for instance Davie, 2000).

this way, advocates of the synergy thesis presented reform as a matter of faith, thereby expelling and delegitimizing opposition to reform.

In making their case, the reformers portrayed the former GDR as a 'land of opportunity.' From this viewpoint, those socialized under state socialism were perceived to be in need of spiritual answers and guidance (Friemel, 1992:31; Beck, 1994:87).²⁰ Following this logic, the small number of Christians in East Germany was not seen to reflect a rejection of Christianity (Neubert, 2000a; Tiefensee, 2000). Because of the secularisation promoted by the party-state, it was contended that most East Germans never had a chance to get acquainted with Christianity.²¹ Furthermore, Christians, it was asserted, were an important minority as 'carriers of the intellectual and cultural foundation of society' (Feiereis, 1997). In promoting the introduction of western-style practices, advocates of reform challenged the alleged effects and sources of secularisation and, in this way, conferred power on religious actors as well as a public role on religion.

With political unification, a rhetorical device often expounded by proponents of reform was to present the defenders of the status quo with a *fait accompli*. German unification meant the extension of the Basic Law to the East. Reformers acknowledged that it would admittedly be desirable to amend the western model but that there was no serious alternative to it. With matter-of-factness and realism, they enumerated a host of practical problems and technical details in their justification of the western status quo: reform would be too difficult to enact and entail too much paper work and no one knows what would come out. In addition, they asked two decisive questions, which stressed the complexity of the issue at hand and the limits of time and resources: how was the East German model to be organized? and, especially, how would it be financed?²²

In the course of the 'politics of institutionalisation', the defenders of reform mainly advanced financial and organisational arguments, but also moral ones. They pointed to the contingent nature of the existing institutions and attempted

²⁰ Drawing on Luckmann, Neubert claims that religion does not disappear. Socialism, he maintains, can be contemplated as a religious phenomenon (2000a:379).

²¹ Conversely, reformers criticized some church officials for having accepted and even promoted secularisation.

²² Confronted with the 'dictate of reason' and the argument that things are too complicated to be altered, Noack, bishop in Magdeburg (East), retorted: 'the popular appeal to simplicity and clarity can, in view of the complicated issue at stake, take on demagogical traits' (1997:160). The bishop also stressed: 'It also numbs theological discussion when everything is immediately to be converted into practical policy. Questions related to God's commandments and obedience are quickly relegated to secondary importance' (Noack, 1997:150).

to delegitimize them by recalling their origins in the GDR, occasionally levelling personal attacks against defenders of the status quo. In this respect, reformers often called those labelled here as ‘conservative revolutionaries’ either naïve or self-righteous. They argued that the latter advanced an anti-modern critique that failed to distinguish between an authoritarian regime, such as the GDR, and a democratic and liberal one, such as the FRG.²³ By way of example, reformers argued that the ethics of peace and the watchdog role or ‘guardian office’ developed by Protestants in the GDR were no longer relevant in a democratic state (Huber, 1998:305). They criticized their opponents for downplaying the negative components of authoritarianism or totalitarianism.²⁴ They condemned what they saw as the glorifying the GDR and the continuation of the deeds of an illegitimate state.²⁵ In this way, the defenders of the East German status quo were seen as to unjustifiably take issue with the foundations of modernity and liberal principles.

The origins and the genuine historical character of the guiding metaphors put forward by the defenders of the East German status quo were repeatedly called into question by their challengers. Reformers argued that if church officials had been given a choice they might have accepted a church tax levied by the state, religious instruction in schools, etc. In making their case, the reformers claimed that certain ‘prerogatives,’ such as the financing of social welfare organisations, the retention of parochial structures and the large administrative apparatus were not seriously called in question and that religious practice was low. Reforms undertaken in the GDR, it was contended, had been forced by the party-state. They reformers further argued that some defenders of the East German status quo had also with cooperated the state-with an illegitimate state – and had had implication with the *stasi*, the secret police. Neubert (1993) asserted that their self-righteous tone was unjustified for the

²³ Such arguments relativized the importance of the opposition movement that developed around the Protestant Church in the GDR. For instance, Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, a liberal theologian from the old Federal Republic, argues that most grassroots groups did not advance any ‘real’ fundamental critique from the standpoint of human rights, but instead sought to reform socialism (Graf, 1996).

²⁴ Graf comments: ‘on a theological level, they neutralize the concept in a way that totalitarianism can become a quality both of the ruling system of the GDR and the society of the Federal Republic. The “open totalitarianism” of the GDR corresponds to an “insidious totalitarianism” in the FRG’ (1990:736). For a recent example of such arguments, see also the declaration issued by former East German activists on 13 December 2001 ‘Wir haben es satt’.

²⁵ This line of arguments was repeatedly invoked in the discussion on LER (*Lebensgestaltung, Ethik, Religion*), a subject introduced by the eastern Land of Brandenburg as an alternative to the western-style religious education in public schools.

eastern churches were, in fact, ‘people’s churches,’ only with less members (see also Pollack 2000:26). The analysis of the debates thus shows us, as Rehberg points out, ‘that well-founded moral and theoretical dualisms (such as enforcement and agreement) do not take us that far empirically, as coercion may mobilize and lead to agreement and agreements are often based on obligation’ (1994:51).

Although the defenders of the West German system can be seen, from the eastern point of view, as reactionaries, the label ‘conservative revolutionaries’ remains useful – if only as an ‘ideal type’ – to characterize the metaphors and strategies of the defenders of the ‘East German model.’ Indeed, the advocates of the East German status quo rejected the point of view advocated by the reformers and propounded a conception of religion and society that did not confer a normative status on modernity (understood as a rational project with liberal values and democracy at its core). When the principles of the West German system were transferred or reiterated to the territory of the new Republic, the defenders of the East German status quo challenged them and became ‘outsiders’ within the churches. This position conferred on them a critical character and committed them to a particular type of strategies. Indeed, the moral utopianism that characterized the ‘conservative revolutionaries’ after radical political change stands in sharp contrast with the apparent pragmatism of reformers.

4. Lessons from the ‘politics of institutionalisation’

A glimpse at the debates within the churches suffices to affirm that the protagonists opposed conflicting patterns of rhetoric related to readings of the new Germany informed by a conception of modern secularity and modernisation that pertains to the churches’ conception of their role as minority organisations and their determination – or indeed unwillingness – to cooperate with authorities in unified Germany. Marshalling the arguments of the defenders of the East German status quo after radical political change, we notice that guiding metaphors and principles were formulated in the new context against the background of a negative guiding metaphor: the much criticized ‘people’s church,’ a church model deemed outdated. They were developed, to paraphrase Carl Schmitt (1963 [1932]), in a ‘friend-enemy’ relationship. The advocates of the East German status quo promoted the critical role and independence of the church, the preference for the voiceless, the voluntariness, and the central role of the parish community. In trying to legitimate the principles, religious entrepreneurs attempted, in their interactions, to manipulate definitions and make use of

available standards of virtue: they conferred moral value onto their models and pointed out the instrumental character of competing ones (1995:24). Institutionalising is, as in the words of Selznic, to ‘infuse with value’ (quoted in Scott, 1987:494). As such, the re-establishment of the churches’ unity and, by extension, German unification can be depicted as processes of ‘normative integration’ (Thumfart, 2001).

Table 2: Organizing Principles, Strategies, and Arguments of the Proponents and the Challengers of the Status Quo

	Status Quo ‘Minority church’	Reform ‘People’s church’
Organizing Principles	Central role of the community Preference for the voiceless (‘for others’) Critical role (independence) Voluntariness (negative right)	Service (<i>Dienst</i>) Society as a whole Partnership with state (<i>Gestaltung</i>) For all (positive right)
Strategies	Moral value Defamation (Opportunism)	Instrumental value Defamation (No believe in God/democracy)
Rhetoric	Jeopardy Perversity Futility	Synergy Imminent-danger Futility

5. Conclusion

As the study of the inner church debates, one important aspect of the transformation process taking place within the Protestant and Catholic churches, allowed for a description of the dynamic of the churches’ guiding metaphors as well as the strategies and patterns of rhetoric of their guardians after radical political change. We have shown that the search for religious authority in the 1990s was signposted by the dramatic fate of the GDR and German unification through the transfer of institutions. Because the West German institutions were reiterated and transferred to the East, most of demands of the proponents of the East German status quo were not materialized into practice. In fact, the defenders of the East German status quo became the underdog. But, as institutions need acknowledgement to become binding and some principles are still contested in spite of sanctions that were taken to discipline critics, the defenders of the East German status quo were also successful in institutionalising some principles that were most present in the GDR. Some adjustments were thus made to the military chaplaincy in the East and a new form of interconfessional instruction was established in the eastern

state of Brandenburg (Mehrle, 1998). Furthermore, the positions and strategies of the advocates of the eastern status quo have conferred them with a critical force in the new Germany. They have so challenged the legitimacy of the dominant model of church and society. In the context of 'actually existing capitalism,' those Christians who had voiced criticism regarding the socialist regime and had appeared to play an important role in the remarkable events of 1989 opposed western church practices, but also military intervention abroad and some economic policies, while favoring political practices developed in the GDR and during the 'Wende.' This stance unwittingly makes them, it might be argued, the defenders of the ideas and practices borne by the former socialist party they once opposed and helped to unsettle.

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Marjan Smrke

**RELIGIOUS FORMS OF SOCIAL MIMICRY
IN A SOCIETY IN TRANSITION¹**

1. Introduction

My contemplation of religious forms of social – that is to say human – mimicry began as an anecdote: as a sociologist predominantly engaged in studies of religion, I regularly read *Družina*, Slovenia's main Catholic weekly. In an editorial some three years ago I came across the supposition that “the position of the Church in Slovenia has become even worse over the last ten years”. Nothing new, I thought, just an old Church mantra, which was regularly iterated even during the era of Catholic Austro-Hungary. It is, supposedly, always worse than before. That same day, during a stroll outdoors, I noticed a cobweb through which I could see the village church. There was no spider on the web, just something as grey as the cobweb itself, most probably the remains of a fly. That very instant a fly was caught in the web. “The remains of a fly” burst into life and became a spider, quickly wrapping its prey into a cocoon. A thought crossed my mind. Were the lamentations of some of the representatives of the Catholic Church in Slovenia merely a mimic strategy aimed at capturing a desired prey? – Namely: holding a privileged position in society.

During my short stay in London last September I read in *The Guardian* (6th September) an article entitled *Pop and new age beliefs “have killed Christianity”* (Finn, 2001). The author, Gary Finn, provided commentary on a statement by the Metropolitan Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Murphy-O'Connor, claiming that Christianity in Great Britain has died out. In another article – *Christianity faces day of judgement* – published the next day, Martin Wainwright wittily pointed out that such whining has a long tradition (Wainwright, 2001). That very same day it was announced that Tony Blair had

¹ This article is dedicated to dog Puda, who is herself extraordinarily resemblant of a footnote.

decided to increase the state's contribution to religious schools. It seems that a similar pattern emerges in both cases: playing (simulating) the role of the loser in order to attain a certain goal more easily.

The question remains: Does the sociology of religion detect these and similar such occurrences adequately? Would the term **religious mimicry** be applicable here? And are there many such instances of this trait in other former socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe?

2. Mimicry in science

The notion of mimicry was first established in zoology. In 1862 the English naturalist Henry Walter Bates (1825-1892) published the results of his observations on the butterflies of the Amazon forests: some palatable butterflies were strikingly similar to unrelated species of unpalatable butterflies. Through imitating an unpalatable species (*the model*) a more palatable species (*the mimic*) gained protection from predators (*the operators*). In the light of Darwinian theory, which had been postulated a mere three years earlier, Bates explained this ability as a consequence of evolution through natural selection. Bates' observations on mimicry did indeed provide the strongest of arguments in support of Darwin (Owen, 1980:115). Furthermore, a special type of mimicry – *Batesian* – was named after him. Batesian mimicry is a form of biological resemblance in which a noxious, or dangerous, organism (*the model*), equipped with a warning colouration, is mimicked by a harmless organism (*the mimic*). Another form of mimicry was named after the German zoologist Fritz Müller in 1878. In *Müllerian mimicry* two or more unrelated noxious, or dangerous, organisms exhibit closely similar warning systems, such as the same pattern of bright colours. The *operator*, which has learned from experience that one of the organisms is noxious, will also avoid the other organism even though it is a different species. Both organisms thus benefit from their resemblance.

The British zoologist Denis Owen broadly defines (zoological) mimicry as “a process in which one animal (called the operator) is unable to distinguish a second organism (the mimic) from either another organism or from part of the physical environment (the models); the consequence of which is to increase the chances of survival of the mimic” (Owen, 1980:115-116).

In recent decades the notion of mimicry has also been used in some other biological disciplines, such as molecular biology (molecular mimicry), botany (plant mimicry) and ethology (from entomology to primatology). While the

first scientists who observed mimicry wrote mostly on mimicry between species (interspecific mimicry), it is now common to write on mimicry within individual species as well (automimicry or intraspecific mimicry). The ethologist Wolfgang Wickler writes: “Mimicry means deception, and deception is of common occurrence in all kinds of communication between organisms, whether they belong to different species or to one and the same species (intraspecific mimicry)” (Wickler, 1965). While the initial observations on mimicry were generally ones of *protective mimicry*, at a later stage various kinds of *aggressive mimicry* were also detected. Aggressive mimicry is defined as a resemblance of a predator (or parasite) to a harmless animal (in order) to facilitate approach to the prey (or host).

The notion of mimicry is only seldom used in the social sciences – mostly in (social) anthropology. Only exceptionally can it be encountered – according to my own examination of literature and glossaries of terminology – in psychology and sociology. Psychology widely uses the notion of imitation, but generally fails to identify mimicry as a specific kind of imitation. In sociology, mimetic behaviour is only partially and unsatisfactorily covered by conformism. Oxford sociologists Diego Gambetta and Michael Bacharach (Gambetta, 2002) together with the Ukrainian scientist Alla Lobanova (Lobanova, 1999) are among the few who have researched mimicry. As far as I am able to establish, there is as yet no extensive example of mimicry in the sociology of religion². Some interesting discourses are to be found in the field of cybernetics; sociobiologist Richard Dawkins (*The Selfish Gene*, 1976) has also written on this issue.³

In anthropology too, mimicry has no clearly defined meaning. Desmond Morris uses the term *dominance mimicry* to indicate the imitation of the status symbols of social domination in order to attain the impression of dominance (Morris, 1994:105). Edward Hagen investigates exploitive mimicry as

² Stark and Bainbridge include the notion of deception as a special form of intersection strategy in their splendid theory of religion; however, they do not provide any analysis of it (Stark and Bainbridge, 1989:173). Rene Girard, the philosopher and anthropologist of religion, uses the notion of mimicry as one of the central notions of his work; however, it does not apply to the forms of behaviour which are associated within the terms of this article.

³ It seems that a number of artists have devoted more time and energy on this sociological topic than the sociologists themselves. The best such example might well be Woody Allen's 1983 film *Zelig*. The main character, Leonard Zelig, is a human chameleon, who – physically and indeed in his entirety – adapts to any given social environment. When amongst physicians, he becomes a physician; when amongst Hasidic Jews, his beard grows – instantly. Zelig's mimicry results from an exposure to strong social pressure during his childhood.

“deceptive strategies designed to extract social benefits from others” (Hagen, 1995). The Slovene anthropologist Stane Južnič perceives the question of social mimicry in the area of man’s self-reflection, and about replacing the original with the acted. This is demonstrated mostly as an ability to simulate and dissimulate. Južnič believes that such behavioural patterns or strategies occur not only in individuals but also in groups and communities (Južnič, 1987:22, 1993:110). Following their goals, various social players *simulate* – feign, pretend to be something they are not; or *dissimulate* – act that they are not something which they are (or lack something which they have). In Južnič’s opinion politics is a field of mimic behaviour, and this is best exhibited in so-called chameleon-like changes – the adaptation of one’s own particular political colour to that of the environment.

3. Social or human mimicry

Human mimicry – that is to say social mimicry – is here defined as those activities performed by an individual or various social groups (all the way up to the national or civilisational level) which aim – by way of simulation or dissimulation – to increase the possibility of success (or reduce the possibility of a failure) in a given social environment. In order to deceive the other player, the mimic imitates a certain (social or natural) model.⁴ This activity is not necessarily a conscious one.

In comparison with mimicry in other species, certain peculiarities of human mimicry should be noted: animal mimicry is limited mostly (but not exclusively) to the field of genetics, while human mimicry is limited mostly (but not exclusively) to civilisation and culture. As Richard Dawkins has suggested: human mimicry is about *memes*. The primary instruments of expression of mimicry are “standpoints”, “convictions”, “habits”, feelings... and not the characteristics which are directly conditioned by genetics. An animal cannot change its genetically conditioned mimetic signals and strategies, while man can.⁵ Of importance here is man’s ability to anticipate

⁴ In my opinion mimicry is mimicry even if it is not successful. In this regard Owen’s cited definition is debatable.

⁵ To illustrate the difference between animal and human mimicry let’s compare two “genetic fishers” – the angler fish (*phrynelox scaber*) and the alligator snapping turtle (*macrolemys temminckii*) with the “cultural fisher” – a fisherman. For the purpose of fishing, both the angler fish and the turtle use a natural appendage which deceives the operator through having the appearance of its own prey. Conversely, the fisherman deceives the operator with an ideal mimic of a prey (moving bait in the case of line fishing, and a fly in the case of fly-fishing, etc.). A “genetic” fisher

developments in the social and natural environment, an ability which may be developed to a greater or a lesser degree in any individual and thus vary from one person to another. While mimicry in animals is an evolutionary adaptation which improves the chances of their survival, human mimicry is primarily a strategy for obtaining less critical benefits, though survival too, may also be an issue.

4. Classification of social or human mimicry

Social or human mimicry can be classified with regard to the mimic, the model, the signals, the operator, the benefits, or even the types or forms (strategies) of mimicry. It can further be classified according to the instruments of expression as well as the arena in which it occurs – political⁶, sporting⁷, economic⁸, military⁹, sexual¹⁰, hunting¹¹, artistic¹² mimicry... Furthermore, mimicry can vary according to age group and social class.

is not capable of immediate mimetic innovation, while man is even able to organize competitions and tournaments based on such ongoing mimetic innovation.

⁶ Politics is a field of mimetic “jeux sans frontières”. It cannot be ascribed solely a negative epithet to these “jeux”.

⁷ Mimicry is an essential part of most sports. Simulations and dissimulations represent much of the play. A good referee (operator) is one who can clearly distinguish between (dis)simulation and reality. A good opponent (operator) can adroitly read the intentions and schemes of a rival – mimetic strategies included.

⁸ An example: the Slovene enterprise *Perutina Ptuj* manufactures a widely marketed salami sausage called “*Poli*”. Its imitators try to deceive potential buyers (the operators) to instead purchase their products (called “Poly”, “Pili” and suchlike) which highly resemble the model.

⁹ The military sphere is particularly rich in mimicry: the operator (enemy) is to be confused and confounded, deceived into incorrectly assessing the mimic’s power, deployment and intentions. The model can indeed be the operator itself. The Trojan horse – the gift of Greeks – is a legendary example of military mimicry.

¹⁰ An example: the contemporary fashion industry offers a number of accessories which increase the mimic’s resemblance to the ideal sexual model thus increasing the mimic’s chances of deceiving the operator.

¹¹ A hunter’s imitation of animal noises to deceive the prey is an example of interspecific hunting mimicry. Add to this the hunter’s camouflage in the colour of the ambient environment.

¹² The occurrence of artistic mimicry can be recognised in Bahtin’s evaluation of the role of fictional characters such as the buffoon and the fool, as well as the personification of stupidity or insanity. Only by way of such a mask is the literary hero (and possibly the author) permitted to criticise social conventions with impunity (Bahtin, 1975/1982:284-290). Sergej Eisenstein’s 1947 epic, *Ivan the Terrible*, is one of the most dramatic examples of artistic mimicry. This critique of *Ivan the Terrible* is in reality Eisenstein’s veiled opinion of Stalin’s rule.

The mimic is defined as the social player who performs mimicry. The model is what the mimic imitates. The operator is the social player who (potentially) is to be deceived by the mimicry. The signals are the communication units of the mimicry that are intended to cause the mimic to be mistaken for the model by the operator (i.e. to disinform the operator). The forms and strategies of mimicry are the methods utilized by the mimic in order to deceive the operator.

Any social player can be a mimic, a model or an operator. The operator may, or may not, be the victim of mimicry. Mimicry can be detected, and detection depends on how (un)accomplished it is, as well as on the operator's own skills of mimicry detection. On occasions the operator desires to be "a victim" of mimicry.

Mimicry can be protective or aggressive, while the power relationships between mimicry and demimicry, as the ability to detect mimicry itself, tends to vary and can differ from one social environment to another. What can be discerned or differentiated as mimicry in a certain social environment, may not be perceived as such in a different social environment. It is only in a specific cultural environment that a certain mimic behaviour has its true meaning.

5. Religious mimicry

Religious mimicry is that type of human mimicry which occurs in the field of religion. Its players – mimics, models and operators – are all involved in a game that in some way or other concerns religion. The models and/or mimics and/or signals and/or operators derive from the sphere of religion.

A mere look at some syntagms in the sphere of religion indicate that this is indeed a rich field of (de)mimetic activity. Furthermore, the only expressions in the Slovene language which have evolved from the root *hlinjenje* (simulation) are *svetohlinjenje* (to simulate piety) and *svetohlinec* (an apparently pious person who prevaricates their piety). The intentions of religious mimicry widely differ, they may be protective, aggressive, life-threatening¹³ or entirely innocent. Some of the models of religious mimicry are specific and can

¹³ Note Bowker's daring comparison of the world of religions with lush vegetation: *Within that "luxurious vegetation" lie the ruthless predators of power and ambition.* (Bowker, 1997, XXIV) If such a comparison is reasonable, the assumption that mimicry also occurs in the religious world would also make sense. Isn't a rejection of mimetic behaviour in people merely a form of dissimulation?

encompass religious ideals, persons, as well as a variety of empirically unconfirmable supernatural instances.

Below are some legendary, historical and contemporary examples of religious mimicry:

1) The Bible (Judges, 3:15-22): Judge Ehud appeared before Eglon, King of Moab, saying: "I have a secret message for you, O king." The King said, "Quiet!" And all his attendants left. Ehud then approached the King while he was sitting alone in the upper room of his summer palace and said, "I have a message for you from God." As the king rose from his seat, Ehud reached with his left hand, drew a sword concealed on his right thigh and plunged it into the King's belly.

What is the distribution of roles here? The word of God, something pertaining to God, something elevated or a person with exalted intentions (a prophet) is the model; Ehud is the mimic; the words of trust are signals; Eglon, King of Moab, is the operator. The naive operator fails to detect Ehud's mimicry and becomes its victim. In this instance mimicry is used as the instrument of an aggressive act.¹⁴

2) Some Hindu and Muslim men living in the Indian state of Punjab wear a Sikh turban as a means of protection against harassment and even violence in this Sikh-dominated province.¹⁵ A Hindu or a Muslim is the mimic in this case, a Sikh is the model, a turban is the signal, while the Sikh extremists are the operators. Here, mimicry is an aid to survival.¹⁶ There are numerous similar examples from European history of conformist religious behaviour demonstrated by non-religious or differently-religious minorities faced with a repressive religious majority¹⁷ or a conformist non-religious behaviour of a religious minority in conditions of secularistic absolutism.

3) Another similar example from India: in the midst of an inter-caste conflict a Vaisya introduces himself as a Brahmin to attackers who are

¹⁴ This form of aggressive mimicry resembles some forms of molecular mimicry: the aggressive mimic deceives the molecule's defence system with a false signal.

¹⁵ Documented in the movie *The Asia Highway*, HNK.

¹⁶ Shia Islam permits denial of one's faith providing that such an act saves a man's life; mimicry is thus permitted in extreme circumstances.

¹⁷ The historian Gerhard Schneider writes in his *Der Libertin* (1970) of the "social mimicry" that European libertines were forced to perform during the 16th and 17th centuries. Outwardly they conformed to the religious status quo, while in private they practised a dissolute lifestyle.

themselves Harijans. And saves his life by so doing.¹⁸ The Vaisya is the mimic, the Brahmin is the model, and the Harijans are the operators. A word suffices as the signal.

4) There is a tradition in the canon of several Christian churches that they are the one and only true scion of the Body of Christ. In this centuries-old mimetic self-perception (which evokes St Paul as the authority), the Church is the mimic, while the “Body of Christ” (with all the emotional admixtures of the divine and the victim) is the model. The operators are diverse and include lay persons, non-church society and even the state.

In the early 20th century several influential theologians of the Slovene Roman-Catholic Church argued that the Church was literally the embodiment of Christ’s mystical form. “This metaphor was raised to the level of a religious and social fact which was supposed to be 'obvious' or empirically verifiable, while at the same time it was treated as literal Truth”. (Dragoš, 1998:31) This meant that he who “attacks” the Church or its role in society, attacks Christ himself. The goal of such mimicry was to protect the privileged social position of the Roman Catholic Church.¹⁹

5) In the 1960’s and 1970’s, military regimes in South America chose images of the Virgin Mary as their emblem. Perry and Eccheveria’s treatment of the Church’s legitimisation of these regimes has a telling title: *Under the Heel of Mary* (1989). In this case the Virgin Mary was the model, the military regime assisted by the Roman-Catholic Church was the mimic, while the people of the country and the international public were the operators. On account of Mary the operators were not supposed to notice the jackboot “heel” of repression.

6) A superstitious example: contemporary astrologers imitate two models simultaneously – a priest as well as a scientist. Indeed, some astrologers in Great Britain wear a variation of a clerical gown and operate with the latest ideas from the physical sciences.^{20 21} In Slovenia astrologers emphasise the

¹⁸ Documented in the movie *The Asia Highway*, HNK.

¹⁹ Nowadays the metaphor (the model) of the mother is predominant: the Church is like a mother, the nation is like a son. Which is basically to say he who criticises the Church is like a son who attacks his mother.

²⁰ Documented in the movie *Twinkle, Twinkle*.

²¹ The example is along the lines of the Grant’s definition of mimicry in the field of cybernetics: “Mimicry is an infection strategy in which a meme attempts to imitate the semiotics of another successful meme” (Grant, 1990).

academic titles which they have acquired at Astrological Universities. Their mimicking of reputable models is aimed at persuading operators (the superstitious public) to place their trust in them.

In the light of an analysis of argumentation, mimetic strategies rest on an inclination of people to accept three cardinal mistakes in argumentation: mimicking the victim represents *argumentum ad misericordiam*, whilst mimicking authority represents either *argumentum e consensa gentium* or *argumentum ad verecundiam*.

In the example of the mimetic behaviour of a world religion it can be seen that the basic mimic strategies arise as a result of the social and historical development of that particular religion. Christian mimetic strategies arise as a consequence of two formative periods: the Jewish Old Testament parochiality and Christian parochiality within the bounds of the Roman Empire. I believe that the two characteristic elements mentioned at the beginning of this article arise as a consequence of these periods.

6. Religious critique of religious mimicry

There exists not only a rich mimetic tradition in religions, but also the tradition of a critique of mimicry or so called de-mimicrisation. This critique applies to mimetic behaviour both within religions as well as in the secular world. As mimicry itself, the mechanisms of its unveiling are also the result of social evolution. Religious schisms, the creation of new sects and religions are inevitably accompanied by a critique of religious mimicry in religious tradition. Such critiques are easily detected in Christian gospels, Buddhist scriptures, as well as some texts of new religious movements²²: in the name of newly (or re-) discovered *authenticity*, such texts reproach falsity and (dis)simulation.

In his *A Prelude Concerning the Babylonian Captivity of the Church* (1520), Martin Luther defined the Catholic clergy as follows: “Although they are wolves, they want to be taken for shepherds; although they are Anti-Christ, they want to be revered as Christ.” (Luther, 1520/1888:537) Luther often compares the Catholic clergy to hunters. He refers to the papacy as a “reign of Nimrod” (Gen, 10:8-9), a mighty hunter and the founder of the kingdom of

²² At the same time, some new religious movements are criticised precisely for their mimicry (and using this very term). The Church of Scientology is thus said by some (look Schmidt, 1998) to be an organisation hiding behind a religious/church model in order to deceive naive operators, namely the state and (potential) adherents.

Babylon (Luther, 1520/1888:498). In his 95 theses (1517), Luther considers indulgences as “the nets for fishing the wealth of people”.²³ Regardless as to whether one agrees with Luther or not, it must be admitted that he was reproaching the Catholic Church for what he believed was its mimicry: in this instance the operators (believers) were being made to believe that the mimic (the Catholic Church) was the same as the model (Christ), while in actual fact the mimic was the opposite of the model. In light of this, Luther’s notion of the “invisibility of the church” represents a rejection of the (misleading) mimetic signals. Primož Trubar, the leading figure of the Reformation movement on Slovene territory, had a similar enlightened operator role: he believed he saw through the mimetic strategy of the Roman Catholic Church, labelling the Jesuits as “a guild of wolves in sheep’s clothing” (1575), and clerical celibacy as “the holy mask of concubinage”. Furthermore, Trubar considered the Catholic clergy false prophets and false Christs.

It seems that cultural – that is to say human – mimicry is more complex and variable than genetic mimicry; religious mimicry, however, appears yet more convoluted again. Why is this so? People are usually taught that religion is the realm of truth, inviolable truth and authenticity, and it is for this very reason that one can find so many appealing models and mimics. The viewpoint of Richard Dawkins is well worth considering here. According to Dawkins, during the early indoctrination periods of any religion a “program” is instigated into a believer who opposes any critical attitude towards that particular faith.²⁴ In terms of the theme discussed here, this program prevents or hinders the detection of mimicry. Any attempts at a critical treatment of religion are treated as sinful or a ridiculous and futile effort (see example of Doubting Thomas) (Dawkins, 1976: 251, 1991).

7. Old moths – new light; social transition and religious mimicry

Major social changes are (hypothetically) of similar significance for social mimicry as major disruptions in habitat are for animal species. Probably the best known zoological example of this is the peppered moth (*Biston betularia*) living in the industrial north of England during the latter half of the 19th

²³ Luther’s early writings are also full of anthological examples of protective mimicry. In his 81st, as well as a number of later theses, Luther, the critic, is disguised behind the views of “shameless and impertinent laymen”.

²⁴ With the notable exception of Buddhism, which explicitly advises a critical attitude towards religious authorities and established convictions.

century. Prior to the advent of industrial pollution lighter coloured moths were more successful in a mimetic sense, as they were less visible in light environment than the darker coloured moths. When the environment became blackened with the soot of industrial pollution, the darker peppered moth became, through natural selection, more abundant (Owen, 1980: 20-21).

The fall of Communism represented the onset of relatively rapid changes in the social environments of Central and Eastern European countries. Alongside the desire for change, uncertainty and fear as to what the future may bring were also present. Anxiety or ambition – in the sense of “Who is going to win?” (Barker, 1997) – was also manifest. Old party (civil-religious) ideologies were in decay everywhere. It was obvious that people were changing their basic political “colours” following the downfall of “the reds”. Political colour became an important part of transitional jargon. Many would say that these were just metaphors; nevertheless, they were metaphors for developments with tangible consequences. The correct anticipation of changes of colour in the social environment seemed to many a matter of vital importance.

In order to fully comprehend the mimetic developments in the period of transition, one should be aware that such behaviour was also practised during the Communist and pre-Communist eras. The “religious” aspect of this mimicry included mostly simulations and dissimulations of behaviour as regards religion in line with the expectations of the Party or, in the pre-Communist era, the Church. As regards Slovenia, the following sociological commentary on the indicators of secularisation during the 1970s is worth considering: “The prevailing non-religious orientation of the higher social classes in Slovenia can be explained by the fact that as a rule such classes (in all societies) tend to conform more to the prevalent cultural patterns. In the case of Slovenia, they behave in the manner they believe is determined by the official ideological pattern. Based on all of the above, this is particularly applicable as regards clerks and officials. /.../ Should this formula change, changes in the ideology of officialdom can also be anticipated” (Roter and Kerševan, 1982:107-108).

The above expectations were further confirmed by surveys of religion-related changes during the 1990s. Within the relatively small changes detected in the basic indicators of the religiosity of the entire population (Smrke, 1999), the largest changes towards a seemingly greater degree of religiosity were identified in the very classes which Roter pointed out as the most conformist. The change index in the high officials of Slovene society (i.e. the highest of three sub-categories of this class) was 139 (Smrke and Uhan, 1999). Although a

“non-religious” orientation still prevails amongst this particular group, it can be assumed that a portion of high officials anticipated “religiousness” as a prevailing or prospective ideological pattern, and thus adopted it.

An explanation of such changes is attempted in the following presentation of the first of three selected transitional forms of religious mimicry.

1. Mimicry of individuals when an anticipated pro-religious change in the social environment is the model.

Over recent years I have been following the careers of five selected Slovene intellectuals who started publicly emphasising their Christian Catholic orientation in the 1990s. I analysed their articles and public appearances. Prior to the political changes in Slovenia, all five were members of the Communist Party; four of them have PhDs. In the socialist era two were involved in the implementation of restrictive party directives regarding the social position of the Roman Catholic Church. During the 1990s all five publicly demonstrated clear changes in their mimetic signals. During socialism they wrote *cerkev* (i.e. the Slovene word for church as the institution) with a lower case initial letter; today they all capitalise it. Before, they would write *common era* now they write *Anno Domini*. While they used to write *god* with a lower case initial, they now capitalise it (this can be documented in the case of four of them).²⁵ While they used to perceive the Communist Party as “avant-garde”, they now perceive the Roman Catholic Church as “avant-garde”. The Church, according to one of the five, is the “spiritual centre of the Slovene people”. It seems as though the old moths have found a new light.

church	→ Church	cerkev	→ Cerkev
god	→ God	bog	→ Bog
before the common era	→ Before Christ	pnš	→ pK

It seems as though these individual’s anticipation of a change in the social environment corresponded to the figures below:

²⁵ Herein I do not question any of the ways of writing this, furthermore in my opinion they are all legitimate. I merely wish to emphasise that a manifest change has occurred in a segment of society and that this change is the imitation of an anticipated change to the (model of the) social environment. Let it also be noted that at times it is not certain whether a discussed characteristic is the work of an author or possibly an editor.

	1.			2.	
cccc		CCCC	pnš pnš pnš		pK pK pK
ccCcc	→	CCcCC	pnš pK pnš	→	pK pnš pK
cccc		CCCC	pnš pnš pnš*		pK pK pK**

(* before the common era; ** before Christ)

Namely, it was anticipated that the social environment would change from a Socialist/Communist dominated one to a Roman Catholic one. Those unable to adapt to such a changed environment would be excluded. As regards the motives behind such conversions,²⁶ it seems that three types of motif intertwine in all five cases studied, elements of the: motif of St Paul – guilty conscience; motif of Maternus – (political) benefit;²⁷ and motif of St Thais – repentance and the following change of lifestyle paradigm from libertine to (at least seemingly) Catholic.

However, it appears as though the anticipated change of the social environment to a Catholic dominated one was not entirely accurate. Although there are several examples of converts gaining political benefit on account of their conversion, a few obvious cases of blatant opportunism were exposed to unpleasant de-mimetic criticism.²⁸ The instances of rejection of religiousness as a criterion of social promotion didn't decrease but rather increased during the 1990s. How should this be understood? This at least partly indicates that a tendency has been detected that such criteria could become established in society.

