Marinović Jerolimov, Dinka ; Hazdovac Bajić, Nikolina. Church and welfare state in Croatia // Faith-based organizations and social welfare / Glatzer, Miguel ; Manuel, Paul Christopher (ur.). New York (NY): Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. str. 129-157 doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-44707-6\_7

**Chapter 7**

**Church and Welfare State in Croatia**

Dinka Marinović Jerolimov, *Institute for Social Research, Zagreb,* Zagreb

Nikolina Hazdovac Bajić, *Institute for Social Sciences Ivo Pilar,* Dubrovnik

**Introduction**

The development of the Croatian social welfare system can be traced back to the late 19th century, when Croatia was still part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Vlado Puljiz[[1]](#endnote-1) points out that the first forms of social policy are visible in the education and health systems, as well as in insurance for certain categories of workers. The beginning of insurance for workers was based on the Bismarkian model of social security. Several humanitarian organisations, which were often connected with religious communities, and state social institutions for helping the needy were also established during the 19th century. In the period between the two world wars Croatia’s social welfare system developed further, but the key social laws were enacted after World War II, in the communist period (1945-1990). Workers' Social Security Law was passed in 1946 and it regulated workers’ health care, pension insurance, accident at work, safety at work, social welfare, protection for the unemployed, and assistance to families and children of employees. The social welfare system was focused on securing stable employment, free health care and education, and subsidized housing. Employment was a key access point to social benefits[[2]](#endnote-2) as social policy was concentrated in companies which became a major arena for social security. On the other hand, social care for vulnerable categories (poor, sick, disabled, elderly, children) separated from the labor market was neglected and continuously faced a shortage of funds, despite a limited population of users.[[3]](#endnote-3) This stance of the official state was part of a so-called “social automatism”, according to which socialist development would in the long-term solve all its social problems automatically[[4]](#endnote-4). However, in the 1950s the doctrine of "social automatism" was abandoned. The state acknowledged the existence of social problems and sought to take on some concepts of Western countries in the development of social work. As a result, the school of social work was established as early as 1952 followed by social work centres established in the late 1950s and during the 1960s all over the country[[5]](#endnote-5).

After the fall of Berlin Wall, as in other former communist countries, Croatia experienced a political transition from a one-party, non-democratic system to a multi-party, democratic one, and, in the economy, a transition from a planned, centralized state economy to a market, pluralistic one. Because of the way the former Yugoslavia disintegrated, Croatia suffered war in the early 1990s. Thus, in addition to these two transitions, we can also add a third one: from war to post-war.[[6]](#endnote-6) The crisis-burdened welfare system struggled to cope with the consequences of war[[7]](#endnote-7) (human casualties, material and economic damage, influx of displaced persons and refugees) and hardly managed to respond to the needs of the impoverished population. Additionally, during this time a process of privatization took place. Under the circumstances, it was non-transparent and opened various possibilities for speculative and criminal activities. These further contributed to the failure of the economy and an increase in unemployment. Foreign assistance at the time was mainly of an advisory, professional nature, provided by large international organizations (e.g., the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and EU organizations like the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Central Bank and the European Investment Bank). Among the transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Croatia has undertaken (beside Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, and today’s North Macedonia) the most social-policy reforms[[8]](#endnote-8) proposed by international monetary institutions.

In order to socially protect the most vulnerable citizens, the Croatian government passed a Social Program in 1993 which included a series of measures that were not limited to social assistance and care but extended to other areas of social security, such as employment, child allowance, pension, and disability insurance.[[9]](#endnote-9) The implementation of this program sought to involve all stakeholders interested in social activity—from local communities to specific humanitarian organizations (religious or other, like Caritas and Red Cross) and civic NGOs (international and local)—in order to lessen the burden on the state.

While civic initiatives and NGOs appeared in Croatian urban areas during the 1980s, the first Caritas in Croatia was founded in 1933 in Zagreb.[[10]](#endnote-10) The welfare activity of the Catholic Church in Croatia is provided through Caritas, which played an important role in social and charitable work until the end of World War II, when the communist state forbade any form of social or charitable activities by the Catholic Church. However, Caritas started to operate again in 1967 illegally, but with the tacit approval of the state.

In addition to decentralization and deinstitutionalization, the first peacetime Law on Social Welfare of 1997 opened the possibility of inclusion of private and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the welfare sector.[[11]](#endnote-11) It also reinforced the previously neglected principle of subsidiarity toward lower level organizations, citizens, and their families. Despite this initial effort to decentralise the welfare sector, Croatia has remained highly centralised regarding financing and jurisdiction. With respect to deinstitutionalisation, significant shifts occurred only in the late 2000s and early 2010s (with the beginning of Europeanisation process), while in political terms it began over the last decade with the adoption of the Plan of Deinstitutionalisation and Transformation of Social Welfare Institutions and Other Legal Entities in the Republic of Croatia 2011-2016 (2018) by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare[[12]](#endnote-12). However, in practical terms the system remained fairly institutionalised.

It could be said that a network of different social actors played a significant role in forming the Croatian social welfare system, ranging from supranational organizations (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, European Union, Council of Europe); religious organizations, international NGOs, governmental institutions; local NGOs and associations of citizens; to kinship and extended family structures.[[13]](#endnote-13)

Given this briefly sketched country-specific experience, some argue that Croatia, along with other postcommunist countries, can be classified according to a widened Esping-Andersen typology[[14]](#endnote-14) of welfare states, as a possible new type,[[15]](#endnote-15) the Central/Eastern European model. It has yet to be seen whether this new model will last in these states under different situational circumstances (endogenous and exogenous in nature). On the other hand, the complexity of the individual transitions of postcommunist countries, different legacies, and varying influence of foreign capital and supranational agencies makes it difficult to refer to these countries as belonging to a singular type.[[16]](#endnote-16) Kallunki and Zrinščak[[17]](#endnote-17) see the Croatian welfare regime as strongly influenced by communist heritage, but close to the Continental (Bismarkian) European model. In addition to this, some characteristics of the Southern European model are also noticeable[[18]](#endnote-18). Given this “welfare patchwork”, rough placement of Croatian welfare system in a particular model is not only heuristically ambiguous but also practically problematic[[19]](#endnote-19).

Croatian society can be described as religious, with high levels of religious self-identification and confessional affiliation (majorly and dominantly Catholic). Religion has a strong public presence. However, despite these facts, the religious situation is not as simple and straightforward as it might seem at first glance. As in other societies of Western and Central-Eastern Europe, parallel (sometimes even opposing) processes of different intensities can be observed at different levels of society. These processes include secularization and de-secularization (or post-secularism), differentiation and de-differentiation, privatization and de-privatization, politicization, mediatization, religious pluralization, and so forth. Taking this complex dynamic into account, new theoretical approaches in the sociology of religion try to avoid the pitfall of focusing on a single dimension.[[20]](#endnote-20) The religious situation in Croatia can be largely explained by employing these theoretical ideas and concepts.

Our aim in this chapter is to provide insight into the role and function of church-based organizations in the welfare system in Croatia, taking into account both communist and post-communist social and legal contexts.

**Path Development: Church–state Interplay with a Brief Historical and Social Context**

The Catholic Church has played an important role in developing and maintaining the identity of Croats, from the initial process of embracing Christianity in the period from the seventh century to eleventh century and through the long history of obtaining and losing state independence. For a long time, Croatian territory was a part of different empires: Hungarian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman. After World War I, Croatia became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians (in 1929 named the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) from which Croatia separated during World War II to become the short-lived Independent State of Croatia. In 1945 Croatia became part of the new socialist Yugoslavia, which, under communist rule, lasted until the end of 1980s. With the introduction of political pluralism, major social and political changes occurred, including most significantly the process of disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia, which culminated in the aggression of the Yugoslav Army in Croatia in 1991 and later in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Kosovo.