²⁶ This article does not resolve one of the most essential issues behind religious mimicry, namely: the relationship between conversion and mimicry. The key problem here is the distinction and differentiation between the simulated and the authentic. According to the definition applied in this text, the authentic conversion is not mimetic; however, this too could be disputed.

²⁷ A notable example is the 4th century post-Nicene Christian father, Julius Firmicus Maternus, a paradigmatic convert to Christianity for the sake of self-interest. After his conversion, Maternus became a zealous oppressor of pagans (*De errore Profanarum Religionum*), drawing inspiration and justification for his activities on more bloody biblical texts.

²⁸ One of the most recent and unpleasant commentaries was delivered by the (dissident) Catholic Bishop Vekoslav Grmič: "It is the former Communist Party members, the "converts", who are today most vocal in their condemnation of the Communist Party. They demand the wholesale purging from office of all those who were connected with the erstwhile regime, and would even sacrifice the innocent, thus being themselves less tainted. All this in order to rid themselves of an unpleasant feeling which pecks at their brain, namely that they too used to be Party members and carry the responsibility for many a thing." (Večer, newspaper, Maribor, Slovenia, 25th October, 2001)

Table 1: Percentage breakdown of responses to the statement: “Politicians who do not believe in God are not at all suitable for public office.”

(SPO) Survey conducted in Slovenia	I strongly agree	I agree	I neither agree nor disagree	I disagree	I totally disagree
1992/1	1.9	8.1	17.5	35.5	25.0
1995/1	4.9	6.0	13.9	14.9	54.6
1997/2	6.1	4.5	14.4	9.0	61.5

And what is the situation as regards this type of mimicry in other countries in transition? To what extent is the revitalisation of religiosity in Croatia (Vrcan, 2001:60-63) an actual true revitalisation of faith and to what extent is it merely a restoration of Catholic mimetic signals necessitated by changes in social environment? Don't the conditions of “nationalisation of the sacred” or “sacralisation of the national” – in Vrcan's opinion a characteristic of transitional Croatia – make it particularly difficult to keep the “colour” of (non)religious persuasion which differs from the colour of the (Catholic oriented) social environment?

2. Mimicry of politics when the “National” Church or Christ(inanity) is the model.

Last summer the media circulated a story suggesting that Radovan Karadžić, sought by the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, now wears the robes of an Orthodox monk as a cover. If this were possibly true, it would be an anthological example of religious mimicry. Several other similar examples of mimicry are to be found in Karadžić's erstwhile military-political career. In early 1990s Karadžić was regularly seen (through deftly stage-managed media coverage) in churches and surrounded by Orthodox clergy. Signals such as lighting candles, kissing the cross, and the like were purposely made to convince the operator (the international public) that the goals of his military-political activity were in fact the same as the model being imitated. If the model was the national church, this was fairly well true.

3. Mimicry of a religious institution which desires a privileged position in society.

Several mimetic strategies can be recognised in the presentations of the Roman Catholic Church in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. One of the most interesting strategies is that hinted at by the ironic title of an article by Pawel Zalecki: *The biggest and oppressed: The Roman Catholic Church in Contemporary Poland*, which was presented at the

third ISORECE conference (Zalecki, 1997). Seemingly opposite mimetic signals are combined here – the signals of small size and signals of large size. In the same breath the Roman Catholic Church in post-communist societies speaks: 1.) of its being “pushed into the catacombs”, about the “social significance of the Church being belittled more than any subculture”, about “second-class status of Catholics”²⁹; and 2.) about all imaginable indicators proving that the Roman Catholic Church is the largest, most important and central social institution in the country.³⁰ The simultaneous imitation of the neglected child model together with that of a giant who should have a special role leaves one with the impression of a giant baby of some sort. A naive operator, the state for instance, can easily fall prey to the role of an ardent provider for the noisiest fledgling cuckoo.

Similar mimetic strategies abound in the animal world. A butterfly with an eye-spot can confuse an operator trying to assess its size. Similarly, as needs may be, a puffer fish can make itself small or large.

In Homer’s Iliad (dis)simulation is perceived as a characteristic which is not alien to the gods. In times of “transition” it is particularly typical of people.

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²⁹ The last two statements are by the Slovene Catholic Archbishop Rode (15th August 2001).

³⁰ According to being far from objective, Archbishop Rode, only some 4% to 5% of the Slovene population are not religious. (Večer, daily newspaper, Maribor, Slovenia, 24th April, 2001)

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Ankica Marinović Bobinac

**DIMENSION OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE AMONG
ADULT POPULATION IN CROATIA**

1. Introduction

Due to its complexity, the phenomenon of religion and religiosity in modern sociology of religion requires an analysis, not only of different aspects and dimensions but various theoretical approaches. Understanding of religiosity and its methods depends on a theoretical context, respectively, on the type of the questions to which we seek the answers. One of the ways of comprehending the phenomenon of religiosity is enabled by the research of certain dimensions from the aspect of the structure of religiosity. A deeper insight, however, can be obtained only if this way is connected to other theoretical approaches and sources. The structure is a way of organizing particular elements that make a whole. From the point of view of the structure, a majority of big religions consists of the following elements that are interconnected: doctrine, rituals, experience, knowledge, values, norms, institutions and personalities of religion. Religions differ one from another in the way in which these elements make a whole. A dimensional approach means the research of the mentioned elements and their relationship at the level of an individual (Bainbridge, 1997; Glock, 1962; Glock-Stark, 1966; King-Hunt, 1972; Roof, 1979). In this way, a prevailing of a particular element determines the type of religion, and the level of development or the dominance of a certain dimension of religiosity indicate the type of religion, respectively the type of a believer. The analysis of a particular dimension is only one of the elements of comprehension of the religious phenomenon that should be observed so separately as well. Consequently, the analysis of knowledge does not speak of anything else but of how much a respondent is familiar with the facts of religion that is the subject of the analysis. So, the intensity of religiosity and the level of acquaintance with the facts of one's own religion should not necessarily overlap. A person can be deeply religious with a minimal knowledge of the facts of his/her own religion, or, on the other hand, very well informed, but not religious. Within

this context, dimension of religious knowledge means the level of being informed and the believers' acquaintance with the doctrines and the normative content of religion. It relates to the expectations that a religious person is familiar with the basic principles and facts of his/her religion and its sacred manuscripts. There are significant differences within and between religions referring to what a religious person should know and what should be the quality of such knowledge to become the indicator of religious adherence (Glock, Stark, 1966).

In comparison to the other dimensions that have been the subject of many researches, this dimension has not been investigated much widely, (Glock, Stark, 1966; King-Hunt, 1972; Faulkner, DeJong, 1966; DeJong, Faulkner, Warland, 1976; Cornwall, Albrecht, Cumingham, Pitcher, 1986). The thing that should be measured, as Glock terms it, is the religious literacy, which would imply different types of questions: a) the questions about the origin and the history of religion to which one belongs, b) the questions on the modernity of religion to which one belongs, c) the questions about other religions, d) the questions related to the checking of secular knowledge, e) the questions related to the religious facts from the fundamental books, f) comparison of the acquaintance with the origin of one's religion with the knowledge about its history and contemporariness, g) the attitudes towards knowledge (the interest in acquiring knowledge, the importance of knowledge and the type of knowledge that is considered as relevant), h) the questions related to the testing of the level of sophistication while reading the Bible and other religious literature (the critical or non-critical attitude towards the Bible)¹. It would be useful to have a typology of believers with regard to the various aspects of religious knowledge: from religious illiterates, through the many levels of religious literacy, to those who are very well acquainted with their own religion, but also with the literature that challenges or is critical of it, etc. Of course, this exceeds the framework of this study made on the basis of the research results in which this aspect of the dimension of knowledge was only one of the research objectives.

The problem regarding how to measure knowledge is related to the type of the question and the way in which they are asked. The only right way is the test of knowledge what might be somewhat embarrassing for the respondent having

¹ Acquaviva and Pace (1996) suggest the four ideal sides of the quadrangle of the religious perception: The perception of the origin of man, origin of the Universe, origin of good and evil and life after death.

regard to the implications that ignorance, as such, normally causes anyway². The questionnaire does not deal with the attitudes but knowledge, what might cause aversion/antagonism, even rejection. Consequently, composing of such a test requires a considerate and subtle approach to the respondent through a serious and tactful formulation of the questions (King & Hunt, 1969; DeJong, Faulkner, Warland, 1976).

2. Dimension of religious knowledge in Croatia

The data from sociological-religious researches in Croatia indicate that a traditional adherence to religion and the Church is markedly a phenomenon of the majority of population, at personal and group level, as well³. Traditional religiosity is mediated through the family socialisation with the recognizable elements: the implicit sequence of the Sacraments received at some points in life or on special occasions, attending religious instruction, religious education in family and at least occasional going to the Church. In such cases, God represents more a traditional value: revered as a Supreme Lord, the most important events in life are done in his name but there is no constant focus on his presence (Dugandžija, 1990:15). God is distant and the way to reach him goes via many unavoidable mediators: the priests and the Sacraments. All good is done in his name, he is being called for help to protect from evil, but he is being invoked at places meant for this purpose, and, of course, when one is in distress. Such type of religiosity is more typical for big religious communities and for majoritarian religions.

The dimension of religious knowledge has not been the focus of interest of Croatian socio-religious researches so far, so this research is the first attempt to get the basic information on knowledge about their own religion of the Catholic majority of the respondents. This is also the basic aim of this analysis. In the

² In composing the questionnaire, the findings of King and Hunt (1969, 1972) were applied, who, by using the approaches of Glock and Stark, drew up an integral questionnaire which consisted of 10 scales for questioning all the dimensions. Some other questionnaires on the dimensions of religiosity have also been consulted (DeJong, Faulkner, Warland, 1976; Cornwall, Albrecht, Cumingham, Pitcher, 1986).

³ S. Vrcan speaks of the basic features of traditional religious behavior: a) primary religious identification, b) at least a minimum acknowledging of the confessional adherence, c) at least some participation in religious services related to the important periods and events in human life (Baptizing, First Communion, Confirmation, Wedding, Death, Funeral), at least a minimum degree of taking part in exercising of such forms of religious behavior or secular behavior with religious characteristics that assumed the features of real folk customs (celebration of certain holidays), e) participation in at least a minimum elementary religious instruction (Bahtijarević, Vrcan, 1975:15).

majority of religious researches the respondents have been asked if they read the Bible, if they read the religious press (Bahtijarević, Vrcan, 1975; Bahtijarević, 1985; Plačko, 1991; Moral i religija u Hrvatskoj 1997; Religijske promjene i vrijednosti u hrvatskom društvu, 1999; Aufbruch, 1997), if they listened to the Catholic Radio, if they watched the religious program on TV (Religijske promjene i vrijednosti u hrvatskom društvu, 1999; Aufbruch, 1997; Moral i religija u Hrvatskoj, 1997), but they have never been asked how much they know the facts from the Bible, the major Church events and other aspects that the dimension of religious knowledge covers.

The results of the mentioned researches (Črpić, Kušar, 1998; Marinović Jerolimov, 2000; Aračić, Črpić, Nikodem, 2003) showed that the respondents were not interested in an active individual learning of the facts of their own religion and that they hardly follow the events within their own Church:

- a) that they hardly read the Bible
- b) that a very low percentage of the respondents listen to the Catholic radio program regularly
- c) that more than one half of the respondents never watches the religious program on TV.

Some Croatian theologians have only parenthetically touched this topic at a theoretical level and basis their pastoral practice experience (Šagi-Bunić, 1981; Šimunović, 1996; Tamarut, 1996). Beginning with ascertaining a prevailing traditional religiosity that many live through inherited and customary forms (Catholicism, loyalty and piousness), to whom religiosity means more a symbol of a historical provenance, a sign of social and cultural appurtenance (Tamarut, 1996:108), in which many alienated from Christian belief or are poorly familiar with it, Šimunović (1996:93) pleads for an 'authentic Biblical formation', since there is an alarming Biblical malnutrition of the Catholic believers (Šagi-Bunić, 1981:460). Besides this, Šimunović suggests that there is 'a significant analphabetism in religion and religious infantilism of the adults in their life's prime, mainly of those from 25 to 40 years old' and a non-existence of the spirit of criticism due to the lack of knowledge of the very basis of their religion. By the analysis of available variables, on the sample of dominantly Catholic believers, in this study we will try to ascertain if the theses of the mentioned theologians are founded.

3. Methodology

These data are taken from the research *Religijske promjene i vrijednosti u hrvatskom društvu – (Religious Changes and Values in Croatian Society)* carried out by the Institute for Social Research in 1999 in Zagreb and Zagreb region on the sample of 705 respondents.

This analysis is aimed at determining an elementary level of religious knowledge of the respondents – some aspects of basic religious literacy⁴.

We selected the two groups of indicators that show a partial insight in elementary religious knowledge of their respondents:

1. The indicators of knowledge acquired by reading the Bible (active participation in liturgies): knowledge of the writers of the Gospel and the acquaintance with the Old-Testament prophets.
2. The indicators of knowledge acquired by religious socialisation (religious instruction and more intense learning prior receiving the Church Sacraments), knowledge of the Ten Commandments and knowledge of the Seven Holy Sacraments.

Both groups of indicators have been intersected by the following variables:

- a) socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents – sex, age, residential status, education and occupation;
- b) confessional self-identification – data on confessional self-identification have been summarized in five categories: Catholics, Orthodox, Muslims, others (all who have declared themselves confessionally but don't belong to any of the three previous categories) and the respondents without confessional self-identification;
- c) religious self-identification – examined on a 6 degrees scale:
 1. convinced believer accepting all what his/her religion teaches
 2. religious, although does not accept all what his/her religion teaches
 3. thinking a lot about this, but not quite sure if he/she believes or not
 4. indifferent towards religion
 5. not religious, though having nothing against religion
 6. not religious and opposing to religion.

⁴ In some supposed future research, focused on this very topic, it would be interesting to study all the aspects of the dimension of religious knowledge mentioned in this introduction and to determine a typology, if any, of religious knowledge of the Catholic believers in Croatia.

Considering that the majority of the respondents placed themselves in the first two categories on the continuum, due to the requirements of a statistical mass, the scale was compressed/reduced to three degrees:

1. convinced believer accepting all what his/her religion teaches
2. religious, although does not accept all what his/her religion teaches
3. others – uncertain, indifferent, non-believers and opponents to religion

d) attending religious instruction

4. The results of the research

4.1. Knowledge acquired by reading and studying the Bible

The two following variables also give a partial insight in knowledge acquired by reading and studying the Bible: knowledge of the authors of the Gospel and the acquaintance with the Old-Testament prophets. The question relating to the acquaintance with the writers of the Gospels contained an offer of seven names: John, Jacob, Peter, Mark, Matthew, Paul and Luke.

Table 1: The answers to the question: Which of the offered names are the writers of the Gospels? (John, Mark, Matthew and Luke) in %

	N	%
Correct answers	177	25.1
Incorrect answers	435	61.7
No answer	93	13.2
Total	705	100.0

As the mentioned variable belongs to the Christian alphabet due to the fact that every extract from the Bible during services and on other ecclesiastical events refers to the author of the Gospel and to the other elements that obligatorily accompany the extract, a high rate of correct answers was to be expected. Moreover that 42% of the respondents attend the service, 16.3% twice a month, 24.7% once a week, or 0.9% every day, and another 43% attend on occasion (15.0%) or only on important church holidays (27.7%)⁵. However,

⁵ These data are taken from the research: *Religijske promjene i vrijednosti u hrvatskom društvu – Religious Changes and Values in Croatian Society*.

despite this fact, only 25.1% of the respondents are familiar with the four authors of the Gospel. The majority of the respondents (61.8%) knows only some of them or is only vaguely guessing.

Considering that this is the first (and partial) investigation of the dimension of religious knowledge in Croatia, there is no empirical data, nor theoretical conception based on them that might indicate that there are some differences in degrees of religious knowledge with regard to socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents.

So, we assume that younger and more educated respondents originating from bigger cities have a higher degree of religious knowledge, especially if it comes to the elementary facts.

Consequently, the variable – knowing the authors of the Gospel – is intersected with socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents.

Table 2 shows a statistically substantial difference in the acquaintance with the authors of the Gospel. The variables involved are only age and occupation of the respondents.

Table 2: Familiarity with the authors of the Gospel and socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents (%)

	Correct	Incorrect	No answer	Total
<i>Occupation</i>	$\chi^2=30.537$			
Farmer	20.0	75.0	5.0	100.0
Worker	13.4	68.4	18.2	100.0
Clerk	21.6	65.4	13.1	100.0
Expert, Manager	36.1	53.1	10.9	100.0
Others	31.4	58.8	9.8	100.0
<i>Age</i>	$\chi^2=25.606$			
18-30	38.0	52.1	9.9	100.0
31-40	20.7	66.2	13.1	100.0
41-50	30.3	55.9	13.8	100.0
51-60	14.5	70.9	14.5	100.0
61 and more	20.5	64.7	14.7	100.0

According to expectations, younger respondents (from 18 to 30 years old) demonstrated that they know the answer the best. As regards to the occupation, those whose position is higher in the social structure – experts and managers, gave the most accurate answers, followed by clerks and the least correct answers were those of the farmers.

The same variable was **intersected** by the confessional and religious self-identification. However, having in mind a large number of the cells in table with the frequencies lower than 5, the interpretation using X square test was not justified. Namely, 92.2% of the respondents are Catholics. All other confessions (Orthodox Serbs, Muslims and “others”) belong to the group of only 4.1%. Confessional adherence was not declared by 3.7% of the respondents. So “Catholics” constituted a separate category with the answers shown for all four analyzed indicators of religious knowledge. The next table illustrates the distribution of their answers.

Table 3: Familiarity with the authors of the Gospel among Catholics

Answers	N	%
Correct answers	169	26.0
Incorrect answers	411	63.2
No answer	70	10.8
Total	650	100.0

According to the data shown in Table 3 only one fourth of the Catholics in the sample answered to this question correctly, what implies a great deal of ignorance as far as this really fundamental Biblical fact is concerned.

Table 4: Familiarity with the authors of the Gospels and religious self-identification (%)

Answers	Religious self-identification		
	Convinced believers	Religious	Others
Correct	24.4	30.9	14.3
Incorrect	67.8	55.6	55.2
No answer	7.8	13.6	30.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

$$\chi^2=44.074$$

With regard to the acquaintance with the authors of the Gospel, a statistically significant difference is ascertained among convinced believers, religious and others. We can observe that with the increasing of the degree of religiosity, grows the percentage of those who know the correct answer (although the difference among convinced believers and religious is not that big), but also grows the percentage of those who are unfamiliar with the answer

(among those who didn't know the answers, more than a half were convinced believers, about one third religious ones and one tenth were others), what is not a surprising information if the sample consisted of the majority of the religious respondents (85.1%).

The next variable (the acquaintance with the Old-Testament prophets) made more difficulties for the respondents. A choice of six names was offered: Isaiah, Matthew, Jeremiah, Elias, Deuteronomy and Isac.

Table 5: Familiarity with the Old-Testament prophets (Isaiah, Jeremiah, Elias)

Answers	N	%
Correct answers	40	5.7
Incorrect answers	507	71.9
No answer	158	22.4
Total	705	100.0

Acquaintance with the Old-Testament prophets is even more deficient. Only 5.7% of the respondents (only 40 in 705) recognized the three Old-Testament prophets (Isaiah, Jeremiah and Elias), and even 71.0% of the respondents gave wrong answer to this question and another 22.4% didn't answer at all.

There was not a statistically significant difference in knowledge of this fact that might be connected with any of the socio-demographic features. The respondents of both sexes, of all age groups, of different residential statuses, of all levels of education and of different vocational groups are likewise poorly acquainted with this Old-Testament fact.⁶

Table 6: Familiarity with the Old-Testament prophets among Catholics

Answers	N	%
Correct answers	39	6.0
Incorrect answers	480	73.8
No answer	131	20.2
Total	650	100.0

⁶ Similar to the previous variable, while intersecting by confessional self-identification the interpretation with χ square test was not justified due to the same reasons.

Out of 40 respondents that gave the correct answer, 39 were Catholics. But this fact reveals more the ignorance of the Catholics than it points to their knowledge, as a great deal of the Catholics did not answer accurately (94%).

The Table 7 exhibits the results of intersecting the same variable with religious self-identification.

Table 7: Familiarity with the Old-Testament prophets and religious self-identification

Answers	Religious self-identification		
	Convinced believers	Religious	Others
Correct	6.4	6.1	1.9
Incorrect	76.8	70.4	59.0
No answer	16.8	23.5	39.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

$\chi^2=24.855$

All three subcategories show very poor knowledge of this relevant Biblical fact. However, there is a statistically significant difference among convinced believers, religious and others with regards to this question, as well. The same conclusion emerges again – in spite of poor knowledge through all three subcategories, with the increase of the level of religiosity, the acquaintance with the Old-Testament prophets is growing to some extent.

If for nothing else, the answers to these two questions alone support the thesis of Šagi-Bunić (1981) and Šimunović (1966) on ‘Biblical malnutrition’ of Catholic believers in Croatia. If we compare the results of the two socio-religious researches in Croatia – *Religijske promjene i vrijednosti u hrvatskom društvu (Religious Changes and Values in Croatian Society)* (which was carried out in Zagreb and the Zagreb County) and *Vjera i moral u Hrvatskoj (Belief and Morality in Croatia)*⁷ regarding Catholic believers’ reading the Bible, we can notice that they also point to a plausibility of the mentioned thesis. According to the results of the first research, even 81% of the respondents do not read the Bible: never (30%) or rarely (51%). The results of the second mentioned research that covered whole Croatia show that 43% of the respondents do not have or do not read the Bible, and 50% of them have

⁷ The research ‘Belief and Morality in Croatia’ was carried out by the Catholic Theological Faculty, University of Zagreb in 1998, on the sample of 1245 respondents.

read it and don't read it any more, or read it occasionally (Črpić, Kušar, 1998:533). Only 0.9% of the respondents from Croatia read the Bible every day and 4.4% from Zagreb and the Zagreb County read it regularly (although its meaning is not specified), what is completely in accordance with these findings. As far as other confessions are concerned, this sample is too narrow to allow making conclusions about each of them. However, the investigation *Vjera i moral u Hrvatskoj (Belief and Morality in Croatia)* carried out on the sample of 2000 respondents, 55.65% of the Muslims declared that they 'occasionally consult the Bible', atheists, agnostics and those who simply are not believers 'read the Bible almost more often than the Catholics, or at least, just as often' (Črpić, Kušar, 1998). According to the same authors, 'the most faithful readers of the Bible are the members of various Christian sects who (100%) read the Bible every day' (Črpić, Kušar, 1998).

In conformity with these data, a socio-religious research 'Religioznost malih vjerskih zajednica u Hrvatskoj (*Religiosity of small religious communities in Zagreb*)'⁸ in 1987, showed that 45% of the respondents read the Bible on a daily basis, and another 25% several times a week. This rate would be even higher, if the sample had not contain some traditional minority Churches, such as the Evangelical and Croatian Catholic Church whose members read the Bible less, trusting more in mediation of the Biblical knowledge, and the Jewish Community (Plačko, 1991:32).

From the shown data it is obvious that a small number of the Catholics reaches for the Bible on a regular basis. The Bible is a highly appreciated book but rarely taken. The priests are in charge of reading it and it is kept on consecrated places in the Church, on the altar mostly, and at home – in glass showcases/china cabinets. Even its appearance (black, heavy, hard-cover edition) and the places where it is kept seem to alienate it from the believers. In the Protestant and other Christian Churches, the Bible can be found everywhere – on benches, tables; it is handed out to accidental passers-by, thus encouraging them to reading. They don't look posh at all, they are of a pocket-size and with covers in various colors. Comparisons point to the fact that there are differences within Christianity: a stronger focus of the members of smaller religious communities to a direct and individual approach to the Bible and a greater trust of the believers of traditional communities in an indirect approach – through

⁸ The research was made by The Institute for Social Research in Zagreb on the sample of 16 communities, totaling 200 respondents.

persons that are mediating Biblical knowledge. There is also a movement within the Catholic Church aiming at returning the Bible into the hands of the believers. We are still talking about the elitist communities whose followers find the Biblical togetherness with all the Christians to whom reading the Bible is an everyday activity.

4.2. Knowledge acquired through religious socialisation (religious instruction and more intense learning prior receiving the Church Sacraments)

Traditional Catholic believers become Catholics by birth and they get acquainted with the religion of their forefathers through the process of religious socialisation carried out in the family and in the Church through religious instruction. They confirm their Catholic status through the ceremonies of transition – Sacraments, for whose receiving some knowledge is needed. The following variables point to such type of knowledge: familiarity with the Ten Commandments and the Seven Holy Sacraments.

The respondents were asked: Do you know the Ten Commandments? The offered answers were: I do, I know some, I don't know. In this question we were counting to a certain degree on sincerity, since many might feel irritated or discouraged if asked to quote in written all the Ten Commandments (be it due to their possible ignorance or due to extensive work – duration of writing down all the Commandments in an already large-scale questionnaire). So we chose this more neutral form.

Table 8: Answers to the question: Do you know the Ten Commandments?

Answers	N	%
I know them all	508	72.4
I know some	174	24.7
I don't know	13	1.8
No answer	10	1.4
Total	705	100.0

Almost all the respondents are totally or partly familiar with the Ten Commandments. This information might be confusing at first sight if compared to the answers to the previous two questions, but at the same time it has sense and can be explained because the Catholic believers (except during the course of religious instruction which they attended at a high rate – 86.7%) have never been

asked about the direct familiarity with the Bible by anybody. The fact is that at each service one of the Gospels is being read (with a stress on its author) but the respondents that attend the service regularly and at a high rate, seem not to memorize these repeated data. The genuineness of the mentioned percentages is supported by the fact that prior all the ceremonies of transition, they acquire, respectively, repeat some basic prayers and the facts of the Christian faith, such as the Ten Commandments or the Seven Holy Sacraments. This is the reason why they remember them much longer.

When intersecting the variable familiarity with the Ten Commandments by socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, a statistically significant difference was found only with regard to the residential status of the respondents. The respondents living in cities know the Ten Commandments better than those coming from small towns or villages.

Table 9: Familiarity with the Ten Commandments and socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents (%)

Answers	Place of residence		
	Village	Small	City
I know them all	74.8	60.0	72.0
I know some	15.5	35.0	25.9
I don't know	9.7	5.0	2.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

$\chi^2=21.115$

Table 10 illustrates the distribution of the answers among Catholics: there is a high rate of familiarity with this religious fact that is being acquired during the process of socialisation.

Table 10: Familiarity with the Ten Commandments among Catholics (%)

Answers	N	%
I know them all	39	6.0
I know some	480	73.8
I don't know	131	20.2
Total	650	100.0

The Table 11 shows if convinced believers differ in this sense from religious and others. Although the percentage of those who know all the Ten Commandments is very high, in this question there is also a statistically significant difference between the three subcategories.

Table 11: Familiarity with the Ten Commandments and religious self-identification (%)

Answers	Religious self-identification		
	Convinced believers	Religious	Others
I know them all	84.9	70.0	33.3
I know some	11.8	28.4	60.0
I don't know	3.4	1.6	6.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

$\chi^2=114.384$

The next question was: How many Sacraments are there? The respondent had to write down only the number (seven).

Table 12: Answers to the question: How many Holy Sacraments are there? (%)

Answers	N	%
Correct answers	482	68.4
Incorrect answers	117	16.5
No answer	106	15.0
Total	705	100.0

The percentage of correct answers to this question is somewhat lower, but still high. Namely, almost 70% of the respondents answered accurately, what supports the previously supposed explanation about better knowledge of the religious facts that are being repeated in order to memorize them. Intersecting the variable – knowledge of the Sacraments by socio-demographic characteristics showed that there is a difference among the respondents also only in relation to their residential status.

Table 13: Knowledge of the Seven Holy Sacraments and socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents (%)

Answers	Place of residence		
	Village	Small	City
Correct	89.3	55.0	65.1
Incorrect	5.8	5.0	18.9
No answer	4.9	40.0	16.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

$\chi^2=34.453$

It is obvious that the respondents coming from the cities know the Holy Sacraments, as well as the Commandments much better than those coming from small towns or villages.

Table 14: Familiarity with the Holy Sacraments among Catholics

Answers	N	%
Correct answers	471	72.5
Incorrect answers	112	17.2
No answer	67	10.3
Total	650	100.0

If compared to a considerable unfamiliarity with the writers of the Gospel and the Old-Testament prophets, the Catholics demonstrated considerable knowledge of this religious fact that is being acquired in the process of socialisation. However, one third did not know the answer to this question.

Table 15: Knowledge of the Holy Sacraments and religious self-identification (%)

Answers	Religious self-identification		
	Convinced believers	Religious	Others
Correct	82.6	63.0	32.4
Incorrect	10.4	21.8	25.7
No answer	7.0	15.2	41.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

$\chi^2=114.383$

With a growth of the degree of religiosity, grows the rate of correct answers within the three subcategories. Consequently, the Catholic believers remember the facts from their religion that are checked and insisted upon by the Church authorities (but only occasionally, in some important life moments) better than the facts that they hear once a week but without any obligation of memorizing them.

The analyzed variables were intersected by the variable – the attending of religious instruction. We presupposed the existence of a positive correlation between the attending of religious instruction and knowledge of the examined facts. The intention was to determine if the attendants of religious instruction know the elementary religious facts better than non-attendants. From the

results of the research we can see that 87% of the respondents attended religious instruction.

Table 16: Familiarity with the authors of the Gospel and attending religious instruction (%)

Answers	Attending religious instruction		
	Yes	No	There is no such thing in my religion
Correct	25.8	20.9	14.3
Incorrect	63.1	54.7	28.6
No answer	11.1	24.4	57.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

$$\chi^2=23.647$$

Table 16 demonstrates that attending religious instruction has an effect on better acquaintance with the authors of the Gospel. The respondents who attended religious instruction gave most correct answers.

Nevertheless, we can see that even 74.2% of those who attended religious instruction didn't answer correctly or didn't answer at all.

Table 17: Familiarity with the Old-Testament prophets and attending religious instruction (%)

Answers	Attending religious instruction		
	Yes	No	There is no such thing in my religion
Correct	6.4	1.2	0.0
Incorrect	73.9	60.5	42.9
No answer	19.8	38.4	57.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

$$\chi^2=22.165$$

Table 17 demonstrates that in spite of poor acquaintance with the Old-Testament prophets, still the respondents who attended religious instruction answered more accurately.

Similar to the previous table, a general bad knowledge of this biblical fact is even more obvious from this table (even 93.7% of the respondents didn't answer correctly or didn't answer at all).

Table 18: Familiarity with the Ten Commandments and attending religious instruction (%)

Answers	Attending religious instruction		
	Yes	No	There is no such thing in my religion
Correct	78.1	32.6	28.6
Incorrect	19.8	60.5	14.3
No answer	2.1	7.0	57.1
Total	100.0 86.8	100.0 12.2	100.0 1.0

$\chi^2=142.824$

Table 18 shows a high degree of correlation between the familiarity with the Ten Commandments and attending religious instruction. Thus, the majority of the respondents who attended religious instruction answered correctly. Unlike the previous two variables, only 21.9% of those who attended religious instruction didn't answer correctly.

Table 19: Familiarity with the Seven Holy Sacraments and attending religious instruction (%)

Answers	Attending religious instruction		
	Yes	No	There is no such thing in my religion
Correct	74.2	31.4	14.3
Incorrect	16.7	17.4	0.0
No answer	9.2	51.2	85.7
Total	100.0 86.8	100.0 12.2	100.0 1.0

$\chi^2=126.436$

Table 19 has similar results as the previous one. The correct answers were given mainly by the attendants of religious instruction, among which there were few who did not know the correct answer (25.9%). It is obvious that the attendants of religious instruction know these facts much better, learning of which was intensified in the period of preparation for receiving the Holy Sacraments, than those facts that can be learned by reading the Bible and which have never been checked. So, in spite of the high rate of the attending of religious instruction, a great number of the Catholics do not know (recognize) the authors of the Gospel and the Old-Testament prophets. Nonetheless, the

attending of religious instruction does have impact on better knowledge of religious facts. It was to be supposed that younger population would show better knowledge of all the analyzed indicators due to their attending of religious instruction in a relatively near past, but it was shown only in relation to the acquaintance with the authors of the Gospel.

5. Conclusion

Basis the indicators of the two types of knowledge: knowledge acquired through religious socialisation (religious instruction and more intense learning prior receiving the Church Sacraments) and knowledge acquired by reading the Bible (active taking part during the Church service), the thesis present in the Catholic theological literature (Šagi-Bunić, 1981; Šimunović, 1996) about the ignorance of the Catholic believers and unfamiliarity with the contents of their own religion, was confirmed. It is obvious that a traditional bonding with religion and the Church relies more on the spoken word and verbal communication than on the written word (Vrcan, 1975). So, it is the parent, the priest (the preacher) and the religious instruction teacher who are the mediators of information and knowledge and not the religious books and the religious press.

There are religions in which some particular kind of knowledge is a prerequisite of everyday religious activities (as it is the Bible for the majority of the Protestant denominations). Knowledge acquired through religious socialisation comes to the second place (since a person approaches such religions mostly through conversion and his/her former religious life is not relevant any more). On the contrary, the Catholics in Croatia show more knowledge when it comes to the facts apostrophized in the course of religious socialisation. They don't read and are poorly acquainted with the Bible, and are totally unaware of the events in the Catholic Church, what could be seen in this research concerning the examining of the familiarity with the Second Vatican Council.

It turned out that socio-demographic characteristics have little impact on the level of knowledge of the examined elementary religious facts. It also turned out that the respondents who were Catholic believers and who attended religious instruction prevail in the category of the respondents who answered to the questions correctly. However, they also dominate within a much bigger category of the respondents who did not know the correct answer to the basic Christian facts – acquaintance with the authors of the Gospel and the Old-Testament prophets.

The obtained results point to a certain passivity of religion on a cognitive level and to a mostly unaware pragmatism – acquiring of the facts needed for some concrete purposes (Communion, Confirmation, Wedding), to the detriment of those facts that are very often available but knowledge of which has never been checked.

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**ALTRUISM AND RELIGION IN EUROPE:
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF MOTIVATION**

1. Introduction

According to the European Values Study in 1990, one in four Europeans undertakes unpaid work for a variety of voluntary groups and charitable organisations. A higher proportion of samples in the Netherlands, Belgium and Scandinavia excluding Denmark involved in voluntary work than other countries such as Portugal and Spain. Voluntary workers tend to be more trusting of others than the population at large, they are more reflective and moralistic than non-volunteers, and less materialistic and more likely to be regular church-goers (Barker, et al., 1992:39). Why do religious people do voluntary works and charitable activities? It would not be just to say they do it for the sole purpose of recruiting new members. On the other hand, it is too simplistic to attribute it to genuine altruism, because religious people's voluntary works and charitable activities tend to have some unique constructions which will be discussed in this chapter with three types of motivation: empathy, rational choice and soteriology. Although religion in modern society loses a major role in providing a moral order for the society, religion still seems to exercise influence over an individual's private life by supplying moral values. One of those moral values is altruism. By using some data from European Values Study and my own research in UK¹, this paper will theoretically discuss altruism and why some religious people in Europe do voluntary works and charitable activities.