The former socialist Yugoslavia was a country of different nations and different religions, with strong connections among particular nations and religion (predominantly Catholic Slovenes and Croats, Orthodox Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins, and Muslim Bosniaks). The breakdown of socialist Yugoslavia and particularly the war against the independence of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, and later Kosovo strengthened the national-religious link.

*Church–state Relations under Communism*

In Croatia (as a part of the former socialist Yugoslavia), religion and churches carried negative connotations. Although the Constitution defined separation of church and state and guaranteed religious rights and freedom, it defined religion as a private matter, thus making it publicly invisible and socially irrelevant. The 1978 Law on Religious Communities regulated their legal position, but did not cover all needs of religious communities, and certainly did not change the basic position of religion and religious people in one communist state. The Communist Party officially treated religion as a regressive social force, and favored non-religiosity and atheism through conformity patterns culturally transmitted by the educational system. Consequently, an ideological “struggle” against religion and churches was fought in different areas of social life, which inevitably affected church–state relations. As Zrinščak[[21]](#endnote-21) points out, religions and religious people lived in a double reality: one which guaranteed religious freedom and the autonomy of religious communities, and another that favored the non-religious worldview. However, this double reality faced changes that occurred in the course of time, but with different intensity. Roter[[22]](#endnote-22) stresses that the relationship between the state and religion (particularly the Catholic Church) changed from a policy of conflicted opposition to a policy of passive resistance or even pragmatic adaptation, and eventually to a period of cooperation.

Zrinščak[[23]](#endnote-23) describes roughly two phases in church–state relations during communism in former Yugoslavia: the conflictual one implemented after World War II, marked by severe repression against religion, and the cooperative one that lasted from the mid-1960s until the late 1980s. The latter reflected the so-called Vatican Eastern policy after the Second Vatican Council when, finally, in 1966 socialist Yugoslavia and the Holy See established diplomatic relations by signing a Concordat. Nevertheless, despite the fundamentally hostile relation of the state towards religion and the church, the latter did not disappear from people’s lives. They were widespread in traditional forms across all segments of society and remained important components of traditional rural as well as modern urban environments (although less so for the latter). In the context of confessional differences, mostly Catholic Croatia, together with Slovenia, was the most religious part of former socialist Yugoslavia. According to official data from the 1953 Census in Yugoslavia,[[24]](#endnote-24) 32% of the population was Catholic, 41% Orthodox, 12% Muslim, 2% other and undeclared, and 13% had no religion. In Croatia, according to this census, 74% of the population was Catholic, 11% Orthodox, 2% other confessions and undeclared, and 13% had no religion. The Census of 1991[[25]](#endnote-25) revealed that 77% of Croats were Catholic, 11% Orthodox, 1.2% Muslim, 7% others and unknown, and 4% had no religion (figure 6.1). Therefore, even in the communist period, Croatia had a very high level of religious affiliation. Sociological research conducted in Croatia from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s also showed high levels of individual religiosity (for example, in religious beliefs, individual and family religious practices, and sacramental practices), although these were lower than religious affiliation. This clearly demonstrated the population’s cultural identification as (predominantly) Catholic.

[Insert Figure 6.1 about here.]

*Church–state Relations in Postcommunist Croatia*

As in other post-communist countries, the period of transition in Croatia was marked by the transformation of the institutional, industrial, economic, and cultural structures of society, followed by parallel processes of liberalization and democratization leading to large scale political and social change. Within the process of socio-cultural change, religion has occupied an important place. Despite differences, Croatia shares several common features of religious change with most postcommunist Central and Eastern European countries: the interconnection between religion and nation, and between religion and politics, the aspiration of churches to restore the more prominent position they enjoyed in the precommunist period, the increase in number of new religious movements, and the phenomenon of revitalization of religion in general.[[26]](#endnote-26) At the same time, Vrcan[[27]](#endnote-27) has argued that the revitalization of religion in Croatia followed a different path from some western countries, that is, it did not manifest a rise of so-called *religion à la carte* but occurred more within the framework of re-traditionalization, re-totalization, and re-collectivization. At the beginning of the 1990s, the frameworks for these changes were shaped predominantly by the leading right-wing nationalistic party, the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica—HDZ). It included the openness of leading social and political structures toward religion and the church (which especially affected church–state relations); church actions (especially those of the Catholic church) in pre-war, war, and post-war periods; and the accompanying national and religious homogenization. All these factors resulted in change in the position and role of religion and churches in society. Religion and churches entered the public sphere in order to participate in defining relationships at all levels of society and in different areas such as public life, the media and the educational system.

To sum up, the development of church–state relations in Croatia after 1990 partly reflects the circumstances of war and transition, as well as general postcommunist conditions and European dilemmas and conflicts about church and state. Concerning the latter, Zrinščak[[28]](#endnote-28) (2011) argues that church–state relations in postcommunist Europe are not profoundly different from what we can find in Western Europe, with both sharing a number of contested issues and the presence of very different types of relations, from profound separatism to state churches. Following Ferrari,[[29]](#endnote-29) he points to (1) protection of individual rights of religious freedom, (2) the lack of competence of the state on religious matters and the independence of religious faiths, and (3) the “selective” collaboration between states and religious faiths. Having these observations in mind, it is important to analyze the details of each country and to go beyond the three basic models (separation, cooperation and the state church model) in order to obtain the real picture of church–state relations in each country. Selective cooperation also points to the presence of a pyramidal model in many countries. This model includes religious communities with very limited cooperation with the state at the bottom, religious communities with a considerable support from the state in the middle, and sometimes, though not always, churches with maximum collaboration at the top. Examples of the latter include the cases of state churches, the Catholic Church in Concordat countries, and the Orthodox Church in Greece. Croatia fits this pyramidal model. As Zrinščak et al.[[30]](#endnote-30) argue, one can observe some of these characteristics and dilemmas in the wording of the first Croatian Constitution, passed in December 1990.[[31]](#endnote-31) It guarantees to all persons rights and freedoms irrespective of, among other things, religious, political, or other beliefs (article 14); freedom of thought and expression (article 38); freedom of conscience and religion; and the freedom to demonstrate religious or other convictions (article 40). Article 41 is of great interest as it states:

All religious communities shall be equal before the law and clearly separate from the state.

Religious communities shall be free, in compliance with the law, to publicly conduct religious services, open schools, academies or other institutions, and welfare and charitable organizations and to manage them, and they shall enjoy the protection and assistance of the state in their activities.

Although the main constitutional idea is the separation of church and state, at the same time it stresses cooperation (protection and assistance). How this support should be implemented would become one of the contested issues in the subsequent years.

The next important step in building the legal framework concerns the signing of four agreements between the Government of Croatia and the Holy See[[32]](#endnote-32) from 1996 to 1998, namely, On Legal Issues, On Cooperation in the Field of Education and Culture, On Spiritual Care in the Military and Police Forces, and On Economic Issues.[[33]](#endnote-33)

Despite the criticism of some scholars who point to controversies and dilemmas, agreements signed with Croatia are not so different from agreements signed between the Holy See and many other European countries, have similar constitutional principles, and can be broadly included in a group of cooperative countries in Europe.

While the Agreement on Legal Issues provoked some scholarly debates, the Agreement on Economic Issues raised much more public interest. It stipulated that Croatia would restitute the property taken by communist authorities after World War II or would compensate (financially or with other real estate) when restitution is not possible. This provision was based on a 1996 law which guarantees the same for all citizens and all public persons. In addition, the Agreement provides for state support to the church by paying an agreed sum each month from the state budget, by financing educational and other social activities of the church like religious instructions in public schools (analyzed in the next section of the chapter), and by exemption from value-added tax and the profit tax for its main activities.

The position of other religious communities remained unregulated until 2002 when the Croatian Parliament passed the Law on Legal Status of Religious Communities,[[34]](#endnote-34) which extended many, but not all, of the rights granted to the Catholic Church to other religious communities, and subjected them to further regulation. In addition, the Law differentiated between the so-called old religious communities, which have a simple (formal) registration process, and new ones, that is, those founded after the entrance of the law into force, which have a special procedure of registration: five years of existence as a citizens’ association and proof that the respective community has at least 500 members. The law also envisaged the possibility of signing agreements between Croatia and religious communities on mutual interest, which would in fact further regulate rights that churches may enjoy: religious education in public schools, chaplaincy in military and police forces, in health and social institutions, and the financing of churches, etc. However, the unresolved underlying question that would soon create legal conflict was: who defines “mutual interests” and in what ways? After the law was passed, the government soon signed five contracts which covered fourteen mainly traditional religious communities, from the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Islamic Community to different Protestant communities. Some religious communities did not want to sign similar contracts. Nevertheless, the question about other religious communities still remains. Namely, the Government in December 2004 formulated new criteria in the form of governmental *Conclusion*, which specified additional conditions religious communities have to fulfill in order to sign the agreement. The consequences of this Government Conclusion appeared in a lawsuit. Three minor Protestant religious communities registered in Croatia in 2007 sued the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg for discrimination, after being rejected by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia. They won their case in December 2010. The Government of Croatia did not appeal this court decision, with important implications for the state of religious rights, religious freedom, social justice, and the rule of law in Croatia. Later the Government signed contracts with these communities. Today, there are 19 communities in Croatia which have signed contracts of mutual interest with the Government of Croatia.

*The Current Religious Landscape of Croatia*

As already mentioned, the change of position of religion and the church after 1990 followed a considerable increase in declared religiosity. Within the sociology of religion in Croatia, there is a considerable body of empirical research and scientific work concerning the religious situation in postcommunist Croatia that pointed to trends in traditional church religiosity and non-religiosity, to their different dimensions and socio-structural elements, to different attitudes towards religion and church, church–state relations, religious education, alternative religiosity, new religious movements, or religiosity of minor religious communities.[[35]](#endnote-35) These works point to the strong identification with religion and the church which became almost complete in the population, and places Croatia among the countries with the highest level of religiosity in Europe, behind Poland, Romanian Transylvania, Malta, Portugal, Italy, and Ireland.[[36]](#endnote-36) Despite general stability in the religious landscape of Croatia, research has found some change, especially among young people and students, toward less religiosity. According to the 2011[[37]](#endnote-37) Census, 86.28% of the population identified as Catholics, 4.44% as Orthodox, 1.47% as Muslims, 0.78% as other religions, 4.57% as not religious, agnostics, and atheists and 2.46% as not declared and unknown (Figure 6.1).

Recent comparative analysis of quantitative data on religiosity in Croatia from the European Values Studies of 1999, 2008, and 2018[[38]](#endnote-38) shows trends in church and individual religiosity among the Croatian population (Figure 6.2). Nikodem and Zrinščak observe a slight decrease of church religiosity, particularly in relation to church attendance and in attitudes toward the public role of the Catholic Church, but they find personal religiosity relatively stable. Nevertheless, a slight decrease of 8% of declared Catholics is observed in comparison to EVS 1999 and Census 2011 (8%). Considering basic sociodemographic characteristics, the authors confirmed that in Croatia, both personal and church religiosity prevail among women, persons with lower education, persons whose parents have lower education, and persons who live in smaller settlements (rural areas and small towns). They also confirm the continuation and rise of connection between religiosity and right-wing political orientation.

[Insert Figure 6.2 about here.]

**The Church in the Public Sphere**

The church in the Croatian public sphere is particularly visible in three areas: education, politics (through support for the right nationally conservative political option) and its strong public stance in matters of the so-called cultural wars. After the turbulent changes in social structure during the transition / war period, it can be said that Croatian society was in a kind of anomie.[[39]](#endnote-39) Social consolidation was based on homogenization in national and religious terms. In such circumstances, the newly created political elites based their legitimacy, as well as the legitimacy of the new social system, partly on religion, as the historical guardian of traditional values and Croatian national and group identity. Since the church was the only institutional opponent of the communist system, in the changed circumstances it obtained “dividends” on that position.[[40]](#endnote-40) Thus, the historical link between religion and nationalism led not only to the revitalization of religion, but also to the strong mobilization of the religious symbolic repository for political purposes[[41]](#endnote-41) (“God and Croats”), that is, to sacralization of the nation and the nationalization of religion.[[42]](#endnote-42) In other words, due to specific historical and transitional circumstances, religion in Croatia has acquired a distinctive political dimension and is tied to specific political views.

The church’s presence in the educational system dates back to 1990 when the first proposal for implementation of confessional religious education in public schools appeared. In the school year 1991/1992, this initiative came to life: confessional religious education was implemented in all public schools as an optional subject (with no alternative in elementary schools). The legal framework for regulating the implementation of religious instruction in schools was adopted much later by signing the Treaty between the Holy See and the Republic of Croatia on cooperation in the field of education, on the basis of which the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Bishops Conference on Catholic religious education in public schools and religious education in public preschools was concluded in 1999.[[43]](#endnote-43) The introduction of confessional religious education was controversial from the beginning. Part of the public believed that because of the rootedness of the Catholic religious tradition in the Croatian national heritage and the need to know that heritage (especially after a period in which it was suppressed for ideological reasons), it was important to introduce confessional religious instruction. On the other hand, opponents advocated the introduction of a confessionally neutral religious culture, warning about the possible instrumentalization and politicization of the religion and influence on the secular nature of the school.[[44]](#endnote-44) In addition to this, the potentially discriminatory nature of confessional religious education toward those students who did not attend it was also discussed.[[45]](#endnote-45) Public debates about religious education were conducted from the very beginning, but as the political decision-making process was fast-paced, the public was left feeling that the decision was politically pre-ordained and that the quickly organized public discussion was merely window-dressing.[[46]](#endnote-46)

Lately, the “visibility” of the Catholic Church in the Croatian public sphere has become much more recognized through its connection with a network of interconnected non-governmental organizations. These organisations appeared during the early 2010s. As their main focus is on preserving the traditional family, they advocate for a decrease of secular influence on it, and oppose „gender ideology“ and sexual and reproductive rights. Public activism of these organisations was recognized in different countries across Europe as a new social movement [[47]](#endnote-47). The church’s support towards them is not open and straightforward, but more subtle and most evident through tight connections between the leaders of the movement and the Catholic Church, as well as occasional public announcements of the clergy supporting different movement goals and providing them with grassroots logistics. Connections between the church and strongly voiced activism in the civic field allowed “NGOization” of religious actors, secularization of their discourse (often using uncharacteristic human rights and freedom of choice discourse), and reaffirmation in the public space in a new light, indicating that religion can serve as a broad platform for opposition to new social values based on relativism, individualism, and secularism.[[48]](#endnote-48) These processes often intersect with issues related to nationalism, defense of national sovereignty, and a call for a return to traditional conservative family values. The movement in Croatia has been successful in legally blocking same-sex marriage, strongly campaigning against sex-education programs in public schools and abortion rights, as well as overall involvement in all matters concerning education.However, without the church’s support, it was not as successful in blocking the ratification of the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention. Strongly positioning itself as a “value-guardian,”[[49]](#endnote-49) the church in Croatia is very visible and vocal regarding issues connected with the culture wars. It is thus a counter example to the concept of “strategic silence” proposed by the editors of this volume, according to which the church deliberately chooses not to voice its own views on these issues with the intention of moving away from ideologically divisive questions in order to be able to devote itself to its core spiritual activity and evangelization.[[50]](#endnote-50)