The term 'altruism' was coined by the French sociologist, August Comte (1798-1857) and entered the English language in 1853 in translation. Since then altruism has been an analytical concept in the social sciences. Originally, Comte used altruism to denote the unselfish regard for the welfare of others, or

¹ An early form of this chapter first appeared in 'Voluntary Work, Altruism and Religion in Europe' *Informationes Theologiae Europae*, pp.35-46, 2003.

a devotion to the interests of others as an action-guiding principle (see Wispe, 1978: 304). Apart from external forces such as increased status, social desirability or social approval, it has also been pointed out that feelings of guilt can motivate altruism and that feelings of guilt seek compensation that can be achieved through altruistic acts (Carlsmith & Gross, 1968; Regan et al., 1972). If altruism is, however, defined as the willingness to help others without normative obligation and without expecting benefits at a later time, we could rarely find actions altruistically motivated. Therefore, this study has adopted the definition by Montada and Bierhoff (1991:18): 'behaviour that aims at a termination or reduction of an emergency, a neediness, or disadvantage of others and that primarily does not aim at the fulfilment of own interests', adding that 'the behaviour has to be carried out voluntarily'.

2. Studies of altruism and religion

There has been a considerable volume of empirical research into the correlation between altruism and religion (Inaba, 2000). Some researchers have found religion related to altruistic behaviour. In 1973, the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) conducted a survey of 1502 respondents. This survey included the question, 'How often do you feel that you follow your religious beliefs and take concrete action on behalf of others?' Barbara Langford and Charles Langford (1974) assessed this survey and pointed out that church attendants perceived themselves as more helpful towards others than non-church attendants. A study by Nelson and Dynes (1976) was conducted in the Southwest of the USA eight months after a city had been struck by a damaging tornado which produced extensive and varied helping behaviour. Independent variables were devotions such as the frequency of table prayers, church attendance and subjective religiosity. Dependent variables were contribution to the funds, donation of goods and participation in formal voluntary social work. The findings showed that independent variables were positively related to dependent variables.

Cline and Richards (1965) conducted a survey in the Salt Lake area² in the USA and reached different conclusions, finding no relationship between the religiosity factors (as measured by frequency of church attendance, frequency of prayer, and contribution of money) and such variables as 'having love and compassion for one's fellow man', and 'being a Good Samaritan'. Darley and

² Religious preference was 72 per cent Mormon, 9 per cent Protestant, 4 per cent Catholic, and 4 per cent other.

Batson (1973) and Annis (1976) also showed that religiosity was unrelated to offering help to others. In another study, no relationship was found between religiosity and volunteering to help people (Smith et al. 1975). Moreover, Rokeach (1969) noted that those who rated high on church attendance were more likely to be insensitive and unconcerned for disadvantaged groups.

I now turn to consider why there was such disparity in the results of the above studies in the 1960s and the 1970s. One possibility is that altruistic attitude might be so much a part of many organised religions that respondents failed to answer self-report inventories honestly. On the other hand, religious people might be more likely to answer questionnaires with honesty, because of their beliefs that a Supreme Being knows people's acts in all situations. Methodological problems such as the measurement of altruism, the measurement of religiosity, the amount of respondent diversity, and the control of situational variables might contribute to the mixed results (cf. Spilka, 1970).

Since the 1980s, various studies have shown that religion promoted altruism. An analysis based on findings from a questionnaire survey of 300 undergraduate students in the USA indicated that religious persons were more likely to carry out altruistic acts (Zook et al., 1982). In the study by Lynn and Smith (1991), those who did voluntary work in the UK gave religion as one of the main reasons for their participation. By analysing various surveys such as British Social Attitudes, Gallup Poll and British Household Panel Survey, Gill concludes:

there is a great deal of evidence showing that churchgoers are relatively, yet significantly, different from nonchurchgoers. On average they have higher levels of Christian belief (which is hardly surprising), but, in addition, they usually have a stronger sense of moral and civic order and tend to be significantly more altruistic than nonchurchgoers (1999:261).

Research by Perkins (1992) examined the relationship between Judeo-Christian religiosity and humanitarianism. The study was based on data collected during 1978-1979 at five diverse colleges and universities in England and the USA and data collected during 1988-1990 at the same institutions. The two statements used to measure humanitarianism were (1) 'People who have done well in life have an obligation to help the less fortunate' and (2) 'It is the responsibility of all members of society to help those members who are unable to help themselves.' The two statements used to measure religiosity were (1) 'People would be better off if they returned to religion, not only for spiritual and ethical guidance but for answers to many questions which mankind is too limited to answer satisfactorily' and (2) 'Religion can help resolve and give guidance to the pressing moral, social, and even political problems of the day.' Perkins concludes:

Religiosity appears to be most salient in directly promoting humanitarian compassion. The influence of many socio-demographic factors often associated with social compassion in other populations failed to attain any level of significance among these student data. Hence these data suggest that the nature of one's religious commitment might remain one of the few important influences on humanitarianism for young persons in the college setting cross-nationally (1992:359).

The study of Yablo (1990) contrasted native-born Thai and the USA citizens on the relation between religion and altruistic behaviour. The results showed that the people in Thailand, where 95% of the population is a Buddhist, displayed a stronger orientation towards altruistic behaviour than the USA citizens. Interview results revealed qualitative differences in philosophies and rationale regarding altruistic behaviour: the Thai interviewees were influenced by Buddhist doctrine, while the USA interviewees reported being less influenced by religion and more influenced by pragmatic considerations. The findings of this study suggest a relationship between cultural and/or religious values and altruistic behaviour.


Regarding the contribution of religion to voluntary work, Wilson and Janoski (1995) analysed the data derived from the three-wave Youth-Parent Socialisation Panel Study by the University of Michigan. The results indicate that the relation between religion and voluntary work is complex and that there should be caution in generalising about the connection. With regard to the habit of Americans of giving to charitable organisations, Regnerus et al. (1998) found the correlation with religiosity by analysing the data from the 1996 Religious Identity and Influence Survey. The 13 per cent of the American population that considered itself non-religious gave less money to charitable organisations than did the rest of the population that held religious beliefs to some degree. Moreover, the results showed that 'which religious tradition a person professes and practices is less important than the fact that they practice one' (Regnerus et al., 1998:490).

3. Motivation for altruism

Although there seems to be no motivation which is common to everyone, several prominent frameworks are readily available for explaining the motivations for charitable activities, and these frameworks are nearly universal and therefore legitimise to draw on in accounting for one's own behaviour (cf., Wuthnow, 1995:61, Inaba, 2001). The European Values Study in 1990 also

found those frameworks, or three distinguished factors; namely altruistic motives, instrumental motives, and obligatory motives. Altruistic motives included ‘a sense of solidarity with the poor and disadvantaged’, ‘compassion for those in need’, ‘identifying with people who are suffering’, ‘to help give disadvantaged people hope and dignity’, and ‘to make a contribution to your local community’. Instrumental motives included ‘having time on your hands and want something worthwhile to do’, ‘personal satisfaction’, and ‘to gain new skill and useful experience’. Motives of obligatory and personal satisfaction included ‘an opportunity to repay something, give something back’, ‘a sense of duty, moral obligation’, and ‘to bring about social or political change’, but also personal satisfaction. The correlation of personal satisfaction with a sense of duty may imply that ‘a part of the satisfaction gained relates to the effective discharge of obligations’ (Barker, et al., 1992:40). The survey also found that voluntary workers had more altruistic and obligatory motives than instrumental motives (Barker, et al., 1992:40).

Figure 1: The results of selected countries, the UK, Demark, Germany and the USA



Source: Barker, et al., 1992:41

In order to compare the results of surveys undertaken in different countries and interpret what the variations in these results may imply, Barker, et al (1992) converted the results of the European Values Study in 1990 into standard scores, or ‘Z scores’. These standard scores were calculated from the combined

scores for all the countries in the survey, and the mean score for all countries is set to zero and the deviation of each country from the average is expressed in terms of 'standard deviations' from the mean (Barker, et al., 1992:3).

As the figure shows, in the UK volunteers stress altruistic motives and social obligation, whilst instrumental motive is of less importance. A similar situation is ascertained in the USA. By contrast Germany and Denmark regard instrumental motives as important, but their situation is different: in Denmark altruistic motives and social obligation are of unimportance, whilst the different motives are of roughly equal importance in Germany. As Figure 1 shows, when it comes to motivation for voluntary works and charitable activities, there seem to be no reasons that are common to all. However, three categories, namely, 'empathy', 'rational choice' and 'soteriology' seem to be useful in attempting to sketch out motivations for performing charitable activities of religious people. We shall now examine the motivations under the three headings.

3.1. Empathy

Sympathy is a similar concept but carries connotations of being on someone's side. People can empathise with their enemies though people may not sympathise much. If you take some action in sympathy with someone else or in sympathy with what they are doing, you do it in order to show that you support them (cf. Campbell, 1998:17). Empathy means identifying and feeling sympathy for another person. There is an abundant literature on 'the empathy-altruism hypothesis' emphasising that sympathy or empathy for the needy is the motive for altruistic activities. One feels sorry for homeless people or people in need and wishes to reduce their distress. Wuthnow (1995) analyses the same motivation of young people for caring acts in the category of 'humanitarianism'. According to Wuthnow, humanitarianism means:

supplying aid, such as food, clothing, and shelter to victims of war or natural disaster. The goal is to eliminate pain and suffering. More generally, humanitarianism combines a feeling of compassion or sympathy with a value that attaches importance to helping those toward whom one feels compassion (1995:65, 66).

The term 'empathy' may be more conceptual than the term 'compassion'. Some religious people may talk about empathy as their motivations for voluntary works and charitable activities by using the term 'compassion'. One feels sorry for homeless people or people in need and wishes to reduce their

distress. Some religious people feel compassion for those people who are suffering and they reach out to those suffering people.

On the other hand, some people feel empathetic distress themselves when they feel sorry for those who are suffering. Their distress arises from the unpleasant emotions which they feel as a result of seeing the homeless people or people in need. Alternatively, their distress may arise from emotions of guilt or shame they anticipate if they do not help. In any case, they feel sorry for people in need and carry out acts to help them. Their actual altruistic acts also relieve themselves from their own empathetic distress. I call these kinds of motivation for altruistic acts 'the empathetic distress motivation'.

3.2. Rational choice

We shall now examine whether it is rational for some religious people to have altruistic concerns and commitments. According to Schmitz³ (1995), rational choice consists of maximising one's utility subject to a budget constraint, and in recent times theorists have taken the term 'utility' to mean something related to or identical to preference satisfaction. In some cases there are reasons to embrace and nurture one's concern for others, and the reasons have to do with what is conducive to one's utility. It is rational to be peaceful and productive in order to create a secure place for oneself in society, which requires one to have a regard for the interests of others. People have self-regarding reasons to internalise other-regarding concerns. On the other hand, one seeks not only to earn the respect and concern of others but also to earn one's own respect and concern. Moreover, it is a simple fact that a person of principles inspires more respect than a person driven by mere expedience (Schmitz, 1995:110).

Our ultimate interest is in having something to live for, being able to devote ourselves to the satisfaction of preferences we judge worthy of satisfaction. Not having other-regarding preferences is costly, for it drastically limits what one has to live for... Concern for ourselves gives us something to live for. Concern for others as well as ourselves gives us more (Schmitz, 1995:105, 106).

Some voluntary works may be considered to be based on rational choice.

³ In this study, I am referring to the discussion by Schmitz (1995) on rational choice and altruism. Regarding the discussion on rational choice and religion, Iannaccone (1997) covers the framework for the scientific study of religion.

In the field of social psychology, altruism is classified as ‘reciprocal altruism’ (exchange relations) or ‘kin altruism’ (communal relations) (cf., Campbell, 1998). Reciprocal altruism is the idea that altruism can be the product of natural selection if one behaves altruistically to others who have the same predisposition to behave altruistically also. One cares for someone else in the hope of receiving help in return, and in such case the altruistic acts are like insurance (cf., Wuthnow, 1995:70). As there is often a delay between an altruistic act and the reciprocation of the act, it occurs in those species where members live in stable social groups, have long memories, and a good ability to recognise altruistic acts. This involves the calculation of rewards and costs for particular courses of action. This suggests that people in general try to maximise their rewards and minimise their costs. The focus is upon the individual making implicit calculations about what is most beneficial to him or her. Regarding reciprocal altruism, Wuthnow (1991:90) emphasises that ‘acts of compassion are discrete gifts that have real and symbolic value in order to suggest that they also embody, like any good or service, an investment of time and energy’. Citing the arguments about gifts and reciprocity by Alvin Gouldner (1977), Wuthnow notes:

giving creates an asymmetry or imbalance in social relationships that people feel compelled in some way to rectify. In some contexts the norms of the situation may require only that you say a sincere “thank you” to the person who has given you a gift. In other circumstances you may be expected to give that person a gift of equal value sometime in the future (1991:90).

The socio-biological theory of altruism emphasises that biological and social conditions develop altruism and that human beings are genetically programmed to be altruistic for the sake of promotion of survival. Within the field of socio-biology, ‘kin altruism’ is a contemporary view on altruism (Wilson, 1978:53-56; Degler, 1991:279-285). Within this discussion, Browning (1992:422) explains:

altruism is frequently defined as behaviour that appears to sacrifice one’s immediate reproductive advantage but which, in the long run, in fact contributes to one’s reproductive advantage; i.e., the continuation of a percentage of one’s genes in the genes of one’s children or close relatives (1992:422).

Kin altruism is based on the idea that family, partners and close friends are inter-dependent (cf., Campbell, 1998). We may say that kin altruism is based on natural affection towards family and close friends rather than rational choice. In these relationships, solidarity and harmony are emphasised; one pays attention not to what others have done for him or her but to their needs. Kin altruism expands to reciprocal altruism by the notion of the norm of social responsibility, which states that people should help those who are dependent on each other. This norm encourages people to go beyond family and friends and to help strangers. Some voluntary works may be based on reciprocal altruism.

Many research findings show that good mood and happiness can facilitate altruism, and Wuthnow (1995:67) also points out that individual happiness and the good of others are not incompatible but are in fact linked. In his own survey (1991), many people reported that helping others made them feel good and was a good way of gaining a sense of satisfaction and fulfilment for themselves⁴. Gaining fulfilment for themselves and feeling good can be considered as compensation for the time and energy invested. This is also the case of rational choice. Some religious people's motivations for voluntary works seem to be based on rational choice in the sense that they calculate the benefits they will receive later. However, this calculation of benefit may not be their primary objective of their voluntary works.

3.3. Soteriology

The third motivation is soteriological. Religion has been always concerned with soteriology. Wilson notes:

The central religious question is, 'what shall we do to be saved?' The answers to it justify religious practice. Just what salvation means varies from one culture to another, and so do the ways of attaining it. Men may seek salvation from immediate and pressing ills that afflict them; or salvation may be seen as the liberation of a people and the establishment of a new political dispensation; or it may be a preoccupation with benefit after death. Salvation extends from therapeutic relief to transcendental reassurance or social transformation (1970:21).

⁴ In his survey, 51 per cent of the public said they receive a great deal of personal fulfilment from doing things for people; another 38 per cent said they receive a fair amount of fulfilment. Among those currently involved in charitable or social-service activities, 63 per cent said doing things for people was a source of a great deal of fulfilment (Wuthnow, 1991:87).

Voluntary works of religious people may be also motivated by the quest for salvation, because the quest for salvation can produce certain consequences for practical behaviour in the world. Weber notes:

It is most likely to acquire such a positive orientation to mundane affairs as the result of a conduct of life which is distinctively determined by religion and given coherence by some central meaning or positive goal. In other words, a quest for salvation in any religious group had the strongest chance of exerting practical influences when there has arisen, out of religious motivations, a systematisation of practical conduct resulting from an orientation to certain integral values (1978:528).

Weber (1978:532-534) discusses salvation attained through good work. He assumes two different forms of a developing systematisation of an ethic of good work. In the first form, 'the particular actions of an individual in quest of salvation, whether virtuous or wicked actions, can be evaluated singly and credited to or subtracted from the individual's account' (ibid.:533). The second form treats 'individual actions as symptoms and expressions of an underlying ethical total personality' (ibid.:533). Although Weber distinguishes the two forms, he concludes that these two produce very similar practical results. Weber remarks:

the social and ethical quality of actions falls into secondary importance, while the religious effort expended upon oneself becomes of primary importance. Consequently, religious good works with a social orientation become mere instruments of *self-perfection*: a methodology of salvation (ibid.:534).

If the ministry of Jesus is a paradigm of altruism, his death, as interpreted by his followers, was its ultimate manifestation. For Christians, states Novak (1992:9), 'Jesus is the altruistic man who died for others as he had lived for them. Altruism is the very stuff of the Christian God'. In Christianity, however, the terms 'agape' or 'love' are usually used instead of the term 'altruism' (cf., Jennings, 1996; Rigby & O'Grady, 1989). Browning (1992:422) remarks '*Agape*, the Greek word most often used to refer to the rule or law of love in the New Testament, is defined in many Protestant sources as entailing primarily impartial, self-sacrificial action on behalf of the other and without regard to oneself'. However, only 'the religious virtuosi' can achieve the extreme self-sacrificial formulations of the Christian concept of love that exclude all self-regarding motives. Weber (1978:539) remarks 'not everyone possesses the

charisma that makes possible the continuous maintenance in everyday life of the distinctive religious mood which assures the lasting certainty of grace'. The extreme self-sacrificial formulations of the Christian concept of love symbolised by the cross have the possibility to deny kin altruism and reciprocal altruism. The extreme self-sacrificial formulations may be too hard for 'the average person' to practise. Consequently, as Browning (1991:423) points out, in stark contrast to the initial goals, these extreme self-sacrificial formulations may fail to extend natural kin altruism to the wider community, or rather function to diminish wider altruism.

Nevertheless, some religious people may value self-sacrifice. For them, 'salvation may be viewed as the distinctive gift of active ethical behaviour performed in the awareness that god directs this behaviour, i.e., that the actor is an instrument of god' (Weber, 1978:541). Weber (1978:541) calls this type of attitude 'ascetic'. Concentration upon the actual pursuit of salvation may entail a formal withdrawal from the 'world': from social and psychological ties with the family, from the possession of worldly good, and from political, economic, artistic, and erotic activities – in short, from all creaturely interests. One with such an attitude may regard any participation in these affairs as an acceptance of the world, leading to alienation from god (Weber, 1978:542). For instances, some people think of self-sacrifice, acts of service to God, helping God's work, and acts for the greater glory of God. They believe that God will bless their acts. Thus, I suggest, there is a strong link between the rational choice and soteriology.

Although there is a utilitarian aspect in soteriology, there is a possibility that ethics based on soteriology facilitate altruism and charitable acts, since the pure heart itself is regarded as life's highest reward in a number of religions.

4. Conclusion

This paper presented three main motivations for voluntary work and charitable activities of religious people. The first one is empathy and the empathetic distress motivation was also considered. The second motivation is rational choice. Reciprocal altruism, kin altruism and a sense of satisfaction were considered as rational choice. The last motivation is soteriology, and Christian concept of love, self-sacrifice, and blessing from God were discussed. Religious people tend to believe that everything is a gift from God and they need God's endorsement of their social life. Religious teachings may play the role of prescribing moral precepts. On the other hand, altruism may be developed best not by reading about teachings, or by listening to the sermons,

but by the relationships with others who have the same faith and try to help each other. If it is the case, religious people in some country may stress altruistic motives more than religious people in some other country; even so, there seem to be no single motivation for voluntary works and charitable activities of religious people which are common to all. To back up this theoretical perspective, more case studies in various countries in Europe are required, but I assume that further research on voluntary work and charitable activities of religious people in Europe will verify the validity of the theoretical perspectives presented here.

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III.

RELIGION IN NEW EUROPE

James T. Richardson and Alain Garay

**THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FORMER COMMUNIST STATES¹**

1. Introduction

The European Court of Human Rights, located in Strasbourg, France, is playing a very important role in defining religious freedom and the meaning of religious pluralism in an expanding Council of Europe, as well as for the rest of the world. The Council of Europe now includes all traditional Western European countries and many countries formerly a part of the Soviet Union. The Court is now exerting its authority over former Soviet Union Member Countries, attempting to encourage them to become more open to the values espoused by the Council of Europe, including the values of freedom of religion and belief, as well as freedom of association and expression. As the Court takes this approach to new Member States, it may also become more willing to exert authority over Western European long-term Member States in Article 9 cases. And, the ECHR, as perhaps the premier human rights court in the world (for good or ill), sets an international standard when it acts on religious freedom matters.

2. Article 9

Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights:

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public

¹ Data for this report were gathered while on sabbatical leave from my home university, during which I was able to visit the European Court of Humans Rights in Strasbourg. The Jehovah's Witnesses legal staff have also been very helpful. Work on this project was facilitated by the Rockefeller Foundation, which approved a stay in fall of 2001 at the Study and Conference Center at Bellagio, on Lake Como, Italy.

and private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of the public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

This Article has been much-discussed in terms of its history and meaning. For a full reading of the history of the development of the specific language see Carolyn Evans (2001), who also has the more thorough discussion of the jurisprudential history of Article 9. The historical analysis contained herein depends heavily on the work of Evans, and that of Jeremy Gunn (1996) and Peter Edge (1998). My own visit to the ECHR in fall, 2001 also furnished considerable information of use in this analysis. After recounting the history of cases involving freedom of religion and belief claims, I will offer some suggestions about why the pattern of case law has developed as it has.

3. Recent Background

The ECHR had for decades demonstrated a remarkable reticence to override Member States in the area of religion, allowing considerable "margin of appreciation" of the historical and contextual needs and desires of political leaders of the individual countries. This posture has allowed some Member States to act in ways that significantly limit religious freedom and the development of religious pluralism (Richardson, 1996; Gunn, 1996; Edge, 1998; Evans, 2001). As Carolyn Evans notes, the most important early decision involving Article 9 was perhaps *Arrowsmith v. U.K.*, decided in 1978. In that case a pacifist was arrested for distributing pacifist literature to British soldiers about to be posted to Northern Ireland. She was found guilty of violating British law and appealed to the ECHR in 1975. The Court eventually said that while pacifism was covered under the "belief" provision of Article 9, not all actions influenced by belief were protected.

Out of the *Arrowsmith* case came a "necessity" test that means no violation of Article 9 can be found unless a person's beliefs *require* a given specific action (Evans, 2001:115). Thus if behavior is merely encouraged or permitted by a religion it is not protected under Article 9, an approach that rather automatically allowed the Commission (still feasible at that time) and the Court to disallow most claims made under Article 9. The *Arrowsmith* necessity test

was used for years as a way to defer to Member States when dealing with cases involving claims based on Article 9's guarantee of freedom of religion or belief.

Only with the *Kokkinakis* case in 1993 did the Court seem to leave this very narrow and limited approach to cases involving claims of violation of Article 9 (Gunn, 1996:322; Evans, 2001:117). The *Kokkinakis* case was adjudicated on the basis of Article 9, and that case was decided only on a split vote of 6-3, even though the case involved application in Greece of a law making proselytizing a criminal offense. Kokkinakis had been found guilty, fined and sentenced to prison for allegedly attempting to proselytize the wife of a local Kantor of the Greek Orthodox Church. The Court, in ruling for Kokkinakis, did not, however, state explicitly that the proselytizing law was illegal under the European Convention of Human Rights (Evans, 2001). Also, some of the individual Court opinions were very critical of the Jehovah's Witnesses proselytizing practices, with some opinions even equating them to the controversial so-called "brainwashing" process (Richardson, 1995:47-48). Nonetheless, the *Kokkinakis* case represents a milestone in the development of religious freedom in Europe, if not the world.

A key decision that followed *Kokkinakis* and even seemed to contradict it, was *Otto-Preminger Institut v. Austria*, decided in 1994 in favor of Austrian authorities who had stopped the showing of a film that was thought to be offensive to many citizens of Tyrol, where the case originated. The case had been brought on freedom of expression grounds (Article 10) but resulted in the Court accepting the argument of Austria that this was really an Article 9 case. The Court asserted in dicta that the "respect for religious feelings of believers as guaranteed in Article 9." (quoted in Evans, 2001:70). As Evans notes, there is no such right guaranteed in Article 9. Thus, this decision seems to turn Article 9 on its head and transform it into a way of protecting majoritarian interests. As Edge points out (Edge, 1998:681), this case was brought against the Institute because of complaints by the local diocese of the Roman Catholic Church. Edge, quoting from the opinion, said: "The Court...found it was a legitimate Convention aim to 'protect the right of citizens not to be insulted in their religious feelings by the public expression of the views of other persons'."

This majoritarian thrust of *Otto-Preminger* was given more impetus shortly afterward with a decision from the U.K. *Wingrove v. the United Kingdom*, decided in 1996, was another case involving an allegedly blasphemous film (Edge, 1998; Evans, 2001). The Court, in ruling in favor of U.K. authorities who had refused to allow the film to be shown, "referred again to the 'right of citizens not to be insulted in their religious feelings'." (Quote from Evans, 2001:71)

Despite the seemingly contrary *Otto-Preminger* and *Wingrove* decisions, since 1993 the ECHR has found a number of other violations of Article 9, demonstrating a somewhat different approach to some such cases, and a greater willingness to address issues of state allowed discrimination on the basis of religious belief or practice. This new stance, if it continues, should encourage more official recognition of religious pluralism, both in older members of the Council of Europe as well as in Former Communist States.

There have been about a dozen cases claiming violations of religious freedom that have been decided for the plaintiff(s) on the basis of Article 9, as well as other cases involving religious freedom claims that were decided on another basis that seemed to affirm freedom of religion and belief. Granted, eight of the post-*Kokkanakis* cases have also come from Greece, and six of those have involved Jehovah's Witnesses (but not all are proselytizing cases). One Greece case involved proselytizing by Pentecostal Church members, and another involved allegations of state interference in the internal affairs of a Moslem group (a case with implications for how such groups are to be treated in Former Communist States). Thus it seems that the Court continues its efforts to criticize Greece's legal strictures on proselytizing as well as other matters where government intrusion in the internal affairs of a religion or the practices of individual believers has occurred.

However, there have been successful Article 9 cases as well from Saint Marin and Bulgaria, as well as an important case from Spain where governmental collusion in a "deprogramming" was unanimously deemed a violation of Article 5 (dealing with false imprisonment), precluding the necessity for the Court to address Article 9 issues. A number of other Article 9 cases from France, Austria and former Soviet Union countries such as Russia are being brought before the Court, as well, in light of recent major anti-pluralism legal developments in several countries (Shterin and Richardson, 1998, 2000, 2002; Richardson and Shterin, 1999; Garay, 2000; Richardson and Introvigne, 2001). Whether the new pattern of offering some support for religious freedom in the future remains to be seen. But, whatever the outcome of most recent submissions, ECHR will play a major role in how religious freedom is defined in the "New Europe" and elsewhere.

This paper will briefly examine the recent decisions where violations of Article 9 were found, as well as some decided in favor of religious groups and individuals on other grounds. This examination will reveal the apparent new thinking on the Court concerning such cases, *Otto-Preminger* and *Wingrove*

notwithstanding. Describing this interesting recent pattern of more apparent willingness to affirm religious freedom in some cases and thereby to offer more legal sanction for pluralism is important. Attempting to explain this new more activist pattern of court decisions by the ECHR is a worthwhile scholarly exercise with implications for understanding how new states from the former Soviet Union will be integrated into the “old Europe.” We also will discuss a few of the recent submissions to the Court that have had a “friendly settlement” after the cases were accepted by the Commission. Such cases demonstrate the power of the Court to effect changes even without an official decision by the Court. And, a number of recent submissions to the Court will be briefly listed, to show where the Court may be headed, as it issues rulings applicable to a much-expanded Europe.

4. Major Successful ECHR Cases Involving Article 9 and Related Articles

The ground-breaking *Kokkinakis* case has already been described here and elsewhere (Gunn, 1996; Richardson, 1995; Evans, 2001). While this case was indeed a major decision of the Court, the question immediately surfaced as to whether this decision indicated a major shift in the thinking of those on the Court. The evidence suggests that the decision did indeed represent a change of direction for the Court, but one with some important qualifications, as will be seen. To demonstrate this point each of the successful cases involving Article 9 and related articles will be briefly described in turn, starting with the other cases from **Greece**.

Manoussakis and Others v. Greece

Filed 8/7/1991 with judgment granted 9/26/1996 supporting right to assemble and legally register for a congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses. Violation of Article 9 was found.

Tsirlis and Kouloumpas v. Greece

Filed 11/26/1991 with judgment granted 5/29/1997 allowing conscientious objector status to two Witnesses. Violations of Articles 5-1 and 5-5 were found.

Georgiadis v. Greece

Filed 2/27/1003 and judgment granted 5/29/1997 allowing conscientious objector status for a Witness. Violation of 6-1 was found.

Valsamis v. Greece

Filed 4/26/1993 and judgment granted 12/18/1996 disallowing punitive action against Jehovah's Witness students who refused to participate in a patriotic parade. Violations of Article 13 and 9, as well as of Protocol 1-2 were found.

Efstratiou v. Greece

Filed 4/25/1994 and judgment granted 12/18/1996 disallowing punitive action against Jehovah's Witness students who refused to participate in a patriotic parade. Violations of Article 13 and 9, as well as of Protocol 1-2 was found.

Thlimmenos v. Greece

Submitted 12/18/1996 and judgment granted 4/6/2000 disallowing employment discrimination derived from earlier conviction for refusal by a Jehovah's Witness to serve in armed forces. Violations of Article 14 and 9, as well as 6-1 were found.

Larissis and Others v. Greece

Filed in 1996 and judgment granted 2/24/1998 affirming *Kokkinakis* holding that proselytizing civilians is a legal activity, thus causing a violation of Article 9. The case involved members of the **Pentecostal Church** who were in the armed service who had proselytized soldiers under their command as well as civilians. (The Court did not find violations for proselytizing members of the armed services who were serving under plaintiffs.)

Serif v. Greece

Filed 10/9/1997 and judgment granted 12/14/1999 overturning conviction of Mr. Ibrahim Serif for usurping the functions of a minister and wearing the uniform of a **Moslem** minister. Violation of Article 9. This dispute arose over elections to replace the Mufti of Thrace, with the Greek government siding with one faction and arresting the leader of the opposing group.

Canea Catholic Church v. Greece

Filed in 1996 and judgment granted 16/12/1997 overturning ruling that the Canea **Catholic Church** on Crete, built in the 13th century, had no legal standing under Greek law to defend its property from encroachment by neighbors. Violations of Article 6-1 and Article 14 were found.

There is also an important early (1993) decision from **Austria** that did not involve Article 9 directly, but was of note nonetheless. Austria has also seen one major case decided, *Hoffman v. Austria* (filed 2/20/87) with a judgment on

6/23/1993, a month after the *Kokkinakis* decision. The ECHR ruled that a child could not be taken from its Jehovah's Witness mother simply because of her religious participation. Violations of Articles 14 and 8 were found.

The small republic of **San Marino** also had an Article 9 case worth mentioning. In *Buscarini and Others v. San Marin*, filed in 1994, a judgment was granted on 18/2/99 overruling a legal requirement of San Marin that those holding public office in the Republic be required to take a religious oath. Violation of Article 9 was found.

Spain also received a ruling against actions taken there in a case involving "deprogramming." In *Riera Blume and Others v. Spain*, filed in 1997, a judgment was granted 14/10/99 in favor of the plaintiffs who had been imprisoned, with the assistance of the Catalan police, for 10 days for purposes of deprogramming them from a religious group, **Centro Esoterico de Investigaciones**, in which they were participants. The Court found a violation of Article 5-1, which precludes false imprisonment.

Bulgaria lost a judgment in *Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria*, filed in 1996, and decided on 26/10/2000. This is the first case to be decided before the ECHR from a Former Communist State, and thus is of special note. The case involved a dispute between two rival factions in the **Muslim** community, with the State siding with one faction and allowing what appeared to be a duly elected Mufti and his supporters to be ousted from office, thus losing control of Muslim facilities and finances. The ousted Mufti won judgments in the Supreme Court of Bulgaria, but the Council of Ministers refused to enforce the judgments. Violations of Articles 9 and 14 were found.

5. Settlements Provoked by ECHR Filings

Some important cases have been settled after submission to the ECHR, after admissibility was granted by the Commission on Human Rights, which screened cases prior to a major change in Court procedures that occurred in 1994. Included are two cases from **Greece**, both of which involved Jehovah's Witnesses:

Pentidis et al. v. Greece

Filed 12/30/1993 and referred to the Court 4/17/1996, with settlement reached on 6/9/1997 allowing Witnesses to assemble and establish a house of prayer.

Tsavachidis v. Greece

Filed 9/20/1995 and referred to the Court 12/15/1997, with settlement reached 1/21/1999 disallowing secret surveillance of Witnesses by police in Greece.

Bulgaria is another country that has been brought to the ECHR by the Witnesses, with the settlement of two cases leading to rather dramatic changes in how that country handles minority faiths. This represents a successful effort to use the Court to effect changes in a former Communist Country, which makes the cases notable. The cases brought to the Court that were settled, after admissibility was granted include:

Jehovah's Witnesses v. Bulgaria

Filed 9/21/1995 and admissibility granted under Articles 6-1 and 13 on 7/3/1997, with a settlement reached on 3/9/1998 allowing registration of a Witness congregation.

Stefanov v. Bulgaria

Filed 7/5/1996 and admissibility to the Court granted under Article 9, with a settlement on 5/3/2001 that guaranteed right to alternative service and that the length not exceed the military service requirement.

6. Selected Recent Submissions: What Will They Reveal?

A number of cases involving allegations of Article 9 (sometimes in conjunction with other articles) are pending with the Court, and what happens in these cases will demonstrate whether the Court will continue to build on its growing record of asserting itself in the area of religious freedom. I do not have a full count of all such cases, but do have a listing of cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses, the most active religious group before the Court, as well as a few other recent submissions.

Currently the Witnesses have cases pending from the following countries:

Bulgaria: Two cases, one concerning deportation of missionaries and the other concerning refusal to allow the Witnesses to legally register locally. A question arises in these and other cases from former Soviet states as to whether the Witness cases from Former Communist States will be treated as Witness cases elsewhere, especially Greece.

Austria: three cases, all dealing with refusal of government to register the Witnesses, and consequences of that in terms of qualifying under the conscientious objector status, and being allowed to meet and function as a religion.

Romania: three cases, including two involving refusal to register the Witnesses, one of which also involves failure to grant c.o. status because of the lack of registration; another case alleges an unfair trial in a case where the

Witnesses were beaten by a mob but were themselves found guilty of hitting and insulting members of the anti-cult group that was attacking them.

France: One child custody case in which authorities took a child from a Witness mother because of the "...harsh, intolerant rules for child-rearing imposed on the children by members of the Jehovah's Witnesses."

Georgia: Three cases, two of which involve the well-publicized ongoing violence against Witnesses in Georgia which apparently has official sanction as demonstrated by refusal of authorities to intervene; another deals with lack of ability to legally register Witness local congregations.

Russia: Two cases, one involving the well-publicized effort of the Moscow prosecutor to dissolve the Jehovah's Witness organisation there, in a case that has lasted for years, and another involving the shutting down of a congregation of deaf Witnesses in Chelyabinski. Claims of prosecutorial abuse, unfair trials, and denial of remedies are involved in these cases.

There are also at least two other non-Witness cases pending from **Russia**, one involving a **Unification Church** affiliated group and the other involving **Scientology**. The UC case comes from St. Petersburg where the UC affiliated organisation Collegiate Association for the research of the Principle (CARP) was liquidated by governmental fiat, leading to a protracted legal battle that CARP eventually lost. CARP was duly registered as a legal association in 1991, but was required by a 1995 law to reregister. However, authorities refused to allow this to occur and then dissolved the group because they were not properly registered. The submission claims violations of articles 6, 10, 11, and 14, with the major focus being on Article 11.

The Scientology case also concerns problem with registration, and claims violations of articles 9, 10, 11, and 14. The 1997 law on religious freedom requires all religious groups to register, but disallows registration unless a group has been recognized in the country at least for 15 years. The Scientology group in Surgut City was organized in 1992, and the government has refused applications to register the group, causing considerable difficulty for the group, which as a result has no legal status or standing.

7. Recent Dismissals of Cases Involving France

There have been two recent major cases filed by the Jehovah's Witnesses in France, both of which have been denied admissibility. One case, *Tavernier et al. v. France*, filed 12/3/1998, sought to establish that an anti-cult group,

UNADFI, did not have legal status to take actions against the Witnesses. The case was denied admissibility on 12/14/1999 on the grounds that the Witnesses could not demonstrate that they were victims under the Convention. Similar logic was used by the Court to dismiss another compliant, *Christian Federation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. France*, filed 12/10/1999, but dismissed 11/6/2001, again because the Court said that the Witnesses did not meet the definition of a victim. This application was replete with many instances of harm that individual Witnesses and Witness organisations had encountered because of official governmental reports and actions in France. Violations of Article 13 (guarantee of an official remedy) in conjunction with 9, Article 6-1 (guarantee of fair trial), and Article 9 by itself.

8. Conclusions: A Double Standard of Justice?

This research has raised an important question why the current pattern of case law has developed with the ECHR, which started (finally) in 1993, finding for the plaintiff(s) in some Article 9 cases. But, as noted herein, there is something odd about these more recent cases, namely, most of them involve Jehovah's Witnesses and most of the cases come from Greece (including some non-Witness cases) and former Soviet Union countries. The one successful case from Spain, *Riera Blume*, is the only exception to this pattern of Article 9 successes. And, it is worth noting that the two recent cases discussed seem contrary to the post-*Kokkinakis* posture, *Otto-Preminger* and *Wingrove*, were from long-term Council of Europe countries, Austria and the U.K. And, the cases that were brought against France by the Witnesses, which look somewhat similar to those brought against Bulgaria, were dismissed using some quite strained logic that does not comport well with what has happened in the Bulgarian cases, where the Court seem to be looking for ways to force change in Former Communist States, as they are integrated into the "New Europe."

It is possible that the theoretical perspective of Boyle and Thompson (2001) might explain some of what is going on, with their emphasis on the paradoxical finding that nations with more open political systems may have the most claims filed in international tribunals such as the European Commission on Human Rights. However, the Boyle and Thompson theorizing seems to leave considerable "unexplained variance" when looking at the ECHR record of the past 10 years. Some other variable(s) may be operating that will assist us in understanding the recent pattern of ECHR cases.

It does seem that the "margin of appreciation" generally afforded Member States by the ECHR is weakening, but in an interesting way. There still seems to be considerable deference shown to dominant and original members of the Council of Europe, but Greece seems to be being used as an example for other newer states, particularly those from the former Soviet Union. In short, it does not seem an accident that Article 9 started seeing some action (after 40 years of no violations found by the Court) right after the Soviet Union collapsed, and a number of former Soviet Union countries began seeking for membership in the Council of Europe. And, it does not seem an accident that Greece, which admittedly does have some egregious laws and practices concerning religion (especially toward the Witnesses), became the "poster child" for this new activism.

The ECHR is, through its current approach, able to extend its authority with former Soviet states but in a way that does not upset the traditional deference shown over the years to original Member States. The ECHR can continue to disallow most claims being made by traditional Member States, while at the same time rightfully claim to be expanding freedoms of religion and belief in areas of the world where such values seem sorely needed.

An alternative to this line of reasoning is obvious, of course. Some would argue that Greece and some former Soviet Union states have had or recently enacted quite punitive laws that do not affirm religious pluralism to the same extent as the legal structures in older Western European democracies do. Therefore, the ECHR should be making decisions that force these new members of the Council of Europe to become more like those Western European democracies. This argument, while appealing, does not seem to address the very punitive actions and laws passed in countries such as France and Austria, however. Thus, there does seem to be some other considerations operating in the recent pattern of decision involving Article 9 and related articles, leading to a possible "double standard" interpretation of recent ECHR cases.

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DEFINING RELIGION IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

1. Religion in (post)modern societies

Religion is man's specific creation.¹ As with many of man's activities, religion is changing along with other changes within society. Thus, it would be hard to claim that religion is disappearing from modern or post-modern society. What we are witnessing in western societies are merely new ways of expressing religiosity, which are the consequences of changes within these societies. Religion in these societies has been restructuring and repositioning in the last few decades. Higher degrees of education, increased geographical and social mobility and the exposure to the media of mass communication make control, which religious institutions have over the use of religious symbols, difficult or even impossible. In this kind of a situation religion can often become subject to larger social controversies, since it becomes less predictable.

Religion is suddenly no longer taken for granted, nor is it defined by the dominating traditional religion of its environment. An important argument for this kind of understanding can be found in the continuous growth of new religious movements (NRM), which are the products of people's normal cultural activities. The substance and structure of these movements mirror the state of the western societies at the beginning of the century. To a great extent

¹ The idea of religion as a social construct which appeared already in the ancient Greece – Ksenofanes (about 580-480 B.C.) – is supposed to be the first to conclude that man creates god according to his own image. The sophists and some other philosophers before Socrates (e.g. Democritus, Anaxagoras ...) came to similar conclusions. Related to these is the comprehension of gods known in the ancient Rome (Lucretius, Gaius Petronius), which ends in the 4th c. with the victorious appearance of Christianity. Only later in the times of Renaissance and Reformation the hermeneutics of doubt again prevail in the comprehension of religion (Smrke, 2000: 21-23). In the modern comprehension of religion, at least since the German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach, religion is considered to be man's formation (man is the one who creates god or gods according to his own image and not the other way around).

this state is defined by an inevitable variety and an exceptional diversity of the worldviews. In the social situation, when NRMs are becoming *global cultures* (Hexam and Poewe: 1997), which “travel the world and take on local colour, /.../ and have both a global, or metacultural, and a local, or a situationally distinct, cultural dimension” (ibid: 41), religious activities are being defined mainly by the principle of choice. Each individual decides about his or her religious choice, similar to any other activity, according to its rewards and costs, as Rodney Stark and William S. Bainbridge (1987) explain in their comprehensive theory of religion as a *rational choice*.

This situation has added an additional dimension in the post-socialistic countries of Central and Eastern Europe where, after the fall of the Berlin wall, the established churches often try to attain the dominant position which they occupied before the climb of communism and socialism. This situation reopens a spiritual arena, which is interesting for NRMs (mainly those from the USA and Western Europe, as well as a small number of the newer ones, being more or less original and unique).²

The ways of defining religion, under social conditions, which are significantly influenced by the deinstitutionalisation of religion and more or less massive appearance of new, more individualistic forms of religion³ (for example New Age), need to be carefully reconsidered, since it is the administrative and legal defining (setting of the conditions on which an organisation is allowed to acquire the status of a religion and thus become entitled to tax benefits, the presence in school programmes, access to public media, etc.) of religion which is becoming more and more connected to serious problems.

Let me illustrate this with concrete example from Slovenia. In spring 2003 the Hindu and Buddhist religious communities convened a press conference in Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia, where they revealed to the public their problems regarding the registration of their activities. Namely, religious communities in Slovenia have to register their activities at a competent governmental office and thus acquire the status of a legal entity. Since 1976, when the Law on legal status of religious communities was released, this office registered 31

² For the analysis of the social status of NRMs and their relationship with the mainstream churches of Central and Eastern Europe, see Barker, 1997.

³ In order to include in the studies also religious phenomena outside the dominating established religions and churches, researchers of religion formed new expressions, such as for example “invisible religion” (Luckmann, 1967). Several different expressions, e.g. *bricolage*, *mix-and-match*, *do-it-yourself religion*, *religion à la carte* etc., have been used to describe modern religiosity.

religious communities, the last one in 1999. The Hindu and Buddhist representatives, however, draw attention to the (in)activity of the agency since there was no response from the office for several months after the application for registration was made. These facts triggered a reaction from the ombudsman's office, they became a prey to the media and were internationalised by the Forum 18, the Oslo based human rights organisation.⁴ Thus, it was gradually revealed that around ten religious communities made a registration application in the past three years but the Office for religious communities simply did not deal with them. The head of the office, who has been performing this function since the middle of the year 2000, alleged the main argument for such (in)activity to be the fact that the concept of religion has not been legally defined. According to his interpretation (as stated in the leading national daily newspaper),⁵ he was not able to register new religious communities since the criteria, according to which he could judge whether a certain group, which wishes to register as a religious community is really a religion, had not been legally defined.

On account of the pressure of the above mentioned organisations and the public, the office registered three new religious communities in August 2003: fifteen months after applying for registration the Calvary Chapel Protestant church became the first new religious community to be registered in Slovenia since 1999; soon afterwards the office registered the Dharmaling Buddhist community (after seven months), and the Hindu community which has been waiting for registration for seventeen months. The office has declined to identify about seven more religious communities who were believed to be waiting for registration.

Although a sort of unofficial moratorium on registration of new religious communities, which governed since 2000, seems to be over, the above presented events in Slovenia⁶ open up a range of interesting questions which are important for the field of academic research of religions as well as religious life in practice. They place focal attention on the principal question of how different social actors define religion.

⁴ Named after Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states: "Every person has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes the freedom to change religion or belief, and the freedom to express – either singly or together with others, and either publicly or privately – one's religion or faith through teaching, practice, worship and ritual."

⁵ 'Delo', 14.6.2003.

⁶ For a more detailed report on the Slovene situation, see Črnič and Lesjak, 2003.

Different social actors of defining religion Officially recognised status of religion in the majority of legal systems ensures certain legal protection, several tax benefits, access to the public media, etc. Consequently, religion becomes a “cultural good” being fought for by various interest groups. It becomes a claim for certain groups to attain the social status and the benefits ensured by the status of religion (Introvigne, 1999).

The defining of religion is thus not solely a task for scholars (as we can see from Slovene case). Definitions can have very concrete and serious practical consequences for individuals and various groups, as well as institutions. Namely, under certain conditions definitions become politically significant in the sense that they influence the relations of power. For that reason, definitions cannot be characterised as being merely theoretical. They can decisively influence the role, significance and borders of religion in public, social life. (Beckford, 1999)

Definitions are not used (and constructed) exclusively by scholars but also by several different actors in the social arena. They may be used by politicians when defining the role of religion in society (e.g. in school system and other public institutions). The legal system may use them when deciding who is entitled to have the status of religion. Definitions are also used by established churches in order to strengthen their position in society and to express their position towards competitive religions. NRMs make use of these definitions when they strive to attain the legal status of a religion, which then makes their social activities and certain benefits⁷ connected with the status possible.

Different parties show varying tendencies when defining religion. Social scientists generally use broader definitions in order to embrace as many religious phenomena as possible into the analysis. On the other hand politicians and the legal system, under conditions of increased competition among different religious entities, often narrow this definition (politicians sometimes do it by using the criteria of authenticity and genuineness). The interpretation used

⁷ It should be mentioned that certain groups and organisations refuse the status of religion since its legal restrictions make certain activities, such as activities in schools, impossible. Thus, for example, Transcendental meditation of the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi (unsuccessfully) tried to prove in the New Jersey Court that it is not a religious organisation but merely a meditative technique and as such it should be allowed to be taught in public schools. Also Brahma Kumaris and Ananda Marga (see Barker, 1989: 146) are avoiding the term “religion”. Similarly, primary schools in Slovakia had to give up the attempt to start introducing yoga in the school year 2000/2001 – first as part of physical education, later as an optional subject – after loud protests of the Roman Catholic and Evangelical churches, and also some parents; the main argument being that the Swami Maheshvarananda’s international association Yoga in Everyday Life is a case of a foreign hindu religious activity.

by politicians and the legal system often comes close to the popular understanding of religion, which is distinctly culturally conditioned and as such normally not inclined to the new ways of expressing religiosity. It usually defines religion with the terminology of the established mainstream religions (such as Christianity in all its different forms in the West), which are thus in a privileged position towards all other religious forms. A similar interpretation of religion is used by the mainstream churches.

Accordingly, we can clearly distinguish between (1) the scholarly definitions, being constructed and used by social scientists, and (2) the institutional definitions of religion, which are formulated and used by various political bodies, courts, etc. (and are commonly influenced by the popular notions of religion).

2. The approaches of social science to defining religion

The basic guidelines followed by social science, in the theoretical defining of religion, seeks to create a definition which encompasses a wide circle of religious forms, and excludes those phenomena which have some characteristics of a religion, but could not be considered as one. The theoretical defining of religion roughly distinguishes between the two basic approaches: (1) **substantial definitions** which try to define what religion is, and to determine which elements distinguish religious categories from non-religious ones and (2) **functional definitions** which define religion according to the function it has for an individual and society.

2.1. Substantial definitions

The substantial definitions of religion are more specific than the functional ones and more explicit regarding the substance of religion. They are also narrower and typically exclusive, enabling a clearer distinction between religious and non-religious phenomena. The substantial definitions are based on the Western Christian view of the world and are therefore closer to the “common-sense” definitions of religion. Many non-Christian cultures have a radically different comprehension of religion. Therefore it is necessary to determine the basic ingredients of religion which, being general, should also be sought in non-Christian religions. For this reason, substantial definitions use an additional criterion – a special relationship of human beings towards the world of gods and supernatural, which is an awe-inspiring relationship and is expressed in sacrifice and worship.

However, this criterion does not solve all the problems. One familiar problem arises when dealing with the *theravada* Buddhism which does not

acknowledge the existence of god, but due to its overall comprehension and the directing of human life towards the “ultimate goal” and the breakout from the cycle of continuous rebirths and redemption in nirvana, it would be hard to abnegate their status of religion. A solution to this problem appeared with the introduction of the category of the sacred⁸ introduced by E. Durkheim within the frames of sociological tradition. It refers to an area which a group of believers determines as consecrated, as such distinguishes it from the profane, and protects it with certain ceremonies and rules (Durkheim, 1915:62). Durkheim comprehends religion as an attitude to all sacred things, which unite people into a moral community, the church.⁹

Part of each religion is a system of beliefs about the world, which determines man’s “ultimate concern”¹⁰ and the area of the sacred, which requires an awe-inspiring relationship and is protected by taboos. Religion usually offers answers to the central questions about the meaning of life, about cosmogony, and also consolation due to the suffering and inevitability of death. It bases and strengthens the fundamental “truths” with ritual practice, which mainly supports and sustains the existing social order, and at the same time unites individuals into a community. Rituals include religious festivals, the sacraments (births, marriages, funerals) and similar activities, which symbolically connect the spiritual and material world.

The substantial definitions are suitable for the studying of religion in relatively stable societies, however, problems can arise when analysing religious changes, since it is difficult (or impossible) to find a substantial definition which

⁸ Within phenomenology of religion the sacred was defined and substantiated by Rudolf Otto as “mysterium tremendum et fascinans” (Otto, 1993). The sacred (*numinous*) is a terrifying and at the same time fascinating field, something, which seizes you with horror and attracts you at the same time. The Romanian historian of religion Mircea Eliade comprehends sacred as something which is beyond our powers of comprehension.

⁹ In his book “The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life”, Durkheim gives a classical sociological definition of religion, and thus defines religion as “a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.” (Durkheim, 1915:47) If we neglect the term *church*, we get a definition, which is still useful and involves four main sociological components; religion consists of beliefs, practice – rituals, the sacred, and of a community or a social organisation of people, united by a religious tradition.

¹⁰ A liberal theologian Paul Tillich (1886-1965) comprehends religion as something which “concerns man as last”, which is his *ultimate concern*. Religion helps answer the ultimate questions of human life and thus gives meaning to the entire human life. That which “concerns man as last”, what is worth living and dying for, is their religion (regardless of the fact whether it contains conceptions such as god, soul, supernatural, etc.) (see Kerševan, 1995:20).

would be permanently valid in societies that are constantly and sometimes rapidly changing. The advantage of the substantial definitions is thus their specificity and therefore usefulness in the empirical studies of religion. However, due to their tight dependence on the historical and cultural environment, they are rather ineffective when studying religious changes and non-Christian religious forms (see McGuire, 1992:11-13). Consequently the substantial definitions are less applicable when studying NRMs.

2.2. Functional definitions

Religion, as seen by the functional and more inclusive approach,¹¹ is that which performs the function of religion. The two well-known functions of religion are the ones of integration and compensation. According to Durkheim's classical sociological definition, religion is a factor, which unites individuals into a community called a church. This is the function of integration, which, by means of its notions, values, rituals, symbols, etc., joins people into a spiritual-moral community. The sole etymological explanation of the word root *religiare* indicates the integrative function of religion. The function of compensation is by all means best illustrated by the Marx's denotation of religion as "the opium of the people", which "has the effect of opium with its images of the heavenly world and the divine kingdom, or of the real inner spiritual reality against an otherwise unbearable external material social reality" (Kerševan, 1995:21). Religion offers consolation for human suffering and the inevitability of death. At the same time, religion usually legitimates, justifies, and strengthens the existing social order – this is called the legitimising function of religion. Apart from the above mentioned, religion also brings meaning into man's activities and life in general – religion can be everything that gives meaning.¹²

¹¹ The substantial definitions are considered to be exclusive, and the functional ones inclusive, but that is not always the case. The category of the sacred can, for example, be the basis of the substantial exclusive comprehension of religion, but it can, on the other hand, "annexionistically" spread the area of religion on anything people consider sacred (the sacred being understood "functionalistically", as something which is the most valuable and the most important for a human being/the society) (Kerševan, 1998:83, 84).

¹² The understanding of religion as a meaning-giving activity in the functional defining of religion is based on Weber's and Simmel's work.

The functional definitions¹³ usually include the majority of the elements of the substantial definitions, but are normally more comprehensive. While certain phenomena, such as ideologies, nationalisms, even atheism, Marxism, etc., are not considered as religion by the substantial definitions, the extremes of the functional definitions allow for this kind of denotation. Certain secular rituals of modern societies, for example political campaigns, television commercials, rock concerts and the Olympic games, perform many functions, which Durkheim has already defined as religious. They promote social solidarity and help construct collective identity. Accordingly, even activities such as sports, art, music, sex, etc. can be the source of religious elements.

The main advantage of the functional definitions, if compared to the substantial ones, is their usefulness when studying the intercultural, trans-historical and changeable elements of religion. This same characteristic, however, makes them less applicable in empirical studies, which require clear quantifiable definitions. But nevertheless the functional definitions are more useful than substantial ones when studying the activity and context of NRMs.

2.3. Open definitions

Although we could claim, that in the religious pluralism of modern societies, the functional and more inclusive approach has proven to be more useful than the substantial (more exclusive) one, both approaches also show some obvious weaknesses. The prevailing tendency in social science is, for that reason, to use different “open” definitions which more or less derive from the works of the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. He introduced a thesis in his *Philosophical studies* (Wittgenstein, 1958), according to which social phenomena which carry a common name do not necessarily have a common basis, however they are connected by a complex net of “Family Resemblance”. Thus, for example, it is impossible to define the common basis of the games where family relations play the most important role. None of the resemblance (characteristics) is necessarily a component of an individual game. On the other hand, none of the games involve all characteristics of all games (see Smrke,

¹³ As an example of a functional inclusive definition of religion I quote Yinger’s definition, according to which religion is “a system of beliefs and practices by means of which a group of people struggles with the ultimate problems of human life”, (Yinger: 1970:12) and Geertz’s five-part definition: “A Religion is (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic” (Geertz, 1968:4).

2000:28, 29). Many authors applied this Wittgenstein's conclusion to religion and found out that it is not possible to determine the basis of religion or a certain common characteristic (or a combination of characteristics), which would be typical for all religions. A special characteristic of religion is the net of (family) characteristics/resemblance, but none of the individual religions includes all characteristics of religion (in general). It is also not necessary that a certain characteristic is included in each individual religion. "The inclusion or exclusion of certain phenomena is not carried out by the deduction on the grounds of the exact rules about the belonging (to a variety of phenomena with the name religion); they are carried out with the help of analogy, that is, on the basis of the judgement, whether a certain system of beliefs and practices in a given example includes a *sufficient* number of dimensions and specific characteristics" (Kerševan, 1998:84). Thus, some world religions have less and others more common (family) characteristics; religion itself is a "phenomenon with blurred margins" (Smrke, 2000:29).

The American philosopher Rem B. Edwards quotes some of the most typical family characteristics of religions: the belief in supernatural or superior beings; a complex view of the world which includes the explanation of the meaning of life; the belief in life after death; a certain moral codex sanctioned by (a) superior being(s); consideration of the question of evil; theodicy (the question of the meaning of suffering); prayers and ceremonies; sacred places and buildings; revealed truths; certain experience, such as awe and mysticism; deep intensive care for something; institutionalised social sharing of (some) characteristics listed, etc. (Edwards, 1972).¹⁴

The approach to defining religion that has been prevailing in modern social science is the unsubstantial, non-hegemonic and multidimensional one. "The purpose of sociology is not to find out (once and for all) what religion as such is, but to try to understand the logic which drives the transformations of the religious universe specifically through the social-historical manifestations" (Hervieu-Léger, 1999:84). The definition of religion is thus a dynamic concept dependent on several different contextual factors. As such, each definition should meet seven initial aims or criteria (Ferré, 1967:44-55):

¹⁴ English sociologist B. Wilson makes use of a similar approach to form a list of twenty most frequent characteristics of religion. In his detailed and extensive analysis, Wilson was able to apply the majority of his list (fifteen out of twenty items) to Scientology, which he then used as a basis to prove that Scientology should be granted the status of religion (Wilson, 1990:279-288).

1. A definition should cover a wide spectrum of religion, without narrowing down the area of study in advance.
2. The definition should not be too loose and indefinite, as it has to distinguish between religious and non-religious phenomena.
3. The thought that religion is relevant to the whole of a person's life should be left intact.
4. It should not bind to certain beliefs or cultural phenomena that are often connected with these beliefs (as for example the belief in God).
5. The question of a private or public religion needs to be left open – it should not be judged or even stated, whether a religion is fundamentally a private or a public phenomenon.
6. A definition should not judge a religion's truth or falsity in advance.
7. A definition should not judge whether a religion is harmful or beneficial in human life.¹⁵

These kind of value- and culture-neutral definitions also encompass the non-conventional religious forms and are thus very suitable for the investigation of the modern diverse and often extremely unclear religious situation.

3. Institutional defining of religion

The attempts to define the concept of religion are however, as already mentioned, not a task reserved for social scientists only. Although legal systems (constitutions and laws) of democratic countries commonly ensure freedom of religious activities, they do not include any specific definitions of religion. Despite this fact, state agencies (politics, judicature) often need to form at least some kind of definition of religion in order to be able to perform their duties. For that reason, courts often ask professionals (in this case social scientists) for their opinion in legal cases which deal with religion. However, the outcomes of such cases can be very different. Expert opinions¹⁶ are decisive only in some

¹⁵ A definition which abandons the understanding of religion as something *a priori* good and constructive, makes the abnegations to the religious status of many NRMs, which are considered deviant by breaking the law, impossible. Obeying the law cannot be the criterium according to which an activity of a certain group is considered religious or not (which certainly does not mean that laws don't apply to religious groups, since democratic societies demand this kind of obedience from all social organisations).

¹⁶ Naturally, not all social scientists define religion in the same way. While the majority of sociologists (but not all) use broad inclusive definitions and usually defend the rights of NRMs,

cases. Often institutional decisions are made on the ground of popular notions of religion, which are influenced by mass media and anticult groups.

An example of an institutional approach to defining religion can be illustrated by examining the criteria, according to which the American Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been determining entitlement to income tax relief of religious communities since 1978. An organisation which would like to gain the right to this particular tax relief in the USA has to comply with the following 14 conditions: a distinct legal existence; a recognised creed and form of worship; a definite and distinct ecclesiastical government; a formal code of doctrine and discipline; a distinct religious history; a membership not associated with any other church or denomination; an organisation of ordained ministers; ordained ministers selected after completing prescribed studies; a literature of its own; established places of worship; regular congregations; regular religious services; Sunday schools for religious instructions of the young; and schools for the preparation of its ministers (Introvigne, 1999:46).

In many countries religious groups are legally obliged to officially register their existence and activity. As a prerequisite these religious organisations have to fulfil certain legal conditions, which often involve a minimal number of devotees or a minimal time period for which the religion has to be present in a particular country. Consequently, the registration of many NRMs, which do not have a large number of devotees and/or have been active, by definitions of western societies, for a relatively short period of time, can be made extremely difficult if not impossible.

The institutional defining of religion thus often restricts activities of NRMs, but on the other hand it frequently guaranties and protects their rights. The controversial relationship of several institutions and the public towards the Church of Scientology¹⁷ is used here as an example. In 1993 the already mentioned IRS approved tax relief to all branches of the Church of Scientology in the USA. However, this happened only after 25 years of severe legal discussions and public arguments in which Scientology was denied the status of religion by arguments such as the absence of religious rituals and prayers, the charging for the services of the Church of Scientology, whose financial structure is supposed to be similar to the one of a multinational company, the membership of

some psychologists and psychiatrists, on the other hand, often use exclusive definitions of religion and several theories of mental manipulation or "brainwashing" when they appear in the court as witnesses against NRMs. More in Melton, 2001; see also Barker, 1997.

¹⁷ See Introvigne, 1999; also Melton, 2000.

Scientologists in other religious communities, supposed criminal acts of many Scientologists, etc. According to the opinions of several critics, the Church of Scientology is an organisation, which uses religion as a cover in order to follow mainly business goals. When Scientology was acknowledged the status of religion by the IRS (which thus considered the prevailing opinion of the scholars), a conflict between the American government and the Church of Scientology, which lasted several years, came to an end.¹⁸

Meaningful example of institutional approach towards defining religion is the decision of the Italian Supreme Court, with which it stated that Scientology is a genuine religion.¹⁹ According to its verdict

“the non-existence of a legal definition of religion in Italy (and elsewhere) is not coincidental. Any definition would rapidly become obsolete and would, in fact, limit religious liberty. It is much better (according to the Italian Supreme Court) not to limit with a definition, always by its very nature restrictive, the broader field of religious liberty. Religion is an ever-evolving concept, and courts may only interpret it within the framework of a specific historical and geographical context, taking into account the opinions of the scholars.” (Introvigne, 1999:65)

¹⁸ Similarly Scientologists faced some extremely intolerant public reactions in Germany. Many members of the government publicly condemned Scientology, the youth organisation of the Christian Democratic Union imposed a boycott on the films featuring Tom Cruise and John Travolta, who are the members of the Church of Scientology. This anti-scientological mood reached its peak in 1997 when government decreed official surveillance of the Church of Scientology. However, courts did not always act in accordance with this kind of public atmosphere. A series of important court cases ended in favor of Scientologists. In 1986 the religious status of the local Scientology organisation was rescinded by the Municipality of Stuttgart. Scientologists sued the Municipality, the Jurisdictional Court in Stuttgart passed judgement in favor of the Municipality, but the Court of Appeal in Mannheim invalidated this judgement in November 1997 and returned the status of religion to the Scientologists (for a detailed report on the position of the NRMs in Germany see Schoen, 2001).

¹⁹ In Italy, where the relationship of society towards non-traditional religions is less hostile, a whole series of court procedures related to the religious status of Scientology took place in the 1990s. In January 1997 the Court of Appeal in Rome decided against a judgement rendered by the Court of First Instance with the decision that the charging for the services is not in contradiction with the religious mission of Scientology and thus does not influence the religious status of the Church of Scientology. Similarly the court in Turin in March 1993 closed a 10-year-long procedure with the conclusion that Scientology is a genuine religion and consequently passed an acquittal sentence to 21 Italian Scientologists charged with tax evasion. The Court of Appeal in Milan came to a different conclusion in 1993 and 1996, proclaiming that Scientology is not a religion. But eventually both verdicts were rejected by the Italian Supreme Court in October 1997 (for a more detailed report on the Italian situation concerning NRMs, see Introvigne, 2001).

As distinguished from the legislation (and also the practice in courts) of the majority of the Western democratic societies, which normally protect religious freedom and consequently the rights of NRMs, several reports of certain parliamentary, governmental and other administrative bodies usually are distinctively negative. Cases of such reports,²⁰ which use theories “imported” from the USA on brainwashing,²¹ mental manipulation and mind control of NRMs to abnegate the status of a “genuine” religion, can lately be traced in France (Assemblée Nationale, 1996 and 1999; Observatoire Interministériel sur les Sectes, 1998; Mission Interministérielle de Lutte contre les Sectes – MILS, 2000), Belgium (Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, 1999), and Switzerland (Audit sur les dérives sectaires, 1997; Commission pénale pour les dérives sectaires, 1999). In France, where relationship of the public towards NRMs appears to be very intolerant, a severe “anticult” law was passed on 31st May 2001 on the grounds of the above mentioned reports. The main goal of this anticult law is to “strengthen the attempts to prevent and prohibit the cult movements which threaten human rights and fundamental freedoms”.²²

4. Conclusion

As we have shown, definitions of religion are not employed exclusively by scholars, but also by a wider public, politics, the legal system, and various religious communities. In (post)modern pluralist societies there is a need to form a concept of religion which will serve the cognitive needs (in academic research) as well as the broader social (political) needs. The concept of religion, however, always depends on the broader context and the specific goals of the person constructing it. As opposed to the expert definitions of religion (formed by social science), which are normally open and include also new, non-traditional forms of religiosity, popular definitions are, on the other hand, considerably narrow and allow only slight deviations from the dominating Christian forms of religion. Institutional definitions usually aim at the middle ground between the expert and the popular definitions.

Thus in practice social definitions of the term religion are often connected with conflicts. This is evident also from the Slovene case described at the

²⁰ For a comprehensive overview of the European parliamentary and administrative reports see Richardson and Introvigne, 2001.

²¹ For a more detailed analysis of the brainwashing theory, see Melton, 2001; see also Lesjak, 2001.

²² For a more exhaustive description of the situation of NRMs in France, see Hervieu-Léger, 2001.

beginning. In certain countries – particularly the post-socialistic ones – religious organisations have to register with a competent state agency. “Not being registered might mean that religious body is unable to hire a hall for meetings, or even to use its own premises for acts of worship; it may even mean that it cannot function as a religious organisation in some societies” (Barker, 1997:58). If a certain group wishes to acquire the legal status of religion, it has to be first recognised by the state – which usually means that it also has to correspond (at least to a certain degree) with the concept of religion as accepted by society.

In modern pluralist societies these requirements are, however, not always easy to meet. This applies particularly to many states of Central and Eastern Europe which legally (and formally) regulate the field of religious activities after the change of the political system. In these societies it is possible to detect clearly articulated and well led attempts of traditional churches to acquire the dominant social status which would be comparable with the one they had before the Second World War. On the other hand, these societies are exposed to invasion of different NRMs which enter this re-opened spiritual area. Both processes lead to the formation of different and often contradictory notions of religion. In practice, however, the social status of religion is most frequently based on traditional notions which are better suited to the established churches and often push new religious groups to the margins since these are usually associated with negative stereotypes.

After 1978, when 913 members of the People’s Temple in Guyana (under the leadership of Jim Jones) tragically died, the American public became extremely suspicious and occasionally even hostile towards “cults”. A similar anticult mood was actuated in Europe by a series of 74 ritual suicides of the Solar Temple in France, Switzerland and Canada between 1994 and 1997. In many countries (USA, France, Germany, etc.) a stereotype appeared in the public perception of NRMs, according to which NRMs were seen as socially destructive and deviant organisations which, due to several illegal activities and “deceitful” techniques of membership recruitment (such as brainwashing, mental manipulation, mind control, etc.), were not considered to be “genuine” religions, but criminal associations whose motives were more financial than religious. As public activities of the anticult movements increased, a certain fear of “cults” prevailed in public mind. This fear can be traced, through its principal characteristics, to a process which sociology defines as *moral panic*.

This public image of NRMs is, however, not confirmed by either the theory of social science or legal practice. On the contrary, a whole range of empirical

research disproved the credibility of the brainwashing theory and similar theories of mental manipulation. On the other hand, a series of court procedures ended with the ascertainment that the majority of NRMs are engaged in legitimate religious activities. Although many NRMs, which appeared in modern Western societies mainly in the second half of the 20th century, practice a different type of religiosity from the one of the established Christian churches, they are engaged in legitimate religious activities.

The substantial approach, which defines religion according to its authenticity and genuineness, is for this reason becoming distinctly problematic in modern, religiously pluralist societies. Open definitions are therefore far more suitable in the described situation. They enable a better understanding of modern religious problems on the grounds of family resemblance within religion. These kinds of open approaches are the ones that enable the analysis and understanding of the modern dynamic religious forms. Religion is an extremely complex and diverse phenomenon, which needs to be studied from several different angles (and consequently within various academic disciplines). In this way, it is possible to develop a wide spectrum of several different legitimate definitions of religion. However, the demands for a universally valid definition of religion for all times and cultures are unrealistic.

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**THE STANDPOINT OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
CHURCH IN POLAND AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC
TOWARDS EUROPE, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS**

1. Introduction

The structural changes of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the fall of the “Iron Curtain” and a real opening of these countries, which until recently were isolated from “Imperialistic societies” and the influence of the West, have involved progressive liberalisation in all domains of social and political life. The transformation of the system has had its expressions not only on the economic level or in domestic policy. One consequence of the system changes was a redefining of relations between the postcommunist countries and the countries of the European Communities (hereafter the European Union). The Communities made an agreement about the economic cooperation with Poland in 1989, and with Czechoslovakia in 1990. Next, the “Europe Agreements” (concerning the affiliation of, among other things, Poland and the Czech Republic with the European Communities) were concluded in Brussels, and became valid on 1st of January 1994 in Poland, and in the Czech Republic on 1st of January 1995.

Due to the process of integration the Catholic Church in both countries has had to take a stand. The Holy See has tried not only to observe these processes, but also to engage in it, founding special institutions. The Popes of the period – Pius XII, John XXIII, Paul VI, and John Paul II have all declared support to the European integration.

Local Catholic Churches, both in Poland and the Czech Republic, have been the actors in the social and cultural transformation at the turn of 80/90s. Obviously the role of the Roman Catholic Church in the Czech Republic is less important in society than the role of the Church in Poland, and its assessment of

Europe or the European Union has less importance for Czech society as a whole than the standpoint of the Church in Poland. Czech society is very secularist, and the Church is not very active in the political or social sphere and it even fears to step into social life – literally – because as Czech bishop Liška said “priests do not put cassocks on going out, in order to escape the risk of mockery”. The Church in Poland is dominant, and Polish society, which is about 90 % Catholic, keeps *sui generis* “monopoly of belief”. The Church in Poland, despite secularisation or pluralisation of culture and religion in Poland, has still a high social authority, and a strong influence on moulding public opinion.