**The Church as a Welfare Provider**

Due to the crisis of the welfare state that has been theorized about in the academic literature during the last two decades,[[51]](#endnote-51) scholars have (re)directed their interest toward the rise and activities of new social actors in the field, especially toward religious organizations.[[52]](#endnote-52) In Croatia, however, theoretical or empirical work on the role and meaning of religious organizations in the welfare arena is scarce[[53]](#endnote-53) and quite recent. On the other hand, several papers deal with the charitable work of the Catholic Church in Croatia during the first half of the twentieth century.[[54]](#endnote-54)

Croatian Caritas, the main organization through which church’s welfare activities are provided, is the official body of the Croatian Bishop’s Conference. It is organized at two levels: through 17 diocesan[[55]](#endnote-55) Caritas branches and at the level of parishes. Diocesan organizations vary in size and services provided, with the biggest one being in Zagreb, capital of Croatia. They provide different services: family counselling, soup kitchens, shelters for the homeless, assistance to victims of domestic violence, assistance and accommodation for persons with intellectual disabilities, homes for children without parental care, hospices, homes for elderly, and so on. On the other hand, the church’s charitable activities at the level of parishes take place within the local communities and establish direct contact with the needy. This type of charitable work relies on volunteer work. Although it is mainly focused on collecting and distributing assistance, it also includes intermediation between those in need and different types of institutions and public services.[[56]](#endnote-56)

It is important to note that the formative period of the institutional welfare system in Croatia happened under the strong influence of anti-religious ideology during which the secular state imposed itself as the primary care-taker, a position previously taken by the church. After the collapse of communism, the possibility of the church’s reactivation in this field was opened. The church was expected to assume certain services (at least partly), thus easing an overburdened state system. The questions that arise are to what extent is the church willing to take such a role, what are the effects of its involvement and what are the expectations of different actors? Zrinščak[[57]](#endnote-57) claims that the state and the church have different ideas about what the position of each actor should be and that this situation creates church–state tensions. Namely, the church wants to take on only a limited role since charitable deeds complement and reflect its central mission. Hence, it seeks to position itself as an additional or auxiliary actor in the welfare sector which would complement services that are not at all or not sufficiently provided by the state. In this way, Caritas organizes different services that exist alongside public ones or steps in where services are absent. On the other hand, if the church became more active, it would ease the burden on the state. The central issue here concerns financing. While the services provided by the state are fully funded, those delivered by the church are only partially financed by the state, in the amount decided by the authorities. The part funded by the state depends mainly on the number of service users (although often the number of users in practice exceeds formal records). Kallunki and Zrinščak claim that different standpoints on this issue between secular and religious services providers on this issue are evident.[[58]](#endnote-58) From the religious point of view, this is a somewhat unfair situation, but the other side believes that the church should invest more of its own resources.

However, the dispute is not only about finances but touches upon a broader social context. There is still a strongly held idea, retained as a legacy of communism, that the public sector should be able to solve problems on its own. This line of reasoning relates to the latent distrust of NGOs, religious as well as non-religious, although their involvement is manifestly encouraged.[[59]](#endnote-59)

Although there are some divergences in opinions and occasional covert distrust, empirical data indicate that in practice there is strong cooperation between state and religious welfare services providers. Kallunki and Zrinščak[[60]](#endnote-60) found that there is a strong network of formal and informal contacts between state institutions (social work centers) and Caritas. In some cases, these contacts also include the illegal exchange of information between actors with the aim of helping beneficiaries. It seems that through formal and informal connections, public servants often shift or redirect a number of users to church-provided services, thus creating a network of interdependence between the state and non-state welfare system.

Another important aspect of the church’s charitable work during the last few years includes help to refugees, most from the Middle Eastern countries, during their passage along the East Mediterranean and Balkan route, as well as assistance to asylum seekers and migrants after the closing of the corridor in 2016. Besides Caritas, other national and international religious communities and organizations were also involved in humanitarian help to the refugees and asylum-seekers, including the Islamic community, Baptist community, Jesuit Refugee Center, Protestant Evangelical Alliance, Christian Humanitarian Aid Organization (Remar), Samaritan's Purse, Nazarene Compassionate Ministries, and Protestant Evangelical Alliance.[[61]](#endnote-61) Particularly engaged, and strongly supported by the government of Croatia, was the Islamic community, because of perceived cultural connections among the groups. A pilot study of their involvement in children’s education[[62]](#endnote-62) revealed that, besides providing general humanitarian support, the Islamic community was and still is actively involved in the process of acculturation of asylum-seeking persons and particularly their children through the educational system. Within the Islamic Center in Zagreb, there is a kindergarten and Islamic high school, while in public schools in Croatia, the Islamic community, according to the Agreement about mutual interest, organizes Islamic education for Muslim children. Besides educating children about Islam in preschool, elementary school, and high school, Islamic education focuses on intercultural education as well, in order to help children in successful acculturation to Croatian society.

At the outset of the 2015 crisis, the Catholic Church in Croatia stated that it was ready to provide assistance to refugees and together with five other religious communities (the Orthodox Church, Protestant-Evangelical Council, the Islamic community, and two Jewish communities) signed an appeal for assistance to refugees. In their appeal, they emphasized that it was the duty of every person to accept refugees and to assist them “until they feel that they have the right to work and to live a decent life.”[[63]](#endnote-63) Religious representatives in the Appeal recalled the war in Croatia and the similar hardships Croatians experienced. They called on believers in particular to reflect and act in a spirit of a culture of cordiality, compassion, brotherhood, and solidarity. The appeal stressed that the religious communities—in cooperation with the Croatian authorities, civil associations, and international organizations—would make all their disposable capacities available to the needs of refugees. After the crisis moved to Croatian territory, the Commission of Croatia’s Bishops Conference *Justitia et pax* issued a statement[[64]](#endnote-64) in which the emphasis was on the legal aspect of the refugee situation. The statement was partly addressed to the state, as a reminder of its international obligations, and partly to believers as a call for help. The Croatian Bishops Conference further declared that it was ready to cooperate with the competent authorities, governmental bodies, other churches and religious communities, and humanitarian organizations in order to help refugees.

As these two documents reveal, the Catholic Church, emphasizing its willingness to help by referring to other actors involved, stresses that it is only willing to take on a limited role. Giordan and Zrinščak, in their comparative study of the Catholic Church’s discourse on the refugee crisis in Croatia and Italy, found that although the initial reaction of the Catholic Church in Croatia to the refugee crisis emphasized charitable activities and support, they later used a more general and diffuse discourse of human rights, which gradually slipped to more neutral and security-oriented tones.[[65]](#endnote-65) The authors concluded that Catholic Church in Croatia remained a silent public actor during the refugee crisis without much substantial public involvement, more oriented towards charitable activities (and in this took positions not that different from those of the Islam and the Baptist communities).