What I should emphasize at the beginning of this article is that the identification of the European Union with Europe is not justified, however this happens often, in statements by Church leaders. The European Union is an economic and political organisation, and firmly emphasizes its neutrality in its outlook, which was expressed in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 and the Nice Treaty of 2000. However the Church, especially the Church in Poland when assessing the possible results of membership in the European Union (threats/costs or profits), takes the moral condition of Europe into consideration – including the European normative sphere (for example processes and phenomena such as postmodernism, secularisation, or pluralism)¹.

The issue of the standpoint of the Churches towards Europe and the integration process is multidimensional. It includes the estimation of Europe (understood as the social and cultural sphere), the stance towards the integration process and the stance towards the European Union, that is the structure which is emerging inside Europe as a result of this process. In this article² I would like to present the standpoints of the both Churches towards the following aspects, which constitute a broadly-comprehended “European problem”. I mean:

¹ Obviously we can suppose that the integration with European structures will have results not only in the economic, political or military community. Thanks to the Union’s basic rights such as free flow of the services, free flow of persons or better possibility of communication, cultural phenomena and processes that are more typical for Western Europe could diffuse more easily in the Eastern societies. However we should take into consideration that membership in the Union structures is not a necessary condition for development of the cultural trends that are typical for Western societies.

² The method of my research was content analysis. I have analyzed the following materials: in the case of Church in Poland – two Catholic papers “Niedziela” and “Gość Niedzielny” from 1990, 1995, 1999, 2000; next the documents which have been located on the Catholic page www.opoka.org.pl, and the texts that I have found in book form. In the case of the Church in the Czech Republic the sources have been: “Katolický Tydeník” (from 1990, 1995, 1999, 2000) and next the documents which have been published on page of the Episcopate www.cirkev.cz, and publications in book form. The unit of content analysis was the whole article.

- the assessment of Europe (understood as the social and cultural sphere)
- the standpoint towards the integration (that is towards the process, which has been initiated after the World War II)
- the standpoint towards the European Union, that is the structure which is emerging inside Europe as a result of this process.

2. The Standpoint of The Roman Catholic Church in Poland Towards Europe, the European Union and the Integration Process

At the threshold of the 1990s the Roman Catholic Church in Poland made few statements about Europe and the changes inside it. But amid this not very large number of clerical voices (at the beginning of the 1990), pro-European views were predominant. For example in 1990 Fr. Andrzej Madej OP (Madej, 1990) wrote: “to return to Europe it’s to go to the sources of water in order to renew the Christian bath, (...) it’s to learn to speak ‘The Lord’s Prayer’ together with those, who were our enemies; to return to Europe it is to return to home from a faraway land”.

It seems that Europe was not understood in the 1990s as a political structure which was forming or an organisation of European countries, but as the symbol and idea of freedom and it has functioned in consciousness as “the Promised Land”. The integration process had to bring a radical change in Poland’s³ situation.

However a year later, when the “Europe Agreement” had been made, very negative statements on assessing Europe and its changes started to appear on a large scale. The clergy charged Europe with eradicating Christianity or with ethical weakness. They criticized European consumerism while integration was called a primitive universalism (Koprowski, 1991). I call this period in the Church’s views in Poland the Eurosceptic phase (1991-1997).

In 1995 Primate of Poland Jozef Glemp⁴ called Europe “imagined” and he asked: “should we enter Europe (...) with legal abortion, with the violation of

³ We should emphasize that there is a conviction that the Roman Catholic Church in Poland has taken the position of Euroscepticism from the beginning of transformation (1989), and it has criticized (in the negative sense) the European order. In fact, analyzing the statements from 1991, we have to confirm this thesis. But we should not omit the short-lived enthusiasm which has appeared in 1990.

⁴ I would like to remind the following statement of Glemp from the sermon from Bright Mountain in VIII 1995. He has warned of the European Union’s attack on Poland on three fronts: biological and economic, by depleting the common property and the base of maternity; moral – by the

Christian principles, with disrespect of marriage, or the family if these conditions do not nurture our independence, our identity? (from: Pieronek, 2000). I would like to stress that this statement is recognized as the first official declaration of the Polish Church's stance towards the European integration process.

The turning point in the standpoint of the clergy was 1997, when the Polish Episcopate paid an official visit to the European Commission in Brussels. Following conversations with Union officials, the Church supported the integration process and the future membership of Poland in the European Union officially. But what is interesting, Archbishop Tadeusz Gocłowski said "one ought to say, that the Church in Poland has never had reservations about the entry of Poland into the Union structures" (Gocłowski 1999). This support (as it turned out) was not unconditional. The Church said "Yes" to integration, but on the condition of the simultaneous re-evangelisation of Europe. What is the standpoint of the Church in Poland towards Europe and the European Union? I would like to answer to this question presenting the results of analysis of documents of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland from years 1990-2000.

2.1. Analysis: The Standpoint of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland

During my research I have distinguished the following categories showing the standpoint of Roman Catholic Church in Poland (further "the Church") towards the European integration process. I will present the results of research and I will answer to the following questions:

1. How does the Roman Catholic Church in Poland evaluate the Europe?
2. How is the European integration conceived by the Church?
3. What is the assessment of the European Union in view of the related threats and chances ?

2.1.1. Church in Poland towards Europe. "Two Europes"

From the analysis of statements of the Church I have gained the impression that in the consciousness of the clergy two quite different "Europes" have appeared: "Christian Europe", and the second, "pagan one" (in an ethical crisis). References designated to pagan Europe take up much more space than qualifications about the Christian one.

introduction of sexual education, by popularisation of the contraception and diffusing of the false understanding of family and feminism. The last front had religious dimension – the attack on the Church by anti-clerical propaganda.

2.1.1.1. Europe 1 – Christian Europe

As indicators of the existence of Christian Europe I have recognized the formulas, in which there was unequivocal reference to this concept. For example, certain metaphors appear very frequently like the: “Christian roots of Europe”. They are often associated with the verbs: “to return”, “to come back”, “discover anew”, “refer to..” and the noun “return”. For example: “the return to the roots of Christianity” (Nycz, 2000). “Europe has its roots in Christianity” (Kamiński, 2000). These verbs appearing near this metaphor are an indication that it speaks of a past Christian Europe, which this second (pagan) Europe should appeal to.

Christianity is considered as something which shaped Europe: “the spiritual face of Europe has been shaped by the influence of Christianity”. (Życiński, 1999b). And next: “leaving behind Europeans (...) through a negation of Christian values” (Pieronek, 1999). This vision of Europe can be seen in the statements of clergy from the beginning of the 1990s.

2.1.1.2. Europe 2 – Pagan Europe

In my analysis I considered as indicators of the existence of a second Europe: the key word “needs”, appears 13 times in different statements, as so does the metaphor of “organism”. These notions have been used to describe the phenomena and processes of Europe.

Europe needs

As an indicator of the second Europe, the occurrence of the expression “Europe needs” has been noticed very often in the documents. “Europe needs” so: “Christian inspiration” (Życiński, 1999b), “the experience of life with the Gospel” (Kamiński, 2000), a “brave theological vision” (Życiński, 1999b), “values” (Chrapek, 2000), “Spirit” (Zimoň, 1999), “new Samaritans” (Życiński, 2000a). These expressions show generally the incomplete value of today’s Europe, because it is devoid of something crucial which is considered to be one of the constitutive elements of European culture – Christianity.

The illness of Europe – that is the metaphor of organism

The metaphor of organism (Wolińska) is a term, which gives the characteristics of organism for social phenomena enabling to consider some qualities as natural and good (life, health, height, soil, fruits), and others, strange to nature, as bad (bureaucracy, administration). But also in this organic vision we can show characteristics which speak of degeneracy (deteriorating, decaying, paralysis, illness).

I will describe the “illness of” Europe (Życiński, 1999b): “Europe is ill” (Życiński, 1999b, 1999c, 2000a), It has “lost its memory” (Kamiński, 2000), It “has amnesia” (Macharski, 1999), “the memory of Europe is very deformed” (Zięba, 1999), “the illness of the soul of Europe” (Kaczmarek, 2000), “Europe lost its vitality, or lost the instinct for self-preservation” (Kopiec, 2000), “Europe is wounded” (Chrapek, 2000). Sometimes statements refer to the “tiredness of Europe” (Macharski, 1999); but sometimes it is in “critical condition” (Tkocz, 2000). “Europe is dying (...) maybe this disease is curable but maybe it is the final collapse” (Michalik, 1999).

-isations and – isms in Europe

In the next part of my analysis I have discerned keywords, which I consider as indicators of the moral condition of European culture. They are: dechristianisation, postmodernism, relativism, liberalism, consumerism, secularisation. Due to lack of space this article will not present a detailed analysis for each of the phenomena. I will show just the fact, that these “keywords” appear in statements of the clergy from the beginning of Euroscepticism to 2000 (to the last documents analyzed as part of research) and they are all negative in character.

2.1.2. European integration in the statements of the Roman Catholic clergy in Poland

In the next part of the analysis I have tried to answer the question: what is the Church’s conception of the European integration process. I have discerned two main categories: “true/authentic integration” and “false integration”.

2.1.2.1. True / authentic European integration

This aspect started to appear in the statements of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland after the visit of the Episcopacy in Brussels. From the period of Euroscepticism (that is from 1991), we cannot find any words about possible or impossible manner of European integration, because everything connected with the EU was constantly criticized by the clergy. I will indicate the statements about the *real integration*: “full unity” (Kaczmarek, 2000), “true integration of the nations of Europe” (Śmigielski) or “durable foundation of unity” (Życiński). We can suppose if there is an authentic integration based on durable foundations, there also exists some kind of false integration. For example: “we should not delude ourselves that Europe can be integrated by the bureaucrats”, “the bureaucrats which come from Brussels are concentrated on the social-technology, technological progress and the quantitative indicators, and that is why, they are

not able to create a realistic picture of Europe, without appealing to the spiritual and cultural institutions” (Tkocz). What were these spiritual and cultural institutions? In these expressions the clergy indicates, we can say, the “unnatural” characteristics of the bureaucrats. It is worth noting that imputing some mechanical features for some social phenomena, are the indicators of their negative nature. The characteristics compatible with the nature’s rights have positive connotation (Wolińska). The notions: *social-technology* or *quantitative indicators* did not bring positive associations, particularly if they contrasted with the *spiritual and cultural institutions*. And similarly: “the increase of production is not a factor leading to unity” (Warzybok), “the integration process cannot be understood in the categories of economy or policy only” (Kamiński) or “if the integration ought to be permanent and fruitful, it cannot be reduced to the political and economic aspects” (Pieronek).

2.1.2.2. *Integration false/unreal?*

What should integration look like according to the Church in Poland? What was the foundation of the authentic integration process? In 1990 appeared the statement: “all Europe begins to integrate referring to the Christian roots” (Zimoń). The clergy talked and wrote about the modern integration based on Christianity.

Pressure on the necessity to make integration more spiritual appeared particularly in the years 1999-2000. In the period of Euroscepticism some possibility of modification of the integration process was not mentioned.

European integration had to be based “on the permanent foundation of unity” (Życiński) or on “the foundation of values corresponding with human nature and constituting the identity of the old continent” (Pieronek). What is this *permanent foundation of unity*? Which values correspond *with human nature*? The identity of Europe was also shaped by the values of the of Enlightenment. Possibly the clergy means the Christian axiology. But what should realisation of the integration on Christian foundations look like in practice? The next: “the integration process should be based on permanent values” (Śmigielski, Gołębiewski).

Following statement seems to be very interesting: “in the integration processes the importance of religion was not appreciated and Christianity was not considered as one of the constitutive elements of the identity of Europe; it may be the source of considerable problems connected with integration” (Nycz). What part of the problems is it, and what kind of problems generally? Religion – that is Christianity – as the constitutive element of the identity of Europe should be the

remedy for these problems. But how should this postulate be realized? The new questions appear, however they are very difficult to answer.

2.1.3. European Union. The perceived benefits and the threats

During the content analysis of documents I have distinguished two main categories: costs/threats and opportunities connected with future membership in the European Union.

2.1.3.1. Benefits:

Among the chances connected with membership in the European Union the clergymen have enumerated: *consumer protection, peace in Europe, economic development*. Other statements about positive facets of Union are from single voices, such as: *free flow of information* (Gołębiewski), *fight with organized crime* (Orszulik), or *taking profits from the Union's budget* (Gołębiewski).

Consumer protection

This aspect of the European Union was emphasized four times in analyzed documents. It appears only in statements from 1999 and 2000. The clergymen stated that some of the aims of integration are: “principles of consumer protection” (Orszulik), “improvement of products quality” (Skworc), or “defense (...) of the rights and interests of the citizens of these countries” (Gołębiewski).

Peace in Europe

The role fulfilled by the European Union aspiring to maintain peace and safety, was stressed four times, also in the statements from 1999-2000. The clergy emphasized, that the European Union wants to have “common foreign politics and safety” (Orszulik) or that thanks to the membership, “we will be even closer to the system of European peace and safety” (Skworc).

Economic development

With the prospect of the future membership, European Union was characterized as a chance for rationalisation of Polish economy. Similar to earlier, this fact was stressed only in 1999-2000, and appeared five times in the statements. For example, the advantages of European Union are: “warranties for the stability of the foreign exchange rate, discipline of budget expenses, restriction of the height of public debt” (Gołowski).

2.1.3.2. Threats

Issues of the costs and the threats connected with future membership in the European Union have started to appear since the critic of the European Union and Europe – that is between **1991-1997**. But there was very often the discussion

about threats after the crucial visit of Episcopate in Brussels in 1997. The expressions like: “there are many secrets in the Union”, “many arrangements are completely hidden from the European societies” have pointed at the existence of the threats. The **threats** or the **mysteries** are not specified, and this ambiguity, or even esoteric of the Union can suggest, that besides what we know, there exists something else behind-the-scenes, out of society’s sight.

Morality

Vision of the European Union as a threat for morality has been created since the birth of the Euroscepticism, that is from 1991. The Union has been accused of providing Polish society with – according to the clergy – “only easy work, good food, entertainment and sex” (Glemp, 1995). The Union has been held responsible for abortion, destruction of the bases of maternity, sexual education, and contraception. Consequently, the EU has been perceived as a threat “financing sexual education, but in anti-educational sense, pornographic magazines, homosexual movements, anti-family propaganda” (Glemp, 2000).

Identity

According to the clergymen, the entrance to the EU should be perceived “in terms of fight (...) about being oneself” (Glemp, 1995). The clergy stated, that the EU “has made Poles believe that they should utter their “Polish”, and their national values” (Nagórny, 1998). After the visit in Brussels this kind of expressions started to appear rarely but they were still present.

National Sovereignty

This fear appeared in the statement, in the Eurosceptic period, and also appears in documents from 1999-2000. Example “we should see entry into the European Union in terms of a fight for independence” (Glemp, 1995), in another statement support for the membership has been considered “national suicide” (Maliński, 1995).

Sale of the land

Clergymen have taken note of this fact in the documents from the two last years. The threat is: “purchase of the cheap land” (Kamiński), “danger of foreigners buying up the Polish land” (Wesoły), or “the issue of selling the land off to the citizens from other countries” (Śmigielski).

Agriculture

In this aspect the Church has anticipated, that the EU could be the “reason for the total disaster of agriculture” (Kamiński), and “our agriculture is too weak to compete with the EEC (European Economic Community)” (Zawitkowski).

Economy

European Union has also turned out to be a danger for the Polish economy. In this category I have placed also: “payment to the Union budget” (Goćłowski), “adjusting the law acts in many fields of economic life” (Glemp, 2000), or “decline of competition of the Polish export” (Goćłowski).

3. The Roman Catholic Church in the Czech Republic towards Europe, European Union and the Integration Process

In 1989 Czechoslovakia, after the events of the Velvet Revolution, found itself in a new political situation. The Roman Catholic Church has participated in these crucial events, and this participation has been assessed favorably by Czech society. When Vaclav Havel became president of Czechoslovakia, his first official visitors were Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of Tibet, and Pope John Paul II. During the visit of the Pope, one of the biggest squares in Prague – Sady Leteňské which witnessed the Velvet Revolution in 1989 – was filled with thousands of the Czech pilgrims. Today the situation has changed dramatically. The Church is not present on the political scene, it does not present its views, and comments on events in the country only very seldom. It seems that nobody asks the Church in the Czech Republic about its opinion. Information connected with the Church has an occasional, cultural and customary character. During the last prepared list of Roman Catholic believers, the Church started to encourage the baptised to make declarations about their beliefs.

In spite of this social and cultural situation, the Church has not been indifferent to the transformation in Europe, to the European integration. However, when I looked for the statements of the clergy about the European Union and integration process in Europe, I had the impression that only Cardinal Miloslav Vlk⁵ (Archbishop of Prague and Primate of the Czech Republic) was interested in changes in European policy. Of course, statements by other clergy appear very seldom, and they do not give a clear picture of views concerning the integration process.

Taking into consideration analyzed statements, we can state with certainty that the Church in the Czech Republic has supported the European Union and the integration from the beginning of the 1990, and the standpoint of the

⁵ What is important, Cardinal Miloslav Vlk in 1993 (and in 1996 again) has been chosen as the president of the Council of Conference of Europe Episcopacies (CCEE). We can therefore see how his office has influenced the process of the European integration.

Church has not undergone evolution or even revolution (as the Church in Poland has). From the beginning of the 1990s the European integration has been treated as the chance to overcome past conflicts or for peace in Europe.

On the 26 May 1998 the Czech Episcopate was invited to Brussels, where the Church in Czech said “Yes” to the idea of integration. The Czech Roman Catholic Episcopate has supported integration “a priori” (Bartak, 1998)⁶ and confirmed its earlier stance.

3.1. Analysis: The Standpoint of the Roman Catholic Church in the Czech Republic

In the content analysis of the statements of the Roman Catholic clergy in the Czech Republic I paid attention to the following issues:

1. How was Europe assessed by clergy?
2. How was the European integration assessed by the Church ?
3. What profits will accession to the EU bring?

3.1.1. Europe in the Statements of the Church in Czech Republic

Visions of Christian Europe and Pagan Europe have appeared in the statements of the Czech clergy, however they are not as clear as in the case of the Church in Poland, because the clergy only mentioned the Christian identity of Europe very rarely. Nevertheless I have created the following categories: “Christian Europe” and “Pagan Europe”. But in this second Europe the picture is not as categorical as in the definitions of the clergy in Poland, because the phenomena considered as indicators of the European culture (such as secularisation or pluralism) have not been assessed negatively by all commentators.

3.1.1.1. Christian Europe

As I said, talk of Christian Europe has appeared in the content of the documentation sporadically. The existence of this Europe is demonstrated in the statement: “European civilisation in the diversity of its culture is based on the Christian ideas” (Vlk, 2000a).

⁶ Worth quoting are the commentaries in *Katolický Týdeník* (the Czech Catholic weekly magazine) concerning the standpoint of the Czech and the Polish Church towards the EU. Comparing these views we can remark that in Brussels “it was necessary to persuade the Polish Bishops that the European Union is not a synonym for pornography, cloning and commercials”. The fact – Bartak wrote – that the Polish Episcopacy has supported the integration, was considered a big success by the Council.

3.1.1.2. *Pagan Europe*

I have considered the following “keywords” as indicators of the presence of the second Europe: postmodernism, secularisation, or pluralism, and also the expression: Europe needs.

Europe needs

When the clergy used the expression *Europe needs*, they showed the need for transformation in the future Europe. This indicator suggests, that in modern Europe something is lacking which is necessary. Example: “Europe needs divine mercy”, “help”, “forgiveness for its sins”, “conciliation”, “waking”, “understanding”, “hope” (Česká biskupská konference, 1999), “spirits” (Vlk, 1997a), “clever people” (Vlk, 1997a, 1997b). And also: “Europe in the time of transformations does not need to be a slave to ideology” (Vlk, 1997a: 59, 1997b: 69).

Europe divided (separated)

The following statements which described Europe by accentuating its crisis, have created a picture of a divided Europe as a result of the conflicts and wars between the nations or the societies in general. For example: “crushed Europe” (Česká biskupská konference) or “Europe divided”, or next: “we look at Europe – the war is going on continually! People still kill each other” (Vlk, 1998:152). The religious divisions in Europe are emphasized, too: “the lack of unity amid the Christians and the lack of unity in the Europe have the same cause, therefore both processes cannot be separated” (Vlk, 1995c:271) or, “as the years go by, the religious gulf has deepened and influenced political development” (Vlk, 1995c:271).

-Isation and -isms in Europe

Similar to the Church in Poland, the clergy in the Czech Republic have showed concern about the following phenomena, which appear in the modern Europe. In turn: postmodernism, secularisation, individualism or nationalism. There was talk of dechristianisation in some of the documents. What is important, those phenomena which were assessed negatively by the Church in Poland, were assessed positively in the statements of the clergy in the Czech Republic. Europe is mostly considered in terms of individualism, or its results like racism, nationalism, or the conflicts/wars in Europe.

3.1.2. *The Roman Catholic Church in the Czech Republic towards the European Integration*

The clergy of the Church in the Czech Republic has enumerated the conditions that should be fulfilled during the process of the integration of Europe. They have pointed at the factors that are insufficient for the European integration.

3.1.2.1. *Inappropriate Integration*

The clergy has emphasized that economics or politics should not be the only goals of the European integration. For example: “the unity of Europe in the political sense, the integration process accelerated by the countries (...) it is not only the matter of the project of any organisation or new structures in the political or economic sphere” (Vlk, 1995c). Here we can remark on the correspondence of opinions of the Czech and Polish clergy. The inappropriate integration was also compared to the creation of an organisation, or of some structures. And next: “the conciliation could not be achieved only by clever policy and diplomacy or management (Vlk, 1997b), “It is not possible to develop unity without taking into consideration the roots and the cause of the division in Europe” (Vlk, 1995c). The last quote suggests that the problem of religious divisions in Christianity cannot be omitted if we want to build European unity.

3.1.2.2. *Appropriate Integration*

On the other hand, the Roman Catholic clergy in the Czech Republic have emphasized these conditions, which, when fulfilled, will guarantee the suitable way of the realisation of the integration process in Europe. They stated: “one can build the Tower of Babel without the Holy Spirit, but it will make the misunderstanding between people” (Vlk, 2000b). According to the clergy, the integration process should be consecrated by Christianity, because in the other case the result of the integration will be comparable to Tower of Babel, which is associated with the conflicts and quarrels. And next: “unity could be protected by the grace of the Holy Spirit (Česká biskupská konference, 1999). The following statement: “It should be the foundations of God’s love, forgiveness and the truth of Gospel. It is the only power to create the integrated world” (List biskupów czeskich i morawskich), “this unity needs the soul, the new spirit, and the new culture of thinking and life” (Vlk, 1995c).

3.1.2.3. *The Church towards the European Union*

The attitude of the Roman Catholic Church in the Czech Republic towards European Union differs from the standpoint of Church in Poland. We cannot find there some catastrophic visions imputing the Union as a potential threat for morality, agriculture or economy. On the other hand, the positive aspects of the Union were mentioned very rarely. According to the clergy, one of the advantages is *peace in Europe*. During the discussion about the conflicts in modern Europe it was said that “on this land should start a process which would carry reconciliation and agreement, so that human rights and democracy

would gain a significance, and the new structures of the world and justice were created similarly to the United Nations and the European Union ” (Vlk, 1995a).

The next perceived benefit is *rationalisation of the economy* and social sphere in the Czech Republic. Example “our Republic will proceed towards thwarting of hope of the integration with the European structures. (...) We demand from politics to listen to the Union marks” (Halík, 1999). During the visit to Brussels in 1998, the Czech Episcopacy enumerated the following benefits connected with the membership in the European Union; they were: tolerance growth, country stability, abiding by law, solidarity, and social fairness (Bartak, 1998).

The EU has been perceived as an opportunity for *restitution* of the Church’s property. I would like to say a few words more about this. After 1989 the Church in the Czech Republic has taken a stand towards the problem of restitution of property which it lost under the communist rule. This issue has triggered controversy, on the level of Church – State relations, and also in Czech society. In 1996 the Roman Catholic Church – represented by Cardinal M. Vlk – declared, that restitution of the Church property “is not the privilege of government, but it is one of the conditions of joining the community of the Western world” (from: Sierszula, 1996). He stated that the indisposition of the Czech government towards the solution of this problematic issue, could be a barrier in getting membership in the European Union. I would like to emphasize that in 1995, the European Parliament recommended to Union members and candidates to facilitate the restitution of the Jewish and the Church property. It was not only on paper – the Church took steps in practice. The clergymen appealed to the Tribunal in Strasbourg, the European Parliament or the Council of Europe. During the visit of the Czech Episcopacy in Brussels Cardinal Vlk stated that the restitution issue is “as important as the problem of observing human rights” (Hekrdla, 1998a). The bishops stated that from the entry to EU they expect better observance of law and solutions to the issues problematic for the Church .

4. Conclusion

At the end of 2002 the Roman Catholic Churches in Poland and the Czech Republic officially declared that they favourably assessed the process of the integration and supported the future membership of Poland and the Czech Republic in the European Union.

The standpoint of the Church in Poland has evolved; the bishops said “Yes” to the integration, Europe and the Union, but this declaration was preceded by a period which may be called *Euro sceptic*.

From the beginning of the 1990s the clergymen in the Czech Republic assessed the European Union very favourably, and they opted to include the Czech Republic in European structures. We can ask in that case if a transformation inside the Church in Poland has led to the change of standpoint? After 1997 the clergy took a stand corresponding to the standpoint maintained by the Church in the Czech Republic from the beginning of 90s. Despite many common features, I propose that the stances of Polish clergy and the Czech Church towards Europe do not share many characteristics. In order to remind on the rendering of the most relevant issues and to facilitate the comparison of the standpoints I have created the following table:

Table 1: Europe⁷

	What was the situation in the past – Christian Europe	What is the present situation – pagan Europe										
		Europe needs	The illness of Europe	Divided Europe	Postmodernism	Secularisation	Liberalism	Individualism	Dechristianisation	Consumerism	Pluralism	Nationalism and racism
The Church in Czech Republic	Rarely ⁸	+	-	+	+	+/- ⁹	-	+	-	-	+/-	+
The Church in Poland	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	? ¹⁰

⁷ Plus means that the clergy took the phenomenon into consideration in their statements, minus means that this aspect was absent from the content of the documents.

⁸ I have found in 3 texts statements about Christian Europe (the expressions about the past, Christian Europe).

⁹ Plus and minus together mean that this phenomenon hasn't been only criticized, but its positive sides were also remarked.

¹⁰ Nationalism or racism weren't mentioned, but the conflict was. The main author was the Archbishop Życinski.

Table 2: European Union

	Profits					Threats					
	Restitution of the property	Peace	Consumer protection	Economy	Tolerance	Morality	Independence	Identity	Economy	Sale of land	Agriculture
The Church in Czech Republic	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-
The Church in Poland	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+

In the standpoints of both Churches we can notice very relevant differences in the assessment of the Union and Europe.

First problematic issues connected with the European integration appeared in the documents. The views connected with the integration process seem to be superficially the same: both Churches emphasize that Europe (if it wants to integrate) should be based on Christian values. However the given arguments differ in the case of the both Churches. The Church in the Czech Republic appeals to the memory of Christian Europe only incidentally. Nevertheless, an analysis of this category (*Christian Europe*) in the statements of the clergy in the Czech Republic has been complicated by the difficulties in finding expressions which indicate the existence of this Europe in the “consciousness” of the Church.

In this place a difference appears: it seems that the Church in Poland has postulated the building of Europe on the basis of Christian values, and it argues “because it was like that in the past” – because the Europe was Christian and should return to this condition (the verbs connected with Europe are: “return” and “find”). By contrast the Church in the Czech Republic puts special emphasis on the power which is brought by Christianity and its values, helpful in integration (love, forgiving, conquering of egoism). There was no talk about a return, but about the new spirit of Europe. The Church in Poland would like modern Europe to become Christian Europe once more. The Church in the Czech Republic talks about a third Europe, a new one.

Irena Borowik (1999) describing the conservative option of “managing” by the Churches in the modern world said that “the conservative option and “pitting” are connected with the trial of constituting traditional understanding of transcendence and the holistic vision of the human person in the perspective of the global differentiation of the modern world”. Taking into consideration the understanding of Christianity as the foundation of the European unity, I can

say that the Church in Poland is more conservative than the Roman Catholic Church in the Czech Republic.

The main difference is in the perception of Pagan Europe by the both Churches. In both cases postmodernism and the expression “Europe needs” are common. Secularisation (similar to pluralism) in the Czech Republic is not universally presented as the “evil” in European society. These phenomena have been considered as “signs of the time”, which the Church in the Czech Republic wants to “read”. The most important difference is in describing liberalism and individualism by the both Churches.

In the statements of the clergy in Poland, liberalism has been condemned unequivocally. Similar to the individualism condemned by the priests of the Church in the Czech Republic. None the less a radical difference exists in the definition of the results of these phenomena, which are (according to the clergy) negative for European societies. The Church in Poland criticizes liberalism, because it is “evil” in general – the analysed texts give this overall impression. Liberalism is perceived as merciless and radical. However the clergy in the Czech Republic assess it differently from the Church in Poland. Using these metaphors we should put individualism before nationalism or racism and consider it as the source of division of Europe. Individualism has been considered an “evil” of Europe, because it was the cause of individual and national egoism. Nationalism and racism are the results, and they have contributed to the divisions in Europe. It is important to note that the clergy stressed that the sin of individualism in the Church and Christianity have contributed to religious conflicts and wars. European integration has been considered a process which is a denial of the individualistic tendencies in modern European countries.

The Church in the Czech Republic has stressed the threats of Europe, which are the results of nationalism, racism, and xenophobia. It has gone beyond the local reality, and has not limited itself to the statements about “evil” of postmodernism or liberalism.

I would argue that the stance to the European Union is the best indicator of the standpoint of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland and the Czech Republic towards the European reality. The Roman Catholic clergy in the Czech Republic did not point at any threats connected with the membership in the European Union and emphasized the opportunities for Europe, the Czechs, and the Church. I have recognized, that the standpoint of the Roman Catholic Church in the Czech Republic can be called *euroenthusiastic*.

The analysis has showed that the estimation of the European reality is multidimensional, and it also includes the stance towards Europe and the European integration. However, taking into account the Polish Church's postulate to build the European integration on the Christian foundation only, I suppose that this proposition was not realistic. It seems to be impossible to realize such an idea in European societies which are culturally and religiously pluralistic. Obviously it is not probable to verify this postulate today. Anyway, the Roman Catholic clergy of the both countries had the similar views on these issues.

Taking into consideration a group of attitudes towards Europe, the European Union and the integration that appeared during the analysis, I have considered the Roman Catholic Church in the Czech Republic as more open and liberal, but also as aware of the civilisation problems in contemporary Europe. The Roman Catholic Church in Poland is more conservative, closed and "looking" at European cultural and the structural changes in a "local" way.

However, I suppose that inside the Roman Catholic Church in Poland (institutional Church) appear the pluralism and the diversity of standpoints, which are not necessarily merely conservative. I have tried to create a typology¹¹ of attitudes, but not so much in the whole institutional Church as among the Church's hierarchy, the Catholic bishops and the archbishops in Poland. The starting point for creating the typology will be the stance of the clergymen towards the EU. I have distinguished:

1. **Euroseptics** – they point only at the threats connected with membership in EU; they fear integration process, and, in a sense, they are afraid of the changes that will take place in Poland after accession to the EU's structures. You may say that they are conservatives.
2. **Eurorealists** – they point at the chances and the costs connected with the integration and the EU.
3. **Euroneutrals** (but euro-non-aligned) – they are not indifferent towards European integration; they speak about Europe, but do not express their opinions about the economy, agriculture etc. that is to say, the issues directly concerning the Union.
4. **Euroenthusiasts** – they do not mention the costs and the threats, and they concentrate on the chances and the possibilities connected with the membership in the EU structures; as the signs of "benevolence"/kindness.

¹¹ As the indicators I took the categories which were created during the analysis.

I acknowledged omitting the costs and emphasizing the favourable sides – the chances and the benefits. I call them the liberals.

Among 21 bishops were: 6 Eurosceptics, 9 Euroneutrals, 4 Eurorealists, 2 Euroenthusiasts. We can notice, despite this, that the Church in Poland officially declares support to the European integration, but it is not so clear-cut when we look at the diversity of standpoints among the Church's hierarchy. Among the types of the stands distinguished, **Euroneutrals** predominate (but they are not indifferent to the entire integration and the Europe). Eurosceptics are placed on the second place. We can ask: *in that case – does the Roman Catholic Church in Poland support the European Union?* Even if the answer is affirmative, we can suppose that the Church in Poland fears the European Union. And it does not matter if it focuses this attention on threats connected with morality, agriculture or economy.

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Lucian N. Leustean

**RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS IN DEFINING EUROPEAN
IDENTITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE**

1. Introduction

This paper presents a short survey of identity as it is perceived in the literature regarding the creation of European identity and current understanding of religious factors and symbols. I shall analyse the present policy efforts and perceptions used in elaborating a common identity within the European Union and Southeastern European countries from a comparative perspective. My main argument is that due to the historical process of secularisation, which has resulted in a diverse religious spectrum in the present members of the EU, the religious elements used in defining current EU identity are different from those in Southeastern Europe, having different implications at the level of national identity. I shall not analyse the functions of religion in underpinning the economic or social motivations of joining the EU or supporting EU enlargement, nor shall I advocate that religious factors contribute decisively in supporting national policies towards EU accession or membership. My intention is to provide a comparative prospectus of the concept of identity and its religious elements for the EU as a whole and Southeastern European countries, focusing on Orthodoxy's role and influence as the 'prevailing religion' in these countries.

I shall argue that the current EU policies which try to create a European identity have centred mainly on promoting common European symbols, which tend to play a 'hidden' religious role. Southeastern European countries, dominated by a concentrated religious power and influence in their political structures and decisions, have a different religious approach in defining their national identity. From this perspective, the current and future EU enlargement will have to take into account the necessities of comprehending the religious complexities of this region.

2. European Identity

The issue of identity has become a major theoretical subject of different disciplines that attempt to define it according to their own perceptions. Even if the senior disciplines in identity studies are anthropology and psychology, the particular interest in this matter dates from the 1960s when identity began to mean more than just 'sameness' and to signify a 'positively valued socio-psychological construct' consisting of 'allegiance to people, group and often place and past' (Macdonald, 1993:6-7). Collective identities can generate a degree of continuity between individuals and their social environment being able, thus, to confer social recognition and approval (Benda-Beckmann and Verkuyten, 1995:24).

Identity derives from the Latin word 'idéntitas' which means 'the same' or 'sameness of essential character'. Identities are diversified in nature being affected by allegiance to things such as own gender, family, class, region, religion, age group, kin group and nation. From all these aspects, some are more important than others, and there is a competition between them for domination or exclusion. Groups' identities are best represented as matrices that change over space and time but consequently the different elements in an identity matrix may be contradictory (Benda-Beckmann, 1993:12). In this way, people maintain devotion to different institutions that may at times clash, or at least in theory be partially exclusive to each other (Wintle, 2000:13-14). An example of such mixed attachments within a single collective identity would be the feelings of allegiance to both nation and region, furthermore being possible to share loyalties for one's own country and for Europe at the same time.

Identity is a complex term. European identity has primarily focused on the major features of the European continent and attempted to analyse the closer features of different European aspects: nations, ethnicity, culture, society, etc., speaking thus about a European ethnic identity, European political identity, European cultural identity, etc. according to different spatial and temporal perspectives. Religion as a mobilising/demobilising factor in creating a common identity has been researched especially from the state-church relations' point of view and sociological dimension of religion. Moreover, in the last decade, outlining the cultural and religious attributes of political structure, there is a growing literature, which describes political culture with a religious dimension and the role of cross-national variations in political systems (Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1990; Putnam et al., 1993).

The present attempt to define European identity has focused on two major sources: firstly, the search for an identity of the European Union itself in the

context of international relations, and secondly in the individual subject disposition as reflected by the Eurobarometer surveys (Soysal, 2002:273). Both analytical searches agree that European political culture is not homogeneous, even if there are some factors contributing to the spread of common values across the continent. From a historical point of view, Europe has had an identity or different identities in the past to which Europeans have felt a higher or lesser degree of allegiance.

The attempt to draw a definition of European identity is a complex issue, which includes the European specificity and historical background (Smith, 1992). The easiest approach in this analysis is to understand European uniqueness, which has changed Europeans' lives throughout centuries and made them a specific group with a particular identity. Schneider (1999:16) created a list of historical facts, which mainly contribute to the development of European identity, from which I mention some of the most representative: pre-classical and classical Antique, classical Hellas, Rome as a Republic and Empire, Christendom in Latin and Byzantine Empire, the Schism, the controversy between 'regnum' and 'sacerdotium' in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the political ideas and movements of the XIXth century, world wars and totalitarianism. Describing Europe as a construct entity, a particular form of 'Europeanness' may be noted throughout centuries as a kind of overarching identity (Smith, 1991).

The societies of the European Union are primarily divided along national lines. As Hix (1999:133-66; 358) asserts 'each individual has a set of beliefs, opinions, values and interests relating to the political process. These <political preferences> often derive from deep historical or cultural identities, religion or language [...] Citizens form their attitudes towards the EU on the basis of personal economic interests and political values and as a result individuals from the same social group in different member states share similar views on EU integration'.

The relationship between religion and identity in the European context of the nation-state has recently been summarised by Smith (1999) and Hutchinson (2001; 2003:7) as follows: 'nations are not explicable only by state necessities. The nation is a moral community that binds individuals into a <timeless> society evoked by <unique> myths, memories and culture so that they overcome contingency and death. Religious institutions can be of great importance in clarifying the definition of national identity because of their deep social reach, often endowing a community with the sense of being chosen that informs the modern nation-state. The nation is a surrogate religion, which arises with secularisation and often builds on older religious identity.'

National identity monopolises the central place in the analysis of border-demarcations (Foucher, 1991; Anderson and Bort, 2001) and human territorialities.¹ Though the 'single national identity – single nation-state' equation dominates the literature, individuals still define themselves to an important extent by multiple identities. The concept of 'matrioshka' nationalism (Taras, 1993:513-538) (named after the Russian dolls that are hidden inside each other) still has a great applicability in defining the domestic politics of European countries. As national, ethnic, regional and local identities overlap but remain 'hidden', various political actors compete with each other for adherents, attempting to wake up and activate 'sleeping' identities. Sometimes these identities coexist peacefully even within a territorial community and also in the consciousness of an individual, but sometimes, as in the former Yugoslavia, they erupt into intense ethnic conflict (Kolossoff and O'Loughlin, 1998).

European identity is founded not only on the geographical approach of perceiving nationality *versus* territoriality but also takes into account very historical and social differences. Moreover, specific national identities evolved and shaped in particular manners due to particular links to mainstream European developments, influenced or not by other European or non-European powers.²

3. The last EU's Enlargement Events and European Identity

Studies of public support for European integration have focused on the notions of postmaterialism and cognitive mobilisation (Inglehart, 1970; 1977) and have explained the individual's support for the integration process as the result of mainly economic (Anderson, 1995:111-134), cultural (Rougemont, 1962; Habermas, 1992:1-19; Bastian and Collange, 1996) and social changes (Engelbrekt, 2002:37-52).

¹ For a detailed analysis of national identity in the EU accession candidates see, *Survey of National Identity and Deep-Seated Attitudes towards European Integration in the Ten Applicants Countries of Central and Eastern Europe*. By the Forward Studies Unit in collaboration with the delegations of European Commission in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria and DG1A. 1998. Brussels: European Commission.

² Transformations of identities affect the functions of national borders. The open, peaceful, well-delimited and internationally recognised borders in Western Europe and North America make up only 8% of the total length of world land frontiers. In Europe, only 2% of political boundaries established in the twentieth-century up to 1989 resulted from plebiscites and about 42% of the total length of land boundaries in Africa represents geometrical lines imposed by colonial powers. About 20% of current world boundaries were drawn up by the British and about 17% by the French.

The conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council stated the completion of accession negotiation with 10 state candidates³ welcoming them as new members of the European Union from 1 May 2004. At the same time the Union welcomes the progress achieved by Bulgaria and Romania asserting the particular intention of these states to join the EU in 2007. As the Presidency Conclusions (2002:4) presents 'the accession negotiations with these countries will continue on the basis of the same principles that have guided the accession negotiations so far, and that each candidate country will be judged on its own merits'. In addition, in Turkey's case the European Council in December 2004 will decide if this country fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria in order to open immediate accession negotiations.

The broad spectrum of this summit, and particularly its conclusions, reveals a very broad political consensus and agenda. The current EU member states agreed that the future European Union would be larger from 2004 with a new economic and political engine. At the same time it is obvious that the other candidates, which do not meet all the political or economic criteria, will have to wait a few years until a new European Council, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, will invite them to join. The particular character of societies in these countries that still have to fulfil other criteria raised the question of the ability of their governments to implement EU policy and *acquis communautaire* into their legislation at the lower social level.

During the post-cold war period, the European Union has encountered vivid debates regarding the nature of its future borders in the context of different European cultural, social and religious patterns throughout the continent. Different definitions of 'civilisations', and possible conflicts between these civilisations (Huntington, 1993a.b.), were raised immediately after the collapse of communism, indicating a possible struggle between Western Protestant and Catholic cultures and, on the other hand, Eastern Orthodox and Islamic. The main questions regarding the nature of future European borders included or excluded, in the name of European values, the Easterners (Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Moldavians) and Southeasterners (the Balkans, Turks) from a reorganised European Union. These questions appear rational, taking into account the diversity of appropriate factors within the European continent – geographic, historic, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, and developmental.

³ Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.

The conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, inviting 10 accession states to be future EU members, extend the border of the European Union and eliminate the former assumptions of incompatibility between ex-communist territories with Western countries' values. The main debate moved from the future limit of European borders to the real capacity of the invited countries to fully adopt into practice the *acquis communautaire* and European values as a whole.

At present there are still a few countries, which have as their national objective the completion of accession negotiations and possible EU membership from 2007. The last European Council noted their aspirations, encouraging and supporting them with a strict calendar and dispatching a favourable financial packet. Bulgaria and Romania are in this situation. In addition, Turkey and Croatia consider themselves in the same position aiming at EU membership in the near future. The same position was also recently shown by the other countries from the Western Balkans. It is possible that the structure of the future European Union will be limited to only a few of these countries according to their particular economic achievements but also due to future political leaders' opinions of where the 'true' Europe should end. Notable is the opinion of the president of the European Parliament, Pat Cox, indicating that the enlargement of the European Union will stop in 2007 with Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania.⁴

The main reasons for delaying official invitations for Bulgaria and Romania are their slow progress towards establishing a functioning market economy and their limited capacities to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.⁵ Expressing its support for Bulgaria and Romania in their efforts to achieve the objectives of membership in 2007, the Commission of European Communities detailed roadmaps, including timetables, and increased pre-accession assistance.⁶

⁴ 'With the entry of ten countries in 2004 and possible accession of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia in 2007, the EU will probably need to stop the enlargement process for several years to consolidate (enlargement by that time)' *EP President Cox sees Croatia in EU in 2007*, European Liberal Youth, <http://www.lymec.org/article.php?sid=176>.

⁵ *2002 Regular Report on Bulgaria's Progress towards Accession*. 09 September 2002. Brussels: Commission of European Communities. p. 35; *2002 Regular Report on Romania's Progress towards Accession*. 09 September 2002. Brussels: Commission of European Communities. p. 49.

⁶ *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Roadmaps for Bulgaria and Romania*. 13 November 2002. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities pp. 1-43.

Clearly the final decision to invite these countries will be a political one, due to the immense economic discrepancy between them and the present members of the European Union. Looking at some actual socio-economic data from the World Bank resources, the GNI per capita of Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia is less than \$2,000 per person per year, at about the same level as Guatemala, while the invited countries such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have a GNI per capita of \$3,000 – 5,000, the same level as in Brazil, Chile and Mexico. Slovenia is at the upper end of the scale having a per capita income of around \$10,000, being thus closer to the level of the poorest present EU member, Portugal.⁷ The explanation of these figures subsides in variable economic and socio-historical explanations; however, this is not the purpose of my paper. Nevertheless, there seems to be a widespread trend within the European political leadership to maintain the accession efforts with the remaining candidates despite these economic difficulties. If this trend does continue, the future European Union will have, in the next years, according to the Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, 25 members plus Bulgaria, Romania and possibly Croatia and Turkey.

Even with the European political leaders' and national governments' support for further EU enlargement, it is still possible that this process may be delayed or postponed due to various reasons. The terms stated by the European Council in December 2002 could be affected by factors such as the new crisis over Iraq; the Union's attempt to reiterate a new European foreign policy motivated by certain US military action which is nevertheless supported by some future EU candidates; or a major decrease in supporting EU enlargement due to unpredicted events in international politics. However, the main task would be an economic one, requesting that the present candidates achieve the promised reforms in creating a functional market economy.

4. Religion, Symbols and European Identity

A brief overview of European state-church relations shows deep connection between the 25 future EU members. Thus, in the constitution of five countries, the Christian cultural heritage is mentioned in the preambles (Ireland, Greece, Poland, Germany, and Slovakia). In six other countries there is a more

⁷ *World Development Indicators 2002*, The World Bank Group, www.worldbank.org. In 2002 GNI per capita in USD: Bulgaria 1,560, Macedonia 1,690, Romania 1,710, Guatemala 1,670, Croatia 4,550, Estonia 3,810, Hungary 4,800, Poland 4,240, Slovak Republic 3,700, Brazil 3,060, Chile 4,350, Mexico 5,540.

or less formal relation between state and church by giving one particular church a special position (Denmark, Finland, Spain, Austria, Portugal and the United Kingdom). In France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Sweden, church and state are formally separated. In the constitutions of Hungary and Slovenia a distinct separation is mentioned between church and state. Malta is the only European country in whose constitution a state religion is established as Roman Catholic. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have religious freedom written into their constitutions, but they favour certain churches and religious communities (Robbers, 1996; Pihl, 2003).

The religiosity in the EU's countries is divided between 'believing without belonging' as in the United Kingdom to 'belonging without believing' as in Denmark (Willaime, 1996:311). According to different surveys after 1990, approximately 59 per cent of the EU's population declare themselves as believers, 29 per cent as non-believers, 5 per cent as atheists and 7 per cent as uncertain about their religious belief. Public trust in different churches and religions varies throughout the EU, while in most countries a strong decline in religious identification and spiritual belonging can be observed. The official dialogue between EU leaders and religious leaders of different churches and religious groups has been active especially during Gaston's presidency in 1980s (Jansen, 2000:111). It is not the purpose of my paper to present the official dialogue framework, the common achievements or the public attitude of the EU leaders toward religion. Nevertheless, there is a stronger trend in the last years at the EU institutions' level, towards analysing and implementing public policies regarding the role of religion in Europe. In this sense, financial support has been allocated for reflection on 'ethical and spiritual implication of European integration' (Hulbert, 1998:25).

This empty European religious space has been the perfect territory for the gradual use of symbols, which had the main task of supporting a common European identity. There is a lack of research in this area, the only present analyses demonstrating the relationship between symbols and nation-state. However, regarding the European Union space, 'the introduction of symbols such as an EU flag and anthem and a preoccupation with a European demos suggests the desire to create a European *national* identity' (Hutchinson, 2003:10).

To have a better image of the progress of using symbols in relation to European identity, I present in the next paragraphs, a short outline as reflected by EU documents and public policy implementation.

In 1973, for the first time, the nine member countries of the European Community decided to draw up a document on European identity. According to

the declaration from the Heads of State and Government during the Copenhagen meeting on the 14th of December 1973 this would

enable them to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs.

They also tried to 'define the European Identity' having

the intention of carrying the work further in the future in the light of the progress made in the construction of a United Europe. Defining the European Identity involves reviewing the common heritage, interests and special obligations of the Nine, as well as the degree of the unity so far achieved within the Community.⁸

In 1983 the Heads of Government signed in Stuttgart the 'Solemn Declaration on European Union' inviting the member states to promote

European awareness and to undertake joint action in various cultural areas.

This message was interpreted as an official recommendation to pursue cultural initiatives

in order to affirm the awareness of a common cultural heritage as an element in European identity.⁹

Consequently, new main areas developed a stronger cultural dimension such as education, training programmes and audio-visual policy.

The 1984 'Television without Frontiers Directive' established a connection between integration and European cultural identity:

Information is a decisive, perhaps the most decisive, factor in European unification [...] European unification will only be achieved if Europeans want it. Europeans will only want it if there is such thing as European identity. A European identity will only develop if Europeans are adequately informed.¹⁰

⁸ CEC 1973, *Bulletin of the EC*, No 12-1973.

⁹ CEC 1983, *Bulletin of the EC* 6, 24.

¹⁰ CEC 1984, *Bulletin of the EC*, 7/85.

The European Council meeting from the same year in Fontainebleau concluded that the European Community should

respond to the expectations of the people of Europe by adopting measures to strengthen and promote its identity and its image both for citizens and for the rest of the world.¹¹

Regarding this matter, a special committee was established to organise and coordinate the best actions. The Committee examined the symbols present in the construction of European identity such as a flag and an anthem, marking the beginning of the campaign 'A People's Europe'. The Committee, under the chairmanship of Member of the European Parliament, Pietro Adonnino, presented two reports in 1985, which focused on the promotion of the 'Idea of Europe'. The Committee proposed concrete EU policies in order to establish a Europe-wide audio-visual area, a European Academy of Science, Euro-lottery, formation of European sports teams, school exchange programmes and a stronger European dimension in education (Höjelid, 2001). The reports also implied that there is a need for a new set of symbols in order to communicate the EU's principles and values. Thus the Commission stated:

Symbols play a key role in consciousness-raising, but there is also a need to make the European citizen aware of the different elements that go to make up his European identity, of our cultural unity with all its diversity of expression, and of the historic ties which link the nations of Europe.¹²

In a formal ceremony in May 1986, a new emblem and flag were created as among the most important symbolic actions. The flag was taken from the logo of the Council of Europe being composed from a circle of twelve yellow stars set against an azure background. As Shore (2000:47) asserts, 'twelve was a symbol of perfection and plenitude, associated with the apostles, the sons of Jacob, the tables of the Roman legislator, the labours of Hercules, the hours of the day, the months of the year, or the signs of the Zodiac. Lastly, the circular layout denoted union'. There are also voices claiming that the circle with twelve gold stars should be perceived as a Christian symbol representing the Virgin Mary's diadem and symbolic reference to the Virgin Mary's sign in the New Testament (Apocalypse 12.1).¹³ Among other symbols, the Committee

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² CEC 1988, *Bulletin of the EC*, Supplement 2/88.

¹³ Elisabeta Constantin and Aurel Nae. 23 February 2000. Ortodoxia și integrarea europeană. [Orthodox Church and European Integration] Interview with Joseph Homeyer, Bishop of Hildesheim, president of COMECE. *Vestitorul Ortodoxiei [Orthodox Church News]* p. 14.

proposed the creation of a European passport, driving licence and car number plates as well as a European anthem and European postage stamps. The most representative initiatives were the creation of EC Youth Orchestra, Opera Centre, the European Literature Prize, the European Woman of the Year Award and over one thousand Jean Monnet Awards (Höjelid, 2001).

The Commission created new celebratory calendar markers such as European Weeks, European Culture Months and a series of European Years dedicated to specific representative themes. The most important moments in the history of European integration have started to be celebrated and the 9th of May – the anniversary of the Schuman Plan of the early fifties – was officially designated Europe Day.

In the Maastricht Treaty, 1991, in order to promote an even stronger sense of belonging to the EU, a new legal category titled European Citizenship was developed. The Heads of Member State and Governments tried to achieve

[...] a new stage in the process of European integration undertaken with the establishment of the European Communities [...] desiring to deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions [...] resolved to establish a citizenship common to nationals of their countries [...] to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.¹⁴

In addition, the Maastricht Treaty emphasised new policy areas within the jurisdiction of the EU including education, youth, culture, consumer protection and public health, and, for the first time, a new 'Cultural article' (Article 128) was clearly stated:

The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.

It is also noted the fact that the Maastricht Treaty does not make any reference to religion or churches. The Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, has issued a 'Declaration on the Status of Churches and Non-Confessional Organisations' stating:

The European Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations and communities in

¹⁴ *The Maastricht Treaty: Preamble.*

the Member States. The European Union equally respects the status of philosophical and non-confessional organisations.¹⁵

As the last released 'Eurobarometer. Public Opinion in the European Union' presents, 53 per cent of EU citizens feel to some extent European, compared with 44 per cent who only identify with their own nationality, while in 9 of the 15 Member States, European sentiment outweighs exclusive identification with one's own nationality. The proportion of people who do not identify with their own nationality and who feel European is the highest in Luxembourg (16 per cent). In the other Member States, the proportion of people who feel European ranges from 28 per cent in the UK to 66 per cent in Italy.¹⁶

Despite the widespread sense of being European, in many member states there are now more people who identify only with their own nationality than in autumn 2000. In Spain, an 18 percentage point increase has been recorded in this respect, followed by a 9 percentage point increase in the UK and Ireland, an 8 percentage point rise in Greece and Italy and a 7 percentage point increase in Luxembourg. The demographic analyses show that people who left full-time education at the age of 20 or older, those who are still studying and managers are most likely to feel to some extent European. Retired people are most likely to identify with their own nationality. The attitudinal analyses show that 70 per cent of people, who regard their country's membership to the European Union as a good thing, feel to some extent European. At the other extreme we find that 73 per cent of people, who regard their country's membership as a bad thing, identify with their own nationality.¹⁷

5. Religion and Identity in Southeastern Europe in the Process of the EU's Enlargement

In Southeastern Europe church-state relations differ from those in Western Europe through the mainly nationalist discourse of religious leaders and the strong use of political and historical myths.

The Byzantine concept of 'symphonia' supports state-church relations in the Orthodox region. This concept emphasises the fact that between church and state there is a continuous and common cooperation maintaining their status quo,

¹⁵ *Official Journal* C 340 10.11.1997.

¹⁶ *Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union*. April 2002. p. 14 Brussels: European Commission, www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

fulfilling their particular goals, each supporting the other and neither being supported by the other. The rapid secularisation of the last century did not strongly affect religious support for Orthodoxy. This was especially possible due to the profound symbolism of liturgical acts and the concept that nationality is formed on a very strong religious basis (Kokosalakis, 1996:133; Janković, 2001). I shall not insist here on the theological concepts, which make Orthodoxy a specific religious approach in church-state relations. The use of religious symbols related to the political field in Orthodox countries is stronger and more significant than the use of secular symbols, such as the country's flag or national anthem. At the same time, there is a significant and contradictory phenomenon within Orthodoxy, which sees the European Union's values as incompatible and dangerous to its own values (Kazantzakis, 1993:114-115) but also a new and revised conception of Orthodoxy's role within the European space (Prodromou, 1996).

Analysing the religious roots of the modern international relations' equation, Philpott (2000:214) tries to find the major elements which could explain the particular role of religion in the international political arena. He argues that 'had the Reformation not occurred, a system of sovereign states would not have developed, at least not in the same form or in the same era as it did. More precisely, were it not for the Reformation, persistently medieval features of Europe [...] would not have disappeared when they did, to make way for the system of sovereign states.'¹⁸ The relevance of the beginning of the system of modern international states, as we know them nowadays, subsides in understanding the major historical events where churches were involved specifically due to their influence in political and social life. The Westphalia Peace of 1648, that established the sovereign state system, shaped the present European political architectural model and the specific ways in which the political leaders know and understand politics.

Concerning the Balkan region and its particular religious and political equation, it is important to remember that only 195 years before the 'birth' of the nation state, in 1453, Constantinople, the religious capital of Orthodoxy, was conquered by the Ottoman Empire. This event has changed completely the political and religious evolution of the whole of Eastern Europe for the next centuries. This situation affected not only the creation of future nation states in

¹⁸ 'More precisely, were it not for the Reformation, persistently medieval features of Europe – the substantive powers of the Holy Roman Empire and its emperor, the formidable temporal powers of the church, religious uniformity, truncations of the sovereign powers of secular rulers, Spain's control of the Netherlands – would not have disappeared when they did, to make ways for the system of sovereign states.'

the Balkans, but also subsequent specific religious elements. All churches from this region, and mainly the Orthodox Church, had to develop throughout the centuries an active presence and nationalistic discourse in order to survive. In Balkan countries, even if politics nowadays is theoretically completely secular, in reality religious influence is rather strong. For example, in Greece, an EU member, religious elements are present in the political arena. The Orthodox Church is perceived as the 'prevailing religion' (Kyriazopoulos, 2001) and this fact created animated disputes in recent years regarding the real place of Greece in the European Union. Consequently, other governments did not escape this mesmerising balance between religion and politics in creating and elaborating their national strategies and main policies interests. As Ramet (1991:259) argues 'religious identity is bound up with national identity, and religious tolerance is often inseparable from national intolerance', this being the main feature of religious presence and revival throughout all Eastern European countries after the fall of communism.

Romania and Bulgaria are both major Eastern Orthodox Christian countries. In order to have a detailed image on how symbolism affects the political arena, I shall focus further on Romania's attitude towards the religious role in the vision of the future of Europe as perceived through public attitudes and official documents of political leaders.

In Romania, the debate on the future of Europe was launched by Adrian Nastase, Prime Minister of Romania, on May 9, 2001, Europe Day. On this occasion, Nastase urged Romanian citizens to express their opinion about Romania's place in the future Europe, by participating in the debates organised especially under the direction of the Ministry of European Integration.

A recent survey (Curelau et al., 2002) analyses the Romanians' attitude towards European integration, according to religious confessional appurtenance and their inner motivations in conceiving the process of European integration. The study has as its main targets the specific groups of Orthodox and Catholic clerics and laymen. The group of Orthodox clerics has proved to be in greater favour of particular Romanian and religious identity and less of a European one, while the Catholic clerics have favoured Catholic and European identities to the same extent. The results do not show an explicit anti-European clerical identity but favour more their particular religious identity in contrast with the European one. Orthodox laymen favour to the same extent the Romanian and European identity and to a lesser extent their religious identity. Catholic laymen favour both Romanian and European identity but they are to a lesser extent in favour of any religious compromise. This aspect may be explained due to the

Catholic Church's active presence in European politics. On the other hand, Orthodox clerics are in an even smaller percentage in favour of religious compromises and for some citizens European integration is even perceived as a threat to their national and religious identity. Thus, in their opinion, the church has the role of the protector of national and religious identity in maintaining Romanian traditions and values. During this experimental survey a provocative question was formulated. The interviewed subjects were told that because the majority of the European Union is Catholic, the process of European integration would consequently accelerate the process of the churches' unification, and local religious autonomy will be diminished. The reactions of both clerics and laymen were mainly the same. Romanians are the greatest supporters of European integration from all accession candidates¹⁹ but their national identity is to a great extent bound to religious identity. Thus, the survey's results indicate that even if in experimental conditions the majority favoured Romania's accession to the EU, they are to an overwhelming extent against accession that may modify or threaten their religious identity.

Romania's position in the framework of the Convention on the Future of Europe debate has a strong religious attitude regarding the public religious discussions in the EU forums. The conception of political leaders on the future European architecture stands, from this point of view, in accordance with the major churches' leaders. On 30 January 2003, the Minister of European Integration, Hildegard Puwak, declared that the proposals made by Romania concerning religious values in the context of the future European Constitution could only be in full agreement with the denominational majority position in Romania. Romania has presented a document to the members of the convention referring to the Christian heritage of Europe-building, which has been drawn jointly by the representatives of the Romanian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, experts from the Ministry of European Integration and the Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs.²⁰

The former Romanian Foreign Minister and ex-President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Adrian Severin (2003), adopted an interesting position regarding this debate. In his opinion, political Europe would not become Christian but Christianity instead will acquire a European dimension

¹⁹ Romania has the greatest support for EU membership with 78% of population from all accession candidates, followed by Bulgaria with 68%, Hungary 67% and Turkey 65%. *Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the Countries Applying for European Union Membership*. 2002. Brussels: European Commission p. 62.

²⁰ ROMPRES, www.rompres.ro, 30 January 2003.

‘by setting at the basis of Europe-building human rights, solidarity, the fight against poverty and the effort to promote peace, love and tolerance. [...] Europe is and will be Christian. This does not mean exclusivity and intolerance, but a Christianity of love for Man, created after the image of God.’ His discourse is close to Romanian public perceptions, furthermore promoting a religious language in asserting his personal political ideas.

In addition, Romania’s concrete proposals in the framework of the Convention on the Future of Europe consists of (1) the creation of a second chamber of the European Parliament, (2) the promotion of the principle of subsidiarity and (3) an economic and social government (Severin, 2002). The second proposal is the well-known political principle of subsidiarity, promoting the best distribution of tasks between the national and European levels. It is enticing to note that the controversy regarding the applicability of this principle has a religious inference, especially to Catholic social doctrine, emphasising the role of the regional and local level in contrast with the European centralised one (Montclos, 1994). Even if Romania’s official position does not have any implicit religious assertions, it is evident that by promoting this principle the major Orthodox denominational countries tend to favour the same Christian values as promoted also by the Roman Catholic Church²¹ in the process of European construction.

6. Conclusions

Religious and political surveys in Europe point out that ‘Eastern Europe is quite close to the norms of the original EEC members with regard to beliefs and values concerning the role of religion in public life.’ In addition ‘there is an emerging secular religious culture throughout Europe, one that sees religion as inconsequential for political life’ (Laitin, 2002:50-88).

The European Union’s leaders use the secular symbols in the same way as major Orthodox Southeastern European’s countries use religious symbols in creating better social cohesion and support of their national identities. The overwhelming public support towards national Orthodox churches in Southeastern Europe would make any other European institution envious in the attempt to promote the best public policy towards a common European identity.

²¹ ‘Certes, les responsables politiques européens ont emprunté à l’Eglise la notion de subsidiarité. Son inscription dans les textes laisserait à penser que les autorités européennes n’interviennent que si elles permettent une action plus efficace qu’au niveaux national.’ (Montclos, 1994: 100-101).

The EU's political leaders used in the gradual construction of the European Union, political symbols in the same way as religious symbols have been used in Southeastern European countries. If in the next years, Bulgaria and Romania will be members of the EU, there should be a great attention to the utilisation of secular and religious symbols in the EU and particularly in these countries in order to maintain the same strong popular support towards EU policy. Otherwise, we might be witness to the rejection of 'foreignness' which does not share the same religious values and an increase in nationalist discourse and propaganda through perhaps the creation of a distinct religious block including the other Orthodox countries. The desired economic prosperity in these countries is not the absolute engine that leads them to the European Union community, but also the feeling of cultural and religious belonging to the same European family.

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IV.

ADAPTATION AND/OR
TRANSFORMATION: RELIGIOUS AND
ECCLESIASTICAL MOVEMENTS

Tadeusz Doktor

**CHURCHES, SECTS, AND INVISIBLE RELIGION IN
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AFTER THE
TRANSFORMATION**

Since the end of the eighties and the fall of the communist regime with its official atheistic ideology in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe significant changes in religious scenery have taken place. They constitute an interesting field for testing many theories to religious change, which are usually formulated and tested mainly on the empirical material from western and third world countries without almost any references to this part of the world. One of the possible reasons for this neglect may be a relatively poor condition of the sociology in these countries, partly caused by the ideological control of this discipline in the previous years, resulting in the lack of data necessary for comparative analysis. This situation is, however, gradually changing and much more data are now collected and accessible for the analysis. Comparative research programs, both more generally oriented (but including many variables related to religion) as EVS, WVS, ISSP and more specifically oriented towards religion as Aufbruch or RAMP, as well as some censuses and other research programs, offer a rich variety of data for testing different theories of religious change.

1. Theoretical interpretations of religious change

Among theoretical approaches to the problem of religious change we may find different predictions concerning the future of religion. The most widespread theory or rather a group of theories will expect a gradual decline of religion (differently conceptualized) with the advancement of modernisation. In the formulation of Thomas Luckman (1999) it is the decline of institutional religion due to the two of the basic components of the overall process of modernisation: functional differentiation and pluralism. The functional differentiation is to subject the public life of the individual members of modern societies to norms without religious significance and restrict the influence of

religious norms to the private sphere of life, resulting in the privatisation of religion. Pluralism makes different worldviews widely accessible and forces to making choices between different options including also religious options.

As the result, the new social form of religion is de-monopolized and the religious collective representation constitutes a relatively open 'market'. Among the old suppliers of this market are:

the survivors from the previous, monopolistic social form of religion remain important as purveyors of what is clearly labeled as a religious notion. This is something of a handicap when it comes to competition with suppliers closer to what is taken to be modern consciousness, but it is also an advantage with regard to the continuing demand for the traditional product on the part of a shrunken clientele. In any case, the churches and sects are doing their best to continue to play a role in those contemporary articulations of a sacred cosmos which are still directly connected to the subjective experiences of the "great" transcendences of life and death as well as to other-worldly salvation. (Luckman, 1999:254).

Among the new suppliers New Age is one of the most successful as being closer to modern consciousness and representing individual 'holistic' responses to the specialisation of institutional domains, the pluralism of mass-culture, the development of a market of world views as general conditions which characterize modern societies:

The new, privatized, and, in a manner of speaking, invisible social form of religion can be best illustrated by certain diffuse recent developments usually collected under the same label: the "New Age" movement – which of course is anything but a movement in the accepted sense of a social movement including the "new occultism", and various programs favoring the "spiritual" development of the individual. They are highly syncretistic. They gather diverse psychological, therapeutic, magic, and marginally scientific as well as older "esoteric" materials, repackage them and offer them for individual consumption. Further private syncretism typically makes selective use of these packages. There is no canonized dogma, no personal recruitment system, no disciplining apparatus. In other words, these movements and (cultic) milieus are marked by varied, generally weak forms of institutionalisation. No attempt to transform these enterprises into a big institutional apparatus is made. Instead, "networks" are formed or, at least, a "network" mystique is cultivated,

and commercially exploitable “cultic milieus” are formed. In fact, this may be a precondition for the successful maintenance of a vague holistic approach, an approach expressly designed to overcome the “alienating” specialisations of science, religion, art, etc. into institutional spheres and segregated cultural domains (Luckmann, 1999:255-6).

On the basis of theory of religious change proposed by Thomas Luckmann we could expect the decline of traditional churches and the growth of invisible religion of the New Age type especially with the advancement of the modernisation. The growth of the cultic milieu should be correlated with the decline of church religiosity.

Different expectations concerning religious change could be formulated on the basis of the theory proposed by Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge (1987), often quoted as an example of emerging economic paradigm in the study of religion. According to this theory and other formulations of the market model of religion the most successful competitors of traditional churches are high-tension groups of the sectarian type.

Sects demand high levels of commitment and high rates of participation, require strict and distinctive codes of conduct, emphasize “particularistic” beliefs and practices (which distinguish their members from those of other religions and, presumably, make them superior to all others), and view secular society as corrupt, dangerous, and threatening. Sects emphasize “volitional membership” (personal conversion as opposed to membership through birth), and they attract a disproportionate share of their converts from among the less advantaged segments of society – ethnic minorities, the poor, and the less educated. Most sects eschew religious professionalism, favoring lay leadership and simple organisation structures in which members can participate as equals (Iannaccone, 1997:104).

Their growth may limit the scope of secularisation in a most efficient way especially in those countries where the conventional churches are weak and the level of state regulation of religion is not too high to make their activity possible (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985; 1987). Eastern Europe, which is now undergoing a radical socio-cultural transformation (one of the factors contributing to the growth of NRMs, according to Stark and Bainbridge), while generally representing low level of religious activity and showing a significant decrease of state regulation of religious market in comparison to the earlier period. The secularisation of Eastern Europe was not a “natural” process due to

the structural differentiation of the socio-cultural system but at least in part, was enforced by the deliberate attempts of the communist state to restrict religious activities of all kinds. After resignation of atheism as an official ideology (in all EE countries) and withdrawing from state regulation of religious market (to a different degree in different countries), possibilities of growth are opened for all kinds of religious organisations including also traditional churches.

On the ground of the Stark-Bainbridge theory we can expect that religious change is related to the existing level of church religiosity and the degree of state control of religious market. From their thesis that sects and cults are reactions to a different degree of erosion of traditional churches, we can conclude: in the countries with a low level of religious participation we may expect further decline of church religiosity accompanied by the growth of cults or cult-like phenomena ('New Age' type beliefs and practices). In the countries with a high level of church religiosity it is to be expected either stabilisation or a slight decline of church religiosity and the growth of sects and sect-like movements within the dominant religious tradition.

Another factor, which may be relevant here is the level of economic development.

Although an economic model of sacrifice and stigma serves to "rationalize" sectarian behavior, it also yields testable implications about the social and economic correlates of sectarianism. For example, it correctly predicts that sectarian groups will attract a disproportionate share of their members from among the poor, less educated, and minority members of a society. (The prediction derives from the fact that the opportunity cost of sect membership is substantially lower for people with limited secular opportunities.) Similarly, the model predicts that a general decline in secular opportunities, such as those occasioned by economic recessions, will encourage the growth of sects relative to more lenient, mainstream groups. (Iannaccone, 1997:106).

In a less economically developed region of Eastern Europe, according to the market model, the most dynamic development will take place in the sector of high tension groups (sects and cults). A typology of religious organisations proposed by Stark and Bainbridge (1987) based on the level of tension and innovation in relation to their environment includes only churches, sects and cults but it may be extended to a fourth element of cultic milieu (with a high level of innovation and a low level of tension).

Figure 1: A typology of religious organisations

Tension	+	Sects	Cults
	-	Churches	Cultic milieu
		-	+
			Innovation

On the ground of both theoretical approaches we could therefore expect a differentiated rate of growth in different sectors of this typology – churches, sects and cultic milieu (in the case of cults, where almost any statistics is lacking, we will not test any predictions). The main area of growth according to the market approach will be the sector of high tension with the sociocultural environment and low innovation related to the activity of sects. According to Thomas Luckmann's theory of religious change, the most significant development will take place in the region of low tension and high innovation related to New Age. In the case of traditional churches both theories will predict their decline. They will lose their position in favor of New Age in Thomas Luckmann's model and higher tension groups in the market model.