On the other hand, during the crisis Caritas workers and volunteers were involved in the distribution of essentials and in psychosocial assistance. After the corridor’s closure, Caritas withdrew from active participation in field assistance but remained ready to help if the need arose. Zrinščak and Župarić-Iljić also stressed the importance of the Jesuit Refugee Center in the post-crisis period when they opened the Center for Integration SOL in a place provided by the local government, where they provide certified language courses, workshops for women and children, and programs of vocational training and professional orientation organized in coordination with the Croatian Employment Bureau.

Beside this charitable involvement, the Catholic Church in Croatia is present in education system, from kindergartens, elementary and high schools, to university and postgraduate programs. In the academic year 2018/2019, there were 12 elementary Catholic schools in Croatia with 1,689 students and 12 high schools with 2,344 students enrolled[[66]](#endnote-66). Croatian Catholic University was founded in 2006 in Zagreb. Its first academic year began in 2010 when the first students of history were enrolled. Today there are five programs of study consisting of history, sociology, psychology, communication and nursing. The university obtained a license from the Agency for Science and Higher Education in 2015 to conduct scientific activities in the field of biomedicine and health, indicating that it will start the study of medicine. There are 40 full-time students enrolled per study program annually. In the school year 2018/2019 there were 1,235 students enrolled in the Catholic University[[67]](#endnote-67). During the ceremony of the blessing of the university’s building, Croatian Archbishop Msgr. Bozanić said: “The starting point for the founding of this university is the Church’s effort, in accordance with its mission, to help the Croatian higher education system and to channel its possibilities into a social space that it considers to be extremely important today, which could not be done in recent decades. We are aware that the Church and the Gospel have something to say in university life as well”[[68]](#endnote-68). During the same event, State Secretary of the Holy See, Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone, emphasized the importance of the “Church's mission to inform and form responsible and mature individuals, aware of their identity and evangelical mission, ready to assume leadership roles in various areas of society” especially in “cultural settings which were until recently under the rule of communist and atheist ideologies”[[69]](#endnote-69).

Although very close to role of the church in society and traditionally associated with it, involvement with welfare services and charitable work is not church’s core mission. In Croatian society this involvement is limited, sporadic, unevenly distributed, and not well recognized by the public. On the other hand, the focus of the Catholic Church in Croatia on national and ethical topics directs its attention toward education policies and institutions. In other words, it seems that the Church in Croatia finds it important to be involved in education of young people who will promote its mission in different areas of social life. Eventual results of this approach can be noticed, for example, in exercising the right to an abortion which, although legal, is unattainable in some medical institutions as a result of doctors’ call of conscience[[70]](#endnote-70).

**Effects**

Although there are no official data, the Catholic Church is able to reach a significant number of users through the network of diocesan and parish Caritas. Caritas is a convenient “complement” to public institutions, because positive civil regulations are often an obstacle to and immediate *ad hoc* help. In other words, assistance in Caritas is provided in quite an informal manner and, unlike the strictly prescribed procedures that must be followed at state social care institutions, it can be obtained the same day it is requested. The (partly) informal nature of its activities causes problems in calculating the reach and the effects of such activism. There is no church institution in Croatia whose task is to collect, analyze, and distribute data about the Church’s charitable work. Also, some parishes do not have any records about their activities in this regard. But, Jelena Lončar,[[71]](#endnote-71)director of Croatian Caritas, states that Caritas family counseling centers have about 3000 beneficiaries a year, that six homeless shelters house about 100 homeless people a year, soup kitchens prepare about 3000 meals a day, and through the Domestic Violence Assistance Program, 200 people are helped daily. The church also takes care of 300 people with intellectual disabilities a day, more than 100 children without parental care, and houses about 420 people in homes for the elderly, disabled, and sick. The hospice receives more than 100 people annually. In addition to this, Caritas organizes a wide range of fundraising activities, projects, and assistance for financially vulnerable families and children.

While Caritas offers several different types of assistance and services to the needy, the numbers of beneficiaries is quite modest. As the share of church-owned institutions in the education sector and in institutions for the care of the elderly and children without parental care is less than 5%,[[72]](#endnote-72) we can conclude that Church’s overall role in welfare system is limited.

The principles of solidarity and subsidiarity, by their very nature, represent some of the fundamental principles embedded in Catholic social teachings, and are the basis for the organization and functioning of church, as well as public, charitable organizations. It remains to be seen whether these principles can have a stronger integrative and cohesive role in contemporary Croatian society with greater involvement of the church in the needs of the modern welfare state.

**Public Perceptions of the Church and Its Social Involvement in the Public Sphere**

Social perceptions and expectations of religion in the public sphere reflect the overall social climate in a country and have been measured in various surveys of public opinion. Nikodem[[73]](#endnote-73) pointed to decreased trust in the Catholic Church as an institution, decreased trust in its public role, and an increase in a general negative perception of the Catholic Church as a “rich” institution interested in power and material wealth. His analysis of comparative quantitative data from Aufbruch research in 1997 and in 2007 showed an increase in the number of people who think that Catholic Church in Croatia is rich (from 42% in 1997 to 58% in 2007), is primarily interested in power on earth (from 28% in 1997 to 38% in 2007), and is a natural ally of the rich and powerful (from 11% in 1997 to 24% in 2007).

In another already mentioned comparative analysis of the European Value Survey of 1999, 2008, and 2018, Nikodem and Zrinščak[[74]](#endnote-74) confirm this change in perception concerning the public role of religion among the Croatian population. They find a trend of decreased trust in the church as an institution (from 63% in 1999 to only 38% in 2018), along with increased distrust (from 5% in 1999 to 21% in 2018). The decrease in positive perception of the public role of the church continues. While in 1999, 52% of Croatian citizens said that the Catholic Church adequately responds to the moral problems and needs of individuals, in 2018 only 29% of them answered positively. They gave almost similar answers concerning the church’s response to problems in family life. Although most respondents answered that the church does not adequately respond to social problems in Croatia today, there is an increase in positive attitudes (from 25% in 2008 to 35% in 2018).

In his analysis of religiosity and social expectations in Central and Eastern Europe, based on quantitative data from European Value Study 1999 and Aufbruch 2007, Ančić[[75]](#endnote-75) showed that in postcommunist countries social, expectations of the socio-cultural role of religion are higher than those of its socio-political role. Specifically, between 71% and 81% of respondents do not agree that religion should exert an influence on politics (for instance on how people vote, or to influence government).

Clearly, most of the Catholic population in Croatia is rather critical towards the Catholic Church, especially toward its public role. This is not a surprise, given some of the Catholic Church’s public statements over the past 30 years in Croatia. For instance, many highly ranked representatives of the church hierarchy refer to the past in general, and to the communist past in particular, as if the church were still “under siege,” anticommunism being a common trope. This is present in other postcommunist countries as well. Several scholars argue that the church was unprepared to function in the new democratic system, stuck in the past trying to restore the time before communism, but also burdened by its position during communism.[[76]](#endnote-76) Davie[[77]](#endnote-77) also argued that churches in Europe should not stick to the past, because the key to their survival is to adapt to the social changes of late modernity.

**Concluding Remarks**

The Croatian welfare system today faces many challenges: severe structural and institutional problems that are the consequence of crisis and poor management, politicization of social issues and their instrumentalization for political gain, decisions made *ad hoc*, pressure due to citizens’ needs and depopulation. Although the welfare state crisis and the latest democratic processes call for stronger engagement of non-profit organizations in the field of health and social care and seek alternatives to existing models of the management of public affairs, it is unlikely that the Catholic Church in Croatia will be able or willing to take over a larger share of state social services.

The welfare role of the Church is only one aspect of its strong public presence. However, the decision to be more vocal about issues in the cultural wars and implying political opinions is met with criticism from citizens and believers. This also causes its charitable activities, despite being limited, to be disregarded and ignored. On the other hand, in practical terms, it can be expected that through the networks of formal and informal connections between public and religious social services, consolidation of existing partnerships and the formation of new ones will take place. . Furthermore, the position of the Catholic Church in Croatia as a “guardian of values” and its focus on ethical issues finds its expression not only through cooperation with “church’s NGOs”, but also through its involvement in the educational system, both through its efforts to influence state education policies and through developing its own educational institutions. Although this involvement can be seen as part of a broader strategic plan to influence decision-making processes and (secular) ethical system from within, welfare involvement of religious actors is only one aspect of the multidimensional and complex dynamics of religion in contemporary Croatian society, which manifests itself in various (and sometimes contrary) trends at different levels of society. This multidimensionality shares certain similarities but also differences with processes that are observed in other Western and Central-Eastern European countries.[[78]](#endnote-78) Therefore, instead of trying to establish linear comprehensive theoretical frames, it is generally best to nest the long-term process of articulating, defining, and redefining the relationship between religion and the state within a specific social context.

1. Vlado Puljiz, “Socijalna politika Hrvatske”, in *Socijalna politika Hrvatske*, eds. G. Bežovan, V. Puljiz, Z. Šućur, Z. Babić, I. Dobrotić, T. Matković, S. Zrinščak, 1-53 (Zagreb: Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 2019). [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. **Notes**

 Bob Deacon, “Eastern European Welfare States: The Impact of the Politics of Globalization,” *Journal of European Social Policy* 10 (2000): 146–61. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Zoran Šućur, “Razvoj socijalne pomoći i socijalne skrbi u Hrvatskoj nakon Drugoga svjetskog rata,” *Revija za socijalnu politiku* 10, no.1 (2003): 1–22. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Vlado Puljiz, “Socijalna politika Hrvatske”, in Socijalna politika Hrvatske, eds. G. Bežovan, V. Puljiz, Z. Šućur, Z. Babić, I. Dobrotić, T. Matković, S. Zrinščak, 19 (Zagreb: Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 2019). [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Vlado Puljiz, “Socijalna politika Hrvatske”, in Socijalna politika Hrvatske, eds. G. Bežovan, V. Puljiz, Z. Šućur, Z. Babić, I. Dobrotić, T. Matković, S. Zrinščak, 21 (Zagreb: Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 2019). [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Vesna Bošnjak, Jadranka Mimica, Vlado Puljiz, Tanja Radočaj, Paul Stubbs, and Siniša Zrinščak, *Social Policies and Welfare in Croatia* (Zagreb: UNICEF, 2002). [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. More than half of Croatian territory was directly affected by war, over a quarter was occupied, 13,583 persons were killed or missing, and 37,180 were injured. In December 1991, there were approximately 550,000 displaced persons and refugees in Croatia, with more than 150,000 refugees abroad. According to data from the State Audit Office for War Damage Inventory and Assessment, direct war damage in Croatia amounted to over $20 billion USD (Marijan Perković and Vlado Puljiz, “Ratne štete, izdaci za branitelje, žrtve i stradalnike rata u Republici Hrvatskoj,” *Revija za socijalnu politiku* 8, no. 2 (2001): 235–38). [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Deacon*, Eastern European Welfare States*, 2000, 150. Deacon also mentions that Croatia, beside Hungary and Poland, is the only state that reacted reacted to the World Bank’s pension reform strategy that includes an individually accounted, non-solidaristic second privately managed tier and possible voluntary third private tier. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Šućur, “Razvoj socijalne pomoći i socijalne skrbi u Hrvatskoj,” 17. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Stjepan Baloban, “Karitativni rad Katoličke Crkve kao ishodište socijalnog rada u Hrvatskoj,” *Revija za socijalnu politiku* 12, no. 3–4 (2005): 275–83. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. According to the new law, social welfare homes and centers for assistance and care can be established, apart from the Republic of Croatia, also by local self-government units, religious organizations, and other domestic or foreign legal and physical entities (Šućur, “Razvoj socijalne pomoći i socijalne skrbi u Hrvatskoj,” 19.) [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Plan deinstitucionalizacije i transformacije domova socijalne skrbi i drugih pravnih (Plan of Deinstitutionalisation and Transformation of Social Welfare Institutions and Other Legal Entities in the Republic of Croatia 2011-2016 (2018), *Narodne novine*, 36, 2011 (also available at <https://mdomsp.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/arhiva/files/47360/plan_DEINSTITUCIJALIZACIJE.pdf> ). [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Bošnjak et al., *Social Policies and Welfare in Croatia*, 5–6. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Deacon, *Eastern European Welfare States*, 2000; Miroslav Beblavý; “New Welfare State Models Based on the New Member States’ Experience?” *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2008, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2403764; Vladimir Rys, “Transition Countries of Central Europe Entering the European Union: Some Social Protection Issues,” *International Social Security Review* 52, no. 2–3 (2001): 177–89. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Menno Fenger, “Welfare Regimes in Central and Eastern Europe: Incorporating Post-Communist Countries in a Welfare Regime Typology,” paper presented at the NIG Conference, Nijmegen, 2005. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Valdemar Kallunki and Siniša Zrinščak, “Interdependence and Competition between the Religious and the Secular: the Welfare Role of the Church in Croatia and in Finland,” *Journal of Contemporary Religion* (forthcoming). [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Maurizio Ferrera, “The 'Southern Model' of Welfare in Social Europe,” *Journal of European Social Policy* 6, no. 1 (1996): 17-37. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Paul Stubbs and Siniša Zrinščak, “Reforming Welfare Assemblages in Semi-Peripheral Spaces: Understanding ‘Drivers of Inertia’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia,” in *Social Policy, Poverty, and Inequality in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, eds. Sofiya An, Tatiana Chubarova, Bob Deacon, Paul Stubbs, 285-305 (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2019). [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. These theoretical approaches include for instance religious-secular competition theory: Jörg Stolz, Judith Könemann, Mallorie Schneuwly Purdie, Thomas Englberger, and Michael Krüggeler, *(Un)believing in Modern Society: Religion, Spirituality, and Religious-Secular Competition* (London: Routledge, 2016); religious complexity concept: Inger Furseth, ed., *Religious Complexity in the Public Sphere* (New York: Palgrave, 2018); concept of collective religions: Slavica Jakelić, *Collectivistic Religions: Religion, Choice, and Identity in Late Modernity* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010); concept of muted vibrancy: Paul Christopher Manuel and Miguel Glatzer, eds., *Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare* (New York: Palgrave, 2019). [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Siniša Zrinščak, Dinka Marinović Jerolimov, Branko Ančić, and Ankica Marinović, “Church and State in Croatia: Legal Framework, Religious Instruction, and Social Expectations,” in *Religion and Politics in Central and South-Eastern Europe: Challenges Since 1989*, ed. S. P. Ramet (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 131–54. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Zdenko Roter, *Katolička cerkev in država v Jugoslaviji 1945*–*1973* (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1976), 311; see also Siniša Zrinščak, “Odnos Crkve i države u Hrvatskoj od 1945. do 1990. godine”, in Religija i sloboda. Religijska situacija u Hrvatskoj 1945–1990, ed. Ivan Grubišić (Split: Institut za primijenjena društvena istraživanja – Centar Split, 1993), 107–25. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Zrinščak, “Odnos Crkve i države u Hrvatskoj od 1945. do 1990. godine,” 112–14. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Nenad Pokos, “Promjene vjerskog sastava stanovništva Hrvatske 1953.- 2001. godine,” paper presented at the *Demografija u Hrvatskoj* conference, Zagreb, 2012.