2. Data and Methods

To test the predictions based on these two theoretical models I will use the data on church attendance and church participation as the indicators of church religiosity. The main source of these data is International Social Survey Programme gathered in 1991 and in 1998. But because this survey has been conducted only in a few countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 1991 I will use as additional source of data another comparative research programmes as European Value Study and World Value Study, which will make possible the comparisons between the beginning and the end of the nineties to indicate the growth or decline of church religiosity. The main source for data related to sectarian religiosity are statistics published annually by Jehovah's Witnesses in the first number of the year in their periodical "The Watchtower". The data related to New Age come from International Social Survey Programme. The survey data will be aggregated on the level on countries and in such a way (country as the principal unit of analysis) will be used in descriptive, correlational and regression analyses to test the predictions related to the market theory of religion and Theory of Thomas Luckmann.

3. Results

Churches

On the average, church membership in the Western world is higher than in Eastern Europe (with the exception of Poland). In the countries participating in EVS in 1990 – the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary and Slovakia, the proportion of unchurched is 24,1% in comparison to 32,8% in the Western countries participating in the same study). Eastern Europe was, however, significantly differentiated in this matter. The percentage of the unchurched population varies from 3,7% in Poland to over sixty percent in East Germany, Czech Republic and Bulgaria (Ester et al., 1994).

Table 1: Percent of unchurched in Western and Eastern Europe

Country	ISSP 1991	ISSP 1998
Germany	11	15
E.Germany	64	69
UK	33	46
Austria	10	12
Hungary	5	27
Italy	6	7
Ireland	2	5
Netherlands	55	58
Norway	6	10
Sweden		28
CzechRep.		44
Slovenia	11	24
Poland	3	6
Bulgaria		13
Russia	63	33
Spain		14
Latvia		34
Slovakia		16
France		46
Portugal		8
Denmark		11
Switzerland		9

Sources: ISSP 1991 and ISSP1998 (Dataset from: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universität zu Köln)

According to the ISSP data the percentage of the unchurched has remained almost at the same level in EE countries between the years 1991 (mean 29,2%) and 1998 (28,9%) as well as in the Western Europe (17,5% and 20,7%). The differences between both regions are not statistically significant.

Comparisons in time in 5 EE countries and in 7 WE countries indicate greater increase in the percentage of the unchurched in the Western than in the Eastern part of the continent (4,5% and 2,6%) but the differences are not statistically significant. The decline of the percentage of the religious 'nones' is observed only in Russia, whereas in more modernized countries of the region we may witness its growth.

It may be also observed in census data (in those countries where question of religious participation was included in recent censuses). For example in the Czech Republic according to the census of 1991 there were 40% of those who do not belong to any church. Ten years later the proportion of unchurched has grown to 58,3% (45,3% in small communities up to 199 inhabitants and 63,1% in the cities over 100 000). According to the preliminary result of this census published at the website of the Czech Statistical Office, traditional churches have suffered heavy losses, whereas some denominations classified as 'others' have increased 161,4%. Significant differences between countries could be also observed on another indicator of church religiosity – church attendance rates.

The results of these surveys (Table 2), conducted in similar time periods, in some countries are diversified (probably due to the different format of the scale measuring attendance, for example frequency of practices is usually higher in EVS data than in ISSP). At the beginning of the nineties Poland, Ireland, East Germany and Slovenia have had quite different attendance rates according to different surveys. These differences appear at the end of the decade in Poland and Slovenia. (I have no access to the latest editions of WVS and EVS at present moment). They might be the result of different research methodologies, so in comparing these results in time, the best solution is perhaps to use results from the same survey program (ISSP). In this case, however, the number of countries, which could be taken into consideration radically diminishes (especially in Eastern Europe), so if the data for a particular country are lacking we may take the data from other sources. Rose and Haerpfer, (1993) for the beginning, and Aufbruch 1998 for the end of the decade, will be especially useful in supplying data for Eastern Europe, as well as EVS 1990 for the rest of lacking cases.

Table 2: Church attendance rates (at least weekly) in Western and Eastern Europe

Country	EVS 1990	ISSP 1991	WVS 1991-1993	Rose & Haerpfer 1993	ISSP 1998	Aufbruch 1998
Croatia				15		25
Belarus			3	3		
E. Germany	13	4			2	3
Latvia			2		5	
Romania			19	16		25
Lithuania						10
Ukraine				5		8
Hungary	14	12	14	11	15	14
Czech Rep	8		15	12	7	9
Slovenia			23	13	13	20
Poland	66	38	65	54	39	53
Bulgaria	5			5		
Russia		2	2		3	
Slovakia	32			35	30	33
Belgium	27		27			
W. Germany	18	15	18		7	
UK	14	10	14		13	
Austria		17	25		19	
Italy	38	32	37		29	
Ireland	81	65	81		61	
Netherlands	20	17	20		14	
Norway	5	5	5		6	
Sweden	4		4		5	
Spain	30		29		22	
France	10		10		12	
Portugal	39		39		27	
Denmark	3		3		2	
Switzerland			22		44	

Sources: Rose & Haerpfer (1993) and datasets: EVS 1990, WVS 1991-3, ISSP 1991, ISSP 1998, Aufbruch 1998.

The comparison of attendance rates at the beginning and at the end of the decade in Western Europe (11 countries) indicates a small decline (from 20,5% to 19,7%), whereas in Eastern Europe a small growth of attendance rates (from 13,3% to 15,6%) can be noticed. The frequency of church attendance is here still lower than in Western Europe, but growing instead of declining as in the West, so the difference between both regions is diminishing.

Both indicators of church religiosity (church participation and church attendance) are growing in EE countries, although not always to the same degree. A significant growth of church participation in Russia is not reflected in the growth of attendance rates.

Sects

The quantitative data on sects (groups within the dominant religious tradition) are available only in some cases and usually they are provided by the movements themselves. The most detailed statistical information is published annually by Jehovah's Witnesses, in the first numbers of their journal 'The Watchtower'. Their reports on membership are rather conservative and include only the most devoted members. Therefore they are usually lower than the data from censuses (Stark and Iannaccone, 1997). Jehovah's Witnesses are present in EE for several decades but it is the last decade, when they record a significant growth in this region. Although the statistical data show high rates of growth in percentages (greater than in Western Europe, where they never exceed 5 per year) but in absolute numbers of committed followers or in relation to the population, the figures are usually smaller than in Western Europe.

In the case of almost all EE countries we may observe (Table 3) the growth of the rate of publishers to the total population in the years 1995-1999 (22% on the average), whereas in almost all WE countries (with the exception of Italy and Portugal) we may note a decline at the same time period (-4%). The difference in the rate of growth between the two regions is statistically significant ($p > ,000$). Eastern Europe is, however, differentiated in the rate of growth of this religious group between former Soviet Union and Central-Eastern Europe. After the initial high rates of growth at the beginning of the nineties in both regions of Eastern Europe, we observe a slowing down of their dynamics in the second half of the decade, especially in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe. The patterns of growth here are more similar to the countries of Western Europe than those for the countries of the former Soviet Union.

Table 3: Number of citizens per each active member of Jehovah's Witnesses ('publisher') in each country in the years 1990-1999.

Country	1990	1992	1995	1999
Croatia	,	1326	1043	893
Yugoslavia	3388	5001	3321	2620
Belarus	,	,	5180*	4038
Estonia	,	,	551	386
E. Germany	784	,	,	,
Latvia	,	,	2579	1238
Romania	1217	938	678	593
Lithuania	,	,	2256	1578
Ukraine	,	,	868	468
Hungary	994	820	605	488
Czech Rep		,	612	616
Slovenia	,	1335	1149	1061
Poland	400	355	311	312
Bulgaria	,	34004	12977	8230
Russia	,	,	2217**	1379
Slovakia	,	612	437	435
Belgium	393	375	363	392
Germany	468	496	479	490
UK	463	444	432	467
Austria	402	391	384	394
Italy	318	297	271	252
Ireland	1474	1266	1144	1174
Netherlands	475	478	470	502
Norway	439	440	428	455
Sweden	377	367	358	376
Spain	465	427	388	387
France	495	475	459	495
Portugal	268	231	211	201
Denmark	319	315	324	353
Switzerland	403	387	381	394

Sources: "The Watchtower" * – 1997. ** – 1996.

New Age

Researches conducted in some countries of Eastern Europe usually show a high level of acceptance of New Age beliefs. Polish university students, surveyed at the end of the eighties, outdistanced their western colleagues in their acceptance of the occult beliefs and this tendency seems to be continued in the nineties (Doktór, 1996). Among 17-18 years old Hungarians, 35,5% believe in reincarnation, 49,6% in telepathy, 43,8 % in UFO's and 45% in God (Tomka, 1996). In the International Social Survey Program in 1991 and in 1998 some questions concerning the parallel beliefs have been asked. Three items may be used to measure New Age beliefs: 'Some fortune tellers really can foresee the future'; 'Some faith healers really do have God-given healing powers'; 'A person's star signs at birth, or horoscope, can affect the course of their future'. They were coded on a four point Likert scale ranging from 'definitely false' (1) to 'definitely true' (4) and form a scale with Cronbach Alpha =,77). This scale, however, do not include items related to oriental beliefs, which constitute another important dimension of New Age beliefs (Doktór, 1999).

Table 4: Acceptance of New Age beliefs (means)

Country	1991	1998
Latvia		2,86
E. Germany	1,85	1,87
Hungary		2,10
Czech Rep		2,61
Slovenia	2,44	
Bulgaria		2,66
Russia		2,58
Slovakia		2,68
W. Germany	2,00	2,20
UK		
Austria	2,14	2,10
Ireland	1,99	2,17
Netherlands		1,82
France		2,10
Portugal		1,91
Switzerland		2,28

Source: ISSP 1991 and 1998 (Dataset from: Zentralarchive für Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universität zu Köln)

Comparative data from ISSP91 include only a few countries, where the questions concerning parallel beliefs have been asked (in the case of EE countries it was only East Germany and Slovenia). In the 1998 edition of this program, there were a few more countries, where these questions have been asked but only Eastern and Western Germany, Austria, and Ireland may be compared with the first edition of this program. In comparison to the results of the survey from the 1991 we may observe a decline of acceptance of New Age beliefs in one country and growth in three countries, in which the same questions were asked. These results tend to confirm the expectations based on Thomas Luckmann interpretations of New Age predicting the growth of this phenomenon. In all three countries the growth of New Age is also accompanied by decline in church attendance (see Table 2). The confirmation is, however, related only to the comparisons in time, because results based only on ISSP data from 1998 – tend to falsify this interpretation. The acceptance of parallel beliefs in a less modernized Eastern Europe is higher than in the Western part of the continent (mean 2,48 and 2,08 respectively) and the differences are statistically significant even on the aggregated level. Similar results may be obtained from correlational analysis using the data for the countries as cases.

Table 5: Pearson's correlations between analyzed variables

		GDP 1998	Attendance rate 1998	Publisher's growth rate 1995-99
Attendance rate 1998	R Sign. N	,001 ,998 25		
Publisher's growth rate 1995-99	R Sign. N	-,714 ,000 28	-,250 ,227 25	
New Age beliefs acceptance rate 1998	R Sign. N	-,602 ,029 13	-,146 ,634 13	,650 ,016 13

New Age beliefs are more widespread in the countries with a lower level of economic development as measured by GDP, which falsifies the Thomas Luckmann's model of religious change. New age is stronger in less modernized countries, contrary to his expectations. Even stronger is the negative correlation between GDP and percent of growth of Jehovah's Witnesses, which supports both theoretical models. Sectarian religiosity flourishes in less affluent and less modernized countries. Church religiosity is not related to GDP but tend to be

inversely related to both forms of alternative religiosity as predicted by both models. The correlation is, however, rather small and not statistically significant.

To take into account the possible effects of the interrelationship between independent variables we will also conduct the multiple regression analysis.

Table 6: Regression analysis with a rate of ‘publishers’ in relation to the population and with acceptance of New Age beliefs as dependent variables

	Publisher’s growth rate 1995-1999		New Age beliefs acceptance rate 1998	
	Beta	Sign.	Beta	Sign.
(Constant)		,000		,000
Attendance rate 1998	-,250	,105	-,040	,895
GDP1998	-,676	,000	-,543	,101
Adj. Rsq.	,48		,16	

GDP is the only significant predictor of the growth rate of Jehovah’s Witnesses (which supports the market model), although the attendance rate is approaching the level of statistical significance. In the case of acceptance of New Age beliefs there are no significant predictors but GDP is approaching the level of statistical significance in the predicted direction.

4. Conclusions

Among the three forms of religious life, church and sectarian religiosity, although still weaker in Eastern than Western Europe, manifest a tendency to grow, whereas in Western Europe are on the decline. The differences between both regions are more pronounced in the case of sectarian religiosity. The main factor influencing these differences is the level of economic development. Eastern Europe and especially countries of former Soviet Union are significantly lower on GDP and in some countries this indicator was even declining during the decade. As the market model predicts, ‘a general decline in secular opportunities, such as those occasioned by economic recessions, will encourage the growth of sects relative to more lenient, mainstream groups’ (Iannaccone, 1997:106). Therefore we may interpret these results as confirming the predictions of this model. They could be also interpreted as confirming Thomas Luckmann’s model, but in this case the confirmation is not so obvious. Although for this author, transformations in the economy are one of factors underlying the modernisation process, it is not the principal factor and the relationship between the economic

growth and the religious change is not emphasized in his model to the same extent as pluralism and structural differentiation. The EE countries, although sometimes declining in economy, are advancing in modernisation understood as growing pluralism and structural differentiation. Nevertheless, they are still less advanced in this process than the countries of Western Europe.

In the case of New Age beliefs, they are growing, where church religiosity is declining (in a few countries of Western Europe and in former East Germany, one of the most modernized country of Eastern Europe). This is confirming the prediction based on the Thomas Luckmann model. However, the data from the 1998 edition of ISSP abate its predictions. The main correlate here is also economic development. It is significant as bivariate correlate of New Age but in regression analysis it is only approaching the level of statistical significance. In both cases, the results are contrary to the expectations of Thomas Luckmann model. New Age beliefs are more widespread in the countries with a lower level of GDP, whereas this model predicts their growth with the advances of modernisation. The market model has no specific predictions concerning New Age. But it may be assumed that because New Age includes specific compensators, it may also involve, to some extent, the similar compensatory mechanism as in the case of sects and some New Age beliefs, especially more traditional (occult) ones as in our data, may have higher acceptance among the socially deprived. More innovatory New Age beliefs include elements of the oriental traditions both in their form (religious inclusiveness and universalism) and content (reincarnation or impersonal concept of divinity). The number of the analyzed countries is also in this case over twice as much smaller than in the case of sect religiosity and the operationalisation of New Age beliefs rather narrow, which may imply some reservations in the interpretation of these results.

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Stipe Tadić and Vine Mihaljević

**ECCLESIASTICAL MOVEMENTS IN CROATIA: SOME
INDICATORS OF MUTUAL ACQUAINTANCE AND
TOLERANCE**

1. Introduction

The presence and more engaged activity of the new ecclesiastical movements in the Catholic Church in Croatia emerged at the end of the 60s and in the 70s. It seems that the two almost coinciding factors had a decisive role in these events. The first one is a loosening up of the rigorous and repressive restraints of the Communists regime with respect to religion and the Catholic Church and its relative opening to the Western democratic societies where some ecclesiastical movements have already got deep-rooted, which enabled at that time the 'import' of some of those movements to Croatia. The second factor is the Second Vatican Council and the opening of the Catholic Church to the world (Aggiornamento). Establishing the dialogue of the Catholic Church with modern society and its opening to the world have considerably inspired the gathering of the laypersons in the new ecclesiastical movements. In a broader sense the new ecclesiastical movements belong to new religious movements which appeared after the World War II and share their common features (Barker, 1989), but contrary to other movements they are at least implicitly recognized by the Church authorities and the local bishop, as acting under the umbrella of the local church, parish and/or diocese (Christifideles laici, 1990:30; Favale, 1991:531; J. Baloban, 1993:49).

Besides these fundamental factors, a global change of religious situation by the end of the 60s and onwards should also be mentioned. Namely, at that time, in addition to all the complexity and an increasing phenomenon of secularisation, 'theology of the dead God' and contesting, religion is back to the scene. Moreover, it became a real 'hit' among the students and the young in general. So, with good reason, sociology of religion does not speak any more of "the descent of the holy" (S. Acquaviva, 1966), "the secularized city" (H. Cox,

1967), but of “the return of the holy” and the revitalisation of religion instead. After an unsuccessful attempt to reinterpret the ‘new religious revival’, new religious and ecclesiastical movements in a thematic set of secularisation, these issues have become in different aspects ‘privileged’ topics of the sociology of religion (Tadić, 2002).

On a global religious plan it was manifested especially in ‘the religions of the young’, ‘the New Religious Movements, while at that time, a new charismatic movement emerges within the Catholic Church and some earlier ecclesiastical movements regain new enthusiasm and motivation inspired by the Second Vatican Council. So, it seems that such a spiritual situation in the Catholic Church strongly echoed through the changed social and ecclesiastical setting in Croatia as well.

The new ecclesiastical movements, as well as the New Religious Movements, are a believers’ response to the new religious and social situation in society and to the challenges of time (Greely, 1979, Harvieu-Léger, 1987, Jukić, 1991). Proliferation of different ecclesiastical and religious movements and groups are, by all means, the signs of modern religious revival. A strong religious personal experience, new religious practice and more engaged activity of the members of the ecclesiastical movements in the Catholic Church and in society, generate changes and the resurgence of the socio-cultural and religious situation. All this leads to the new pluralisation of already plural religious offer in Croatian society, but at the same time, to a certain, even though, latent fideism and (sectarian) inaccessibility.

This study examines how much the members of a particular ecclesiastical movement who participated in this research, are acquainted with charisma¹, respectively, with the fundamental mission, activity and spirituality of another movement (the movement the respondent belonged to, was not assessed), then to what extent the members of an ecclesiastical movement cooperate with other ecclesiastical movements. The focus of our interest was also a response to the question what the members of such movement think about the attitude of their movement towards the Christian sects and the New Religious Movements that are not of the Christian provenance². In this way we wanted to assess the level

¹ The term ‘charisma’ in this text means the fundamental mission, specific activity and spirituality of a particular ecclesiastical movement. Namely, the interviewed members of the ecclesiastical lay movements do not understand this term in the sociological (scientific) Weber’s sense of an exquisite personal gift of an individual, but as a specific basic mission, communitarian activity and spirituality of a certain ecclesiastical lay movement.

² Sects are the forms of a religious community within Christianity and which break contacts with the Churches from which they derive. The New Religious Movements have appeared mostly after

of acquaintance with the activity and spirituality of another ecclesiastical movement and the readiness to cooperate with other movements.

2. The main characteristics of the ecclesiastical movements

The new ecclesiastical movements stem from the church 'basis' of the believers (Tadić, 2002). They do not establish themselves, but emerge, happen, start, live. Their initiators are laypersons, namely, the believers who do not belong to the clerical hierarchy of the Catholic Church. They represent a response to various socio-cultural and religious challenges of time. These movements are mostly marked by ecclesiasticism, strongly shown dimension of community, by personal religious experience incited by sensation of the Holy Spirit, manifested in human reality, by the ecumenical openness, the openness to the young people, the spiritual and evangelical resurgence, the uniqueness and specificity of the holiness of the Christian life. The Second Vatican Council contributed to the emerging of the new ecclesiastical movements while (besides the ministerial) emphasizing the general priesthood of all the baptized, what has become a theological presumption for the laypersons to engage more and have a more influential role in the Catholic Church and in the world.

Therefore we might say that the Catholic Church itself was the very source and origin of the lay turmoil and development and the motivation for emerging of the new lay movements, respectively, in the changing circumstances in the world, the Catholic Church did not prevent but encouraged their rising. For that reason it is understandable why the sociologists (J. Ségué, 1973, D. Hervieu-Léger, 1990) tried to interpret the new ecclesiastical movements, as well as the charismatic revival as the "shock" of modernity and the turbulent post-Council times in the Catholic Church. There was also an attempt to explain these movements as a protest of laypersons against the ecclesiastical control or as a protest against the monopoly of clergy in the area of the sacral, and finally, as an attitude of an individual or of a group, respectively, a community.

After the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church in Croatia also experienced various spiritual lines of force among the laymen, lay turmoil and ecclesiastical movements. They act and are engaged in the Church and in the

the World War II. They are offering the means and services aimed at acquiring transcendental knowledge and spiritual enlightenment of an individual. These movements include the fundamentalist-oriented Christian groups, groups that assume the religious concepts of the East, especially Hinduism and Buddhism, and psychological-therapeutic groups (comp. H. Knoblauch, 2004:183-238).

world primarily through the group, communitarian functions. They exist and function on the principles and laws of other bigger or smaller groups. The majority of them emerged, as mentioned earlier, from the 'basis' of the believers, but still with the presence of the priest and within the clerical, hierarchic part of the Church. They have no firm organisation, they are not established by any legislative stipulation and are not found in a form of an organisation, nor have they been established by a decree or the wish of the Church hierarchy. The bishops of the former Yugoslavia emphasize the criteria of the ecclesiastical of the various groups and movements – small Christian communities – that represent important places and bearers of the Evangelic, more true upbringing in faith and a valuable contribution to the revival of the Church, “unless they separate from the universal or local Church and their leadership” (Bishops of Yugoslavia, 1983:72).

From the beginning of their activity until today, the Catholic ecclesiastical movements did not have a prominent social engagement. As a matter of fact, they remained on the edge of the ecclesiastical events, partly because of the “harsh attitude of the Church authorities”, partly because “priests find it hard to give up the established forms of pastoral activity and do not accept or barely accept new forms and offers”, or perhaps because members of ecclesiastical movements “abandon their own parish” (Ivančić, 1981:252). All this emphasizes a latent tension between the hierarchic Church and the ecclesiastical lay movements. After democratic changes in Croatian society, in the transitional period of the last years, both, the leaders of certain movements and the members of the hierarchic top of the Catholic Church in Croatia, feel the need for stronger cooperation of the movements and for a coordination body, or an umbrella organisation covering all the movements (Vijeće za laike Hrvatske biskupske konferencije – *Council for Laypersons of the Croatian Bishop Conference* 2002:707-759).

3. Methodology

This research examines the selective groups in the Catholic Church in Croatia with a purpose to collect as more socio-religious data about the Catholic lay movements and their members³ as possible. The research included

³ The authors did the research of the ecclesiastical lay movements in Croatia (belief, practice, perception /insight/, religious experience-experience of religion and belonging) within the religious context “Globalisation and (post)modern ecclesiastical and religious movements” in the Institute of Social Sciences “Ivo Pilar”, Zagreb.

the following movements: “The Prayer and Word Community” (Zajednica Molitva i Riječ – MiR), “Focolare Movement” (Djelo Marijino – Pokret fokolara), “Marriage Encounters Community” (Zajednica bračnih susreta), “Cursillo” (Mali tečaj – Kursiljo), “Franciscan Youth” (FRAMA), “Franciscan Secular Order” (Franjevački svjetovni red), Charismatic Renewal Movement (Pokret karizmatičke obnove) and “Neocatechumenal Way” (Neokatekumenski Put). Besides the listed movements, the questionnaire offered an open possibility of belonging to some other not listed movement. In such a case, the respondents wrote the name of the movement themselves.⁴

The expected size of the sample was 700 respondents, but 549 were realized. (Note: in this sample of 700, we expected to question 100 respondents of the Neocatechumenal Way, but after having agreed to participate in the research and accepted the questionnaires, they refused to hand the filled questionnaires in. The program of this movement regarding the formation of its members, emphasizes the inappropriateness of the psychological and sociological techniques. Therefore, their restraint with respect to this research is understandable to a degree.) In agreement with them, we distributed the questionnaires to the leaders of some ecclesiastical lay movements, who, by random selection, distributed them further to the members of their movement in the period from the 25th of June to the 10th of August. After that the questionnaires were returned to the leaders, which they handed in to the researchers or sent by mail.

The analysis of the mutual acquaintance of the spirituality and the activities of the members of the ecclesiastical movements, the cooperation of the members and the attitude of a certain movement towards the sects and other religious movements was carried out by introducing the values starting with ‘I am not familiar at all’ to ‘I am familiar to a large extent’, respectively from exclusive to inclusive attitudes of a certain movement.

In presenting the results, we used frequencies, percentages and arithmetic means from the descriptive statistics.

⁴ This possibility was mainly chosen by the members of the ‘charismatic movements’. Namely, the respondents interviewed in the House for renewal “Tabor” – Samobor expressed their belonging to other movements and wrote charismatic movement after conferring with the leader of the charismatic community.


4. The research results

4. 1. Familiarity with the fundamental mission, spirituality and the activities of other movements

One of the questions in the questionnaire was: “How familiar are you with the charisma, respectively, with the fundamental mission, the activities and spirituality of other ecclesiastical lay movements?” Familiarity with the spirituality and the activities of other ecclesiastical movements, without assessing their own movement, was measured according to: *totally unfamiliar with, mostly unfamiliar with, more or less familiar with, mostly familiar with, and familiar with to a large extent*. The members of the movements are reproached of “elitism”, “sectarianism”, self-sufficiency and inaccessibility, mostly by a hierarchic part of the Catholic Church (Ivančić, 1990).

Graph 1 shows us how familiar respondents from certain ecclesiastical movements are with the charisma, respectively, the basic mission, spirituality, and the activities of other ecclesiastical movements.

Graph 1: The extent of familiarity that members of certain ecclesiastical movements have with spiritual values and activities of other ecclesiastical movements (%)




The results show a generally high level of unfamiliarity with the activities and spirituality of other ecclesiastical movements, especially the activities and spirituality of the Schönstadt family (62.6 per cent), Mary's Congregation (47.7 per cent) and the movement "MI" (40.6 per cent). There is a slightly higher level of the acquaintance with the charisma, respectively, the fundamental mission, spirituality and the activities of the Prayer and Word Community (19.3 per cent), Franciscan Secular Order (19.4 per cent) and the movement of Franciscan Youth (21.9 per cent).

The results shown on Graph 2 reveal an average acquaintance of the respondents with spirituality, the charisma, respectively, the basic mission and the activities of other ecclesiastical movements.

On the average, the respondents are familiar the most with the lay movement of the Franciscan Youth (FRAMA), the Franciscan Secular Order and the Prayer and Word Community, while they are the least familiar with the charisma, respectively, the basic mission, the activities and spirituality of the Schönstadt Family, Mary's Congregation and the movement "MI".

Graph 2: Average level of familiarity of respondents with the charisma and spirituality of certain ecclesiastical laymen movements



The average familiarity of the respondents with the charisma, the activities and spirituality of other lay movements, while not declaring themselves about their own movement, was measured by values from 1 to 5. Value 1 corresponds to the statement *totally unfamiliar with*, 2 corresponds to *mostly not familiar with*, 3 to *more or less familiar with*, 4 *mostly familiar with* and 5 *familiar with to a large extent*.

The results confirm the hypothesis that the members of the ecclesiastical movements are mostly limited to the activities within their own movement and that there is no sufficient familiarity with the charisma, respectively with the basic mission, the activities and spirituality of other ecclesiastical lay movements, was justified. Consequently, we can say with reason that the interviewed ecclesiastical movements, with their inaccessibility and focus only on their own sphere of action, their lack of communication with other movements, have certain features of the sects in the Catholic Church.


4. 2. Cooperation of the members of certain movements with other movements

One of the questions referred to the cooperation of the respondents with other ecclesiastical movements: "To what extent do you cooperate with other ecclesiastical movements?" We measured the cooperation of the respondents with other ecclesiastical movements (without their declaring about cooperation within their own movement) using the values: *I cooperate to a great extent, mostly cooperate, more or less cooperate, mostly do not cooperate and do not cooperate at all*.

The following graph clearly indicates a prevailing lack of cooperation between the movements. After a very poor acquaintance with the activities and spirituality of other ecclesiastical lay movements, it is hardly surprising to find such a high level of non-cooperation of the respondents with other movements. *Ignoti nulla cupido!* So 77.6 per cent of the respondents do not cooperate with the Schönstadt family at all and 74.2 per cent do not cooperate with Mary's Deed (Focolare Movement).

It is notably a low percentage (below 10 per cent) of the respondents that cooperate with the movements the Prayer and Word Community (8,5 per cent), the Franciscan Youth (9,0 per cent) and the Franciscan Secular Order (9,5 per cent), as shown on Graph 3.


Graph 3: To what extent do respondents cooperate with other ecclesiastical movements (%)



The results show a high level of non-cooperation of the members of the interviewed ecclesiastical lay movements with other ecclesiastical lay movements. This is a logical consequence considering the fact that a high percentage of the members of ecclesiastical lay movements is not familiar with the charisma, respectively, the basic mission, spirituality and the activities of other ecclesiastical movements.

On the other hand, the members of some ecclesiastical lay movements are familiar the most with the lay church movements of the Franciscan provenance with whom they cooperate to the largest extent. We should emphasize too that the results show a higher level of the acquaintance and cooperation with an also original lay church movement in Croatia: The Prayer and the Word (MiR). This is shown on Graph 4.

Graph 4: A display of the average level of cooperation between members of ecclesiastical movements and certain other ecclesiastical movements (their own movement excluded)




4. 3. The attitude of some movements towards the sects

The next question is related to the attitude of the members of the interviewed ecclesiastical lay movements towards the Christian sects. To the question: "What is the attitude of your movement towards the sects?", the following answers were offered: "*acknowledging*", "*indifferent*", "*not acknowledging*" and "*disqualifying*". After the results showing a high level of unfamiliarity with the charisma, respectfully, the basic mission, spirituality and the activities of other ecclesiastical movements and the lack of cooperation with them, the results of their attitude towards the sects are hardly surprising. Namely, the attitude towards the sects is, to a great extent, determined by previously declared attitudes of the members of the interviewed ecclesiastical movements.

The results presented in Graph 5 show that one third of the respondents (32.2 per cent) considers their movement has a disqualifying attitude towards

the sects. Slightly more than one third (34.3 per cent) claims their movement does not recognize them, while 22.1 per cent claims the attitude of their movement is indifferent. Only 11.4 per cent of the respondents have an acknowledging attitude towards the sects. So, the two thirds of the respondents (66.5 per cent) consider their movements have a negative attitude towards the sects.

Graph 5: Attitude of members of ecclesiastical movements towards sects (%)



Graph 5 illustrates the mentioned attitudes. The results question the openness of the members of the interviewed ecclesiastical lay movements to the ecumenical activities in our region. Investigating the reasons of such an attitude of the ecclesiastical lay movements towards the sects exceeds the context of this study.


However, it should only be mentioned that during the war and the post-war period, there was a general mistrust in other people and different views. In this period there was very little sympathy even for some Christian sects that associated their proselytizing activities with their humanitarian work in order to persuade new members to join their Christian denomination. Besides this, we would also like to mention that for the members of the ecclesiastical lay

movements the term 'sect' does not have a neutral meaning, but rather more pejorative one.

4. 4. The attitude of certain movements towards the new religious movements (NRM)

The following question was: "What is the attitude of your movement towards the NRM?" and the offered answers: *acknowledging*, *indifferent*, *not acknowledging* and *disqualifying*.

Graph 6: Acknowledgement of new religious movements by the respondent's movement (%)



Over one third of the respondents declared their movement has an acknowledging attitude towards the NRM (36,6 per cent), 18,4 per cent indifferent, 26,0 per cent not acknowledging, and 19,0 percent disqualifying, as shown in Graph 6.

Members of the interviewed church lay movements have shown far more positive attitude of their movement towards the NRM of the non-Christian provenance than towards the sects of the Christian provenance. This shows a relatively high readiness and openness of certain interviewed church movements to the inter-religious dialogue.

5. Conclusion

A modern religious revival, resulted in the new religious and new ecclesiastical lay movements, as well, is focused on the concern of the meaning of the human existence. Religion (only) gives the (valid) answers to the questions of the global meaning. Therefore, it is understandable why the authentic religious dimensions of life got rehabilitated in the new religious and church lay movements: the questions of the absolute meaning of the human existence, searching for the full meaning of one's own life, unappeasable searching for a personal sensation of the holy. Especially promising is a possibility of the personal, direct sensation of the holy.

All these are the questions that modern secularisation has completely marginalized. This is the reason why the anti-secularisation dimensions of life are strongly emphasized in the modern religious revival. The very thing that had preceded the anti-secularisation processes on a global social scale, and what has been clearly manifested in the NRM and the ecclesiastical lay movements, was a total undermining of the foundations and destroying the religious contents of the world of modernism. Foremost, it is the belief in sciences, linear progress, fake promises of the social utopia, spectacular terminating of great ideologies, respectively, worldly religions and their transcending into the mentalities. The modern religious revival represents a strong anti-secularisation process. NRM, the new ecclesiastical lay movements and the 'religions of the young' at the end of the 60s are a quite obvious evidence of this phenomenon.

The new ecclesiastical lay movements, as we already mentioned, emerge in the Catholic Church in Croatia by the end of the 60s and in the 70s. At these post-Council times a very intense religious life awakens and grows in the Catholic Church – and a charismatic movement emerges.

For the purpose of this research, we were interested, firstly, in the topic of the intra-church dialogue 'ad intra', respectively, in the mutual acquaintance and cooperation of the members of different ecclesiastical lay movements. After that, our intention was to assess the willingness, or unwillingness of the members of the ecclesiastical lay movement for a dialogue 'ad extra': readiness for ecumenical activities (the attitude towards the sects of the Christian provenance) and for an inter-religions dialogue (the attitude towards the New Religious Movements).

The results of the research show that the members of the interviewed ecclesiastical lay movements are poorly acquainted with the charisma,

respectively the fundamental mission, the activities and spirituality of other ecclesiastical lay movements they don't belong to. Obviously, this caused the unwillingness of the members for cooperation with the members of other movements. So, the lack of communication among the members of different movements is not surprising. Establishing of one umbrella organisation, respectively a coordination body of the ecclesiastical movements in Croatia, would probably help better communication, openness, knowledge and cooperation of the members of the ecclesiastical movements. It is 'ad intra' dialogue within the Catholic Church, we are speaking of.

Further, the obtained results demonstrate that the attitude of a specific movement towards the sects of the Christian provenance is to a great extent negative and disqualifying, while considering the new non-Christian religious movements, it is rather positive. First of all, the very fact that the attitude towards the NRM is considerably more affirmative than to the sects, is quite surprising.

A relatively closed atmosphere within the interviewed ecclesiastical movements contributes to the (sectarian) inaccessibility as well, as to a quite negative attitude towards a further pluralisation of the already plural religious scene in the Croatian society. This in turn generates new tensions and intolerance, and sometimes exclusivism. Such results were indisputably influenced by recent war events, problems and tensions of the transitional period of the Croatian society.

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Péter Török

**COLLECTION OF DESCRIPTIVE DATA ON NEW
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS: OBSTACLES AND A
PROPOSAL***

1. Introduction

The scientific study of new religious movements began in the early seventies, about thirty years ago¹. As a result, a significant amount of publications appeared focusing not only on specific NRMs or issues related to them² but also on the methodological considerations of their exploration. The prospect for convergence of research in social movements and in NRMs was also investigated (Mauss 1993). In the course of time, however, several problems surfaced, one of which has seemed to be rather lasting. This problem is the collection of systematic and reliable basic descriptive data of NRMs.