Zagreb: Ekonomski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 2012. str. 33–34 [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Population census, 1991, https://www.dzs.hr/ [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. Irena Borowik and Gzegorz Babinski, eds., *New Religious Phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe* (Krakow: Nomos, 1997). [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. Srđan Vrcan, “Novi izazovi za suvremenu sociologiju religije. Politizacija religije i religizacija politike u postkomunizmu,” *Revija za sociologiju* 30, no.1–2 (1999): 45–64. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Siniša Zrinščak, “Church, State and Society in Post-communist Europe”, in *Religion and the State. A Comparative Sociology*, eds. Jack Barbalet, Adam Possamai and Bryan S. Turner (London: Anthem Press, 2011), , 159–84. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. Silvio Ferrari, “The European Pattern of Church and State Relations,” *Comparative Law* 20 (2003): 1–24. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Zrinščak, et al., “Church and State in Croatia,” 136. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. “Ustav Republike Hrvatske,” *Narodne novine* 56, no. 9, 1990. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. *Ugovori između Svete Stolice i Republike Hrvatske* (Zagreb: Glas koncila, 2001). [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. Siniša Zrinščak, “Religion and Society in Tension in Croatia: Social and Legal Status of Religious Communities”, in *Regulating Religion. Case Studies from Around the Globe*, ed. James T. Richardson, 299–318 (New York: Kluwer Academic Plenum Publishers, 2004). [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. “Zakon o pravnom položaju vjerskih zajednica,” *Narodne novine* 83, no. 2, 2002. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. Branko Ančić and Tamara Puhovski, *Vjera u obrazovanje i obrazovanje u vjeri* (Zagreb: Forum za slobodu odgoja, 2011); Gordan Črpić and Siniša Zrinščak, “Dinamičnost u stabilnosti: Religioznost u Hrvatskoj 1999. i 2008. godine,” *Društvena istraživanja* 19, no. 1–2 (2010): 3–37; Ankica Marinović and Dinka Marinović Jerolimov, “What about Our Rights? The State and Minority Religious Communities in Croatia: A Case Study, ” *Religion and Society in Central and Eastern Europe* 5, no. 1 (2012): 39–53; Dinka Marinović Jerolimov, “Religious Changes in Croatia: Some Empirical Data from 1972, 1982 and 1999 in the Zagreb Region,” in *Religion and Social Change in Post-Communist Europe*, ed. Irena Borowik and Miklos Miklos (Krakow: Zaklad Wydawniczy Nomos. 2001), 163–80; Dinka Marinović Jerolimov and Nikolina Hazdovac Bajić, “The Atheist Bus Campaign in Croatia: One Day Stand,” in *The Atheist Bus Campaign: Global Manifestations and Responses*, ed. Steven Tomlins and Spencer Culham Bullivant (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2016), 114–38; Dinka Marinović Jerolimov and Ankica Marinović, “Is an Anti-Cult Movement Emerging in Croatia?” in *'Cult Wars' in Historical Perspective. New and Minority Religions*, ed. Eugene Gallagher (New York: Routledge, 2017), 81–92; Srđan Vrcan, *Vjera u vrtlozima tranzicije* (Split: Glas Dalmacije, 2001); Zrinščak et al., “Church and State in Croatia.” [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. Grace Davie, *Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000); Siniša Zrinčšak, Gordan Črpić and Stjepan Kušar, “Vjerovanje i religioznost,” *Bogoslovska smotra* 70 (2000): 233–55. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. Population census, 2011, https://www.dzs.hr/ [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. Krunoslav Nikodem and Siniša Zrinščak, “Između distancirane crkvenosti i intenzivne osobne religioznosti: religijske promjene u hrvatskom društvu od 1999. godine do 2018. godine,” *Društvena istraživanja* (forthcoming). [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. Krunoslav Nikodem, “Religijski identitet u Hrvatskoj. Dimenzije religijskog identiteta i socio-ekološke orijentacije,” *Socijalna ekologija* 13, no. 3–4 (2004), 263; Miklos Tomka, “Secularization or Anomy? Interpreting Religious Change in Communist Societies,” *Social Compass* 38, no.1 (1991): 93–102. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. Silvio Ferrari, “Novo vino i stari mjehovi. Tolerancija, pravo i religija u suvremenoj Europi,” *Društvena istraživanja* 20, no. 6 (1995), 802. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. Srđan Vrcan, “Religija i politika - Simptomatični primjer bivše Jugoslavije devedesetih godina 20. stoljeća,” *Republika* XV (2003): 1–30. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. Ivan Markešić, “Od religijskog do nacionalnog identiteta i natrag (na primjeru Bosne i Hercegovine),” *Društvena istraživanja* 19, no. 3 (2010): 525–46. [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. Ugovor između Vlade Republike Hrvatske i Hrvatske biskupske konferencije o katoličkom vjeronauku u javnim školama i vjerskom odgoju u javnim predškolskim ustanovama, signed on 29th of January, 1999, http://www.nku.hbk.hr/dokumenti/index.html. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. Ankica Marinović Bobinac and Dinka Marinović Jerolimov, “Religijsko obrazovanje u Hrvatskoj,” in *Religion and Pluralismin Education:* *Comparative Approaches in the Western Balkans*, ed. Zorica Kuburić and Christian Moe (Novi Sad: CEIR, 2006), 39–71. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
45. Branko Ančić and Tamara Puhovski, *Vjera u obrazovanje i obrazovanje u vjeri* (Zagreb: Forum za slobodu odgoja, 2011); Nikolina Hazdovac Bajić, *Nereligioznost u Hrvatskoj: Sociološki aspekti organiziranja nereligioznih i ateista* (PhD diss., Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences University of Zagreb, 2017). [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
46. Marinović Bobinac and Marinović Jerolimov, “Religijsko obrazovanje u Hrvatskoj,” 51. [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
47. Roman Kuhar and David Paternotte, eds., *Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe Mobilizing against Equality* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017). [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
48. Kuhar and Paternotte. [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
49. Per Pettersson, “Majority Churches as Agents of European Welfare: A Sociological Approach,” in *Welfare and Religion in 21st Century Europe. Volume 2: Gendered, Religious and Social Change*, ed. Anders Bäckström, Grace Davie, Ninna Edgardh, and Per Pettersson (Farnham, UK; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), 15–59. [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
50. Paul Christopher Manuel and Miguel Glatzer, “'Use Words Only If Necessary': The Strategic Silence of Organized Religion in Contemporary Europe,” in *Faith-Based Organizations and Social Welfare*, ed. Paul Christopher Manuel and Miguel Glatzer (New York: Palgrave, 2019), 1–18, 3. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
51. Francis Castles, *The Future of the Welfare State. Crisis Myth and Crisis Realities* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 2004); Mia Arp Fallov and Cory Blad, eds., *Social Welfare Responses in a Neoliberal Era*, (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2018); Palier, Bruno ed. *A Long Goodbye to Bismarck? The Politics of Welfare Reform in Continental Europe* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010). [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