My study, eventually offering at least a partial solution to this problem, consists of two main parts. In the first one, I discuss briefly the obstacles of systematic research. It is followed by a short description of suggested solutions and the attempted realisations. The second part contains my suggestion, with some evaluative remarks resulting from its application to the investigation of Hungarian NRMs in 2002.

* The financial support of NATO Advanced Scholarship (2001) contributed to the realisation of this project.

¹ Some researches date the rising of their interest back to the sixties. C.f. Melton (1995:265). Melton's article appeared in a thematic edition of *Social Compass* entitled "20 Years On: Changes in New Religious Movements".

² It would grow beyond the boundaries of this study to list all of the movements and the topics discussed in the literature. I mention only a time-tested classic, Barker's *The Making of a Moonie* (1984), which not only describes a movement but also investigates one of the topics most frequently connected with NRMs, brainwashing.

2. The Obstacles of Systematic Research, Some Suggestions and their Realisations

Sociologists noted as early as 1985 that one of the difficulties in the scientific study of NRMs is the lack of basic descriptive data³. According to Robbins, “comparative and theoretical inferences from the available data are impeded by the non-standardisation of data collection techniques and foci” (1988:16). Despite the early warnings, scientists were more involved in the methodological problems of *particular* interests in researching NRMs, which might be explained by the controversial issues surrounding at least some of these movements. The titles of the chapters in Barker’s practical introduction (1995) or in Wilson and Cresswell’s edited work (1999) investigating the areas where NRMs have affected contemporary societies reveal these issues⁴.

The *systematic* research of these movements with the aim of gaining basic descriptive data has concerned only a few scholars. Robbins’ “Note on Methods” (1988) lists several general problems afflicting most scientific works on NRMs, including the inadequate methods of collecting data. He also observes that “sociological journals do not like to publish ‘mere’ descriptive accounts, and thus sociologists’ descriptions become abbreviated and distorted in order to be accommodated to the ‘theoretical’ embellishment necessary for publications” (1988:16). Richardson, Balch and Melton (1993) identify six major problems of contemporary research. These are the (1) abundance of one-shot research designs, the (2) compounded accounts, the lack of (3) longitudinal research, (4) replication and standardized instrumentation, the (5) difficulties surfacing from data collected at therapy settings, and (6) the limitations of research conducted among “happy members”. In their words, “considerable data have been amassed, but often the data have been gathered in ways not allowing easy comparisons. Many studies therefore are idiosyncratic and difficult to relate to other research. Different concepts and theoretical perspectives are used, and limited ad hoc methodologies discourage comparisons” (1993:214). What is even more alarming, as Richardson *et al.* note, very little

³ Balch (1985).

⁴ These issues in Barker’s book (1995) include conversion vs mind control (Chapter 2); deception, physical violence and criminal activities (Chapter 5); suicide, drugs, finances, confessions (Chapter 6); sexual practices, attitude towards women, children (Chapter 7); detachment, isolation and dependancy, totalitarian authoritarianism (Chapter 8); the breaking up of families, strains between non-NRM members of the family, ‘mixed marriages’ (Chapter 9); and parents’ reactions (Chapter 10).

has improved in this regard since the mid-eighties, because “suggestions for systematic data gathering ... have rarely been followed” (1993:215).

For a possible solution, Balch, Robbins, Richardson, and Melton⁵ suggested that sociologists should construct something akin to anthropologists’ Human Relations Area Files (HRAF), in which seventeen categories of classifiable data are identified. These basic categories of such data are the

- (1) demographic characteristics of membership;
- (2) historical development;
- (3) structure and content of belief system;
- (4) leadership;
- (5) social organisation;
- (6) relationship of members to outsiders;
- (7) economic practices;
- (8) material culture;
- (9) patterns of everyday life;
- (10) talk patterns;
- (11) sexual patterns;
- (12) child rearing;
- (13) deviance and social control;
- (14) recruitment strategies;
- (15) commitments and sacrifices required of members;
- (16) socialisation techniques;
- (17) conversion patterns; and
- (17) defection patterns (Robbins 1988:16).

However, it has been noted that the volatile nature and effervescence of NRMs “which sift their patterns in response to the inspirations of gurus as well as environmental pressures will undercut any program of cataloguing groups on the model of the anthropological files”⁶.

Some scholars tried to solve this problem by mailing questionnaires to the movements. As far as I know, two such attempts⁷ have been made with different results. The London-based INFORM ended up with a 30 percent response rate⁸, however, the undertaking of the Japanese RIRC resulted a 70 percent return rate⁹. Apart from the uncertainty of the response rate, the reliability of the answers is also questionable in this way. The obvious question to be raised is

⁵ Robbins (1988), Balch (1985), Richardson et. al. (1993:215).

⁶ Robbins (1988:16). With regard to the environmental pressures, Török (2000) notes, that in the area of the former Communist bloc, even the disappearance of the anti-religious system did not create confidence and trust to conduct appropriate research among NRMs.

⁷ Here I am counting only those attempts where questionnaires containing something similar to HRAF were mailed.

⁸ Personal communication with Eileen Barker, the founder and leader of INFORM, in November 2001. A short description of INFORM can be seen in Barker (1995:141-144). The colleagues of INFORM also provided me with the questionnaire, which was used, although in a much more detailed form in my research.

⁹ Personal communication with Dr. Keishin Inaba, then research associate of Centre de Recherches sur le Japon, in 2003. Dr. Inaba also mentioned that the homepage of RIRC would provide further information, but the homepage is only in Japanese. I also conducted the leader of RIRC, but as of 19 July, 2003, I received no further information, therefore, I cannot confirm their return rate.

whether it would be possible to improve this method without encountering the time constraints of researchers facing the volatile NRMs.

3. A Possible Solution of Collecting Reliable Descriptive Data

3. 1. Semi-Structured Interviews with the Leaders of NRMs

My suggestion is that a semi-structured interview with the leaders of NRMs supplemented later with observations and other techniques, e.g. surveys, might be – at least a partial – solution to the problem. The development and conduct of semi-structured interviews was the first phase of a three-staged systematic research of Hungarian NRMs¹⁰. This stage is followed by a questionnaire survey conducted among the members of several movements. In the third phase, the creeds of NRMs, collected during the semi-structured interviews, would be analyzed. Obviously, interviewing the leaders of all NRMs is not everywhere possible; in North America it would probably be unfeasible. But in our region of Central and Eastern Europe, it is more attainable, because of the relatively low number of NRMs¹¹. Furthermore, some sort of registration of religious organisations in most of the former Communist countries is required enabling researchers to contact the leaders relatively easily. After reaching a certain level of development or institutional organisation, it is in the interest of most of the NRMs to be heard and, so to speak, ‘socially recognized’¹². We can always explain to the hesitant leaders that it is better for them to speak for themselves than to gain information from their real or perceived enemies. In 1996 and 1997, the present author was able to conduct interviews with 48 of the then 55 Hungarian registered NRMs¹³. Finally, a repeated interview in a few years would provide a relatively simple means to see and document the changes

¹⁰ The research has been envisaged and undertaken by the Department for the Study of Religions, University of Szeged (Hungary).

¹¹ Compared to the estimated 10,000 African, the 800 to a few thousand Japanese, or the 2,000 European NRMs (Barker 1999:16), the Hungarians named about 250 religious organisations to which they belonged at the 2001 Census (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 2002). However, this number must be further reduced because people used several different names for the same religious group. The final number would be between 150 and 180. Personal communications with colleagues in Romania and Ukraine revealed similar proportions.

¹² I am not denying the fact that some groups have and maintain an anti-social attitude. However, the experience I gained from the Hungarian research is that their proportion is rather small. Some of these groups in the second round of asking for interviews agreed without hesitation.

¹³ C.f. Török (2000). Obviously, unregistered NRMs must be contacted as well. However, my experience is that most of them are as cooperative as the registered NRMs, partly because they also want to be ‘socially recognized’.

in the life of a NRM. In other words, the conduct of longitudinal studies would be made easier.

The semi-structured interview,¹⁴ as it is presented in the Appendix of this study, is a rather structured interview. However, it is evident from the letter¹⁵, which is to be sent to the leaders prior to the interview, I encourage them to express themselves openly and fully on particular topics. Furthermore, certain questions naturally invite the comments of the leaders.

Before discussing the main parts of the questionnaire, a problem of terminology must be clarified. Some of these movements expressed their antagonism with and dislike for the expression of new religious movements¹⁶. However, the Hungarian legal nomenclature solved this problem, because it simply calls any religious organisation a 'church' (Schanda 2001). This is the reason why in the interview, and occasionally in this paper¹⁷, I referred to all of these movements as churches.

3. 2. The Structure of the Interview

There are seven main parts of the interview, which begins with the protocol. My intention of taping the interviews is mentioned both in the letter and the protocol. It is conceivable that the leaders would not approve of it, therefore I also mention that I take notes simultaneously. I do not offer it as an alternative, rather it is a safety-measure or device to ensure data-recording.

The following part inquires after the name and addresses of the NRM. It is important to know the so-called front organisations as well. That is why I ask about organisations, such as publishing houses, theological academies, etc. that are associated with them.

Another part of the interview seeks information on the belief system of the NRM. The institutionally accepted formulation of the belief system¹⁸ and its availability to others, along with other indicators, are the signs from which we can infer the NRMs' level of institutionalisation. Similarly, the existence of

¹⁴ I would like to thank Prof. Eileen Barker and her colleagues in INFORM for helping me develop this structure.

¹⁵ It can also be seen in the Appendix of this study.

¹⁶ C.f. Goswami Mukunda's article (1995), entitled "NRM is Four-Letter Word".

¹⁷ Especially when I quote a question from the interview.

¹⁸ The lack of such a system is as valuable an information as the existence and the content of the formulation.

special and strict dietary and dress rules can expose significant aspects of their life, which will be discussed later.

A section on the history¹⁹ of organisation precedes the inquiry on membership. Membership is usually a sensitive issue for the leaders of NRMs; they can easily refuse to answer. However, from the history of the NRM, we might be able to have a fair guess about the criteria and different levels of the membership, the sanctions for violating the practices and beliefs. It is also important to know whether mixed membership, i.e. simultaneous membership in other denominations is possible. To find out more about the different levels of membership, the following question can be helpful. “Let us suppose, I convert now to your church. How could I become the leader of this church? What stages must I go through? What would be my possibilities if I were a woman?”

The next part seeks information on the structure of the organisation. Special attention is given to the education of children and also to the teaching of the NRM on different moral questions. Here the leaders, as *leaders* of their organisations, will reply to these questions, but our intention is to ask the same questions later in a survey from the individual members of at least a few movements as well.

The final section inquires after the relationship of the NRM and the wider society. Apart from asking the leaders about the general attitude of the host society toward their organisation, it is worth seeking information on their view of the neighboring countries’ attitude. The evaluation of the different post-communist governments can reveal also a lot. Needless to say, that these questions, along with inquiries on legislative measures regulating the country’s religious life – such as the question on Mr. Semjén’s unsuccessful proposal defining what is NOT a religion²⁰ – forcefully invite the leaders to express their views. Each country can easily replace this question with its own legislative proceedings on the issue. It is also important to know the NRMs’ relationship toward other religious organisations. I ask them to list three churches with which they have good and bad relationship, respectively.

The final section also contains attitudinal questions. Before I discuss these questions, I have to deal with a sensitive problem, namely the so-called church-

¹⁹ Prompting words help the leaders summarize the most important aspects of the international and local history of their movements.

²⁰ For a discussion of Mr. Semjén’s proposal see Schanda (2001), especially pp. 280-1, and Török (2003), especially p. 138.

sect typology. I am aware of the difficulties in defining these categories and establishing whether a particular group is a cult, denomination or sect²¹; and I do not want to categorize the Hungarian NRMs accordingly. However, certain aspects of a movement's relationship with the hosting society are related to the church-sect typology. Based on Robbins' (1988) and McGuire's (1997) works, these aspects are the movement's teaching on the exclusive or inclusive nature of salvation²², the group's general attitude to the society – friendly or hostile. Furthermore, these aspects also include the role of religiosity in everyday life – segmented or diffuse²³ –, and finally, whether the movement accepts mass-religiosity or it requires their members to be religious virtuosos²⁴.

If we use the nature of salvation and the group's attitude towards the hosting society as the determining factors of our categorisation, we can decide whether a particular religious group's stance is churchly, cultic, sectarian or denominational, as it is depicted in Table 1.

Table 1: Stances of Religious Communities.

Relationship of Group and Society	Nature of Salvation	
	Exclusive	Inclusive
Positive	Church	Denomination
Negative	Sect	Cult

However, it is useful to “distinguish sectarian, cultic, denominational, and churchly *individual orientations* from the parallel patterns of *collectivity stance*, because several different orientations can occur within the same collectivity”²⁵.

²¹ These difficulties begin with the definition of religion itself. A good discussion of these problems is O'Toole's work (1984, Chapter 2). For a good summary of different typologies see Robbins (1988, Chapter 5) and McGuire (1997, Chapter 5).

²² It is exclusive if a group claims that salvation can be achieved only in and with the group. Inclusive salvation, on the other hand, implies that salvation can be gained not only in the given group but also in others.

²³ Diffuse role of religiosity means that a person's every conscious moment is, or should be, guided by religious norms. On the other hand, segmented religiosity implies that religion plays a guiding role in a person's life only at certain times, mainly at religious services. This is the area where the existence of special dietary and dress rules is revealing.

²⁴ Weber's notion of religious virtuoso (1991, especially Chapter X, and pp. 187-188), i.e. a person striving for perfection and is not satisfied by the normal levels of religiosity, is contrasted here with a minimalist approach.

²⁵ McGuire (1997:153). This categorisation, however, is applicable not only to individuals but also to collectivities.

In this case, our axes of categorisation are the role and emphasis of religiosity, as it is illustrated in Table 2. The questions in the remaining part of the interview intend to probe the above mentioned aspects.

Table 2: Religious Orientations

Religious Role	Religious Emphasis	
	Mass Religiosity	Virtuoso Religiosity
Diffused	Churchly	Sectarian
Segmented	Denominational	Cultic

Any question on money is always sensitive, therefore, I left the inquiry after their budget to the end of the interview. Even if the leaders refused to reply this question, it would not create a hostile or suspicious atmosphere for the rest of the interview. A preliminary discussion and evaluation of whether and to what extent my expectations were realized follows in the next part.

3.3. A Preliminary Apprehension of the Hungarian Results

Nine aspects of the semi-structured interviews can be briefly assessed here, of which the first is the response or 'return rate'. As we recall, the mailed questionnaires resulted a return rate of 30 and 70 percent of response rates in London and Japan, respectively. The 68 interviews conducted in Hungary in 2002, covered about two thirds (63 percent) of the registered churches²⁶ in Hungary. This calculation of the 'response rate' is very conservative, because if we accepted the claim of the Prime Minister's Office²⁷ that at least 25 percent of the 135 registered churches were not functioning, the response rate would be 77 percent. However, based on the lack of any means to communicate with them²⁸ and the fact that they did not receive from anybody the 1 percent of the income tax, which can be channeled to the churches, I considered only 14 churches (10 percent) inoperative. Apart from the inoperative churches, 13

²⁶ The requirements of registration are rather formal. According to Act IV/1990, sections 8-9, a "church has to be founded by 100 private individuals, has to have a charter ... and elected organs of administration and representation. The founders have to submit a declaration whereby the organisation they have set up has a religious character and its activities comply with the Constitution and the Law" (Schanda 2002:19).

²⁷ This office is responsible for the distribution of state budget assigned to the churches.

²⁸ A second letter was sent to those groups, which did not respond to the first letter asking for an interview. Finally, we tried to reach them by phone and/or email if these communication devices were available.

other organisations were, for all practical purposes²⁹, nonexistent. In addition to the 68 registered churches, I interviewed the leaders of 4 non-registered churches as well³⁰. It can be concluded that with this method we can achieve a fairly good result³¹. Comparing the Hungarian interview to the questionnaire of INFORM, we can state that the covered areas are basically the same. However, the Hungarian research examined them more deeply, not only through the more detailed questions, but also through the added information provided by the leaders during the interview. Several more aspects of the semi-structured interviews would further demonstrate the usefulness of this method.

As it was noted, both in the letter asking the leaders to participate in the research and the protocol of the interview emphasized the researchers' intent to listen to the leaders. Such an openness of the interviewer resulted in a much deeper understanding of the particular topic than what the answers to either a closed or an open ended question would have allowed in a mailed questionnaire. Nevertheless, the closed questions in the semi-structured interviews provided a good base around which the leaders' additional information could be arranged.

The purpose of taping the interviews was twofold. First of all, it guaranteed the preservation of all the information said by the leaders. It would also serve the researcher as evidence in disputed issues, provided the leaders approve of the recording. Only in four cases was our request for recording denied. In these instances the signing of the sheets of the semi-structured interview served as proof of the leaders' testimony. The procedure of one of the NRMs should also be mentioned here. The leader of this particular group invited their lawyer to the interview. At first, the presence of the legal expert created some tension on the part of both the researcher and the interviewee, but the end of the interview witnessed mutual respect and cooperation.

The inquiry after organisations related to a particular NRM brought up a certain difficulty (Q8³²). As it is known to scholars, some of the NRMs

²⁹ These churches were duplicates or part of other churches.

³⁰ The non-registered churches were the Family, Sri Chimnoy, Ananda Marga, and Menora, a Messianic Jewish group. Several other groups, listed by a cult-watching organisation – *Apológia* – indicated that they do not consider themselves religious organisations.

³¹ It is at least as good as what the Japanese RIRC reportedly achieved through its mailed questionnaires. However, as it was noted earlier, no information was available on the research of RIRC.

³² For easier reference, I numbered the questions of the interview, which can be seen in the Appendix.

establish so-called front organisations, which might serve as a cover for the real nature of the group. From the point of view of presenting these organisations, problems surface when a publishing house, rehabilitation center, foundation, association, etc. are registered and/or function independently from the NRM. Although the researcher might be aware of the existence of these organisations, the leader of the NRM does not mention them, because officially or formally they are not associated with the movement. The semi-structured interview, especially when it is conducted at the headquarters of the NRM³³, has definitely an advantage over mailed surveys, because the interviewer can raise the issue and clarify it.

Questions with regard to the belief system of a NRM (Qs16-18) also brought up a phenomenon, to which not much attention has been paid so far. In Hungary, about one third of the interviewed churches do not have any officially recognized belief system. This can certainly contribute to the relatively short existence of many of the NRMs³⁴.

As I noticed during the presentation of the semi-structured interview, the membership of a particular movement can be so sensitive that leaders might avoid reporting it. However, after discussing the history of the NRM, the criteria and different levels of the membership, the sanctions for violating the practices and beliefs, most of the leaders considered it inconsistent³⁵ and contradictory to refuse to answer this question. However, it must be noted, again in favor of the semi-structured interview over a mailed questionnaire, that the presence of the interviewer facilitated the provision of information on membership. In two cases, where for technical reasons³⁶ the leaders filled out the sheets of the interview, they did not report the number of their members. At the same time, it seemed prudent to include a question on the possibility of simultaneous membership (Q37) as almost two thirds of the interviewed leaders reported such a possibility. Similarly to the question of membership, the

³³ In several cases the offices of the front organisations are located on the premises of the headquarters. It happened several times, that the leaders provided me with a guided tour, during which I noticed these other offices.

³⁴ In Barker and Mayer's words, we can "hope only to understand more about religions that do survive to change if we have a greater understanding about those that do not survive to change" (1995:162). See also Stark (1996).

³⁵ Especially during the discussion of the history of the church, many of the leaders already mentioned the magnitude of the membership.

³⁶ My car was stolen, so I could not visit all of the NRMs. In twelve cases, therefore, I had to conduct the interview through email.

magnitude of the yearly budget of the NRMs did not turn out to be as sensitive as I had anticipated. Some of the NRMs even provided me with a copy of their bookkeeping records.

However, the questions of two other areas need further improvement. Unlike expressing their general opinion on the society and its particular institutions, the Hungarian leaders found it somewhat difficult to select churches with which they have good or bad relationship (Qs 89-90). Auxiliary questions must be formulated in order to probe the movements' relationships toward other religious organisations³⁷. Similarly, the attitudinal questions (Q91-98) exploring whether a particular group demonstrates church, sect, cult, or denominational stance or orientation, must be further developed. The question, for instance, whether for the sake of salvation or achieving Nirvana, etc. it would be better for the community to live apart from the rest of the society (Q94), did not have any spread or standard deviation, because all of the leaders dismissed such an idea³⁸.

4. Conclusion

This paper highlighted a rather lasting methodological deficiency in the research of NRMs, the lack of reliable, basic descriptive data. Scientists suggested a long time ago the use of the anthropologists' human relations area files (HRAF) to obtain descriptive data, but because mostly of the researchers' time constraint and the volatility of NRMs, the creation of these files on NRMs seemed rather unlikely. Some scholars tried to resolve this problem by mailing questionnaires to the movements. My proposal, however, is to conduct semi-structured interviews with the leaders of NRMs, where the findings can be later relatively easily supplemented with and controlled by participant observations and other techniques. In fact, the semi-structured interview can cover, although to varying extent, most of the areas of a HRAF, only the talk patterns, material

³⁷ Leaders were more cooperative when I presented the simple request of naming churches with which they have good or bad relationship in a somewhat more humorous way. Unfortunately, the Hungarian expression of *prűszkölni valakire* cannot be properly translated into English. For all practical purpose, I asked them to name churches which show annoyance toward them, or at which they show annoyance or take offence.

³⁸ Let us not forget that most of my interviewees were the leaders of *registered* churches, which, so to speak by definition felt the need to work for and in the society. The encounter with the leader of a more secretive movement might have resulted in an approval of this proposal.

culture, conversion and defection patterns of a NRM must be explored later by other means.

The application of these interviews in the systematic research of Hungarian NRMs in 2002 demonstrated that this method can provide at least as good a response rate as the reportedly best mailed questionnaire survey did. While examining several aspects of the semi-structured interviews, certain deficits of the questions were highlighted, it was also noted that in many of the areas the semi-structured interview can produce better results than mailed questionnaires would.

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Appendix

The letter sent to the leaders of Hungarian NRMs prior to the interview

Dear Leaders,

The Department for the Studies of Religion at the University of Szeged is starting to carry out a systematic research on new religious communities (NRMs). This department, the first and so far the only one in Hungary, is independent of both ecclesiastical organisations and political parties, which is a prerequisite of an objective approach to the study of NRMs. The research was planned during my 2-month stay in INFORM, based at the University of London, which holds what is probably the largest collection of files on NRMs in Europe.

The first stage of our research is a semi-structured interview with the leaders of the NRMs. A semi-structured interview means that while there are preestablished answer-choices – e.g. (a) mostly men, (b) mostly women, (c) equal proportions – it is also possible for the leaders to express their opinion on the topic discussed in more detail. In order to make sure that every word is taken into account, I would like to tape the interview; and a copy will be sent to the interviewee.

The topics to be discussed include the belief system of the organisation, its history, geographic and demographic data, and its relationship to the wider society. The systematic research implies that we do not rely exclusively on these interviews; rather, we intend to triangulate, i.e. to collect and check the information in some NRMs through observation and questionnaire in the second stage of the research.

This research is probably known to most of the NRMs in Hungary. In 1996/7, I conducted similar interviews with the leaders of 48 out of the then 55 registered NRMs. Two publications resulted from that research:

1. "A magyarországi bejegyzett kisebbházak tagságának alakulása 1990 és 1997 között." (Changes in the Membership of the Hungarian Smaller Churches between 1990 and 1997) *Távlatok* 48 (July 2000): 290 – 300.
2. "Egyházszámadás" ("Church – Inventory" – The Churches of Hungarian Youth) *Egyházforum* 12 (1997/2): 60 – 66.

A longer version of the first publication, with a more detailed view of my approach towards NRMs, is also available on the Internet at www.vallastudomany.hu.

Participating in the interview provides the religious organisations with an opportunity to talk for themselves; and they can check what is written about them in the "Directory of NRMs in Hungary", which is to be published as a result of our research. We do not wish to have to rely solely on other sources – sometimes hostile to NRMs – for information.

In the hope of your cooperation we request an appointment of about 1.5 hours in January or February, preferably between 2 p.m. and 8 p.m. on Monday, Tuesday or Wednesday. A self-addressed and prepaid postcard is provided in this letter to facilitate your reply. I also ask you to give a phone number through which I can confirm – or modify if necessary – the date, time and location of the interview.

With best wishes, Yours sincerely,

Péter Török

The interview

Semi-structured interview with the leader(s) of the

.....

italics: instructions to the interviewer
underlined text: read out to the leader(s)

- Protocol:**
(note the following details)
1. Date of interview:
 2. Location of interview:
 3. Time of interview:

Thank the leader(s) for having made possible the interview, then ask:
Would you allow me to tape the interview – just for the sake of being able to check for accuracy – but at the same time I would also take notes. I would send you a copy of the tape.

4. May I ask who is/are present?

Person(s) present:
..... (position)
..... (position)
..... (position)
..... (position)

1. Let us begin with a few simple questions about the name of the church/org.:

5. Hungarian name of the church:

6. English name of the church, if there is one:

(Note by circling this sentence if they try to make the English name up on the spot.)

7. By what other names is the church/org. known?:

None – the following names:
(circle "none" or list the names)

8. What organisations – e.g. theological academy, publishing house, voluntary organisations, etc.) – are associated with the church/org.?

9. International headquarters of the church

Address:

Tel:

Email:

Web-site:

10. Address in Hungary:

Tel:

Email:

Web-site:

(If the department does not have a contact person from the church/org., ask for one.)

Contact person:

11. In which countries is your church/organisation operating?

(Circle the appropriate one, and/or list the countries.)

No other country – worldwide – following countries:

12. Appearance in Hungary (year): *(Specify the “form” of appearance: e.g. missionaries, converted students/workers returning from abroad, registration, etc.)*

13. Where does the Hungarian church/branch send missionaries?

Nowhere – the following countries:

(circle “nowhere” or list the countries)

II. Now, I would like to turn to the belief system of the church/org.

14. What religious tradition(s) are you associated with?

(Hand over Card I. containing the names of different religious traditions. Circle the appropriate one or write in the space provided.)

None

Animism, Buddhism, Christian, Confucianism, Hindu, Islam, Jainism, Judaism, Naturalism, Shinto, Sikhism, Tao, Zoroastrianism,

Other:

15. Does your church/org. refer to sacred texts/written materials, such the Bible or Qu’ran, or your own documents?

No – Yes

If yes, to which one(s)?:

16. Does your church/org. have its own – institutionally accepted – formulation of belief system (its own creed)?

No – Yes

17. If yes, what are its main tenets/distinctive features?

(Use a separate sheet of paper if necessary.)

18. Does the formulation of your belief system exist in printed format or in any other form accessible by or available to others?

No – Yes

19. If yes, would it be possible to get a copy of it?

Received one – not received one.

20. What are the special feast days and dates of celebrations of the church/org.?
(List them.)

21. What type of services and meetings do you hold?
(List them, with their location and time.)

What are the special religious practices of your church/org.?

22. Special rites:

23. Dietary rules:

24. Dress rules:

25. Symbols:

III. Let us turn to the history of your church/org.

26. Is the church/org. an exclusively Hungarian establishment? (This church/org. originates in Hungary.)
Yes – No

27. If “no”, where was the original church/org. established?

28. If it was established “somewhere else”, where and when did the first missionaries come from [to Hungary]?

29. Is there any publication on the history of the church/org.?
Yes – No, if “yes”, name the most important one(s):

30. Is it possible to receive/buy a published work?
Received – Not received.

Even if received, ask about

31. The international and Hungarian “story” of the church/org.:
Hand over Card II.; and mention the following keywords: founder(s), persecutions, allies, missions, organisational work, internal tensions, dates, members, converts, turnovers, children.

IV. I would now ask several general questions about the membership.

32. Does membership in the church have precise criteria?
No – Yes

33. If so, what are these?
(Prompt the leader(s) to tell the official and “unofficial” reasons.)

34. What are the sanctions, if any, when certain beliefs/practices are violated?

Do you have sympathizers, who are not members, but support your church organisation, e.g.

35. Financially

Yes – No – I do not know

36. Morally, e. g. by attending centers, writing to news papers/MPs., etc. (Specify:)

Yes – No – I do not know

37. Is membership in other denominations possible at the same time?

Not – Yes

38. Are there different levels of membership?

As a help, list the following possibilities (lay member, student/novice, monk/nun, teacher, guru, priest, minister, etc.)

No – Yes

39. If yes, what are these, and what are their characteristic duties?

It may help if you ask the following question:

Let us suppose, I convert now to your church/org. How could I become the leader of this church/org.? What stages must I go through? What would be my possibilities if I were a woman?

Membership categories/levels (their main features)

40. What was the total membership of your church/org. in Hungary on January 1, 2002?

Clarify level of membership talking about.

If you have the membership data of the church from 1996/97, note the direction of change; and ask why it was growing/declining?

41. Reasons of growth/decline:

NB difference between birth/death, conversion, leaving

42. What is the age distribution of the membership like?

3. approximately corresponds to that of the Hungarian Society
4. younger
5. older

43. What is the gender distribution of the membership like?

- a. women and men are equally represented
- b. more women
- c. more men

44. Would it be possible to tabulate the members by age-groups, levels and gender?
 Hand over Card III. containing the tables.

Age	Male	Female
< 18		
18-30		
31-45		
46-60		
> 60		

Level	Male	Female

45. Where do you have congregations/communities in Hungary?:
 Name them with the approximate number of members

Budapest:	number of members:
.....:	number of members:
.....:	number of members:
.....:	number of members:

46. What is the proportion of mixed-membership? member

V. A few questions about the organisational structure of the church/org.

47. How is the church/org. built up?
 (Let them explain it; try to draw a chart in the "Notes" section, then ask by choosing the closest one.)

48. So the structure of the church is rather
- Episcopalian (*explain*),
 - Presbyterian (*explain*),
 - Congregationalist (*explain*)

49. What charity work does the church do?
 (Hand over Card IV. listing the different charity works.)

- orphanage
- old age home
- feed homeless

- d. shelter homeless
- e. care for disabled people
- f. alcohol rehabilitation
- g. drug rehabilitation
- h. other, specify:

50. What charity work does the church intend to do in the future?

- i. orphanage
- j. old age home
- k. feed homeless
- l. shelter homeless
- m. care for disabled people
- n. alcohol rehabilitation
- o. drug rehabilitation
- p. other, specify:

Still some questions related to the organisation

51. Are the members' children educated within the organisation?

No – Kindergarten – Elementary school – High school (*circle the appropriate one(s)*)

52. Sunday school or other religious education

Yes – No

Other specify:

53. Do you consider the public education – supplemented by your organisation with the religious education – satisfactory for your children?

Yes – No

54. Does the church intend to establish its own child-care/school system?

Yes – No

(Hand over Card V. containing the following questions.)

What is the teaching of the church/org. on the following issues?

55. How many children should a couple have?

- a. as many as God wants them to have (not even natural method is allowed)
- b. it is completely up to the family, the church/org only condemns abortion and artificial birth control,
- c. it's completely up to the family, the church/org condemns only abortion,
- d. it's completely up to the family, the church/org does not have anything to say about it
- e. other:

56. Based on the teaching of the church, to what extent would you agree with the following statement: The father should be the family's breadwinner, and the mother should stay at home with the children.

1 2 3 4 5
 completely disagree neutral completely agree

Based on the teaching of the church

	Yes	No	No teaching
57. Is pre-marital sexual relationship permitted?			
58. Is sexual relationship outside marriage permitted?			
59. Is partnership/common-law relationship permitted?			
60. Is divorce permitted?			
61. Is homosexuality permitted?			
62. The theory of evolution, developed by Darwin, describes properly the creation of the world.			

VI. And finally, I would like to ask some questions about the relationship of your church/org. and the wider society. I will proceed from the general to the particular.

63. In your opinion, how does the Hungarian society relate to your church? As I said, first I would ask about your general opinion; there will be questions on specific institutions later.

1 2 3 4 5
 Hostile neutral friendly

In your opinion, how do the following societies relate to your church?

1 2 3 4 5
 Hostile neutral friendly (9, not applicable; 0: dk)

Society	1	2	3	4	5	9	0
64. Rumanian							
65. Ukrainian							
66. Slovakian							
67. Czech							
68. Austrian							
69. Croatian							
70. Slovenian							
71. Yugoslavian							
72. American (US)							
73. French							

74. How would you evaluate the Antall government's church-policy?

1 2 3 4 5
bad neutral good

75. What was good – if any – about it?

76. What was bad – if any – about it?

77. How would you evaluate the Horn government's church-policy?

1 2 3 4 5
bad neutral good

78. What was good – if any – about it?

79. What was bad – if any – about it?

80. How would you evaluate the Orban government's church-policy?

1 2 3 4 5
bad neutral good

81. What was good – if any – about it?

82. What was bad – if any – about it?

83. In your opinion, would it have been better if Semjen's proposal defining what is NOT a religion had passed?

1 2 3 4 5
much worse neutral much better

84. Do you agree with the statement that a government should somehow regulate the requirements of establishing a church?

1 2 3 4 5
completely disagree neutral completely agree

85. Has the church/org. ever asked for financial support from the government?

Yes – No

86. Has it ever received any?

Yes – No

87. In your opinion, how does the Hungarian press relate to your church?

1 2 3 4 5
Hostile neutral/objective friendly

88. To what extent do you agree with the statement that the press associated with the socialist – liberal parties presents new religious organisations in a more favorable way?

1 2 3 4 5
completely disagree neutral completely agree

89. What other churches does your church have good relationships with?

Best
Second best
Third best
None

90. What other churches does your church have bad relationships with?

Worst
Second worst
Third worst
None

As the leader(s) of the church/org./community, to what extent do you agree with the following statements?

1 2 3 4 5 9: NA; 0: dk
completely disagree neutral completely agree

Statements	1	2	3	4	5	9	0
91. We, as a church/religious organisation must play down the things that divide us and emphasize those things which make for unity.							
92. There are many roads that lead to Salvation/God/Nirvana/Clear/etc.							
93. Our church/org./community is one of many equally good/valid ways.							
94. For the sake of salvation/becoming clear/achieving Nirvana/etc. it would be better for our community to live apart from the rest of the world, say, on an isolated island.							
95. A church/org. should define the minimum requirements of salvation for those who are less sensitive to spirituality.							
96. Members of our church should restrict their friendships to fellow members.							

97. To what extent do you think that members of your church do in fact restrict their friendships to fellow members.

1 2 3 4 5 9: NA; 0: dk
not at all neutral completely agree

98. Is the members' religious character externally recognizable at their workplaces?

1 2 3 4 5
not at all e neutral completely agree 9: NA; 0: dk

99. I do not want to know the exact amount of your annual budget, but what are its sources? (Not only for the charity work, but in general. As a guideline, mention some possible sources.)

Membership fees percentage
Donations, collections percentage
Publications percentage
Services (specify) percentage
Government subvention percentage
Other percentage
Other percentage

Notes

(– Note here those questions, which will be answered later. Note also the name and phone number/email address of the person who takes responsibility for the answers.
– Draw here the structure of the church.)

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