52. Kees van Kersbergen and Philip Manow, eds., *Religion, Class Coalition and Welfare States* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Lina Molokotos-Liederman, Anders Bäkström, and Grace Davie, eds., *Religion and Welfare in Europe: Gendered and Minority Perspective* (Bristol, UK: Policy Press, 2017). [↑](#endnote-ref-52)
53. Siniša Zrinščak, “Religion, Welfare and Gender: the Post-communist Experience,” in *Religion and Welfare in Europe: Gendered and Minority Perspective*, ed. Lina Molokotos-Liederman, Anders Bäkström and Grace Davie, (Bristol, UK: Policy Press, 2017), 135–60; Kallunki and Zrinščak, “Interdependence and Competition between the Religious and the Secular”; Siniša Zrinščak and Drago Župarić-Iljić, “‘I was a stranger and you welcomed me?’ Religious Actors, Integration and Refugee Rights in Croatia,” paper presented at the ESA biannual conference in Turin, Italy, 2018. [↑](#endnote-ref-53)
54. Stjepan Baloban, “Karitativni rad Katoličke Crkve kao ishodište socijalnog rada u Hrvatskoj,” *Revija za socijalnu politiku* 12, no. 3–4 (2005): 275–83; Stjepan Baloban and Vladimir Dugalić, “Neke oznake solidarnosti u katoličkoj socijalnoj misli u Hrvatskoj 1900.-1945.,” *Bogoslovska smotra* 74, no. 2 (2004): 493–538; Duško Lozina and Mirko Klarić, “Uloga crkvenih karitativnih organizacija na području zdravstvene i socijalne skrbi,” paper presented at Kršćanstvo i zdravlje conference, Split, Croatia, 2005. [↑](#endnote-ref-54)
55. http://www.caritas.hr/index.shtml [↑](#endnote-ref-55)
56. Kallunki and Zrinščak, “Interdependence and Competition between the Religious and the Secular.” [↑](#endnote-ref-56)
57. Zrinščak, “Religion, Welfare and Gender: The Post-communist Experience,” 145. [↑](#endnote-ref-57)
58. Kallunki and Zrinščak, “Interdependence and Competition between the Religious and the Secular.” [↑](#endnote-ref-58)
59. Ann Dill, Siniša Zrinščak, and Joanne Coury. “Nonprofit Leadership Development in the Post-Socialist Context: The Case of Croatia,” *Administration in Social Work* 36, no. 3 (2012): 314–41; Maria Geiger and Siniša Zrinščak, “Overview of the National Situation,” in *Welfare and Values in Europe. Transitions Related to Religion, Minorities and Gender. National Overviews and Case Study Reports. Volume 3. Eastern Europe: Latvia, Poland, Croatia, Romania*, ed. Anders Bäckström (Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala Universitet, 2012), 157–83. [↑](#endnote-ref-59)
60. Kallunki and Zrinščak, “Interdependence and Competition Between the Religious and the Secular.” [↑](#endnote-ref-60)
61. Zrinščak and Župarić-Iljić, “‘I Was a Stranger and You Welcomed Me,” 7. [↑](#endnote-ref-61)
62. This qualitative pilot research (conducted in 2018) focused on NGOs (one of them faith-based) and the Islamic community, particularly their perspectives on integration and acculturation in the early educational system of refugee and asylum-seeking children during and after the migration crises in Croatia (Dinka Marinović Jerolimov and Lana Peternel, “NGOs' Perspectives on Integration of Refugee and Asylum-seeking Children in the Early Educational System in Croatia,” paper presented at *International Conference on Migration, Integration and Religion in Early Childhood Education*,Zagreb, 2018). [↑](#endnote-ref-62)
63. Islamska zajednica u Hrvatskoj, „Apel vjerskih predstavnika u RH za pomoć izbjeglicama,“ available at <https://medzlis-split.org/index.php/aktivnosti/vjesti/160-apel-predstavnika-vjerskih-zajednica-u-rh-za-pomoc-izbjeglicama>. [↑](#endnote-ref-63)
64. Statement by the Croatian Bishop's Conference Commission *Justitia et Pax*, „Izazovi migrantske krize u europskom prostoru“, available at <http://www.hbk.hr/?type=vijest&ID=564>. [↑](#endnote-ref-64)
65. Giuseppe Giordan and Siniša Zrinščak, “One Pope, Two Churches: Refugees, Human Rights and Religion in Croatia and Italy,” *Social compass* 65, no. 1 (2018): 62–78. [↑](#endnote-ref-65)
66. Nacionalni ured za katoličke škole, Hrvatska biskupska konferencija, available at <https://katolicke-skole.hbk.hr/category/skole/>. [↑](#endnote-ref-66)
67. Dana from Croatian Catholic University, available at http://www.unicath.hr/. [↑](#endnote-ref-67)
68. Informativna katolička agencija, „Blagoslov prostorija Hrvatskoga katoličkog sveučilišta“, available at <https://ika.hkm.hr/novosti/blagoslov-prostorija-hrvatskoga-katolickog-sveucilista/>. [↑](#endnote-ref-68)
69. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-69)
70. Siniša Zrinščak, “Zdravstvena politika,” in Socijalna politika Hrvatske, eds. G. Bežovan, V. Puljiz, Z. Šućur, Z. Babić, I. Dobrotić, T. Matković, S. Zrinščak, 1-53 (Zagreb: Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 2019), 185-187. [↑](#endnote-ref-70)
71. Jelena Lončar, “Doprinos Caritasa Zagrebačke nadbiskupije u kontekstu karitativne djelatnosti Crkve u Hrvatskoj danas,” *Bogoslovska smotra* 84, no. 3 (2014): 673 –87. [↑](#endnote-ref-71)
72. Croatian Bureau of Statistics: Education, Social Welfare, 2017, https://www.dzs.hr/. [↑](#endnote-ref-72)
73. Krunoslav Nikodem, “Religija i crkva. Pitanje institucionalne religioznosti u suvremenom hrvatskom društvu,” *Socijalna ekologija* 20, no. 1 (2011): 5–30. [↑](#endnote-ref-73)
74. Nikodem and Zrinščak, “Između distancirane crkvenosti i intenzivne osobne religioznosti.” [↑](#endnote-ref-74)
75. Branko Ančić,“What Do We Want From Religion? Religiosity and Social Expectations in Central and Eastern Europe,” in *Spaces and Borders. Current Research on Religion in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. András Máté-Tóth and Cosima Rughinis (Berlin; Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2011), 151–67. [↑](#endnote-ref-75)
76. Andras Mate-Toth and Pavel Mikluščak, Nije kao med i mlijeko: *Bog nakon komunizma* (Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost, 2001). [↑](#endnote-ref-76)
77. Grace Davie, *Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000). [↑](#endnote-ref-77)
78. Steve Bruce, *Secularization. In Defence of an Unfashionable Theory* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011); Grace Davie, *Religion in Britain: A Consistent Paradox* (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015); Silvio Ferrari and Sabrina Pastorelli, eds., *Religion in Public Spaces. A European Perspective* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012); Inger Furseth, ed., *Religious Complexity in the Public Sphere* (New York: Palgrave, 2018); Slavica Jakelić, *Collectivistic Religions: Religion, Choice, and Identity in Late Modernity* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2010); Gert Pickel, “Contextual secularization. Theoretical thoughts and empirical implications, ” *Religion and Society in Central and Eastern Europe* 4, no. 1 (2011): 3–20; Detlef Pollack, “Modifications in the religious field in Central and Eastern Europe,” *European Societies* 3, no. 2 (2001): 135–165; Detlef Pollack and Gergely Rosta, *Religion and modernity. An international comparison* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Jörg Stolz, Judith Könemann, Mallorie Schneuwly Purdie, Thomas Englberger, and Michael Krüggeler, *(Un)believing in Modern Society: Religion, Spirituality, and Religious-Secular Competition* (London: Routledge, 2016). [↑](#endnote-ref-78)